04 - THE PRACTICAL DIVINITY OF THE PAPISTS

THE PRACTICAL DIVINITY OF THE PAPISTS discovered to be destructive of CHRISTIANITY AND MEN’S SOULS

CONTENTS

Introduction CHAPTER IReal worship of God not necessary in the Church of Rome CHAPTER IIChristian knowledge is not necessary for Romanists by their doctrine CHAPTER IIITheir doctrine makes it needless to love God CHAPTER IVThere is no necessity of saving or justifying faith by the Romish doctrine CHAPTER VThere is no necessity of true repentance for Romanists by their doctrine CHAPTER VITheir doctrine leaves no necessity of holiness of life, and the exercise of Christian virtues CHAPTER VIIMany heinous crimes are virtues, or necessary duties, by the Roman doctrine CHAPTER VIIICrimes exceeding great and many are but slight and venial faults by the Popish Doctrine CHAPTER IXMany enormous crimes are no sins at all in the Roman account CHAPTER XThe Roman doctrine makes good works to be unnecessary The Conclusion Chapter By Chapter Summary

General Index

Scripture Texts

[As this is a polemical treatise, it has been deemed necessary to use more than ordinary care in verifying the numerous quotations. Almost the whole have been so verified, and may be depended upon as absolutely accurate.—Ed.] AN ADVERTISEMENT

I have always thought, since I considered and understood what popery was, that the knowing of it would be a sufficient dissuasive from it, to those that regard God and their souls. This persuasion, together with compassion for those that are seduced, and desire to secure those that are in danger, engaged me in this present undertaking; wherein I have discovered what the practical divinity of that church is, how pernicious, and inconsistent with the way to salvation declared in the Scripture. I have herein the concurrence of some (few in comparison) of that church, who are sensible of such doctrine prevailing amongst them, as they say is absolutely opposite to the rules and spirit of the gospel; such as no man that hath never so little tenderness of his own salvation, but must conceive an horror at;² such as they call a poisonous morality, more corrupt than that of pagans themselves; and which permits Christians to do, what pagans, Jews, Mahometans, and barbarians, would have had in execration;⁴ such as is, in their style, the most palpable darkness that ever came out of the bottomless pit; such as overthrows the essential points of Christian religion, and the maxims that are most important, and of greatest necessity, in order to the salvation of men.⁶ Of this they have given the world notice in several discourses, two of which I have seen (though unhappily not the latter, till I had gone through the greatest part of what I intended). As to the extent of this execrable divinity, they declare, that whole societies would have these extravagancies accounted Roman traditions;⁸ that the church is overgrown with this poisonous morality; that it is ready to be overwhelmed with the deluge of these corruptions; that the church is filled with this most palpable darkness. Elsewhere they seem to fix this charge upon the Jesuits principally, as if they would have it thought not to reach much further; but withal tell us, that the Jesuits are the most numerous and the most powerful body of men in the whole church, and have the disposal of the consciences of all the greatest.¹⁰ So that I can represent them no worse than some of themselves do; and the worst that can be said falls, by their own acknowledgment, upon the most considerable part of their church. That they should so far accuse the whole, cannot be expected (whatever occasion there be for it), so long as they think fit to continue in its communion. But then, if we regard those who are so great a part of the church upon the account of their numbers, and more in respect of their authority and influence, the maxims so branded, are Roman traditions,² the true doctrine of faith, the true morality of the church, not asserted by that society alone, but equally (if not more) by Catholic writers of all sorts; and those that quarrel thereat are factious spirits. Hereby, so far as the testimony of adversaries against themselves can clear a matter in question, there is evidence, both that the practical doctrine amongst them is pernicious and damnable, and also that it is common and generally followed.

I intend not here to impeach any maxim peculiar to the Jesuits, but that doctrine of the Romanists which is far more extensive, delivered by canonists and divines, secular and regular, of every sort, and in part by the canon law and their councils (who sometimes glance at this subject, though they make it not their business); that which in most particulars, and those of greatest moment, is ancienter than the Society; and in many points such, as the censurers of the Jesuits’ morality do not touch, but either approve themselves, or dare not condemn, lest they should involve the whole church in the condemnation. I cannot discern that the practical divinity of the Jesuits is more corrupt than that of other Romish writers, their contemporaries; and those that view the moral discourses of both, and compare them, will (if I much mistake not) discern no other. I never yet met with any author of that order so intolerably licentious, but might be matched, if not outvied, by others. There is no need to except Escobar or Bauny (though most branded), nor do their keen antagonists do it, when they speak of others whom they know to be no Jesuits, as the most extravagant that ever were. There is no reason why the odium which a community incurs should be appropriated to a party; nor that the Society only should be noted as the sink, when the corruption is apparent everywhere. So far as the Jesuits are concerned herein, it hath been sufficiently exposed by others; upon which account I decline those of that order, not putting the reader to rely upon any evidence from their writing. Only because it is requisite to shew their concurrence in some points, which otherwise might not pass for the common doctrine, I make use of Bellarmine freely (whom none can count a corrupter of popery, however Christianity hath been treated by him), and of Suarez sometimes (whose judgment alone is counted equivalent to a thousand others, by some⁴ that are none of the Society). I allege beside, though rarely, one or two more of those fathers, of like eminency and authority in that church; but none of them, save in such points wherein they have not been noted for extravagancies by others; or in such wherein those of other orders concur with, or go beyond them. The greatest advantage I make of them, is to represent the opinions of others, not their own; and most herein of Suarez, who usually gives an account of the common doctrine out of unexceptionable authors. Those whom I principally rely on to make good the charge, are the ancienter and better sort of their divines and casuists (the strictest of them in points of morality that I could meet with), such as are so far from being disciples of Ignatius, that most of them are Dominicans (most opposite of all orders to the Jesuits, and said to be the least tainted with these corruptions), and the greatest part of them were writers before their order was founded, or appeared to the world on this subject. To these I have added other casuists of this last age, not that there is need to produce any worse than the former, but to shew that time hath made little or no alteration amongst them for the better. The Romanists, when they are ashamed of their doctrine, or think the world will cry shame of it, are wont to disown it. It is like they may do so here, and tell us that these points, not being determined by councils, are not the doctrine of their church, but the opinions of particular doctors. This serves them for a shift in other cases with some colour, but it will be absurd to offer at it here. For though this be not their doctrine of faith, which with some generals, most about the sacraments, (reflected on in the sequel as there is occasion) is the business of their councils; yet it is the practical doctrine of their church, if it have any, and if they think their catholics concerned to be Christians more than merely in opinion. And this, under several heads, I have collected out of such writings as are the proper place of it. Therefore, to say that this is not the doctrine of their church, because the particulars are not found decided by councils, is to tell us that they are not charged with it, unless we can find it, where they know it cannot be found, and where, with any reason, it cannot be looked for. It is no more reasonable than if one, who hath taken a purse, should plead, though it be found in his hand, that he is not to be charged with it, unless we can spy it in his mouth, when yet he never opens it. That councils should give particular directions for conscience and practice, in cases innumerable, was never attempted, nor ever can be expected. Their church leaves this to her divines and casuists; and that nothing may pass them but what is agreeable to her sense, no books are to be published, but with the approbation and authority of such as are counted competent judges hereof; so that the doctrine of their authorised writers, that especially wherein they commonly agree, is the practical doctrine of that church, or else she hath none such, and consequently no care of the lives and consciences of her members; and though this be not infallible, or de fide, as they count the decisions of councils, yet is it as certain, they say, as the nature of the subject requires, nor do they pretend to have any infallible doctrine for particular directions herein; which yet may justly seem very strange to any man that considers that gross faults in life and practice are more infallibly damnable than errors in faith and speculation. Now, upon this their common doctrine, the substance of the charge ensuing, and the principal articles thereof, are grounded. As for the opinions of particular doctors, wherein there is no such common concurrence, though they be not so certain as the other, yet they are (even the worst of them) safe in practice, any of their people may follow them without danger, and with a good conscience; for this (as will appear hereafter) is the common judgment of their schools and doctors, and so far the doctrine of their church. And if that church did no farther own these opinions, common or particular, then, under this character, this is enough for our purpose (when the question is of the danger of popery in reference to men’s salvation), that she counts such rules of life safe, and publicly allows them as direction for practice, which tend to ruin religion and men’s souls. If they were not counted safe, that church which pretends to so much care of souls, since all in her communion are exposed to the danger, would be concerned to give warning of it, and brand these maxims as pernicious; but this was never yet done, nor ever like to be. These opinions, all, or the greatest part of them, were taught and published in that church, before the Council of Trent; there was time enough, in eighteen years, to take cognisance of them and their pernicious consequence; yet, when they bestowed anathemas so liberally, where there was occasion, and (for the most part) where there was none, they thought not fit to bestow one curse upon these doctrines, how execrable soever; yea, some part thereof of worst consequence had there an express confirmation. Their popes since, though they could see occasion to condemn such propositions as the five ascribed to Jansenius, and those of Baius, White, and many others, could not, by the help of a judgment counted infallible, discern anything in the worst of these doctrines worthy of, or fit for, their censure. The cardinals of the inquisition at Rome, and their setters in other countries, whose business it is to spy whatever (in books particularly) is against faith and good manners, see nothing of this nature in that which destroys both. No expurgatory index (what havoc soever has been made by those tools in their best authors) hath, so far as I have observed, touched the common opinions here exposed. It is true, some others have been expunged, and I find above forty opinions of the late casuists censured by Alexander the Seventh, and the cardinals of their sacred congregation; but hereby more authority is added to those I insist on, being thought good enough to pass untouched; which must therefore be counted sound doctrine and safe for practice in the judgment of their virtual church, and the chief parts of their church representative.

There is no ground to expect that this doctrine, as to the principal and most pernicious parts of it, will ever be condemned by any popes or councils of such complexion and principles as that of Trent, where it was a maxim observed religiously, that no determination should pass, which either in matter or form would disoblige any considerable party among them, much less all. The Roman interest is supported by such politics, and must be secured, whatever become of souls or saving doctrine. There are indeed some dissenters amongst them (as there are elsewhere) who complain of their moral divinity, but they are such whose power and interest can reach little further than complaints; and these are so far from being the voice or sense of their church, that their writings which exhibit such complaints are condemned at Rome by the supreme tribunal (as they call it) of the inquisition. In short, by the known custom and settled order of the Roman church, the people, for regulating of their hearts and lives, are to be directed by their confessors, their confessors have their direction herein from their casuists and practical authors; both priests and people must believe this to be safe, because the church hath made this provision for them, approves the course, and obligeth them to take no other. And thus that doctrine, the deadly venom whereof I here discover, must be conveyed from their casuists to all sorts amongst them; nor must they fear any danger in it, unless they will question the wisdom and goodness of their church. There can be no question but that this doctrine is thus far owned by the church of Rome; whether it be delivered fallibly or infallibly, by councils or without, is not at all here considerable. It is enough that such is the conduct provided for Roman catholics, and that it is to be followed without apprehension of danger, and cannot be declined by those that will keep the ordinary road of that church, though it lead directly to destruction. When no other shift will serve, to hinder those from being undeceived whom they would delude, it is usual with them to make loud outcries of false citations, and that their doctrine is misrepresented. I have been very careful to give no just occasion for this, being apprehensive that he who doth it wrongs not them more than he doth himself and his cause. The places cited I have viewed again and again, where there might be any doubt of misconstruction, and set down their own words where it might seem scarce credible that Christians and divines (directing conscience) should speak at such a rate; and where that would have been too tedious, have given their sense faithfully, so far as I could discern it, and directed the reader where he may find and judge thereof himself. Yet if, notwithstanding all the care and diligence I could use, it hath been my unhappiness anywhere to mistake them, upon notice from any I shall do them right; and am capable to give them further satisfaction, knowing well that I am yet far from representing their doctrine fully so bad as it is. Large volumes might be filled with the corruptions of it; I have but pointed at some, and contented myself with few authors in many particulars, where plenty might have been produced. I designed briefness, and have waived much that was ready, lest I should be tedious, considering that some who are most concerned in such discourses will have nothing at all when they think too much is offered.

I have been less solicitous about the style; it doth not always satisfy myself, so that I can allow others to find fault with it; it may be thought sometimes less grave, elsewhere too sharp and vehement. I suffered it to be what the subject would have it; and the quality thereof now and then overruled me, somewhat against my own inclination. Only I make nothing ridiculous, but find it so, and should scarce do it right if I represented it otherwise than it is. Where I seem too sharp or severe upon any occasion, I found something in the nature of the subject that forced me to it. And it is not easy (if it be congruous or just) to speak of what is monstrously extravagant or pernicious, with such calmness as we treat indifferent things.

It will be enough for me if (through God’s blessing) people will hereby be brought to understand that popery designs not to trouble them either with the reality of religion, or the happiness which Christ has entailed thereon. And that their practical doctrine is contrived accordingly, will, I doubt not, be hereby manifest to all such as have a mind to see, and are not wilfully resolved to lose the way to salvation, and their souls together, by shutting their eyes against so plain a discovery of so great a danger.

INTRODUCTION The danger of popery in points of faith hath been sufficiently discovered to the world by the divines of the Reformation, but their doctrine, which concerns life and practice, hath not been so much insisted on. And yet there is as much occasion for this; for here the mischief is as great, an unchristian heart and life being at least as damning as erroneous belief; and hereby the great apostasy and degeneracy of the papal church is as apparent, and herein they have proceeded with as much disregard of Christ and the souls of men. Their design in this seems to have been, not the promoting of Christ’s interest (for that is manifestly prostituted), but the securing and greatening of a faction, which, under the profession of Christianity, might be false to all its realities. And their rule is the corrupt inclinations of depraved nature, to which they have throughly conformed their practical divinity, which easeth it of the duties for which it hath an aversation, how much soever enjoined, and clears its way to those sins to which it is disposed, as though there were no need to avoid them. This rule serves their design with great advantage; but souls are more endangered hereby, and their principles become more pernicious, because they are so taking. Persuade a man that he may safely neglect the duties which he owes to God, his own soul, and others, and may gratify the lusts he is addicted to, and give him the maxims of religion, and the authority and conclusions of divines, and the teachers whom he trusts, for it, and he will like that religion, because he loves his sin, and is in danger to follow both, though he perish for it eternally. And indeed this is it which makes the condition of papists deplorable; for though the principles of their belief, as it is popish, be mortally poisonous, yet there might be some antidote in the practicals of Christianity, retained and followed by those who are unavoidably ignorant of the danger of their more speculative errors, and so some hopes of such; but their practical doctrine being no less corrupted, the remedy itself becomes poison, and their condition who freely let it down hopeless. Whether their errors in matters of faith be directly fundamental hath been with some of their opposers a question, but those who will view their practical doctrine may discern that it strikes through the heart of Christianity, casting off the vitals of it as superfluities, and cuts off those who will believe and follow it from the way of life; not only by encouraging them with security to live and die in all sorts of wickedness, but also by obliging them to neglect, as needless, the greatest and most important concerns of Christians, without which God cannot be honoured by us, nor salvation attained. This will be apparent by observing what is determined in that church by those who have the conduct of their lives and consciences, concerning the worshipping of God, Christian knowledge, love to God, faith in Christ, repentance from dead works, and holiness of life; as to the exercise of Christian virtues, the abandoning of sin, and the practice of good works; of all which in particular the following discourse gives an account. THE PRACTICAL DIVINITY OF THE PAPISTS discovered to be destructive of CHRISTIANITY AND MEN’S SOULS

CHAPTER I Real worship of God not necessary in the Church of Rome

There is nothing wherein the honour of God and the happiness of men is more concerned than divine worship. Religion provides for these great ends by obliging us to worship God; this it doth indispensably, and can do no less without abandoning itself; for this is essential to it, and gives it being. And the truth and goodness of it depends as much thereon; for no religion is true and saving but that which obligeth to worship God really. Now worship is not real unless mind and heart concur in it; whatever it hath, without this it wants² its life and soul, and is no more worship really than a picture is a man. Hence Christ brands those who draw near to God with their lips, without their hearts, for hypocrites, Matthew 15:7-8, Mark 7:6; such as pretend to be what they are not, and to do what really they do not; who are but worshippers in show and fiction; no more so indeed than the stage-player is the prince whose part he acts. The Romanists seem to acknowledge all this, and therefore ought not to deny but that it is as necessary that God should be really worshipped, as it is needful that he should have any honour in the world, or that there should be any true religion amongst men, or salvation for them. Yet notwithstanding, their practical doctrine makes it needless to worship God really. That this may be fully and distinctly manifested, let us observe, first, what they count requisite in divine service and in their mass. The former is their worship for every day (which goes under the name of canonical hours and the divine office), and is the proper service of their clergy and monastics; the latter is for holidays, and is common to the people with the religious, and the only public service they are ordinarily obliged to. Afterwards we may reflect upon what else passeth under the notion of worship in public, and also take some notice of their devotions, or religious employments in private. For the first of these, their divine service, if there were anything of religion or religious worship counted needful amongst them, it would be required of their clergy, and those whom by way of eminency they call religious, in their divine office especially (if anywhere); but by their doctrine it is not needful for them to worship God really there, unless he can be said to be worshipped where both himself and all that concerns worshippers indeed may (as it may by their leave) be quite neglected, and no way actually minded. They seem, at least some of them, in their discourses of worship and prayer particularly, to require as necessary thereto both an act of the mind and of the will (attention and intention they call them); but proceed with them a little, and you will find the former of these quite lost in the latter; and the latter, as they order it, dwindling into nothing. It is the common determination of their schools and doctors, that actual attention of mind is not necessary when they recite their canonical hours, that is, they need not mind God in their service, nor the matter of it more than the object, nor the sense of what they say, nor the words they use; not any of these need be actually minded. A purpose or intention to do it is sufficient, though that purpose be not at all performed. This is the doctrine of their great Aquinas, concerning prayer in general, whom the rest² commonly follow. Attention is not necessary all the while, but the virtue of the first intention, with which a man comes to prayer, renders the whole prayer meritorious, as it falls out in other meritorious acts. And this first intention also is enough to make the prayer prevalent. So he explains his main conclusion, viz. prayer ought to be at least attentive in respect of a previous intention. So that they may be attentive enough, by virtue of this first intention, though they do not at all mind afterwards what they are doing, when they should be worshipping; which is just as if they should say, a man that goes to church with an intent to join in their service, but falls fast asleep when he comes there, serves God effectually, and is attentive enough by virtue of that former intention, though he sleep all the while. It seems it is sufficient in the church of Rome, and effectual, even to a degree meritorious, to worship God as one that is asleep may worship him, if he falls asleep after a good intention. However, hereby it is manifest that with them it is not needful to worship God at all, even in their most solemn service, but only to intend some such thing. If there be a purpose of worship, though God be never worshipped indeed, by their doctrine, it is enough for him. I suppose ‘his holiness’ would not think himself well served at this rate. The common women at Rome are to pay him a julio a head weekly, for the liberty he gives them to drive there their trade; now if, instead of payment, they should allege an intention of it, and declare this is all they are obliged to, and that they ought to be acquitted upon that account, though they never laid it down, he would think himself not paid hereby, but scorned; he loseth his sacred reverence, and is affronted into the bargain; yet at this rate will he have God served by Roman catholics. Well, but if God need not be worshipped but in purpose only, and the intention may serve without the act, yet sure it must be an actual intention, or at least a purpose to worship God. If it be not the worship of God that they need intend, divine worship is clearly abandoned, both in deed and in purpose; if it must not be actual, there need be actually no thought of worshipping God. But I cannot discern that they count either of these necessary. They declare plainly that an actual intention is needless; in this they generally agree, though they differ in the terms by which they use to express it. They call it an habitual, or a virtual, or an implicit intention, in opposition to that which is express or actual; so that actually either to worship God, or to have an intention of worshipping him, is more than needs. But since they will not have it actual, let it be what sort of intention they please otherwise, yet sure the thing intended should be the worshipping of God; so that they may be said to worship in purpose, though they think it needless to do it in deed. Whether they count this necessary, may be best discerned by their own expressions, which they use in some variety. Commonly, they say, a virtual intention may serve. Now this is not an intention, indeed, to worship God; but supposeth a former act, by virtue of which one is said to have an intention when really he hath none. As they call that a virtual intention to worship when a man had a purpose to attend, though he do it not at all; answerably, a virtual intention to worship will be a purpose or thought to have such a purpose, though he never have it. Let those who can apprehend how they may be said to worship God so much as in purpose, by virtue of a purpose to worship him, which they have not, but only intend to have, without effect. But it may be there is no such intention needful with them, for custom may serve to this purpose (Soto). The precept for attending the performance of divine service canonically includes two things:² first, that at the beginning of prayer every one mind what he is going to do. But for this former it is enough that it be done by virtue of some former intention and custom, as if one, when the sign is given for prayers, go, as is the custom, to the choir; by this he satisfies the precept. Now this he may be accustomed to do, without any thought of God, or of worshipping him; yet by virtue of that custom, wherein God is quite neglected, he will have their virtual intention to worship him; all the intention that they require, that is, plainly none at all, unless by virtue of neglecting God he may be said to mind him. Or an habitual intention may serve, they sometimes tell us. Sylvester expresseth it thus, after Paludanus, he is bound in the beginning of the service to have an intent to perform it, so that the service may be from his reason, and not from his imagination only, i. e. he must go about it like a man, and not like a beast. But lest it should seem too hard for a man to go about their service, with an intention so much distinguishing him from a brute, he adds a favourable gloss. This is to be understood, saith he, either in act, or habit, or virtue; so that if it be but an habitual intention, it may suffice. Navarre explains it by this conditional (and others with him), if one be asked, why he takes his breviary, he would answer, that he doth it to say service.² Now hereby we are told, that rather an habitual than a virtual intention is expressed; and they acknowledge that such an intention is not sufficient for a human act, much less therefore for an act of worship. Since then they think that such an intention will suffice, a purpose to worship God is not needful with them, unless they can make divine worship of that which is less than human; or will have the brutes to be catholic worshippers. They tell us also that this habitual intention is in those that are asleep.⁴ So Scotus, the first founder of this distinction (and herein that which they call virtual agrees with it; indeed, Aquinas saw no cause to distinguish them; and⁶ others, who affect Scotus his subtlety, use the terms as if they were distinct, yet confound them in their instances). And thus, when all the worship which they think needful is shrunk up into an intention, yet that intention is no other than they may have in a dead sleep, when they dream of no such thing. So that their souls need be no more concerned in worshipping God, either when they are at service, or when they are addressing themselves to it, than if their church were in mount Celius with the seven sleepers. When they are coming to it (as we see here), they need have no more purpose to worship God than if they were asleep; and when they are at it (as we said before), they need no more attend to what they are a-doing than if they were not yet, awake.

They say also an implicit intention will suffice; which is, as they explain it, when a man hath not expressly any thought of praying or worshipping God, when he is to read service, but only intends⁸ to accomplish the precept of the church, or to perform his task, or to do as he is wont to do. As when a man first takes orders or enters into a monastery, understanding that the church enjoins all in that capacity daily to recite their canonical hours, if he then have an intention to perform this task, to do as the church requires, or as others of that quality are wont to do, and accordingly say his hours as the fashion is, though he have not once a thought of God or worshipping him all his life after, either when he is going to service, or when he is reading it, yet that first intention may suffice, yea, it is of such sufficiency that any other act of mind or heart, either in worship, or in order to it, becomes needless; it is of such admirable efficacy, that by virtue of it they can worship God, when they mind no such thing as God, or worshipping him, no, nor ever intend it otherwise. Let us suppose that they thought it requisite to renew this implicit intention frequently, yet would it not necessarily amount to a purpose of worshipping God, for not only their task, and what they are wont to do, but the precept of the church, may be (as we shall hear them by and by declare) accomplished by acts of wickedness, which sure cannot be acts of worship, nor a design to do them an intention to serve God; yea, they may satisfy the church’s injunction for divine service, though they have an express intention not to fulfil it all the while, as² Arragon and their divines of greatest reputation determine. So that if the church did enjoin them to worship God, yet no intention to worship him would be needful, because they can satisfy the church with a contrary intention. Finally, a sinful intention will serve their turn; this passeth for their common doctrine.

If a man intend principally his own praise or worldly advantage, and so design to serve himself, and not God, this cannot with any reason be counted an intention to worship God; yet such a design will suffice for the worship they require, and it will be substantially good in their account, only a little tainted with a venial speck, which, though it may hinder it from being meritorious of eternal glory, yet he that never otherwise intends to pray or worship cannot be damned, and so will be saved notwithstanding. In short, the Lord requires the heart in worship; without this, nothing else can please him, nothing in his account will be a real honour or worship of him, but only in appearance and fiction. The Romanists teach, that God need not have anything of their hearts in their service, not any one act or motion thereof, while they are at it, only some sort of intention before, while they are going about it; but this no act of will or heart neither, but only a virtual, or habitual, or implicit something; they have minced it so small, that an ordinary eye cannot discern in it so little, as a purpose to serve God; yea, in fine, they have reduced it to that which is worse than nothing, and if the heart must be cumbered with any such thing as an intention about serving God, yet a sinful intention may serve, this satisfies their holy church and her precept fully; she doth not, she cannot, require any more for God, what burdens soever in other cases she lays upon the consciences of men. But though the heart, and every act of it, be thus discharged from any concern in their service, yet it may be they will have the mind more engaged. One act thereof, and but one (mental attention), they seem to require; and it is true some of them make show of calling for it, but as soon as ever it appears it is dismissed immediately as needless, for they conclude generally, that a purpose to attend will serve, though they attend not, and this purpose too by their handling (as we have seen) comes to nothing or worse. But suppose they did (though they do not) account an intention to worship God needful, and that actual, express, and well qualified, yet they confess an intent to worship or wait on God is not to worship him really: no more than a man is sober when he is drunk, because he intended to be sober. But they leave us no ground for this supposition, yet ascribe as much to their intention, and more than the best imaginable will bear, after they have reduced it to as bad as nothing. However, since all the worship they count necessary is included in this purpose, and all their pretensions depend on it, they are concerned to have it thought to be something, and they will seem cautious about it, as a thing material, so this proviso they lay down. It must not be changed into a contrary purpose; if that should fall out, it will lose its wonderful virtue, and not make those worshippers who mind not what they are doing when they should be praying. But there is no danger of this, nor need they be solicitous about it, for (as they tell them) they change not their purpose, though they do nothing that they intended, or do what is quite contrary to it, viz., though if they purposed to attend, yet they attend not at all, but turn their minds to other things, if they act cross to the supposed intention; yet, so long as they assume not a contrary purpose, they must be thought to mind what they are about, though they mind it not one moment; and there need be as little care, as there is danger of changing their purpose, for² carelessness cannot do it. It cannot be changed, unless a man designedly, and on set purpose, will turn his mind from what he is about to other things. Since then a person who doth not mind God, or anything that concerns his worship, when he seems engaged in it, doth not worship God at all, as is evident in itself, and they confess it, in case he mind not this on set purpose; therefore, though he doth not worship God at all, yet he worships him as much as the Romanists require, unless he wills not to worship him on set purpose; yea, though he voluntarily mind nothing that concerns a worshipper, though he deliberately and willingly let his mind run upon other things, yet so long as he is so regardless of God, and what he is about, as not to take notice of this extravagancy, he fulfils the precepts of the church, and minds divine service as much as is required. Thus Cajetan, Soto, and others; so that by their doctrine, if they do not worship God and voluntarily neglect it, yet they do as much as the church enjoins, so long as they take no notice that they do not worship him. And as they may voluntarily employ their minds about other things, when they should be worshipping, so may they on set purpose busy the outward man about other employments, when they are saying their service. They can perform their best devotions while (to give their own instances) they are⁴ washing themselves, or putting on their clothes, or mending pens, or laying the cloth, or making beds, or anything else which requires no more attention. Nor dare they count this a venial fault, because the Dominicans are enjoined by the rules of their order to say their service while they are doing something else. That which would spoil the devotion of others gives no impediment to theirs, and good reason, for how can that be disturbed that is not, or lessened when it is already nothing? This is to worship God after the Roman mode, when neither body nor mind is taken up with the service, but both deliberately employed about something else. But that by their principles they need be no better worshippers, will yet be more manifest if we view their doctrine concerning attention more distinctly. Aquinas and Bonaventure (whom the rest follow) give an account of three sorts hereof, according to the severals which may be minded in prayer. The first is attention to the words, so as not to err in pronouncing them. The second, to the sense of the words. The third, to the person prayed to, and the things prayed for.

Bonaventure calls attention to the first superficial, and that to the second literal (we may as well call it human or rational), that to the third spiritual (divine or Christian attention others call it).

Now (which is to be observed as that which unveils the whole mystery), they hold that any one of these is sufficient, not only the third or the second, but even the first, though it be the worst, and of least importance. So Angelus, Sylvester,⁴ Cajetan, Bellarmine,⁶ Tolet, so Aquinas,⁸ Soto, Navar, so all of them, it is (they tell us) the common doctrine universally received. And this clears all, and leads us directly through their reserves and concealments, and the ambiguity of their expressions (apt to mislead an unwary eye, and abuse a charitable mind, loath to think them so bad as they speak themselves) into the open view of their irreligious (not to say atheistical) doctrine. This makes it very evident that with them it is not needful either to worship God or intend it. For since they agree that any one of the several sorts of attention is sufficient, the first, which concerns the bare words, is enough on their account, and the other are needless. It is not requisite that they should mind either the things to be prayed for, or the God they should pray to, or the sense of the words they pronounce; it will suffice that they mind the words, to them senseless, and therein the empty and insignificant figure and sound. Now, words without sense are in themselves neither good nor bad; no worship, sure, can be imagined in them; they are no better (but less tolerable) in the mouths of men than the sound of brutes. And the mere figure and sound of letters can make men no more worshippers than conjurors; yet such is all the worshipping and praying that they count necessary. But if they had a mind to supererogate, and their Catholics were to do more than their duty, i. e. act as becomes men in their service, taking the sense along with the words, yet the third sort of attention, which concerns God, is still unnecessary, there need be no application of the mind unto God in their prayers. Surely in any religion but that which will have men abandon both sense and reason in matters plain and obvious to either, God would not be thought to be worshipped when he is not at all minded. By their common doctrine now mentioned (wherein all sorts of their authors conspire), first their minds may in their divine service not only depart from God by natural or inadvertent vagaries, but they may dismiss them from God on set purpose; for they may voluntarily and upon deliberation decline in their service what is more than enough; and the attendance of the mind upon God in prayer is plainly with them more than enough, seeing they declare that their attending to the bare words alone is sufficient. If they mind but to pronounce the words entire, no more is needful; God may be left out of their minds during their whole service; and they may be as much without God in their worship as others are said to be without him in the world, deliberately and out of choice. They leave us not to rely for this upon consequences, how evident and undeniable soever; they stick not to declare that they may without sin voluntarily abandon the better sorts of attention, viz. both that which is rational and that which is spiritual. This will be no fault at all, if done upon a reasonable account; for example, if any one decline these, that he may not tire his head therewith, or anything of like nature.² It seems reasonable with them not to trouble their heads with minding God, or what becomes men in their worship of him. The reason is, because they are not obliged to serve God as well as they can. It is a received maxim amongst them, that they are not bound to do their best.⁴ The third sort of attention is better than the second, and the second is better than the first (that is worst of all); but when there are better and worse ways of serving God before them, they may choose the worst. The worst attendance of all, it seems, is good enough for God, even that wherein he is not at all regarded. This doctrine is so common, that I find but two who demur on it, and one of them (Cajetan) but drawn in by consequence. Only Navar, though he, as the rest, counts the first and worst sort of attention sufficient, yet thinks it may be a venial fault to retain it, so as voluntarily to exclude or hinder the better. Yet both⁶ these hold that they may voluntarily want the better, and may without fault turn their minds from God to other things, so long as they observe it not, or if they do observe it, yet so long also as they do not reflect upon it as a vagary. And both maintain that any one may pray whilst he is dressing himself, or is taken up with any other like employment. And such action, though it be consistent with the worst attention, yet undoubtedly (they say) it hinders the better, especially that which is spiritual and elevated. So that herein these authors are either reconciled to the common opinion, or fall out with themselves. And that such employments (though inconsistent with spiritual attention, i. e. with minding God) are lawful while they are at their service, is not only the sense of these two casuists, but to deny it is against the usage of all the pious (it seems the Roman piety is without regarding God even in his worship). All the Dominicans are particularly obliged to it (as we saw before), and have a visible demonstration for it from the ancient form of their dormitories. Thus one way or other all agree that God may voluntarily be neglected in their worship without sin.

Secondly, As it is not necessary by their doctrine to worship God, so neither is there any necessity to intend it. When they have encouraged all, even their religious, not to pray at all, by assuring them they need not mind God at all, whilst they should be praying to him, yet they would persuade them notwithstanding that they may pray by virtue of a former intention. The vanity of this is shewed already (where we prove both that this is not enough, and that indeed they require not so much); but because it is the only pretence that such can be worshippers of God who think it needless to mind him, even in the most solemn addresses amongst them, it will not be amiss to see it again put quite away by their own doctrine. What must be designed in that previous intention, upon which, not only the efficacy, but the reality, of their prayers depends? Must they intend, when they are going about it, to mind the things they are to pray for, or the God they should worship, or the sense of the words they utter? No; as it is not necessary to mind any of these when they are at their worship, so neither is it needful to intend it beforehand: it will be sufficient if they do but intend to mind the senseless pronounciation of the words, and neither God nor anything else which becomes Christians, or men in acts of worship; nothing but what brutes or birds are capable of, the mere uttering of the words. This is very manifest by their common doctrine, now before us, concerning attention in prayer. Attendance to the words without the sense is sufficient, but they need not purpose beforehand to have any sort of attention more than that which is sufficient; for they will not imagine there is any need of a purpose to do that which is not needful to be done; and they declare expressly this is all which is requisite, that they come to their service with a purpose to have any sort of attention, that is sufficient; telling us withal, that attendance to the bare words will suffice. So that in the issue the worship of God (his and our greatest concern in this world) is reduced to this: there is no need to mind God, and so not to worship him at all, either actually or virtually, since it is neither needful to do this, nor intend it. He is not worshipped in that remote and minute way which they call virtual (which is not the doing of it, but a purpose only to do it), but by virtue of a former intention; where this intention is not, it can have no virtue; but with them there need be no intention to mind God, and so by their doctrine it is not necessary to worship him one way or other.

Thirdly, Since with them it is not needful to mind anything in their service, for which they can be counted worshippers, nothing but the words, it will not be very material to take notice what attention they must give to these; yet seeing the senseless recital of the words is all that they would have them mind in divine service, one would think that this should be attended to purpose, at least actually. No; it is enough if their attention be but virtual, i. e. if they have a purpose to mind them, when they are going about their worship, and change it not while they are at it, though then they mind them not; for as they generally hold that attention to the words is sufficient, so none question but a virtual attention thereto will serve.² It may seem strange that one should be said to attend when he attends not, but they will satisfy this with something that is as odd; they would have them think their heedlessness is excused by being more heedless, and so the more careless they are in their worship the better. For if they mind not what they are doing, when saying divine service, yet if they do this without reflection, and take no notice that they mind it not at all, they therefore mind it well enough. Such is the attention which the strictest of their authors require and judge sufficient; even such as is as good as none, and about that which is nothing worth. Now, this doctrine hath such an atheistical aspect, that they (who profess themselves to be, and would have the world think that they are worshippers of God) seem concerned not to expose it commonly barefaced. And indeed they give it some disguise, when they declare so much for attention of mind in worship, as that which is of the substance of worship, so essential thereto, that without this it is no worship of God, no praying at all, but a mere clamorous noise, yea, a mocking of God, and taking his name in vain.⁴ The Jesuits forbear not frequently to acknowledge this. Who would not think hereupon, that they count it most necessary for the mind to attend God in worship? Oh! but the vizor falls off, when we understand that attention of mind to nothing else but the bare words, stripped of their sense, and all respect to God, is enough with them, and that virtual only, and in purpose, though they never actually mind so little. They themselves assure us that the attending to the words only (if that were to be done indeed) is no attending God; for they make these distinct things, and will have one of them suffice without the other; and it is against the resentments of all religion, and common sense, too, that God should be said to be worshipped when he is not at all minded. And therefore, in fine, when they teach (as the best of them do, so that it passeth for their common doctrine) that superficial attention in their service is sufficient, they declare plainly enough, that in the church of Rome there is no need to worship God, no, not for their religious, in that which they call divine service. But if we would have a plainer acknowledgment hereof than is needful, we may have it from those who declare that no attention of mind is needful in worship, and these are the greatest part of their authors, which I find alleged in this question (taking none into the account neither, but those who are ancienter than the foundation of the Society). They determine, without distinguishing that all attention is needless, actual, or virtual. If the words are pronounced entire, and no external action admitted to hinder that, it is no crime with them, if as nothing else, so neither the bare words be further minded, but the thoughts be quite dismissed from them. Sylvester, the master of the sacred apostolical palace, and their prime champion against Luther, in his book dedicated to Pope Leo the Tenth, determines expressly, that to pray with attention in their canonical hours is not required by God’s law. If he had said, the church had not required it, he had spoken within compass, and said no more than many others before and after him; but he says that too, for having told us that Hostiensis, Antoninus, Summa Rosellæ do all hold, that the church enjoins, not attentiveness, but only saying the service, he adds, that they say true as to this, that attention is not under the precept of the church.² Of the like persuasion are Durandus, Paludanus, Angelus de Clavasio, and others. For attention, as they say, is not a command of their church, but a counsel only, which may be neglected without sin. Others, who make the best of it, deliver it thus. The church do not command internal acts, no more than judge of them, therefore requires not attention in worship; the precept is fully accomplished without it, by the external act alone; the want of attention is no fault, unless upon the account of the natural precept, and in reference to that it is no worse than venial.⁴ They are herein opposed by some later casuists and Jesuits (however these come to be counted more licentious). But the differing parties fully agree in making it needless to worship God. For both hold, that they need not mind either God, or the matter, or the sense of the words in their service, either actually or virtually, and both conclude that the words without the sense (and all else for which they can be considerable) need not be minded actually. All the difference is about a virtual attention to the bare words, whether the want of that (which is no attention indeed) be a mortal crime. It is just as if when they had concluded it lawful to murder a man, they should fall into a hot debate whether it were a deadly crime to disorder his hair. But so it becomes those who make no scruple to destroy religion body and soul, to make a zealous stir about the slightest appurtenances of it. Something must be done with some shew of conscience, too, about its appendices, that the world may not think they retain nothing of it amongst them. And yet how palpable is the irreligion of these sophisters, who will have it a damnable crime to neglect their empty words, but no fault at all wholly to neglect the great God, even when, if ever, the whole soul should attend him. Here is evidence too much, that the church of Rome, so far as we can know her sense by her doctors, the most, and best of them, if she think it fit that God should be worshipped, yet thinks it not needful that he be minded, i. e. though it be convenient to pretend worship, yet it is not necessary to worship him indeed. Medina is so ingenuous as to tell us, that since the church requires not attention in their service, she doth not oblige them to pray, when she enjoins them to say their canonical hours. So that all in the Church of Rome are discharged from any obligation to worship God at all, even in their most solemn service; they need not pray when they are at their church prayers. Not only he, but all of them, must acknowledge this, who will yield to that reason or authority which they count best. Their law saith, God is not prayed to with the mouth without the heart;² and it is a natural and evident principle (as themselves tell us) that vocal pronouncing of the words is not prayer, unless it is done with some attention; whereas most of them say no attention is requisite in their service; and that virtual attention which the rest are for, themselves say, is no attention indeed, no more than the purpose is the act when not performed. But what then becomes of their pretences to worship or devotion? May they be wholly without this? Medina easily resolves this difficulty: though he who useth their service hath no devotion, yet the church in whose words he prays, and whose minister he is, brings her devotion.⁴ So that the church brings devotion still, though none in the church, no, not the clergy, not the religious have any. The church prays effectually, in the words of those who say service, though these should blaspheme God in their hearts, while they utter the words of a prayer, and they pray in the person of the church by their common doctrine. So that though they be in mortal sin (suppose atheists or debauchees) their prayers prevail in regard of the church’s holiness. Happy persons they are, as ever any were in a dream, who can pray effectually when they pray not at all, and be devout with another’s devotion, and why not saved too by the church’s holiness? But, then, since this is applicable to all particular persons, what is that church, by which they may have such advantages? It must be something not made up of particular persons, something abstracted from subsistence, and refined above the grossness of any reality; and the structure, their devotion and worship must be answerable, and as much beholding to imagination for a being. Not to disturb their fancies further, it is enough that they acknowledge (what cannot be denied) that they are not obliged to worship God in their divine service; being there is no worship without attention, and no attention with them necessary, or only that which is in effect none. But it is no wonder they make attention at their divine service not necessary, since, being in Latin, it is, to far the greatest part concerned in it, impossible. The first sort of it, which they call superficial attention, none are capable of effectually but those that are well acquainted with that language, so as not only to understand, but duly pronounce it, which few of their monastics are; indeed, it is not the talent of many of their priests. The lowest degree of attention, saith Soto, none can have, but he that knoweth the tongue. The second, which they call literal attention, fewer can arrive at, it is only for expert divines. To attend to the sense is not for all Latinists, but only for those that are expert in divinity² (saith the same author), which is so far from being the attainment of monastics and common priests, that many of the chief of their clergy cannot pretend to it. It was necessary for them to conclude (since they will have their own way, whatever the Scripture saith against it), that it is no sin for the clergy not to understand what they say when they say service, though they confess they can have no relish of what they understand not. As to the third, which they call spiritual attention, they cannot mind the things prayed for, who know not what they are, and apprehend nothing of the contents of their prayers. Nor can they mind the God that is to be prayed to, when they know not whether they pray to God or no; for they understand not to whom the prayer is directed, to God or to a creature, to an angel or a saint, to a man or a woman.

Now, seeing attention to what they do at their service is impossible to most and unnecessary to all, it may seem superfluous to shew that with them reverence and devotion is also unnecessary. (And what religious worship there can be without these, let those who have any tolerable notion of religion judge). For reverence and devotion are included in attention, or necessarily depend on it, and unavoidably fall with it. No man will imagine that there can be any devotion or reverence toward God when he is not so much as minded, when he is not before their eyes, when the mind is voluntarily turned from him and wholly taken up with thoughts which are inconsistent with the observance of him. And this is the plain import of that non-attention which they allow in their service. When the mind departs, the heart follows it (since it moves by its conduct and acts, not otherwise), and when these are gone,⁵ the man is morally absent, and worships God no more, nor hath any more devotion or reverence for him (if these be so much as moral acts) than if he were not in the place where he is worshipped. And seeing (as themselves tell us) outward acts in worship are not considerable, but as signs of inward motions, all external shows of devotion or reverence, when there is none of these in the soul, will be but hypocritical significations, denoting that to be there which the Lord discerns is not there, and so tend to affront him, instead of approaching him with reverence, worship, or devotion. But there is no need of a proof where the thing is confessed; they tell us plainly that neither reverence nor devotion is necessary.

Reverence (saith De Graffiis, in his time the grand penitentiary at Naples) consists in this, that the body be in a composed temper, otherwise it signifies an incomposed mind; they ought, therefore, reverently and humbly to pray, for such prayers penetrate the heavens. But this is only counsel and advice; it is not commanded, as he tells us immediately. Such reverence, saith he, is not required by any precept; though the service be said irreverently, yet the command is satisfied¹. Here is encouragement enough for irreverence, inward or outward. All the danger follows, but possibly it may be a venial fault if the irreverence be great, according to Pope Innocent. And if great irreverence will in the pope’s judgment prove but a small fault, they may venture on great as well as little freely, for neither pope nor penitentiary thinks any much concerned to avoid a venial sin. Sylvester tells us³ that irreverence is not always mortal; but will it ever be so, or when? It is not so when, instead of worshipping God, they take his name in vain, how severe soever the terms be in which the Lord hath forbidden this, and thereby signified the heinousness of it. Yea, that irreverence to God, which is injurious to his divine majesty and excellency, may not be big enough to be counted mortal;⁵ unless it be so outrageous as to destroy the majesty of God, or some of his perfections, it may be venial. The little account they make of reverence is the more considerable, because, as themselves describe it, it compriseth all love and observance of God. For devotion, Aquinas tells us, as to the fruit of spiritual devotion, he is deprived of it who doth not attend to the things he prays for, or doth not understand; so that devotion is lost (by the oracle of their schools) on a double account, both when prayer is not attended, as it needs not be with them, and when it is not understood, as it cannot be. He that is negligent both as to attention and devotion offends venially. Thus Cardinal Cajetan, after he had told us that devotion consists in every holy affection.⁸ So that he who through negligence wants all holy affection (whatever is included in attention or devotion) incurs but a slight fault; and it may be not so much. There ought to be devotion (saith Cardinal Tolet), and he sets it out by love to God and desires of seeing him, but adds, if this be wanting without contempt, it is no great sin. Whether he thought it a little one, he saith not; but if he had so hard thoughts of it, the Jesuit is more severe than those of other orders. Graffiis, after he had described devotion, concludes,² He that wants devotion sins not, not so much as venially it seems. Lopez and Metina in him censures that opinion as false and cruel which will have actual devotion requisite for receiving of the eucharist, though that devotion be no more than an actual consideration that they are there to receive Christ. Indeed, they generally count devotion needless there, where, if ever, it would be counted requisite. To⁴ be destitute of it and attention too, at the eucharist, is either but a small fault or none at all. Sylvester saith inward devotion is not enjoined by the church, but as to outward devotion, he will not exempt it from the command; and what that is, he lets us understand by the undevoutness which is forbidden: when they make sport with one another for a great part of their worship, so as to scandalize others and disturb the priest.⁶ It seems they may be as devout as their church would have them when they play the wags one with another at divine service, so that their sport be but thus qualified; if it be not so uncivil as to offend the people, or so boisterous as to disorder the priest, or so long as to take up a considerable part of their worship, their church, who requires no inward devotion at all, will not burden them much, we see, with that which is outward. So little devotion serves their mass, their divine service requires no more. Devotion there, saith he, is not commanded. Others, amongst which the same author names Hostiensis, Antoninus, and Summa Rosellæ, hold that in the orders for divine service,⁸ the bare saying of it is commanded, but all that consists in devotion is no more than counsel (which by their principles may be neglected without sin). The ground of their persuasion is considerable; to enjoin devotion (say they) had been to lay a snare for men, and impose intolerable burdens on them; so that it seems the church had been wicked and unmerciful, if she had but obliged their clergy and religious to be devout in their worship. And by this reason, neither God nor man can make devotion a duty to any sort of Roman catholics; hereafter we must not wonder if they neither enjoin nor observe it. And though their reason may be singular, yet the opinion is the common doctrine, since all are discharged from devotion or reverence, who are not obliged to attention. Such, therefore, and no other, is the worship which the church of Rome makes needful for the clergy and religious. Such as it can be, without attention, without holy fear or affection; it is not the thing they call it, it deserves not the name of worship, or the title of holy or religious; it must be a profane and irreligious exercise, it can be no better without reverence, and without devotion; it cannot but be without these, whilst it is without attention, which they oblige all to neglect, by declaring it needless. Durandus maintained that images are not to be worshipped properly, but only abusively, that is, as they explain it, though worship be exhibited before, or about the image, yet the mind of the worshipper is far from it. This, his opinion, is now damned, as little less than heretical; being, in their account, no less than a denial that any worship is to be given to an image. Yet this abusive worship is all that they make necessary for the God of heaven; for requiring no attention of mind, no devotion of soul in their service, they allow both mind and heart to be far from him, while they do something before or about him which they call worship. So that what worship they count intolerably too little for a senseless image, not to say a detestable idol, they think enough in conscience for the true and living God. I have not observed that any idolaters in the world were ever so gross and stupid, as by their avowed doctrine thus to advance what they look upon as a mere image, and so to debase what they took to be the true God. However, hereby it appears, that they count no worship at all needful for God, since worship without the heart will, by their doctrine, serve the turn, which,² in reference to an image, is, with them, no worship at all. It is not true honour or worship, but fiction and mockery. This is their own character of such worship when images are concerned, and under it I leave their divine service.

Sect. 2. Let us in the next place view their mass. This is for the people, and is the only public +worship enjoined them in any of their days for worship. They call it⁴ the chief part of their religion, and this summons us to expect that herein, if at all, they will shew themselves religious, and worship God indeed; however, they think not themselves obliged to it in their divine office. But all expectation hereof is quite blasted when they tell us, that less attention is required at the mass than at their canonical hours; yet so they commonly determine, and their reason is,⁶ because prayer is a more rational act than that moral presence required at mass. So that their hearing mass is a less rational act than that which is performed without understanding, and requires less attention of mind, than that to which none at all is actually needful. And we cannot yet apprehend how that can he divine worship, which is so far from being reasonable service, or how God can be thought to be worshipped, when the soul which is to worship him doth not take any notice of him. The servant of servants at Rome would not think himself honoured, if the holding out of his toe were not regarded by such as have access to him. But Roman catholics may, it seems, mind God less at their mass, than one that minds him not all, and yet worship him well enough after their mode.

Besides, all inward worship is clearly discharged, for when they teach that the mass is for the people, the only worship on the Lord’s days, or any other day set apart for worship, they tell us expressly, no inward worship is the duty of those days, external worship alone is commanded. So Aquinas, Cajetan,² so Navar, so de Graffis, so Lopez, Dominicus a Soto also, who asserts it with many reasons, amongst which this is one, because the church requires no other than this external worship, and if God had required more, the church had not been fida divini juris interpres, a faithful expounder of the divine law, which rather than they will yield they will admit anything, though it be that God should never have any true worship amongst them.

Particularly and expressly, they deny all acts of contrition for sin to be the duties of mass days. So Sylvester, Summa Rosellæ,⁴ Melchior Canus, and all the other authors last mentioned.⁶ Likewise, all acts of love to God, Bellarmine, and in him Aquinas,⁸ so Navar and Pope Adrian, de Graffis,¹⁰ and Soto, who would maintain this with many arguments, one of the chief of them, he calls it ingentissimum argumentum, is, that this would be to ensnare souls, and cast them into grievous straits, if so harsh a duty as an act of love to God, were enjoined so frequently. Another is,¹³ that all the commands of God, as to the substance of them, may be fully accomplished without love to God, and therefore this.

It is good divinity with them that we are not bound to worship God out of love. The mass, saith Navar, which we are commanded to hear on those days, and nothing else, may be heard well enough without any such act of love. So Bellarmine, we are not bound on these days by any particular precept not to sin, or to have any act of contrition, or any act of love to God. What, not one act of love to God? No; he will prove it. One of his arguments is,² because the church hath determined the time and manner how divine law is to be observed in keeping this command, but the church nowhere requires inward acts; she thinks, it seems, that God may be served sufficiently with the mass, without any sense of sin or love to God. And thus all those other graces and affections that flow from repentance, or love, or necessarily depend thereon, as filial fear, spiritual desires, delight in God, &c., will be no duty on their mass days, their mass hath nothing to do with them. Confessions of sin there may be well enough without godly sorrow, and petitions without desires, and praises without complacence or ingenuous gratitude, because all is well enough without love to God, or grief for offending him; and that on all these days wherein they are obliged to hear mass.

If you would see anything of the worship of God in the mass, it is as if you look for the life and nature of a man in a picture; and such an one as will not so much as shew you his colour or figure, but very rudely. The precept for observing mass days, as Sylvester tells us, requires not the end, that is, waiting upon God, nor what is necessarily requisite thereto, but the hearing of mass. Not waiting on God, but hearing mass! These are distinct things, and disjoined in the sense of the Roman doctors, the one is commanded, the other is not; so that they may duly hear mass all their lives, and yet not wait on God one moment: the former they must do, the latter they are not obliged to regard, nor anything that necessarily belongs to it. Navar⁴ asserts this, and would prove it by reason, and the authority of Aquinas, herein generally followed. In short, if there be any worship required in the mass, it is merely external; and that, disjoined from the inward service of the soul, is but a mere shew or visor of worship, as they themselves confess in their lightsomer intervals. Well, but is it worship in any sense? Is there anything religious required of the people herein? For this they tell us it is enough, if it be a human act, no more is enjoined, the precept obligeth not, but to hear, so that it may be a human act,⁶ saith. Soto and others, and if it suffice that it be a human act, it needs not be religious. Let it be deliberate, that is enough to make it a human act; and then, though there be no religious motion or intention in it, the precept is fulfilled. Sylvester confirms us herein: the precept, saith he, is given unto men, and therefore the work must not be the issue only of the imagination, which is common to us with beasts, it must proceed from deliberation, which requires some attention.⁸ So that there is something more required of one that goes to mass than of a beast; but that is before he comes there; if he advance but to it as a man, he may be excused even from human acts, when he is at it, he needs neither exercise his understanding nor his senses. He needs not understand it, that it is far from being a duty, they have made it impossible; it is no sin either for priests² or people not to know what they do, so reasonable is their service. The Latin makes it unintelligible enough, but if it were in a language less known, if in Mosarabic or Greek, those who are present without any but their mother tongue fulfil the precept. As Victorel tells us,⁴ after Soto and others, he need not see what is done, he may do all that is requisite at the mass blindfold; he needs not hear it, as Cajetan and others tell us,⁶ and this is much, he is enjoined only to hear mass, and yet doth all that he is enjoined if he hear it not, if not one syllable of it reach his ears; it seems, with them, to hear is not to hear. Just by the same figure that they say they worship God, when in truth they do not worship him at all.

He needs not be sensible of anything about it; to hear mass, saith Tolet, is not to use any of his senses about what is done in the mass. And if this be their worshipping God, a man may worship him as much as the church of Rome requires, not only without reverence and devotion, without heart and affection, but without the use of sense or reason. A brute may do more at mass than they require their catholics to do. No wonder that church enjoins no attention, devotion, or reverence, nor counts them needful (as we have already manifested), for can there be any pretence to require these, when both sense and understanding are superseded; or can there be anything that deserves the name of worship without these?

They themselves cancel and overthrow all their own pleas and pretences for their offering God anything of worship in the mass. For, they say, he doth not worship there who is not present; and they cannot deny that in God’s account he is absent whose mind is not present. And yet they justify voluntary departures of mind and heart, when they would be worshipping; and those who would not seem to do this do it really, when they conclude it no fault to employ themselves about other things when they are at mass. They allow them to say their hours (and so neglect the mass, out of a neglect of their divine office), or to recite what is enjoined them by way of penance (and so prefer a punishment before the chief part of their religion), or other voluntary performances (so they may do what they will rather than mind what they are about). They know they cannot do two things at once, especially in divine worship, which should take up the soul. Though in their worshipping, where the soul is not concerned, they may attend a hundred acts at once; as much as they are obliged to mind the mass, that is, actually not at all. They admit them not only to read or write what they please, but also to sleep part of the time, so that they take not too long a nap.² It should not last above a third part, or half the mass (for that is pars notabilis); if it be but less than that, it passeth for nothing.⁴ Or if they be too brisk to sleep, they may entertain themselves with familiar chat. Medina concludes that he who is at mass may spend the whole time in discourse about other things,—merchant affairs or making bargains,—and yet fulfil the precept.⁶ They must, it seems, demean themselves at mass altogether as religiously as at the exchange, and no more is required. Suarez would have the discourse neither so long nor so serious, there should be some intermissions to attend. But what attention can he mean? He (with the rest) tells us that to the mass less attention is requisite than to their divine office; and to that office, he and they say, a virtual intention is sufficient, and this is the least of all that can be. So that to the mass less attention than the least of all will suffice; and this, to common apprehension, is none at all. Others of them (as we saw before) will have no attention of mind needful for their office; and so with them, none will serve the mass. Their catholics may have their choice here, and satisfy their devotion at mass either with the attention of this doctor and some other late authors, which is none at all; or (if this seem too much) with that of their ancienter doctors, which is less than none. And what must they attend to who need neither hear, nor see, nor understand what is said or done? It would puzzle one as subtle as himself to tell one how he can attend to that which is neither offered to his senses nor his intellect. And therefore the Jesuit, though he seems more strict, yet herein is less rational than Medina, and not so consistent with himself or their common doctrine. Also he would not have the discourse at mass so grave and serious as that of merchants: it should be more light, more idle than that about trade and business. It seems the levity of the stage suits with the mass better than the seriousness of the exchange. Answerably, if their discourse be not decent, nor the subject of it very modest, the mass will comport with it, and the church’s precept will bear it without a breach. And no wonder, since it hath been the custom of that church (as many of their writers inform us²) to sing not only profane, but filthy, songs at high mass; and that to the organ, that the people might not only be refreshed by their own private immodest discourse, but edified more effectually this way by the louder voice of the church. And how, we learn by a grave cardinal (though little herein more rigid than others), who tells us that the hearers were thereby excited to what was profane and filthy, as experience witnessed. And still notwithstanding any pretence of reformation, tunes to the organ at divine service or mass, though lascivious and very profane, will pass for a small fault (in the judgment of those who seem most severe in the case) if either the matter be slight, or the intention good, or the actors inconsiderate.⁴ Here is provision enough, that the scenes in their mass may not be dull and heavy. Yet further, they may laugh and be pleasant, and when the music (which sounds not always) doth it not, they may make themselves merry in the height of their worship. But this with some caution: their talk and laughter may break out into such noise, that possibly it may prove a sin of irreverence. Here is some show of danger, but it will vanish presently; for if it should be a very loud extravagance, and the irreverence great, yet great irreverence may with them be but a small fault, and they have the authority of the pope to warrant this.⁶ Nor must this seem strange to us, since they will not have all contempt of God criminal; that which is material may be venial, and it is not formal, unless besides the contempt of God there be also an intention to contemn him. Such is the most solemn worship in the Roman church, and so is God worshipped amongst them; and that not by the unwarranted presumption of the profane multitude, but by the rules and conclusions of those who direct their worship and guide their consciences. Here we may see in the mass the religion of Roman Catholics; they call it the chiefest, the best part of their religion, that we may not look for anything better amongst them, nor anything religious, if it be not found here; yea, it is all (better or worse) that the people are obliged to in public (and in private their church doth not trouble them with any).⁸ He that views it well, and believes he hath a soul, and that there is a God, must have little or no regard of either if he do not bless himself from it, as a thing which hath nothing of religion but the name, and that merely usurped. A religion which needs nothing, by the doctrine of its chief professors, that is either godly, or so good as human; no regard of God at all, so much as in one thought of him; nor any act of reason, yea, or of sense, either about anything religious or divine, yet allows a free exercise of both about that which is profane and irreligious; he that counts this religion indeed, must stifle the common notions of religion and Christianity; and he that, understanding it, makes choice thereof, had need first be very indifferent, whether he have any religion or none. Had the ancient fathers talked after this senseless, lewd, extravagant rate concerning the worship of God, how would Celsus, Porphyry, and Julian have triumphed over them! Nay, they might justly have challenged them to have instanced in any one that bore the name of a philosopher, that ever treated of the worship of God with so little reverence and discretion. Had such loose and wild doctrines been broached by the first teachers of Christianity, the heathens needed not have raised so fierce a persecution against it, they might with ease have hissed it out of the world. But this is not the worst: they encourage that in the mass which they cannot but condemn as wicked, and maintain that the precept for hearing mass may be satisfied by such wickedness. Melchior Canus to this objection (that the command of God or the church cannot be fulfilled by sin) answers according to the opinion commonly maintained amongst them, that he is no transgressor of the precept who to the act enjoined, and good in its kind, adds something sinful. He supposeth that the act commanded by the church is some way good; but withal, that the precept may be satisfied, though it be done wickedly, and that by their common doctrine. Whether the circumstances may be venially or mortally wicked he saith not, but leaves us to understand it of either. Dominicus à Soto tells us expressly, that though what is added to the act² enjoined be a mortal wickedness, yet the precept may thereby be satisfied substantially. With these divines of greatest reputation amongst them, concurs Navarre, no less renowned (and none of them Jesuits); The opinion of Antoninus (which he is disproving) presupposeth, saith he, that by a sinful act, especially if it be a mortal sin, the command of the church cannot be fulfilled; but that this is false we have largely proved. He would have us know that he hath fully demonstrated that the precept for hearing mass may be entirely accomplished by deadly crimes. This is the judgment of the most eminent doctors amongst them, such as are not of the Society, and (if they will believe their famous bishop of the Canaries) the common doctrine in the Roman church, and by this the world may judge what a church it is, what her religion, what her worship, what her precepts for it are, when all that she requires for that worship, which is the principal part of her religion, may be satisfied by acts of wickedness, such as are mortal and damnable to the worshippers, and most (of all others) dishonourable to God, whom they pretend to worship. And let those that are seduced, or may be tempted by seducers, seriously consider whether they can wisely trust their souls to such a conduct, or be safe in such a communion, where there is no more tenderness for the salvation of souls than to be satisfied with such a worshipping of God as will confessedly damn them.

Sect. 3. Thus much for the manner of their public worship, all of it, whoever amongst them it concerns, whereby it appears that they count it not necessary that God should have any real worship from them. This will be further manifest by what they teach concerning the end of it.

They maintain that it is lawful for their clergy and monastics too (who profess perfection) to serve God for their own ends, viz. to get preferment, or compass a dignity, or gain some worldly advantage, and so to prostitute the honour and worship of God to such low, earthly, sordid designs, as religious persons would never appear to own, but that irreligion is grown too monstrously big for its vizard. He that riseth to their morning service for this end, that he may have his daily dividend, if it be not principally for this, he sins not. So their glossa celeberrima, the two popes Urban and Cœlestine, determine that it is lawful for their clergy to serve God in their churches for this design, and hope to get ecclesiastical dignity; in Navarre. But then this great casuist (of so high esteem among them, that he was sent for from Spain to Rome, to give advice and direction to the old gentleman there, that cannot err) understands (after Aquinas and Jo. Major,² as he pretends) the principal end to be something else than others do. It is not that which so much moves the agent, as that without it he would not be drawn to act by any other end; and accordingly he will have the premised testimony to be understood. So that one of their perfectionists, who riseth to morning prayer for this end, that he may have his dividend, and would not stir⁴ out of his bed to attend the worship of God for God’s sake, or any other end beseeming a religious person, if the consideration of his daily allowance did not rouse him, yet he serves God so well herein as that he is sinless, and not so much as venially tainted. Likewise the clergy who address themselves to the worship of God, moved thereto more by hopes to gain preferment and dignity than any respect to God, yet they sin not; that is, they worship God well enough, though they respect themselves and their own ends more than him; or, which is all one, though they serve themselves rather than God, whom they are to worship. They are all concerned to maintain this; for he tells them, if such acts of virtue or worship were vicious, all their acts in a manner would be stark naught, since there are extremely few amongst them that are purely done for God. They are a church in the meantime that worthily profess godliness, since nothing is done, or needs be done by them, even in the worship of God, for him, so much as for themselves; and, indeed, Sylvester deals ingenuously when he tells us plainly, without the cover of any pitiful shift, that it is no sin to serve God principally for their own profit.

Moreover, and yet worse, they teach it is no sin to worship God for an end that is in itself a sin, if it be not principally intended. It is lawful by their doctrine to preach, to pray, say mass, &c., for praise of men (though Christ will have those that designed it, as Cajetan notes, even when he is excusing this, to have no better reward), or for vain glory (though they reckon this amongst capital crimes³), only he must not make so wicked a thing his chief end, and then he is innocent enough, though sin against God be his design in worshipping him. It is no sin, yea, it is meritorious, to do these things, viz. to preach, and say mass, and to do other things of like nature principally for God, and secondarily for vain glory and praise of men, aptly directed as our end. Thus Navarre determines after their great saint and doctor, Aquinas. Now he had taught us before, that these acts of worship are but done secondarily (and so unlawfully) for these criminal ends, when they so much sway a man as that he would not worship God unless he were excited by them; and that vain glory is not his principal end, even when he is so much influenced thereby as that he would not pray or preach, &c. If this were not his motive, this in the judgment of others, as he acknowledged, is to make sin his principal end, and to advance wickedness above God, even when he pretends to worship him.⁵ But let us not interrupt this great doctor in his way, it is foul enough as himself makes it; for hereby a man may serve God, and that meritoriously (after the Roman mode), though he never would let him have an act of worship, if pride and vain glory did not set him a-work. He would never pray or preach, &c., if he were not more moved to it by sin, and out of regard to some wickedness, than out of respect to God.

Further yet, they hold it is but a venial fault to worship God principally for vain glory, and other designs of like quality. Aquinas, as he is represented by Sylvester, determining that it is no mortal sin to serve God principally for vain glory, if that be one’s chief end actually only, and not both habitually and actually. Sylvester declares it as his own persuasion, that it is both against Aquinas and the truth to hold it is a mortal sin, when those things which are ordained for the glory of God are used principally for a man’s own glory. He instances in the sacraments, saying mass, the Scriptures, and preaching.

Cardinal Cajetan declares himself thus in one instance, which involves the rest: It is but venial to preach for vain glory, or hopes of a gainful alms, signifying that he means such vain glory as Christ condemned in the pharisees, when he told them this was like to be ‘their reward.’

Navarre affirms, that to preach, or say mass, or pray, and such things as are instituted for the honour and worship of God and the salvation of souls, for vain glory principally, or more than principally, is but a venial fault; and that such as gainsay this (who are but two) have been confuted by others, and by himself after them. These are the chief of their doctors, whom the rest commonly follow (and none of them Jesuits), who unanimously assert this. Now it is not necessary with them for any man to avoid a venial sin, since by their doctrine a world of them can never damn a man; and therefore it is not necessary for any papist to worship God otherwise than principally for vain glory, or ends equally criminal, i. e. it is not needful for them to worship him at all; for no man can imagine that he is worshipped when he is in the highest degree dishonoured and affronted; and what greater affront can be put upon him than under a pretence of worship to debase the great God, and thrust him lower in our designs, not only than ourselves and earthly trifles, but lower than sin, the vilest thing on earth, yea, or in hell? and this is evidently done when vain-glory (a capital sin) hath the pre-eminence of God in addresses to him, and is regarded as principal; when the Lord of heaven and earth hath no regard at all, or only in a lower place. It is not worshipping of God, but a horrid impiety, for men to serve themselves instead of God, but more intolerably impious to worship sin; and that hath the worship and is honoured in the place of God which hath the highest advancement, and is principal in religious addresses; yet no better than this is all the worship which, by the Roman doctrine, is necessary from their catholics. In short, whereas by their doctrine of non-attention, formerly examined, it is so evident that they discharge themselves from all real worship, as they have no colour to hide it, no shift to evade it, but a supposal of some previous attempt to serve God when they are addressing themselves to their service; this, their last reserve, they themselves ruin, by their doctrine concerning the end of worship; for they teach, besides what is premised, that a man who comes to mass or divine service, with a purpose not to worship God, but to serve his lusts, doth satisfy the precept. We are not obliged, saith Soto, to hear mass but only so that it may be a human act, which it may be, though there be a sinister intention in it; yea, though the thing intended be a sin, and that highly criminal, for he adds: If one attend prayer, though he do it for vain glory (that is a small matter to stick at), yea, though it be with a purpose mortally wicked, yet he fulfils the precept substantially. Such are the commands of the church of Rome for her most sacred worship. They may be fully satisfied by deadly wickedness; there needs no purity of heart or hand for her devotions; a design damnably evil will serve the turn. That of Antoninus, saith Navarre,² is not to be maintained, that he doth not satisfy the precept who comes to church principally to look on a handsome woman, or to talk with her, or for any other sinful thing. If a man, in going to mass, designs to satisfy his curiosity, or his lust, or anything else which is wicked, that church is so good-natured she will be satisfied with it, and think her precept for worship well observed, and you must believe (if you can) that she is a good Christian church that will have Christ worshipped at this rate. He adds reason for it. A man may come to church for a wicked end, and yet hear mass well enough there.

Bonacina instances in several sorts of wickedness, whereby the command for worship may be fulfilled. This is one amongst the rest: if a man go to church on purpose to gaze on or to lust after women lecherously, he satisfies the precept, and for the general rule vouches not only Sotus, Navarre, Medina, and others of greatest reputation in their church, but also their angelical Saint Thomas.

I need not censure these things. Let those that are impartial consider the premises, and see if this be not their sense, that the people in the papacy, by its order, do not, or are not obliged to give God any real worship in public, and by their leaders are taught and encouraged, instead of worship, to present him with gross wickedness. If the measures of religion may be best taken by its worship, what can any indifferent person judge of popery, where a service so palpably irreligious is the best and the most excellent worship they have? If this were duly considered, I think it alone might be sufficient to reduce those that are deluded, and to secure those against temptations who are not yet ensnared.

Sect. 4. There is another public exercise which Christ makes as necessary as any evangelical service whatever, and that is, preaching and hearing the word of God. But the Romanists are not of his mind in this. The mass is commanded, but not preaching, saith Sylvester, and he one of the order of predicants. Accordingly hearing mass is commanded, but hearing sermons is only matter of advice (saith another), which may be neglected without imputation of sin, and if observed is an act of supererogation.

They conclude it no duty in such circumstances where it would be counted necessary, if ever; it is no duty on the Lord’s day, or any other time set apart for the public worship. Mass must be heard then, but no need to hear a sermon. If it were any man’s duty in their account, it would be so in that case when one wants the knowledge which is necessary to salvation, and hath opportunity to get it by hearing; but even then they declare him not obliged. Sylvester propounds the case in these terms:³ Doth he sin mortally who is ignorant of those common things which are necessary to salvation, and may hear sermons, but doth not? He answers, He so sins who omits it out of contempt, or with notorious scandal, but not always when it is out of negligence; because, according to Aquinas, negligence is not mortal, unless something be omitted which is under precept, or with contempt; adding, such negligence may possibly be a mortal sin, but when it is so, it cannot be determined. It seems no man can tell when it will be a crime for a person damnably ignorant to neglect the means of instruction; but more briefly and positively he resolves it elsewhere, that he is not commanded to hear a sermon upon the Lord’s-day; although he be ignorant of those things which are necessary to salvation, because he may otherwise satisfy the precept for learning.

Sect. 5. As to the sacraments, and the worship in them, the despatch may be quick. There are none considerable here but baptism and the eucharist, for their other five are not of divine appointment, nor the worship of God, but their own inventions; and therefore, how needful soever they count them, thereby they make no true worship necessary. But indeed none of them are in their own account necessary to salvation, save only penance, and that we shall meet with hereafter. What worship they shall have in the eucharist is sufficiently discovered by what they are satisfied with in the mass, where we have found them contented with none at all, or that which is worse than none. Neither do they account this sacrament simply necessary, for although it be required that they communicate once a year, yet that is but by human law or custom, as they teach. The sacrament of the eucharist, saith Canus, is not a sacrament of necessity. For baptism, if they account any worship necessary, it must be either in respect of the administrator or the baptized; as to the former, none with them is needful. For by their doctrine it may be validly administered by any man or woman, or one that is both; yea, or by a child, by those also that are strangers, or enemies to all Christian worship, by Jews, pagans, or infidels of any sort, by such as worship not the true God (as Sylvester tells us out of Aquinas, Paludanus, and their church’s law); by such as believe that baptism is good for nought, and minister it in scorn; by such as believe that it is not a sacrament, that it hath no spiritual virtue, and intend not, while they baptize, to administer a sacrament, but only think to do as the church does, although they account that to be nothing at all; so Aquinas² and Pope Innocent saith it will be effectual, though the baptizer neither know nor believe what baptism is, but counts it a trifle; though he neither know what the church is, nor minds to do what the church doth, but means to do the contrary. No other worship is necessary upon the account of the ministers, but what might be expected from such as these. Nor any more upon the account of the persons baptized. For as to the adult (there being no pretence in reference to infants), they think it sufficiently administered by force to those who would not endure it, but for fear of death if they did not yield; to such as make all the resistance they can,⁴ and offer foul injury to the sacrament, and defile the water; to those who receive it, not for the purpose for which it is intended, but for quite other ends than ever it was designed for; yea, to those that are frantic, and never had the use of reason, or are⁶ stark mad, and that in the height of their madness; to those also that are fast asleep, if they had a mind to it when they were waking. Since they think it duly administered to such as these, they cannot count any worship necessary herein upon the account of the partakers, but what such as these now mentioned may offer.

Sect. 6. For fuller and more particular satisfaction, it is observable that they divide their sacraments into some for the dead and some for the living. Those for the dead are baptism and penance. As to these two, some count no disposition requisite but only a willingness to receive them. Others, who would seem to be more severe, count attrition sufficient, which is a slender dislike of sin, not as it is an offence to God, but out of some other consideration, human, natural, or servile. And the lowest degree of this possible, and that despatched in a moment; and this moment need not be while they are at these sacraments, but either before or after. Their penitents² may make their confession with laughter instead of grief, yet have as much grief at their sacrament of penance as they require; this is past doubt with them. So that it is their common doctrine that no good act, or motion at all, no, not so little and low as that of attrition, much less any ingenuous reverence or devotion, any act of grace or holy affection, is needful while they are at the sacrament, either of baptism or their penance. The sacraments of the living are their other five: confirmation, orders, matrimony, extreme unction, and the eucharist. These, they say, were instituted for the increase of grace; this is their proper effect; and that they may have their effect, there is not requisite in the partakers any actual dispositions at all, not the least inward act or motion that is good; no, not so little as that of attrition, which, in their account, is of all others the least and lowest disposition. And well may they count it so, since the best sort of it, with them, is but the issue of servile fear, which, as such, is below the least degree of moral goodness; and so far from being supernaturally good, that it is morally evil, as we shall see hereafter. All that is needful is only that the partakers be in a state of grace (such as a priest may put a sinner into who is impenitent, and never truly contrite), though he shew it not by any act in the sacraments, where, if ever, it should appear. That the sacraments may confer an increase of grace, they only require an habitual disposition, i. e. that they be received in the state of grace; this is the judgment of Aquinas and Scotus, whom the rest generally follow. So that, to partake worthily of these sacraments, no actual disposition, no act of reverence or devotion, not any inward motion (such as should be in true worshippers), is more required or expected than in the senseless statues which they idolise. Their souls need act or move no more as worshippers of God herein, than if they were neither Christians nor men; than if they were so far from having grace, as to have no souls. Yea, these sacraments may be valid, and duly celebrated as their church requires they should be, while the partakers are not only void of all good motion towards God, but while their souls are in motion against him, and all that is divine and sacred. Their minds and hearts may, during the celebration, be taken up with acts, not only of folly and vanity, but of pride, or lusts, or revenge, or infidelity, or atheism, or what is most contrary to the most holy God and his worship, and yet partake as well as the church requires. For the precepts of their church, concerning the administering of the sacraments, and all other things by her enjoined, may be entirely satisfied by acts of wickedness; so notoriously holy is that church, by the report of their chief writers.

Sect. 7. If they count any of their sacraments more worthy of holier treatment than that now mentioned, it will be the eucharist; for this they count more worthy than the rest, and have it in such veneration, as not only to worship Christ in it, but to worship it even as Christ himself; and therefore here, if ever, they will judge it requisite to shew themselves worshippers indeed. Yet for all this, whatever worship of this sacrament they count needful, they conclude no true worship of Christ necessary; no, not so much as the least inward act of reverence, devotion, or honour; for this is their common doctrine, that besides the disposition of habitual grace, there is no precept so rigorous as to require any actual disposition for the worthy receiving of this sacrament, so as that the omission of it can be a mortal sin. In this all their divines agree; so that any one may partake worthily of this sacrament, and be free of mortal guilt, without any actual reverence or devotion, any act of grace or holy affection, while he is communicating. This one maxim (wherein they all concur) quite stifles the spirit of Christianity, and bereaves it of its life and soul; it leaves nothing that can honour or please Christ, or be of any advantage to souls, needful in any Christian duty. For no good motion of mind or heart, being needful in the celebrating of this sacrament, which requires it more, they cannot imagine it necessary in any other duty of less consequence; and the want hereof being but a venial fault, there is no more necessity to have it, than there is to avoid a venial sin, which they make nothing of. In this very case, they hold that³ a venial sin, even in the act of communicating, will not hinder the effect of the sacrament. Yea, it may not be so much as a venial fault, if the vagaries of the mind, which exclude attention and reverence due to such a religious act, be natural. But will it not be more than so slight a fault, voluntarily to abandon every good motion in the celebrating of this sacrament? No; to decline every good act of mind or heart, and that voluntarily, it can be no worse; if it be without contempt, it will be no mortal fault, and that also in the judgment of all their divines. But though there be not any good disposition in the soul towards Christ, in partaking of his supper, yet is it not necessary that vile and wicked dispositions should be excluded? No; there is no more need of this than the other. The mind and the heart may actually entertain such as are sinful, without any more danger than it rejects those that are good. It is but a slight fault² to communicate out of ostentation and vain glory, and so to nourish pride while he should be feeding upon Christ, and to design his own honour without any act of reverence for Christ; he may let his thoughts run out upon vanity, or entertain his soul with vain delights, without the least motion of love, or delight, or desire for Christ, without the least act of faith in him; and may be pleasing himself with sin, instead of grieving for it, when he hath the greatest advantage to look upon him whom he hath pierced. And all this he may do without any guilt that need be repented of or regarded. This is all the worship and honour that it is needful their souls should give to Christ, even in the sacrament of his body and blood; who will have others cursed to hell, and burned beforehand, for not giving divine worship to a wafer. But this is not all; their church will be satisfied with greater indignity offered to Christ than this; for they teach, that those who communicate unworthily, to such a degree as they count sacrilege (and that so heinous, as they question whether it be not as tolerable to cast that which they count their God to be devoured by dogs, or throw it into the dirt to be trampled on; and many of them are positive that it is greater wickedness than murder or adultery, or that uncleanness against nature which is most abominable),⁴ do fully satisfy the precept of the church for this communion. Thus Soto, Corduba, Covarruvius, and others, alleged by them. And this is all derived from their St Thomas, that maxim of his so generally received; the law commanding an act enjoins the substance of it, but not the manner. By which we must understand, that the church would have the thing done, but regards not how they do it, whether as Christians or as atheists. She is indifferent as to devotion or sacrilege in her catholics, having something else in design than to be concerned in the honouring of God, and the happiness of men, which so much depends upon the manner of worshipping. It is too plain to be denied, that such a treatment of holy things (to use their own words) is not at all for the worship of God, or the salvation of souls, but opposite to both; yet their church’s precept is entirely thereby fulfilled. So that, if God have no worship, and men no salvation, yet the church is satisfied. This and other outward acts mast be visibly done, that the world may not think but they have something like religion amongst them; but though, instead of the worship due to the divine majesty, they perform the acts of it in such a manner, as no less dishonours and provokes him, than the crying sins of murder or sodomy, their church hath full contentment; it is all she requires.

Thus we have surveyed the church service amongst the Romanists in the several parts of it, and cannot discern any real worship therein to which they are obliged; but rather that all such worship of God in public is, by their rules and orders, rendered either impossible or unnecessary.

Sect. 8. Let us inquire, in the next place, whether they count it needful that God should have any worship from them in private; and this we may discover by what they determine concerning meditation, reading the Scripture, and private prayer. For meditation, the casuists speak little of it, nothing at all (that I have met with) of its necessity; it is like they reserve it for their contemplative persons, as a degree of perfection to which others need not aspire. The perfectionists themselves may waive it, but when they will be so over good as to supererogate, and do better than God commands them, if they judge it necessary at any time, sure it would be on those days when such acts are most proper and requisite.² But they conclude it no duty upon the Lord’s day, or any other devoted by them, as they pretend, to the observance of God. For they generally agree that no inward worship is then required, and meditation is discharged by name; now if they need not think of God on his own day, or any other, wherein a particular observance of him is requisite, it is ground enough to conclude they do not count it needful to think of him at all. Who can imagine that they judge it necessary to think of God at any time, who count it needless to have God in their thoughts when they are at his worship?

Sect. 9. As for the reading the word of God in private, they are so far from esteeming this a duty, that they will scarce excuse it from a crime: all that can be obtained for it is only a toleration (as a thing that passeth under an ill character), and that but in some places, and there but for some persons, with more restriction and caution than the public stews are tolerated by their holy bishop in Rome. So much friends are they to the word of God, or so little do they judge it a friend to them. They are the best catholics in their account who do not desire to look into it, or to understand from God what he would have them to be; they think it advisable that no mortal should be acquainted with more of the Scriptures than is in the mass, where they can understand nothing, and need hear nothing of it at all.

Sect. 10. For private prayer, it is either vocal or mental. That which they call vocal, they generally count not necessary by any law, either of God or nature, or the church; and so all praying with families is quite cashiered from the rank of Christian duties. There to call upon God’s name together they are not concerned, though some think the heathen are. They count it not a duty to say so much as the² Lord’s prayer (if they understand but otherwise what is to be prayed for). This is the common opinion in Suarez; nor do they think an Ave Mary (though these are the prayers most in request with them) more needful. They are not obliged to say it when the public sign is given at night for that purpose; nor need they use any vocal prayer at all, no, not so much as on the solemn days for worship. But is mental prayer a duty when the other is not used? So it seems; but the question (as in all affirmative precepts) is, when? Lessius thinks it should not be put off above a month or two; that would signify too much neglect of our salvation. It seems those that pray but once in two months do not much neglect it; but this Jesuit is too strait-laced. That opinion is probable enough, saith one of the greatest casuists of this age, which⁶ assigns three times for prayer, once when we come to the perfect use of reason (suppose when they think him capable of fasting, about twenty-one years of age); and again at the point of death, and in the interval, when we are obliged to love God (that is, once in five or once in seven years). But is not this Jesuit too severe also? It may be those of other orders will not oppress us so much, or wish us so unlike to atheists as to have us pray once in seven years. The Jesuits, though accounted most licentious, yet seldom exceed, and sometimes fall short herein of their other divines. Sylvester, a Dominican of greatest reputation amongst the casuists, thus determines the question after Aquinas.⁸ When one first comes to the use of reason, he should pray for God’s assistance; (videtur) he is not peremptory that he must, and speaks but conditionally too; for he adds, If he be thus inspired, otherwise he is not determined to that time. When then? Why, the providence of God moves him to it when it is necessary. Thus he leaves it, and finds no other time, when a man is obliged to pray once for himself, but when he sees his soul in greatest danger, which, it may be, he will never see. Their common doctrine is yet worse; thereby we are not bound to pray but in the article of necessity, and that is, when we are in such extremity as there is no other remedy for us:² if we judge that we can any way else obtain what we would have, we need not pray. The law of God or nature makes it not then our duty. They help us to understand this by two instances; the one to shew when it is requisite to pray for ourselves, the second when for others. When a man falls into most grievous temptations to impatience, or to lust, if there can be no other remedy against it but the grace of God, to be obtained by prayer, then it may be his duty. But it seems if he can rid himself of it any other way, or but think he can, then, though the temptation be never so violent or dangerous, he needs not pray. The other is, when a man at a distance sees two ready to fight a duel, and makes account there is no remedy but the help of God for parting them, then he is to seek it (which is not the case of one in a thousand), yet if perhaps he can any otherwise more help them than by praying, he may let it alone.⁴ So that private prayer needs not be their daily practice, nor used as a Christian exercise in ordinary, but in extremity only, and cases otherwise desperate, and as the last remedy, and when there is no other indeed, or in their apprehension; it will not be a duty, but in such circumstances as do very rarely, if ever, concur.⁶ They are not to use it as their common repast, but as physic; not for prevention neither, but when they are already surprised with extreme danger. And if such extremity occur not once in seven years, they need not pray for so many years; nay, perhaps it may not befall them, or they may not be apprehensive of it while they live, and then they need not pray at all. This is not my inference only; it is their own, and acknowledged to be the consequence of their common doctrine. Thereby there is no divine precept for prayer which can oblige any directly; only by accident it may happen sometimes to be a duty, but such an accident as few may meet with. It is said expressly that from thence it follows that many may pass their whole lives without ever praying to God, and this without any great fault. It should be said, without the least fault; for where there is no obligation, there is no duty at all; and then no sin, great or little, in the want of performance. This is some of their church’s sense; but they speak it more fully who tell us that mental prayer is to be reckoned amongst counsels (which none are obliged to observe), and this by the common consent of Aquinas and their other doctors. And accordingly, that there is³ no divine precept, or of natural law, of itself obliging to mental prayer, meditation (some peculiar engagements or occasions set apart, wherein mental prayer is not concerned); and this is counted so certain, that to teach the contrary is temerarious, because against the common use and sense of the whole church. So that they are not far from the sense of the church, who (without excepting public or private, mental or vocal), deny that there is any divine precept in special for prayer. And these are not only their modern divines, but some of the ancienter also, particularly Alexander Alensis⁵ (the prime of all their school doctors), in strictness seems to deny that there is any proper command by divine law for prayer, taking it properly, but only in a most large sense, as any pious act or good desire may be called prayer. And those who would not seem to like this in general, yet allow it when they come to particulars, since they teach that the precept obligeth not at any such particular time or occasion, when it would oblige, if ever. There is no command, they tell us, which binds them to pray in private at any set time whatever. They are not obliged to pray when they first come to the use of reason,⁷ nor on common days afterwards; not the least prayer, not a paternoster, not once a-day, no, not at their meals; even their clergy need not do it; nor on holidays neither,⁹ no, not when they have quite neglected their service in public; nor on their fasts, though Scripture still joins these, as all Christians who minded religion were wont to do of old. Their fasts are no more religious for prayer or any holy exercise than the abstinence of their cattle; nor to prepare themselves for sacred or solemn employments, for their sacraments of penance, or else for the eucharist (though this would but trouble them once a-year);¹¹ not at the beginning of any service or undertaking whatever. To pray at such times and occasions is mere matter of counsel, which none can be blamed for neglecting; nor when a man hath vowed and solemnly promised to God, and sworn too, that he will pray, even then, if it be but a little prayer,¹³ it will be but a small fault to omit it for all this. In short, which compriseth all, there can be no certain time assigned (unless the hour of death) in which, by any precept of religion, we are bound to worship God, or seek his help by an act of prayer, as in like case is said of an act of contrition and love to God. So Bonacina; no time for prayer certain, none determined; but, as they conjecture, perhaps it may be a duty, when they apprehend themselves under grievous and dangerous temptations, and judge there is no remedy but prayer. This, or none at all, is the time for it by their common doctrine; and this is in effect to say, it is a duty at no time, for no person. For those under temptation may not apprehend it dangerous, or a remedy needful, as all will be ready to do who either regard not temptations, or are pleased with them, or what they lead to. And neither these nor any else can judge there is no other remedy but prayer, if they believe their doctrine, which offers them divers other remedies, and those more relied on than this. To mention none else, almost any of their sacramentals (of which they have multitudes) will serve their turn, even a little salt,² conjured after the mode of holy church, may do it. Thus we see these catholics secured from all divine obligations to pray while they live. But they have another way to do it; for, if any apprehend themselves in dangerous temptations, and also that there is no other remedy against it but prayer, they determine that if such be ignorant that it is then a duty, or if they know it, but do not consider it, they are excused from sin, though they then neglect to pray. Now, the people may well be ignorant that they are in such case obliged, when their learned men scarce know it. And for those that do know it, the violence of the temptation (and the case supposeth it violent) may leave no place for consideration. However, no man considers this or other things unless he will, and so it will be no sin to neglect prayer at that time, when only they count it a duty, unless he list. Yea,⁴ though the ignorance or inconsiderateness be culpable, and through his own default, yet the neglect of the duty which is thereby occasioned they can excuse from sin. Besides, if they should both know and consider that prayer is then their duty, yet they teach that the omission of it is then no special sin, i. e. no other sin than that which they should seek to avoid by praying; whereby they plainly declare that there is in their account no special precept for prayer, no, not in that case wherein alone they would have it thought a duty; otherwise they would judge it a special sin then to neglect it.

Sect. 11. But though their catholics be thus sufficiently eased of all obligations to private prayer all their lives, by virtue of any divine command, it may be there is some precept in the church for it. Can she be content that they should live so much without God, or any acknowledgment of their dependence on him, more like atheists than Christians? Yes, there is not anything for private addresses to God amongst all her precepts; she is too indulgent to trouble them with any such thing; she requires not of them the least prayer, or such as are accounted best, not so much as a Paternoster: there is no ecclesiastical precept for this, to make it so much as a venial fault, not to use it, says Medina, not a Salve Regina, no, nor an Ave Mary. They have indeed a special respect to this last, and prefer it ten to one before any other (though they might use this every minute, without ever praying once to God all their life). And Pope John XXII. ordained, that thrice every evening the bell should sound, that every one might say an Ave Mary thrice; and since it is grown a custom (and a church custom usually stands for a law with them), that not only at evening, but at noon and morning, too, a bell should sound for the same purpose; so that this, if any, is under injunction. There is a fair show for it, but it is no more than a show, for they assure us this is a voluntary devotion, and hath nothing of obligation in it. Those that never use this and such prayers, it is, they say, a shrewd sign they do not live well; but the omission thereof is no special sin with respect unto any precept either of God or the church. And is not this a very pious concession that they are pleased to grant, that for a man never to say his prayers, is a general bad sign that he does not live as he ought, though they will by no means allow it to be any special sin. Oh the piety and tenderness of this mother and head of all churches!

If, for all this, any of them should conceive themselves obliged to pray sometimes; or if, without such opinion, they should find some season for private prayer, though God (as they dream), and the church (as they know), hath prescribed none; as when a confessor enjoins it for penance; or out of voluntary devotion, when they have a mind to supererogate, and do better than God requires, upon which accounts some of them may be found now and then very busy with their beads; yet in these cases there is by their principles no more need to worship God in their private than in their public prayers, where (as we have shewed) they account no actual observance of God at all necessary. As for the prayers enjoined them by way of penance, these are not necessary for them, but as their punishment; and then they pray not, for that is an act of the soul, but this is a suffering of the outward man. The church as (they say) it cannot judge of inward acts, so it cannot order them to be penal. And the malefactors here being their own executioners, as there is no need, so there is no fear that they will punish their souls, but leave them untouched, unconcerned, whatever their lips, or fingers, or beads may suffer, by that grievous penalty of praying. But it were well if God did not suffer more by such abuse of his name and worship, than those malefactors, who count it a suffering to do anything like his service. And it sounds not well that prayer must pass for a punishment. It is, as Damascene defines it, and they after him, the ascent of the mind unto God. Now, is the approach of the soul to God a punishment? One would think the devils should think better of it; for the misery of hell is distance from God, without hopes of having access to him. But they can solve the difficulty well enough, for they mean not to do any such thing as praying in the case, but only to suffer some thing which they call so. Their care and pains is about their beads, not their souls; if they keep but count, and bring in the full tale which the confessor enjoins; though in as many crowns and rosaries as there are Ave Maries in each ten thousand times over, they have not one thought of God, nor the least motion of mind or heart towards him; yet they give full satisfaction, and undergo all they were adjudged to. In their voluntary prayers there is less worship required than the other, if there can be less than none. For when they need not use such prayers unless they please, they may do it as they list; it being no duty enjoined, the manner of the performance is arbitrary, and wholly at discretion. Hence those who think something (of some sort) of attention requisite in commanded prayers, count none at all necessary in these; no, not that which is superficial, not so little of that as they call virtual. So that, if herein they mind nothing at all, wherein worshippers at prayer are concerned, not so little as the bare words; yet they acquit themselves well enough, yea, if this neglect of all be wilful,² and the mind not only run of its own accord, but be sent away and employed about something else on set purpose, it will be at worst a slight fault.

Sect. 12. In this fashion they would have us suppose that God may be worshipped, when there is neither inward nor outward observance of him. Inward he hath none, when the mind is departed from him, and the heart with it. Outward he hath none, unless merely in show, when the mind directs it not to, and designs it not for him; which is never done, when he is not minded. In fine, by the doctrine of the Romanists (to say nothing of the idolatry or superstition of their service), it is unnecessary that God should have any real worship, either public or private; unless God can be said to be truly worshipped, without the love or fear of God, without acts of wisdom or affection, without reverence or devotion, without sincere or honest intentions; or with designs of wickedness; without knowing what they do, or heeding what they are about; without mind or heart, yea, or body either, unless in mere show; this is apparent by the premises. The people (as they think) worship God well enough at this rate; their leaders teach them no more is needful; their church, by confining their service to an unknown tongue, makes it necessary for their divines thus to teach, and unavoidable for the people to worship, no otherwise. Now, what a church is this, or of what religion, that makes the real worship of God, and of Jesus Christ, to be needless, and takes an effectual course that he shall have none? Let those who are of their communion, or tempted to it, consider it seriously, and in the fear of God. Is it the way to salvation to be without religion? Is there any religion, indeed, where it is made needless to worship God really, when worship is as essential to religion as a soul is to a man? They may, by joining with them, greaten a party, and promote the interest of a faction, which carries on other designs under religious pretences, without regard of God, as to his worship and honour, or to the souls of men, as to their happiness, and the true way to it; but if they follow the conduct of the Roman doctrine, and worship God no otherwise than these would have them; they may be of the Roman profession, and yet of no religion. If a man have a mind to trouble himself with none of the realities of Christianity, and yet to pass for religious enough, in the opinion of so much of the world as is papal, and will hang his soul upon so common reputation, popery is contrived to allure and gratify him; and he may safely venture on it, if damnation be not dangerous, or if he can escape it by an opinion or show of worshipping God, and being religious without morality.

CHAPTER II Christian knowledge is not necessary for Romanists by their doctrine

Sect. 1. Knowledge is the foundation of almost all that is saving: of faith, holiness, obedience, worship. It is the groundwork, without which scarce a stone can be laid in the whole structure of salvation. No saving faith without it, Romans 10:14. There can be no love to, or hope in, an unknown object. There can be no fear, no desire of what we know not. There can be no true worship of God, unless that of the Samaritans was such, ‘who worshipped they knew not what.’ There can be no obedience without knowing whom, what, why, and for what end we obey. In brief, without knowledge there is no eternal life, John 17:3; nothing but ruin and eternal destruction, Hosea 4:6, 2 Thessalonians 1:1-12.

Yet for all this, popery decries knowledge, as that which is unnecessary for the people, and extols the want of it, as that which is essential to their faith (Bellarmine saith, faith is better defined by ignorance); as that which is the mother of their devotion; (so others declare it), as that which is the excellency of their obedience; none comparable to that which they call blind obedience, as Cardinal Cusanus tells us.²

It sufficeth the people to know that their church hath knowledge; and their sight is good enough, in that their teachers have eyes; so one of their authors: In matters of faith, the people ought not to see with their own eyes, but the eyes of their superiors. They need not know what they pray for, nor what they are to believe, nor what they are to do.

1. They need not know what they are to pray for, or to whom, or whether they pray or not; all is muffled up in an unknown language, and they are to venture at they know not what, nor how, nor whither. No wonder if they direct the Lord’s prayer to saints, male or female; and say Our Father to the virgin mother, and, in like manner, direct Ave Maries to Christ, as if they took him to be a woman, or to be with child (and with himself too), to be the fruit of his own womb; or to be his own mother, which the words so applied signify. This ignorance is the dam of such devotion, such as is both horrid and blasphemous to the highest degree of horror; and yet their great clerks will countenance it. The wisdom of their church hath thought it fit, that they should not be so wise as to understand what they do, when they are serving God. The Council of Trent fulminates a curse against those who hold that the mass ought to be celebrated in a known tongue; that is, they curse those who approve not that mode of service, which the apostle condemns as barbarous, 1 Corinthians 14:1-40, such as is not fit for God or man; they curse those who will not offer a blind sacrifice, or blindfolded. As if one under the law ought not to have seen whether that which he offered were a hog or a sheep; whether he sacrificed a lamb, or cut off a dog’s neck; whether he presented an oblation, or offered swine’s blood. They think not only the people, but even the clergy unconcerned, to know what they say when they speak unto God. The clergy (saith Jacobus de Graffis), or the laity, when they are at divine service, if they understand not what they say, they sin not.² It is so far from being their duty to serve God as Christians, that they need not act as men in his service. If the words be but said, though with no more understanding than magpies are taught to sound them, it is as reasonable service as their church requires; what God requires of them is no matter. They expect not that any should understand their service but expert divines, as Soto tells us.⁴ Now it is a very small part of their clergy that pretends to be divines, and a small part of those few that are expert therein; it is an attainment which most of their bishops fall short of. Their common priests are sufficiently qualified with the art of reading, nor need they be masters of that neither; the mass-book is almost taught to read itself. For in the missals established by Pius the Fifth, and recognised by Clement the Eighth, every syllable is diversely marked, whether it is to be sounded long or short. What do we speak of clergy or priests? It is not necessary for their popes to be able to understand, or to read their common prayers; themselves spare not to divulge this. It is manifest, saith Alphonsus à Castro, that many popes are so illiterate, that they are utterly ignorant of the grammar. It seems he may be universal pastor, and the teacher of the whole world, who hath not learned his grammar; and the infallible guide of all mortals, who understands not his own language, wherein the articles of faith, their laws, ceremonies, and church service is delivered. And is it not very much that two things so different as ignorance and infallibility, should have the good hap to meet together in the same person?

Sect. 2. Secondly, they need not know what they are to believe; they tell us they are obliged, under pain of damnation, to believe whatever the visible church of Christ proposeth, as revealed by almighty God. Now, their church proposeth for points of faith so revealed, not only what they have in Scripture, but what they have by tradition, or by the custom of the church in former ages, or by the consent of the fathers, or by the decrees of councils, or by the determination of popes, ex cathedra, whereby points of faith become infinitely numerous, beyond all account which the learned amongst them can give, either to satisfy themselves or others; yet all must be believed, and that under pain of damnation, whenas it is but a very small part of them that can be commonly known. The articles of the creed called the apostles’, are not the hundredth part of those points that must be believed by all that will not be damned; and yet they generally conclude that it is not necessary for the people to know all of those few articles. How to believe the rest, and it may be five hundred times more, which they know nothing of, nor ever once came into their thoughts, they must make what shift they can.

However, they need not know all the articles of the small creed, as the chief of them teach. Not all, saith Aquinas, but what is sufficient to direct to the last end; not all, saith Scotus,² but the gross things, as that Christ was born and suffered, and others belonging to redemption; not all, saith Sylvester, and many with him, but those particularly for which the church hath public solemnities; not all, saith Bonaventure,⁴ but those which we have notice of by the church solemnities, or acts of the priests, and these in him are four, that of the nativity, passion, resurrection, and remission of sins, to which he adds another, which the sign of the cross teacheth, and wherein Angelus follows him; so that the half and more needs not to be known, for they reckon fourteen in all.

Others there are who require not this little, nor think it needful to know these articles more than implicitly, that is, without understanding them; so Gulielmus Parisiensis, and Altissiodorensis in Bannez. Summa Rosellæ, after others,⁷ holds it enough for the simple, and perhaps all discerning people, to believe that God is the rewarder of the good, and punisher of the evil. A compendious creed, truly, and that which will never trouble the conscience of a Turk or a heathen; the knowledge and faith of a barbarous infidel is enough, it seems, to make a papal Christian. Accordingly, others teach, that such as are educated amongst catholics, and are ignorant of the Trinity, are excused from the explicit knowledge thereof, especially if they want a teacher. So Bartholomew, Medina, and Immanuel say, who gives this reason for it: We cannot say that an infinite number of Christians, otherwise good people, do perish, that scarce know anything aright of the mystery of the Trinity and incarnation; yea, judge perversely of these points if you ask them. And yet, without the knowledge of the incarnation of Christ, there is no knowledge of the creed or of the gospel. Sancta Clara is of the same mind too, and quotes others for it.⁹ So that by this doctrine a man needs not know the persons in the Godhead, nor the incarnation of Christ, upon which his birth, life, death, resurrection, and intercession depends, which are the sum of the gospel; yea, he may not only be ignorant of these truths, the knowledge of which, if of any, is necessary to salvation, but he may have false and perverse apprehensions of them, and yet be secure from perishing. According to Soto and Medina, he that is ignorant of the incarnation and Trinity, because he was educated in the mountains, without a preacher to instruct him, will be saved if he die in grace, which they suppose he may have without knowledge, for an implicit faith, that is, without knowledge, will then serve his turn. Secundum doctores nobiles, as noble doctors conclude, saith Lopez, so that they may have eternal life without knowing the true God, or Jesus Christ whom he hath sent. Ignorance hereof will be invincible, that is, both inculpable in itself, and sufficient to justify the criminal issues of it, if they want a teacher, that is, not only if it be not possible, but if it be difficult or inconvenient to have one. The cardinals of the Inquisition at Rome will have such confessors allowed, who hold that persons are capable of absolution, and so supposed to be in a state of salvation, how palpable soever their ignorance might be of the mysteries of faith; nay, though out of pure negligence they know nothing of the mystery of the blessed Trinity, or of the incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ. Medina teacheth, that if one when he is dying acknowledge that he hath been very negligent to learn Christian doctrine, and would not hear it, and thereby wants the knowledge of the mystery of the incarnation and Trinity, and the articles of faith, yet to deny him absolution would be impious: so Lopez reports him,⁴ and himself says, such an one is to be absolved. Here is encouragement, more than enough, to live and die in gross ignorance, and those who have a mind to continue without the knowledge of God under the name of men, or of Christ, under the profession of Christians, have a general warranty by their doctrine to do it. For the former sort of their divines, who seem to require a knowledge of some articles, do indeed make no more knowledge necessary than those who require it not. For when they explain themselves, commonly such a knowing is sufficient, as is without understanding, a dark conceit, that such things there be, though they apprehend not at all what they are. Such mysterious subtilties their doctors are pleased with, as they have a sort of faith without knowledge, or any thought of what they believe; so a knowledge without understanding.

Scotus thinks they have sufficient knowledge of the Trinity, three persons and one nature, who can neither apprehend what a person or a nature is. Accordingly, Bonaventure saith, the people may know the Trinity by crossing themselves, since they do it in the name of the Father, &c.; and by the festivals, they may know the rest which is necessary to be understood. And when it is argued, that there are few, but such as are expert in divinity, who know how to distinguish and number the articles of the creed; and therefore, if all were bound to know them distinctly and explicitly, id est, to know what they mean, few or none would be saved, which is an extreme cruel saying; he in his answer grants it all.

Bellarmine seems to make some knowledge of the articles of the creed necessary, but what it is he signifies elsewhere, when he tells us that experience witnesseth that the greatest part of the faithful, and in a manner all the country people, are so far from understanding the mystery of the Trinity, and the incarnation, and other such points necessary to salvation, that they scarce apprehend anything besides the mere sound of the words, and yet are deservedly counted believers. So cardinal Tolet requires in those that are to be absolved, a kind of acquaintance with some prime articles of faith, but signifies it will be sufficient if, hearing them rehearsed, they can tell us which is an article, and which not; and this they may do by the sound, though they understand nothing of the sense.⁵ De Graffiis is confident, that a confessor may make an ignorant person understand all that is necessary to salvation by making the sign of the cross. And Angelus, who would have three or four articles of the creed to be known, yet concludes, if one can answer this or that article decently, Quod sic, it is so; it will be sufficient for him, though he know not the creed.

Sylvester pretends to make more knowledge requisite than Rosella, but yet he determines that mere want of knowledge is no sin; that it is not a sin to be ignorant of what he ought to know, but upon the account of negligence; that negligence to know things necessary to salvation may be a mortal sin sometimes, but when, it is hard to tell, yea, impossible. So that here is encouragement enough to continue carelessly in ignorance of things necessary to salvation, and to neglect saving knowledge; for when this is a mortal sin, no man can tell, and a venial fault no man needs avoid. In short, they not only justify simple ignorance, how gross soever, but that which has a worse character, ignorantia pravæ dispositionis: and count it no crime, not only to want the knowledge of the articles of faith, but, out of ignorance, to entertain opinions contrary thereto. He that believes an heresy, saith Navarre, out of simplicity or ignorance, because he thinks the church holds it, and is ready to relinquish it when the truth shall be discovered regularly, he sins not mortally. And with Alphonsus à Castro, no kind of heresy is a sin, if it be out of ignorance and without pertinacy;² if their teachers instil such errors into the people, and they, through ignorance, receive impressions contrary to points of faith, and follow such guides blindfold, therein they sin not. Yea, I say more, saith Angelus, Sometimes such an error may be meritorious; for example, one hears a famous preacher or a bishop preach some error, and he simply believes it, with a mind to be obedient to the faith, but ready to be reduced, for things are to be judged of by the intention. But sometimes it may be a venial fault,⁴ as when an old woman believes the Trinity to be one woman; and because she thinks the church so holds, therefore believes it. To recite the names of those who assert that the people, through ignorance, may safely follow their teachers in errors, would be tedious, they are so many. For shortness, let us take Sancta Clara’s word, who tells us, It is now the common opinion of their schools and doctors, that people erring with their teachers or pastors, are wholly excused from all fault; yea, many times by so erring materially, for this Christian obedience which they owe their pastors, they merit. So that ignorance of points, whose belief is with them necessary to salvation, is so far from being a sin, that it can render heresy sinless, yea, make the entertaining of damnable errors to be a meritorious belief.

We cannot expect that knowledge should be accounted necessary, where the worst sort of ignorance hath such excess of honour and privilege. It is no more necessary, nor more of it, according to their principles, necessitate præcepti, by virtue of any command, than we have shewed out of their best writers. But then the necessitas medii, needfulness as a means or way to life, that is none at all; for as the same author tells us, and brings us abundant evidence of it, it is the common doctrine of their more grave divines, that men may now be saved; and the more common tenet of their schools,⁷ that they may be justified without the explicit belief, and so without the knowledge of Christ himself. So that those who hold the knowledge of Christ unnecessary to salvation are many, and their most grave divines; those that count it unnecessary to justification, are the greatest number of their doctors: put these both together, and there will be few left amongst them, and these little considerable in comparison, for number or gravity, but such as judge the knowledge of Christ needless to bring men into a saving state; for this, it will not be needful to be Christians, unless any can be Christians without the actual belief or knowledge of Christ.

Sect. 3. Thirdly, They need not know what they ought to do; they may be, without sin, ignorant of what the Lord hath made their duty. Adrian, Corduba, Herrera, determine, and it is the more common and received opinion, that men may be inculpably ignorant of the law of nature and the ten commandments, as Sancta Clara informs us. But, then, since they need not know the rule, what have they to follow? Why, the direction of their teachers; and these they must follow blindfold, right or wrong. It is one of the qualifications required in the obedience of others, but especially of the religious, which they would have us think to be best of all, that it be blind;² nor should fear of going wrong move them to open or use their own eyes, for if they do wander out of the way of God after such guides, yet they are right, and do their duty. Those who managed the conference for the Romanists at Ratisbon, anno 1601, maintained that the people are so subjected to the government of their teachers, that if they err, the people may and ought to err with them. And they are not only excused from all faults, when they thus wander with their teachers, but their obedience to their pastors herein is many times meritorious. This is the judgment, not only of Valentia, Angles, Vasquez, but the common determination of their schools in Sancta Clara.³ It seems a man may deserve eternal life by leaving the way to it, and may come to heaven meritoriously by wandering from it. What a strange thing is it, that they will not let their catholics be certain of salvation, since they cannot miss it, no, not by going out of the way that leads to it! When they follow their guide into the ditch, yet they are safe; but that is a small matter: by being willing to be led by such as see not, or mind not the way, they merit, and spring up to heaven marvellously, even when they are falling from a precipice, and tumbling headlong after their leaders. The same author tells us that some doctors ascribe so much to the instruction of pastors, who have care of the flock, that if they should teach that now and then God would have them to hate him, a simple parishioner is bound to believe them. All think not fit to give so broad instances; but whether all have not warrant to do it by their common tenet, let others judge.

However, if the people (content to trust, and not to see, what so much concerns them) suffer themselves to be deceived, they sin not, their ignorance will save them harmless. And what would any impostor desire more than to have those whom he hath a mind to abuse to the uttermost, possessed with such a confidence, that however they be deluded, it will not hurt them? Now what an admirable expedient is ignorance for the children of this kingdom, when by virtue of it the leaders may carry the people whither they list without suspicion, the people may follow in the dark without danger! No wonder if ignorance be nourished in them by all means, when they are not concerned to know whether that which they are led to be good or evil, just or unjust, against God, or for him; whatever it be, they ought to obey at a venture. They need not so much as know whether their leaders have power to require what they enjoin.

If they be in doubt whether that they are led to be against the law, yet on they must go, for they all agree here to drive them. Secundum omnes, saith Sylvester, if he doubt of this, whether it be against the command of God, yet he is bound to obey, he may venture safely, It seems that is no danger which the apostle speaks of, ‘He that doubteth is damned,’ Romans 14:23. They allege an express text for this in their law, which will carry it against the apostle. And as that evil which God forbids may be done by him that doubts lest God hath condemned it, so that good which he hath enjoined (if salvation can be had without it) may be neglected when superiors will have it so; their canonical text saith it,⁵ which must be regarded whatever becomes of that other, ‘Whether it be better to obey God or men, judge you,’ Acts 4:19.

Yea, if they be past doubt, that what is required is against God, if they think, if they believe it to be against his command, yet if they believe it but upon weak grounds, yea, or if upon probable grounds (if they be not more certain thereof than they ought to be of their salvation), they are to suppress their own judgment, and will be excused for the goodness of such obedience, i. e. for obeying men rather than God, and that against their own judgment.

Such art is used to persuade the people, that they need see nothing they are to do further than their leaders would have them; if they doubt or if they believe, if their eyes be opening or if they be opened, they must shut them close, and obey men blindly, without discerning what God forbids or requires. And it is not for nothing that they deprive them of their eyes, for thus they can make them grind. Such ignorance is the way to have them in more subjection, and that they account the most perfect obedience, which is next to brutish, without knowledge, and without judgment; that they need not have, and this they must not use. A judgment of discretion must by no means be left the people, that is a point they would maintain against us; but as to their own followers, they put it out of question beforehand, for by keeping them without knowledge, they leave them no judgment, but such as one may pass on colours in the dark. Ribera expresseth their sense significantly, All who are to obey, especially religious persons, ought to have no head of their own, i. e. they are to obey as if they were without eyes or brains. So he explains this worthy expression, non suo sed rectoris sui consilio duci. Let me but add the pregnant words of Cardinal Cusanus, which comprise all that I charge them with in this particular, No man (saith he) can be deceived by an ill pastor; if thou say, Lord, I have obeyed thee in him whom thou hast set over me, this will be sufficient for thy salvation; for thou by obedience paid to a teacher whom the church tolerates, cannot be deceived, although he command what is unlawful. Wherefore the opinion of the pastor binds thee upon thy salvation for the good of obedience, although it be unjust; for it belongs not to thee to take notice whether it be unlawful or not, neither hast thou leave not to obey if it seem unlawful to thee, for that obedience which is irrational is the most complete and most perfect obedience, to wit, when one obeys without the use of reason, as a beast obeys his owner. A speech fit only for the mouth of the beast and the false prophet. The sum of their doctrine concerning ignorance is little less than this: they need not be men as to their obedience; they need not be Christians as to the knowledge of Christ; they need scarce be either as to their worship.

Sect. 4. The ground of all this is, that they judge the knowledge of the Scriptures unnecessary, in a manner, to all sorts; yea, count it necessary to keep as many as they can possibly from acquaintance therewith. They are highly concerned for this, even as much as those who have villainous designs, and would accomplish them without observance and control, are concerned to shun the light. They know full well the Scripture condemns popery; we may well say they know it, when themselves confess that both their worship and their doctrine is contrary and repugnant to Scripture, and allege this as the reason why they would have as little of the Scripture, as can be, known to any. From their own mouths we have the reason why they would never have suffered the Bible to be exposed in a vulgar tongue, if it could have been avoided. The protestants’ translations made that impossible, and the papists among them, who had a mind to look into the word of God, might have made use of these, if no other had been provided. To prevent which they were forced to translate it, and yet their own translations (which are so strange a disguise of Scripture) they dare not trust to the common view; they are in the index of forbidden books put out by Pius the Fourth, and an unpardonable sin they make it for any to read them, but such as can procure a licence for it from a bishop or inquisitor; that is, none but those who, they are confident, will not be moved by what they meet with there against popery. And yet (as if so great restraint were too much liberty for so dangerous a thing as the word of God), in the after edition of the index, by Clement the Eighth, he declares that no new faculty is granted to bishops or inquisitors to grant any licence for reading the Bible, since, by the mandate and usage of the church of Rome, and the universal inquisition, all power of granting such licences is taken away. So far are they from thinking the knowledge of the Scriptures needful for the people, that they count it heresy to affirm the Scripture ought to be in a language which they know (how can it be less than heresy to think that needful to be known, though it be the revelation of God, which discovers popery to be an imposture?). It is a sin from which they shall never be absolved, if they read anything of the word of God in a language which they understand, without a licence from a bishop or inquisitor, by Pius his rule; and no bishop or inquisitor hath any power to grant any licence, by that of Pope Clement.

Knowledge of the Scripture is no more needful for monks than other people; it is equally necessary that they should be ignorant of the word of God; they are under the same restraint, and are no otherwise permitted to read or buy it. Ignorance is proper for this kind of creature, they are for contemplation, not for knowledge.³ It seems they may employ their heads in contemplation of they know not what. To be sure they need neither sacred nor any kind of literature. A monk may be illiterate (say they) they have that privilege by their canon law, there quoted by Sylvester and others, and they generally make use of this indulgence; for their clergy, six parts of seven, need no more to be acquainted with the Scripture than the black art. The four first orders are sufficiently accomplished, if they are able to read⁵ (according to the Council of Trent); the two next should understand Latin, i. e. the words, but not the matter, yet no necessity of either; it is not of necessity to their sacrament of order that any below a bishop should have the use of reason when he enters into orders.

Yea, their priests need not have any knowledge of the Scriptures. It is no part of their qualification; nor doth their office, by the Roman constitution, require it; all that belongs commonly to a priest is only to say service and to say mass;⁸ there are infinite numbers made priests merely to read mass (as Polydore Virgil tells us); and this they may do completely, though they cannot so much as read without a fescue, such as the missal hath ready for every syllable.² But if the priest have a special cure, and so be a preacher or confessor, yet may he be both good enough Without any acquaintance with the Scripture; he may preach the gospel after the Roman mode, without knowing the word of God; for with them it belongs both to deacons and monks to preach; yet those need not understand anything of Scripture, and these must not read it in a language they understand, without a licence. The priests in Scotland were accounted sufficiently qualified, who, it is said, did think the New Testament to have been composed by Martin Luther. The priests even in Italy, if they had more notice of the author, yet scarce more acquaintance with the contents of the New Testament; they never read it, and were much more ignorant thereof than the silly women amongst the Taborites, as Æneas Sylvius, afterward Pope Pius II., writes.

Knowledge of the Scriptures was not counted necessary for their preachers, either regular or secular. The chief of their regulars were the Franciscans and Dominicans. In the rule of friar Francis, approved by several popes, the Minorites (one sort of preaching friars) are, amongst other vices, to avoid learning, if they were illiterate. And those of the Dominicans (the order of friars prædicant) who were rude and illiterate, did preach notwithstanding. As for their other doctors or teachers, that which they are bound to know is, the rudiments of faith (such as our children, who can scarce read, will give an account of. The papacy had no doctors or divines more eminent than those of the Sorbonne; yet they seem little beholding to the Scripture for their divinity. Robert Stevens in the last age, conversing with those doctors, would be asking in what part of the New Testament such or such a thing is written, but had such answers returned. They had read it in Jerome, or the Decrees, but what the New Testament was they knew not. For a confessor he is sufficiently qualified, according to Aquinas, Bonaventure, and Albertus, as Sylvester collects, if he have but read and understand (not the Bible), but Antoninus his book entituled Defecerunt, unless he be a mere natural or presumptuous fool; and neither will doubt of anything (when be knows nothing), nor inquire of others. So that he may be a complete confessor and guide of consciences, who knows nothing of Scripture, and little else, if he have but the wit to discern his own ignorance, and a will to learn of those that are wiser, when he can meet with them. Thus we see a Roman priest is furnished for all points of the office, common or special, without any acquaintance with the word of God. As to bishops, they seem to agree, that some knowledge of the Scripture is requisite in them, and some venture to say a full and perfect knowledge of the Old and New Testament, signified by their mitres, the two horns whereof mystically demonstrate, that they understand the two Testaments both alike. And, indeed, since their prelates, secular and regular, have honour, power, and plenty by the papal contrivement, and hopes of more and greater than other professions can offer, their interest ties them so fast to it, that they may trust them (if any) with the sight of the word of God securely, and not fear that any discovery of popish corruptions, through such a medium, will make any impressions on them to their prejudice, or move them to believe, or act anything against that which is so much themselves; there is no such danger in admitting these to some acquaintance with Scripture, as others, who have no expectations from religion, but for their souls and eternity. Nevertheless, their rules which seem to make this knowledge necessary for bishops, are rather counsels than precepts, they are cautious, and will not press this too much (for conscience enlightened sometimes proves too hard for secular interest). And their prelates may be easily dispensed with, if they be ignorant of Scripture, or have little notice of it. It is one of Sylvester’s and Angelus’s questions, whether an ignorant bishop sin mortally, if in his ordination, being asked whether he understand the whole Bible, he should affirm he does? This he so resolves after Richardus à Sancto Victore. If the bishop be so ignorant, that he knows not in general the commands of God, the articles of faith, what are virtues and vices, and which the sacraments, then he so sins, he lies perniciously: leaving us to judge that he doth not thus lie, when he solemnly affirms, that he hath as much knowledge of the Old and New Testament as the church of Rome requires in a bishop; if he do but know the creed, the ten commandments, which are virtues and vices, and which are sacraments, and have but some general perception of these. They will not have the bishops burdened with too much Scripture learning, since every child they confirm should have no less than this. This may pass for perfect knowledge of the Scripture, and of an episcopal pitch with those who count it no imperfection to be ignorant of that which, they say,² doth more hurt than good, for so they were wont to blaspheme the Scriptures, or the Holy Ghost, whose inspiration they are. The bishop of Dunkeld thought he had enough of it, when he said, I thank God I have lived well these many years, and never knew either the Old or New Testament. I content me with my portuis and pontifical (History of Church of Scotland, lib. ii. p. 66). The bishops in other countries thought themselves bound in conscience to be as ignorant of the Scriptures, when they counted it a sin to read them.

Yea, he that wants a sufficiency of this knowledge, though so very little or nothing be sufficient, may be dispensed with upon the account of some other quality. As for example, charity, they say, will make up want of knowledge in those who have not sufficient to make them capable of any place or dignity amongst them. Yea, they may be dispensed with, though they have no better qualities than in Gerson’s time, when he tells us, there were none anywhere that were good, or approveable for doctrine or practice, but all chosen were both carnal persons, and ignorant of spiritual things.² So he in the fifteenth age; and about the same time Clemangis says there were scarce any advanced to the pontifical dignity, who had so much as superficially either read, or heard, or learned the Scriptures; or who had ever touched anything of the Bible, except the cover. ‘Quotusquisque hodie est ad pontificale culmen evectus qui sacras vel perfunctorie literas legerit, audierit, didicerit; imo qui sacrum codicem nisi tegumento tenus unquam attigerit.’—De corrupt. Eccl. Statu. In the age after, wherein the Council of Trent was held, we have (in Papyrius Masson de Episc. Urbis) the character of the Roman prelates, by Pasquil begging the next cardinal’s cap, as being more capable thereof than the bishops then created.

Si imbelle sum atque rude marmor, Complures quoque episcopos creari Ipso me mage Saxeos videbis. And the same age, in the Council of Trent, where (as they boast) was the flower of all the Roman prelates in Europe, very few of the bishops had knowledge in theology, as father Paul tells us, yet these had only decisive voices in that council, and all was concluded by plurality of their votes; when far the major part understood not the matters concluded, so that the articles of the Roman faith were voted blindfold. And yet all must be damned who believe not these points of faith, when those who made them so were ignorant of them, and knew not what they did when they decreed them. Such is the Roman charity and knowledge; so burning and shining are their best lights, they will have all burned here, and in hell, too, for not believing that which the council (for the greater part of it) understood not. But sure, the knowledge of the pope must be transcendent, especially as to the Scripture; his place and office requires it, being accounted the head of the whole church (which ought to have good eyes), and teacher of Christians (as much or more than Peter was), and judge in all controversies which concern religion, and interpreter of all difficulties in Scripture, and a more lively oracle of God than the Scripture itself in the things of God. Yes, say they, the pope ought to have far more knowledge than any other, being the president of the whole Christian commonwealth, so de Graffiis. But, then, he adds, as to him the presumption of the law is enough for all this, and that presumes that all is in the cabinet of the pope’s breast (as it may well be presumed, that a skill beyond that of all physicians is in a bold mountebank), although indeed what is quite contrary may prove true.² Accordingly the pope may be all that they style him, without the knowledge of a novice in the Scripture, without any such acquaintance with it, as to pretend to the name of a divine (though acquaintance with it be expected from none but divines), and many that have the name have little or nothing of the thing. The popes think not themselves concerned at all to trouble their heads with divinity. If he be but a canonist (as Peter no doubt was), he is the apostle’s undoubted successor, though he be no more a divine than his chair is, or can make him, and why may not the chair inspire him with knowledge as much as holiness? Pope Innocent the Tenth, in our days (since they have been more concerned for the reputation of the Vatican throne, than, as before, to let monsters of debauchery and ignorance ascend it), declared that he had never studied divinity, nor was it his profession.⁴ Pope Clement the Eighth began to study it when he was very old, and then not to much purpose it seems; for he could not at last decide the question that he had studied, how much soever their church was concerned in it.

None can understand their church prayers but expert divines, as Soto tells us; he means the matter of them indeed, but popes need not understand the words neither; for many of them do not who pass for lawful popes, and such can neither understand the subject nor the words of the Bible, for it is in Latin; and, if Alphonsus deceives us not, many of them have not gone so far as their grammar; yea, very many of them have been so ignorant as they could not speak their own name in Latin. Yet such knowledge of Scripture is enough in the Roman account for the infallible interpreter of Scriptures, the supreme judge in all matters of faith, and the teacher of the universe. When we are ready to wonder at this, they stop us presently by telling us that God did make Balaam’s ass speak.²

They seem to grant as much stupidity in a pope as can be imagined, but then the miracle of making an ass speak does partly answer that objection. Had the bishops of Rome anciently been such ignorant, dull creatures, as many of their later popes, and yet adored at that rate, the heathens might have had some colour for charging the Christians with worshipping an ass’s head. As for the people, they are so far from obliging them to get knowledge, that they either make it impossible for them to attain it, or encourage them never to look after it. They cannot attain it but either by reading or hearing. They must not read the Scriptures (as before), and they cannot, or need not, hear. If the priests be ignorant (as they are allowed to be), they are not able to instruct them; if they be able, they need not preach; that is sub consilio; or the people need not hear, no, nor inquire of them in private; no, not those that are most ignorant. The further they are from all knowledge, the more excusable, if they take no care nor pains about it. Sancta Clara makes this query: Are they not bound, at least to some diligence, to free themselves from this ignorance? He answers, if it be one who hath no knowledge of these things which may move him to seek instruction, it is certain that no diligence or care is required of him, especially if he do not at all doubt, i. e. if he be confident that he knows well enough, and his ignorance makes him so senseless that he discerns it not. His reason is, because he is not obliged to that which is impossible, and it is not possible that one should seek that which never came into his mind (as Angles also determines with him); so that if knowledge never came into his mind, there is no need that it ever should come there, and he is not bound to take the least care or pains to make way for it.

CHAPTER III Their doctrine makes it needless to love God

Love of God, or, as they had rather call it, charity, is in their account, as they seem sometimes to express themselves, of greatest moment. Regeneration and spiritual life, they say, consists in it; without it no man is in the state of grace, or favour with God. This is the righteousness whereby they are justified, and their sins pardoned, i. e. abolished (for that is pardon with them), and their souls sanctified (for justification and sanctification is all one in their reckoning). This is it which is the life and spirit of all other graces and virtues, say they, without which the best of them are dead and unactive things, and deserve not the name of virtues. And though they look not for heaven unless they deserve it by their own works, yet their works, they say, are of no worth without this;² yea, their indulgences will not avail anything without it. So far, therefore, as love to God is unnecessary, so far regeneration and spiritual life, a saving state and reconciliation with God, justification, pardon, all graces and virtues, all their own good works or their church’s indulgences, are unnecessary; no further need of what either God or themselves have made necessary to salvation.

One would think, if they had any desire of heaven or fear of hell, or dread of their own purgatory, if they had any design for the salvation of souls, or any regard of what is saving, they should be tender in this point above all, and not abate any moment of its necessity. But what they do herein, let us see. Indeed, they make both the habitual and the actual love of God unnecessary. First, for habitual love, they teach, the Lord hath not at all commanded us to have the habit or principle of this love; he nowhere requires that we should love him habitually. Certainly, saith Bellarmine, the Lord hath not commanded that we should love him from an infused habit, for laws do not require habits. Add to him one of the most eminent amongst the Dominicans:⁵ there is no affirmative precept for habitual love to God, saith Melchior Canus. I need allege no more; I find none of them questions it.

Now, in that they do not make this love necessary as a duty, they cannot account it necessary as a means; for they hold that all means necessary to salvation are commanded. So that the habitual love of God, by their doctrine, is no way necessary. And this they teach not only of the habit of love, but of all other graces. The precepts of the law are not for habits, saith Soto. We are not, as he adds, to pay what we owe from a habit of justice or liberality.³ When we are enjoined to live soberly and righteously, we are not required to do so out of habit, but only to do it, saith Bellarmine; and these instances they bring to shew that we are not obliged to do anything out of a habit or principle of love to God.

Sect. 2. Secondly, For actual love, how can they account the acts of it needful, when they make the habits or principle from whence the acts must flow to be unnecessary? But let us view their doctrine about this more distinctly. The acts of love are either more foreign and remote, which they call imperate, or native and proper, which they call elicit acts. For the former, all acts of religion and righteousness, that they may be truly Christians, such as the gospel requires in order to salvation; that they may have a real tincture of divine and supernatural goodness, and be advanced above the pitch at which heathen or graceless persons may arrive, they must proceed from love to God, and be ordered and directed by it. This they sometimes not only confess, but assert; and yet, notwithstanding, they teach that it is not needful to perform any such acts, or to observe any commands of God out of love to him.⁵ The commands of God, saith De Graffiis, do not oblige us to perform them in love; he clears his meaning by an instance: for he sins not, nor is punished of God, who gives due honour to his parents, although he have not the habit of piety (and so though he do it not out of such a principle), much less, adds he, doth the church oblige any one to observe the command in love; for if the end of the precept be love, saith Canus, we are not forthwith bound to observe all the commands out of love. The reason is premised; for in the opinion of Aquinas and the most grave authors, we are not bound to observe the end or intention of the lawgiver, i. e. of Christ, but the means which the law prescribes in order to it. Soto discourseth this at large, and concludes: Love being considered as the universal condition and mode of acting all virtues, and performing all obedience, such a mode of acting out of love is not commanded, as when we are enjoined to honour parents, the precept binds us not to honour them out of love to God. This he delivers as the doctrine of Aquinas, and finds but² one doctor amongst them of opinion that we are bound to do all out of love to God; but condemns this as false and very near the Lutheran error condemned by the council of Trent, because then all acts done without grace would be sins. So we must believe (if we will not venture to fall under the condemnation of their council) that it is no sin not to obey God out of love to him; that all acts of virtue and obedience whatsoever may be performed without sin, though they be done without love to God; that any man baptized may be saved, though he never act out of love to God, no, not so much as once while he lives; though he perform not one act of a true Christian while he is on earth. He can never perish for want of love to God in any, or all the acts of his life; for he will never be damned but for sin, and to act without love to God is no sin. Thus their chief doctors determine, and this they must all do, in conformity to the decrees of their infallible council, and be deluded infallibly in a matter of no less consequence than the way to heaven, believing that they may arrive there without acts of love, filial obedience, or ingenuous observance of God in anything that he hath commanded, without ever acting as (and so without being at all) true Christians.

Sect. 3. But though they do not transgress other commands, when they observe them without love, yet they may violate that special command which requires inward acts of love, if at that time when this obligeth they do not act out of love. Some of them seem to say this, and we shall see what they make of it in the next place. The nature and proper issue of love is its internal act, when the heart being possessed with a principle of divine love to God in Christ, actually loves him above all. If this actual love (the inward act of it) be not necessary, as there will be no need of the habit (that being but in order to acts), so there will be no place for the imperate acts; for those who would have us sometimes observe other commands out of love, yet never think this requisite, but when the precept obligeth us to actual love.

Now, whether there be any command for this act of love, or whether it oblige, or when, they are not agreed, only in the issue they conspire to make the commandment of no effect.

Some of them determine that the command to love God with all our mind is not obliging; which is all one as if they should say, There is no command for it at all. Thus Stapleton, one of the greatest divines amongst them in his time, The precept of loving God with all our mind is doctrinal, and not binding. To the same effect others conclude there is no special precept of love to God. So John Sanctus, There is no special command in the law of God for this, but general, says he. By which he would have us understand, that there is no precept in particular for loving God, none besides those commands that require other things; which, if they be done, we are discharged from any act of love, or inward affection to him. Aquinas is vouched for this, and much alleged out of him,³ to shew he was of this persuasion. If there be any special precept for this affection to God, it is that which requires us to love him with all the heart, and soul, and strength; but this (as Cardinal Cajetan declares) does not oblige to the love of charity. And Bannez⁵ teaches, that for natural love there is no special command; and so amongst them they leave no such command for any sort of love to God at all. The command to love God with all our hearts, Maldonate will have to be a general, no special precept.

Others of them confess there is a special command obliging us to love God actually; but they put such a construction upon it, that it signifies little or nothing more than if there were no such thing. They say it is requisite that we should love God one time or other; but what time this is needful, you will never learn of them; what period one fixeth, another unfixeth; and while they find no certain time for it, in the end they leave no place for it.

They all agree in this, that we are not bound to love God always actually; for, say they, the precept for it is affirmative, and such precepts bind not at all times. But since we are not obliged to love God at all times, at what determined time is this required of us? Are we to love him after we are fallen into sin; is that the article of necessity? No; Canus supposeth that this will be generally denied, that a man is obliged to love God soon after he hath sinned. Are we to love him when he vouchsafes some special favour; when he discovers his infinite goodness and amiableness, and makes the most lovely representations of himself to us? One would think, then, if any time at all, we should be obliged to love him actually. No, saith the same bishop, and he no Jesuit or late casuist, he sins not mortally (i. e. he transgresseth no command of God) who loves him not, how much soever he discovers his divine goodness, and most enamouring loveliness, unless it be when it is necessary to love him. And when shall we ever meet with the time when it is necessary, if not in such circumstances as these? If it be not needful to love him, either when we disoblige him, or when he most obligeth us to acts of love; if neither when he is angry with us, nor when he is well pleased, when will, when can it ever be needful?

Let us see if any others amongst them can nick this article of time when this love will be necessary. Are we bound to put forth an act of love on holy days? So Scotus thought. The time, saith he, for observing this command is on holy days; then we are to recollect ourselves, and ascend in mind unto God. He would have had this love to be a holiday habit at least, if not fit for every day’s wearing. But this is too much (say others), nor do they find any reason why this imagination should come in the subtle doctor’s head; Canus saith, without all doubt it is to be rejected, and so they do. Scotus herein is borne down by the full torrent of their doctors. I find none now that will have us obliged to love God so often. But since they think it too much to love God every holiday, are we bound to love him upon his own day? No, not once a week neither; for though the church oblige them to be present at his worship, to mind things above, to praise his infinite divinity, and to give thanks for his bounty towards them, yet in all this they are not bound to any act of love; and Soto gives this reason for it: The end of the commandment (which is love) is not commanded. The assertion is hardly so absurd as the reason given for it, that the end, which is the principal in moral actions, should not be commanded. This is to say, that the law does not require to be fulfilled; for love, which is ‘the end of the commandment,’ is by the apostle expressly said to be ‘the fulfilling of the law.’ But, notwithstanding all this, in this maxim (which is one of their chief engines, whereby they demolish Christianity in the practice of those who profess it; make void the commandments of God, depriving them of their life and spirit, and leave nothing of the whole body of religion but the mere superficies),³ their divines, he tells us, unanimously agree with Aquinas. So that, it seems, the worship of God may be sufficiently discharged without any love to him. We may serve him well enough (as far as the command for his service will have us) without any affection. In all acts of worship, there needs not any act of love (by their doctrine) in any part, or any of the times of worship, either their own holidays, or the Lord’s. They have no more respect to his than theirs, nor for him in either, but serve them and him all alike, and think they hallow them, and honour him enough, without any motion of love in their hearts, when (if ever it were needful in their account) it should be most in motion. Certainly those that think not this love due to God in his worship, think it not due to him at all. But if it be more than needs to love God once a week, are they obliged at least to love him once a year, if not at ordinary times, yet upon extraordinary or special occasions, such as more particularly seem to call for some act of love; when they are to partake of some sacrament, when they come to the eucharist, or to the sacrament of penance (as they are to do once yearly by their church orders)? No; it is not then necessary neither.² It is false, saith Navarre, that we are bound to fulfil this command when we receive any sacrament; for it is enough that we be not in mortal sin, or that we probably believe so, although no such actual love be conceived in the heart. We are not bound to that love (saith he) when we minister, or receive the sacraments; because we are not then bound to have contrition. Those that make such hard shifts to discharge themselves from the obligation of loving God, whenever occasion is offered, will scarce think it needful to love him upon no occasion; and what occasion can we think of upon which it will be counted requisite, if not on these already specified? If not after sin, if not upon the receipt of mercy, if not on any day of worship, if not in any part of worship; if these be not occasions for it, who can hope they will ever meet with any? If an act of love be not requisite once a week, or once a year, on such an account as would make it so, if any imaginable could do it, it will not be a duty in any week, or any year, in a whole life; those that discharge themselves of it in such circumstances, do plainly enough discharge it for ever. But since they would make a show of finding some time for it (though their determinations all along are pregnant with a denial of any), let us proceed with them a little further. If an act of love be not due to God once a year, yet may it be a duty once in four or five years? Soto and Ledesma, in Filliutius, ventured to think it may be requisite once in five years; and he gives this reason for it: Because the time is not determined, but left to the judgment of the wise; but (saith he), thus wise divines have thought.

Thus love to God, the greatest duty that we owe the divine Majesty, and that which is the sum of all the rest, is left to men’s arbitrement; and if two or three reputed wise shall judge that God is to have no love at all, or but one act of love in a whole life, that must be the rule; God and man must be determined by it. Man will owe no more, and the Lord must have no more. Those of their divines have had the repute of wise, who thought it enough to love God once in a lifetime, as well as such who conceive it probable that he should have an act of love once in five years, or once in seven, for thither it may be adjourned by our author’s leave. The Jansenists charge this opinion upon the late Jesuits, and would have all the odium cast upon them; but they go about to lead us into a mistake, if they would have us believe that these, and other horrid conceits concerning an actual love to God, are confined to that society; they are too common amongst those doctors who are of greatest repute, and judged free from extravagancies in their morality, and more tenacious of what they would have accounted the genuine doctrine of their church.

There were many in the time of the Council of Trent, when Jesuitism was but in its infancy, who held it enough to love God actually but once in a lifetime. One act of love, once in a life, which some count enough, saith Soto; and these some, he tells us afterwards, were very many. In the time of Francis de Victoria, who lived till the council of Trent had sat a year, this was the common doctrine, that a man is but obliged to love God once in his life. For upon the question, when the precept for love obligeth, he says, ‘Nec videtur sufficiens solutio communis, quod tenetur semel in vita,’ Relect. part iii. n. 11. The common answer, that one is bound to it once in a life seems not sufficient;—he speaks modestly, as one loath to dissent from the common doctrine.—That council (who, if it had been concerned for God and men’s souls, as it was for other things, would have appeared in all its thunder against such an error) mends this, as it did other matters, by establishing a doctrine which makes it needless to love God so much as once in a life; of which hereafter. But when is that once? They leave us at liberty for the time, so it be but before we die. Suarez was not alone in this: as he wants not followers, so he had many that went before him in this conclusion, and those not Jesuits only; for it is grounded upon the notion which the Romish doctors have of affirmative precepts, when the time for their accomplishment is not expressed. They teach, that such divine commands, divers of them are fulfilled, and have sufficient observance, if they be but obeyed, semel in vita, once in a lifetime. Those that are very cautious express it with a saltem, once at least in a whole life, intimating that though more may be better, yet once is as much as is precisely needful; and this they extend to such things as, by the Lord’s constitution, are means necessary to salvation. There are precepts, saith Canus, without determination of time, which oblige us to observe them some times, at least once in our life, such as are the means necessary to salvation. But in what part of our life must it be, that the Lord must have this act of love from us, which is enough once in the whole? Why, since neither the Scripture nor the church, say they, hath determined the time, there is no reason for one time more than another; it is left to a man’s own discretion,³ to love God when he thinks fit, let him do it before he die, and he may take his own time; so some leave it. But Vasquez would not leave it at such uncertainty, so he fixeth the period, and that is the period of a man’s life; he determines, the time for loving God is when a man is at the point of death. Nor is this the doctrine of a Jesuit only; for before his time, and before the Society was founded, it was the common opinion of the Romish doctors; so Dominicus Soto informs us,² very many hold that the time for the observing of this command is at the point of death, that is (as he explains it) when there is not any time left for deserving aught of God. Now every act of love being meritorious with them, either they contradict themselves, or by this opinion they are not bound to love God actually, till there be no time left for any acts of love. We are not by this doctrine obliged to love God, till we can live no longer, and are past acting at all. But are we then bound to love him, is it then necessary? May not a man be saved, who hath continued without love to God all his life, if he love him not actually, neither, when he is a-dying? For this, observe what Aquinas tells us, that we do not break this command, but fulfil it, so as to be free from all mortal guilt, if we do nothing against the love of God, that is, if we run not into mortal sin, and so hate him; as a soldier satisfies his captain’s command, who, though he get not the victory, yet doth nothing against military discipline; or as Bonaventure explains it,⁴per exclusionem affectus contrarii, by the exclusion of the contrary affection, as if it were sufficient that he do not hate him.

Marsilius (of great renown for learning amongst their divines), will have that which the command for love enjoins, to be the keeping of grace and friendship with God, and the recovering of it when lost. So that it doth not oblige to actual love, but only to the avoiding of habitual enmity and hatred of God. But what if we hate God, and persist therein; is it not absolutely necessary that he should beware of that? It seems not; for saith one of their doctors, there is no precept that a sinner should not persevere in enmity against God; there is no negative command which forbids him to persist in such hatred. It may be you do not read this (no more than I could) without some horror and trembling; and I confess, when I found Reginaldus quoted for this, I was ready to think it was but the extravagancy of some singularly bold Jesuit; but upon further inquiry, I find it asserted by such whose writings have the greatest approbation of the Romish church. Melchior Canus, a Dominican, a bishop, cried up as a most elegant, judicious, and cautious writer too, and inferior to none of that order, their angelical doctor only excepted, clearly delivers this doctrine, we are not bound by any negative precept that we should not be enemies of God, in respect of guilt. He adds, for as there is no affirmative precept requiring habitual friendship with God, so for habitual enmity against God in respect of guilt, there is no negative precept that forbids it. So that to persist in enmity and hatred against God, by their approved doctrine, is no sin, it is against no command.

We need not allege the words of any other, since this is the plain and necessary consequent of their common doctrine; and we must take it to be the judgment of all, who hold that it is no sin to delay contrition (i.e. repentance and turning to God) in which both their ancienter school doctors and modern divines agree. For while it is no duty to turn to God, habitual enmity and hatred of him will be no sin. Now, contrition (and so conversion to God) they say may be deferred till death. Indeed, by their doctrine it will never be a duty; for even at death, the last attrition, with their sacrament of confession, is all that is needful.

Sect. 4. However, they make it unnecessary to love God either living or dying. For though they pretend that there is a time, some or other, when the precept for it is obliging, and make a show as if then unavoidably, he that will be saved must have an act of love for God in his heart; yet whenever that time comes, in life or death, to which their several fancies have determined it, they discover to them many ways whereby the precept may be satisfied, without any act of love that it requires; and those which have a mind to be deceived with hopes of heaven, without ever loving God while they live, may have their choice which way they will be deluded, for they present them with variety. First, a natural love will serve the turn, such as a graceless man may have. For Aquinas determines after others, that he that hath no love to God may observe the precept of loving him actually, by disposing himself to receive this grace; and whereas some think that this great precept of loving God, since Adam’s sin, cannot be fulfilled but in the state of grace, Navar asserts the contrary, both upon reason and authority, because a man by his natural power, remaining also in mortal sin, may and doth conceive God to be amiable above all, and the last end of all, and consequently can love him as such; as also, because there may be a love for God above all, without grace, as Cajetan proves; moreover, because St Thomas affirms that one may, without grace, fulfil the command of loving God, as to the substance of the act, though not as to the meriting of blessedness.

Elsewhere he affirms that all the ten commandments, and all other precepts, may be fulfilled by him who is in mortal sin as to the substance of the act, so as to avoid all sin that would be incurred if they were not fulfilled; and this, according to the judgment of Aquinas, commonly followed, and the sense of the Council of Trent.² They assign, we see, two ways whereby the divine precept may be fulfilled. One as to the substance of the act, so as sin is avoided, and the other as to the end of the lawgiver, so as to deserve heaven. And they teach that any precept may be accomplished the former way by such as are destitute of grace. Now to observe the command of loving God, so far as not to sin against it, is all that is required, if Bellarmine’s arguing be good. If I sin not, saith he, when I love God, without degree of love (in the judgment of St Thomas), certainly I am not bound in strictness to love him more; therefore, if I add another degree, I love him more than I am bound to do.⁴ So that an unsanctified man, loving God in such a degree as not to sin against the precept of love, hath all the affection for God that it requires; and none will be obliged to any love but such as is natural, and may be found in a graceless heart.

Secondly, An inferior degree of love will satisfy the command, such as is far short of what it enjoins. He is no transgressor (saith the oracle of their schools) who attains not the intermediate degrees towards perfection, if he reach but the very lowest of all. To keep the divine precepts (saith Bellarmine), any degree of love whatsoever is sufficient.⁶ Any act of love (saith Bannes), how remiss soever, is sufficient to fulfil all the commands of God; neither is there any certain intenseness requisite that one in this life may accomplish the precept of love to God. The Lord requires that we love him with all our hearts, i. e. with all the affection our hearts can contain; they say that any, the smallest degree, will suffice. He enjoins us to love him with all our might, i. e. as much as we can. They say it is enough to love him as little as we can; we need not love him as much as we might if we would; no more is commanded but as little as possible. The lowest degree of all will serve; and if we advance but another step, we supererogate, and God is beholden to us for more than is due. Their gross mistake about the perfection of obedience in this life entangles them in a necessity to maintain this and other impious absurdities. For if every just person perfectly observes the law, the least degree must be sufficient for such an observance; and when this command, declared with such circumstance, of loving God with all our hearts, mind, and strength, doth especially puzzle them, they are concerned either to deny its obligation, as some of them do, or to interpret it so as to make it signify that which is next to nothing, as others. All of them are obliged to deface it one way or other, that it may not appear to confound them. But to go on. If we are not bound to love God save in the lowest degree, yet that degree sure should exceed our affection to all other things. No, not so neither; for they tell us commonly we are not obliged to love God more intensely than other things. So Cardinal Tolet. Yea, saith he, sometimes we more fervently love things sensible and the creatures. Navarre,² after Aquinas, and their divines, ancient and modern, concur herein.

It is true, they say, God should be loved appreciatively (as to valuation, and in esteem) above all; but then by all they understand, not simply all things, but the worst things of all. In those, the worst. of evils, he is to have the pre-eminence; but the creatures are not such evils, and they may be preferred before God in most cases. By their doctrine we may prefer the judgment of others, or our own, before the advice of God in all matters of mere counsel, and to this they have reduced the greatest part of Christian duties; and we may follow our own wills, or the will of others, rather than God’s continually, and make this the constant practice of our lives in all those innumerable evils which they count venial. And so in the most instances by far we may love and esteem ourselves and others more than God, and yet love him enough, and not transgress the precept. We need not love him more than all creatures; we may love any creature more than him, even in way of valuation; only he is to have this honour, and this will be enough, to love him more than deadly crimes, such as declare open hostility against God. This is all the import of that great precept whish concerns us in this life, as it is expressed after Aquinas by Soto and others.

Yea, to admit mortal sin, and so to love the creature more than God, in that respect in which alone they say he is more to be loved, is not against this precept. So Navar informs us. Indirectly, saith he, to love the creature more than God is not against this command (of love), because whoever sins mortally, indirectly loves something more than God; yet such a delinquent doth not therefore sin against the precept, because directly he doth nothing against it, nor acts what in itself, and in its own nature, separates from God, but by accident, according to Aquinas and Scotus. So that to love the creature more than God, and to shew it in a way which themselves say is most repugnant to the love of God, is no transgression of this command. To say he doth nothing against it directly is no salvo, when that he doth is all which they count (if they count anything) inconsistent with the love commanded. He tells us further, and Lopez after him, that absolutely to love God, but so much, or not so much as other things, without making any comparison, is not evil. So that if God have some affection from us, though we love him less than other things, it is no sin, no transgression of the precept; and if this be not transgressed in the instant when it calls for performance, it is fulfilled.

Thirdly, It will suffice, if nothing be done against love, as we heard before out of Aquinas. So that when the precept of love obligeth, if we then do nothing contrary to that love, we may be excused from the act itself, or from acting anything out of love. For that which they count contrary to it may be avoided out of fear, or other considerations foreign to love; and so the command may be satisfied at the instant, when (if ever) it requires actual love, without any act either of love or from it.

Fourthly, External acts may satisfy. The precept of love, saith Soto, doth not oblige precisely to inward affection, but certainly to some outward act; so elsewhere he explains this loving God above all, by doing his commandments.³ To the same purpose Maldonate and others. Now if the precept of love may be fulfilled by external acts, or by endeavours to observe the other commands of God, then it requires not the exercise of the inward act of love to him, and so there will be no command for that at all, nor will it be a duty; and all these other commands may be satisfied without any act of love to God in the heart, and we shall love him enough, though we never conceive any actual love for him in our souls.

Fifthly, It will satisfy the precept if a man believe that he loves God above all, though indeed he do not. So Lopez. It is enough to avoid the sin of neglecting this precept, for one to believe probably that he fulfils it at the time when its obligation occurs. Navarre had concluded this before him.⁶ He that believes God, probably believing that he is in the state of grace, and that his love is a love of God above all, although in truth it is no such thing, nor he in such a state; nevertheless, the precept is fulfilled by him, so far, that he is not then guilty of sin for omitting the observance of it. He adds this reason for it: Because, without special revelation, no man can know when he is in the state of grace, as the Council of Trent determines; and so unless we maintain this, we cannot know when we fulfil the precept. Thus, though his determination seem strange and desperate, yet the ground he proceeds on is a principle of their faith, and obligeth all to be of his persuasion who submit to that council. He declares himself further to this purpose: He sins mortally who loves not God at that time when he is bound to do it, under the pain of mortal sin, that is, when there is danger of death, or necessity of receiving or administering a sacrament, unless he probably believe that he hath grace or charity;² for then he would have us believe it is not sin, as his limitation shews. Here we have the times specified wherein the precept of loving God obligeth, and these are but two, and the latter of them himself expungeth, concluding it false that we are bound to love God at a sacrament. So that a man is never bound to love God but when he apprehends death approaching; no, nor at the point of death neither, if then he probably believe that he hath grace and charity, though he have it not; for such a presumption will excuse him from sin if he love not God (as all his life before, so) even when he is dying. Thus is the case resolved according to their common principles, by the most learned and the most pious of their casuists, as Bellarmine honours him, though he was none of the Society.⁴

Sixthly, Attrition, with the sacrament of penance, will excuse any from loving God actually, living or dying, and will secure him from perishing eternally, though he never entertain an act of love for God in life or death. The doctrine of their church obligeth them all to believe this, and if any of their doctors seem to say otherwise, they contradict either that or themselves. For their church requires nothing precisely to put a man into the state of grace and salvation, living or dying, (how long soever he hath persisted in enmity against God, how highly soever he hath expressed his hatred of him), but only a due partaking of the sacrament of penance; and he is sufficiently qualified for such a participation if he be but attrite, that is, as they explain it, if he have but some remorse for sin out of servile fear, not out of love to God (for that fear as servile is contrary to the love of God), so that for this (which they count sufficient to secure his eternal state), even at last gasp, he needs not any act of love to God. And this is not only the opinion of particular doctors, but (as I shall shew hereafter) the doctrine of the council of Trent,⁶ and so not only probable with them, but certain.

If a man at the point of death, who never had an act of love for God in all his life, do then ask his confessor whether such an act be needful for him before he die; if the priest tell him it is not necessary, he may safely give up the ghost, and die as he lived, without any actual affection for God; for though he be deluded by his confessor, yet consulting him he has done his endeavour, and so his ignorance, they say, is invincible, and will excuse him. And the priest must tell him that it is more than needs, if he believe the council of Trent, since there it is declared that the sacrament, with attrition (though this include something repugnant to such love), is enough to justify, and pass any into a state of grace, and consequently is sufficient for salvation. And thus they argue,² grace is a sufficient cause of glory; hence whatever it is, without which grace may obtained, that is not necessary to salvation; by which account no act of love (nor of any other grace) will be needful for them, that they may be saved.

Thus, in fine, here is a religion which pretends to be Christian, but excuseth and disengageth all that profess it from the love of Christ; a doctrine which bereaves religion of that which themselves count its life, and quite stifles all the spirits of Christianity, chops off all Christian virtues, all gracious acts and qualities in this one neck, and leaves nothing but a ghastly carcase. For obliging them to neglect love as needless, it makes the rest impossible; without it, there can be no saving faith, no godly sorrow, no filial fear, no delight in God, no desire to enjoy him, no genuine gratitude. When the life of a true Christian should be made up of these, they leave it not possible for him to have one act of true Christian virtue, for without love, they say themselves, there cannot be any one true virtue. Here is a way to heaven for those that never loved God in life or death, a path that pretends to heaven, but lies quite cross to the way of Christ, and leads directly to outer darkness; a doctrine that encourageth them to live in hatred of God all their days, and in the end sends them out of the world under the dreadful sentence of of the apostle, 1 Corinthians 16:22, ‘If any man love not the Lord Jesus, let him be Anathema, maranatha.’ To conclude this head, it is a doctrine which is damning, not only meritoriously, but effectually, and will certainly ruin eternally all that believe and practise it, and hath in it the mortal poison and malignity of a hundred such speculative opinions as pass for heresies. And beside the danger and horrible impiety of this doctrine, it is ridiculous to the very highest degree; for can anything be more senseless, than to ask how often a man ought to love his best friend and benefactor? whether once in his life be not enough in all conscience? nay, whether it be not very fair not to hate him? And, indeed, they state the business all along in such a manner, and manage it with such nicety and caution, not as if they were afraid lest men should love God too little, but as if all the danger lay on the other hand; and their great care were that nobody should love him too much, or love him at all. I do not believe that things so palpably impious and ridiculous were ever so solemnly debated by men of any religion whatsoever.

CHAPTER IV There is no necessity of saving or justifying faith by the Romish doctrine

Sect. 1. That no man can be justified or saved without faith is so evident in Scripture, that none but an infidel can question it. The Romanists do not express any doubt of it, and yet they make no other faith necessary than that which is neither justifying nor saving. They have two sorts of faith, one for the unlearned and ignorant, which they call implicit; the other for the learned and more knowing, which they say should he explicit. The former, as they describe it, is an assent to some general, including many particulars, with a mind to believe nothing contrary thereunto. The general is this, that whatever the Roman church (which cannot err) believes, is true; the particulars included are they know not what, for they are supposed ignorant. Now this, we say, is no Christian faith, and make it apparent that it is no such thing. For, first, it is no belief of any one particular or article of the Christian faith. It is only a belief of a general, which is no truth at all, much less Christian (that the church of Rome cannot err, or believe anything but what is true), when the ignorant person neither knows what this church is, nor what she believes, nor why he should give her such credit. So that the act is a blind conceit, unworthy of a man, or a Christian; and the object a general error. And then as to the particulars which are necessary for Christians to believe, this implicit faith doth not actually believe any of them at all; if it did, it would not be what it is, implicit. It apprehends them not, and therefore cannot believe them; for, as themselves acknowledge, that cannot be believed which is not known. To render this clear to us, they thus explain it. When² a man is asked whether Christ were born of the Virgin Mary, and whether there be one God and three persons, and he answers that he knows not, but believes touching these things as the church holds, this is to believe implicitly; so that a man may have this faith completely, and yet not believe an article of the creed; and if this be Christian faith, a man may have it who believes nothing of Christ. They are believers, at this rate, who have a mind to hold what the church doth concerning Christ or the creed, though they never know what that is. They know not what the church holds, unless the church’s knowing be their knowledge; and so believe nothing, unless the church’s believing be their faith; and so have no faith to save them, unless it be saving faith to believe by an attorney.

Secondly, As this faith may be without the knowledge and belief of any of the particular articles which are necessary to be believed by Christians, so (which is yet more strange) it may be with the belief of what is opposite and repugnant to the Christian faith. This they acknowledge, and clear it to us by instances. A man may be disposed to believe what the church holds, and yet may believe that God the Father and God the Son are not equal, but one greater and elder than the other, or that the persons in the Trinity are locally distant. Such is the virtue of implicit faith, saith Alstentaig, that, if he who hath it believes these errors, or any like them, he would be no heretic; he would not sin, provided he doth not maintain his error pertinaciously, and that he believes because he thinks the Church believes it. Or such a catholic may believe⁴ that the three persons in the Godhead are one woman; it would be but a small fault with Angelus to believe this, thinking the church believes the same. Or he may believe that Christ is not true God and man, and yet not be condemned for it, if the pope believed it too. If trusting a priest (who tells him the church holds it) he believes anything against the articles of faith, he is excused, saith Sancta Clara, after Scotus and Gabriel and others.² Though he expressly disbelieve any article of faith, yet he may be said to believe it implicitly. So that he may believe that the creed or the gospel is not to be believed, he may count it a fable (as Pope Leo called it) and yet be a Christian as to his belief, if this be the Christian faith. He may be expressly an heretic or a monstrous misbeliever, and yet implicitly be a faithful Roman catholic.

Thirdly, Such a faith as this Jews and Turks and Pagans have, even the worst of these, who do but acknowledge a God of truth; for they believe what this God reveals is true, and this generally involves all the particulars of the Christian belief, so that if the belief of such a general, without other faith as to the particulars, may be sufficient for papists, such infidels may pass for as true believers, as Roman catholics. Yea, the faith of such catholics will be so much worse than that of these infidels, as it is better to believe God’s veracity and revelation than to believe the infallibility of the Roman church, or the truth of all therein believed.

Indeed, such a faith was not counted sufficient for Christians, till Christians were thought to be something like asses. Aquinas inquires whether all be alike obliged to have an explicit faith. He answers negatively, and the ground of his conclusion is Job 1:14, ‘The oxen were ploughing, and the asses were feeding beside them;’ from whence he argues gravely that the people, who are signified by asses, are to lie down in the faith of their superiors, who are signified by the oxen, as Gregory expounds it. But what if the oxen go astray; what must become of the asses then? Why, they may follow them without hurt, believing that they are right when they are in a wrong way (for they must not have their names for nothing). So he resolves this difficulty. Human knowledge is not the rule of faith, but divine truth,⁵ from which, if some of the superiors (the oxen) make defection, that hurts not the faith of the simple (the asses), who believe them to have the right faith. After these two saints, their best pope and their angelical doctor, that we may see we owe not this rare notion (where their whole church is so subtilly divided into oxen and asses) to any lower than the most eminent amongst them, Cardinal Bellarmine, their great champion, makes use of the same exposition of that text to maintain the sufficiency of such a faith.

Stapleton would have us believe that they admit not of this implicit faith, save in points of less moment; but herein he misrepresents them, and would delude us; for it is the common doctrine of the Romanists, that an implicit faith in Christ (such as pagans may have, and for which none should have the name of Christians) is sufficient under the gospel to pass any into a justifying or saving state. This is it which our divines commonly teach, saith Vega, when they say the faith of one mediator, either explicit or implicit, is enough for justification. And Sancta Clara,³ with others, tell us this is the more common tenet in their schools; and whereas they make some difference between justification and salvation in this point, Bannes helps to remove it. It is neither heresy, saith he, nor error, nor rashness, nor scandal, to assert that a man may also in the same manner be saved, because justification, being the last disposition to glory, it is very probable that he which is justified by an implicit faith, may also, by the same faith, without alteration, be saved.

It is true, they say there is a precept for a more express faith, though no more than this implicit belief in Christ be needful, necessitate medii. But they have so many ways to exempt infidels (even under the profession of Christians) from its obligation, that few in comparison will be culpable for not observing it. By their doctors they are excused, if they be dull or gross-witted. If they be ignorant or impotent,⁶ or if their priest or their parents mislead them, or if the object of faith be not duly proposed,⁸ if by slight reasons or by impious persons (then it would be imprudence to believe); or if they do not doubt of their faith, or if their teachers be fallacious or erroneous, or if the proposal¹⁰ be not enforced with reasons, with holiness of life, with the confutation of the contrary, and with some wonders; in short, if they have not had sufficient instruction (in this all agree). And this alone will excuse a great part of their church, who, for want of such instruction, are acknowledged by themselves to be infidels. Thus Navarre delivers it. In the whole Christian commonwealth (he means the Roman church), there is so great neglect as to this, that ye may find many everywhere who believe no more of these things (i. e. of Christ and the most necessary articles of the Christian faith) in particular and explicitly, than some heathen philosophers who have only the natural knowledge of the one true God. But if the precept could reach any through all these securities (which we cannot easily imagine), yet there is one way to clear them all of it, so that they may live and die infidels, without danger from any command requiring faith in Christ; for he that hath not that express faith which is commanded in the gospel, but only what is requsite necessitate medii, is living or dying, if he be sorry for his negligence, and purpose to amend (which may be in their sense without true repentance), capable of absolution without any instruction from his confessor. And by virtue of that he may live in a justified state, or if he die, he passeth out of the world as a very good Christian, though he believe in Christ no more than a heathen.

Sect. 2. Pass we to their other sort of faith, which they call explicit. It is, as they define it, an actual assent to the particulars which the church propounds as revealed by God. This, with them, is justifying faith, requisite in the learned and more intelligent amongst them. As to the object of it, if we view it well, it looks untowardly for a thing by which a sinner is to be justified. For it is prodigiously extended, and takes in things uncertain, false, impossible, impertinent, and ridiculous, as points that must certainly be believed unto justification; for their church propounds as things revealed by God (and so objects of justifying faith) not only what is delivered in Scripture, but unwritten traditions concerning matters of faith and manners, and these, if they will be justified, they must believe, though they know not what they are, nor where to find them, but in the church’s unerring fancy. She propounds also the unanimous consent of the fathers in several points; and though this never was, or is impossible to be known, yet it must be believed by those that mean to be justified. She propounds the decrees of councils to be believed as divine truths, when it is acknowledged that the design in councils for many hundred years was not to discover truth, but to promote the Roman greatness. She propounds also the determinations of popes: these must be believed as infallible, when ordinarily they were neither persons of common truth or honesty; and we must be justified by believing the dictates of atheists or heretics,³ of conjurors or incarnate devils,⁵ of vicious beasts and wicked monsters; for those who cry up his holiness have adorned him also now and then with these other sacred titles.

I know not whether these things are more ridiculous or more horrid; however, letting them pass as they are, let us take their faith at best, and make it better than they will have it. Suppose it rested in the Scriptures, and had nothing for its object but revelation, such as is truly divine, yet even so, they give such report of it as will scarce suffer us to think that they can expect to be justified by it. Considered in itself, they count it not worthy the name of a virtue. They call it a dead, idle thing;⁸ and though they would have it to be an infused habit, and the gift of God (because the Scripture so calls that which is justifying faith indeed), yet they say a mere human quality, acquired without any supernatural assistance, may perform its proper act and office by actual assent to the whole Christian doctrine. They confess it is commonly found in the worst of men (in perditissimis hominibus), such as are neither acted nor possessed by the Spirit of God; such as live and die in mortal wickedness, and are damned for it; yea, some of them confess that it is in the devils. This faith, saith Cardinal Contarenus,³ is not it by which we belive that there is a God, or by which we believe that the things are true which God speaks; for this also is in the devils and the most wicked men. Yet at other times this is with them, the Christian, the catholic faith, as if it were enough to make them true Christians and catholics; but sure they will not seek for their Christianity and catholicness in a room lower than purgatory. However, instead of a faith which the Scripture calls for as saving and justifying, they commend to Christians a faith which hath no connection at all, necessary or probable, with salvation or justification. All they have to say is, that it must necessarily be joined with love; but when they have said this, they undo it, and all by making love itself unnecessary, as we saw before.

Sect. 3. In fine, they seem little concerned for faith, who hath it or hath it not, or how little it be, or how seldom acted. It is not necessary that the pope himself should have this faith (though the devils want it not), yea, or any other virtue, for all his ‘holiness:’ the body may do well enough, though the head of it be an infidel. They are obliged to maintain this, because their popes often have been no better. And the body may shift pretty well without it too. This may be the true catholic church made up of the whole company of believers, when not one amongst them all hath faith; for time was, say they,⁶ when none at all had faith, but only one woman, and it may be so again. As for the exercise of it, Hurtado thinks an act of faith may be requisite once in a year; but the Jesuit may seem to deal unmercifully with them, putting them to believe some of their creed once in twelve months. Those of other orders would not have them so much oppressed, once in twelve years will be enough; Bonacina⁸ saith four or five moments in a whole life may suffice for this, and specifies them; but because this may seem too hard, he signifieth withal how they may be eased in a manner of them all. For once (though that be at the point of death) an implicit act may serve; at another time or two, the precept for faith doth not of itself oblige to the act, only¹⁰ it is requisite by accident; and so the neglect of it, then, will be no special sin, nor need be confessed; at another time (or more if there were occasion), ignorance, or want of consideration, may excuse them (for these two, though they ruin the greatest part of the world eternally, yet are the greatest security of Roman catholics; and not only exempt them from that which is most the duty of Christians, but will not suffer them to sin, at least mortally, do what they can). So that, after all, one act of their faith once in a lifetime will be enough. I think it sufficient (saith he after many others) for those that are rude, to give an explicit assent once to the articles necessary to salvation, while they are propounded by their confessor, or some other.² But how must the confessor propound these articles to them, so as they may pass this one act of faith upon them once for all? Why, the best way, he tells us, is by a mode of forming the sign of the cross, as it is described for this purpose by Graffiis, Bellarmine, and other great divines. I had the curiosity to see how a confessor can make the most ignorant persons true believers by the sign of the cross, and so effectually, as they never need more believe than once while they live, and found it lying thus:⁴ Let the confessor teach him to form the sign of the cross with three fingers, to signify the mystery of the most sacred Trinity. But first, it must be drawn from the top of the head, or front, to the navel, to shew that the Son of God descended from the highest heavens into the bowels of his mother; then draw the cross line from the left arm to the right, so the cause of the incarnation is expressed; he came from heaven to earth, that we, who were to be placed amongst the goats at his left, might be removed to his right hand amongst the sheep. This is the admirable expedient. The grave Benedictine reflecting on it was put into a transport; for he adds, Behold what great mysteries of faith mother church has taught us by one mode of forming a cross, so that a rude person needs know nothing besides this, even this alone may be sufficient for his salvation! Here is a compendious way indeed to salvation, and all the knowledge and faith needful for it. He that can be satisfied with it (and give himself up to absurd and ridiculous delusions, against all the evidence of God’s word), may in few minutes, with once making the sign of the cross, get all the faith requisite for a Roman catholic; and when by such admirable conduct of the cross he hath but once believed, he need never more trouble himself with faith while he lives.⁶ The precept for faith (saith another) obligeth not, but perhaps once in a life; and it is delivered as the judgment of Aragon Torres, and other their chief divines, that of itself it binds not, but when one comes to the use of reason, or if it be not then performed, afterwards; but after one act of faith once put forth, the obligation to exercise more acts do rarely, or may be never, occur. Such is their faith, and thus you must conceive, if you can, how they live by it. They can make a life of faith of one act alone in a whole life. No wonder they presume that they can so perfectly fulfil the whole law, yea, and pay God much more than his due, when they make the greatest commands (the sum of the law and gospel) to amount to little or nothing, and instead of a hundred, set down, not fifty, but a fraction, or a cypher; when, in the case before us, they take no more notice of the faith which the gospel calls for, yea, make bold in a manner wholly to neglect that of their own making.

CHAPTER V There is no necessity of true repentance for Romanists by their doctrine

Sect. 1. If anything be absolutely and indispensably necessary to salvation, it is repentance. Christ himself declares it, Luke 13:3. The doctrine of repentance from dead works is a fundamental, and so made expressly by the apostle, Hebrews 6:1; so that without the belief and practice of it, no sinner can possibly be saved, nor have any hopes of it, but such as are delusions. Thus necessary hath the Lord made it, and yet by the Roman doctrine, it is more than needs for any sort of sins. As to original sin (the corruption of our natures), those of them who hold there is any such thing within us, yet declare that if it be any sin at all, it is the least of all sins. Andradius, employed by the council of Trent to write, tells us that their divines so determine. Bellarmine saith, that amongst all sins it is the least voluntary, and on that account is less than any venial sin; and it must be little indeed, that is less than any venial, for that, as another cardinal² tells us, passeth for nothing. And that which hath so little, or nothing of sin in it, needs no repentance. So Soto concludes, a man that hath no guilt but that of original sin, hath no need of any repentance. Thus they represent original sin as it is in them before baptism, but after they are baptized, they all agree that it is no sin at all. The council of Trent hath determined it (and so it is now with them an article of faith) ⁴ that in baptism, not only the guilt of original sin is remitted, but whatever of it hath anything of the true and proper nature of sin, is totally taken away; and they curse those who hold that it is only pardoned or impaired, and not all the sin of it quite abolished by baptism. They say they are become innocent, pure, harmless,.spotless,⁶ without the least speck of original sin, and so without any need of repentance upon that account. They are so far from being actually obliged to repent of any natural corruption, that they cannot be obliged to it, God himself cannot bind any one to repent of it. So that if there be in our natures any defectiveness as to the image of God, any averseness to God and that which is good, any propenseness to evil, we are not to take notice of it, or grieve for it as a sin; for however the apostle frequently calls it so, it is none; no more to be repented of than an innocent, harmless thing. Thus original sin is quite discharged from any concern in our repentance.

Sect. 2. There are other evils which make up the far greatest part of actual sins, which by their doctrine are but venial. Of this quality are not only those which they count small in their own nature, and those which are small in respect of the matter of them, but likewise all (how heinous soever as to the nature of them, how great soever as to the matter of them) that are acted without perfect deliberation, and are not completely voluntary. And by favour of their describing this third sort of minute evils, the most enormous wickedness that can be acted against God or man, may come under the notion of venial faults (of which hereafter). Blasphemy, perjury, adultery, murder, &c., when without perfect deliberation, will be no worse.

However, these with them are light faults, and lightly cancelled (as they tell us) by the bishop’s blessing, by holy water, by knocking the breast, by saying a paternoster, by extreme unction (so our Rhemists, Aquinas adds), by the encharist, by any of the seven sacraments,² by any sacramental unction, by prayer in a holy place; yea, or by but entering into a consecrated church. So that by these and other such means, et si aliqua alia sunt hujusmodi (saith Aquinas), pardon of venial sins may be obtained; yea, any one of them will quite abolish the fault, if not the whole penalty, particularly holy water, which (as Canus teacheth⁴) takes away the punishment of sin, and also the faults that are venial. No wonder if they determine that the sacrament of penance is not needful for these, not so much as their ritual repentance, and that there is no necessity they should be so much as confessed, nor any remorse or grief required for them, nor that they should be relinquished so much as in their resolution only.⁶ Contrition is so far from being requisite for venial sins, that with them attrition is not needful, for that is a displicence arising from shame or fear; but these sins are (in their account) neither shameful, (it is no crime, they say, to glory in them) nor dangerous; no man can be condemned for them.⁸

Thus their doctrine giveth them all abundant encouragement to live and die impenitently in these sins, in all of them; for all of them in the world, if found in one man together, amount not to so much as one mortal sin. All the penitence for these that is required by the precisest of them, is no more than one act of charity contains, i. e. such a virtual dislike as a man may have of that which he was never actually displeased at, no, nor so much as thought of.

It may seem strange (the operation of the spirit of delusion not considered) how such a conceit could ever possess the fancies of rational persons, and of some acquaintance with the Scriptures; that their sacramentals (holy water, and the like trifles) should have the virtue to procure pardon of sins, even without repentance. Aquinas would have us satisfied with this, that they do not remit sins of themselves, but are said to do it, because they may excite that fervour by which they are remitted; but this fervour is not repentance, and whatever it be, it ought to be excited, that it may remit sin, since this admirable virtue is ascribed to it on that account. No, say his followers, we must understand him so, that it is not always requisite it should be excited, but that these sacramentals are instituted for this end. Wherefore to receive them as accommodated by the church to this effect is an act of repentance, and procures remission of venial sins; although there be no way any excitement of devotion, nor any remembering of these sins, nor any dislike of them; for if this were required, truly they would not be sacramentals, since this dislike alone would be sufficient; so de Graffiis after Soto.⁴ Here is pardon of sin by an excitement of fervour, though it be not excited; that must be the implicit repentance, sufficient for the pardon of venial sins; and the explicit very like it, an act of repentance (such as is receiving of holy water), without any remembering the sins to be repented of, or any dislike of them. They had need believe that these sins are no transgressions of the law, since they expect to be secured from its penalty by that which is no repentance.

Sect. 3. Hereby it is too manifest that they make repentance needless, both in reference to original sin, and likewise to all those which they count venial. If they will have it needful for any sin at all, it must be for those they call mortal; but then these are but few in comparison. They have reduced them to seven, and none pass for deadly but such as quite extinguish spiritual life, and kill the soul immediately.

Well, but is repentance necessary for these? As to this, divers of great eminency amongst them conclude that there is no divine precept for repentance. God hath not commanded any to repent. Now if he command it not, it is not necessary; and if it be not a necessary duty, it is no mean necessary to salvation. For, as themselves tells us, though all that is commanded be not necessary to salvation, yet all that is necessary to salvation is commanded. That there is no special precept which requires repentance, was the opinion of their famous Franciscus de Victoria (in his time the great master of divinity in Spain), and of other divines, both before and after him, as Melchior Canus (sometimes his scholar) tells us. And when that of Christ, Luke 13:1-35, ‘Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish,’ is objected, they answer the meaning is, They shall perish for preceding sins, not for impenitence. By their doctrine there is no danger that any should perish for that, though persisted in unto death; and they had some reason to allege Aquinas (the angel of their schools) as of their judgment herein; for he saith plainly, that impenitency continued in till death is no special sin, but a circumstance of sin. By this doctrine it is no sin, no transgression of any divine precept to be impenitent, or to persevere therein to the end.

Those who will be concluded by the council of Trent must believe that there is no divine precept which requires contrition or true repentance precisely, but only disjunctively, either that or what is there declared to be sufficient without it. And they must take it for certain that it is not a medium necessary to salvation, since that council has determined that something else will suffice for pardon without it, and so they declare it expressly.

Sect. 4. But let us take notice of those who seem more severe. Many there be who think that repentance is under a divine command, yet these in the issue make it no more necessary than the other, who find no precept for it. For they determine that we are not obliged to repent presently, that it may be deferred till the approach or danger of death; and, in fine, that it is needless, even when a man is dying. For the first, they teach that a sinner is not bound to repent presently, it is lawful to defer it. So their doctors of all sorts, so all the faithful (say they), so the whole church. That a man is not bound to repent presently is a conclusion, saith Soto, established by the practice and the usage of the church. Canus tells us it is his own, and the common opinion, that a man is not obliged to repent forthwith; and this, he saith, is confirmed by best reason, viz. the consent of all the faithful, both priests and people; and adds, that to make the precept so rigid as to require present repentance, hath no probable reason, no, nor any authority.⁵

Now this doctrine concerning repentance, in this first step of it, where it appears more modest and innocent than in its further advance, is yet very horrid and desperate. For it is all one as if they had said, that they may, notwithstanding any command of God, continue (for some time at least) in their hatred of God, and state of enmity against him, since that is confessedly the temper and state of the impenitent. Besides, it emboldens sinners, and giveth them confidence to leave their souls at a desperate venture, presuming they may repent time enough hereafter, when they can have no assurance of any time at all for the future. And it is the more dangerous, because their doctrine takes away all apprehension of danger, leaving them no fear, either of penalty or sin, in putting off repentance; no danger of suffering by present neglects or delays, for they are told that they may repent when they please. The Lord, saith one part of their divines, is every moment ready to help them to repentance; or, say the rest, he will help them to it (if they please) in the article of necessity, whenever the precept makes it their duty.² And what should hinder them, upon such encouragement, to defer it, even to the point of death? They need not fear that they shall perish, nor need they fear they shall sin by thus putting it off. Some of their doctors make it no sin at all, others as good as none. Bellarmine determines that it is not a sin, but only a circumstance of sin, when the command doth not oblige; and that it doth not presently, but only at a certain season. Medina affirms that, without all doubt, it is lawful.⁴ Soto saith it is but a venial sin. Canus takes a course to reconcile them, he concludes it is no sin at all not to repent presently, and that is but a venial sin to will (or resolve) not to repent.⁶ Now if it be no sin at all, there is no danger at all; if it be but a venial sin, there is very little or none to be regarded, no necessity upon any account to repent of it; and he saith the people never confess this in order to repentance, the priests never require it nor regard it; by the consent of all, we are not obliged to it.

Now, that which a man is not bound to repent of, he may still continue in, and so he may still continue resolved to put off repentance; yes, so he may safely, say they, till the article of necessity.

Sect. 5. But when is that? Let us next inquire after it, and in the pursuit thereof we shall discover the second point I charge them with, That a man, by their doctrine, needs not repent all his days, till he be in danger of death. This is their common doctrine: since the command to repent is affirmative, it doth not oblige, but in time of necessity, even as other affirmative precepts do. All the question will be, When is this time of necessity, when it will be necessary to repent without longer delay? Now their doctors are agreed in no other article of time, except it be the point of death, or when a man’s life is apparently in danger. There is no other time in a man’s whole life, wherein it is likely that repentance should be requisite, but they deny it to be then necessary, and offer arguments to prove that it is not needful in any other, however probable seasons. Let me shew this in some instances. Is it necessary to repent at solemn times of worship, when we address ourselves in a more particular manner to a holy God? No, say they, generally; and Canus³ giveth this reason for it: Though acts of religion be then required, yet repentance is not an act of religion, but of revenge. Is it needful on days of fasting? It may seem so, because the main and proper end of fasts is the exercises of repentance and humiliation. No, say they, it is not needful then; for if this were the intention of God, or the church, in enjoining fasts, yet the intention of the lawgiver doth not bind us. No exercise of repentance is with them requisite on their fasts, but what they may perform in a dream; for if they sleep the whole fasting day, yet they fulfil the precept for fasting.⁵ To their fasts they require nothing but abstinence from some sort of meat, not any religious act at all; and if with them the precept for the mass, or prayer, could not be fully accomplished without some penitent sense of sin, as it may, yet neither the mass nor prayer, public or private, is requisite to their fasts. Yea, in extraordinary times for prayer, upon occasion of some great calamity befallen them for their sins, they think not contrition for sin needful. The people know not there is then any necessity thereof; their confessors and preachers are never wont to mind them of this as a thing necessary; and therefore Lopez saith, he would not condemn any private person that neglects it in these circumstances, and so concludes he after others. As for their common fasts, these (no more than their festivals) require not abstinence from acts of wickedness, much less repentance for them. Is it necessary, when sins are brought to our remembrance, and when our minds dictate to us, that they are to be hated and repented of? It seems then needful, if ever, seeing a practical judgment obligeth even in things lawful, though they be not otherwise necessary. No, not then; a man is not bound to repent when his sins are offered to his mind, either speculatively or practically.² One would think, if a sinner needs not repent, when he is mindful of his sins, it could never be needful, since he can never repent but when he is mindful of them. Is it necessary, when a sinner comes to their sacraments, particularly to that of penance? This must be the time for it (as we may well conceive), if there be any time for it at all, in the Romish church. Then a sinner is to survey his life, to find out his sins, and as a penitent to make particular confession of them, and is to have pardon of his sin, as one that only repents; being absolved by a judicial sentence, as valid as if Christ himself did pass it immediately.⁴ If repentance be not needful, when a sinner is to have pardon, then the Lord never required it, nor can it ever be made necessary by man. This notwithstanding, repentance, they say, is not necessary, no, not for the sacrament of penance. Attrition will serve for that, which is but a slender dislike of sin, because it is hurtful to a man’s self, without respect to God, as it is offensive to him.⁶ This, though short of true repentance, is sufficient to qualify a man for the sacrament of penance, by the doctrine of their church. For they hold the sacrament is not only duly administered, but effectual for all its ends and purposes, when there is no obstacle in the receiver;² the obstacle in this case is complacency in mortal sins, the complacence is gone, when sin is disliked or displeasing out of any respect,⁴ and so the obstacle is removed by the dislike of sin, which is in attrition.

Thus comes attrition to be sufficient, and true repentance not needful, no, not for the sacrament of repentance. This is not only concluded by the generality of their doctors, but by the council of Trent. And by these particulars we may discern, that repentance with them is not necessary, at any season of a man’s life, and when it would be counted so, if they did judge it needful at all, before the approach of death.

Sect. 6. But, indeed, there needs no induction of particulars to prove this, for they declare plainly, that by the command of God, it is not necessary to repent till one be at the point of death. This is said to be the judgment of Aquinas, Soto, Navarre, Durandus, Medina, Cajetan, and others, in Suarez. The ground of it is, because the reasons brought to prove that it doth not oblige presently, prove it as much of any other certain time in our life, except that only when a man is dying.

It is to the same effect that others say, the precept does but oblige in danger of death or perpetual madness. So Bonacina, and in him (besides Jesuits) Medina, Sotus, Angles, Zerola Pitigianus, Sayrus, Molfesius, and others, De Sacram, ibid. n. 5. So that, while a man is like to live, and be sober, he need not repent; but if he be in danger to die, or run mad, he should be so wise as to repent first; but how he shall know when he is like to run mad, or that his madness will be perpetual, is a hard question; and till he can resolve it, they will go near to excuse him. And if he can have a confessor, though he be at the point of death and distraction too, he need not trouble himself with repenting, that proviso they still add (saltem quando non adest copia confessarii, cui fiat confessio cum attritione); this, indeed, is it, that their confessors serve for to save sinners the labour of going to heaven, by turning them out of the only way to it.

However, by this it appears, that any papist hath warranty, by their doctrine, to live impenitently, till he be in danger to live no longer. He need not grieve for offending God till he be dying, nor resolve upon that account to forsake any sin, till there be reason to think that he can live no longer to commit it.

What a temptation is here for all wicked persons to turn papists, if they could but prevail with themselves to believe in this particular as the church believes, against all that God hath declared concerning repentance! And since men easily believe what they desire should be true, though against the word of truth, how strange would it be if the world did not ‘wonder after the beast’?

Sect. 7. But though they excuse a sinner from repenting all his life before, yet when he comes to die, do they not then make it needful? They make some show of it, indeed, but it is a mere delusive show; and they are therein as false to their own pretensions, as they are to the souls of sinners. For at the approach of death (as at any period before, wherein some of them seem to make repentance necessary, yet), even then they abuse them with conceits, that something else will serve without it. The expedients which they have provided thus to delude perishing souls all their lives, and even when they are passing into eternity, are many and various; that those who do not like to be ruined one way may be taken with another; and so, that repenting, which alone can secure them, may be declined by all.

First, Repentance without any sensible sorrow for sin, will serve the turn. This is the way of Scotus, and Vega, and others. A will not to have sinned, though it be without any grief for sin, or without any actual consideration that he hath sinned, is sufficient for pardon. Such an act of the will is the essence of that contrition which procures forgiveness, as not only Scotus, but Paludanus, Cajetan, Soto, Victoria, and Navarre in Lopez.²

Sorrow is not essential to repentance, but an effect; and such a one as is contingent and separable, and doth not necessarily follow it. Correspondent to this is their doctrine, who teach, that a virtual repentance is sufficient,⁴ any act whatever, which may be counted penitence virtually, though it be no such thing actually, or formally, is enough by their common doctrine; any love to God above all is such a virtual repentance, though without any remembrance of sin;⁶ this is is not only the opinion of Medina, but that which is commonly received. Any kind of love will serve for this, though it be but natural, and such as may be had without the grace of God, as Navarre expresseth it. And the limitation which he would seem to add, that such a virtual repentance is but sufficient when there is no time for a formal repenting, is excluded by their common doctrine; for he, and others with him, generally teach, that there is no space of time requisite for this, but it may be sufficiently despatched in a moment.⁸ And some of their chief divines hold that, a sinner being pardoned upon this virtual penitence, if he remember his sins afterwards, is not bound to repent of then. So Corduba, Sotus, Vega, Bonacin. ibid. d. v. q. v. p. 2, n. i.

Thus we have repentance sufficient to salvation in the Roman church without any sorrow, without any sense or remembrance of sin. And how can they count any more sorrow for sin necessary, who hold that no prudent person doth confess his sins to a priest, but he detests them formally or virtually, and so some way sufficiently; when it is known to be their common practice to confess sins, without any sorrow or detestation thereof? Yea, even in the hour of death, asking God forgiveness, without any remembrance of sin or actual repentance, is enough for pardon. So Joseph the Minorite teacheth, favouring their conceit (as Lopez observes) who think it repentance enough, to beat their breasts, and say, ‘Lord, have mercy.’² Nor doth such pernicious presumption find encouragement only in the Minorites’ divinity. Pope Clement the Eighth contributes more to it when, in his indulgences sent to Poland, he promiseth pardon to any one whoever that is dying, if he have but the name Jesus once in his thoughts, though he cannot express it. As there can be no true repentance without sorrow for sin, so neither without resolution to forsake it; and yet they teach, repentance may be as well without this as the other. A virtual resolution may serve, i. e. such a purpose to abandon sin, as he may have who never thought of leaving it. Navarre tells us that the sufficiency of such a purpose is learnedly and magnificently asserted by Vega.⁴ He himself explains it and defends it, without any limitation, but that, the vanity whereof appears before; and tells us the council of Trent requires not a formal purpose, but thinks that sufficient which is only virtual.⁶ And their divines whom they call Nominals, deny that any purpose to forsake sin is necessary to repentance, as Soto informs us. So that by the doctrine of all sorts of divines amongst them, a repenting, which wants the essentials of true repentance, will suffice in life or death.

Secondly, A repentance or sorrow for sin which is merely natural is counted sufficient. The apostle to true repentance requires godly sorrow, 2 Corinthians 7:9, 10, but they, many of them, think it not requisite that it should be godly, no, not in respect of its original. That will serve which is not from God, but from nature. Scotus, a leader of one mighty squadron of their school doctors, determines, that such a sorrow may be had by the power of nature as will in congruity merit pardon of sin. And Adrian, Durandus, with all the Nominals in a manner, take that to be his judgment, and are of the same persuasion themselves. The Franciscans maintained it in the council of Trent.² Aquinas, whom the rest of their school divines generally follow, was of that opinion too. And the chief of the Dominicans, his modern followers (even those of them who are loath their angelical doctor should appear to be so much a Pelagian), do hold, that such a sorrow as is merely from nature (without either habitual grace or special assistance) is enough to justify him who through ignorance thinks it enough. So Canus and Soto in Lopez,⁴ from whence Lopez infers, that in their account such remorse for sin, as requires special assistance, is not necessary to the justification of a sinner; but that may suffice which is had from the power of nature, though the ground of it be but outward disgrace. Thus if we will believe the Roman doctors, Thomists or Scotists (the Jesuits, who serve themselves of both as they see occasion, I need not mention, since of their concurrence herein there is no question), a sinner may be saved by such a sort of repentance as is not the gift of God, but the pure issue of corrupt nature.

Thirdly, A slight and inconsiderable sorrow (such as falls short of what the Scripture calls for) will suffice instead of true repentance. One act of grief, they tell us, is enough for the sins of a whole life, one only, there needs not two. So Soto, Bellarmine,⁷ &c. One act will serve for all sins in general and together; remembered or not remembered, in which sense they say general repentance will suffice. Their sense de Graffiis thus reports: A particular repentance is not required, but one general will serve, extending itself, at least virtually, to all mortal sins, both which he remembers, and remembers not; with a will to abstain from all; this is enough tot remission of sins.²

Further, this one act of grief needs be but very little and slender; the very least remorse, in the lowest degree that can be, will serve. When they require no sensible sorrow at all to repentance, but only a dislike of the will, or a will not to have sinned, the least and weakest motion of the will that way (against past sins) will suffice. To the perfection of repentance, a certain slender inward grief is requisite, saith Maldonate; one act of contrition, though it be remiss, is enough, saith Tolet. These two are Jesuits, but speak more modestly than others of their doctors. Let us hear Canus: We need not grieve for sin as much as we can; such an endeavour is not required in any other precept for love, faith, hope, or righteousness.⁴ Yea, they would be foolish precepts, if they enjoined a certain degree. But if we need not grieve so much as we can, how then? Why, as little as can be; or if that will not satisfy, as little as we will. Quantumcunque sit remissa, saith Navarre. Penitence, be it never so little, it is sufficient for the washing away of all crimes, according to the common sense of the doctors, quantumvis remissa, be it as little as you will, says Lopez after Aquinas. No certain degree, none that can be assigned, above the least of all, is requisite in Bellarmine, Victoria, &c.⁷ But should there not be a degree, more than the least, for the more grievous sins? No, no more for them than the less. In honesty we may grieve more for the greater, to comply with the advice of God, but there is no necessity for it; it is only matter of counsel, and so left to our pleasure. But must we not grieve for sin, as those who conceive it to be hateful above all, and most to be avoided? No, not that neither.⁹ Lopez tells us, that neither council nor Scripture have declared it necessary to grieve for sin, as that which is most hateful, and (which is more than all) that the council of Trent requires it not. Navarre had said as much before him, only the former thinks it may be requisite that the penitent do not expressly or positively form in his mind a resolution not to grieve for sin above all that is hateful.² Thus is repentance reduced in a manner to nothing. In respect of appreciation, it is too much to grieve for sin, as that which is most odious; in respect of intenseness, it is enough to grieve less for it than other grievances; the least degree of all is sufficient, and that which is next to nothing may serve.

Moreover, this one act, so extremely little, may be despatched in a moment. The least degree of it is enough, but the least continuance is too much; all the repentance that is a sinner’s duty may be perfectly finished in the twinkling of an eye; an indivisible instant can serve all the exigencies of it, and it may be as soon over as a man can say Peccavi. It is such an act as vanishes so soon as ever it appears, and is come and gone before there is time to observe it; they allow not the least space, the least particle of time to be necessary for it. And it is so in faith, hope, love, and other virtues; no man ever required any space of time for this; so Bellarmine, Canus de Graffiis;⁵ so Navarre, so all in a manner; for he tells us it is the common sense of their divines.⁷ The least penitence that may be, in the shortest time that can be, yea, in that which is less than any particle of time, even in an instant, is enough to blot out all crimes. And Scotus, for saying that penitence despatched in a moment is not sufficient for pardon, had like to have suffered shrewdly, every one almost being ready to fall foul upon him; but his followers have compounded for him, and brought him off with a distinction, which makes him say as the rest do, whether he thought so or no. And now it passeth currently, that all the sorrow which any need have for all his sins may be over in less than a minute, and may be begun, perfected, and ended in less time than you can pronounce the least syllable of miserere, and this they restrain not to extraordinary cases, but conclude it as common to all. Finally, This one little act, so suddenly despatched, need never return: do it but once, and no need to do it again. The act, though next to nothing in degree, though nothing at all as to continuance, is not necessarily to be repeated, or the defect of it to be supplied by another act, though there be time and occasion for it; all exercise of repentance for sin, supposed to be thus pardoned, upon any occasion, is altogether unnecessary. Having passed one act of grief, so extremely slender and so suddenly over, he needs never trouble himself with it further. There is no command that can oblige us to have it twice for the same sin. Such is the repentance which, in the church of Rome, is counted sufficient for salvation even in ordinary cases; how agreeable it is to that which the Scripture makes necessary, let others judge; to me it seems calculated for the humours of those who would be saved with a conceit of repenting, without troubling themselves with the thing; yet this is not the worst. For,

Fourthly, When they have commended to sinners a sort of repentance which is not sufficient to save them, they take it for granted that it is insufficient, and yet maintain that it is enough, if the sinner do but think so, yea, or do not think the contrary. He that thinks he is contrite, saith Soto, when he is not, though his inward remorse be not sufficient, yet because he means honestly, he shall receive justifying grace by the sacrament. Navarre tells us that Soto herein followed Aquinas commonly received, and he,² after Franciscus Victoria, judgeth it to be the plain sense of the council of Trent; Corduba, Canus, and de Graffiis,⁴ with others, concur herein. As for the followers of Scotus, amongst them it is taught, that whosoever thinks he is contrite, hath really obtained pardon; and therefore none, who make account they bring contrition to the sacrament, do by it receive the first grace, because they are possessed of it already, by thinking so well of themselves, as Soto reports them. Add but Cardinal Tolet (that we may see how all orders conspire herein⁶), those who come with remorse (which they think to be contrition) receive the first grace. He thus explains it: Sometimes a man hath some grief for sin which is not sufficient for pardon; but the sacrament being added, he is pardoned.

Thus, all sorts agree in this conceit, which I know not whether it be more ridiculous or pernicious, that a man’s thinking he hath true repentance, when he hath it not, is enough (at least with the sacrament of absolution) to save him. Let any man but delude himself, or be deluded by others, with a false conceit that he truly repents, when he doth not; and any priest can let him, in his impenitence, into heaven; if the best of the Roman guides may be believed, or those impostors regarded, who hereby make it plain (if they did it no other way), that they are given up to strong delusions.

Fifthly, If a man want that penitent sorrow which is sufficient, yet if he signify that he would have it, or that he is sorry that he hath it not, it is as effectual as if he had it. The penitent is to be asked (saith Paludanus) whether he repent; and if he do not grieve sufficiently, whether this do not displease him, and whether he would not grieve sufficiently; and this (saith he) is sufficient, which Sylvester would have well observed, because one so disposed may be absolved (i. e. though he want that repentance which is sufficient, yet he hath enough to put him into a saving state); and this, he tells us, is not only the sense of Peter Paludanus, but of Aquinas and Bonaventure, and all their divines. Navarre saith as much, approving it as the opinion of all their doctors. And yet this willingness, which they will have to supply the want of sufficient repentance, is but a conditional velleity, such as, Lopez observes,³ may stand with an absolute unwillingness to repent sufficiently; such a will as a whore may have to leave the stews when she hath an absolute purpose to stay there; and yet he himself will have such a velleity with attrition (which is far from true repentance) to be sufficient in the want of it. And this leads us further;—

Sixthly, Attrition, though known by the sinner to be short of true repentance, is sufficient without it, to pass him into a saving state, if the sacrament be added. Betwixt contrition (which with them is true or complete repentance) and this attrition, the distance is great; they give an account of it in many particulars. That is a grief for offending God, this for temporal or eternal punishment, as the greatest evil; that proceeds from filial, this from slavish fear; that cannot be had without supernatural assistance, this may be had by the power of nature, say many of them; that is an act formed by grace and love, this an act unformed, destitute of grace and love; that can pass one into the state of grace, with a desire only of the sacrament, this cannot, without an actual partaking of it; so, in fine, that is complete repentance, this but a defective remorse, such as was in Antiochus and Judas. Attrition, we see by their own account, is very far from true repentance, yet being held sufficient for a saving state without it, if the sacrament be added, by virtue hereof, repentance is most evidently rendered needless. And such attrition they think sufficient for this purpose, as either ariseth from the turpitude of sin, as it is disagreeable to reason, or from fear of hell, or apprehensions of temporal punishments and damage, as loss of health, credit, estate, &c. The council of Trent admits of any of these. For attrition, by their declaration,⁷ is either that which proceeds from consideration of the turpitude of sin, or fear of hell, or other punishment. And such attrition is, with the sacrament, sufficient for pardon, as is determined by that council in these words: Hereby he makes his way to righteousness; and although without the sacrament, it [attrition] cannot by itself bring a sinner to justification, yet it disposeth him to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament of penance. So that, by their doctrine, attrition so disposeth a sinner for justification, that their sacrament being added, it actually justifies, i. e. puts a sinner into a state of grace and salvation. From this sentence of the council, as Bellarmine tells us, the truth of what their divines hold is conspicuous, viz. that attrition, arising out of fear, is a disposition to justification, and the sacrament being added, doth truly justify. How generally they hold (with some difference of notion) the sufficiency of attrition with their sacrament, we may see in such as give an account of their opinions distinctly (not taking any of the Society into the reckoning): it will be enough but to name some of them, since their suffrages, after the determination of a council, are less needful. Some are for attrition improved,³ as Henricus, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, Petrus, Soto; some for attrition mistaken for contrition, as Victoria, Soto, Ledesma, Vega, Corduba; some for attrition known to be so,⁵ as Aquinas, Scotus, Paludanus, Capreolus, Durandus, Adrian, Antoninus, Sylvester, Canus; and some for the opinion of attrition without the reality. But this is enough to shew that, by the doctrine of their church, attrition with the sacrament is sufficient to put a sinner into a saving state at any time, living or dying. Thus is true repentance reduced to attrition, and this made enough to qualify an impenitent sinner for pardon, so as he cannot fail of it; and yet attrition, of what kind soever, can scarce pass for a good quality. That sort of it which is rational (a dislike of sin, because it [is] disagreeable to reason), is not so good in their account as that which is servile; because, as such,⁷ it is but a mere natural act, and hath no respect to God, and so hath nothing in it which looks like godly sorrow. As for that which is servile (a dislike of sin only, or principally, for fear of punishment temporal or eternal), this is so far from being spiritually good, that it is morally evil; so bad it is, by the authority and reason of their own divines. Thus Gregory, Almain, and Adrian conclude, that it is evil to act out of fear of punishment, as the next end or motive. It is no better by the reasoning of others, who would have us think better of it; a sinner thereby prefers himself before God; and that sure is a sin (in any, unless they will except ‘his holiness’) not any repenting of sin; for he that dislikes sin for punishment principally, or as the greatest evil, regards more (as themselves argue) that which is evil to himself, than that which is evil to God, and so placeth the ultimate end in himself, not in God.

Sect. 8. Having thus reduced repentance to a thing no better than we see attrition is, as though it were yet too good and too much, they bring attrition down to nothing. It is but as they describe it, a dislike of sin, not as that is offensive to God, but out of other respects, wherein self-love is most concerned, and slavish fear is most operative. The least dislike of this nature will serve, and in the lowest degree that can be:³ nor need this continue any longer than the least moment. And it will be sufficient, say some, though it be but merely natural, excited by some natural or human motive, without the grace of God, or his divine assistance; so Canus and Soto. Or it will serve if there be but a dislike that this dislike of sin is wanting;⁵ so Paludanus, Navarre, and others. Or it will be enough if there be a willingness to have it in those who have it not, according to the doctrine of their holy men, Aquinas and Richardus especially; or a man’s thinking, probably, that he hath it when he hath it not,⁷ will serve the turn, so Canus and Vega; or if he neither have it in reality nor in conceit, it will suffice, if he be but willing to partake of the sacrament; for so, they tell us, he is virtually willing to be attrite, and this qualifies him for pardon, though he neither actually hath attrition, nor desires it; so Scotus, and Sylvester after him. Thus after attrition hath swallowed up true repentance, yet it still becomes more lank by their handling, and, in fine, shrinks quite away. But whether it be little or nothing, it will serve to justify them, yea, and that too without their ritual penance; other sacraments or rites, with this, will do it. They advance the sufficiency of attrition, for all the purposes of true repentance, even without their penance. This, with the eucharist, will serve; not (say they) that there is need of true contrition, a conceit that he hath it, with this and the eucharist,⁹ will procure him pardon. This, with extreme unction, will serve, as Sylvester tells us; yea, this may be enough without any sacrament at all, as if a man in mortal sin, and so (with them) not in the state of grace, be killed, because he is a Christian, while he is asleep. If he was attrite, and willing to suffer before, by virtue hereof his sins are pardoned; so Cajetan, Sotus, and Lopez² after them. In short, the mass may serve their turn; for divers of them hold that this being offered for such as are attrite, by virtue thereof (ex opere operato) immediately, and without more ado, they have pardon of mortal sins and habitual grace; so Catharinus (in Canus, loc. Theol. l. xii. c. xiii. p. 693) and others.

Here is competent provision made that sinners may perish securely, and never look after true repentance, living or dying. There is but one thing which may seem to give some check to this great encouragement. These administrations, whereby they will have the impenitent saved, depend upon a priest; and the sinner may be in such circumstances (though this be very rare) wherein a priest cannot be had; and then, if he should chance to die without contrition, he will perish. But this need not disturb any in their course of impenitence; for in case of necessity, where a priest cannot be had, another may serve in his stead; though he be a laic, confession may be made to him, and God will supply the want of a priest; so Aquinas (in iv. dist. xvii. q. iii. art. iii.); or he may have the eucharist administered to him without a priest; and it is their common doctrine that the eucharist justifies one that is in mortal sin if he be attrite, and thinks but himself contrite; yea, he may administer it to himself with the same effect in case of necessity. Divers of all sorts amongst them are of this opinion. The authority of Aquinas is alleged for it (iii. q. lxxxii. art. iii.), and Cajetan in Matthew 26:1-75. The example of the Queen of Scots (commonly produced), who, having the sacrament by her, administered it to herself, is highly approved by all.

Thus far Satan has prevailed with them to promote the damnation of sinners, by hardening them in impenitence, even when the interest of their priests seems a little concerned. But what if a catholic sinner, relying upon such impostors, still neglect true repentance, and death to surprise him so suddenly as to render these other devices unpracticable; is not his case then desperate? No; he may have as good hopes of salvation as other catholics have, a probable ground for his hope (and none must have any certainty). Such a ground is the judgment of their angelical doctor, who declares that if one sick desires penance, and before the priest comes he dies, or is speechless, the priest may look on him as if he had confessed, and may absolve him, being dead (Opusc. Ixiii. de offic. Sacerd.). Accordingly Clemens VIII. absolved one whom he saw falling from St Peter’s church in Rome (Molfes. t. i. tr. 7. c. v. n. xlviii.); so that any may be absolved, i.e. pardoned and sanctified (for the sense of the priest’s absolvo is, I give thee grace which pardons thy sins, Impendo tibi gratiam remissivam peccatorum; ut communiter doctores; in Jo. Sanc. disp. xxvii. n. xviii.) even after they are dead, if they did but desire confession before. Now, those amongst themselves who do not desire confession while they live, are such only as will not have salvation if they might upon the most trivial terms, and so none need fear damnation, how impenitent soever otherwise they live and die, but such as are worse than any devil now in hell. And who can accuse them as too rigid, if they make true repentance unavoidably necessary for such as these, since this doctrine makes it needful for none besides?

All these ways any man may be saved without true repentance, if he will believe the Roman doctors (though, if we believe Christ, he shall certainly perish that repents not, whatever course he takes besides). Any of these are probable, and may be by their principles (having grave doctors, more than enough, to authorize them) safely followed; but that of the council’s prescribing is infallible, and will not fail to secure those who practise it, if anything in their church may have credit, nor can fail to ruin those who follow it if the word of God may be trusted. Thus, while they would increase their party by having it thought that in their way scarce any Roman catholic will be damned, they take the course (in this as in other particulars) that none who will follow them can be saved, unless salvation be for the impenitent.

Sect. 9. By this it is also manifest that the charge brought against them in the three last articles for making saving faith, love to God, and true repentance, needless in life or death, is not founded only upon the opinion of their private doctors, or the greatest part of them, but hath that which they count the surest ground of all, the determination of a general council confirmed by the pope. For if attrition be sufficient, as that council declares, then true repentance is not necessary. If grief for sin, out of slavish fear or shame only, without any love to God, be enough, then love to God is needless; and if love be not needful, then faith, which works by love, and is the only saving faith, is needless, till there be no time for it to work. But is it credible that they who sometimes seem to lay so great stress upon these graces, as necessary to salvation, should contradict not only the Scriptures, but themselves, and make them needless, not only all a man’s life before, but even when he is dying? Sure, they must have some device to supply, in pretence at least, the want of these, if not before, yet at the point of death, and will substitute something in their stead of supposed equivalence to them. Indeed, they are fruitful in inventions tending to ruin souls and subvert the doctrine of salvation; and one particularly they have in this case, and that is, what we before mentioned, their sacrament of penance. When a man is near death, if he be attrite and confess his mortal sins to a priest, and be absolved, by virtue thereof he hath remission of sins, and together therewith infusion of grace, particularly of faith, hope, and charity. Thus they come to have grace in a moment who lived graceless all their days before, and had died so if such a rite had not been provided for their relief. By virtue of this sacrament, love is planted in their heart, and their faith in God; and sorrow for sin is formed by love, and becomes saving, so that if they die presently in that state, their salvation is secured. But what if they live, must not these habits be afterwards exercised? must not there be some act of contrition in those who never had any before? No; by their doctrine there is no necessity for it, though there be no true actual repentance without it. The question is in one of their greatest divines, Whether in the law of grace, after justification obtained by the sacrament of penance with attrition alone, there remain any obligation to have contrition? And it is resolved that there is no such obligation, and that this is the judgment of all those who hold that the sacrament of penance doth justify with attrition alone, known to be so; and these are the most for number, and the most considerable for authority in their church and schools, Aquinas and Scotus both, whom the rest most commonly follow, concurring in it, besides their great council.

Sect. 10. This, then, is the doctrine of their church, introduced there instead of that of the gospel. The habits must serve to save them without their acts, and the sacrament of penance will help those that are attrite to those habits. Here is all the hopes they have for sinners whom they have encouraged to continue all their days without repentance, saving faith, or love to God, even to the very article of death. If this sacrament do not perform all this for them, they will not deny but they are certainly damned. But what ground have they for this, upon which their everlasting estate depends? None at all but their own opinion, and the opinion of such men as themselves, without any support from the word of God. If their own word will secure them for eternity, they are safe enough; otherwise, trusting to this, they are lost for ever; the whole weight of their salvation hangs upon a spider’s web, spun out of their own conceits. For this sacrament of penance, upon which all depends, is a mere invention of their own; there is no divine institution for it, it was never authorised by God, he never promised anything to it, or any part of it upon their terms, much less any such thing as they expect. And who but they who are under the power of strong delusions would trust to anything for salvation without a word from him who is the absolute disposer of grace, and the sovereign Lord of life and death? Some of themselves acknowledge that their sacrament of penance was never instituted by Christ. And many³ of them hold that the material parts of it have no such institution. Now, to trust to any device of man for spiritual effects of so high a nature is impious folly; but to lay their salvation on it is prodigious madness. They may with as much reason expect the infusion of grace from the sprinkling of holy water, or the cleansing of a soul at death from the guilt and stain of sin by a priest’s spittle; the Lord hath given them no more ground to expect any more from the one than from the other. But I need not insist upon anything which they may have the confidence to deny. It will be plain enough by what they cannot but acknowledge, that neither pardon nor grace can be expected from their sacrament of penance as ordered by them. For they assert that pardon and grace are always inseparably conferred together, so that he hath no infused grace that hath not pardon. And it cannot be denied but that pardon can never be had without true repentance; in Scripture nothing is more evident; he therefore that comes to the sacrament of penance with attrition only, and so without true repentance, he gets thereby nothing at all; neither pardon, which cannot be had without repentance, nor infused grace, which is never had without pardon; neither love, nor faith working by love, nor godly sorrow, nothing that is saving, unless he can have it without God, or against what he hath expressly declared. So that if he comes to their sacrament in a damnable condition, he certainly dies so, for any relief that rite will afford him. And therefore their doctrine, which encourageth sinners to live all their life without saving faith, or love, or repentance, in confidence that this rite will help them to these graces when they are dying, is a damning imposture; and their sacrament of penance, a most pernicious trap to draw sinners (as they set and bait it) out of the way of salvation whilst they live, and to plunge them into hell when they die, without any apprehension of their danger till there be no way to escape it.

Sect. 11. Hereby they manifestly declare themselves to be enemies to Christianity and the souls of men. For what more effectual course could they take to destroy these, and root out that, than by concluding it certain (as certain as they would have a decree of the council of Trent accounted), that though sinners neglect the great duties and acts of Christians, and live in any wickedness opposite to the rule of Christ, yet the church hath a device to save them, and by it they may be sure to escape hell without true repentance! What is this but to declare that the most damnable neglects and practices shall never damn them? Though they never repent thereof, the church hath a trick to secure them notwithstanding. What is this but to proclaim that the laws of God and the rules of the gospel are unnecessary impositions, without the observance whereof salvation may be had? The knowledge of Christ, explicit faith in him, actual love of him (which comprise all the rest), as they teach, are not necessary as means, salvation may be had without them. And as for a necessity hereof by virtue of any precept, that is not considerable, but in reference to the danger of not observing the precept; and there is no danger in this, though the neglect hereof were in their account a mortal sin, no more than in venials (or no sins at all), if it will not damn those who never truly repent of it. So that plainly by excusing sinners from repentance, they make all sins safe and all duties needless; and give men assurance that they may live and die impenitently, in the neglect of all, even the most important duties, and in the practice of any, the worst, wickedness, and yet be saved. There never was any heresy broached in the world more monstrous and pernicious than this which the council of Trent hath brought forth; it hath all the damnable wickedness, both as to judgment and practice, that ever was or can be on earth, in the bowels of it. It promotes the birth, the growth, the continuance thereof; for it promiseth safety to impenitency therein, yea, salvation too, by a knack of a very easy use and new invention. It hath in it the venom of all damning opinions, practices, and neglects; for that which makes them all deadly is impenitency; nor would they without this be finally and unavoidably destructive. But this would have impenitency itself swallowed.

CHAPTER VI Their doctrine leaves no necessity of holiness of life, and the exercise of Christian virtues

Sect. 1. Holiness of life is needless by the popish doctrine; though the Lord hath made this every way necessary, both as a duty which he indispensably requires, and as a means without which he ordinarily will save no man. It is declared necessary both ways at once, Hebrews 12:14. The papists indeed boast much of it, and seem sometimes to lay great stress on it, as if they would have it to be a character of the true church; concluding theirs is the only true church, because there is no holiness to be found in the world but amongst them only. Thus they pretend it to be of greatest consequence; but this is but to serve another turn, the design is not for holiness of life, for their doctors count that more than needs. And really they are extreme good husbands here, and make a little holiness go a great way; for it is enough to denominate the universal church holy, if there be but one holy person in it. So Costerus: How many soever of its members be dead and impious, so long as there is any one man that retains holiness, the church must be called holy. And then to make this one man holy, one act of virtue is enough, and that a very slender one too; for, saith Bannes, any one act of charity, how weak soever it be, is enough to fulfil all the commandments of God.² Now, he is doubtless a holy man who fulfils all those commandments. Further, this one act he need but do once, and that not all his life; he may defer it till he die, if he have no mind to trouble himself with it in any part of his life before, as we have already shewed. Yea, and he may be excused from it when he is a-dying too, as well as whilst he lives, if he can but get a priest to absolve him; and the priest must absolve him, if the dying man give but any sign which may be interpreted a desire of it. And their sacrament he must have, and be absolved absolutely, when speechless and senseless, if any can but witness that he desired confession, Antonin. iii. part. tit. 10, cap. ii.; Sylvest. v. confess. iii. n. 16; Paludan. dist. xxi. q. 2. a. 2. concl. 2. Yea, if he did not desire it, nor ever give any sign of repentance, he may be conditionally absolved, Rituale Pauli. 5. And though he have lived wickedly without restraint all his days, if at last gasp he be attrite, and have but (though it never appear) the virtue of Judas (only hoping better, i. e. presuming more, than he did), by virtue of such absolution he will be as certainly saved as other good catholics; though the other unfortunate wretch, for want of a priest (as virtuous as himself), to absolve and give him hope, was unhappily damned.

See here a most compendious way to be holy! Who can imagine any other but that such principles as these make holiness of life extremely needful? But, more particularly, we may discover how necessary they judge it, by what they determine concerning the necessity of exercising Christian virtues, and the forsaking of sin. There is no need of either of these by their doctrine.

Sect. 2. It is not necessary to live in the exercise of such virtues (though one would think that religion could not be Christian which obligeth not the professors of it to Christian virtues, and excuseth them from the most proper character of true Christianity), yet those who have the confidence to account themselves the only true Christians do this. For they teach that the acts of these virtues are required by affirmative precepts, and such commandments oblige not at all times; no, nor always when there is occasion and opportunity for the exercise of them, but only in the article of necessity; and when this is, it is not certain, there is no determination of it, it must be left to discreet men to judge; and being left to men, either they find no time for it at all, or none that will signify it needful to live in the exercise of such virtues. To exert an act of virtue once a year, or once in many years, or once in a whole life, or at the hour of death, is far enough from the daily exercise of Christian virtues, or an intimation that it is needful in their account who so determine. But indeed their church is more indulgent, and assures them all (that have no more regard for their souls than to believe it), that at the hour of death one act of slavish fear (though themselves count not that so much as a moral virtue), with confession, will excuse the neglect of every Christian virtue all their lives, and make their way at last into heaven, though they never had one act of virtue, any one character of a Christian, all their days. A pleasant doctrine indeed, and greedily to be swallowed by those that have an antipathy to a holy life, if the gospel and the doctrine of Christ concerning hell and heaven and the way to it could be counted but fables.

Sect. 3. They reckon but three theological or divine virtues; all the other they call moral, of which the divine are the foundation, and so all the rest must stand or fall with them. Now, two of these three they make needless (as is before declared), and without these two, hope, which is the third, is so far from being needful, that it is not possible to have it, as themselves acknowledge. A lively hope with them is needless till they be dying, and then it can but be like the giving up of the ghost.² For to all that follow their doctrine, and look after no more than that makes necessary, their hopes at last can be no better, no other, than the expectation of such a pardon of sin, as a priest can give to an impenitent person, one to whom the Lord did never give hopes of pardon. And this is a hope than which despair itself is more hopeful; for this leaves no sense of danger (which despair retains), and so leaves no desire nor endeavour to avoid it, even when they are sinking into bottomless misery. Hope is no more needful with them than a house is to him who thinks himself concerned to dig up the foundation of it, and counts it enough that he hath a castle in the air. And when they have left nothing that can be a real ground of hope, they found it upon that which is worse than nothing, their own merits; that which is inconsistent with the free grace of God and the merits of Christ, without which sinners are hopeless. It is a conjecture, founded upon a delusion, upon merit, which no man can have, and themselves say none of them know they have, and so upon they know not what. Oh wretched hopes, that have not so much for their foundation as the sand, that have nothing to bear them up but a proud and groundless fancy, that we might count ridiculous, if it were not too horrid to be the matter of sport. Can they blame those who doubt whether they will be saved, when they themselves have no better hopes of their own salvation?

How much they are concerned for hope they declare, when they tell us that the precept for hope does but of itself oblige, when the soul is tortured with the more grievous assaults of despair. It seems, unless they be violently tempted to despair, they need not hope. This rarely falls out as to any, and is scarce the case of one in a thousand, so that there is not one of a thousand in popery who need have any hope in God, or of mercy from him. No, not any at all, as others teach; for the command for hope is satisfied both by grief for sin, and also by a purpose against it (Dian. after others, v. Spes.) So that either of these, or both at least, will supersede all acts of hope for ever, and make them needless. And indeed he that considers what sorrow and purposes they count sufficient, may believe them when they teach that these leave them without hope.

Sect. 4. The next in excellency to the divine graces, by their account, is humility, and for this their doctrine makes excellent provision, as a virtue most necessary, by quite sweeping away the true ground of it. It leaves them without sense of any sinfulness, weaknesses, or unworthiness, to make or keep them humble. Being baptized, by virtue thereof all the sinfulness of their natures is not only pardoned or weakened, but quite washed away and utterly abolished. So that they are pure, immaculate, innocent, even as our first parents were in the state of innocency; not anything left in the least that can be truly counted sin. So that it would be very absurd and irrational for them to be humble under the sense of any remaining sinfulness, since they believe really there is none. But if they sin mortally afterwards (for venial sins they make no account of, and think that the Lord herein is such an one as themselves), they may be presently restored again by their sacrament of absolution to a perfect righteousness, without the least mixture or allay of what is faulty; a perfection short of heaven, because not so firm and fixed, but not wanting a hair of what is due, having not only all the parts, but every degree of what is required for their present state.² And by the power hereof they can fully and perfectly fulfil the whole law in every precept, without any culpable defect; they can fulfil it very easily, facili et parvo negotio. Yea, they can do much more than the law requires, or the Lord hath made their duty;⁴ so far are they bereaved of all sense of any weakness that might humble them. And their righteousness is not only spotless, but meritorious; there is such a transcendent worth and sufficiency in it, as they improve it, that they need not, at least after they are justified, ask anything of God but what they fully deserve at his hands. All that God doth for them is but the paying of his debts; his bounty is prevented, his grace is quite excluded; it is not in his power to bestow any free gift; all is due to the meritorious excellency of their performances beforehand. They can merit the first grace in congruity,⁶ the second grace by way of condignity; and heaven and glory is as due to them as a penny for a pennyworth, or hell is due to proud, presumptuous sinners. God would be unjust, and not pay what he oweth them on their own just account, if he should not let them have all the glory of heaven and eternity. They can merit the pardon of mortal sins before they have grace; pardon of venial sins before or after; they can merit the continuance of grace while they have it, and the restoring of it when they have lost it.⁸ They can merit not only for themselves, but for others; and deserve for them not only pardon, but grace; such grace as will enable them to set up and merit heaven for themselves. They can merit not only habitual grace for them,¹⁰ but the divine assistance, whereby the Lord works it. They can merit for them not only while alive, but when they are dead, and by their merits bring them out of those torments which are equivalent to the pains of hell, but only for the continuance, which their deserts hinder from being everlasting.

Here is a doctrine as proper to nourish humility as poison is to make a man fat and healthful; however, this, as that, is apt to swell them big, and mount them upon the heights of boasting and glorying. It is far below persons of such dignity to receive eternal life at God’s hands as a poor man receiveth an alms: absit, far be it from them; it moves their indignation to think of it, that they should expect eternal glory for God’s sake. They will not so disparage themselves as to have it in such a beggarly way; they will have it for their own sake, as that which they fully deserve, or else be without it. They will have it in a way more glorious, becoming persons of such transcendent worth, as conquerors and triumphers, as a laurel which they have sweat for, and is due to their merit. The Lord must treat them as persons of such high quality, and in a way that suits their honour. Now it is much more honourable, saith Bellarmine, to have a thing by his own merit than another’s gift (though God be the giver).³ And the Lord (adds he), to honour them, would have them get heaven by their own deserts. Oh humble doctrine, and that which is as like the gospel as the apostle St Paul was to the king of pride. Can they think humility needful, who, plucking away the true grounds of it, instead thereof instil those principles, than which hell can scarce hatch any prouder?

Sect. 5. As for those virtues which concern men, they are all comprised in love, that love which affects others as capable of eternal happiness, and so desires it for them. Thus they describe Christian love (as for human or natural, we are not here concerned in it), and tell us it is this the Scripture speaks of, John 15:1-27 and Colossians 3:1-25, and cannot deny but it is called for in the New Testament most frequently, and with greatest importunity; and yet their doctrine makes it needless. We are not bound, saith Sylvester, to be moved with love towards any men whatsoever, but only in preparation of mind, if necessity occur. This seems to dissolve the obligation of this great command, and turn it into a mere counsel; for in these very terms they describe a counsel to us,⁵ and thereby distinguish it from an obliging precept. But are we bound to love our brother when there is necessity? No, not when he is in such necessity as is extreme, and consequently never; for though it be requisite that we help him in that condition, yet we sin not if we do not help him out of Christian love; it is enough to avoid sin if we relieve him out of natural affection. Thus Navarre. And this holds not only in the external necessities of others, but also in those that are spiritual; only he saith that it very rarely falls out that one can relieve spiritual necessities without this Christian love; but he tells us also,⁷ that a Christian is rarely in such necessity. So that though it cannot be done without Christian love but very seldom, that will not make such love a duty at any time, because the external act needs not be done but seldom. Yea, if the external act also, whereby we should relieve the soul of our brother, be neglected, it is with them no great matter. For as Cajetan determines that weakness of mind, which withholds us from those things which are profitable to our neighbour, especially for the salvation of souls, though it be grievous, it is but a venial fault. In short, whatever be the circumstances of our brother, yet we may be excused from loving him indeed, if we do but think we do it. For Navarre² and others tell us that he who honestly thinks himself to be in the state of grace when he is not, may satisfy this command for Christian love by some other kind of affection, so that it is enough to think that we have this love when we have it not; and this is confirmed by a reason a fortiori, because it is so in our obligation to love God. Thus one dangerous error is grounded upon another, and by such arts we are discharged from all Christian affection to God or men. But we need not stay longer here. All necessity of this love they quite take away, by making it needless to love God, the connection between these being indissoluble by their own account.⁴

If any will not rely upon consequences, Cajetan tells them, that the command to love our neighbour as ourself, obliges not to a love of charity, i. e. that special love which was always thought, till the Roman doctors taught otherwise, to be the great duty required of all Christians by the gospel. By the doctrine of Aquinas, the precept requires no special act of love to our brethren, no formal⁷ or internal act at all, nor any exterior that will signify more than the want of hatred. This is the common doctrine amongst his devoutest followers, the Dominicans. Others express it thus:⁹ There is no affirmative precept for love to our neighbour, no time for it; it is enough that we do nothing against him. Thus, so great a part of the whole sum of the law and the prophets, and all the rules of the gospel, leading us to brotherly love and the special expressions of it, are snapped off short; and we reach all that they oblige us to do, by doing nothing. We love them well enough, though we neither will nor do them good, if only we do them no mischief; or do no more for them than may be done without inward affection, or any Christian charity.

Sect. 6. It would be tedious to pursue this in all particular virtues. The generals which they acknowledge will serve for the rest. They confess that knowledge must go before faith, and that faith is the foundation of charity, and that charity, or love to God, which hath its rise and being from faith,² is the form and root of all virtues. They all agree in it, nor is it only evident by their own confession, but also by the nature of the things themselves, that other virtues depend upon knowledge, faith, and love, for their being or exercise. For example, without love to God proceeding from faith, there can be no delight in God, nor desires to enjoy him. Delight and desire are but love in several postures; desire is love in its motion, and delight is love in its rest. There can be no delight in enjoying that which we love not, nor can the enjoyment of it be desirable; so, also, there can be no filial fear without love, for love is essential to it, and thereby it is distinguished from that which is slavish. Ingenuous fear springs from love,⁴ and is nourished by it, and increaseth or declines with it; it cannot be, nor act, but when and where love is, and is acted. So that together with love, the fear of God and the acts of it are cashiered; even all due reverence of him, and care not to offend him.

It is their common doctrine, that there is no special command, either for servile or filial fear of God; so that the want of it need neither be confessed nor repented of.⁵ So likewise there can be no hatred of sin, or sorrow for it, as it is an offence or dishonour to God, nor any true virtue at all without love, nor love without faith, nor faith without knowledge. Now, these radical graces being rendered needless by their doctrine, as I have declared before, they hereby stub up all the rest by the roots, so that neither sprig nor bud thereof can be expected. To tell us, after this, that they count any exercise of Christian virtue needful, is as if a man should take the spring out of his watch, and then persuade us seriously that he counts it very necessary it should still go, and the wheels be always in regular motion.

Sect. 7. But let us stay here a little longer, and observe how their principles, concerning love particularly, disengage all from any exercise of virtue, and every act that is truly Christian. They take notice in virtue of a goodness that is merely moral, such as may be found in heathens; and of a goodness that is divine and supernatural, such as ought to be in Christians. This latter, they tell us, is derived from their end, when in the exercise of them they are referred to God as our supernatural end, and acted for his sake, with an intent to please him. They declare, further,⁸ that they cannot be thus referred to God without affection for him, nor done with a design to please him, unless they be done out of love to him; and so must be at least imperate acts of love, that they may be Christian acts, and anything better than nature in the heathen might reach. And yet they conclude, as appears before by variety of testimonies, that we are not obliged to observe any command, or act any other virtue out of love to God. They find no time at all, when we are obliged to this, unless it be when we are bound to have an inward act of love to God; but when this is, they never agree, except in this, that it may be never. For those who seem to say that it should be sometimes, though but seldom, or but once for all, in other words signify it need not be at all, since they assign something else which may serve instead of it, whenever it may be thought requisite. Thus, according to their rule in indefinite precepts, their wise men have determined, if their school doctors, or casuists, or their council of Trent, will pass for wise. Now, being thus discharged from doing anything out of love, they are thereby exempted from all Christian acts, and any other Christianity, as to the exercise of virtue, than honest heathenism. It is true, they hold they cannot be saved without meritorious acts, and cannot well think them meritorious if they be no better than merely heathenish: they should, one would think, have some Christian character upon them, and this of love particularly,² that they may merit salvation; and if they disengage their catholics from this, they make it not needful for them to be saved. But I cannot help that, seeing they will have it so.

If they think there is no necessity their catholics should be Christians, as they do when they make no act truly Christian needful for them, they conclude it is not necessary for them to be saved, unless they believe that such as are no Christians can be heirs of salvation. Their church, pope, or council, or whoever it is, must provide them some other heaven, since that which is prepared for Christians they need not; no one step of the way to it being needful for them. All the necessity laid upon them by the popish profession is not for salvation, but for something else; they must be Roman catholics, but they need not be true Christians; they must be the pope’s subjects, but they need not be Christ s disciples; and this, and the rest, because they need not learn of him one Christian act while they live.

Sect. 8. Moreover, all exercise of virtues, opposite to acts in their account but venially evil, is with them unnecessary. And this goeth near, not only to discharge all acts of virtue which are required of Christians, but such also as were found even in pagans. This is grounded upon their doctrine concerning venial sins; these with them are not necessarily to be avoided, being either not prohibited by any command, as most of them hold, or by no command necessary to be observed, as some of them had rather express it, and therefore no need that the virtuous acts opposite to them should be practised. Upon this account no exercise of virtue will be necessary but what is consistent with the vicious acts contrary thereunto, in any degrees of wickedness which they think venial; no acts of temperance, sincerity, righteousness, truth, or faithfulness, chastity, liberality, &c., will be needful, but what is consistent with all the intemperance, hypocrisy, unrighteousness, perfidiousness, &c., which by their docrine is venial. So he may be temperate who still loads his stomach till he vomits, and is daily half drunk; he may be sincere enough, though he always design to seem better than he is, or good when he is not; he may be a man of truth and Roman faithfulness, though his constant practice be telling lies, or breaking promises, or swearing falsely, so all be but in venial measures; he may be just enough, though in all his dealings he be continually wronging others in lesser matters. He may be chaste enough, though he be unclean in thought, word, and deed, venially; and he may be liberal enough, though he constantly practise all the covetousness which is opposite to every degree of liberality, so it be no worse. He may be religious enough, though his soul never actually worship God, and devout enough without any inward devotion, and reverent enough though greatly irreverent, even in the worship of God, and though at other times he be still profaning the name of God with vain oaths and divers sorts of blasphemies; holy enough also, though he never have one act of inward holiness, no, not on those days which either God or themselves have made holy; and, in short, he may be godly enough, though he never love nor fear God till he die! Some of these particulars are plain by the premises; the rest will appear so when we present their account of venial sins. So that, though a man were so far from expressing any Christian virtue, that he should be instead thereof continually acting the contrary sins in all degrees not mortal, yet he would not be condemned; for by their doctrine, all the venial sins in the world that a person can be guilty of, though every hour, every minute of a whole life, how long soever, should bring forth one or other of them, cannot possibly damn him. And since whosoever shall not be condemned will be saved, which themselves also maintain, consequently he that, after baptism, acts not one virtue divine or moral, whose whole life hath nothing of a Christian in it, but less and worse than a pagan, will yet be saved. Thus may they be deluded who trust their souls in this infallible church; they may be true catholics, though they be not Christians, so much as to one religious act, and may pass currently to heaven though they never move one foot in the way. Such a thing we must take Christianity to be, and with so ghastly and frightful a face will it look upon the world. If popery have not thus far abandoned it, and obtruded upon us a changeling, instead of what Christ left us, there will be no lineament of virtue in the visage of it, not one of necessity; nor needs there be more in the lives of those who would be counted the only true professors and faithful embracers of it.

Sect. 9. They have other ways to make the exercises of Christian virtues unnecessary. They do it especially by turning the commands of God into counsels. Of those things that are required in Scripture, some, they say, the Lord only adviseth and commends, others he commands and enjoins: those which he adviseth, they call evangelical counsels, the other are divine precepts. Now, the precepts, they say, are necessary to be observed, sometimes at least; the counsels are not needful to be observed at all, any man may be saved without complying with them, they are matters of supererogation, more than we need to do. So that all those virtues which they make but matter of counsel, are unnecessary, the acts and exercise of them more than needs. And those which they make so expressly, are not small nor inconsiderable in themselves, and in consequence little less than all. Many of those admirable rules which Christ giveth us in his sermon on the mount, wherein the singular and divine excellency of that religion to which he calls the world is so very conspicuous, they will not have to be laws obliging all Christians, but dissolve the obligation of them by declaring them mere counsels, though they were ratified by our great Lawgiver with those universal sanctions: Matthew 7:21, ‘Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven, but he which doth the will of my Father which is in heaven.’ And ver. 26, ‘Every one that heareth these sayings of mine, and doth them not, shall be likened unto a foolish man who built his house upon the sand.’ Maldonate giveth that as the account why he is said, chap. 5:2, then to ‘open his mouth,’ because he never before propounded that sublime doctrine of evangelical perfection. Of this nature, in their account,² is trusting in God, such as frees us from solicitousness about the things of this life, chap. 6:31, 34; sincerity of intention in doing good, such as is enjoined, ver. 1; patient digesting of injury, such as is commanded, ver. 39; relieving others freely, such as is required, ver. 42; innocent communication, such as is specified, ver. 37; avoiding occasions of sin, such as are meant, vers. 20, 30; exemplary walking, intended ver. 14; poverty of spirit, ver. 3; spiritual mourning, ver. 4; Christian meekness, ver. 5. The three last, saith Soto, are trinum consiliorum votum. We must take them to be peculiar concerns of votaries. Righteousness, likewise, as to earnest desires after it, ver. 6; mercifulness, ver. 7; purity of heart, ver. 8, as it is the height of charity; peacefulness also, ver. 9; love to enemies, ver. 44, more pressed by Christ than the rest, vers. 45–48; and before popery, taken to be the proper character of Christians, but with them it is no duty, nor anything of like nature: as that, Proverbs 25:1-28. ‘If thy enemy hunger, feed him,’ &c. Yea, acts of mercy are no more our duty, for these are another instance of the same author immediately adding, et reliqua præcepta misericordiæ; not only that, Proverbs 3:4, ‘Honour the Lord with thy substance,’ but all the rest in Scripture of like nature. So likewise, not only magnificence and magnanimity, but humility also,¹² with sincerity of conversation, and Christian simplicity or plain dealing. If these be not enough, all good works are in danger to become no duties. Dominicus à Soto tells us, there are three kinds of good works to which all Christian offices are reduced: one respects a man’s self, the quelling of his own pleasures, signified by fasting; the other respects the love of our neighbours, of which kind is alms-deeds; the third respects God and divine worship, denoted by prayer; and all these three with him are works of supererogation. When they come to an account in particulars, they vary not: as to what concerns ourselves, to abstain from our lawful pleasures, even when they may be an impediment to holiness, is but advice, we need not follow it. Also, to avoid worldly cares, to be content with food and raiment, not to be eager after superfluities, not to be too solicitous for the body, not to affect dignities, are but matter of counsel by their common doctrine, in Jo. Sane, disp. 7. n. 10. As for the concerns of God, no inward worship in public is under command, nor any outward, but the mass; and for the hearing of that, no, divine precept. No more are we obliged to worship in private;³ meditation is reckoned among counsels of perfection. Vocal prayer is not enjoined by God, and so all public prayer in Christian families and assemblies are under no divine injunction. Mental prayer may be a duty,⁵ when it is our duty to love God; but when that will be is not well known. So mental prayer will be a duty, nobody well knows when. But this is a Jesuit, who minces the matter too precisely. In the judgment of Aquinas,⁷ and the generality of their doctors, mental prayer is under counsel only. And it is the more considerable, because they tell us that in mental prayer all the internal acts of religion are comprehended; so that hereby the very soul of religion is dismissed, as a thing of no necessity among Roman catholics. And since in all worship, public or private, they will have spiritual attention and devotion to be but matter of counsel (without which all that they call worship is but a cipher, or a blot rather), they leave no worship of God at all necessary. Cardinal Tolet gravely distinguisheth of a sanctifying the Lord’s day and all other holy days, for which presence at mass and abstaining from servile work is sufficient, and of a sanctifying them well, to which it is necessary that he who is in mortal sin should be contrite, and turn to God; and he that is in grace should give himself to divine contemplation and good works, and both of them should abstain from new sin; yet observe, saith he, that a man is bound under mortal sin to sanctify the day, but not to sanctify it well; and after concludes: So I am only obliged to these two things, viz., presence at mass, and avoiding servile works; but not to the end, to wit, sanctifying it well, although it be very good counsel to perform all the other upon this day. Thus with him it is no necessary duty to which any are obliged on Lord’s days, or any other days for worship, to repent of sin and turn to God, to meditate on divine things, and do good works, and abstain from any wickedness. All these, it seems, are only matters of counsel; and herein, he saith, Soto, Navarre, and Cajetan concur with him. And if they be only counsels on all these days, the world will scarce find a day when they will be duties. However, with them, to do a thing is commanded, to do it well is not necessary. On all the days which either God or themselves would have kept holy, it is mere counsel either to do that which is good or to think of it, either to be sorry for past wickedness, or not to commit more. And since it is no more on the holiest, it may seem not so much as a counsel on profane and common days. The means of honouring God being thus by them made unnecessary, no wonder if they discharge us from the due use of them. Pious sedulity (diligence for heaven and our souls) is but matter of counsel; we need not trouble ourselves with it. No more scarce with anything else, for² the shunning of idleness is but counsel, yea, and such as doth not oblige the monks themselves, though they will have none else obliged by counsels. In reference to them, Soto says, the avoiding of idleness is not commanded.

Acts which concern others are either those of righteousness or charity; for the former, how favourable they are we saw before; they discharge us from such desires thereof as Christ encourageth to the uttermost, Matthew 5:6; the latter they make corporal or spiritual. That mercy or charity which affords outward relief, even their religious are not obliged to; nor need others exercise it by giving anything,⁵ no, not to those that are in greatest necessity, how much soever themselves have, how extremely soever others want. Spiritual relief, in affording of which the exercise of mercy consists, they give an account of in many particulars, viz. advising those that want counsel, teaching the ignorant, comforting the dejected, correcting offenders, remitting offences, bearing those that are burdensome, and praying for others. Now, all these (and as many more belonging to the other branch) are no necessary duties, or, which is all one in effect, under no precept obliging to mortal guilt, except in two cases only, saith Navarre, and those two concern only corporal relief; so that all the other duties, which we owe to the souls of men, are left arbitrary, as mere matters of advice without exception. That of the apostle, 1 Peter 2:13, for subjection to governors, is with them a counsel; no more is that rule of Christ for church discipline and government, Matthew 18:15–17, ‘If thy brother shall trespass against thee,’ &c.

Mortification can scarce with them be so much as a counsel, for their doctrine will have nothing in us to be mortified; that which is to be so treated is sin in us, but they maintain that in a just man there is no sin after baptism. Carnal concupiscence itself is sinless; it is natural to us, and so innocent. That which is in us by nature, they say, is neither worthy of praise or dispraise; hence they conclude, he is blind who will say concupiscence is a sin. They grant it induceth us to sin, but it is no more sin upon that account than hearing, seeing, or other of our senses; than gold, or honour, or beauty, or anything else that may draw us to evil; and so, plainly, we are no more bound to mortify it (if sin only is to be mortified) than we are obliged to ruin our senses, to destroy gold, or to spoil the beauty of a handsome woman. And the same must be said of other vicious habits contracted by a continued practice of sin; for though they call these vices, yet vices with them are no sins, no more than virtues are duties.³ The law of God is not concerned in any habits; as it commands not those that are good, so it forbids not those that are vicious, and no reason to mortify that which is not condemned by the law. However, they retain the word, but little else we meet with in them about this great concern of a Christian, and a very odd object they find for it, instead of that which the Scripture assigns. It is the natural body that is to be afflicted and macerated, not the ‘body of sin;’ and so they are not concerned to get the work of the devil destroyed; it is the work of God that must be mortified. They may be excused if they make not this so much as a counsel. But they say the maceration of the body is in order to the bridling of concupiscence. It seems, as innocent as it is, it may need a curb, yet they take care to leave it loose enough, for those severities which should hamper it, they say, are not commanded. Afflicting of the body is under no precept, saith Soto and Sylvester. Having told us out of Aquinas that a vow is properly of a work of supererogation, acceptable to God, he adds, the maceration of the body, as such, for the bridling of concupiscence, falls under vows.⁵ And so, how unruly soever the flesh is, they may choose whether they will use the bridle or no; yea, if the priest should be so rigid as to enjoin severities of this tendency, the sinner needs not submit to them. Nor will they have us more engaged against the world than against the flesh. All the evils of the world are by the apostle reduced to three heads, 1 John 2:16; but the oracle of their schools tells us that to relinquish these three wholly, as far as we can, belongs to evangelical counsels. Soto herein follows him, and tells us² that Christ left this unto every ore under counsel. So to be crucified to the world, and to get the world crucified to us, Galatians 6:1-18, is matter of advice with him; nor are we obliged thereto in reference to those things, or lusts, which very much endanger our souls.

Self-denial also hath the same measures from them. Bellarmine, by those words of Christ to the young man, Matthew 19:21, ‘Follow me,’ understands self-denial, explaining it by Matthew 16:1-28, ‘If any man will come after me, let him deny himself.’ It is nothing else, saith he, but to renounce one’s own judgment and affections, and to accommodate himself to the judgment and will of others. This the young man should have done, but it was not his duty; it was only a counsel of perfection, as he and all of them conclude, to subject himself thus to the will and judgment of Christ. He distinguished indeed, and will have submission to the will and judgment of Christ in things necessary to salvation, to be a common duty enjoined, Matthew 16:1-28 and Luke 9:1-62; but such a subjection of our wills and judgments to Christ, in things not of themselves necessary to salvation, to be only a counsel, it is advice for those alone that would be perfect. This is bad enough, for thus it will not be a duty to subject ourselves to Christ in most things, or to deny ourselves in anything which is not in their sense a deadly evil. But Soto, than whom there was no divine more considerable in the council of Trent, advanceth farther, and concludes that self-denial, not only which is required, Matthew 19:1-30, Luke 18:1-43, but that also commanded, Luke 9:1-62, Matthew 16:1-28. (which the cardinal understood to be a subjecting of our wills and judgments to Christ in things necessary to salvation), is but a counsel; and tells us for a man to deny himself is by vow to give up his liberty to another’s will; and so Christ nowhere enjoins other self-denial than what their perfectionists voluntarily oblige themselves unto by vow, and the main duty of Christians is confined to cloisters, that self-resignation wherewith Christ should be honoured being transferred to an abbot.

There is one thing more remains which Christ requires of those who will be his disciples, that is, Christians (and but one where be gives us the sum of all), and that is suffering for him. It would be strange if, when they have eased themselves of the rest, they should leave their catholics obliged to this. The device of evangelical counsels had not been so useful a tool, though it freed them from the rest of Christ’s yoke, if it would not have served to cast of the heaviest part of it; but hereby they can cast off sufferings greater or less. Martyrdom they reserve for those who receive the truth in love; for themselves it is only a counsel, when it serves for nothing more than the glory of God and the advancing of the faith; and this according to the judgment of Aquinas. If it be no more than an opportunity of manifesting the divine glory and edifying the church, it is a work of supererogation, and of no necessity, saith another. Parting with other things for Christ is no more a duty;² to ‘forsake brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for Christ’s sake,’ Matthew 19:29, is not a duty of any Christian, but only such as profess perfection. Such forsaking all for Christ, to follow him, is more than needs; it was so in the apostles. In short, taking up the cross is more than is commanded, when it is joined by Christ with self-denial, and following him, as the best character of his disciples, Luke 9:1-62. They take it to be but matter of counsel, and so quit themselves of the full character of Christians at once.

If there be any virtue left, requisite for the practice of a Christian, which this engine hath not yet demolished and brought to discretion, by working it otherwise, it will make clear work. The least degree of virtue, they say, is all that is necessary; none can be assigned above the lowest (in faith, hope, love, repentance, or other virtues) which is enjoined. Now that which is lowest of all is next to nothing, and that which is no more can act no further; so that all exercise of virtue which their doctrine makes needful, is either nothing or next to it. All growth in grace with them is needless,⁶ for the first degree they attain is not only a sufficiency, but all the perfection that is necessary; what is more may be profitable, but not simply needful. The first and least degree of virtue in every kind satisfies the precept, and that being satisfied, requires no more. So all other degrees will be but under counsel; it will be no duty to look after more than the least, nor will the grossest negligence as to endeavours for more be any sin. And since increase of virtue is by the exercise of it, where the increase is not necessary the exercise is needless. Further, no act of virtue in any degree is requisite, but only in the article of necessity; for then only affirmative precepts oblige; at all other times they bind no more than mere counsels, nor then neither, unless it can be known when this article occurs. And how shall it be known? The Scriptures have not declared it, they say, nor counsels neither. Why, they have a rule in the case. Things not determined are left to the arbitrement of an honest man; and so it is left to every man’s will who can suppose himself honest. If he never find time for any act of virtue, he will not be obliged to any; or if he will be so cautious to consult their divines in the case, some of them declare that such a virtuous act is rarely needful, nor can they certainly tell when; others conclude there is no necessity of it at all. Now he may follow which please him best, even those, if he list, which discharge him from all obligations to the acts in question; and this he may do safely, not only by their doctrine of probability, but by the determination of their oracle. The council of Trent will secure him; though he never perform one act of virtue all his life, nor repent thereof at his death, by a fine device, which is neither repentance, nor a virtue; of which before.

Besides, all acts which have more than moral goodness seem by their doctrine to be under counsel, and all acts supernatural and truly Christian more than needs. They are not truly Christian unless they be done out of respect to God, with an intent to please and honour him, as the apostle requires, 1 Corinthians 10:30. But this rule, as Soto tells us, taken in that sense which is nearest to the letter, that all be actually referred to God, is but a counsel. But may not a virtual intent to glorify God be necessary, though an actual respect thereto be but advice? No, not that neither; for without such a virtual reference, the acts we speak of may be morally good (as they say they were in those that knew not God), and so no sin. Now in any degree above this (viz. wherein they are more than not sins, or anything better than merely inculpable),² they are works of supererogation, if their great cardinal be not mistaken.

There is yet another maxim pregnant for this purpose. The mode of virtue falls not under the precept; that is, we are not enjoined to act in a virtuous manner, or as becomes virtuous persons, viz. out of a virtuous habit or principle. Aquinas, who delivers and maintains this maxim, explains it by this instance: He is neither punished by God nor men as a transgressor of the precept, who pays his parents due honour, though not out of a habit of piety.⁴ Such honour, though it be no act of that virtue (piety they call it) from whence proceeds what we owe to parents, doth satisfy the precept, so that the person is free both from sin and the punishment. Accordingly Soto: We are not commanded to pay what we owe out of the habit of righteousness or liberality, but only to pay it to the full. By this one instance he would have us judge of all other precepts concerning virtues. The habits, i. e. the virtues, need not be exercised. Let the thing be done, and it is all the command of God requires, though it be not done out of a virtuous principle, nor be any act or exercise of it. So Bellarmine: When God commands that we live righteously and soberly, he commands not that we do this from a habit, but only that we do it. The external acts which pious, sober, and righteous persons do are requisite; but the exercise of any virtues therein, whether they concern God, others, or ourselves, is not commanded. ¹ The habit is that which they count the virtue. Since, therefore, they say that nothing need be done out of habit, they thereby declare that no exercise of virtue is enjoined; nothing that we do need be the act or issue of a virtuous principle; this will be but matter of counsel, and not under any obliging command. Indeed, they make the exercise of virtue universally needless, since they declare it not requisite in all those cases where, if in any at all, it would be needful; they find no necessity for it, either in worship or common conversation; all may be done very well, without any act of grace or virtue. They may pray effectually; they may celebrate or hear mass meritoriously (and these are the sum of all their ordinary worship); they may partake worthily of all their sacraments; they may obtain all the effects of sacraments or sacramentals (these are evident by the premises); they may satisfy all the commands of God, and precepts of their church, so as to free both from sin and punishment, in the judgment of Aquinas and his followers; yea, they may merit too, not only other things, but grace and glory. This is the point more stuck at than the rest, but the gravest of their authors maintain that it is sufficient for merit that a man be in the state of grace, though he do not act it; and this state consists but in that imaginary grace to which a priest can help an impenitent sinner. It will be hard to divine for what ends the exercise of virtue can be by them counted needful, since without it all the ends specified may be accomplished, the chief not excepted. However, here is enough to enter the exercise of virtue amongst mere counsels.

If we should take into this account all these rules in Scripture, the transgression of which is by their doctrine but venial, as Scotus, Gabriel, and others would have us (Scotus et Gabriel, asserunt peccata mortalia esse contra præcepta; venialia vero contra consilia, Vasq. in i. 2, tom. i. disp. 143, c. iv. n. 7), the number of counsels would swell infinitely, and all conscience of the exercise of virtue would be in a manner stifled under that notion; but of venials hereafter. They have, without this, yet another expedient ready to do them universal and effectual service this way; for by their principles any one may turn what divine precept soever pinches him into a counsel, and make no more conscience, of it, if he have but some doctor’s opinion for it; Ad præceptum non teneris, si te non teneri probabilis Doctorum est sententia, Medina, Soto, in Victorell. ad Sa. v. dubium, n. 2. Yea, though he have but the opinion of some one doctor, that is enough to secure him, as Angelus, Sylvester, Navarre, Sairus, Victorel (ibid, and in Jo. Sanct d. xliv. n. lxi.), and above twenty of their authors conclude (vid. infra). So far is it from being the singular conceit of some Jesuits; yea, though that doctor therein be opposed by all others.—Idem, ibid. after Lorea, Villalobos, and many more. Not to be tedious; where Christ intimates, Matthew 5:19, that some of the commands are greater, and some less, the great commands some of their writers will have to be evangelical counsels, because they are better, more meritorious, and tend to greater perfection; others will have the less commands to be such counsels, because they are not necessary to be observed. Now betwixt these two, both the great commands and the less will be dissolved into counsels, and what then becomes of the exercise of Christian virtues? If this be but matter of counsel, there is no necessity that any should trouble themselves about it. For this is the difference, saith Aquinas, betwixt a precept and a counsel: a precept imports necessity; counsels are left to the free choice of him to whom they are given, so that he may mind or not mind them, as he lists. If he observe them not, there is no fear of penalty, either eternal or temporal.² There is no punishment, saith Bellarmine, if a counsel be not observed. They all maintain this. Not one of their divines will yield that God may punish any one for acting against his counsel, though of the highest importance. And no wonder, for by their doctrine he no way sins mortally or venially that doth not observe it. Though it may seem strange that it should be no sin to neglect counsels given us from heaven, and not to follow the advice of the all-wise God, yet it is past all doubt by their principles. A neglect of counsel is no sin at all.⁴ It is not only no sin to neglect these counsels at other times, but also when God calls us to comply therewith by divine inspirations and motions of his Spirit; to disobey these calls, and resist these inspirations, is no fault at all. Cardinal Tolet is rejected as too rigid for counting it so bad as a venial fault, not to yield to these divine inspirations (Jo. Sane. disp. vii. n. iv.). So that if the great God calls to us, either by his Spirit or by his word, or both together as our counsellors, we need not regard it; we may resist both, and yet be innocent. Herein others concur. Aquinas himself counts it no sin to neglect counsels, even against conscience dictating that it is good to follow them (2 sentent, dist. xxxix. q. iii. art. iii. ad. vi.). They may refuse the observance of them with some contempt; a presumptive contempt (i. e. a continued neglect thereof) passeth without control as innocent. A negative contempt hereof is justified as either a small fault or none at all. And some of them exclude not a positive contempt of these counsels of perfection, but allow a contemptuous neglect of them as sinless. So Angelus, after their law and gloss, and their Saint Antoninus.⁶ They may glory in their neglect of these divine counsels, and make their boast thereof. This will be but a slight fault, at most; for they may glory in anything but mortal crimes, and this is not so much as venial. It will be no worse if they not only neglect, but abandon them with some abhorrence too. They may bind themselves by oath not to observe them; it will be but a small fault at worst to swear, and call God to witness that they will not follow his counsels. So they commonly determine;⁸ and if they be true to their oath, it will be no fault at all. So that if we be loath to believe that they abandon holiness in the exercise of Christian virtues, as a thing superfluous, and more than needs under this notion of counsels, to put us out of doubt they are ready to swear it, and their doctors assure them they may do it safely.

Sect. 10. But if all this were otherwise, and any exercise of virtue were needful by their doctrine, yet would there be no necessity of it, but only during the pope’s pleasure. For by their principles, if the pope should determine that any virtue were a vice, all Romanists are bound in conscience to conform to his judgment, and virtue must be avoided as if it were a vice indeed. Bellarmine, their chief champion (who is wont with so much confidence to deny, or with so great artifice to hide or disguise anything in popery, which may render his party either odious or ridiculous), delivers himself plainly to this purpose. If the pope, saith he, should mistake in commending vices, and forbidding virtues, the church would be bound to believe those vices to be good, and those virtues to be evil, unless she would sin against conscience. The cardinal would have us think, that he proceeds herein upon an improbable supposition, and that the pope cannot thus mistake, as to commend vices, or forbid virtues; but the world knows, that this is so far from being impossible, that he hath already actually done it, and this in such instances as may well persuade us, that it is not only possible, but likely, that there is not any virtue, but (if occasion serve, and his interest requires it), he may forbid it, and declare it a sin, yea, and bind the church in conscience to avoid it, as if it were a vice.

He may do it with as much demonstration of reason, holiness, and infallibility, in any case, as he hath already done it in too many. Since, then, that church hath so far subjected all the conscience and reason they have unto him, as they cannot without sin but believe him, if he should determine that light is darkness, and good is evil, he may take away all conscience of virtue, and the exercise of it, whenever he pleaseth; there will be no need of any act of virtue for any papist, if he list but out of his chair to say so; they cannot, without sinning against conscience, practise any, if he do but the same thing in the rest as he hath done in a great many already. This is enough to shew how needless they count the exercise of Christian virtues, and so how unnecessary they make all holiness of life; but it will be yet more evident, if their doctrine allow them to live in a course of sin, and make it not necessary to forsake wickedness, and abandon such evi ways as are condemned by the holy God. For continuance in sin is as inconsistent with holiness of life, as it is with hopes of salvation; and this is as clear in Scripture as if it were described with a sunbeam, 1 John 3:8, Acts 3:26, 2 Timothy 2:19, Galatians 5:16, and Galatians 5:19-21, 1 Corinthians 6:11, 1 Corinthians 6:9, &c. Notwithstanding, by their doctrine it is not necessary to forsake sin; this will be manifest, if we take notice, that there are many sins that they count virtues, and so not to be avoided; and many which they call sins, but think it not necessary for the salvation of any man to abandon them; and many sins also, which they have made to be no sins at all.

CHAPTER VII Many heinous crimes are virtues, or necessary duties, by the Roman doctrine

There are many horrid sins which they have transformed into virtues, or count high strains of piety and devotion; and thereby are so far from being concerned to forsake them, as they are obliged to live in the practice of them. I might instance in blasphemy, idolatry, perjury, robbery, murder, &c. Their blasphemies, in ascribing the peculiar excellencies of the divine majesty and the prerogatives of our Lord Jesus Christ to the blessed virgin, and other creatures, and to their popes (though divers of them, as themselves acknowledge, were monsters and incarnate devils), have been sufficiently discovered by others, and therefore, designing brevity, I here waive them. For the same reason, I will not insist upon their idolatry in invocating saints, adoring the host, and worshipping images; only as to this last, let me observe what is less taken notice of, that their own doctrine, before opened, quite shuts out the best, and only considerable, plea they make use of, to excuse themselves from this crime. It is their common doctrine, that the same worship is to be given to the image and the exemplar, id est, the worship of God to the images of the Trinity, the worship of Christ to a crucifix, or a cross, or the image of the cross. They also define idolatry to be, a giving the worship of God to any thing else besides God. Who would imagine but they had hereby fastened the charge of idolatry upon themselves unavoidably? Yet they make account to escape by pleading that the worship they give to images is transient, not terminative, id est, it stays not in the image, but passes from it to the exemplar, the mind of the worshipper directing it to God. There is no need to ask what ground they have to imagine, that their giving the worship of God to an image transitively, is not idolatry; it is enough that they acknowledge it to be idolatry, if it be not transient, since whatever they pretend when they are pinched, yet they count it not requisite that their worship should pass from the image unto God, but think it safe to let it stop where it first fell, and terminate in the image. For they confess it passeth not to God without an act of the mind directing it to him. This is not, nor can be, when in the worship God is not minded; and they generally agree (as was shewed before) that they need not mind God in their worship. So the result of their own doctrine is, that they need be no better than idolaters. I know not what they will say here, unless, as Cajetan, that a virtual termination will suffice, id est, when they have an intention to terminate their worship on God, without doing it actually, and indeed. But if no more be necessary, the worship need not pass to God really, but may rest in the image, and actually terminate there; and so they will be real and actual idolaters, whatever their intention be. Yea, as to that, by their doctrine it is not needful to intend to worship God, as we saw before. Answerably in their prayers to saints, before their relics, or before an image (which is their usual practice); since, by their common doctrine, the person prayed to, whether God or a creature, need not be minded, the address may be actual to the image, and to that only; the mind not transferring the prayer, so much as by one thought, towards the saint, it will terminate in the image, if anywhere, and be as senseless idolatry as the most stupid amongst the heathen were guilty of. Thus, what they say, many of them do; by their common doctrine all may do, viz., apply themselves to a senseless image, as though it heard their prayers, and searched their hearts, and were no less than God.

Sect. 2. There is another branch of this crime which I shall stay a little on, viz., their worshipping of relics. Herein they are so liberal as to give religious worship to such things which they do but fancy to be relics; yea, such as it is absurd and ridiculous to imagine they are relics. For who can imagine (at least when he is waking) how they could catch or keep St Peter’s shadow, or bottle up Joseph’s cough, his toilsome breathing, when he was at his carpenter’s work? Yet both these, with others of like quality, are among the relics which they count worthy of such worship. The shadow of St Peter, says one, is not the greatest among relics, and therefore, if that be adored, why are not the rest to be honoured and worshipped? Bellarmine asks, What relic can be imagined to be meaner than the shadow of Peter?³ Possibly he might be resolved, near Blois, in France, where Joseph’s cough is honoured and worshipped as a relic. Baronius ascribes much to the shadow of Peter, for he makes it the ground, not only of their worship of images, but also of the honour and power of the popes. Who can doubt hereafter, but that the weightiest things in popery have a substantial foundation? They worship their relics, not only when they are whole and sound, but when they are corrupted and reduced to dust, or nothing else of them left but the vermin bred in them. Not only the ashes, but the vermin too, may be worshipped, though some stick at the latter. Henricus, one of their school doctors, concludes, that the relics in the form of dust and ashes may and ought to be adored, but not under the form of vermin, and gives some reason for it; but their great Vasquez rejects this scruple, and the ground of it, as vain and frivolous, and concludes they may be worshipped as well when they are vermin as when they are ashes. A man, saith he, may with right intention, and sincere faith, apprehend a saint, and worship him in worms.⁵ If the question had been of the little worms in the ulcer of St Harry of Denmark, for which he had such saint-like love, as when they crept out of his knee, to put them in again, that they might be nourished where they were bred; or of the lice of St Francis,⁷ for which he had such a holy tenderness (it is recorded as an argument of his holiness), that when they were shaked off, he gathered them up, and put them in his bosom. I suppose Henricus himself could scarce have denied but those sacred creepers (having so near relation to, and being sanctified by such extraordinary contact of so great saints) might have been adored.

It cannot be denied but they are liable to gross mistakes about the object of their worship here; and some of them acknowledge, that the people herein are deluded with great and detestable impostures. What if the tooth which they worship for St Christopher’s (as big as a man’s fist),⁹ should prove the tooth of a beast? or the hair, which they worship as part of St Peter’s beard, should be the excrement of some malefactor? or the shift which they worship as the virgin Mary’s, should be the covering of some harlot? or the dust or the vermin which they worship as the remains of some saints, should have been in their original no more holy than a brute or a damned sinner? As great mistakes as these about their relics, the world has discovered, and themselves have been convinced of. Valla, a person of great learning and eminency amongst them, says plainly, There are ten thousand such things (counterfeit relics) in Rome itself. And if the seat of infallibility be so well stored with cheats, what shall we think of other places? They say, indeed, they have the attestation of visions, revelations, miracles to ensure them; but these they have, and produce as well for those that are confessed to be counterfeits, as for them which they take to be true. So that they are proved beyond all question to be all alike: the true ones, as very counterfeit as any, and the counterfeit as true as the best. Now, may they with safety venture to worship them for all this? Yes, their devotion is maintained to be not only safe, but meritorious, however they be deluded about the object of it. They may worship at all adventure, what they take to be a relic, though indeed it be no such thing; and yet be so far from idolatry or any sin, that they deserve highly at God’s hand by so doing. If any man think, says one, that to be a relic of a saint, which indeed is not so, he is not frustrate of the merit of his devotion.² Yea, a man may merit by a mistaken belief, though he should worship the devil, says another. So that they have not only a fair excuse, but great encouragement, to venture, though they may happen to worship the devil himself, and not only some limb of him, instead of Christ, or his saints, or their remains. When the Lord declares, Deuteronomy 32:1-52, ‘that his wrath should burn to the bottom of hell,’ for that the Israelites ‘worshipped devils instead of God,’ they might, if Baronius had been their advocate, have come off well enough with his plea, fides purgat facinus. The Israelites believed as firmly as the Roman catholics (only they were mistaken), that they did not worship devils, but that which was a proper object of worship; therefore, they were so far from the bottom of hell, or any danger of it, that hereby they might merit heaven and glory.

Let me add, that the miscarriages in their mass furnishes them with many sacred relics, and their orders about the disasters there create for them divers objects of worship, and help them to many right worshipful things of the vilest vermin, and that which is more loathsome. If the body or blood of Christ (so they will have it to be) fall to the ground, it must be licked up; the ground is to be scraped, and the scrapings, reduced to ashes, are to have place among the relics. If the blood be spilt upon the altar-cloths, those cloths are to be washed, and the sacred wash is to be enshrined. If a fly or a spider fall into the blood, it is to be taken out and burnt, and the ashes put into the holy shrine. But if the blood of Christ be poisoned, it is to be kept in a clean vessel among the relics; and so poison becomes a very worshipful thing. If a mouse, or a spider, or a worm, eat the body of Christ (I must desire pardon for mentioning such horrid things), these vermin, in their ashes, are to have the same preferment, and be put into shrines for relics. If a priest or other person do vomit up the host, even that (if no man’s stomach will serve him devoutly to lick it up), being turned into ashes, is to be honoured among the relics. All these and more particulars are ordained and provided for in the cautels of the mass; and thereby we see what order is taken by holy church, that dirty water, the scrapings of the ground, venomous or loathsome vermin, yea, the vomit of a weak or gluttonous stomach, casting up that which they call Jesus Christ, may be enshrined among the relics which they adore. They tender worship to all, under the altar promiscuously; yea, their very prayers are so directed thereto, that you cannot discern whether it be more to the relics or the persons they relate to; for example, when they say, Oh you that are seated under the altar, intercede ye to God for us. For they may as well believe that these relics can intercede, as that Christ, or the glorified saints, are seated under their altar.

Sect. 3. Some of them would have us believe that they give not divine honour to relics, but a sort of religious worship, which they call δουλέια; but the Scripture (and secular authors too, as is acknowledged) make no difference between the terms of their distinction, but appropriate both to God. And the people make no difference in their practice, as is confessed, but worship saints (and so their relics), even as they worship God. And their teachers and learned writers encourage them to give that to relics, which is divine worship indeed, viz. to put their trust in them, to swear by them, to bring them oblations, to burn incense, and pray to them. So they are taught to give them the thing which is confessed to be divine worship, only they will not give it the name (for though they be real idolaters, yet it is not convenient to be called so). Nor is this all: there are a world of relics, to which they will have thing and name given, even λατρεία, expressly; for it is their common doctrine, that the relics of Christ are to have the same worship with Christ himself. And under the notion of these relics, they take in (as of the saints also) not only the parts of his body, but all that belonged to him, yea, that touched him, or was touched by him. Accordingly Aquinas (whose doctrine is highly approved, not only by all the Jesuits, but in a manner by all their universities⁴) teaches that not only the cross is to have divine worship, because it touched Christ, but all things else that belonged to Christ, by virtue of this contact; and Damascene (whom he quotes) will have all things near to Christ, τὰ ἀνακέιμενα, worshipped on that account. It is true they distinguish here; some things touched him innocently, others injuriously. Waldensis seemed loath to grant these latter should be worshipped, lest he should be brought to adore the lips that betrayed him, or the hands that buffeted him; but he is run down by the stream, both of their doctrine and practice, for the things which they worship especially, and will have worshipped as Christ himself, are the instruments of his sufferings. The knife wherewith he was circumcised, the pillar at which he was scourged, the cord wherewith he was bound, the twenty-eight steps of white marble, up which he was led, in his passion, to Pilate’s house; the purple robe, and the white one too, which he wore in derision; the keys and stones of the sepulchre, the sponge, the reed, the vinegar, the crown of thorns, the lance, the nails, and (which may serve for all) the cross, which is, never the less for the loss of so many pieces, as are ten thousand times more than the whole. All these (and who can tell how many more?), though they ministered to his pain, or reproach in his passion, have divine worship. But the things which they will have worshipped for the innocent contact might suffice, being numerous beyond account. To waive the rest, Damascene (whom Aquinas follows) of this sort reckons not only his clothes, and tabernacles, the cave, the manger, and sepulchre, but also Golgotha, and Sion, and the like, wherein may be included Galilee, Samaria, Judea, and Egypt, the earth where he trod in every place being (if not deified, yet) sanctified by such contact. There is a divine virtue therein, says Baronius,² and they were wont to bring earth from those parts for the working of miracles. And amongst the relics at Venice they had a stone translated from Chio thither, whereon, it is said, he sat at Tyre. The water also of the River Jordan, at least after it comes to the place where he was baptized, and there that was taken up, they say, which is enshrined at Cassino.⁴ And why not the air too, when it comes to any place, wherever it touched him? And so every element might furnish them with objects of divine worship; and they might have no need to content themselves with such petty idols as the heathen had, but have them in such extent and largeness as is proportionable to the vast improvement of this kind of devotion in the church of Rome.

Moreover, by virtue of this contact, not only things, but persons, are capable of divine worship, and such as touched Christ may be thus worshipped. The blessed virgin in the first place. Cajetan declares that, in secret, where it can be done without scandal and danger, she may have divine worship on that account; and tells us this is the sense of Aquinas. Later writers determine that she may be so worshipped as Christ himself, either upon the account of contact or consanguinity. Upon the same ground Simeon may have divine honour, for he once embraced Christ; and Joseph, his foster father, for he had him oftener in his arms, which their church has taken notice of in a prayer on his holiday. The apostles, and seventy disciples did probably sometimes touch him, and so, by the same reason, may have the same worship with their Lord;⁶ and no wonder, seeing they tell us the lips of Judas, for but touching him with a treacherous kiss, may be thus worshipped; the woman also with the bloody issue, and those many of the multitude that pressed him, Luke 8:45. Mary Magdalene especially, she has double honour, seeing they worship more bodies than one for hers. But this is common, and they had need of a prodigious faith to believe (if any of them believe) that the things they worship are not counterfeit; since the most of them may be convicted of imposture, even by their own practice and approved writings. They must either believe themselves deluded, or believe that one person had more bodies, and one body more heads than one, yea, more than two or three. Many of their most eminent saints are thus turned into monsters, but I instance only in those who may challenge divine worship upon the common ground of contact. John, who touched Christ when he baptized him, had three or four heads, if he had as many as they worship; for they worship his head in so many several places, and when they have it whole in some shrines, yet they will have several pieces of it in others. So that Herod had not beheaded him when one head was quite cut off; and when the damsel had it in a charger, it might be still on his shoulders. Longinus also, who, they say, pierced Christ’s side, and had his eyes cured with a touch of his blood, must have four bodies, for in so many very distant places they worship it; and yet this their saint had never one body, nor being in the world.² As for St Christopher (who must needs touch Christ too, if, as they say, he carried him over an arm of the sea on his shoulders), there was no need to make him so many bodies, since they have made him one as big as many, and worship for him an effigies more like a mountain than a man. I need not mention those many thousand besides, who had an occasion to touch Christ for the space of three and thirty years, while he was on earth; the meanest of these might have divine worship, by that doctrine which makes contact a sufficient ground for it. Nor must this seem strange, since the very ass he rode on, when it could be done without scandal, might upon this account be religiously adored.⁴ Yet all these are not all that may have the honour of Christ, if we follow their doctrine whither it leads us. Hereby not only these persons, but their relics too, are capable of divine worship; for they commonly teach that the relics may have the same worship with the persons whose remains they are. Those are in the right, says one of their most absolute divines, Doctor Stapleton, who confer the like honour on the relics, as on the saints, since from both they hope to receive the like advantage.⁶ Thus they have huge shoals of objects fit for divine worship: those multitudes of relics which pass for the blessed virgin’s, and all accounted to be the apostles’, and the other persons fore-mentioned. They say they have the blessed virgin’s hair in several places, which is no such wonder, since a monk could shew some of the hairs, which fell from a seraphim, when he came to imprint the five wounds in Friar Francis his body! Her milk too kept from souring, by a continued miracle, sixteen hundred years, and so much of it as if, with their St Catherine, she had had nothing but milk in her veins.⁸ Nor is this so wonderful, seeing an image of hers could let forth of its breast such a liquor in great plenty. Her nails, too, or rather the parings of them (worthy enough of divine worship), for the nails themselves she could not spare at her assumption. That one story has prevented a hundred other fables. If they had not believed the assumption of her body, it is like we had heard of as many bodies of hers, in several places, as Geryon had, twice or thrice over, and more heads than they were wont to shew of St Barbara. Her wedding ring,¹⁰ too (though they used none in her country), and her attire cap-a-pie, from her veil even to her petticoat and shift too. Whether she wore any or no is not material; the archbishop of Chartres² wore it, and was thereby inspired with such courage in a battle against Rollo, that the dagger wherewith St Michael combated the dragon (if he had borrowed it of his neighbours in Normandy) could not have performed braver exploits, nor made greater slaughter, than his grace did; though some will ascribe less to his prowess, because being harnessed with such a shift of mail he might think himself invulnerable. Her slipper also, and shoe; yea, the figure also of the sole of her shoe is to be adored. Yet this is at a pretty distance from Christ (though its prime virtue be from contact), and derives from him, like the feathers of the hen which were of the brood of the cock that crowed when Peter denied him. They have Simeon’s arm (mentioned in the Gospel) at Aken,⁴ which hinders not but they may have it at Hartsburg and other places too. They have not only Joseph’s hem, but his breeches; and I hope kept less nastily than Thomas Becket kept his, which yet were worshipful, vermin and all, and that not per accidens (it may be), since it is one commendation of his saintship that his breeches ran quick. They have some remains of all the apostles, though nobody could tell them where divers of their bodies were interred, but things of this nature they still have by revelation. And how can such as these want revelations, who, in pilgrimage to holy relics, declared that a goose carried before them was the Holy Ghost.⁷ They have Peter’s keys, his sword, his staff, his coat, his garment besides, and his girdle; part of his body is at Constantinople, half of it at Rome in one place, and yet the whole in another. They have martyred him over again (or some other bodies for his), and torn him into more pieces than their St Hippolytus was torn with horses. They have his head (or some of it) in seven several places in Rome; only they want his brains, which were reserved in another place, and worshipped (or a pumice-stone instead thereof). And there may be some mystery in that; for they speak of some time, under Peter’s successors, when their church should have caput sine cerebro. Setting that aside, we may be sure they have missed nothing that belonged to St Peter, since they could catch his shadow, and hold it as fast as they do his keys. And why might not this be done as well as the monk could bring with him from Palestine the sound of the bells that hung in Solomon’s temple.¹⁰ I have not yet in their sacred lists discerned the lips of Judas, but they have his lantern, which shewed him the way to apprehend his Master, and thereby perhaps in time they may discover the other. They want nothing for this but some of the oil of the candle of the sepulchre, which can light itself, and this the monks at Casino can help them to. If they have not the ass upon which Christ rode to Jerusalem, they missed it narrowly when they caught the palm¹² he then had in his hand (whether he had any or no); and a worshipful relic of the ass some shew; it is said his tail is enshrined in Liguria. And who can think but that may be as proper an object of adoration as the hay wherewith Friar Francis his ass was saddled. And every hair in that tail may make a complete relic, as worshipful as the whole; for by their divinity, the virtue of the whole is in every part. If it were but well distributed, this one might serve to furnish a hundred shrines, and entertain the devotion of as many votaries and pilgrims as come to worship at Loretto. But I need not insist on such relics as are to have divine worship by consequence; those which they say expressly should be so worshipped are enough, and as many as they please to imagine. For though they have no good ground to believe that they have any one true relic of Christ, or the least part of one, yet imagination is enough with them, both to give them being, and to multiply them in infinitum, and to warrant their worship of each of them as of Christ himself; even such imaginations as interfere and confute one another, and are each of them confuted by such miracles as are the ground of the whole imposture. The foreskin of Christ is more religiously worshipped among them than Christ himself; as Erasmus observed. It is kept and exposed in at least four several countries,³ and miracles brought to confirm the truth of its being there; and yet while it is seen and adored in so many places on earth, some of their chief writers say it is nowhere on earth, but in heaven; and must be so, otherwise the glorified body of Christ would be imperfect, and not entire. His shirt, and besides that (though he had no other shirt) his coat, which the soldiers disposed of at his death, was not found till the year 593; yet they had it elsewhere, and greatly worshipped it long before in a city of Galatia, says Gregory of Tours.⁵ It is much that they should have it before it was found, and something strange too, that as it was without seam so it should be without rent, though afterwards they found it in several places at once, many hundred miles distant. They have it in Germany, and they have it in France, and they may have it in all parts of the world at once, as certainly as they have it there; but whether they have it or no, that which they take to be it must have the same worship and honour with Christ. And we must not think it strange that it should be in so many places, since they say it grew on his back, and so not unlikely might multiply itself since. About the blood of Christ there is no less imposture, and as great idolatry. They pretend to have much of it in parcels; that which Nicodemus saved in his glove, that which Longinus brought in a vessel to Mantua, that which Joseph of Arimathea brought into England in two silver vessels, that which is kept at Venice with the earth it fell on, that which is shewed at the holy chapel in Paris, that which is adored at Rome on Easter day, that which may be seen in every country where popery hath left people no eyes. Yet the angel of their schools⁷ (whose doctrine they say was approved by a miracle, and which they must not question if they believe their portess) is positive that all the blood of Christ that was shed before was in his body at his resurrection, and so ascended with him into heaven; and that the blood which is shewed in churches for relics did not flow from Christ’s side, but miraculously from a certain wounded image of Christ. So that the blood which they worship as God is no better than that which an image can bleed; and this will scarce prove so good in England as the blood of Hales, which (how much soever worshipped) was discovered to be but the blood of a drake.

They have the reed, the sponge, the crown of thorns, in so many places as gives them reason enough to believe they have them in none, and yet they worship these in all. We must imagine (to have such things go down smoothly) that they grow more than any thorn hedge does, not only in length but in number. And something towards this, Gregory of Tours writes of those thorns: they are green still, and though the leaves wither sometimes, yet they revive again, and flourish. But the old bishop had not the good hap to see this, he had it only by rumour; and such rumours their annalist is wont to make much of; for it is not amiss to abuse others into a belief of that which they cannot believe themselves. The lance which pierced Christ’s side was got into the West before it had left the East (its proper place). Otto the Great presented Athelstane, king of England, with it and other rarities, in the tenth age.² Yet the dominical spear (the same, we may suppose, though some question it) was the same age in the possession of Rudolphus, Duke of Burgundy, of which Harry emperor of Germany was so covetous, that he threatened the Duke to destroy his country with fire and sword if he would not give it him; and, in fine, gave him a good part of his country for it. Much worship it had, and brave feats it played then, and I know not how long before, for Charles the Great, they say, had it too;⁴ yet for all this it was still in Asia (if anywhere), and not found there till two hundred years after, for the Latins having taken Antioch, were blessed with the revelation of it in St Peter’s church (for holy relics was the adventure which those knights errant sought, and they were concerned in point of honour either to find or make some). But this was confirmed by miracle, else it had not been worth a rush. Peter, the finder of it, to prove the truth thereof,⁶ walked through a mighty fire with the lance in his hand. It is like this champion had something of the metal of that hermit’s marvellous pot, in which, though it was of wood, he boiled his meat constantly, how hot soever the fire was, without burning; but that of the pot it seems was better tempered, for that endured many years, do the fire what it could, but the man could not long survive that hot brunt, dying shortly after. The nails wherewith Christ was fastened to the cross were three or four at most.⁸ Baronius dare not say they were four, though he does not always speak with the least in this matter of miracles. These, as the rumour was, being sent by Helena to Constantine, lost quite the form of nails, being used for the making of a bridle and a helmet for the emperor. In this, Theodoret, Sozomen,¹⁰ and Socrates agree, but they tell us not how the nails which pierced Christ were known from those which fastened the two thieves to the other crosses. If they had foreseen that such things should have been worshipped equally with Christ himself, they would have thought this necessary, or rather to have said nothing at all without better ground, lest the nails of the thieves might have divine worship for those of Christ’s. Gregory of Tours, who will have a fourth nail, says one was thrown into the Adriatic Sea, where it seems it spawned, and from thence came the multitude of nails which were shewed and adored for the true one. (This is as satisfactory as the shuffling account which their great annalist gives thereof.) If Constantine had lived in times of popery, his horse had been in danger of divine worship for his bridle’s sake, and his helmet could scarce have defended itself from being made an idol; but seeing his religion was of another strain than that now in request with Romanists, it is well if he escape reproach for converting that, the counterfeit of which they think worthy of the worship of God, to a profane use. However, they would not long endure such abuse, for upon a time one of them (whether reassuming its old form or no, I know not) skipped out of the bridle (or helmet, as you please, into Constantine’s sword hilt, and that from thence, sword and all, into these western parts; and that we may not question this, it was given by Otho the Great to our Athelstane.² But this was nothing to the spear which Count Sampson gave to Rudolph of Burgundy, and which Harry the emperor (or king, as Baronius calls him) forced from Rudolphus; for there were I know not how many of these nails artificially fastened to the spear, say some; others will have it wholly made of them,⁴ and then these nails had need be twenty times more than ever touched the cross, or else they must be such as were fit only for the use of their giant Christopher, whose saintship they make full twelve ells high. For all this they had still many of these nails at their shrines and altars. To waive the rest, the bishop of Metes, officiating at Tryers⁶ for Poppo, who was turned pilgrim, slily filches away from the altar one of those sacred nails, conveying another very like it into the place; and he had carried it clearly, but that, as ill luck was, the holy nail fell a bleeding (and it is like the nail had more tenderness than the consciences of those who coined such stories). However, this holy bishop, who had so dear a love for relics, must not suffer under the bad character of a thief, much less as sacrilegious, for stealing of relics was then the practice of the best (and no wonder if theft got reputation, when cheats were in so much request). Besides, there was something more than ordinary in the case, for such thieves, with the receivers, cheated themselves most of all, and those that were robbed made account (as they had reason) that they lost nothing, but worshipped what was gone, as still in their possession. So they at St Dennis believe that they have still the body, as well as the name of St Dennis the Areopagite, though Pope Leo the Ninth declared by an authentic bull, that it was stolen from thence, and carried to Ratisbon in Germany. And no wonder if the French will not be baffled out of their faith by the pope; for is it likely that he who carried his head in his arms (after it was smitten off) ⁸ for two or three miles together, and would not die till he came to the place where his body should rest, would not keep it from being carried from that place, signalised with such a miracle? And the remains of St Bennet’s body were stolen from Cassino in Naples, and carried, as they say, to Fleury in France, and the monks there offer proof of it by miracles; and yet those at Cassino believe they have it, and accordingly worship it still, confirming themselves and others in that confidence of miracles too. Whereby the world may judge of their miracles, for since God works none upon such occasions, to be sure, not for the confirming of contradictions, these must be the fictions of cheating knaves, or the feats and illusions of Satan. And some of themselves² confess that multitudes of them are no better as to their original. Indeed, they make such use of their miracles, that it is enough to blast the credit of a thing to have a miracle alleged by them for it, since it is their common practice to confirm one lie with another, and the confirmation is more intolerable than the first fiction, because they will have the divine power interposed, thereby to delude the world. Not to digress further, they tell us of the oil, or liquor which drops from the knots of the true cross. No wonder if this be thought worthy of no less worship than the rest, since they ascribe to it a divine power. Besides many marvellous feats, it can cast out devils; for it must be of no less virtue than the oil of the sepulchre of St Martin, which, duly administered to a man possessed, gave him such a purge that he squirted out a foul fiend behind, and voided the devil for a stool.⁴ In short, that the cross itself should have divine worship is their common doctrine. This at first was no more than one man might well bear, but by the good housewifery of that church (who scruples no cheats in this sacred traffic) it is retailed out for worship in so many pieces, that together would sink a ship of a good burden;⁶ so that there are many, many cart loads of Roman gods, which are really no better than common chips. In all this there is not any one bit, which they can upon good ground believe to be part of the true cross. They cannot be more confident of any than that piece which, with Pilate’s inscription on it, they say is reserved and worshipped at Rome; but that is detected to be a counterfeit by Baronius his own words; for he says, that on the true cross the Latin inscription was first (and so the Greek next, and the Hebrew last), and confirms it by no less authority than that of a pope, Nicholas I.; whereas in that piece at Rome, the Hebrew is first, and the Latin last. By this we may judge of the stories concerning the invention of the cross by Helena. This now mentioned was a considerable piece of the discovery; nor would the cardinal himself have us believe, that what is said to be sent to Constantinople, or reserved at Jerusalem, were more real parts of the true cross than that at Rome. However, true or false, here is enough, one would think, to glut the most ravenous devotion of any Egyptian. But when they will have this worship given to the images of the cross,⁸ in any matter whatsoever, or immaterial either, they give warranty to turn all things in the world into idols, any sticks or straws, yea, a man’s own fingers laid across may be worshipped by him; or let him but move one finger across in water, or oil, or the air, anywhere, and instantly he has of his own creating what he may worship as God. For those relics to which they give divine worship under another name, they are yet more numerous. So that, upon the whole, if the Philistines had worshipped not only the god of flies, but the flies themselves too, they would scarce have outvied these in numbers. The idolatrous Israelites, who worshipped the host of heaven, had a fair company of idols; but the Egyptians might have more, who could sow gods in their gardens, and make them spring up on their backsides; but both put together would come short of the Romanists herein, both for number and quality, though they of Egypt became the scorn of the world for the vileness of what they religiously worshipped. How they came by so many, when for three hundred years after Christ we hear of none, we have an account from their own authors. Out of covetousness, says their learned and ingenious Cassander, false relics were daily forged, feigned miracles were published, superstition thereby nourished, and sometimes, by the illusion of the devil, new relics were revived.² So that, in brief, to use the language of their own author, the devil helped their church to some of them, and covetous knaves to others. This stuff might be had cheap, and sold very dear; this encouraged many to take up the trade, and monks are noted as prime merchants for this traffic. They were such who, in Austin’s time, being employed, as he says, by Satan (whose factors they were, and for whom the trade was driven), sold the members of martyrs, or what they pretended to be so. He was of the same profession⁴ who declared he came out of Spain into France with relics, which, being looked into, proved to be roots of trees, the teeth of moles, the bones of mice, and the claws and fat of bears. And they were monks who, as the same author tells us, were found at Rome, near Paul’s church, digging up bodies, and confessed their design was to make relics of them. As for him whom Glaber speaks of, who furnished France with innumerable relics, it may seem strange that he should be counted a cheat when he was thus trading in another country, since his stuff had the very same mark which makes their other relics current as good ware, unquestionably good, and than which their best have no better; for he wrought wonders (or the devil for him), and by one carcase, which he feigned to be a martyr’s,⁶ he freed many that were sick from variety of diseases; but I suppose he was not free of the company, and they like not interlopers. The court of Rome can furnish altars with holy relics out of common graves, and none must count them cheats for it. And if this huckster had but procured a commission from thence, he might have transubstantiated the bones in any churchyard, yea, those of a sheep or a hog either, into the bones of martyrs or apostles, as well as others. By this we may judge what their relics are, the best of them mere cheats; and consequently, how criminal it will be to give them worship, the highest of all; and yet they are so far from abandoning this, that it is in a manner the sum of their religion. And so it is expressed by some of their own communion. The whole of religion is almost brought to this, to wit, their religious treatment of relics, through the covetousness of priests, and the hypocrisy of monks, fed by the foolishness of the people. Thus their great Erasmus, in his Annotations, approved by Pope Leo X. his brief.²

Sect. 4. Let us see, in the next place, if perjury may not prove as blameless and as necessary. Breach of oaths is no less with them than a virtue, or a necessary duty in many cases (of which a further account hereafter). Let me now instance but in one. Suppose a prince that has protestant subjects should, for their satisfaction, give them the security of his most solemn oath, that they should not suffer for their conscience either in life, estate, or liberty; that religion does oblige the prince to break all such oaths, or to count himself no ways obliged by them, because they are against the laws of the church, against that particularly of the general council of Lateran under Pope Innocent III., which forbids all favour to be shewed to heretics, under the severest penalties, and decrees that favourers of heretics are under excommunication. So that in this case it must be the prince’s duty to be perjured, and to break his oath made in favour of his heretical subjects, and that by the sacred decree of the church. He must forswear himself, if he will not be excommunicated, and consequently deposed, and thereby exposed to the violence of every hand; yea, he puts himself into the state of damnation, and sins mortally, if he be true to his oath. So Pope Martin V. declared in writing to Alexander, Duke of Lithuania: Know, says he, that thou sinnest mortally if thou keep thy oath with heretics. Hereby it appears that no papists, princes or subjects, can possibly give any security which may be trusted, that protestants shall enjoy anything which is in their power to deprive them of; for the greatest securities that can be given in this case are engagements of faith and truth, God being invocated for confirmation in solemn oaths. But by the principles of their religion they are so far loosed from all such bonds that they are not at all to be trusted by any but credulous fools, unless it can be supposed that they will act as other men than papists, and contemn all the authority of that church, which leaves no hope of salvation but in obedience to it; for another general council, that of Constance, has determined that no faith is to be kept with heretics. In the nineteenth session of that assembly, it was decreed that no safe conduct given by emperor, king, or secular prince to heretics, or any defamed⁴ for heretics, though with a design to reduce them, by what engagements soever they have obliged themselves, shall hinder those heretics from being prosecuted, unless they recant, though they come to the place of judgment relying upon such security, and would not have come otherwise. And it is declared further, that one thus bound by promise was not hereby in the least obliged. And what they decreed and declared they immediately practised; for the emperor Sigismund, having given safe conduct to John Huss, and so engaged the public faith and his own honour that he should come and go safe to and from the council; and Pope John XXII., then present in the council, having given his promise and engaged his faith (if he had any) for his safety, yet the honour and faith of the emperor was borne down by the principles of their church, and the pope (as soon as the poor man was drawn into danger past escaping) made nothing of his promise, pretending, when he was urged with it, that he was overruled; and so, notwithstanding all the security an emperor and a pope had given him, he was first miserably imprisoned, and after cruelly burnt to ashes. Hereby the world, protestants especially, have this plain and useful admonition, that they must trust to nothing among papists (those that will be true to that church), but what will keep them out of their power. The principles of their religion (for such are determinations of general councils) bind them to observe no faith, or truth, or common honesty with those whom they count heretics, no, not when life is concerned. Their religion obliges them to violate the most sacred oaths and the most solemn engagements of faith and truth, rather than an heretic shall be safe in any of his concerns where they can reach him. It is a virtue, a duty in that religion to snap asunder all securities (by which the world and human society hath hitherto been preserved) to ruin a heretic; no fear of perjury or any other perfidiousness must be a hindrance in the case. Nor is perjury so necessary or innocent only when it is mischievous to us, but when it does mischief to themselves, and the world also. The practice of their popes for many ages may satisfy us herein, and to those who are acquainted with history, which gives an account thereof, it is no improbable observation that the bloody wars and massacres that have been for many hundred years in those places which the papal influence could reach, cannot be imputed to anything more, for the most part, than the perjuries of the popes themselves, and of those whom they involved in that guilt by discharging them from the obligation of their oaths.

Sect. 5. And this brings me to some other crimes forementioned, robberies and murders, which the wonderful power of papal holiness hath transformed into Christian and virtuous acts. By the doctrine of their church, to deprive those whom they count heretics of their estate and lives is a virtue, and a meritorious act. There is too good evidence for this. A decree of Pope Innocent III., recorded in the tomes of their councils, by their own writers, as an authentic act of the general council of Lateran under that pope, and inserted by Gregory IX. into the decretals, which is the law of their church, and part of that which passes with them for divine law. There is, there can be, no act of their church more authoritative and obliging than such a decree as this. There, first of all, heretics are excommunicated and condemned; and then it is decreed that the estates of those condemned are confiscated. But that is not all; the secular princes or lords are to be compelled (if they will not do it otherwise), and bound with a solemn oath, to endeavour to the utmost of their power utterly to destroy them all. They are to labour in good earnest with all their might to root them all out.² And, further, if any temporal lord proceed not to such ruining execution within a year, the pope is to absolve those that are under him from their allegiance; the land is to be seized on by catholics, who, having exterminated the heretics, are to possess it without control. Here it is plain that, by the highest authority the Roman church pretends to (that which is no less with them than divine), the papists are bound to destroy all whom they count heretics, and to take possession of their estates. And this barbarous decree (which has so much force with them, as the word of God with any) was put in execution in the days of that very pope; for he employed armies against the Albigenses (the predecessors of the protestants in France), who destroyed above two hundred thousand in the space of some months.² It was executed in the age before this in France, where so many thousands were treacherously and cruelly murdered, that the channels run down with blood into the river; and this magnified as a glorious action, honoured with a triumph at Rome, and the unparalleled butchers rewarded with his holiness’s blessing. We have known it executed in our days upon some hundred thousands of the protestants in Ireland, where that bloody tragedy was acted by the pope’s excitement and concurrence, just according to the tenor of that decree, the Irish papists endeavouring, with all their might, utterly to destroy all the protestants, that their estates and the whole land might be in the possession of Roman Catholics. And in all countries about us, wherever they have been powerful enough, or but thought themselves so, they have effected or attempted it. Such outrages were and are to be committed by warrant of the Romish doctrine. They are bound to act thus by all the authority of that church, which not only enjoins this by her decrees, but gives all encouragement thereto; such robberies and butcheries are virtuous, yea, meritorious acts. Those that will engage therein to the utmost (as their church requires) are assured by the pope, of these indulgences and privileges, which were granted to the adventurers for the recovery of the holy land, and these are expressed, in an appendix to that council, to be full pardon of all their sins here, and a greater measure of glory hereafter.⁴ At no less rate do they value the blood, and utter destruction of such as we (whom they count heretics); with such, and no less hopes, do they engage all papists, to endeavour, as far as possible, our utter extermination. It is true, there are good-natured persons amongst them, as there are amongst other sorts of men, and such as have a great aversion to such barbarous cruelty, but their religion tempts them to it, not only with hopes of heretics’ estates, but of the greatest rewards that can be propounded; yea, and forces them to it, even beyond their inclination, with threatenings of the most dreadful import, expressed in that decree, which signifies also, that they must act at this rate of inhumanity if they will be counted Christians, and must not expect to pass for faithful Romanists, unless they will act as monsters. But if it be their duty, as they are Roman catholics, and they bound in conscience, as far as their religion, and all the power of it, can bind them, to destroy the protestants amongst whom they live, and seize upon what they have, why do they not fall to work, and make an end of us, that all may be their own? How is it that they live quietly and peaceably in this, and some other places? To satisfy us here, they use plain dealing (though we must not always expect it), and tell us in express terms they do it not, merely because they have not power to do it. Though the church have made it their duty to destroy protestants, yet when they are not strong enough to do it, and where the attempting of it, because they are a weaker party, would endanger them, there they are excused, they may wait the happy hour till they have sufficient power, to shew their obedience to the church in executing her exterminating decrees, without apparent hazard of their own interest. So Bannes, a Dominican, determines that catholics in England and Saxony are excused from rising up against their protestant princes with their subjects, because they commonly are not powerful enough, and the attempt in such circumstances would expose them to great danger. Bellarmine speaks it as plainly; if it were possible to root out the heretics, without doubt they are to be destroyed root and branch; but if it cannot be done, because they are stronger than we, and there be danger if they should oppose us, that we should be worsted, then we are to be quiet.² So that the reason why protestants in such places are not presently ruined, is because the papists are not there strong enough; we and others have the privilege to live, because they are not yet able to kill us, and to seize on what we have. When they have once power enough (or but think they have it), let us look to ourselves; for if papists have any conscience, that anything in their religion can touch, they must then destroy us utterly, and leave us neither liberty, estate, nor being, unless they will resist conscience, and rebel against the authority of that church which they count most sacred and sovereign; or, which is all one in their catholic sense, they must either exterminate us, or be damned themselves. And to deal thus with us would be so far from being a sin, that by their most infallible doctrine (the decrees of popes and councils) it would be an act highly meritorious, though in the common sense of mankind it be robbery and murder. They may become the best catholics, by abandoning justice, mercy, and humanity itself, and procure pardon of all other sins, by the most detestable injustice and cruelty, and obtain higher degrees of glory by such crimes, as (to use their own expression) deserves all the fires of heaven, and earth, and hell. If Satan could inspire all other sects with this catholic doctrine, it would be an expedient to satiate his enmity to mankind; this would turn the world into a shambles, and no sort of men should escape unbutchered, but such who could find no party able to force them to the slaughterhouse, yet this is the way to heaven, and transcendent glory, for those who will follow the Roman conduct, and believe what passes for most infallible amongst them!

Sect. 6. There is another crime which passes for an eminent virtue with them, and is so esteemed and practised, that is, sorcery and conjuring. In the books of devotion published for the use of their exorcists, there are such horrid practices in and upon the devil as fully answers the titles of the books, one of which is called Horrible Conjuration, and another Devilish Exorcisms. He that has not seen them can scarce believe that such things should be practised by any that bear the name of Christians; nor can they be heard without conceiving a horror at them. But they have been mentioned by others, I will only insist on that which may seem more innocent, but has indeed too much of sorcery and enchantment, and that is their sacramentals, with things of like nature and supposed virtue. Of this quality is their consecrated water, salt, oil, bread, waxen tapers, branches of trees, roses, bells, medals, and Agnus Deis. To such things as these they ascribe marvellous and supernatural effects, a virtue to save and sanctify souls, to blot out sins, to expel devils, to cure diseases, to secure women in travail, to preserve from burning and drowning. Pope Alexander, in the decrees which they ascribe to him, asserts that water, mixed with salt and consecrated, does sanctify the people, purify the unclean, break the snares of the devil, and bring health to body and soul. The form of exorcising salt, which we have in their authorised books, tells us it is exorcised, that it may be to all that take it both health to body and soul.² The exorcised water is to chase away all the power of the devil and root him out. The virtues of an Agnus Dei are described by Urban V. in verse, wherewith he sent some of them to the Greek emperor. If you will believe a pope, who may be infallible in rhyme as well as in prose, it drives away lightning, and all malignancy, delivers pregnant women, destroys the force of fire, secures from drowning, and, which is more, destroys sin, even as the blood of Christ does. Bellarmine says⁵ they are of power for the blotting out of venial sins, for the chasing away devils, for the curing of diseases; others ascribe to them a power to excite gracious motions, even ex opere operato. Now, it is acknowledged, that the natural power of these things cannot reach such effects, and that there is no virtue in or of themselves to produce them, no more than there is in such things by which magicians and conjurors work their strange feats; nor has the Lord instituted them, or anywhere promised to empower them, for such purposes, no more than he has promised to make the charm of any sorcerer effectual for marvellous operations. Bellarmine confesseth that such things have their force not by any promise of God expressed. And Suarez⁸ says the effect thereof is not founded in any special promise of God, because, as he had said, it does not appear there is any such promise. And they confess there is a tacit invocation of the devil in using things for effects, to which they have no power, natural or divine. There is such an invocation of the devil, says Cajetan, when one uses any thing or word as having power for such an effect, for which it appears not to have any virtue, either natural or divine, for then he tacitly consents to the aid of the devil. And so Sylvester¹⁰ after Aquinas; If the things made use of for such effects appear to have no power to produce them, it follows that they are not used for this purpose as causes, but as signs or sacramentals, and consequently they belong to some compact with the devil; and this, even the Jesuits will acknowledge. Thus cardinal Tolet, It is to be generally observed that there is a tacit invocation of the devil when a man attempts to do anything by that which neither of itself nor by divine power produces such effects. And Filliucius, declaring the several ways whereby a magical operation may be discerned, most of which are applicable to their sacramentals, gives this as the reason of them all:¹² because when the effect cannot be expected from the power of such causes, since they have it not, neither from God, who has not instituted them, it follows that it must be expected from the devil, who is therein tacitly invocated. They take it for evident, that the efficacy of such things is not from God if he did not institute them; not from God, says Filliucius, since he was not the instituter. So Sylvester² will have the magical signs referred to diabolical compact, because, having no such power of themselves, they are not of divine institution, plainly signifying that if their sacramentals were not instituted of God, they could be no better than what he refers to the devil. Now, what evidence is there that their sacramentals are of divine institution, and appointed by God for such purposes? They say so, and that is all, and so may the magicians say, if they please, and prove it as well too; for from the word of God, the only proof in this case, neither of them have a syllable. The author and original of this strange power may hereby be discerned, and the means they use to derive it helps the discovery. They have it, they say, by virtue of their exorcisms, but if they can consecrate or exorcise a thing into a power which is above itself, and yet comes not from God, their consecrations hereby will prove no better than conjuring. And, indeed, he that reads but their consecrations may have cause to think they are no other; for instance, their form of consecrating salt in these words: I conjure thee, creature of salt, by the living God, the true God, the holy God, that thou mayest be made a conjured salt, for the salvation of believers. And the like conjuring they use for the making of holy water and other things. There is a charm in Alexander Trallianus, a magical doctor, which is exactly like these, in what the form of an enchantment requires, to convey a virtue into an herb for the cure of a disease: I exorcise, or conjure thee, by the great Jah and Sabaoth, the God that founded the earth, &c.; take the spirit of thy mother-earth and its virtue, and dry up the flux of feet and hands.⁴ He that will count this a charm, will have no reason to deny but the papists’ form of consecration is an enchantment; and indeed the common notion of enchantment is applicable hereto. They define it to be the conveying of a marvellous power into a thing by virtue of the words of an enchanter. Now, it is a marvellous power which they will have conveyed by their consecration, since it is a power above the natural capacity of the things, and such as enables them for spiritual and supernatural effects; and they think it conveyed by virtue of the words of the consecrator, as in the other case by the words of the magician, for as soon as the words are pronounced, they believe the things so consecrated are endowed with the power. They will say, indeed, that they expect the power from God, and use his name accordingly in their consecrations; and so might enchanters and magicians say, with the like reason, for they were wont to use the name of God in their charms and incantations, as Origen assures us. Many, says he, of the Egyptians, when they are conjuring devils, insert in their incantations ‘the God of Abraham;’ and he says, not only the Jewish exorcists did invocate the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,⁶ but almost all others who meddled with conjuration and magic. Oh, but this virtue comes from the church’s prayers, says Bellarmine! By these prayers, I suppose he means their forms of consecration; yet in them there is no praying, but rather plain conjuring, for the words are all of them directed to the things consecrated, and not at all to God, as is evident to any that reads them. And if they should use some prayers besides the forms of consecration, a magician may do so too besides his charm, and yet be no less an enchanter. Origen tells us that some invocation of God and use of his name is often found in conjuring books. And what would it mend the matter for either of them to pray to God to bless an enchantment, or make his conjuring effectual? If the Ephesian magicians should have invocated God at the recital of their γράμματα; or the conjurors among Jews or Gentiles, in the use of their suffumigations and other magical tricks;³ or the Simonians for their agogima; or Eleazer in the application of his ring and root;⁵ the practice had been no better on this account, it would be still, at least, a tacit invocation of the devil, from whom alone such virtue must be expected, as is neither in the nature of the thing nor from God’s appointment; yea, it would have been worse to make so bold with God as to invocate him for the service of the devil. But, indeed, popish prayers themselves, as they use them, are as like charms as they can look. In their prayers there are barbarous, i. e. unintelligible words (like those of the magician in 2. Pausanias), which the people, or priests many times, understand no more than the hard words in the charms of conjurors were understood: such as Jah, Zebaoth, Elohim, Sadai, or those which Cato says were used in a charm, for curing members out of joint; or the name Abraham, which though the conjurors in other countries used, yet they knew not what it meant, says Origen.⁸ They are tied to the same syllables, as conjurors are in their charms, and that they may not vary, must, as the Persian magician, read all out of a book, yea, though they have it by heart. It is not requisite by their doctrine, as we saw before, to mind the God of heaven in their prayers more than the prince of darkness. The mere muttering of the words they count effectual, as in charms and enchantments, yet they have no promise from God, that the bare recital of their forms, without any inward devotion or attention, shall prevail, more than a magician has, that such a pronouncing of the words he uses in conjuring will be prevalent; or more, that the words of a prayer which one carries in his pocket,¹⁰ another charm in use among the papists, will be effectual. So that Salmeron had more reason than he expressed, to say that their prayers were like the words of a charmer. They had need first excuse their prayers from this crime, before this will serve to excuse their sacramentals.

Sect. 7. There is another crime, no less heinous than the former, and yet in their account it is a necessary duty and a most excellent service, and that is, the destroying of Christ, which by their doctrine and laws of their church they are to do daily in the mass. To clear this, take notice of these severals: they teach that Christ is really in the mass, not only as he is God (and so everywhere), but as he is man, soul and body, flesh and blood, and there not only mystically in signs and representations, or spiritually in virtue and efficacy, but as to the very substance of his body, some say corporeally, others after the manner of a spirit; but all say the true substance of his flesh and blood is as really on the altar as his body was on the cross when nailed to it; yea, that it is there visibly, and may be (though it be not ordinarily) seen. 2. They hold that Christ is truly and properly sacrificed in the mass, and his body and blood there offered, as much as any bullock or lamb was sacrificed under the law. The council of Trent declares that the sacrifice in the mass, and that offered on the cross, is the very same for substance, and differs only in the manner of offering; and denounces a curse against any that shall say that this is not a true and proper sacrifice, or that Christ in these words, Do this, did not command the disciples, and priests after them, to sacrifice the body and blood of Christ. 3. They maintain that in every true and proper sacrifice, that which is sacrificed is really destroyed. So Bellarmine: To a true sacrifice it is required that what is offered to God in sacrifice should be plainly destroyed.³ And if it be a live thing that is offered, that it may be a true and real sacrifice, it must of necessity be slain and deprived of life. A true and real sacrifice, says he, requires the true and real killing of it, since in the killing of it the essence of the sacrifice consists. Hence it clearly follows, and it is their own inference, that Christ being truly and properly sacrificed in the mass, he is there really consumed, killed, or destroyed; he is as really consumed in the mass as incense when it was burnt for an oblation. The body of Christ, says the cardinal, for the honour of God, is laid upon the table that it may be consumed. He is as really destroyed as the whole burnt offering was destroyed when it was totally burnt. The consumption of the sacrament, says the same author, as it is done by a sacrificing priest, is an essential part of the sacrifice; for it is a real destruction of the sacrifice, and is counted correspondent to the burning of the holocaust.⁵ He is as really killed in the mass, by their doctrine, as a bullock that was slain for a sacrifice. If in the mass, says he, there be not a true and real killing and slaying of Christ, it is not a true and real sacrifice; adding this reason, because the essence of a sacrifice consists in the killing of it. So also Doctor Allen says, Christ is killed there indeed, and sacrificed to God.⁷ And Vega, Christ is as truly slain and offered in the sacrament of the eucharist, as he is truly in the sacrament; and they think him to be as truly there as they believe him to be in heaven. Aquinas⁹ favours this opinion, and Gabriel insinuates it; Soto, Ledesma, Canus, and the modern Thomists do plainly deliver it, besides Bellarmine and other Jesuits. Canus says they believe that to the perfect sacrificing of an animal it ought to be destroyed and slain, if it be truly sacrificed. He says also, that the body of Christ, in the mass, is a living and breathing body, even the very same that is in heaven, and that it is truly sacrificed. What, then, can follow from hence, but that the living and breathing body of Christ in the mass is truly killed? This is not denied, only they say it is an unbloody death. And this indeed is their doctrine, Christ is put to death in the mass as he was upon the cross. It is the same death for the substance that he dies by the priest, as he died by the Jews and Romans, only with some difference in the manner of it: it was a bloody death on the cross, it is an unbloody death in the mass, but he is put to death in both. And why should they say it is an unbloody death that he suffers by the priest, since they profess that his blood is there shed and poured forth, the very same blood that was shed on the cross?² This may seem strange, and they cross themselves here sometimes; but nothing must seem strange in the mass, for it is such a heap of absurdities and contradictions as ever entered into the fancy of any men waking and in their wits; nor could have entered into theirs, if the spirit of delusion and the dream of infallibility had not distracted them. However, this they do, and must hold, whatever come of it, that Christ is killed or destroyed in the mass. They are as much concerned to do it as all their religion comes to; for if Christ be not really destroyed in their mass, they have no true and proper sacrifice; and they tell us (to prove us altogether irreligious), where there is no proper sacrifice there can be no religion. Hereby it is very manifest that the office of their sacrificing priest is daily to offer deadly violence to Christ; that Christ in their mass is every day slain or consumed, and that the highest devotion of the Romish church is the destruction of Christ. It is true, Christ is above their reach; whatever they fancy, they cannot offer him this violence, or destroy him as they do his members; but they really design to destroy him when they would make a sacrifice of him. And they verily believe they do it, and they do all which they count requisite in order to it; and therefore they are destroyers of Christ by their own rule: to will to do it is the same wickedness with the doing of it.⁴ The horridness of this will be more apparent if we take notice wherefore they will thus use Christ. Their church does it for the honour of the saints and of his mother. In that part of the mass which is called the offertory, they say, We offer thee this oblation in honour of the blessed Mary, for ever a virgin, and of all the apostles, and of all the saints, that it may be for their honour. So that they sacrifice the Son to honour the mother, and destroy the Lord in honour of his servants. If one under the law had but offered a pigeon, or the meanest sacrifice, in honour of Abraham or Moses, it would have been counted a crime worthy of the worst of deaths, for this had been an advancing them into the place of God; and yet to sacrifice the Son of God, that is, to destroy him in honour of a saint of the pope’s making, is a meritorious act. Further, the priest will not venture on such a fact for nothing; he has no reason to destroy Christ, more than Judas had to betray him, without some valuable consideration. He is to sacrifice Christ for the living and the dead: for those that are dead, if they have bequeathed anything to the church for this purpose, or if their friends hire him to do it; for the living, those that are frugal, may be secretly mentioned in the momento of a common mass for a piece of money, but if any will go to the price of a particular mass, the priest is ready to sacrifice and destroy Christ on purpose for them in particular. In fine, they do not offer this to Christ for spiritual respects only, but for temporal and worldly advantages, and such often as are of no great moment.² Christ is to be destroyed for the health and safety of any body that is catholic; yea, for the curing of a diseased horse, or the recovery of a sick pig, or the preserving of their fruit from frost or a blast. They think it not amiss for such matters as these to make a sacrifice of Christ, and to destroy him; it is done amongst them many thousand times daily. And though the apostle seems to make it a horrid crime for one to ‘crucify again the Son of God,’ yet for them to do that daily which, for the substance of the thing, is as destructive to Christ as the first crucifying was, is the principal part and office, and the most eminent and meritorious act of their religion.

These and such like are the prime virtues of the Romanists, most needful to be observed and practised; and if things of such a quality be so far from being relinquished, where shall we find anything which God hath made a sin that can be thought worthy to be forsaken? But I have stayed long enough here; let me proceed to the next head propounded, to satisfy us that they count it needless to forsake sin.

CHAPTER VIII Crimes exceeding great and many are but slight and venial faults by the Popish Doctrine

Sect. 1. There are innumerable evils which they call sins, yet they count it not necessary in point of salvation for any to forsake them; but give all encouragement to live and die therein, as sins for which they can never be condemned. Such are those which they count venial. Let me shew you what sins they are which they reckon to be of such a quality; and thereby it will be discerned how far their doctrine gives warranty to sins of all sorts, and to continue in the violation of all the commands of God. And this I shall do out of their own authors, such as are unexceptionable, declining the Jesuits; and thereby it will be more manifest how little reason there is to excuse the practical doctrine received in their church, by charging their impious and licentious principles upon the Society. To hate God, if it be out of inadvertency, and not with deliberation, is no mortal sin: and this they say of actual hatred; for habitual enmity against God is, with them, no sin at all. Acts of infidelity, when they are led thereto by fear,⁴ or worshipping an idol (such as not only we, but themselves, count idols), are no worse than venial. Unbelief, and perplexing distrustfulness of God about the things of this life, is as innocent. To present the body only before God, in all religious exercises, in prayer, the sacraments, yea, the eucharist itself, without any actual disposition suitable to the nature of the duties, without any good motion in mind or heart; without any inward attention, reverence, or devotion; without any act of faith, fear, love, desire, or any other grace or holy affection, though the want of these be voluntary, is but a venial fault. It is no worse, not only to make base and earthly things the end why we worship God, but to make that which is a sin our design in any part of his service, yea, to propose it as the chief and principal end why we worship him; though this be no less than to prefer sin, and the pleasure of the devil, before God and his honour. To make use of a witch to dissolve some witchcraft, is scarce so much as a venial sin. And so to use the devil’s assistance instead of God’s, and employ others disposed thereto to act as witches, and to practise with the prince of darkness by a deputy in diabolical arts, is not unlawful. To deal with the devil for to get some knowledge by him, or obtain other things of him by such converse, is but a venial fault. For example, if an exorcist require the devil to satisfy him in some curious questions (such as tend nothing to the expelling of him); if he believe him not, but does it out of lightness and curiosity, he offends but venially.² To use adjurations to God, or man, or angels, or devils, or irrational creatures lightly, without reverence to the name of God, or any necessity, is but a slight fault.

Sect. 2. By virtue of their doctrine concerning venial sins, they have formed rules to encourage men in the practice and constant use of all sorts of profane and wicked oaths. They acknowledge that the oath is sinful, unless it be made in truth, and judgment, and righteousness; when that which is sworn is not true, or not just and righteous, or not with reverence and discretion; yet they teach it is but a venial fault to swear without⁵ reverence or discretion, or without righteousness also, if that be not much. So that, though swearing be an act, as they tell us, of God’s worship, wherein divine honour is given to him whom we swear by, yet this may be done without reverence and discretion (as the rest of their worship is), and God may be solemnly called to witness that the man intends to sin against him, if it be not much; and this without any great fault. A habit of swearing thus, or worse, is no sin, for habits of what wickedness soever are not forbidden. To use this habit frequently, so as to swear customarily, almost at every word (tertio quoque verbo), unless he regard not at all whether he swear true or false, yea, though he regard not that as much as he ought, is no more a fault. So to swear⁸ out of lightness and vanity, upon any the slightest occasion, without any advantage or the least necessity, is as innocent a practice, according to all their doctors. And the common practice of their catholics is correspondent to these conscientious rules. You can scarce find any one, (says Soto) who will either begin or end the least discourse without an oath; for they use oaths for ornaments of speech at every word. But should they not at least endeavour to leave this custom of swearing? No, never to endeavour; it is but a small fault. Although (says one of their most approved casuists) he sins venially who swears true without any necessity, and so the custom of swearing be evil and pernicious, yet he sins not mortally who labours not to break off that custom, because it is but an occasion of falling into venial faults. Hereby they have encouragement, not only to accustom themselves to this impious practice, wherein so much profaneness, irreverence, and contempt of God is expressed, but also never to give it over, yea, never to endeavour it. And the reason whereby they warrant this, reaches all the wickedness which by those conscientious divines is counted venial; they may commit it customarily, continually, and need never go about to do better; all will be but a fault so small as is next to nothing. They need not regard in what terms their oaths are dressed. They may swear [by the] body or blood of God, by Cajetan’s leave;² yea, though they swear by such parts of Christ’s body, or such members of the saints, or the virgin mother, as are not to be named (per inhonesta membra), it is but venial, if without contempt and scandal, which will make an act, in itself lawful, to be criminal. And though they seem to give caution that what is sworn be not false, since this cannot be excused by any artifice from being damnable, yet they try what may be done to make this go down as easily as the rest. If the thing sworn be false, and he knows it, yet swears it by his faith, or troth, or this fire, such perjury is venial, non peccant mortaliter cum perjurant (Angel. after Aureolus v. perjurium). To swear that which is false in jest is a harmless venial, by the gloss upon their law. Commonly to swear that which is false, without considering whether it be false or no, or whether he swear or not, is as harmless.⁵ This is the judgment of Aquinas and their common doctrine: so that if a man heed not what he does, he may do what he will, and, as it were, wink a damnable crime into a slight fault. By this expedient he may swear false as commonly as true without any considerable hurt. This is enough, one would think, to render their worse sort of swearing, perjury itself, practicable in ordinary, with ease and safety. Yet, as an overplus, they add, he that swears what is false through gross or careless ignorance, thinking it to be true, though if he use due diligence, he sins not at all; yet if he used some diligence, but not enough, he offends no more than venially, if Aquinas or the common doctrine may be credited; for this is it, saith Navarre. And that, which way soever a man turn himself, he may have liberty to be perjured, they teach that he that swears the truth, believing it to be false, and takes notice that he swears, but minds not what he swears, sins not mortally; or if he neither regard the one nor the other, but does both without consideration, it is only a little fault,² unless this inconsiderateness was wilful and out of contempt, for then perhaps it may be worse upon the account of contempt; probable error will excuse perjury from mortal guilt, as if one appeals, thinking there is reasonable cause for it, though he has sworn before not to appeal. So Panormitan. and Angel. Sum. v. Perjur.

He that hears a thing from a person of credit, may swear it is true, only not in court, unless he express his reason (Bonacin. tom. ii. disp. iv. q. i. punct. iii. n. vii). But as if it were not sufficient for a man to swear false himself, they conclude he may without harm draw others to do it also; for, 1, they say he may induce others to swear, when he is not satisfied whether they will swear true or false; that is the opinion of Aquinas and their common doctrine. Further, he that knows another will swear false, may yet put him upon it, if he be a public person; that is also the opinion of Aquinas, and commonly embraced by their doctors;⁴ yea, moreover, any one whosoever may put him to swear whom he fears, or knows will forswear himself, if he be disposed to swear. Let us see in the next place, whether they may not be as perfidious in promissory oaths, as they may be false in others, and upon as easy terms: in all cases, good, or bad, or indifferent. He that swears he will not go to or pass by such or such a place, though he do it for no end that is honest or profitable,⁶ sins not mortally if he go contrary to his oath. He that swears he will do a thing lawful, and does it not, sins but venially if it was a small matter; this is the common opinion which Navarre attempts to prove with several reasons. As if a woman swears she will give her children apples to quiet them, and gives them none; or swears to chastise them, and does it not (which are Cajetan’s instances, though he vary from the rest in the general conclusion); or if a man swear he will say an Ave-Mary, and says it not; or swears to say a Pater-Noster, or to give a small matter, and gives it not; or not to take place of his friend, and yet does it; or to game no more, and plays a little: in such cases any breach of promises, confirmed by oaths, is but a small fault; and consequently it will be no worse in all matters, not only small but great, for the obligation of an oath rises not from the quantity of the matter sworn, but from the concern and interest of God in an oath, he being invocated therein as witness. Now this is always the same, whether the matter be less or more; and so if they be not obliged to keep oaths in less matters, neither are they bound in greater. But by their rules of conscience they are set at liberty to break all. He that swears to give a whore one hundred crowns for the act of fornication, is only bound to give her that part of it which persons of his condition are wont to give such women, because a prodigal engagement confirmed by oath obliges only to that proportion in which there is no profuseness (Bannes et alii in Diana, v. promiss.). If a man swear to be true to a whore, and she to be faithful to him, so as to entertain no other, the oath doth not oblige either of them to such honesty (Idem, v. juram. n. x). Whether the matter be small or great, when one is drawn by fear, or brought by law to swear, if he break his oath that is promissory, he sins but venially (Pet. Aureolus, Joh. Andreas, et multi alii; et placet Angel, sum. v. Perjur. n. vii.). He that swears he will not observe some evangelical counsel³ (that which is not only lawful, but excellently good, and better in their account than what the law of God requires), offends but venially; so their authors generally. And yet to these counsels they have reduced a great part, almost all, which God has made our duty, as we shewed before; so that a man may call God to witness, that he is resolved not to do what he has made his duty. As for one to bind himself by oath that he will not lend to his neighbour, nor be surety for any, nor give alms to any in great necessity, nor do any of those important things, which they count works of supererogation, is but a small venial.⁵ Such oaths, they say, do give obstruction to the Spirit of God, yet they may be kept without sin. He that swears he will return to prison and does not, is no more guilty, if he was not duly imprisoned. He that swears he will commit any sin if it be but a venial, offends but venially; this is the common doctrine, well declared by Cajetan and Navarre, as he tells us.⁷ As if a man should swear that he would never use to speak without an oath, or never avoid any of those horrid acts which they mince into venials. To call God to witness that he purposes thus to dishonour him, is, it seems, no great contempt of him, or else a great contempt of God with them is but a trifle. This is to threaten God to his face, and call upon him to take notice of it, that they will do these evils against him. Soto and others say, it is such a threatening of God when they swear to commit mortal sin, and no difference can possibly be here discerned, but that the one is a threatening God with a greater evil, the other with a less; however, this is their common doctrine, Assertio posita communis est. They give as much liberty for fraudulent oaths, whereby God and man are abused; to swear with equivocation or mental restriction, so as those to whom oath is made are deluded, is with them, in many cases, not so bad as a venial evil, of which in due place. To take an oath outwardly, without an intent to swear, is but a small fault, though it seem a mocking of the divine Majesty, and is cross to the end of an oath, if it be unduly required. So they determine also in case one swear without an intention to oblige himself. Angelus inquires, whether he sins who takes an oath with a mind not to be obliged; he tells us² Panormitan affirms, that if he be a perfectionist (id est, a votary) who so swears, he sins venially, otherwise not; but himself says, Whether he be perfect or imperfect, he sins not so much as venially, and proves it by their law. He takes an oath, which in its own nature obligeth, without an intention to be obliged; he calls God to witness when he is deluding men; he abuses the name and authority of God for a cheat; and yet offends but venially, whoever he be, says one; and sins not at all, says another, but then he explains it: Understand this when in swearing, he had a mind to use an oath for reverence to God, but not for obliging himself. So that must be for reverence to God which mocks him, and he must be invocated in a way that is most obliging, without any intent to be obliged. And further, to prevent falseness (where there is nothing but fraud), he must swear with a mental reservation. For example, I promise thee an hundred (pound), with this inward reserve not expressed: If I be bound to pay it; for such concealments, says he, are lawful, and quotes their church law for it, as allowing that, which all other laws of God or honest men condemn.⁴ It is plain by the premises that their doctrine encourages the Roman catholics to venture upon all sorts of oaths, in many cases, whether they be rash, or injurious, or fraudulent, or false, as slight and trivial faults. No more do they make of perjury, though it be frequent and customary. If more evidence be desired, take notice only of the determination of Dominicus Soto (a grave and learned doctor, and one who was a principal divine in the council of Trent). He having premised something concerning the heinousness of perjury, that the Lord forbids it, with a particular emphasis more than other sins; that it is a greater crime than murder, and is most grievously punished both by God and man; his tamen non obstantibus, all this notwithstanding, he lays down two conclusions, in which he maintains perjuries of all sorts, id est, both in promissory and assertory oaths, to be no worse than venial: 1. Every assertory oath, though it be vain and unlawful, and in a sort perjury, is not a mortal sin, but oftentimes venial. 2. There are many promissory perjuries (promissoria perjuria) which are no greater faults than venial, and reduces these perjuries to four general heads (under which many thousands of particular cases may be obtained), and all must pass for venial. Then, for customariness of such perjuries, how commonly, how often soever a man is guilty thereof, that makes them not mortal; he speaks of some mentioned by Scotus, who thought that a light perjury was no worse than venial, but if it were customary, it would be mortal; but he confutes this opinion by a principle generally received, that a multiplication of the same acts, do not change the nature thereof, that is, ten thousand venial acts do not make one mortal sin; and concludes,⁴ if the perjury be but venial (as it may be by his determinations now mentioned in many thousand instances), how habitual and customary soever it be, it is not thereby mortal; so that if a man, how talkative soever, should never speak while he lives but with an oath, or such perjury as he here excuses, yet all the perjuries of a whole life would not be a mortal sin.

Sect. 3. They determine in their schools, that of all sins those are the greatest and most heinous, that are against the theological virtues and religion. Of those against religion (which are counted sacrilege), there are three degrees; and in the highest of all (containing crimes against the deity and being of God), as the most grievous, they place perjury, blasphemy, and the sins against the Holy Ghost (and those in the same rank with these), yet for practice how little they make of perjury we have seen. Blasphemy meets with the same measures; they teach it may be but a venial fault in any of those cases wherein they describe it: whether by denying God’s infinite perfections, his wisdom, goodness, justice, providence, &c.; or by charging what is reproachful to him, as injustice, partiality, impotency, cruelty, ignorance, &c.; or by ascribing his incommunicable excellencies to others, as calling a friend our God; or attributing the divine perfections to the devil; or else, by way of detestation, decrying, renouncing, cursing God, with imprecations against his blessedness or being; or else by way of derision, &c. Now it will be but a venial fault to blaspheme the divine Majesty in such a manner, (1) when it is out of lightness of mind; or (2) when it is sudden from passion; so Sylvester² after Aquinas. And Navarre after Angelus adds, that it is not material though the passion be without just cause, or in gaming, or from drunkenness, or any unlawful employment, such passion and excess will be so far from being great sins, that they will lessen the greatest. Or (3) when it is from wicked custom, with contempt of one’s own salvation;⁴ when one is so habituated in the practice of reproaching God, that blasphemies break from him without observance or consideration. So Cajetan and Sotus, and Navarre after Sylvester. Thus, by their rules, the more a man sins in the most horrid instances, the less will his sin be. To blaspheme God customarily, may be a slight fault, when to do it rarely will be a most deadly crime. Here is a course described, to make such blaspheming of God, as a soul that has any sense of his majesty, can neither think nor speak of without horror, to be familiar and practicable without danger. Let him, then, blaspheme God at first out of levity or passion, he may do it thus customarily with safety; and the oftener he does it, the more he secures himself; for when he hath so perfected this habit of wickedness by custom, that blasphemies will issue from him without his notice or observance, he may, when he is not heated by passion, reproach God at every word while he lives, and breathe out his soul with blasphemies when he dies, and yet be saved, for all this will amount to no more than such faults as never endanger the soul of a Roman catholic. There needs no more to make mortal sins venial but to get the perfect habit of them; that is, if a man be but wicked enough, there is no great danger.

Sect. 4. For the sanctifying the Lord’s day, or any other which they count holy, all that is necessary is the worship of the mass only, with abstaining from servile works; this is enough on any festival for the avoiding of mortal sin. It is their common doctrine, and there is not anything wherein they more generally agree. So it is to be observed, that the total sum of all the holiness which is necessary for these catholics, even at those times when it should appear, if ever, and all which they are obliged to exercise, consists in their being at mass, and avoiding servile work. What holy attendance at the mass they count necessary, we saw before; they may spend the time in sleeping, or talking, or laughing, or scoffing: only with some little intermissions, that they may stand at the gospel, and kneel at the consecration, and bow at the elevation; but therein no inward act being necessary, all the holiness requisite lies in their legs, which should be ordered as the priest gives the signal; yet even this they are not obliged to, who neither hear nor see what is done; and it is not needful, at the mass, for any of the people so much as to use their senses. When the mass (which may begin at break of day, or before) is despatched in such a holy manner, with such attendance as would scarce be counted civil, at least sufficient, at a stage-play, they may spend the rest of the day according to this beginning.² Those (says Cajetan) who, after mass, vainly consume the rest of those days in sports, in jesting, in idle vagaries, in hunting, in seeing shows or plays, and anything of this nature, by such acts, because they are not servile works (upon which account, they say, that no other acts of wickedness are a profaning of these days, or a breach of that precept), they incur no mortal sin. But then he (who is more precise herein than the generality of their divines) brings an after reckoning. Yet, says he, hereby, because they neglect that divine worship for which these days were instituted, they sin greatly.⁴ How can that be, since he said immediately before, that they sin not mortally? Why, there is a latitude in their venial faults, some are great and some less; and so with him, to neglect all worship but the mass is a great sin of the little size. He gives the reason, because hereby they give not to God the things that are God’s, and as much as in them lies make the festivals of Christians ridiculous, according to that Lamentations 1:7. So that, by him, those who, after morning service, spend this day in such pastimes, they rob God of his due, and they render Christians, in their pretences to the sanctifying of the Lord’s day or others, ridiculous to the world; and yet this is but a venial sin; or at worst, but a great little fault, not so great as any man need fear; no, not he who is most afraid of damnation. Navarre adds another reason why it should be a sin, though but a venial, to consume these days but in recreations; because in such employments many mortal sins occur, according to Antoninus, who says, The blindness of Christians is to be lamented with the tears of all men, who more grievously offend God, on the days appointed for his worship, than the whole week besides. Notwithstanding this is their way of sanctifying the Lord’s day, and all other times for devotion of their own; with profane and irreligious divertisements, such as render their pretences to religion ridiculous (as the cardinal notes), accompanied with such debaucheries, as make their holy days the profanest of all others. It is but a venial fault at most (for many count it not so much), to consume the whole day herein without any other religious act, or exercise of any sort whatever. They need hear no sermons, nor attend their vespers, nor use any prayers, public or private, nor read the Scriptures, nor sing the praises of God, nor meditate on him; nor have any one act of love, or contrition, nor any other act of inward worship at all, nor of outward either, but only part of the mass. This will serve for all, so highly divine and religious a service it is; though they declare themselves not obliged therein, either to mind God or divine things. Yea, though they hear mass (when nothing else is needful for the sanctifying of the day) out of contempt for the day; yet the precept is satisfied. But if they be not at mass on those days (though presence at mass may make all other holy duties unnecessary in other cases, yet) should they not make up that defect with some other prayers or religious exercise, lest God should have no service at all, nor show of it, in public or private, on those days which alone are set apart for that purpose? No; if they neglect mass, either upon reasonable or damnable occasions (to wit, if they spend the time when they should be at it, in any other wickedness), yet are they not obliged to prayer, or any other act of worship, on those days afterwards.² This is the doctrine, not only of their famous Navarre, but of Pope Adrian, and their St Antoninus, with others. Yea, after all other holy exercises are cashiered as needless on any of their holy times, the mass itself may be dismissed too for company. And because all their religion necessary for the people consists in this, at all times, when anything religious is by their doctrine needful for them, it will not be amiss to observe how easily they may be excused from this. Thereby we may discern of what moment it is in their account to have nothing at all of religion amongst them. Cardinal Cajetan will satisfy us herein: he determines that it is no mortal sin to neglect the mass on a reasonable occasion, though it be but such an occasion as is not urgent. Yea, he says, it is but a venial fault to omit it, upon no sufficient reason, and universally it is no great fault to neglect it, if a man thinks really he may be excused from hearing it, or if, besides his intention, out of some negligence it be omitted.⁴ Yea, they may be excused by custom; for so, he says, maids are excused from hearing mass till they be married (and their mothers, too, who are obliged to stay at home with them), because so is the custom. If so were the custom, it seems, all the rest might be excused. So many ways, at least, may these catholics be excused from all their religion; by custom, or necessity, or opinion, or (which alone may suffice) by an insufficient reason; it will be but a venial fault at most, together with all religious exercises, to omit the mass too; and that at those times when alone (if ever) they are obliged to them. Such being their doctrine, we need not wonder if religion be starved to death among them; the life of it cannot be sustained (no more than God can be honoured by mankind) without some acts of worship and religious exercises in ordinary practice. Their teachers assure them that they are not ordinarily obliged to any of these on common days; and to none of them all, but the mass, on their days of worship; nor to any religious attendance on God or their souls, in that; nor to any attendance on it at all, but what they may decline, without mortal sin. If the life of religion be preserved amongst any, without its necessary supports and proper nourishment, it must be by a miracle; but they seem so far from regarding the life or the power of it (on which the honour of God and the salvation of souls depends), that they are not concerned for the carcase of it, in exterior acts; no, not that of the mass (when they have reduced all to that), further than the fear of a venial sin will oblige, ten millions of which cannot, as they teach, damn a man. As for servile works, abstaining from which they make the negative part of this precept, the avoiding of these is but that we may with more leisure attend on divine worship; it cannot be expected they will much insist on the means, when they have so overturned the end. In short, they determine that they who do any servile or forbidden works on the Lord’s day, if they do it not with a design to profane it, offend but venially. Thus, if they never all their life perform one religious act which God has commanded, on his own day or others, they scarce sin venially; or, if they neglect that, which themselves have made the religious duty of these days, they may do it without greater fault or danger. And for the negative part, if they consume these days in servile works (without an intention needlessly perverse), or, which is worse, in profane divertisements; yea, or in acting the most enormous wickedness (as we shall see in its place); yet by their doctrine they do nothing against this precept, or nothing which any of them need regard. Thus their doctrine of venial sins is improved to possess them with a conceit, that they may make what breaches they will upon the commandments of God, without doing anything at all (or anything dangerously) against them, and so to render all sorts of ungodliness practicable with safety. We have seen it in instances against precepts of the first table; let us see if those who make so bold with God, in the duties which more immediately concern himself, will be more tender as to those which respect man.

Sect. 5. The duties which children owe their parents (to instance, for briefness, only in those which the Lord hath made the exemplar of the other, and by which we may pass a judgment on the rest), they reduce to these three: reverence, love, and obedience. In reference to the first, they conclude that those who have no more respect for their parents, than to count it a disgrace and a shame to be their children, if it be for the inconveniences of a sinister opinion, or such like cause, sin not mortally; and the fault may be less still, if the parents consent to it expressly, or tacitly, to avoid some inconvenience. It seems the command calls for no such reverence from children; but they may be ashamed of their parents if they be poor and low in the world. Children may curse their parents, if they do it but with their lips, and this whether they be alive or dead, the offence is but venial. And, indeed, they allow parents to give their children occasion enough to curse them, when they will not have them obliged, under mortal sin, to teach them any more than the sign of the cross, the small creed, and paternoster; nor teach them these in a language they understand.³ However, parents may come even with their children, and if they love and reverence their father and mother, so much as to curse them, their parents may curse them again, upon as easy terms, only they should not desire mischief to them in their hearts, though their words express that desire. When parents curse their children, having no inward desire of their mischief, it is never a mortal sin, says Soto⁵ (and it may seem strange, considering the account of it immediately added): Although it be indeed a wicked custom, and not at all for correction; besides, that the heat of cursing often raises anger into hatred, and so alters the mind, that they often desire that all the mischief imprecated may befall them; besides, the appellation of the devil can scarce be excused from a mortal evil, for it is a kind of blasphemy and scandal to wish eternal death to any. Yet all this, it seems, may be excused from deadly sin, though not very easily. For love, they may rejoice at the death of their father, because of some outward advantage they gain thereby; they may accuse their parents of heresy, though the effect of that will be a cruel death to those who gave them life.⁷ As to obedience; in things that pertain not to paternal government, it is no mortal sin to disobey them. In any things whatsoever it is but a venial fault to disobey them, out of negligence or sensualness;⁹ and so there is room enough for a continued disobedience while they live. In matters of great importance, where, if ever, disobedience would be mortal, they exempt it from such guilt. They may enter into a monastery before they are at age, though their parents charge them not to do it; they may dispose of themselves in marriage without their parents’ consent, because, according to Aquinas, in the choice of their condition they are not subject to their parents, and their parents’ concurrence herein is for decency, not out of necessity.¹¹ Not only in things of great consequence as to this life, but in matters necessary to their salvation, it is but a venial fault if they disobey them; so it be not out of contempt, that is, out of obstinacy and pertinaciousness. Thus Sylvester and others. De Graffiis is more particular herein: a son should not be disobedient to his father in things which belong to the family, and his salvation, as in avoiding pernicious company, and unlawful games, and whores; he should not disobey him herein out of contempt, by which (says he) I understand obstinacy and pertinaciousness, so that not to be obedient (herein) out of inconsiderateness, or negligence, or sensuality, would be venial.² They encourage a maid not only to dispose of herself in marriage without consent of parents, but also to give up herself to uncleanness. If she willingly be deflowered, they conclude it is no injury to her nor to her future husband, nor to her parents. Their reason is, because she has the disposing of her own body, and so may use it freely, for the satisfying of lust, though not lawfully; yet lawfully too so far that they will have this lewdness to be no wrong at all to the parties most concerned, herself or others. If she be unchaste herein, yet not unrighteous, she owes not so much obedience to her parents as to keep herself honest; nor have they authority to oblige her not to be a whore, no more than not to be a nun. By this we may take an estimate of the honour which other superiors must expect, by their rules of morality. I must not descend to other particulars, fearing tediousness.

Sect. 6. They hold that he breaks not the sixth (in their account the fifth) commandment, who desires, or procures, or does any mischief to another’s soul. It seems it is no murder to kill the soul. It is a rule with them, that sins in heart, word, and deed are of the same kind.⁵ So they yield to Christ in this, that anger and hatred may be a kind of murder; yet they think fit to exempt these, for the most part, from mortal guilt. When there has been such hatred and enmity betwixt two, as neither of them will be induced to speak to the other, yet both are to be absolved (says de Graffis) when there is such indignation that will admit of no affability or converse. It is a fault, says Cajetan, for the inordinancy of the passion, yet commonly venial.⁷ They would reconcile us to anger when both the measure and the effects of it seem intolerable, when it is so extravagant as that it both burns excessively within, and flames out no less in external significations of its excess, yet such an excess is a small fault. It will be as harmless, though it be revengeful too, if it seek not a great revenge; yea, a man as innocently seeks and takes the greatest revenge, if he do it inconsiderately. This they deny not when they tell us withal that the passion may be but venial when it makes a person inconsiderate; so that a man may destroy all that he is angry at if his passion be but quick, and great enough. To desire that he whom we count our enemy were killed, or to rejoice that he is murdered, if it be for some good that ensues upon it, is no crime.² No more it seems than it is for the cannibals to delight to have others killed; it is for the good they reap thereby, they have the advantage to feed on them. They will scarce be able to persuade one that it is unlawful to act what he may lawfully desire; yet they count it no sin to desire the death not only of those that are mischievous, and do or may do them hurt, but of such as are innocent; nor only of strangers, or of such they count enemies, but even of their nearest relations. A woman may desire the death of her daughters because they are unhandsome or poor, so that she cannot marry them according to her mind; and the reason (which must clear this from guilt) is, because this is not a hatred of enmity to their persons, but only a hatred of abomination as to their unhandsomeness and poverty. Thus she may hate her own children to any degree of abhorrence, so far as to will them the grandest evil in this world, death itself, because they are not rich; or because they are not comely; she may kill them, so far as her mind and heart can do it, upon this account, and sacrifice them inwardly to her covetousness, or ambition, or curiosity, and this very innocently. An affecting to kill one’s enemy without consent is but a venial fault with Cajetan. If he actually kill him, so it be done indeliberately, he does no great harm. The rule received by them without exception will warrant it, surprise and inconsiderateness excuses from mortal sin.⁴ Thus, if a man kills any he meets with, without any deliberation at all, through natural hastiness, drink, or passion, it is no mortal sin; yea, it may be done as easily, with some deliberation, if that be not full and perfect; and there are so many things which they tell us of to hinder it from being full, that killing of others may be a common practice, with little or no fault. But when it is more voluntary, there are more cases, wherein they make murder no sin at all, than so much as a venial fault, of which in its proper place.

Sect. 7. Proceed we to the next command. Some of their doctors have determined that fornication is not intrinsecally evil, nor forbidden because it is evil, but only evil because it is forbidden. So Martinus à Magistris, and after him Durandus, held that fornication is not condemned by the law of nature as a sin deserving eternal death, but is only prohibited by a positive law, Deuteronomy 23:1-25, Ephesians 5:1-33, and so it will be no worse, nor deserve any more than a venial fault, since a positive law neither adds to the penalty nor makes it a greater evil, but only declares the native evil of it more expressly. Not only fornication, but also adultery, even in the clergy, has passed amongst them as a lesser sin, and is so expressed in the pontifical law. For some crimes clergymen were to be deposed, for others the bishop might dispense with them, to wit, when they were lesser faults. Amongst these lesser, Pope Alexander III. reckons adulteries; but for adulteries, says he, and other lesser crimes, the bishop, after they have done penance, may dispense with the clergy. They teach that for a whore, though she be a married woman, or a nun, to seek or receive a reward for prostituting herself, is but a venial fault, if any, only they differ how she should have it. Some say as a gift or gratuity,² but others as a hire, legally due in justice; by which it is evident that either they must think such uncleanness not to be intrinsecally evil, or else that it is as warrantable to seek and receive rewards for other such acts of wickedness (as for slandering, robbing, assassinating men, or firing houses, &c.). The use of matrimony before the marriage be solemnised, if it be without contempt, is no mortal sin, says Cajetan,⁴ because neither the violation of rules nor of custom, through the weakness of passion, can be mortal. Others concur with him herein. Nor do Antoninus and John Tabienna much mend the matter, who will have the first act to be a sin, but none of the rest after. He or she who first contracts marriage with one privately, and after with another publicly, sins not mortally, if they lie with the former without scandal, but is bound to live with the latter, the church commanding it, if there be no danger of coming together. As though they could cohabit together as man and wife without such danger! This is in effect to determine they may lie with both, and they that have a mind to it may have warranty from the master of sentences⁶ for the latter, and from the master of the sacred palaces, and others, for the former. A woman whose chastity is attempted with some force,⁸ though she cry not out, though she call not for help when it may be had, though she make no resistance at all with any part of her, though she do not so much as any way move to hinder it, yea, though she take natural pleasure in the act, yet if her will do not deliberately consent (though they say in any court she could not in such circumstances but be presumed to consent), she sins not mortally; thus Soto with others. They confess that a woman can scarce ever do this and be honest, and yet give this encouragement to all to do it. Here is a way to have all women corrupted that are but attempted with eagerness, if the rules of those who have the guidance of their practice and consciences be but complied with. Impetuous lust may make the essay upon any without fear of so much as a check or any resistance, and those who are engaged by the laws of nature, God, and man, to make opposition, may innocently give place to it without struggling; yea, they may be chaste enough though they yield to such lust with pleasure, so it be no more than sensual, and these delights be not jumbled together in practice, which in the doctrine of their teachers is sufficiently distinguished and parted for them. They bid fair also to make that uncleanness to which persons are drawn by the power of courtship and insinuation pass as innocent; for they say that is no sin which is involuntary, and that is not voluntary to which we are necessitated; and Cajetan tells us (in a case much akin to this) that our passions, excited by exterior persuasion, do, as it were, offer us violence; after he had informed us that what whores extort by flatteries more than their hire is an involuntary gift, the mind being this way necessitated; and sure flatteries in reference to the act, as well as the reward, may as much necessitate, and make the one as involuntary as the other; further, if man or woman need neither force nor importunity, but be ready to commit uncleanness without more ado, one may without sin invite them to it. Self-pollution is no mortal sin in any that desire it may befall them in their sleep for the ease of nature;² nor is it a sin to be pleased with it when it is past for a good end, and so Aquinas, Paludanus, and the common doctrine; nor to be pleased with it as future, if the pleasure do not cause it, nor to be pleased with it when it befalls them awake,⁴ if the pleasure be but sensual, and not rational. Under the favour of this distinction they may act uncleanness, either natural or against nature, and that with delight too; for though the lower faculties take pleasure therein, yet if the superior either check it, or run not into a full compliance therewith, they are safe. They encourage them to venture upon, and continue in, such occasions of uncleanness, as those who think it needful to avoid the acts cannot but judge necessary to be abandoned. They that eat hot meats, such as provoke and cause uncleanness, or otherwise eat excessively, if they do it not with such an intention, but to satisfy their gluttony, or for other cause, yea, though they doubt uncleanness will be the issue of it, offend but venially. Carnal touches,⁶ used for sensual pleasure, without designing the act of uncleanness or the delight of it (though it be confessed that of all other occasions this leads most directly and most dangerously to the consummation of the act), yet are they but venial faults with many of their writers. To go to the place or company where is danger of sinning mortally, by reason of the sights, persuasions, opportunities, or anything of this nature, though it be done without any cogent necessity, is not a mortal sin with them; and the reason is, because it rests in the man’s free will not to sin mortally, though such occasions of sinning be offered. Filthy discourse, when it is out of lightness and curiosity, without any other ill design, or when it is merely for the pleasure taken in the obscene talk, without any further intention, is no worse than a venial fault.² The filthiness which the apostle forbids, Ephesians 5:4, Bellarmine, understanding thereby filthy words, will have it be but a venial; and the same he determines not only of filthy talking, but scurrility; and Cardinal Cajetan⁴ before him, says, in its own nature it is not a mortal sin, though he describes it to be shameless mirth; and Alensis refers it to lascivious affection; and in Angelus,⁶ it is a provoking others to laughter either by idle or obscene words. A woman sins not mortally, who, being moved with the affection of a little vain-glory, without any other deadly intention, does paint or adorn herself, although she believe that some who see her in such a dress will be inflamed with mortal lust, when it is certain also, that without any disparagement or inconvenience, she might abstain from such a garb; yea, though she so trick up herself, that some may be induced to love her honestly but carnally, or with a dishonest affection either, only not beyond the bounds of venial uncleanness. This being their doctrine, no wonder if Christian purity be abandoned in their practice. Navarre,⁸ tells us there is such a deluge of unbridled luxury amongst them who are so near a kin, that he dares not express it; and amongst the married and unmarried, amongst virgins consecrated and unconsecrated, that divine and immense goodness may send upon them a horrible deluge of all calamities, not only corporal, but spiritual. And because it is not lawful for one to take the profession of a nun if she have committed uncleanness before, he says that there are few grown up that without caution can be lawfully consecrated for virgins.

Sect. 8. For theft, they teach that to steal anything of small value is but a venial fault; for this is the rule they universally proceed by, the smallness of a thing in all causes excuses from mortal sin; and thus far all are encouraged to steal, not only strangers, but children from their fathers, and wives from their husbands, and servants from their masters.²

1. A servant may be excused from mortal guilt if he steal from his master by little and little, though in time it come to a considerable sum, provided he convert it to his own use. He should not, it seems, steal for others too, unless he do it out of charity.

2. A son may steal more from his father than strangers or servants may do; he must be regulated herein by his father’s estate. This love and indulgence to him, the greater that it is, the more he may steal from him. They excuse him if he steal from his father the sum of three crowns; they say not that it may not be a greater, but only that it should not be a far greater sum.

3. Accordingly, he may spend what he gets from his father in gaming, or in recreations, not only such as are honest, but also luxurious, without any more guilt.

4. If his father allow him not what others of his condition do, he may filch from him privily what a prudent confessor thinks fit. Thus men’s estates will be at the confessor’s discretion, and as much may be stolen from them as their priests please.

5. Or if he do business for his father, his expenses deducted, he may keep to himself as much as a stranger would have for such service.

Now, that we may know when theft will be a mortal crime, it must be known of what value the thing stolen must be to make it so; and this not being determined by any law natural, divine, or human, they agree, that this must be determined by the judgment of a good man; and who better than the Casuists, since they ought, and are presumed to be, both knowing and conscientious? Let but them conclude (and they have done worse in many cases) that things of great worth are not of value sufficient to make the stealing thereof to be a mortal sin, and then theft, neither little nor great, will be criminal. Thus this command of God (as the rest are) will be made of none effect by this distinction. An engine which (as they work it) serves to destroy both law and gospel, and to sink Christianity, in morals, many degrees below heathenism. Let us see what progress they have made herein, and whether they have not done it in effect already. They teach that to steal anything, though in itself small, yet of great value in the account of the owner, and of much consequence to him; so that the damage he suffers by it, and the trouble it gives him, is really great, yet if the thief did not, or could not know it, it is but venial.⁹ Yet the reason why they count the stealing of a small thing, to be but a little fault; is because the owner is presumed not unwilling the stealer should have it, it being no considerable loss, or trouble to him; but this cannot be presumed in the now mentioned cases. And if theft, whether of small or great consequence, whether with or without that which makes little theft to be venial, be still no worse than venial, then will no theft be mortal. They also teach, that those who are in need, though it be not extreme, but such only as would be counted great, may steal from others for their relief;² nor are they bound to make restitution, when they have got a good estate. Thus theft will be made as common as moderate indigence; and the practice being continued, as long as there is need, it may amount in a while to a considerable sum; yea, when the necessitous are grown rich, those whose estates are impaired by such thefts shall have no reparation. Thus a wide door is opened for common thievery in considerable quantities, without any restraint, either from respect to sin or to satisfaction. Further, when so many persons in no necessity take each of them a little fruit from a vineyard or an orchard, or a little corn from a field, that there is nothing at all left for the owner, yet if they did not conspire together to do this, it is a small fault.⁴ And thus any men of estates (since it holds in other cases, no less than those specified) may be utterly impoverished; and yet those that ruin them be guilty of nothing that they need regard. Moreover, when any one without any need continues so long in the stealing matters of less worth from one person or many, that in time they rise to a great value, and the thief thrives into a good estate thereby, without designing it, this altogether is no more than a venial fault; nor will it be worse, though he never make restitution, if there was any considerable interval betwixt the acts of theft, say some; no, nor if there were no such intervals, say others.⁶ The consequence of which is, as Lopez observes, that any innkeeper or tradesman may grow rich, and raise a fair estate, without mortal sin, by defrauding all that buy of them, a little, in false measures, and so fleecing a whole town. And why might not they as well conclude, that he who beats another, so it be but with little blows, though he beat him to death, offends but venially? These of old were thought alike.⁸ They conclude also, that such a quantity may be stolen as is sufficient to make it a mortal sin, without sinning mortally, if it be for a good end. These are some of the instances they give: 1, A man may steal to give alms. We need not wonder at this, since they think not much to rob Christ of his honour in all their good works, and so commit the worst kind of robbery (the highest sacrilege) in their best acts, arrogating that to them which is Christ’s peculiar satisfaction and merit. And then, that the charitable thief, if he become rich, is not bound to restore what is stolen, is the common opinion. Also, one may steal money from another, rather than he shall venture it in gaming;² for it is good divinity with them (whatsoever it was with the apostle) that one evil may be done to hinder another, and that not only in other sins (as friar Joseph would limit it), but such as are intrinsecally evil; for example, if one be about to commit adultery, it will be a lawful, a holy act, to beseech and persuade him to commit fornication. Or nearer the matter in hand, if one be ready to steal an hundred pounds, I may advise him to steal fifty, and so persuade to a mortal sin with some moderation. They think it not only lawful to persuade a thief to a smaller robbery, but also to accompany and assist him therein. Further, a woman, if her husband be profuse, may against his command take away his goods, and conceal them to provide for the future.⁴ If a man be distracted, or if he be absent, his wife may spend more of his estate than he would do if he were sober or present (Bonacin. ibid). Finally, they all agree, that to steal anything, of what value soever, inconsiderately, that is, without full and perfect deliberation, is but a venial trespass. And how he can be obliged to restore it, by their principles, I understand not; since they hold that no man is bound to make restitution but for a mortal offence. If in a matter that is weighty, the fault be venial, for want of full consideration, it will not be so much as a small fault, not to make restitution, how much soever be stolen inconsiderately.⁶ By these and such like rules, they have opened a way to make thievery, small or great, practicable, without any sin or danger, but what is small and inconsiderable in their account. Scholars, and those who count good books their treasure, are by their doctrine exposed more particularly, for they teach, that to take away heretical books from such as have not licence to read them, is no theft (Bonacin. de restit disp. ii. q. viii. punct. i. n. i.); so that it will be no fault at all to rob one of the best part of his library, how valuable soever.

They open as wide a gap, and give as much encouragement to cheating, and like unconscionable practices. They teach there is no necessity to be regulated in bargaining, by the just value of things; but they may sell for as much as they can extort, and buy answerably; and this they take for a general rule, a thing is worth so much as it can be sold for. Hence Sylvester concludes it lawful for any one to sell as dear, and buy as cheap as he can; which, unlimited, gives liberty to all to prey upon one another, without equity or conscience. So one may buy a thing of great value,² though he knows it, and the owner understands it not, for a small matter; nor needs he declare it, when he apprehends that it is much more worth, since that may be inquired of others. They conclude, that false measures and weights may be used, though the buyer be hereby deceived and damnified, and the custom itself to be a corruption; yet they are excused who use them, if they do it for their own security, or for moderate gain, as if in case they should give full measure, the price would be greater, and consequently they would have few or no customers.⁴ So, by their rules, they may further deceive those that deal with them, by selling one thing for another, or adulterating what they sell; and so cheat them not only in the measure, but in the quality, yea, or the substance of the commodity. Instances hereof we have in Soto. Corn or wine, when it is more worth than the set rate, the merchant may sell it by false measure, thereby to get his price. If a man have very good wine, but people, if they did not take it for Rhenish, would not give so good a price for it, he may sell it at the rate they would give for Rhenish, though it be not.⁶ So he may mix his wine with water, and sell it for pure, taking but a just price; as, for example, in case wine were so dear, that scarce any would buy it at the price it is worth, he may mix it with water, and sell it at the rate they will give.⁸ So cloth or silks may be sold for that of such a country which is most esteemed, though it be of another. These conclusions, he says, are collected out of Aquinas; and to complete these cheats, he tells us,¹⁰ that if perhaps the seller should lie too, in these cases (for example, if he should affirm that to be Rhenish wine which is not, or that to be pure which is adulterated, or that to be full measure which is short of it, &c.) it would not be a mortal sin. And Sylvester determines, that a man with perjuries and lies, denying the badness of his commodities, or making them better than they are, the lies, if they do not much damnify the buyer, are but venial. They allow persons also to deceive those who entrust them to dispose of their estates or goods; as, if one be employed to sell what is another’s at a certain price, if he sell it for more, he may keep the overplus to himself; yea, say some,¹² though he had a reward for his pains in selling, yet he may retain to himself the overplus of what is sold.

Further, Panormitan takes notice, that their canon law allows of deceit, if it be not extended beyond half the worth of the thing bargained for (that is, if a man be not cozened of above fifty per cent. in a bargain). But then, to salve the reputation of the law (which he, like a true canonist, says was formed by the instinct of the Holy Ghost), he will have it understood of deceit in the thing, not of fraud in the persons, and others after him; but Sylvester, who sees no ground for that, uses another shift: he says it may he understood, either of deceit in the thing or fraud in the persons, which their law tolerates, but approves not.² Cajetan grants so great deceit is lawful by human constitution; but says, it is condemned by the law of God. And so we leave this shameful deceit, lawful by the pope’s decrees, but damnable by God’s word.

Sect. 9. Let us see, in the next place, what truth may be expected in popery, or those that profess it; and whether their rules tend not to leave neither truth in the world, nor amongst themselves, by giving liberty to all falseness and lying in words and deeds. A lie, as they define it, is an asserting of what is false, with an intent to speak falsely, and to deceive others. Now they teach that to deliver what is false,⁵ if not on purpose, though it be without any care whether it be true or false; if it be a fault, is such as needs not be regarded, unless where it is in testimony or upon oath (and there they will excuse it too, by and by), because this is but a material lie, and not in its formal perfection. But then a perfect lie, with a design to speak what is false, and to deceive the hearers, is as innocent, if it be for pleasure or in sport,—ridentem dicere falsum quis vetat?—to make a sport of violating truth, or in offering it such injury to please himself or others; any one may do it out of habit, and make a practice of it, and tell lies when he list, out of mere pleasure to be telling lies; yea, or out of malice,⁷ (though that be the highest aggravation of sin). An officious lie is with them as harmless, they have warrant enough for the most complete and perfect lies, when they are of any advantage to some, and no hurt to others, how much soever truth be injured, or others deceived thereby. So that their true catholics need leave no place for truth, either in their heart or words, when the excluding of it from both will, without hurt, serve either their pleasure or profit. However, herein they use true and plain dealing, in letting the world know that, in these cases, they are never to be trusted, either in matters of conversation or religion. This being their principle,⁹ received by all catholics, and universally acknowledged, we need not wonder that it hath been their common practice in several ages, and that they make no conscience of it still, to counterfeit false miracles, to forge false stories, to shew false relics, to divulge false visions and revelations, to obtrude on the world supposititious writings, to corrupt the monuments of former times, and expunge out of them all the truth that makes against them, to make even the dead speak lies, or disguise the truth. For all this falseness is officious; it serves the interest of the church; it is to commend her doctrine, and to maintain her authority over men’s consciences, and it does the world no hurt; for it is (they say) the duty of all men, and would be their advantage, to entertain her doctrine, and subject themselves to her authority. Now if the rest of mankind, Jews, Turks, heathens, had retained no more conscience nor reverence for truth than these catholics; if upon their supposition (that their way was the best) they had proceeded by their rules and methods to broach any lies for them, or falsify any records against them, who sees not that this had been a direct course to have left no truth at all in the world, nor means to come to the knowledge of it? Yet this practice with the Romanists (so great friends are they to truth) is but a venial fault. Did I say they count it so bad? I do them wrong; it is a great piece of piety to make lies for their religion, as some of themselves do acknowledge it has been accounted. To proceed, there are five or six several sorts of lies (that they may have room enough still to avoid truth) which they may make their practice without danger.² It is the pernicious lie only that need be avoided, that which wrongs others, and is against justice; and thus no violation of truth, no injury to it, how great soever (so tender they are of it) will be a crime, unless, withal, it be against justice; and a lie (be it as gross as can be) will not of itself, and in its own nature, be more than venial, but only by accident, when it so falls out that it does mischief. And it may be as innocent to tell lies as truth, and as criminal to speak truth as lies. There will be no difference as to mortal guilt in their own nature, and by accident they may do hurt alike. However, considering that truth and their religion are so much at odds, the world is obliged to them for being so indifferent as to truth and lies, and that these have no more the preference. But then, though none but pernicious lies need be shunned, yet not all of this sort neither; they give liberty to tell mischievous lies, as many and as oft as you please, so the mischief they do be not great, though it prejudice others in spirituals or temporals; or though ye do the greatest mischief that can be done,⁴ yet, if you did not intend it to be great, or if you should not or did not observe and consider that it would be so, in such cases even pernicious lies will be harmless venials. They may, by their rules, lie to the prejudice of others in soul, body, or estate, and that deliberately, and with design to do it, provided the damage be not great; but when it will be great, their casuists cannot well determine. This is not confined to a point; there is a fair latitude, and liberty enough given for less or more, it is much left to discretion; and if he do much mischief instead of little, the liar cannot be charged with mortal guilt; for who can condemn any for transgressing bounds that are not set? And how can they think that any injury done by lying can be great, who count it better than innocent (as we saw before) to abuse the world with lies in point of religion? Sure if the injury be not great there, any will be small. And in other matters, they have fair leave to do great hurt by lying; so they do it but by degrees, and be not so hasty as to do it all at once. Take but an instance of it in commerce. To use lies, says de Graffiis, in bargaining, to get a good price, or the using of them to deceive others in a little, is but a venial fault, though it were a daily practice. Hostiensis thought that this lying to cheat others, if it were their continual practice, might prove mortal; but he is confuted by the common judgment of their doctors, who hold that a venial, how much soever multiplied or continued, can never become mortal. We see they may lie, and deceive those that deal with them, if they wrong them but a little at once; this they may do daily and continually, and so in time, that little will be much, yet the sin will be no more; the pernicious lie, which does great injury, will be as innocent as any.

Others teach that lying is venial in trading: for example, if one affirm falsely that his wine is so many years old, or of such a country, which, if the buyer know to be a lie, he would not buy it at all, or would not give so much for it, this seems no mortal sin, provided, all circumstances considered, it be as good, and as much worth, or not much less (Bonacin, de contract. disp. iii., q. i., punct. ii., sect. ii., n. vii.); or if the sellers affirm with a lie, that the thing cost so much, or was sold to others at such a rate, that they may draw the buyer to a rigorous price; by thus lying, for the most part, they sin but venially, and regularly they are not bound to restitution; because such lies are customary, and men commonly know that these are the tricks of sellers, to which those who deal with them give no credit; and for the same reason the same must be said of buyers, who affirm (falsely) that they bought the thing cheaper, or had it offered them for less, that they may get it at the lowest rate (Idem ibid., disp. iii., q. i., punct. iv., n. xxxi.) after others; yea, if they not only lie, but swear false too with some equivocation, they may be probably excused from mortal sin, if no great damage be done thereby to another. But though they have no more regard of truth in common conversation, or in commerce, yet it may be expected that they will be more tender of it in judgment and courts of judicature, since they cannot but acknowledge that the perverting of truth in judgment is destructive of human society, and tends to throw the world into confusion. Notwithstanding, they maintain lying there also, and that in many cases; I shall but mention some of them. 1. To lie in court, if the end of it be but delight, is harmless; also, witnesses may lie there seriously, if they do it not as witnesses, and in matters judicial;³ and the judge too, if he lie not as a judge. Further, they may bear false witness in favour of another;⁵ a false testimony for my neighbour is not mortal with them; and the reason is, because the precept forbids false witness aqainst another, not for him. And upon the same account, Soto says, a false testimony may be excused, when it is to hinder one from doing injury. Likewise, when the matter in judicial process, is not of great consequence, a lie is venial, whether it be for or against another. So Navarre, and in him Ledesma (whom he calls the glory of the Dominican order), with Soto (of the same order and no less renown), maintain that no lie is mortal in any court exterior (that of the judge) or interior (that of the confessor), which is but venial out of court; so that if the lie be not signally injurious, it is not mortal, however or wherever it be delivered, though by a witness in a trial before a judge in the face of the country. Moreover, it is as innocent in all those cases, wherein the liar is not obliged to speak truth, which are not few. A lie, says Sylvester,² in judicial matters, is pernicious and mortal, because it subverts the truth of judgment, which tends to the ruin of the universe. But then he adds, this is to be limited to things in which the liar is bound to speak the truth, and not extended to any other. Now they hold, there are very many cases in which they are not obliged to speak the truth, no, not in courts; and in all these, by their common doctrine (not that of the Jesuits only), either they may lie plainly, or (which is all one as to the justice of the practice, and as to the subverting of judgment) secretly, by equivocation or mental reservation. Antonius Corduba determines, that a person otherwise virtuous, being unduly interrogated, whether such a thing was done, which confessed might endanger him, he and the witnesses too, if they cannot otherwise evade (by saying, I know not, or I remember not), may say, though it be false, that it was not done, with this reserve, to discover it unto thee, and says, such interrogatories may be answered or evaded, by any, with equivocal words in usual form; so that he is not bound to tell the truth, though he be sworn to declare it. Navarre holds that not only virtuous, but any person whatever, may so answer in like case, denying that to be done which was done, secretly meaning, in such a month; and this he asserts after Gabriel, Paludanus, Adrian, Vincentius Justinianus, and Lopez after him. Sylvester⁶ concludes, when the process is not judicial, or the accused not subject to the judge, in this case mentioned, or any other cause whatsoever, though a lie be not lawful, yet it is not mortal; yea, it will not be so much as venial, if answering cautiously, and, as they say, sophistically, he speak that which is false in the judge’s sense, and true in his own, since not being under him, he is not obliged to speak truth in his sense; and alleges Henricus de Gandavo, with his reason for it. Soto allows him to use equivocation. Cajetan permits him to deny his complices though he had them. If the judge demand of a priest upon oath, whether he knew such a thing by confession?² Aquinas, and all the doctors conclude that he may swear he knows it not, though it hath been confessed to him, because he knows it not as a man; and according to Vervecellus, if he cannot otherwise decline the judge, he may answer he knows nothing, with this inward reserve, as a man; and in this Richard. de Sancto Victore, Bonaventure, Scotus, and Panormitan agree; yet Angelus thinks, when he swears he knows it not, it had better be with this reserve, to discover it, because it cannot be denied, but that he knows it as a man; but this, says Sylvester, is said against the judgment of all his doctors, and against the canon law, understood according to their common doctrine, because the priest is there said to know it as God. This needs no aggravation; a priest rather than speak the truth (though the discovery of it may be necessary to secure a prince or a nation from ruin), may with mental reservation delude authority and blaspheme God, and lie and swear falsely in open court; and be justified in all, by the authority of the chief saints and doctors that church has had, and such as she gloried in, before Ignatius had any disciples.

But, though truth suffer so much by them in civil things, it may be she may find sanctuary in their divine offices, and be secured there from such shameful violations; no, even there she is prostituted before their altars, in their pulpits, and at their penitential tribunals; their liturgies have been stuffed with fables, and lies made both the ground and part of their public devotion; their own writers take notice of plain lies recited in their daily prayers.⁶ And what store of them there were in the whole, we may guess by a part. Peter Abbot of Cluny declares, that in a church-hymn in praise of Saint Bennet, though reading it cursorily, and not marking all, yet he found twenty-four lies at least. Some reformation hereof was thought requisite, for shame of the world; but though the old sore smelt noisomely even to the sense of those amongst themselves who had any; yet it must be touched tenderly, and not all the corruption let out, lest nothing at all of the old service should be left. Melchior Canus (a bishop from whom better things might be expected than most in the Council of Trent, where he sat) acknowledged, some years after, that there are things read in their church-service that are uncertain, counterfeit, frivolous, and false too; but yet he thought it not advisable to have this thoroughly purged. Those that attempt it, in his account, want prudence; they cure a sore nail, but mischief the head; they bring in grave stories instead of what were false, but they change the church-service so far from what it was, that scarce any show of the old religion seems left in the daily prayers, whereby he lets us understand what their old religion or religious service is, since so little or nothing of it would be left, if no lies or forgeries were left therein. Another learned bishop of their church, who survived the Trent Council, and all the orders there made for reformation, not only complains still of false and foolish things there, but of something worse too, in these words: If the Bishop of Lyons, says he, who declared that he had corrected superfluous, and ridiculous, and blasphemous things, in their missals and antiphonaries, were now alive, and did behold them, oh, with what terms would he set them out? for our prayers are defiled with most filthy corruptions; but the rest will admit of no reformation through the fault of the bishops. He signifies that there was something worse in their service-books than that idle, false, ridiculous, and blasphemous stuff which that ancient bishop, Agobardus, corrected in the old missals and antiphonaries; declaring expressly that their prayers now were polluted with most filthy corruptions, and that without hope of amendment. Nor is truth more secure amongst them in the pulpit, though that (where it bears any sway at all) is its throne. A preacher may lie, by Cajetan’s leave,² if he does it not as a preacher, or in things which belong to him as such. In other matters, it seems, he may take his liberty, and lying when he is preaching, will be but venial, unless it be scandalous. He may lie in the pulpit if he can do it wittily, he may mix his sermons with false stories, (if they be facetious) to please his auditory, that is commonly a venial.⁴ He may tell a tale in his sermon, or anything ridiculous, if he do it with some wit, this is commonly no worse than venial; no, nor so bad, if it be done succinctly, to make the people merry, so the mirth be honest. He may lie too, as a serious divine, and instil false doctrine into the people, without any fault but what is venial, if it be done without contempt or scandal, so Summa Angelica, and Rosella, with others, conclude.² They limit it, indeed, to matters under counsel, but this does not much straiten them, for practical divinity being the most proper subject for sermons, and virtues, with Christian duties (and the opposite sins), being, by their common doctrine, in a manner all reduced to counsels, some way or other (as we have shewed before); they have liberty enough left them to do nothing else but lie instead of preaching. But in any matters of divinity whatsoever, speculative or practical, enjoined or but advised, they may lie at as easy a rate, if it be but done out of a fluent faculty, or without danger and design of doing signal mischief. Their practice publicly allowed, has outdone their rules; for these, though licentious enough, must have now and then some show of modesty and caution. Sylvester takes notice of those who held it was no mortal sin to lie in the pulpit,⁴ and acted accordingly, and thought themselves concerned, only to avoid such monstrous lies as the people would smell out. But this cautiousness was not always thought needful; he that reads the legends, which served the people heretofore for sermons, will find there multitudes of such stories, so absurdly, ridiculously, horridly false, as may fully convince him that the spirit which acted them was seven times worse than that which inspired Ahab’s prophets; and where they are now disused, it is not with any acknowledgment that such notorious lies were not fit to be preached, but for shame of that part of the world which they could no longer delude and abuse. And, even after their reformation, they could not quite leave their old habit; their priests since, have this testimony from one of their own doctors: The law, says he, is perished from priests; for history they recite fables; for serious things, jests; for truth, lies; for the power of God, feigned miracles, not to say the prodigies of devils. That such doctrine should have some confirmation is no more than needs; they provided such as was answerable to it, such are their false miracles, which their (now mentioned) Espencæus calls, devilish prodigies. And false relics, or miracles, they allow to be shewed or published;⁶ it is not a mortal sin with them, unless it be done for filthy lucre, and it is not filthy lucre, if it be done principally for a good end, and less principally for gain. And now I cannot devise where there can be any expectation that they will be restrained from lying, unless in their sacrament of penance, that is, in their account, the holiest rite, wherein the partakers have liberty of speech. Here they confess sin, and profess to do it with a sincere abhorrence of it, as before God, in order to pardon, which they then expect. One would think, in this act, at least, they should count themselves obliged to be far from such a crime as offering violence to truth; but hereby it appears that truth can in no wise be fastened to any part of their religion, they let us know that there is nothing so holy amongst them where they will not find a place for lying and deceit, and that wherever they have liberty of speech they must have leave to lie. It is the common doctrine that they may lie in confession, which yet they say is directed principally to God, and they look upon the confessor’s chair as the divine tribunal. The confitent may deny that ever he committed those venial sins which he is guilty of,³ or affirm he is guilty when he is not, or he may deny either venial or mortal sin to his confessor, if he be not sufficient.⁵ Or he may deny that ever he acted those mortal sins which he has committed, if he has confessed them to another. And thus he may without mortal sin delude and cheat his confessor, even when he is upon his knees before him, and looks upon him as God and not as man (for so they are taught to do, as we said before). To this purpose, when their purpose is too shameful to be made known to a sober priest, a person may have two confessors;⁷ one a lewd fellow like himself, to whom he may, without shame, confess the worst debauches; and the other more civil, to whom he may confess his lesser sins, denying, if he be asked, that he is guilty of any greater. And as they may abuse their confessors with plain lies, so likewise with equivocations. Joh. Sanchez (no Jesuit) offers us several instances (Select. Disp. ix.) He that is not able to make restitution, may affirm he has done it, if he think his confessor be ignorant, and would not absolve him without it. He that is accustomed to some wickedness, and thinks the confessor would not absolve him if he confessed it, may with equivocation deny it is his custom; to this sense, I have no such custom, not absolutely, but which I will confess at present, n. vii.; yea he may deny it, though he believe the priest would absolve him, n. viii. Also he that is in the next occasion to sin, which he cannot avoid without great inconvenience or scandal, may, using equivocation, deny it, n. ix. Or if the penitent be known to the confessor, who well understands that he has a sister with whom he commits uncleanness, not removed out of his house, and so will not believe but he is in such occasion to sin, he may feign himself to be another, changing his voice, habit, name, country, and the like, without plain lying, yet using equivocation (n. x. after Navarre); yea, though he be a religious person he may do thus, and deny his order with equivocation (Ibid). And as the penitents may thus delude their confessors, so they may have their satisfaction on them, and delude them likewise; pretending to absolve them when they neither do it nor intend it (Idem. disp. xxxv. n. i., n. vii. and viii.; Antonin. Dian. resol. v. equiv). Let the world judge where we may be assured of truth and honesty in Romanists, that walk by these rules (which the holiest of their doctors give them), since they think not themselves obliged thereto in any of the cases specified. If by their doctrine they may without danger be false to private persons, to magistrates, to their priests, to their God, where can they have credit? If they may practise lying and deceit in common conversation, in commerce, in doctrine, in worship, in courts of justice, and before that which they count God’s tribunal, where may they be trusted?

Sect. 10. They give as much liberty to violate faith as truth, and no less encouragement to perfidiousness and breach of promises; either where faith is engaged mutually, as in compacts and agreements, or singly, as in pollicitations. They distinguish perfidiousness as they do lying, and accordingly make the like decisions for both. There is a pleasant perfidiousness, another which they call officious, and a third pernicious. To be perfidious merely for delight is venial; to deal perfidiously, if it be for the advantage of any, and no great hurt to others, is as harmless; and they have ways enow to make that which is pernicious pass for innocent. Cajetan gives this reason why the two former sorts of perfidiousness are but venial: because from a simple promise no duty ariseth but that natural duty of not telling a lie; for in each is a moral duty, without which moral honesty cannot be preserved; and both are reduced to the same virtue, to wit, that of veracity; and both respect others, being for the society, and advantage, and conversation of mankind. One would think those who regard natural duty, moral honesty, or veracity, and human society, should for this reason rather judge both to be great crimes, than either of them petty faults. But let us take notice of their rules for conscience in this matter. To make a promise without an intent to be obliged, is but venial,² if no great hurt be done or intended to others. He promiseth, but while he is doing it intends not to perform, though he make others believe so, nor to be obliged to it by that which should engage any one who has faith and honesty; and yet offends but venially. If all men should take the liberty which this rule gives Roman catholics, human society would disband; all confidence on promises and assurances vanisheth, thereby I can never be sure of another, nor he of me. That which Navarre, after many others, determines elsewhere, does it more fully. He that promiseth anything outwardly without any intention to promise, if he be asked whether he promised, he may deny it, understanding that he made not any promise that was obliging, and he may swear it too. He may promise, and yet not intend to promise, and so cheat; he may deny that he promised, and so lie; and swear that he did it not when he did it, and so be perjured innocently, because he promised as a perfidious knave. Sylvester inquires, whether one by a promise alone or a compact be obliged in conscience? He answers he is bound, under pain of mortal sin, if it be of important matters;² signifying that in other matters it is no mortal sin to break promises or agreements. And Navarre expresses their common opinion when he tells us, that the violation of a promise in a small matter is not mortal, though it be venial. But why should perfidiousness be a crime in great things and not in lesser; since it is no less perfidiousness in one than the other, and faith and truth is equally violated in both? The reason they give is, because in great matters there is injustice; great wrong is done, and so by accident perfidiousness becomes criminal;⁴ from whence it follows, that perfidiousness, how great soever, without the addition of injustice, is no crime; a man may be as treacherous, and faithless as he will, if he be not withal unjust too, there is no danger. And so the world must believe that they would oblige men to be just, though not to truth or faithfulness; as if those who may by their rules without scruple be false and faithless, will make any conscience, or find any more reason, to be just and righteous. However they teach that they who promise but small things, and perform not, are excused from mortal sin, though they confirm the promise with an oath or a vow. Whether the thing promised be little or great, if it be an internal promise, though an oath be added not to revoke it, yet it obliges not, but may be revoked without mortal sin. (Panormitan. Jason. Rebellus et alii cum Bonacin de contract. disp. iii., q. xii., punct. ii., n. i. and iii.) Yea, if it be made in the form of a vow, yet when it is of a thing indifferent or less good; as if a man inwardly promise to marry such a woman, and promise it to God, too, it does not oblige him (Idem, ibid., n. ii.). And how can it be expected they should be faithful as to any engagement to man, who think they are not bound to observe truth or faith with God, how much soever concerned, either as a witness (in oaths) or as a party (in vows)? Well, but when the matter is of great importance may they not then break promises, bargains, or compact, may not perfidiousness, which themselves account pernicious, pass commonly for an innocent venial? Yes, they have ways enough ready to make this current at so easy a rate. The worst perfidiousness in the world may be excused from mortal guilt, according to Cajetan, through ignorance of the fact, or through forgetfulness (if one forget to be honest, he may be innocently a knave); or out of confidence in him to whom he is engaged (the good nature of one party concerned may be a warrant to the other to break faith with him); or for any cause which he thinks reasonable. He need have said no more than this, any one may violate all truth and faith, not only when there is some reasonable cause, but when there is any that seems but so to him, when anything will seem so to him who is disposed to play the knave. This is enough to license a world of perfidiousness; but this is not all. Sylvester after others tells us a man is not obliged to perform promise or compact, if he had not a mind to oblige himself thereby, yea, or if he had a mind to dissemble (to feign that he is engaged when he did not mean it); for, says he, though he offend, yet he is not obliged, unless there was a cause from some command which of itself would oblige him; as for example, if he had promised clothes to his father, and he is now starving for cold.² In such a case (would ye think it?) one may be bound to keep his promise, to wit, when he would have been a monster if he had not done the thing though he had never promised it! He tells us elsewhere, that a promise does oblige when it is made to a city, or an university, the clergy, the church, or the poor of a certain place, in case it be for some cause, to wit, for the honour of God, or the like; but if there be no cause it does not bind, though it be made to those fore mentioned; and it does not bind, when it is made to any other besides those, though there be cause for it. Others⁴ maintain that a promise or compact does not oblige in conscience to performance, if the cause why it is made be not expressed; so Panormitan, Angelus, and Rosella, with others. So that if a man forbear but to mention the cause (which is most commonly done, and may be always); though he bind himself with ten thousand promises or covenants, he may with a safe conscience break them all, by their rules. They hold that the firmest promise does but bind under venial guilt. (Cajetan, Armilla, Rebellus, Garzias, in Bonacin. ibid., n. xii.) Or if it did of itself oblige further, yet he that intends to bind himself no otherwise, may break any promise without any more than venial guilt, whether the matter be small or great which is promised (Ibid., n. xii.). Lopez, that a promise may bind under mortal guilt, concludes it requisite that he who makes it should have a mind to be so bound by it; and so in promising (as he says), unless there be an oath to confirm the promise, or a writing, as is usual, they are not thought to oblige themselves to mortal sin; and by this, says he, a multitude of scruples is removed. And he says true, for hereby a man may without any scruple break any promises that are not under his hand or oath.² But what if he had no mind so to oblige himself by his oath or writing? Why, then, by his own rule, he is no more bound by his written or sworn promise than by any other. To this purpose he concludes again, that he who promises in word, without mind or intention to oblige himself, is not bound in conscience to perform it; and this is their common doctrine. So that if a man intend not to be honest, he need not be so, whatever he promise. These rules observed are more than sufficient to excuse men from all faith and honesty in contracts and promises of all sorts; to fill the world with cheats and perfidiousness; to take away all confidence and security from men in dealing one with another; to ruin human society; and to render Roman catholics less conscientious, and more faithless and intolerable to mankind, than sober heathens; nor are they more like the rules of Christianity than those which bid defiance to it.

Sect. 11. Hitherto, thus much of deceit and lies, in word and promises, &c. Hypocrisy is a lie, indeed; both are equally sinful. Aquinas, after some of the ancients, asserts that it is all alike to lie in deeds as in words: as that is a composing of words, so this of acts, to signify and make one believe what is false: both are used as instruments of deceit, and it is all one which way you cozen another, so he be but cheated, as it is all one whether you kill a man with a sword or an axe, as they express it; and both by their doctrine are made venial. Sylvester inquires whether to make a false show of sanctity be a sin?⁵ He answers that if it be for the honour of God, and the profit of others, it is no sin; but if it be to palliate his own wickedness, and that he may be accounted good, then it is a sin, because it is a false ostentation of sanctity. But so is the other too, which yet with him is no sin; either both must be acquitted, or neither. So Cajetan will have it to be evil, though the end he good; because we must not do evil, that good may ensue. But they agree, and it is their common doctrine, that bare hypocrisy, when one feigns he is good and is not, or better than he is, is no mortal evil, though it hath the force of a lie,⁷ and be designed to deceive others, otherwise it would not be so bad as a venial.² Although he delight in thus playing the hypocrite, it will not be worse; this is but vanity, not wickedness, unless it be for an end mortally wicked, such as will make an act, otherwise indifferent, to be criminal. But if he made this false and deceiving show for an evil end, to wit, for vain glory, so long as it is not made his last end (to wit, his God), such vain glorious hypocrisy will be no worse; for though the sin, says Cajetan, be here doubled, yet the double sin is but a single venial. And if he do those works which are naturally ordained for the service of God with an intention not to serve him,⁴ but for glory from men, it is but such hypocrisy, and that with some extenuation; it is not so bad explicitly, seeing the intention to deceive is but implicit. They have a reverence for hypocrisy as a holy art: they honour it and their church with the same title, both being holy alike (so much alike, some will think, that it is hard to know the one from the other). They extol their great saints from their holy hypocrisy. It is amongst the commendations of Saint Dominic himself. Vincentius, Bishop of Beauvois, in his praises, spends one chapter upon this subject, de sancta ejus hypocrisi, shewing that it was not only the practice of their saint, but that he commended the holy thing to his brethren, the friars predicant. Hypocrisy being such a holy quality in their account, and a special ornament of their greatest saints, no wonder if they be so far from branding it as a crime, that they declare it meritorious. A religious person that feigns himself to have more holiness than he hath, that others may be edified, sins not, but rather merits (so Rosella v. Hypocr. n. i.) Thus they give us warning not to trust any shows of sanctity or mortification amongst them, since they are so far from counting it a sin, that they conclude it meritorious even for their religious to deceive others, with hypocritical ostentation of what holiness they have not. Indeed the Romanists are concerned to speak favourably of hypocrisy, and treat it with kindness; for since they require no more truth and sincerity in their dealings with men, and make no more than exterior shows of piety (if so much) needful in the worship of God, and yet would be accounted the best or only true Christians on earth; if they should condemn hypocrisy as a mortal sin, that religion and righteousness, which their church counts sufficient, would be branded by themselves as damnably criminal.

Sect. 12. Disgracing and defaming others to their face by contumelies, or behind their backs by detraction; reproaching them with charges true or false, to the impairing or ruining of their esteem or credit (though some of them say this is worse than theft or robbery, and others make it worse than adultery; and in the canon law such are called murders; yet) is allowed under the notion of a venial in so many cases, that he who is addicted thereto may satisfy his humour fully in the practice of it without scruple. It is a maxim with them that the quality of sins in words is regulated by the intention. It is this that gives this sin, and others besides, their formality (which Cajetan often inculcates); and without that they are no sins, or but venial. Hence he tells us that the contempt of our neighbour is a mortal sin, speaking formally, that is, with an intention of contemning him; for no man formally contemns another, but he that despises him, that he may despise him; so no man is a detractor formally, but he that backbites, that he may backbite; and no man is formally contumelious but he that speaks reproachfully that he may reproach.² So that if he intend not thus to sin, let him say what he will against his neighbour, he is not guilty of the sin formally and in deed. Accordingly he tells us that materially (i. e. without intention of dishonouring another) contumelious words may be spoken, either without any sin, or any but what is venial. It is true, some of them say words may be a crime, if they grievously defame a person, though they be uttered without a design to do it; but then withal they allow of such reproaches as venial, which are of no better consequence, but tend to disgrace him effectually. To reproach him with natural defects of mind, or body, or birth, is regularly but venial. All agree in this, says Sairus: To charge him with ignorance, to say he has little wit and small judgment, to call him a fool, or an hermaphrodite, or a bastard, though the charge be false. To report one to be infected with the French disease is but venial, because that is no great disgrace. (Pet. Navar. Sairus, et alii communiter in Bonacin. ibid. n. ix.) Also to charge him falsely with any wickedness which they count venial.⁵ Thus they may calumniate any man, and without crime charge him falsely as a blasphemer, a thief, a liar, a perjured person, a cheat, &c., since they count these in many degrees venial; and if they be consistent with the honour and reputation of Roman catholics, yet others, either Christian or heathen, will think their credit blasted with such imputations. Likewise to revile one in such terms as may signify either great or lesser crimes, to accuse him as one greatly proud, covetous, wrathful, or anything whatsoever which may denote either the natural inclination and first motions or the outward acts, this is not mortal, because the hearers are to put the better construction on it. And here is liberty enough to calumniate in such terms as may ruin any person’s reputation, upon a presumption that all who hear the slander will be always so wise and good as any rarely are. Or if a man be noted for wickedness already, you may charge him with crimes that are not known, and yet offend but venially, because you cannot hurt his reputation, which is hurt already; as if, when a man has dangerously wounded himself, you might give him more wounds and despatch him, when life and fame are of like account; or you may charge those falsely for committing a crime when they did it not, if it hath been their practice before;² or you may charge them with any crimes that are secret, if they be less than those that are known; as if one had been guilty of murder, you may accuse him of theft, and if he hath stolen, you may accuse him of fornication, and if he be a heretic you may charge him with anything, since with them nothing is worse than what they count heresy. Or you may accuse others of any wickedness, which such sort of persons seem to make nothing of, as some young men of fornication, and others of adulteries.⁴ Further, any terms tending to defame others may be used in passion, such as hinders full deliberation, for these will excuse blasphemy against God, much more the worst reproaches of men; or you may do it in jest, with moderate facetiousness, when the reproach is set off neatly; then it is a virtue with those who learn their divinity, of Aristotle rather than the apostle, and think if a man hath wit he needs herein have no conscience. Or you may do it out of levity or pleasure in tattling, unless the words be so exasperating as to occasion some other deadly evil;⁶ or it may be done by way of recital, suggesting what tends to blast them as reported by others; or when the defamer is not believed, or gives no just cause of belief;⁸ or for correction, for they may defame others to amend them and reform them by making them worse than they are. Or through some want of cautiousness, as amongst women and persons of inferior rank, who vent what reproachful language comes next, how injurious soever;¹⁰ or when their reputation does hurt, and may seduce others, to defame them is absolutely lawful, eos defamare esse licitum, absolute respondet Adrianus in Soto, ibid. q. x. art. ii. Or (to add no more) if one accuse others whom they think he ought not, though he impute nothing to them but what is true, they may charge him with false crimes; this will be no worse than a venial fault (Bannes, xxii. q. lxx. art. iii. p. ii.) Thus, as in other cases, so when anything is said or writ to the disparagement of their church or themselves, how justly and truly soever; if they fix upon the authors the most odious imputations that can be invented (such as Bolsec and Cochleus would have fastened upon Luther and Calvin), and divulge them with a design to delude the world into a belief thereof, though their own consciences tell them there is not a syllable of truth therein, yet they incur no fault thereby that a good catholic need fear or make conscience of. This is not only the opinion of the Jesuits, but the common doctrine of Aquinas his disciples, as Ledesma, a Dominican, assures us; and so we may spare those more than twenty doctors, which, Caramuel says, assert it. Hereby they give warning to mankind, that they are no more to be trusted in their charges against their opposers, to vindicate the reputation of themselves or their church, than such persons will be trusted in a court which openly sentenced them to the pillory for false testimony; yea, in this maxim they have as good as set themselves upon a pillory, and done that justice to the world as to fix this inscription upon their own foreheads, We are they who declare it no crime to calumniate most odiously and falsely whoever speak ill (how truly soever) of us and our church. These are some of their methods for destroying the honour and reputation of others, without any fault which they regard; they deliver them in great variety, so that every one so disposed may serve himself of such as suit his humour. And as a man may defame others, so he may do the same good office for himself, not only by blazoning his secret wickedness, but by charging himself falsely with crimes he never acted; thus to impair or utterly ruin his own credit, is but regularly a venial fault, according to Adrian and Sotus and others; for prodigality is but a venial, and this is but to be prodigal of one’s credit.

Sect. 13. Flattery also (that falseness of every sort, even the vilest, may not miss of their favour and encouragement) is reconciled to common practise under the notion of a venial. To praise one for the virtue which he has not, or the good that he does not, is little or no fault. To extol the good he does above measure and desert, is as innocent; yea, when a man is to be praised for a good work, though you know he will thereby be transported with deadly pride, such as will destroy his soul, yet you should not desist, but may and ought to lay aside the sense of his future ruin, because (says Cardinal Cajetan) there are twelve hours in the day, and a man may in an instant be illuminated and changed by divine mercy.³ To applaud one for his sins, if they be not mortal, is as harmless, when it is out of a design to please the sinner without ruining him, or to gain some advantage by such flattery; so that when it is both wicked and sordid at once, yet will they scarce count it a fault. There is no more hurt in giving flatterers reward and encouragement. Sylvester inquires if this be a mortal sin? and in him Aquinas answers No, unless a man affect, as Herod, to be extolled as a god, or design and desire to be magnified for mortal crimes. But it is a virtue to give consent to false flattery, as when a woman who is secretly an adulteress is praised for faithfulness to her husband, that scandal may be avoided and others deluded by a good opinion of her.² And so we may understand how the praises of the church of Rome for her faithfulness to Christ come to be a virtue. Or if one be not in so complacent a humour as to flatter others, he may curse them at as easy a rate, for it is but a venial fault to curse in words (if not from the heart) any thing, any person, one’s own father not excepted; to imprecate any mischief or misery to them; to wish God’s curse on them, or an ill end might befal them, or the devil might have them.⁴ And when he is at it he may curse the devil too. It is no sin at all if it be for his fault, and gives the devil but his due. Cursing may be one’s usual practice as innocently.⁶ It is scarce so bad as a venial, when cursing is used for honest recreation. And he may curse the irrational creatures or the elements, and if he do it with his mouth only, or with both mouth and heart, without respect either to God or man, in these cases it is only a venial fault.⁸

Sect. 14. I have been long in viewing their account of venial sins; the pernicious use made of it to corrupt the whole body of practical Christianity, and to give liberty to the acting of all sorts of wickedness, with this modification, will excuse me. They venture hard to leave in a manner no mortal sin, and so none needful to be avoided. This will be further manifest by what they determine concerning those few sins which they style mortal or capital; they are reduced, in their ordinary reckoning, to seven. Some of these they conclude to be in their own nature, or regularly venial; in others of them they state the mortalness so high, that those who will be satisfied with wickedness which is not rare and prodigious, may live in the sins, and not reach the mortalness, and so wickedness which is deadly, in their speculative account, may be practised without mortal danger.

Covetousness is one of these capital crimes, which in general they heavily aggravate, and inveigh against, as most pernicious; yet when they come to direct conscience, and give particular rules for practice, it is shrunk into a harmless venial. Covetousness, says Cajetan, simply and absolutely, is not a mortal sin in its own nature, because it is not against, but besides charity. To deliver themselves more distinctly, they consider this sin, either as it is opposed to liberality or to justice; as it is opposite to the former virtue, they generally determine it is but a venial fault; so the same cardinal, As it is contrary to liberality, and signifies an inordinate desire of money, so commonly it is a venial sin.² Thus Navarre, and Sotus,⁴ and all after Aquinas. So that by their doctrine, if a rich man should be so sordidly, so monstrously tenacious, as not to perform one act of liberality to himself or others, in all his life, yet would not this be a mortal sin, since the vice, which is opposite to all liberality, and wholly exclusive of it, is but a venial fault. Only when it is opposed to injustice,⁶ it may be a mortal sin, that is, when a man gets riches by unjust practices and methods, or detains what he has unrighteously. Thus covetousness, however it comes into the account of mortal sins, yet it will stand there as a cipher, and signify no such thing, unless injustice be added to it. Let a man have the most extravagant passion for riches, let him be as greedy as hell or the grave, and penurious as the worst of misers can be, yet if he be not withal a thief, or a cheat, and attempt not to get or keep an estate by fraud or violence, there is no guilt upon him that he need regard. In their sense only thieves and robbers, extortioners or cheats, are covetous, when covetousness is a crime. They speak of covetousness as little worse than an indifferent thing. Injustice added to an act, otherwise lawful, will make it criminal, and this vice will be no crime upon easier terms. But is covetousness a mortal sin, indeed, with them, when it is accompanied with injustice? They would seem to say so sometimes, but then they unsay it again in their other decisions. They allow men to gain unrighteously, and to keep what they have so gained. They declare them not obliged to restitution of what they have got by sinful practices, yea, and such as are most abominable. I have shewed before what unjust and fraudulent methods of gaming⁸ they encourage under the favour of venial faults; let me here instance in gaming only. This with them is venial, though it be not only of an ordinate, but of an excessive desire of gaining, if there be no other mortal ingredient; yea, though not only the subservient, but the principal end be lucre, and so that which is only for recreation be turned into a trade. And this is not only the opinion of some particular doctors, but seems to be the persuasion of them all; for, says Navarre, we see in all parts of the world, all sorts of people play for great sums of money, and the greatest part of them principally for gain; and yet the confessors absolve them, though they signify no intention to give over the practice, which they could not do, if there were any mortal sin in it. And such gaming is allowed, even that which they call diabolical,² in any place, though in their account sacred; at any time, for whole days, even the holiest, that little time excepted which will suffice the people to hear the chief parts of the mass; or in any person, even their cloistered pretenders to perfection, so they omit not divine service. Their mode of devotion needs be no hindrance, for with them it is lawful to make a game of their prayers. Lopez inquires (an licitum sit ludere preces sacras) if it be lawful to play at prayers. He says it is the practice of devout persons, and that Navarre seems to approve it, part ii. c. xxxii.; so does Bonacina after Navarre, Rebellus, and others, De restit. disp. ii. q. iii., punct. i. n. viii., and not only at Ave Marys, but other prayers also, and that it will be no irreverence against God to play with their prayers, if they do it reverently, ibid. To say nothing that their clergy and monks may be spectators of games, and shows that are mortally wicked, if they continue not a long time at it, and yet offend but venially. They teach further, that it is not needful to restore what is wickedly gained.⁵ Sylvester, after others, says, that filthy lucre (that is, dishonest or shameful gain) is not necessarily to be restored, it is but matter of counsel. But he that hath lost much at unlawful games may take another course for his satisfaction; for pope Adrian and others allow him to steal it from him that has won it, Vid. Lopez, ibid. Or to save himself the trouble of stealing, he may refuse to pay what he loses; or if he have bound himself by oath to pay it, not only the pope, but any bishop may release him from the obligation of his oath, and that without the citation of the party. So Navarre, Corduba, Sotus, Penna., et alii in Bonacina, ibid, punct. iii. n. ii. Yea, they will not have those obliged to make restitution who have received anything for acting enormous wickedness, for example, a judge for passing an unjust sentence, or a witness for false testimony and perjury, or a man for satisfying the lust of a lewd woman, or any sort of woman for prostituting themselves, or an assassin for murdering, or a rogue for firing houses or towns, all are comprised in this conclusion, that which is unjustly received, freely of the giver, where there is wickedness on both parts (as in giving, so in receiving), is not, by virtue of any command, to be restored to any. Only (for the encouragement of covetousness, and injustice together) where money is given for the perpetrating of such crimes, if they be not acted, it is to be restored; but if the wickedness be done, the villanous actor may conscientiously detain it. As the judge that receives a bribe for a false sentence, if he pass a just one, he is obliged to restore, but not if he make an unjust award. And a witness, if he receive money for a true testimony, is bound to restore it, but not for a false deposition.² He that is promised a reward for murdering a man, may not receive or keep it before he kill him, but after the murder is done, he may take it (and need not restore it) upon the account of his labour and hazard in killing him, and because therein he has done a fact profitable and delightful to him that hired him, Idem ibid. n. v.; Pet. Navar. et alii. So an astrologer, who takes money for telling things which he cannot know but by the help of the devil, is not bound to restore it, after diligence and pains to get the devil’s assistance therein, because that diligence and pains (with the devil) is valuable, though it prove ineffectual. But he that pretends but to this skill, and makes no use of the devil, is bound to restore, Pet. Navar. et alii cum Bonacin. ibid. n. x. And that the poor may be cut off every way by covetousness, whether it be with injustice or without it, though they say what is received for the perpetrating of wicked acts, may be restored to the poor; yet it is a rule with them that restitution to the poor, in this, and other cases, is only a counsel, not a command, so that he who is hired to do villany may restore what he received to the poor, if he will, but if he will not, he needs not; he may conscientiously enjoy the fruits of his villany, and the poor have nothing. In short, not only disquietment of mind through the tumult of worldly distracting cares, and the restless agitation of a covetous humour,⁴ but also hardness of heart against the poor, and unmercifulness to them in their distress (the natural effect of extreme covetousness) is as innocent as its cause, no worse than venial, unless when one is obliged under pain of mortal guilt to afford relief. And when is that? Only in extreme necessity,⁶ when the starving man may sell his own child to get bread; or when it will be lawful to steal from him who would otherwise part with nothing;⁸ or when he may be compelled by law to part with something; then his heart must relent so far as to let go what he cannot keep; but it is like he may never meet with such a case while he lives, and then the miser is excused; no moment of his life need be embittered with one act of charity; he may enjoy the felicity of a petrified heart all his days, and not suffer by one dint in it. Or if he should unhappily meet with one in such extremity, yet may he escape without giving a farthing; it will be enough to exchange or to lend; yea, he may be excused from either giving or lending,¹⁰ if it be but likely that any other may do it. In fine, this unmercifulness, which admits no compassion for the distress of others, is scarce ever mortal, unless it become so (accidentally) by some other mortal acts, and so there is no need to confess it as a sin. How well does this indulgence to such monstrous covetousness as quite swallows up at once Christian charity, mercy, and liberality, become those who cry up themselves as the sole assertors of the necessity of good works? But that they may not be partial, they shew themselves as favourable to the crime in the other extreme: pure prodigality is no mortal sin, because it is a less fault than covetousness, contrary to liberality, which is manifestly of itself no mortal sin; and the reason of both is, neither of them is against charity to God or others, but only besides it; so Cajetan and others. So Navarre: prodigality (including both that of a man’s credit and his estate) is regularly no mortal sin;³ and this after Aquinas.

Sect. 15. Pride is another capital crime; they style it the queen of mortal sins; but then they will have it advanced so high before it be mortal, that the proudest person amongst Christians can seldom reach it. And so all pride which is not of an extraordinary size, and such as is rarely found, must pass for venial. In Aquinas it is an aversion to God, in that he will not be subject to him and his will; not upon other accounts (to wit, desire of pleasure or profit, &c.), but out of contempt;⁶ so Cajetan also, and others after him. Navarre says they make it an actual contempt of being subject to God; and adds, thanks be to God, this is but found in few Christians, though all are truly proud.⁸ So that mortal pride, by that account which the oracle of their school and his followers give of it, is rarely to be found in the Christian world. It is questionable whether Scotus did count that pride mortal which Aquinas judged to be so; he says, few learned men know in what degree it is deadly, and others are not bound to know it. However, Cajetan ventures to tell us what pride is venial, and his account is worth our view. It is thus at large: He that shews himself so irreligious and ungrateful, as if he had not received all from God, is proud (says he) in the first kind; for of a like effect the apostle says, What hast thou which thou hast not received? why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received? whereby glorying, as the effect, the inward pride is manifested, as though he had not received it. Likewise when one is so affected as to be secure concerning the good he hath, or querulous for the good which is lost, or wonders that he is not heard of God, this is the second kind of pride, because such a one makes account that such things are due to him. But he that prefers himself before others, and is prone to spy in his mind or fancy the defects of others, or to excuse his own naughtiness and to aggravate that of others, has a third sort of pride, when he will have himself to be great as if he alone were great. Further, he who caring little for the heavenly country, for the members of Christ, for the expiation of his sins, passing his days as one dreaming or scarce awake, has a fourth kind of pride; for he presumes he is a heavenly citizen, a friend of God, a son, a member, when such negligence and carelessness are no evidence of his favours, the love of God, where it is, producing (those) great things. And likewise in reference to his neighbour’s crudeness of mind, and incompassionateness to others, counting injuries intolerable, impatience, not enduring to be slighted, indignation, and the like, do shew that the man thinks better of himself than he is, &c. So great a litter of this monster he exposes to our view, telling us its issue is much more numerous; and then strokes all gently over, calling them venials. These, says he, and many others, are a sort of imperfect pride, and are commonly venial sins for the imperfectness of them, since they occur in the manner of passions, without injury to God or others.² Yet (that we may be the more amazed to see all this pass for a little fault) such sins, he adds, hinder spiritual life exceedingly, being of the stock of pride, when it is written that God resists the proud. As for that pride which they count mortal, and grown to its full height, Aquinas out of Gregory, and others after both,⁴ give an account of it in some particulars. The prime are these: When one thinks that good he has is from himself; when he thinks that what he has from God is for his merits; and when he boasts that he hath what he has not. If their great Azpilcueta could see none of this most deadly crime amongst Christians, having the merit of congruity and condignity before him, either his sight failed him, or his church was not visible. Others, with his eyes, can see not only mortal pride, but (as deadly a sin) infidelity, where this is part of a creed.⁶ To make up one article of two deadly sins, must be a sure mark of the only church. Seriously, finding so many of their authors on this head, charging the opinion of merit, with mortal pride; and therein following not only the greatest of their doctors, but the most infallible of their bishops, I have wondered why they did not either make that none of their faith or this no such sin. What salvo they will find against deadly sin, when it is in their faith, I know not; but if part of their belief had proved arrogance (though that sounds like the worst of pride), they might have come off well enough, for arrogance is a venial sin, except in some rare cases. It is, says Cajetan, frequently venial, when without prejudice of others a man values himself as having more knowlege, or goodness, or authority than he hath; and again, It is a sin, but it is not mortal, unless when it usurps against God; as the king of Tyre, when he said, I am God (now none are observed to do this except the pope, who has the law in his own hand), or against others by tyranny (which is so odious as all disclaim it; and affecting it is no worse than affecting to kill men without consent, which with him is not deadly), or unless it be made one’s ultimate end (which none will own). Accordingly, Angelus determines that arrogancy is commonly a venial fault, unless upon the account of something else that is mortal, as when it arises from mortal pride; but that (as he and others define it we heard before) is scarce to be found amongst Christians.²

Sect. 16. Ambition was wont to be counted a deadly crime; the world and the church too has reason to judge it so, since the most of their miseries and ruins may be imputed to it; but the church of Rome and her champions are concerned not to think so ill of it, stilo curiæ, in the sense of the court it may pass for venial. Angelus inquires whether ambition be a mortal sin? He answers negatively, it is not so simply, but may be so in respect of its end, and so may anything in itself lawful be, if its end be criminal; or it may be so, if the thing affected be a crime, but that is accidental, and still ambitiousness, the inordinacy of the affection is excused, and may transgress all bounds if the honour and power affected be lawful. Thus Cajetan, he will yield it more than venial,⁴ when one will be honoured for a crime, or would be counted a god; accordingly, it is resolved by Sylvester, with Navarre, regularly an inordinate appetite or greediness of honour exceeds not the bounds of a venial fault.⁶ Indeed, if pride and ambition had been branded as damnable, two cardinal virtues had been concerned, and, which is more, the Vatican ‘throne, both in its foundation and supports.

Sect. 17. Vain glory is another capital crime in their account, and pregnant with many others. They define it to be an inordinate affecting of human glory, and yet determine, that an inordinate affecting of praise, or favour, or honour, or reverence, or glory, is but regularly a venial sin; only it may happen to be mortal in some case, as when one would inordinately have glory from others for a deadly end, or for a mortal sin, or that which he makes his last end; in all other cases this capital evil is but a slight fault. According to their common doctrine, Cajetan will have it to be mortal then only when one glories in mortal sin⁸ (but to glory in venials they count it a small fault), or sets his ultimate end in vain glory. Angelus collects out of Alexander and Aquinas, that vain glory of itself imports not anything contrary to the love of God or man. Aquinas himself says, that if love of human glory, though vain, be not perfectly repugnant to charity, it is not mortal. And Sylvester delivers this as the sense of their oracle, that the desire of vain glory in its own nature is not mortal.² Angelus concludes, that this may be a man’s end in all things but the Scripture and the sacraments; but this limitation is too strict in the judgment of their doctors which are of greatest repute: for they determine, that he who does those things which are principally instituted for the honour and worship of God, and the salvation of souls, for vain glory as his chief end; as for example, he that in preaching, or praying, or celebrating, makes vain glory his principal end, and aims at nothing higher, sins but venially.⁴ Angelus had made it worse, but others had confuted him effectually, and Navarre after them. Aquinas, the angel of their schools, was, it seems, of this persuasion, that vain glory may be actually our principal end in worshipping God, without any mortal sin: for Sylvester tells us, that Angelus did contradict, not only the truth, but St Thomas, in saying it is a mortal evil, when those things which were ordained for the glory of God, are done principally for a man’s own glory, as the sacraments and the Scripture. And they are highly concerned to maintain this, for, says he, if this were a mortal sin, the whole clergy in a manner were in an ill condition;⁶ he means they were in a state of damnation: so that it was high time for the Roman doctors to form a divinity of new maxims, since those of Scripture and antiquity left them in a damnable condition. One would think, that to count it but a peccadillo, to make vain glory the cause or motive without which a man would not preach, or pray, or perform any worship, should be a prodigious thing for any that calls himself a Christian; but he that will allow it, under no greater censure than that of a petty fault, to be the principal end of worship, and the great concern of salvation, advances it higher. He that takes a church living or spiritual benefice, principally for honour or temporal profit, offends but venially, unless he be unworthy because of his ignorance or other defect.⁸ So that in their church, for any or all of them, from the pope to the meanest officer, to make honour and profit their chief end in taking the charge of souls, or other place or employment, which concern the worship of God, or the the salvation of the people, is so slight a thing as needs never trouble them; ten thousand faults of this nature, ten thousand times over, would never hazard their souls. These two last conclusions will help us to discern of what complexion popery is, upon what it is founded, for what ends they may think it safe to maintain it, and persist in it, without or against any conscientious or spiritual consideration: and why they may make religion all along serve a worldly interest and truckle under it. There is no danger in all this; it is a harmless venial by their doctrine, to thrust the great God and his glory into an inferior place, below their honour and profit, even in those things which they say were principally instituted for his sovereign honour; this is a fault with them next to nothing. If they should, in the worship of God, aim at him in the first place, and at their own glory and profit in the next, there might be some danger lest they should too much oblige him: for thus to join God and their carnal interest together, as their end in any religious concern, is a meritorious act, according to Aquinas. Further,² vainglorious boasting, though it be with irreverence to God, and injury and scandal to others, if that be not much, is only venial, according to Aquinas and Alensis. And a man may vaingloriously praise himself for something that is good, though it be false, or something that is evil, if it be not deadly, and yet offend but venially, when he does no great mischief to others.

Sect. 18. Aversation to, or grief at, spiritual and divine things, is another capital crime in their reckoning, which is called acedia. The object is God, as to man’s friendship and communion with him, and the spiritual acts and duties requisite thereto; the act they express by sloth, and loathness to meddle with these things, coldness, tepidness about them, not caring for them, nauseating and accounting them a grievance. This some of them do not deny to be a mortal sin, but they will have it mortal only upon such strange terms, that any one may have a great aversation for God, and the things of God, without danger of deadly guilt; for they define it by an aggrievedness at what is spiritual and divine, quatenus est divinum, as it is divine, and not otherwise; not because it is laborious or troublesome to the flesh, or any impediment to its pleasures, which are Aquinas’s words;⁵ but under that formality, in that it is divine, as his followers understand it. So that the greatest disaffection to spiritual things, if it be because they are unsuitable to corrupt nature, not agreeable to the flesh, its ease and pleasure (which is the common and ordinary cause of it), if it be not on an account that rarely falls out, as they acknowledge, and which a man can scarce ever deliberately be subject to;⁷ it brings him not under this guilt. So Cajetan tells us, If a man, not as to his affection, but in effect, be grieved at this, viz., that he is to be a citizen with the saints, and one of God’s family, because he little cares for the happiness of this divine friendship, neglecting to attain it, because he gives up himself to other delights, he is not guilty of this sin. Angelus, that he may discover when this disaffection to spiritual and divine things is mortal, and when venial, tells us, that when it consists in the omission of things not necessary to salvation, it is venial;² that is, it is little or no fault, if all the duties of real worship, all the acts of grace and Christian virtues, are omitted; for we cannot yet discern that they account any of these necessary to salvation, and by the premises it appears they do not. It is venial, says Sylvester, when a man counts the doing of it grievous, but yet omits not what he is bound to. Angelus expresseth it more significantly: By this it appears, says he, what is to be said of him who counts grievous, and abominates divine and spiritual things, since unless they be necessary to salvation, and he declines them, or is deliberately disposed to decline them, he sins not mortally.⁴ So that spiritual and divine things (all that they account not necessary; that is, all in a manner which is requisite for a Christian) may be abhorred, without any mortal guilt; and herein the two sums agree well enough, though they seem to be at some odds. It is false, says Sylvester (not limiting it to things necessary) that abominating of spiritual things is always a mortal sin. Accordingly he determines, that rancour against those who would induce us to spiritual things (that is, would draw us to God, or the things of God), is a venial fault.⁶ It is no mortal sin (say others) to conceive an indignation and loathing of those who persuade to what is spiritual (so as not to endure to hear or see them), whether preachers or others. We see by this (as by other instances) that sins so stated, as they are scarce ever practicable, they can be content to have them counted mortal; but common provocations, and such of which there is most danger, must pass for venials; yea, there are some amongst them who will have this capital crime, though it have such a deadly aspect, both in itself and in its effects, to be no mortal sin.—Laisius Turrian. ibid. sect. iii. n. ii.

Sect. 19. Anger stands in their general account as another capital crime. I have touched it before; but here let us see how criminal they make it, when in particulars they bring up their reckoning. It is considered in respect of the mode or degree, and the tendency or effects of it. As to the degree of it, how high soever it rise, to what excess soever it transport one, inwardly or outwardly, it is not in its own nature mortal, unless it be so vehement as to bear down both love to God and man, and leave the passionate person neither, which yet it will not do, though it sally out furiously into curses or blasphemies against God or man, if this be but merely verbal, as we saw before.² The tendency of it, that which it leads to, is revenge; and as to that, it will be venial if the revenge be but little, or it may be great when it can be taken legally; or it may be great and illegal too, if the passion be but quick and great enough. The more excessive it is, the more mischief it may do, and be innocent, if the passion prevent deliberation when it comes, and hinder it while it stays; both it, and the effects of it, how horrid soever, will be venial. So that, if one be angry enough, he may blaspheme God, renounce Christ, perjure himself, kill or burn whom or what he will, with little or no fault. Thus, by their doctrine, this capital crime seems more like a virtue than a vice, since the greater is the better; or at least the less it has to do with reason, the more excusable and venial. Other extravagant passions meet with as favourable measures. Indignation, which makes a man disdain others, as unworthy of his conversation or affable treatment, it is commonly venial.⁴ Audaciousness, in itself, is no worse; nor excessive wrath and immoderate fear, because they are not contrary to charity, but exorbitant from the right measures of reason. So intimidity or fool-hardiness is venial, when it proceeds from tolerable foolishness; but the folly may be so great, that the fault will be none.⁶ Also incontinent desires, or lusts; love likewise, whether of the flesh or the world. Of the former, thus Angelus: Immoderate self-love, when one excessively seeks the delight of the body and ease of the flesh, it proceeds from luxury, yet it is commonly venial, when it causes not other mortal acts or neglects.⁸ As for love of the world, to love it for necessity, is no sin, and to love to stay a long time in the world, for the pleasures of it, is but a venial fault.

Envy is another capital crime, and in general they inveigh against it, as a devilish wickedness; yet when they come to give particular rules for conscience and practice, they leave room enough for the entertainment of it in the hearts and lives of their catholics. The general notion of it is an excessive grief at the good of others, but all are acquitted from mortal quiet who grieve at others’ good, because it may be prejudicial to themselves, or because they want it. So far a man may envy all in the world who have more worth, honour, or power, or prosperity than himself. This may be good or evil, but evil in no other degree, than the desire of temporals,² which, when it is excessive, is of itself, by their doctrine, but venial. Or they may grieve at others’ good, because they think those who have it unworthy of it. Grief or indignation at the outward happiness of others, upon this account solely, is of itself a venial fault with Aquinas and Cajetan. But why evil at all? The reason is because, since that which is grieved at is neither an evil of sin or punishment, it seems in a manner to reprove God, and to grieve, as though there were injustice in the dispenser of these things. All the envy in the world may find shelter and security in these decisions, as a harmless venial. If this last-mentioned be not envy, what is? why, a grief at the good of others, as it lessens and obscures our proper worth or excellency. But he that thinks others more unworthy, and himself far better, will think it a lessening and obscuring his own worth to have it so overlooked, and that which they distinguish and mince in speculation, will go down together in practice. However, two limitations they add, which will commonly excuse envy: it must be betwixt equals,⁴ and so grief at the prosperity of inferiors, or superiors at least, will be acquitted; also, if it be for little things, it is venial. Now all temporals are little things to him who has the eternal in his prospect; so way is made to acquit all envy for outward prosperity, which yet they make the only object of envy.⁶ And if envy, upon a small ground, may be excused as a little fault, envy upon a great occasion will be excusable, as less; except when they derive the sinfulness of an act from its exorbitancy as to reason; that will be less sinful which is more unreasonable. They might as well have concluded directly, and without circumlocution, as Lorca the Dominican doth, that envy is no more a mortal sin than vainglory or covetousness, which they count venial, unless heightened with some such circumstance as will make an act otherwise good to be a deadly evil.

Sect. 20. Intemperance, which they call Gula, comprising both gluttony and drunkenness, may well pass for a cardinal crime, yet both together, by an after reckoning, make but a poor venial. They define it an inordinate appetite of eating and drinking, viz., to excess, not for necessity, but for pleasure. This, when it is excessive every way, in the charge, the time, the quality, the pleasure, the quantity, is not in its own nature a mortal sin, according to the doctrine of Aquinas, though it be a capital vice, and the cause of many other. But then it may be deadly by accident, if it be grievously hurtful to the body;² so it becomes those to determine, who are more tender of the concerns of the body than of the soul. Yet that we may understand how the pleasure of sensuality may be preferred before either soul or body, they tell us, that if the damage done to the body by intemperance be not grievous, or if it prove so great, yet if the glutton do not observe it, or if the great prejudice done to his health be not so frequent that he is bound to observe it, it will be venial still. But Cajetan troubles us not with this respect to health, but concludes it may be venial (and of a large size sometimes), not only when it brings upon us other inconveniences, but other sins, and particularly when it is prejudicial to health.⁴ He has but one case wherein it will be more than venial; then only is it mortal, says he, when this pleasure in eating is a man’s chief end, and his belly his god; that is, when for the pleasure of it, he not only transgresses all rules of temperance, but has no regard of any command of God, or the church, as if a man will steal to play the glutton, &c. It seems this sensual lust will never be criminal, unless one be so much at its devotion, as to contemn God,⁶ and make nothing of any other wickedness to gratify it. And though there be no danger here, but when one makes his belly his god, yet there is no great danger of that, since a man may be a perfect epicure, like the rich glutton in the Gospel, and yet escape. When one, says Angelus, for delight of his appetite, resolves to give up his whole life to such (gluttonous) pleasures as Dives, &c., this is near to mortal sin. It seems, then, it is not deadly, but only near it; though it brought the epicure not only near hell, but into the torment of its flames. Yea, further, if intemperance proceed to beastliness, and pollute not only the soul but the body loathsomely, if the glutton load himself with more than he can bear, and so burden nature, that it is forced to ease itself in nasty ways, this will be no more a fault. Intemperance, says Navarre, is regularly venial, though without any profit, and out of design, one stuff himself so full with meat and drink, even to vomiting.⁸ If he eat so much till he vomit, on purpose that he may be at it again the sooner, and so may be still gormandising, it is no worse. Uncleanness, says Angelus, which is the issue of intemperance, when one provokes himself to vomit, that he may eat the oftener, or when he eats so much that he must of necessity vomit, is commonly a venial fault. Cajetan more fully: Uncleanness is used for the sin of voiding excrements excessively, as of meat by vomiting, and the like, proceeding from intemperance; it is frequently a venial sin, since it is neither against the love of God nor man; yet it is filthy, since it brings with it even bodily nastiness.² So that intemperance, even when it bewrays itself, and vents its filth by all the passages that oppressed nature can find in the glutton’s body, is but a small fault. To be half drunk is no mortal sin. So Lopez, after Aquinas;⁴ herein they all agree, says a learned cardinal; take their sense in the words of Cajetan.⁶ Drunkenness not complete (when one by drinking wine is made too merry, or is disturbed in his fancy, so that the house seems to whirl round, or the like effect of intoxication befalls him, but he does not quite lose the use of reason), without doubt is a great sin (but not big enough to be feared), unless it be done for medicine; because it is excessive drinking in quantity or quality, when fallen into it knowingly or negligently; but it is worse when it is out of design (when one drinks too much, with an intention thus to disorder himself), because then it is almost mortal (there is no danger in all this, since he adds) but yet it is not mortal, since it reaches not the complete notion of drunkenness, and is without signal damage to reason. So that if a man be not dead drunk, and utterly deprived of the use of reason, he falls short of that perfection which is requisite to make this a deadly evil. In fine, however the Scripture, ancient Christians, and all that are sober, brand drunkenness as a most deadly vice, yet the Roman doctors have discovered two admirable virtues in it; one is that the full dose (perfect drunkenness), will make the highest impieties, the greatest outrages and villanies, to be no sins at all. So Angelus, who proves it by the canon law. So likewise Rosella, after others. Those of their writers which seem most cautious,⁸ except culpable drunkenness, as to this only, when such outrages are the usual effects of it. So that unless both drunkenness, and the criminal issues of it, be customary, this will not be sin, or imputable to the drunkard. Hereby they furnish the Christian world with a new argument to prove Mahomet a false prophet, seeing he was so greatly mistaken in making his law so severe against wine, which, in its greatest abuse, is of such sovereign efficacy as to drown so much mortal sin, and to make all crimes whatever lose their deadly quality. But that impostor’s head was not so intoxicated but he might discern that such who are guilty in the cause, are chargeable in the effects; nor was he so much a prophet as to foresee, that in after times, anything under the disguise of divinity should stumble at this. The other virtue of this sin is, that the moiety of it (half drunkenness) will make any the most horrid crimes to be but small faults. Weakness of judgment, says one, such as they who are half asleep, or half drunk, though it be enough to make a sin venial, yet not mortal.² When those, says another, that are half asleep, or half drunk, perpetrate any wicked thing whatever, since they are plainly under weakness of judgment, they are quitted of mortal guilt. So that if any one will but make himself half drunk every morning early (and it will be no worse than a venial to do it purposely), he may, whatever wickedness he acts, be free from mortal sin all his life; and thus, he that lives all his days like a devil, may escape hell notwithstanding, and be saved by being daily half drunk.

There are multitudes of particular sins which they comprise under these seven capitals, and call them their daughters, after Gregory and Aquinas; but they need not be taken notice of as mortal by common confessors, much less by their confitents, for such confessors need not know whether they are mortal or no, as Angelus tells us after Henricus; and so must absolve sinners, though they never resolve, or think of leaving their sins.

Sect. 21. By the premises we may see what, and how many, sins may pass for venial in the church of Rome, and they have presumed to make them so without evidence from Scripture, as even a Jesuit will acknowledge. The maxims they proceed on therein (though eternal life or death depend on it) are purely their own conceits; no wonder if they leave them at great uncertainty. Many sins are believed to be venials which are mortal, says Bonaventure, and it is most difficult to discern them.⁶ So that they have no sufficient direction from any rule, no, not their own; but they are encouraged to venture upon all this wickedness in the dark and blindfold. The instances I have given may serve for a test; there is a world more, nor have I picked out all the worst; more time and diligence may discover more as bad or worse. But by these we may discern, that whatever the Lord hath forbidden in his law, they have ways to reduce it to the rank of venials; for the whole matter of the divine law is, in itself, either of less or greater weight: if it be small, or they please to count it so, they conclude presently, Upon that account, it is not mortal. Whatever appears not to be a grand enormity, whether it be against God, others, or ourselves, must be venial, according to that of Richard de Sancto Victore. Mortal sin cannot be committed by any, but by a grand corrupting of himself, or contempt of God, or grievous mischief of others; all the rest are venial. Whatever is not, in their apprehension, grand and grievous, is next to nothing. Yea, one member of the three is, in a manner, wholly shrivelled away into venials. A man can scarce do anything against himself which will be big enough to make a mortal sin of.² Indeed, it may seem no more than requisite to make it no crime for a man to damn himself, when they animate him to venture on so many damnable things, as if they were nothing. Thus they serve whatever the great God hath forbidden, which they have the confidence to count small; but if they cannot choose but think it great, they have other expedients to level it (according to the exigence of men’s lusts), and diminish it into a venial. To make it more, they require so very much, that a sinner may make shift enough to be without some of it, and so escape the mortalness (as they will have him dream) though he practise the wickedness. That any sin may be mortal, there must be judicium integrum, an entire judgment, not distracted, not weakened, not disturbed, as they prove out of their canon law. Also, there must be perfect deliberation;⁴ it is venial (how grievous soever otherwise) where there is not perfect deliberation. If, by any means, deliberation not only in itself, but in its perfection, be either prevented, and the thing be done before the mind take due cognizance of it, or hindered while it is under debate, it cannot be mortal. And that deliberation may be perfect, there must be a sufficient presenting of the evil in its object and its circumstances. If the mind only consider the advantage or pleasure, and not the sinfulness and danger, it is but a semi-deliberation, and not full enough to make a sin mortal. Besides, it will require time to perfect it,⁶ and here they may favour the sinner as much as they please, by determining what time is sufficient for human frailty; but if he be in haste, and do not stay this time, because he is so forward to sin, he will but sin venially. Finally, there must be full consent of will. If the inferior and sensual part take never so much complacency in a wicked thing, yet so long as the superior takes no notice of it, there is no harm; it is certainly no more than a venial. Or if the superior part takes cognizance of it, and be some way inclined to the wickedness, yet that may not make it criminal, for every inclination is not sufficient for this purpose, but full consent of will, such as is perfectly deliberate; neither is a tacit and constructive consent sufficient.² A neglect to repel or suppress the delight in sin, with some reluctancy of reason, is with Bonaventure constructive consent, which, in the opinion of many doctors, is no mortal sin. Now if there be not a concurrence of all these, the horridest crime that can be perpetrated will be a venial. If a man should blaspheme God, or curse Christ, or renounce the faith, or murder his own father, or ravish his own child or mother, or fire cities and countries, yet if he did it not with such perfection of judgment, deliberation, and consent as is expressed, it would be a petty fault. And he may be easily furnished with many things, which will any of them so weaken this as not to hurt him. Ignorance, drowsiness, disorder by drink, inconsiderateness, negligence, forgetfulness, precipitancy, natural or accidental, levity, passion, custom or habit, and the like, will serve to excuse any wickedness from mortal guilt. Let me but add one more (which serves to make clear work): the opinion of their doctors, one or more, will make any crime not to be mortal to him that follows it. Any person upon this ground may venture upon the most deadly sin as if it were venial. It will be no more dangerous, for he is to be absolved, by their doctrine, though he declares that he will not forsake such a sin. The confessor ought to absolve him, though in his own opinion, and the judgment of other divines also, it be a mortal crime.⁴ This is their common doctrine, delivered by multitudes of their writers; so that hereby a fair way is opened to leave no mortal sin in the world, at least in the consciences of all that will regard their doctors. In the mean time, the far greatest part of sins the world is guilty of are, by this and their other maxims, become peccadilloes, and they bid fair for all. The principles, by virtue of which they have done so much already, a little improved (though extended no further than they will reach), would go near to leave no deadly sin at all. To be sure, he that will regulate himself by their maxims, may act any wickedness in the world without fear of deadly guilt. And hereby it appears plainly how very needless holiness of life is in that church (which pretends to a monopoly of all the holiness on earth), since by their doctrine they may not only neglect acts of piety, righteousness, and common honesty, but may live securely in practices opposite to, and inconsistent therewith. They may continue in customary blaspheming of God, in common swearing and perjuries, in perfidiousness to God and men; in a neglect of all that is acceptable in divine worship; in a total profanation of all time which is indeed, or in their account, holy; in impiousness and disobedience to parents or superiors; in divers degrees of uncleanness and murder; in variety of cheats and stealing; in unfaithfulness as to breach of promise and compacts; in all falseness and lying, everywhere, and upon all occasions; in slandering or detraction, in covetousness or prodigality, which they will; in unmercifulness and outrageous passions; in pride and ambition; in vain glory and hypocrisy; in flattery or cunning; in gluttony and drunkenness, &c.; in sins against God and man, against godliness, righteousness, mercy, charity,—in any of these, a little modified in all of them, and many more than I can reckon. They may persist in them impenitently to the death, and yet (if impostors may be trusted rather than the word of God) not fall short of salvation; their doctrine gives them encouragement to live in them without conscience, and die in them without repentance. It takes off the motives which might work upon either fear or love (the main principles of such motions in us) to forsake them. They are taught by their best authors that these sins may stand well with their love to God; that they do not so much as impair the habit of charity; that they do not hinder the increase of grace, or the effects of their sacraments;² that they do not stain the soul; that they hazard not God’s favour thereby; that they displease not God, that they are not against his will;⁴ that they are consistent with a perfect fulfilling of the law; that they have not perfectly the nature of sin;⁶ that they are not against the law, but only beside it; or if they be against it in any respect, as some of them think,⁸ yet against no precept, the observance of which is necessary for salvation, or not against the end of the law, which is charity; that they are but as specks or motes,¹⁰ we may look on them as nothing, that without the interposal of mercy they are such in their own nature,¹² as ought to be passed by, they deserve pardon. They do not (as they teach) deserve eternal punishment, and the Lord (as they blaspheme) would be unjust, if he should condemn any for them. So that not only as long as God is merciful, but while he is just, the practice of these sins is safe. Neither love to God, nor fear of his displeasure, nor dread of hell, nor desire of heaven, nor a design for perfection, need move them to abandon any one of these sins. They need not fear, how much soever they multiply or abound in them; if they should commit millions of them in a day, and continue the practice all the days of a long life, this would not damn them; for all the venial sins in the world, if they meet in one man, would not amount to so much as one damning sin.² They may commit them not only out of ignorance or infirmity, but with a high hand out of contempt. They may praise themselves or others for them,⁴ they may boast of and glory in them, they may perpetrate them out of malice.⁶ They may be so far from resolving to leave them, as it will be but a small fault, to bind themselves by oath to commit them, and call God to witness, that they will thus sin against him. They may die with resolution to continue therein,⁸ if they might live; yea, they may breathe out their souls with delight and complacency in these sins, and yet be saved. To conclude, mark how they may act and multiply, and persist in them, and then view the nature and quality and number of them, or guess thereat by the severals premised; and then suppose a man living after the rules of these conscientious doctors and casuists, and taking but part of that liberty which the Roman divinity allows, such a man would pass for a good catholic with them, and be holy enough, according to the holiness left among them, and made necessary by them; yet, even by the rules of heathen morality, he would appear little better than a monster. So faithfully do they retain, and so much do they regard the rules of Christ in forming the maxims of their new divinity, that sober heathenism would be ashamed thereof; and so like is practical popery to true Christianity, in that wherein the reality and triumphant splendour of it consists, innocency and purity! If an atheist had a mind to render the Christian name odious, and to represent Christianity with a black and detestable visage to the sober part of the world; if he had a design to make men believe that Christ was a minister of unrighteousness, and the gospel a licentious doctrine, tending to debauch mankind, he would need no more, but persuade them that the maxims of the Roman divines were conformed to the rules of the gospel; but then, if he should attempt to prove this conformity, he might as easily demonstrate that darkness is light, or the Alcoran the Christian gospel.

CHAPTER IX Many enormous crimes are no sins at all in the Roman account

Sect. 1. I proceed to those sins which they will have to be no sins, but need not stay long here, having given a large account of those which they make venial; since betwixt these, and no sins, there is little difference in their doctrine, and none in their practice. I need not stay to shew how it is no sin with them to vilify the Scriptures (the written word of God), or to rob him of the sole glory of his mediation, and to give much thereof to others, in all its parts and specialities, merit, satisfaction, intercession; or to put their trust in others besides God, for things which he alone can give, and for which he only is to be relied on, and this not only in saints and angels, but their images, and their imaginary relics. And how it is no sin in their account to abide in ignorance, unbelief, impenitency, or to live without the love and fear of God, and the exercising of other graces; by what is already premised this is sufficiently manifested. To resist the inspirations of God, drawing us to the observance of his commands, or withdrawing us from wickedness, is no special sin, i. e. we contract no other kind of guilt thereby, than if we had sinned without any such inspirations to withhold us from it. Thus it will be no fault at all to quench the motions of God’s Spirit, inducing us to turn to him, to love him, to repent, &c., or dissuading us from blasphemy, perjury, adultery, murder, or any other crime. And yet if a man be ready to commit any wickedness, it will be no sin for another to invite him to do it. Thus far men may promote all sin in others, and resist the Spirit of God, moving against it. As for evil spirits, they conclude it no sin, for good men, by special instinct or revelation, to make use of the ministry of devils;³ they tell us that to apply themselves to devils to know, or obtain any thing of them, is to have some familiarity and society with those damned spirits (unless it be the better to expel them out of the possessed), yet they teach it is no sin to inquire of the devil in a possessed person, what his name is, and wherefore he vexes that person, and what devils are his associates, and the like. But he must not believe the devil, though he tell him (for this would be as bad as necromancy);⁵ yet if he believe him not, none can tell how the devils answering him in those inquiries can contribute any thing to his expulsion. They declare also, that it is lawful to use adjurations to the devils who possess no person, not to assist those that do, or to apply themselves to the great devils, to cast out the less.

Sect. 2. So far we see (and further) they may deal with the devil; how they may deal with God we saw before. Though the whole body of popery be corrupt, yet there is nothing more leprous than their worship. They think it not needful that it should be conformed to the divine rule in any thing, either as to the end, or manner, or matter, or object, yet it is transcendently good in their own eyes, no sin in it, even when there is nothing else. For what sordid and wicked ends they think it fit to worship God, we have discovered already, and also in what an irreligious manner. To this latter, let me add, what I meet with in Angelus, when he is inquiring, whether attention or devotion be necessary in their divine service (a strange question it might seem among any called Christians, if their divine service were the worship of God), he tells us their gloss maintains that it is sufficient to say it (their service) with the mouth, though not with the heart, and that many other canonists agree therein. Thus it seems they understand the pope’s law for divine worship; so as to approve that in plain terms which Christ expressly, and the prophets before him, condemns; so as to declare to the world, that the church of Rome makes no other worship necessary, than what Christ hath openly branded as vain, false, and hypocritical, Isaiah 29:14, and Matthew 15:7–9. The sense of their divines agrees so well with the canonists, and as little with Christ (though it be expressed in other terms), that the contradiction to him is not so open though it be as full. Angelus himself, and Sylvester after him, with others, determine that wandering in one that observes it, when it is but as to the inward act, though it be temerarious and grievous, is not mortal unless it be out of contempt,⁴ the plain English of which is this: the departing of the mind and heart from God in worship, willingly and wittingly, how great soever it be, is a small fault, if any, unless to this neglect of God a greater contempt be added, whereas the contempt of God herein is very great. His reason is that which others give, because the church is not to judge of mere inward acts; and therefore, if a minister of the church, when he is at service, mind something else, he seems to be no transgressor of the precept by that act.⁶

He tells us out of Aquinas (what we saw the rest of them do before) that they need not continue actually attentive in worship, but only virtually, id est, if they intend to perform service when they are going about it, that will make them pass for attentive enough all the while, though their minds be carried away after other things when they are at it, and never heed the worship in hand. This is the common sense of their authors, as if they should gravely tell us that a man who goes into company with some intent (actual or virtual) to be sober, but presently falls to his cups, is overcome and continues drunk divers hours, yet he may be said to be sober all the while he is drunk, by virtue of his first intention. And so we should wrong the Romanists if we did not think they would have as much of true worship and religion in their service as that man has of sobriety all the time he is dead drunk.

Sect. 3. But there is not any more horrid abuse of divine worship than that which they are guilty of in reference to its object; for besides what they determine concerning divine worship to be given to other things besides God, it is no sin with them to worship the utensils of their worship, the vessels, books, tables, linen, and priestly vestments, being once dedicated to divine service, and made holy by the charm of a consecration. Antonius Corduba says they are to be worshipped for themselves, and in the judgment of Clychtovius they are to have a worship distinct from his worship, to whose honour they are dedicated.³ Vasquez will have them worshipped relatively (as images, to whom he gives divine adoration) with respect to him in whose service they are used.

It is no sin to worship the word Jesus, whether it be pronounced or written, and some will have honour given to the word for itself; so Corduba and others. Some will have the word worshipped together with him that it signifies, as the image and the exemplar are both worshipped together, so that they will have the word Jesus to be worshipped as the image of Jesus.

It is no sin to worship the accidents of bread and wine in the eucharist, where the object worshipped is not only Christ there, nor is it the substance of bread and wine (for they say there is no substance left), but that which they worship is the colour, figure, or taste of the elements. The colour, when there is nothing that is coloured; the tartness, when there is nothing that is tart; the roundness, when there is nothing that is round. To these wonderful (not to say monstrous) accidents, some will have a single worship due, but that, the very same worship that is due to Christ, and besides that divine adoration, which is common to them with Christ, will have also a proper worship given without reference to Christ; but all of them agree that they are to be adored with divine worship, and some say that this adoration is terminated on them, as the worship of the exemplar upon the image. They will not only have the manger wherein Christ lay, and the thorns wherewith he was crowned, and the spear that wounded him, to be worshipped, but the picture of these when they are but painted;² they are to have the same worship which the true cross has, that is, divine adoration; and so are natural thorns or a common manger or spear to be worshipped, when they are made use of to adorn the cross or to set off the passion of Christ, as they are wont theatrically to represent it.

It is no sin to worship anything that Christ touched, or that touched him, how injuriously soever. Therefore, they teach that the ass upon which Christ rode is to be worshipped. Hereby it appears, says Vasquez, how rightly the ass upon which Christ did ride may be worshipped, and that the very lips of Judas (that traitor and devil as Christ calls him) for kissing Christ, when he betrayed him, for that very act wherein he shewed himself a traitor and devil, are to be worshipped.⁴ If they had but that traitor’s lips they would reverently and devoutly kiss, that is, adore them; and it is strange if they have them not among their sacred relics, since they say they have the foreskin of Christ cut off at his circumcision, and his very countenance impressed by him upon a white cloth,⁶ for one would think these as hard to come by; however, in diverse places they worship something at a venture which they count so.

It is no sin to worship the imaginary blood which flows from a crucifix or image of Christ, when it is wounded, for they, being given up to believe the most ridiculous lies, do believe that such blood hath issued from a mere picture or image, they keep it as a most sacred relic,⁸ and it is to be worshipped with the same worship they give to Christ himself.

It is no sin to give divine worship to any man, not only the saints in heaven or holy persons on earth, but any men whatever in the world (the wickedest not excepted), may, together with God, have divine worship, as the image has with the exemplar, since every man is the living image of God. This is not only the doctrine of Vasquez, but of Alensis, of Waldensis, and of Cardinal Cajetan, only in the practice of this there must be caution; for Albertus Magnus and Aquinas say there is danger lest a man being of more excellency than an image, divine worship should be given him, not for God’s sake but his own dignity, but where this danger is not, they would not deny but any man may be so worshipped, even with divine worship; so that if Paul and Barnabas, with the Lycaonians,²Acts 14:1-28, had but proceeded with the caution of these doctors, and taken care that those people should so worship them only for God’s sake, they might lawfully have admitted the worship offered them, though they (not learned in this kind of doctrine) chose rather to be stoned than so honoured.

It is lawful to worship not only rational creatures, but anything else in the whole world, whether living or lifeless. Any beast or creeping thing may be worshipped as the image of God, which they hold is to be honoured with divine worship; so that not only the planets, stars, the queen, and the host of heaven may be thus adored (for which the Lord condemns Israel and Judah as idolaters), but the vilest creature that lives on earth, a fly, or a frog, or a serpent, or a toad may be thus worshipped; yea, meaner creatures than any that have life, any inanimate thing whatsoever, though it be but a wisp of straw. That is our author’s own instance: whereas, says he, the Wickliffites object that Christians who worship images may as well worship a wisp of straw (modulum straminis). The same Leontius (upon whose authority he grounds all) would as freely grant this of a bit of straw, as he does it of everything else in the world, so far is it from being counted absurd; yea, they may worship not only vile, but sordid things; and not only God, but angels and saints in them, quævis alia res mundi; anything whatever in the world, whether lifeless, unreasonable, or rational, may rightly have divine worship with God. And this is not only the judgment of their famous Vasquez, but of Cardinal Cajetan, and in consequence, of them all; for those great wits well discerned that the adoration of other things, approved and practised by the Romanists, could never be defended, without extending their principles to such a latitude. Thus it is manifest that whatsoever the apostate Israelites adored, or the Egyptians worshipped, or the Laplanders do worship, or the grossest and the most ridiculous idolaters in the world, ever made an idol, all that, with much more and worse, may lawfully be worshipped by popish principles; there never was any idolatry so absurd or horrid in the world but may have patronage or excuse by this doctrine. And now heaven and earth being furnished with their idols, one would think they need go no further, but be satisfied, without seeking hell for any, yet there is an inquiry which reaches that too. It is a question amongst them, if the devil should appear in a beam of light, or the form of a crucifix, whether that apparition may be worshipped? Antisidorensis, Alexander, Aquinas, Marsilius, Adrian, and others, will not allow it should be worshipped, unless conditionally, and with a condition expressed; but Vasques is for adoration hereof absolutely, no condition expressed;² and he has those who are otherwise minded at a great advantage, because they conclude for worship absolutely in a parallel case; for they will have a consecrated host to be worshipped without condition, though the devil were in it, or lurked under it; and if they think he would be worshipped in the former without the interposal of a condition, he will be worshipped in the latter, where they will have no condition to exclude it. I conclude this with what Holcott determines: a man may merit by a mistaken belief, although it so fall out that he worship the devil.

These decisions were necessary to justify their devout persons who have met with such adventures. A great part of popery is grounded upon visions and apparitions. These were much affected and admired by their reputed holy men, and women too, who were admired and adored for them. Satan, in the darkness (wherein this mystery did best thrive), had the advantage to put store of cheats upon them. Many monks and hermits (says à Lapide) were deceived by him. Particularly, among the rest, Valens the monk was thus deluded, the devil frequently appearing to him as an angel. In fine, Satan in an apparition feigned himself to be Christ, and the monk went, and for Christ worshipped the devil (Idem in 2 Corinthians 11:15). They are concerned to plead for that worship, which had the same original with much of their religion.

Sect. 4. For oaths or perjury, I will only instance in those which are fraudulent. First, they determine that he who takes an oath, and intends not to swear, the oath binds not, it is no sin to go against it.

Secondly, when a man intends to swear, but intends not to be obliged by swearing, there he is not obliged, but may lawfully break it, as the ancienter casuists and school-doctors generally determine.

There is real evidence for the practice of this from the conclave; for, as their excellent historian tells us, in the vacancies of the see, the cardinals use to compose certain capitulations to reform the papal government, which all swear to perform if they be assumed to the popedom, though it appear by all precedent examples that every one sweareth with a mind not to keep them in case he shall be pope; for so soon as he is elected, he saith, he could not bind himself, and that he is at liberty by gaining the papacy. This was remarkably exemplified in Paul IV., who, resolving to break one of the capitulations he was sworn to a little before, and some of the cardinals being ready to put him in mind of his oath, he declared in consistory, that it is an article of faith that the pope cannot be bound, and much less can bind himself, that to say otherwise was a manifest heresy,³ and threatened the inquisition to any that hold it. It seems it is damnable error, deserving something like a hell upon earth, to believe that his holiness intends to be honest whatever he swear. It is true, every one has not the privilege of a pope to have it counted heresy for any to believe that he can be bound to keep any oaths, or ever to intend it; but all have this liberty by their doctrine, that they may take oaths without any intention to keep them, and are not bound to keep them if they do not intend it.

Thirdly, to elude an oath, and deceive those who give it, or are concerned in it, by equivocation, or other artifice of words, yea, or by mental reservation, is no sin, and that in many cases. As when a man has no mind to swear, and thinks he is not bound to do it; when he is drawn to it by force, or induced by fear, or brought to it by importunity; or when the judge is incompetent (as they count all that are heretics or excommunicate, and that have not lawful jurisdiction), or if the judges are competent, yet when they proceed not juridically.⁵ In these and other cases, either for avoiding harm or inconvenience, or when it may be for their advantage in any respect, they think it lawful to use these methods of deceit in swearing. Indeed, the reason they give to justify the practice in these cases, will make it as lawful in any other; for they say what is so sworn is true in their own sense, though not in the sense of the hearers, and so they will have it in strictness to be neither lie nor perjury, nor any mortal sin, even when there is no honest nor reasonable occasion for swearing or promising in this fraudulent manner. And that you may perceive the Jesuits are not the prime masters of these arts, I shall instance in other authors who were either before them, or not addicted to the Society. For equivocations, or other sleight of words in swearing, they are justified by multitudes of their writers, viz., Sairus after Aquinas, and their Gloss, Paludanus, Gabriel, Johannes Major, Adrian, Hen. Gandavensis, Angelus, Sylvester, Soto, &c. The instances which Soto gives may serve for a test; as for example, when one instead of saying I swear, uses a word which signifies another thing, but so pronounces it as the difference is not discerned; or if the word God in the language wherein the oath is taken may signify some other thing, he that swears may mean something else by it, when he that gives the oath understands the God of heaven; or if the oath be formed in this order, I swear to you to pay so much money, he that swears may mean not to pay him but some other, when he to whom the oath is made, understands it intended for himself. Such an oath, says Soto, is true, just, prudent, because then simulation is profitable,⁵ having said before that it is lawful, with such fraud to deceive one who forces him to swear, since he who puts him to swear hath no right to do it; and these fore-mentioned are the very same instances which Sanchez uses⁷, by which we see the Jesuit was not the inventor hereof, but learned them of a Dominican. Of mental reservations, justified by their chief authors, who were no Jesuits, instances might be given in abundance; for example, if a man will have his wife swear that she is not an adulteress, though she be guilty, she may deny it with an oath, and swear what is false in his sense, if it be true in her own, by the addition of some secret reserve. If a man swear to give another a hundred crowns with this inward reserve, If he owe it him, he sins not, though he swears false in the sense of him who is to have the money. A woman who, because of some secret impediment, will not live with her husband, and is excommunicated for it, she at the point of death, that she may be absolved, being put to swear, that if she recover, she will live with him, may swear it absolutely in show, with this conditional reserve, If she may do it without sin; yet if she do it not, she is not forsworn; so Sylvester and Navarre, according to the determination of Aquinas and Jo. Major. He that in the time of pestilence comes to a town where the officers, before they admit him, will have him swear that he came from no infected place, though it be not true he may swear it, if he think himself have got no infection.⁴ If you have not a mind, or are not bound to give or lend anything in your possession which another desires, you may lawfully swear that you have it not, with this inward reserve, that you have it not, to give or lend. If a man threaten to kill a confessor, if he will not tell him, whether his wife hath confessed her adultery to him, though she have confessed it to him, yet the priest may absolutely say and swear that she has not, with this reserve, So that he should be bound to tell it. He that is examined upon oath concerning crimes that he knows, and swears to declare all he knows, may, concerning some that are not known to others, though they be to him, swear without perjury that he knows them not, with this secret reserve, he knows not to discover them.

If one promise to another, or contract with a woman outwardly, without an intention of promising, and is demanded of a judge upon oath whether he promised or contracted, he may plainly deny it, because he may have this sense, I promised not with a promise obliging me; and he has just cause so to answer, because since he cannot otherwise prove his want of intention, he will be condemned to pay what he owes not, or to cohabit with her whom he truly contracted not. A witness, either when he is not interrogated juridically, or when he has good occasion not to bear witness in judgment, as if he fear great damage to himself thereby, may answer, that he knows not, or saw it not, or the like, with a mental reservation;³ he that out of necessity, or for any profit, offers himself to swear of his own accord, may therein use such fallacy. He that hath good occasion to hide his goods, lest they should be seized by his creditors, being for his livelihood, and to keep him from beggary, may swear that he has not hid any, understanding not any that he could not hide, or any that he is bound to discover. The same may the witnesses swear for him (viz., that he hid none), knowing that he hid them lawfully; such fallacious oaths may be used also in contracts and bargaining. Those who cannot otherwise get a just price of the buyer, may swear in a sense that he perceives not, that the commodity cost them so much.⁶

Here are a few instances, but they have rules (some of them are premised) which license it in cases innumerable, so that it may be a common practice, and they may use it upon any occasion which they think reasonable.

These things considered, with others authorised among them, I cannot devise what course can be taken to bind those who follow their doctrine, or to get from them the least security by an oath. They have declared that if you put an oath upon them which they think ought not to be imposed, they may lawfully deceive you if they can, and put a cheat upon you even in a solemn oath. Contrive then what oath you will for your security, they will take it so far as you can judge, as much as any man in the world takes an oath; yet if they did not intend to swear (which none can tell but themselves) by taking this oath, they have not sworn, they are not obliged. Or if they had a mind to swear as well as to make you think so, yet if they did not intend to oblige themselves thereby, their conscience by their principles is free, the oath does not touch them; or if they have a mind to be obliged by that oath, yet need they not bind themselves to that it was designed for, but to quite another thing, for they may swear in a sense vastly distant from what you intend or imagine; and thus they are taught to do, and it is practicable, either by the sly and undiscerned change of one letter in a word, as they may pronounce it, which will turn the sense as far from yours, as burning is from swearing, which is plain in a former instance. Or else by the ambiguousness of some word in the oath, affording another sense than you are aware of, they may fix upon that and leave yours to yourself, and so bind themselves to nothing you are concerned for, when you think you have them fast bound to all; or if such care be taken that in the oath there he no ambiguous terms which may give them the advantage to delude you by a sense foreign to your intendment; yet, do what you can, they may put such a sense upon it by a mental restriction; for thereby adding something reserved in their mind, to what is expressed in the oath, the sense is quite changed, and the thing they swear is nothing at all of what you would have sworn.

Yea, or if they swear that they will observe the contents of your oath, according to the plain and natural meaning of the words, without any equivocating or mental restriction; yet at the same time they may mean, without any mental restriction that they will tell you of, and so delude you with a mental reservation when they are swearing against it. Nor is this an imaginary supposition of a thing that they never practised; for thus their priests and others have taken the oath of allegiance, and by this art eluded it; and so they are instructed, and may do still, and defeat any oath that can be devised. Yea, by their doctrine they may do it lawfully, and without sin; for in all this juggling they teach that they do not swear false, but by the artifice specified, it is true in their own sense, though not in theirs who give the oath. Indeed this is a cheat (where God is called to witness), nor do they deny it. But they say such deceit is lawful, as in many other cases, so always when the judge is incompetent. And that is our case in England; we have none from the throne to the lowest bench that, in their account, have any jurisdiction;² we have none that have power to put an oath on them; they may choose whether they will swear or no, or whether they will cheat them all in swearing. No oath which can be given them can oblige them, but in their own sense, how distant soever from the true sense of the oath or of the imposer of it. This our Roman Catholics were assured of long since, by instructions sent them from Rome in Queen Elizabeth’s time. So that they need make no conscience (if they will follow the best guides of their consciences) to practise all their contrivance upon us in oaths (much more in promises, contracts, &c.), even such as the light of nature has ever condemned in the world, as not only impious in point of religion, but destructive to human society, and those which tend to subvert the main grounds and foundations of it. We can never oblige them by oath at any time but when they please, nor any further than they list. We can never tell when they swear, though they take oaths, nor when they are obliged, though they swear. We cannot possibly know when we may be sure of them; when we think them fast, by all the rules that men of conscience and common honesty proceed by, yet they can juggle themselves loose by the Roman rules at pleasure, and make sport with God and man, even in oaths where God himself is a witness, and the greatest of men concerned as parties.

Sect. 5. There needs no other demonstration of the irreligion of the Roman church, and its utter regardlessness of God and the souls of men, than their doctrine concerning the observance of the Lord’s day, and all other which they pretend to be set apart for holy employment. If any man would understand what religion is left among them, he may see it there in short, and needs look no further, since there he may be satisfied that they have no design for the honour of God or the salvation of souls. For when they have discharged the people from all duties of religion at any other determinate times, and reserved all which they make necessary for them to holy days; yet even on these days, by their doctrine, nothing is made their duty to which any regard of God or of their souls is needful. All that they are obliged to is only to be present at mass,² no other act or duty of religion or worship is necessary; no internal act at all, nor any external,⁴ either public or private, but only the mass. And that may be so external that neither God nor any divine thing need to be minded in it. For this I have produced evidence enough already, let me only add this; they are wont to speak of a three-fold attending at mass (as before was shewed at their divine service). One, to what is said and done by the priest, as sacred; a second, to the meaning of what is said or done; and the third, to God and divine things. Now the first of these, they say, is enough, though it be the worst of all; therefore the second (to regard the meaning of what is said or done); and the third (to mind God or divine things) is more than needs. So that plainly all that is required of a papist, by their doctrine, in order to the honour of God and the salvation of his soul, on any of those days when these ought to be most minded, is only being present at mass, without understanding what is said or done, and without minding God or anything divine. Such is their worship of God and care of souls in the church of Rome; this is the sum of their religion, when it appears set forth to greatest advantage, in its solemn exercises; he that understands it, and can be in love with it, must be under the power of some other consideration than that of God and his soul.

Having seen how these days are sanctified, or profaned rather, by their worship, we might view what observance they have in reference to servile works. And here they have little but what may be done without sin; and indeed, as they order the matter, it may seem less sin to follow the works of their callings than to forbear them, since their abstinence from them is not that they may better attend the worship of God (for they think it not needful to worship him, unless he can be said to be worshipped when he is not heeded), but that they may be idle, or worse employed than in their daily business. However, whether it be to indulge their ease, or serve their lusts, or to make show of some rest (though far enough from a holy rest), they will have some works forborne; but herein they will be regulated by custom, not the divine law. Paludanus and others will have them excused who use manual labours on these days, if they omit not the mass.² And Sylvester says, this is reasonable, because custom, the interpreter of laws, will have it so. This may so far regulate them, that every province and city must observe those days, and those alone, in that manner, and so far only as custom requires. Yea, it must so far prevail, that if it were the custom to observe these days no longer than till noon, or only till mass were ended (which may be dispatched in half an hour, and that before sunrise), the rest may be spent in servile works.⁴ They account it worse to spend these days in servile labour than profane divertisements; for this, with them, is only a venial fault, or none, but that may be a mortal sin; yet they declare there is no sin in the worst but what custom makes (they are like to make conscience of it, when their own wills and practices are their rule). This, as many other, by their doctrine, which makes void the commands of God at pleasure, is but a sin at discretion; they may make it none when they please, and render all days alike, as easily as they can bring up a custom, such a one to which nature is forward.⁶ But no wonder they think not these sacred days violated by working, since they teach they are not profaned by any acts of wickedness. Their divines generally agree herein. Contrition for sins, and the avoiding of other sins, is not enjoined, says Cajetan.² The day is not profaned by fornication, says Soto; nor by lying, murder, or blaspheming, says Bellarmine;⁴ nor by any wickedness whatsoever is holy time profaned, but only by those opposite thereto, viz. not hearing mass, and bodily labours. So that the days may be sanctified well enough, according to the holiness of that church, if after an irreligious presence at mass for half an hour (the precept for which may be satisfied without minding God or abstaining from wickedness while they are at it), the rest thereof be spent in beastly drunkenness or gluttony, in perjuries, blasphemies, or cursing God or man, in murders, whoring, sodomy, or bestiality, or the most enormous debauches. And though they are not bound, as they teach, to be at the pains of one good act of mind or heart in serving God at the only time set apart for his service, Scotus is almost worried by the herd of their divines for seeming to think that a good act of mind towards God was enjoined on these days; yet they may spend their bodies, and toil themselves more in the service of their lusts, without profaning them, than in servile works. The reason why they hold that no excess of wickedness does profane these days, is because wicked acts are not servile works.⁶ It seems slavery to Satan, and the service of the vilest lusts, is not servile; whatsoever Christ or the apostle thought thereof, John 8:34, Romans 6:16, that is consistent enough with the liberty and honour of such Christians as they are. However, hereby it is manifest that their religious observation of all holy times (and so all the religiousness which that church requires of her catholics) is consistent with the lewdest acts of ungodliness and debauchery. In fine, God can have no honour from men, nor they salvation from him, without religion; this cannot be kept up in the world without the solemn exercises of it; these cannot (or will not) be performed without time for that end; therefore hath the Lord appointed time to be set apart for these purposes; the church of Rome hath reduced all religious exercises, at the times appointed by God or themselves, to the people’s hearing of mass, and there will not have the precept oblige them to any real religiousness, not so much as to a thought of God or any thing divine, yea, or the forbearance of wicked thoughts and acts while they are at mass. Thus far is religion (upon which the interest of God and man so much depends) sunk among them. And it must of necessity sink (all but the shadow or froth) in any part of the world where these principles prevail. But though they declare them not obliged to serve God any better at this, or at any other time, yet they maintain for them as much liberty to serve the devil and their lusts on these holy times as any other. Let all concerned judge of the Roman religion and holiness hereby; if there were nothing else by which the measures thereof could be taken, this would suffice.

Sect. 6. In the next place, in reference to heretics, to go no further (for that is far enough, since in their charity the far greatest part of Christians are no better), all relatives are discharged of their respective duties enjoined them by the laws of God or man. Their decretals (the law of their church, which presumes to over-rule all other law, natural, divine, or civil) deprives heretics immediately of all due fidelity, right, duty, observance, which any whosoever do owe them. They lose all which they have by civil right.² Subjects owe no allegiance or duty at all to princes or magistrates. Children owe no duty to their parents;⁴ they have (by their law) no power over them, and this from the first day of their heresy. Wives owe not conjugal duty to their husbands; and if they knew they were not papists when contracted, they lose their dowry.⁶ Servants are freed from all fidelity to, and observance of, their masters. Yea, debtors are freed from paying what they owe to heretics, though bound thereunto either by penalty or oath.⁸ They hereby oblige their followers to make nothing of such duties, without the observance of which mankind would become worse than brutes. But this may seem a smaller matter to them; they go higher, and allow any one to kill a heretic, as though murder were no sin; they may be killed with impunity, says De Graffiis, and proves it out of their church laws. Pope Urban II. declared that they are not guilty of murder who kill any that are excommunicate.¹⁰ Now all heretics are excommunicate by the Council of Lateran, under Innocent III.; and the sentence which lies dormant there is roused once a year; the pope in person denouncing it in a solemn manner, and very gravely, with a peacock-tail on either side his head. We in England particularly are under excommunication to this day, and Cardinal Barbarin thought fit, not long since, to give special notice of it in a letter to some of the Irish. They forget not how obnoxious we are; and we may remember how much we are obliged by them, that any of us are suffered to live, when they may kill us without murder.

Sect. 7. But we may the better bear with them in this, because they seem not very tender of killing one another. A man is not to be punished who kills his wife, taken in adultery, and the adulterer together with her. He may kill his own daughter in like case, or his sister, yea, or his own mother, if his father give order for it; and he may do it as safely though these his female relatives be quick with child. For the child in the womb (say they) being the same morally with the mother, he that may kill the mother may kill the child too. Thus a private person may be judge in his own cause, and proceed to mortal execution without trial, and sacrifice the guilty and innocent both at once, to his own or another’s passion, and destroy together the body and soul of his nearest relations, and all this with impunity. They deliver it for certain, that a mother in danger may lawfully use a medicine which tends directly to her cure, though it be probable that it will make her miscarry. And because she may take such a course to secure her life or recover her health, they conclude it lawful to do this to preserve her state or reputation.² So that, if a maid or married woman have prostituted herself to another’s lust, she may procure abortion, when otherwise the crime might be discovered, and her life or credit in hazard. Thus neither families, nor parishes, nor monasteries need be pestered with natural children, how many soever be got; the shame of their birth, and the pain too, may be prevented, and the trouble and expense of their education avoided, by a receipt approved by the Roman doctors, if it be but taken in time. As for the censures of their church in this case, or worse, there is no fear, for even a nun got with child may procure abortion, and not be excommunicate⁴ (so much more favourable is new Rome to her vestals than the old was, though their crimes be doubled); any who are so disposed, have encouragement enough to venture upon both. For as to the murder, they are secured from the laws of God by this doctrine, which makes it no sin; from the laws of the church by her natural indulgence; and may be from those of the state, by their own private conduct. And as to the whoredom, they may be quitted upon as easy terms as they would wish. For the priest, if he get the child, is empowered to absolve the mother, and he need not be so strict as to enjoin for penance the avoiding of the sin; yet for all this, they seem so tender (which may amuse us) of unborn infants in other cases, that they will have it lawful to cut up the mother quick, and she obliged to suffer, yea procure it, that the child in her womb may not perish unbaptized. Thus their doctrine will have them more regard the reputation of a whore than the life of an honest woman; yea the child may perish without regard of its wanting baptism, when the credit of a strumpet is concerned; but a chaste woman must be killed in the other case, that the infant in her womb may have it. Yet one would think the issue of whoredom in as much danger for want of baptism as the fruit of lawful matrimony.

They teach further, that a man may kill another, either to secure his own person, or his goods, or his reputation. In defence of his person, they hold it lawful to slay any one; a servant may kill his master assaulting him unjustly, or a monk his abbot, or a subject his prince, or a child his own father. This is their common doctrine, and thereby there is warranty for it, not only to secure one’s life, but to avoid a wound or a blow.³ Any one may do this at any time, even a priest while he is celebrating, may kill one that invades him, and when he has shed his blood, may go on with his other sacrifice, which will be unbloody notwithstanding. If he that assails him be frantic, or in drink, yea, or asleep,⁵ and has no sense that he offers any wrong, he may innocently kill him for all that, whoever he be, if he cannot otherwise avoid the injury; yea, though the aggressor have had the highest provocations, by intolerable reproaches, or the loss of his estate, or the defiling of his bed; yet in this case, he that has given the occasion, and done the wrong, may kill the sufferer; the thief may lawfully slay him whom he has robbed, and the adulterer may kill the husband after he has abused the wife, or deflowered his sister, or buggared his child. He may not only kill the aggressor, but an innocent person also, to escape himself.⁷ As if he cannot be secured from Peter, without killing Paul, he may be the death, of them both; or state it thus (and they cannot stick at it), if he cannot escape his father without killing his mother, he may slay both father and mother at once. Thus they may deprive any of life, not only when they are actually assaulted, but before any blow is given. When a man perceives one coming towards him with his weapon ready, and fears he is not able to deal with him, he may shoot him dead at a distance. Nor need he be hindered by the consideration that killing him in such circumstances (since he is in mortal sin), will be the destruction both of body and soul together. Soto objects this to himself, but abates nothing of his conclusion notwithstanding. Yea, he answers, that to hold it not lawful to kill in this case (with the destruction of the slain man’s soul too), is both to pervert the law of nature, and to render the sweet and easy yoke of Christ intolerable. They give further instances wherein they will have it no sin to kill a person that has not yet touched them; it is sufficient, in their account, if they know that he is prepared for it, yea, or does but design it. In case one be shut up in a house or a city, so that he cannot get out, and knows there is one in the town that designs upon his life, and waits but an opportunity to execute it, he may prevent the designer, and fall upon him unawares, and kill him.² They declare it lawful for a man to kill his wife taken in adultery; but then they allow the adulteress to be beforehand with her husband, and kill him first if she can: she may despatch him with the poison prepared for her, or stab him with the weapon he has ready, and so secure her adultery by murder, and yet be innocent.

They maintain it is lawful to kill others to secure their goods; so it is no sin with them to take away the life of him that would take away part of their goods by night or day; yea, if he that steals makes no resistance or defence, but flies, he may be pursued and slain, to recover what he has taken. And although the goods may be recovered otherwise, and in a legal way, yet if it be not certain that he may get them with the greatest ease, but doubtful that it may give him some trouble, he may use his liberty, and send him to hell to save himself a little trouble.⁵ But of what value must the goods be (that we may discern at what rate they set the life and soul of a man)? It must not (says Soto) be a vile thing; it should not be so little worth as two or three ducats. So that it seems, if what is stolen be of the value of about twenty shillings, a man may be killed for it, and his body and soul destroyed together; and since a crown or a shilling may be more to some than twenty to others, those who follow him might well infer from hence, that a man’s life might be taken away for a crown or less; yea for an apple, since to some persons, that may be of more value than the sums mentioned. Accordingly, they conclude expressly, that he who takes a thing, the owner or keeper of it seeing, and offering to hinder him, may be lawfully slain for it, though it be but of the value of one crown or less either,⁷ because thereby he offers an affront. That is another ground of their lawful murder. A man, they avow, may kill others for his honour or reputation; for though it be so slight a thing, that it will be scarce a fault in a man to throw it away himself (as we heard before), yet they will have him maintain it at the expense of the blood and life of others, and his own too. For example, if he sees one approach to assault him, though he might avoid the danger by retiring, yet he may kill him rather than so avoid it;⁹ because it would be a disparagement to him to fly, and so rather than suffer the least, in the repute of the injudicious rabble, he may be the death of any person, and be a man of blood, that he may be the master of such honour, as a truly generous spirit must despise. They advance further yet: if one should offer to give a person a blow with a cudgel, or a light switch; he that is offered such an affront may lawfully kill him for it, especially in Spain, where this is counted a great injury, says Soto. And elsewhere, a box on the ear may be resented as such an injury. Accordingly, others determine that he who gives it may lawfully be slain for it, yea, or he that does but offer it.² If he be any person of any moment that is thus attempted, he need not stay till he feel it, but may prevent it by killing him that offers it, if there be no other honourable way to avoid it. He need not fly to avoid it, if that would be a disgrace, for he is not obliged to suffer such an inconvenience, though by retiring he might save both his own life and the aggressor’s, says Bonacina after others. In this manner, when one smites them on the cheek, do they turn the other; and thus do they comply exactly with Christ’s advice, by stabbing him to the heart, who smites their cheek, or does but offer at it! The same they determine of ill language; that is with them a sufficient ground to kill men. In the judgment of all, says Navarre, it is lawful to kill him that gives reproachful words, when there is no other way to avoid the injury, and the words being once past, there is no preventing them. Thus, killing men may be as common as provoking language, when such language, by their doctrine, may be as common as any they speak. They teach that it is but a venial fault, ten thousand of which he may commit every day or every hour without endangering his soul, to give one the lie, to call him a fool, a bastard, &c.⁴ And then they declare it lawful to slay men for such words, as if it were their design to have it thought tolerable for men to do nothing else but kill one another; and shedding man’s blood were no more to be avoided than such faults as they encourage the continual practice of. They proceed further yet, and conclude it lawful to kill one, not only for contumelious words, but for mere signs of such import, when an ill word is not spoken, suppose such motion of the tongue, or lips, or nose, or fingers, as are accounted an affront. This is after the Roman mode to imitate Christ, and comply with the apostles’ rule in laying down their lives for their brethren, when they take away their lives for a foul word or an untoward gesture. But what if one who gives such a blow, or such language, or the like affront, should run for it when he has done, is it lawful to pursue him to force satisfaction from him, though it be by the loss of his life? Yes, say they, the person affronted may pursue him, and strike him till he have reparation of his honour, though it be by killing him.⁶

They speak favourably of duels. Cajetan says, princes may permit them lawfully among their subjects, as the stews are permitted upon reasonable considerations; so that it seems they may farm out this liberty, as the pope does the other. Bannes determines that an innocent person may either accept or offer combat, not only to secure his life or estate, but his reputation, when he cannot otherwise do it. Such a person, when one goes about to accuse him falsely before a judge, and he is like thereby to be defamed, may challenge him and kill him lawfully. This he reports as Cajetan’s opinion, and counts it more than probable. But there is no need of duels in the case; they discover a way to despatch men more effectually with less notice and less hazard to the murderers, allowing them to kill any privily to secure their repute. The same Dominican, in the case mentioned, concludes, that if the accuser, being admonished, will not desist, the aggrieved person, in defence of his concerns, may kill him.² Not only judicial accusations, but more private aspersions, are counted a sufficient ground to kill men. He who, by whispers and detraction, endeavours to wrong and bespot another, if the infamy and disgrace cannot otherwise be avoided, it will be lawful to slay him. So Pet. Navarre, who gives reasons why he thinks it more advisable to kill a defamer privily than in a duel; nor need he stay till he be actually aspersed, but when one threatens, or signfies he will do it, he may lawfully prevent it by killing him. Forty-nine doctors are produced in favour of this. Prado, an eminent Dominican, says it is the common doctrine of Aquinas his followers.⁴

These are some of the maxims which serve so much to furnish those who design upon men’s lives with lawful occasion to murder, and tend so plainly to fill all places with blood and slaughters, without leaving any man security of his life, that even some Jesuits, though they deny not that they may be probable in speculation, yet seem shy to allow their common practice. But this is rejected by others, and so the Jesuits’ cautiousness and moderation counted unreasonable, seeing that in matters of morality, what is speculatively probable, i. e. safe and lawful, in point of conscience, must, as such, be admitted in practice. Indeed, though there be no charge more odious upon the Society than their doctrine of murder, yet, so far as I can discern, they are outdone here by others, both in numbers and extravagancy. However, the maxims, to diminish the horror of which the Jesuits seem solicitous, are now the common doctrine in that church; the divinity of her schools and doctors generally being advanced to such a pitch as to bid defiance to common humanity. And if the civil laws did give as much liberty to murder as their rules for conscience do, desolation would soon be brought upon the face of the earth.

Sect. 8. For uncleanness, they are very favourable to it, they seem to condemn the consummation of the act, but scarce anything else, and not that neither in every kind. They give up the outworks which should secure them from this sin; they admit its approaches, they encourage sinners to venture upon the occasions, even such as have very often ensnared them in this wickedness. Any confitent, they teach, ought to be absolved, though he do not purpose to avoid any occasions which lead to it, unless they be such as he does or ought to believe, he can seldom or never use without perpretrating the deadly act. So that, though he very frequently fall thereby into uncleanness, yet unless he believe they will, quasi semper, in a manner always overthrow him, he may make bold with them. To go into place or company, where the sight of any, their persuasions or opportunities, expose him to the danger of sinning, though he do it without necessity, is of itself no great fault, says Cajetan;³ and if he find, that he can for some time withstand the temptation, and do not in a manner presently fall, statim aut quasi statim, though he find himself weak, yet he may venture on them without any necessary occasion, as the cardinal leaves us to conclude from what he there adds. A confessor does well who absolves those who will not express any purpose to avoid converse with such women, by which he hath very often sinned every way, both by desire, words, shameful touches, yea, and the very act of uncleanness; because this is such an occasion as is not deadly in itself, nor does make them, fere semper, commit deadly sin. Those women or servants who have committed lewdness with their masters or others in the house, yea, though they be their kinsmen, may be absolved, though they still live together, if they cannot leave them without great inconvenience or damage;⁵ provided if they be truly sorry for what is past, and intend to sin no more, and think they shall not; yea, though after this they fall many times into the same wickedness,⁷ of fornication, adultery, or incest, and do not avoid the occasion, yet still they may be absolved. And this liberty is not restrained to houses where they live together, he extends it to other houses also. He that hath secretly committed filthiness diverse ways, with a friend or a kinswoman in another house, may be absolved, though he do not intend to forsake that house.⁹ Or if the occasions he meets with in private houses do not satisfy him, he may venture into the common stews, but then it ought to be with a good intent. A man may go to a common whore, with confidence that he may convert her, though there be danger, and it is probable that he will commit filthiness with her. And so any, their religious brothers or fathers not excepted, may seek the conversation of common whores, though they see imminent danger that they shall make no better use of the strumpets than those who come to them with the worst design.

They are as indulgent to unclean thoughts, as to lewd and ensnaring company. To entertain filthy thoughts, to delight in those thoughts, and to consent to that delight,³ is either no sin, or but venial; says Sylvester and others. They distinguish betwixt the unclean act and the thought of it. Cajetan, though he would not have the act to be the object of delight, yet he allows any to take pleasure, not only in the thought, but in the special manner of the act. If a man do not observe what he is delighting in, while he is pleasing himself with such thoughts; yea, if he do not fully consider it, though he entertain himself with this mental pleasure a whole day together, it will not be sinful delight.⁵ Lust, with a perfect inadvertency, will not be mortal; when the delight of it so invades the mind, says Lopez,⁷ nor needs he resist such delight, or repel these thoughts, if he believe they will not engage him further, or if he thinks that by resistance they will grow upon him; or if it would hinder him from some necessary, or profitable, or honest employment, such as the study or reading of filthy things, which provoke such delight, is in their account.⁹ They are no more rigorous as to obscene words, filthy songs, lascivious writings and discourses. They sin not, says Navarre, whether they be men or women, who see, or read, or hear, or speak any filthy things, men to women, or women to men, such as provoke to uncleanness, if it be upon an honest occasion; now, it must needs be an honest occasion when this is done, while they are at church for divine service; and there they have used it. Church music is now so licentious, says one, that filthy ditties are sung to the organ, and keep time even with the canon of the mass, the most sacred part of that which they count most sacred; and Cajetan informs us, that in their church this is the practice everywhere, to sing to the organ amorous and filthy songs;² and that such cleanly stuff is in the person of the church offered to God, instead of responsals and divine praises, and that experience witnesses that the hearers are thereby excited to profane and filthy things.⁴ He allows not this indeed, but in some, and with limitation, laying the blame of the rest upon the pastors of their church, who seek not, as he says, the things of Christ; and would have us believe the church approves it not, when yet he allows it to be the common practice everywhere.⁶ It seems, she does but tolerate filthiness in the church, as she does in the stews, that she may be holy uniformly everywhere. However, if any one should, out of simplicity, think it lawful to mix profane and filthy songs with divine worship for recreation sake, because he sees that this custom hath commonly prevailed, Navarre would excuse him from mortal sin, as Lopez tells us. And so will Lopez excuse him too, provided the songs mixed with divine service be not too grossly filthy, and excessively lascivious. And so he may well excuse those who sing obscene or lascivious songs in the church, but not in divine service, as he seems to do those who sing to one another filthy rhymes on the evening of the nativity, when they are asking benedictions. It seems that is the usual way to get their church blessings; but the custom of that church needs no timorous advocate; this can plead for itself, and is wont to stand as good as any law whatever, that of God not excepted.¹⁰ Their sacrament of penance also is an honest occasion; and there in confessions, as one of their bishops informs us, the priests inquire after such obscene and shameful things (instilling thereby into their ears unheard of filthiness and lasciviousness) as cannot without the blushing of the confitents of either sex, and without provoking the wanton appetite of the confessor, be well expressed in any words.

Further, they allow persons to entertain themselves with pleasure conditionally, upon supposal that they were married together, if the act be not respected as present. They grant liberty to make use of such things as provoke lust. He may be absolved who, by eating of hot meats, hath fallen into grievous temptations of the flesh, and has been drawn to consent to pollution or fornication, though he hath no purpose to avoid such provoking meats, this being done with the provisoes before mentioned.² They are no more severe against immodest touches or shameful sights. To suffer touches from one who is thought to do it out of honest love or custom, is no great fault; but if it proceed from lust, in order to the act of uncleanness or impure delights, she sins if she avoids them not; and this holds if she can avoid them without scandal (say they) which signifies they account it no sin to yield to this impure treatment, since none are obliged to give way to sin for the avoiding of scandal. He that by ensnaring sights, viewing another’s nakedness, &c., hath been often drawn to sin, may be absolved, though he do not propose to avoid such temptations, with the forementioned cautions.⁴

Men and women viewing one another’s nakedness (pudenda vel partes vicinas) may be excused, if it be but for curiosity, and a short time, without danger of great commotion. The beholding of filthy sights, for natural or sensual pleasure, when there is no danger of passing into unclean thoughts (id est, passing through the mire when there is no danger of being dirtied), is no crime. Those who, upon pretence of spiritual mortification, make women strip themselves naked, to discipline them, sin mortally, if lust were the principal cause of it, says Sylvester,⁷ leaving us to think, that if lust be but a less principal motive to do it, it is but a small fault or none. In fine, they account it no crime to offer no hearty opposition unto temptation. He (says De Graffiis) who coldly resists temptation, so that it returns upon him, and invades his soul a second and a third time, because he resists so coldly, sins not mortally, if there be no danger of consenting; as if there could be no danger to consent when there is little or no mind to resist.

They teach that a man, suspecting his wife is an adulteress, may with a good intent offer her the occasion to commit adultery without sin. Also that a servant is excused (when declining it would be a great inconvenience) if he accompany his master when he goes a-whoring; because here is a just occasion, and the action is of itself honest. And a maid too, if she go along with a whore to the house of her lover, to act filthiness with him, or opens the door for him on such occasion. And so is a servant likewise to be excused, when he is sent to bring a whore to his master’s lodging, or carries presents, or an epistle, or a message, or writes letters, when the contents are to have a whore come to him, at such a time; or any such (with them) indifferent thing, unless there be an express desire of the filthy act.²

Such encouragement they give to use the preparatives, and play with the incentives, and dally with the temptations to lust and actual uncleanness. For the act itself, how little they make of self-pollution we have seen before, they conclude that single pollution (though a sin against nature) is of itself no sin at all, and so they may desire it beforehand,⁴ or delight in it when it is past, for an honest end, and use the incentives, if it be but for gluttony. Moreover, whoredom itself has excessive favour and encouragement from this holy church. This is too plain by their authors, and their practice, to be denied; and too heinous to be excused by any but those who have a mind to have mortal sins to pass for small, or no faults. It seems it is no sin to build stews for the entertainment of common whores, and the best accommodation of them for their trade of uncleanness. Pope Sixtus did it, as Cornelius Agrippa tells us,⁶ and they were so multiplied long since, that as one of their doctors observes, under Christ’s vicars, and Peter’s successors, urbs est jam tota lupanar, now the whole city is one whorehouse. It is no sin to farm out whoredom, and to take so much a-head of the strumpets weekly for their practice.⁸ The pope’s holiness hath done it long at Rome, and does it to this day; and the whores daily commit lewdness, not only for themselves, but for the pope, their benefactor’s, advantage, who is to share in their gain: they drive this trade for him. And the number of his farmers was so great long since, that they brought him in yearly an intrado of above twenty thousand ducats, a great sum then, and probably very much improved since. Such an abominable tribute, nature, even corrupted, blushes at; but that Holiness at Rome thinks it no shame to maintain his honour and state, as Christ’s vicar, by the hire of whores. Evagrius extolling Anastasius the emperor for abolishing such a detestable practice, brands it as a wretched tribute, abominable to God, and shameful to the most barbarous people; as that which was a reproach to nature itself and the civil government; as that which did, as it were, by a law authorise this wickedness. Nor do the popish writers deny that it is as bad as he represents it; and yet, since the pope hath made it a custom, they have the confidence to justify it. Hear one of their prime penitentiaries: The gain, says he, or tribute for whoredom, is by the common law a deadly crime; and Nicephorus says it is a filthy gain, detestable, absurd, hateful, and which the most savage barbarians may be ashamed of.² What then? Is he or the great bishop ashamed of it? You may know how by what he adds immediately. Yet, says he, because of the custom, which passes for a law, the pope consenting to it in the lands of the church, non est peccatum, it is no sin, it ought to be paid. So that the pope’s will and interest, passing into custom, can make that to be no sin, which nature, law, history, and their own consciences condemn as a most horrid crime, and that well becomes his holiness, which the worst barbarians would detest. No wonder, then, if they conclude it lawful for any to let their houses to harlots, though they know they take them for the practice of whoredom; the trade is so good, they can pay higher rents than others. No wonder their casuists and divines determine so many things in favour of whores; what they receive for their detestable practice is not to be accounted a reward only, but a lawful debt;⁴ thus their divines conclude, while their conscience extorts this from them, dolendum tamen est, debitum esse ob scelus putatum. And so they may demand it, and recover it, and have patrons and officers for their assistance; that whoredom may be practised by rules of justice, and they may force the payment, though there was no price agreed on, nor is the whore bound to make restitution, though she take more than her due,⁶ nor is it necessary she should give any of it to the poor. And they are as punctual in resolving prostitutes and their customers about the price of this staple commodity, as about the lawfulest negotiations in the world.⁸ Who may sell themselves to serve the lusts of others, at what rate, what liberty they have to take a price, answerable to the just value, how the value may be computed, and how they may improve it, &c. Though filthiness in a woman be a fault, yet it is no fault filthily to set it to sale. A man may satisfy the lust of a female at a price; and he is so far from being obliged to restitution, that it is more than equal it should be paid him; he parts with more for it² (there is not only justice, but equity, and conscience for him in the case); and there is invincible proof for it, since Alexander himself took hire upon this account, and the Amazons were wont of old to hire men to do this work.

Any whores whatever may retain the price of their filthiness; only a whore is bound in conscience to restore what is given her by their religious persons.⁴ This, it seems, is the peculiar privilege of their votaries, that harlots must serve their turn gratis; and they have so much encouragement more than others to practise whoredom, since in conscience it must cost them nothing. But if a secular person give a religious man money, or anything else for the religious man’s whore, that is not to be restored. It would be too hard to part with his whore for nothing. Yet one encumbrance there is, but very gently laid on them: if the religious man have goods in his power to dispose of, he may (it is not said he must) satisfy a wench when he has deflowered her, &c.; for this is a pious use.⁶ A woman that commits lewdness secretly may take the price of fornication more justly than a common harlot (though she does it justly enough), because in her it is more valuable; the price may rise, being an honester whore. If a married woman fall into adultery once and again, she may take her price without charge of restitution (it is more lawful gain than to have any such burden annexed), and the adulterer is bound upon his soul to lay it down; for though adultery be illegal, yet to buy and sell it is no sin, if the price be not excessive, and much above the just value of the thing, the quality of the persons considered.⁸ And it must not be forgotten that the adulteress is not to be accountable to her husband for what she gains by this traffic, or a maid to her parents when she prostitutes herself for hire in her father’s house, but may convert it to their own use, as that which they earn by hand labour, unless they grow very wealthy by the trade. And if these women do but take moderate sums for this filthy traffic of those who are not at their own disposing, they are not bound to restitution; because it is presumed that those who have the charge of those minors do allow such expenses.¹⁰ This was necessary to be added, that harlots might not be discouraged from admitting boys under age among their customers. Lastly, a nun playing the whore may both do it for hire, and with a good conscience keep it when she hath done. It had been hard measure for their votaries if some provision had not been made for them, that their trade might be gainful, when their own authors tell us it is so common. There was no reason to be partial, and make much difference betwixt them and other prostitutes, when their Clemangis could see no difference betwixt their nunneries and the common stews.² But to proceed with the latter, while they are giving rules for conscience, they tell us the law countenances fornication so very much, that it compels public whores to commit lewdness with any one whomsoever giving her her hire. And so indulgent is the church to whoredom, that harlots who live there many years (even as long as they can get custom), do incur no ecclesiastical censure.⁴ So that at Rome, made so purely Christian by its popes, whoredom is as lawful as when it was most heathenish, and is objected as the shame of it by St Augustine, that there the use of whoredom was a lawful practice. Hereby the people under popery are so well edified that they cannot easily know whether fornication committed with common prostitutes be a sin, as one of their doctors tells us;⁶ for many of the common people (says he) who know not how to distinguish betwixt sin permitted or not forbidden as to the punishment, and not as to the sinfulness; because that simple fornication is not punished, and whores have the privilege of impunity, they make account it is no sin to deal with them (at the pope’s rate); and this is very common in cities otherwise well instructed in the faith and religion (of Rome) as those who hear confession well know. It seems confessors have something to do to persuade the people that that is a sin which the pope publicly allows; and they might have more to do if the people did not suspect that the pope is a man like themselves, and for all his infallibility may, in matter of whoredom, err as they usually do. But if any man be not disposed to take this liberty, so freely offered, of haunting the common stews, he is encouraged by the law of their church to have a concubine at home, and that without any great hazard. It will not cost him so much as the loss of the communion, for the canon law provides, that he who has not a wife, but instead of a wife a concubine, shall not be kept from the communion, so that he be satisfied with one woman, either a wife or a concubine. Now, since they tell us sometimes that none who are in mortal sin may partake of the communion, it should seem that with them to live in fornication is either no sin, or none that is mortal. Their doctrine is as indulgent to those who will not put away their concubines as such persons need desire. Absolution is not to be denied him who, having lent his concubine whom he keeps in his house one hundred crowns, has no hope to recover it if he put her away. Or, on the contrary, if the woman be not like to recover the like sum owing her, if she leave the house of the whoremaster; for, as was said before, none are bound to avoid the next occasion of sin, to their great loss. Nor is he bound to put away his concubine if she be very useful for the gaining of temporal goods by way of traffic. It is enough that he intends not to sin hereafter. Yea, if the concubine be very serviceable for the delight of the whoremaster, so that his life would scarce be pleasant without her, and other cates would be very distasteful to him, and another woman, so much for his purpose, would hardly be found, the whoremaster will not be obliged to put her away.³ Neither is absolution to be denied if he might lose his reputation by quitting his whore; yea, or if the concubine would be disgraced thereby. It is enough if he firmly promise not to sin more with her, since it is in his power not to sin, although there be present danger of it while she stays in his house. But what if he sin with her still, after such promises to the contrary? That will not hinder if he repent still; and he may truly repent (in their way), and be absolved, when there is no appearance of amendment. So he determines in a like case after others. Accordingly, Bonacina determines a confessor may absolve one who keeps a whore, and will not put her away, if he cannot do it without much disgrace, or scandal, or other great inconvenience.⁶ And him also who sins but seldom with his whore, three or four times in a year (or thereabouts), and hopes he may not relapse further. And so may a youth be absolved who keeps a whore in his father’s house, with whom he sins customarily, though he put her not away, so that he have a firm purpose to desist.⁸ But what if after such a purpose he relapse still? He may be absolved still (as we heard before), even innumerably innumerable times, because so oft we are to forgive our brother. Or if a concubine at home will not satisfy an unclean person, but he commit fornication with others, yet if he make but himself drunk before, that fornication will be no sin, or but an inconsiderable fault, if he be but half drunk. Nor will adultery be a sin in that or many other cases. Christ teaches that ‘he who puts away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery,’ Matthew 5:32; yet they teach that where the marriage is both firm and consummated by conjugal enjoyment, yet the parties may be separated as to cohabitation, and as much divorced as they can be for adultery (by their doctrine), either for outward danger, or when one tempts the other to mortal sin, or for that which they call heresy, or if either of them will enter into a monastery. And if there had not been carnal knowledge after the marriage, though it be firm and valid, yet if either of them will make the monastic profession, the other is at liberty to marry another, and live together as man and wife, the parties whom they first married still living. So that if a wife will turn nun, she may put away her husband (doing it eo ignorante vel invito²), and he may marry another wife. The Council of Trent confirms this to purpose, when it curses those who hold that lawful matrimony, not consummated, is not dissolved by a solemn religious vow. It is acknowledged by Boniface VIII.,⁴ and Gregory XIII., that this of matrimony is a bond made firm and indissoluble by God himself, and the other, of a vow, but a church constitution; yet (as was observed long since) the Trent prelates will not only have a human bond to dissolve a divine, but will have those accursed who will not believe that an institution of man, born many hundred years since the apostles, should prevail against a divine institution, made at the creation of the world.⁶ Thus in behalf of their pretended chastity, they have opened a broad way for real adultery; and who could expect more reasonable decrees in such a case? This for their laity; then for their clergy and monastics, their doctrine is, that adultery is not so much a sin as marriage, no, nor incest, or sodomy, or bestiality, so that they may better venture upon any of these abominations than upon that state which the Lord hath authorised and honoured. And he is more capable of orders amongst them who hath kept two whores, than one who hath been twice married, or but once married a widow.⁸ An incestuous person, says Erasmus, is admitted to be a bishop, a murderer, a robber, a sodomite, a sacrilegious wretch; a parricide, is admitted, and who not? Solus digamus, one that has been twice married, is only excluded from this honour, though he alone be blameless. The apostle commends marriage to prevent the heats of lust, which he calls burning; but burning lust is with them innocent. To burn, says Valentia, does not signify to burn with the flames of lust, for this in itself is not evil. The apostle determines it better to marry than to burn; but Bellarmine says, it is worse to marry, however our adversaries gainsay (where he puts the apostle with us amongst his adversaries), especially for her who is under solemn vow; and a little after he tells us, she that marries after a simple vow,¹¹ in a manner sins more than she that commits fornication; his reason is, because the one makes herself uncapable of keeping her vow, which she does not, who plays the whore. Where we see what their vow of chastity is (the argument wherein they triumph to prove the holiness of their church), it is a chastity which consists well enough with whoredom, and is only violated by marriage. Accordingly, the clergy have liberty to haunt the public stews. It is in reference to those who are unmarried (to wit, the clergy) that the stews are held to be so very necessary;² that no consideration could move the pope or his council to think any thing more fit to be done against the common whores, but only some diminution of their pride and luxury, as one of their doctors intimates. And as if that would not serve, they have been heretofore allowed to keep whores at home, paying a yearly rent for that liberty; yea, those priests that would not keep whores (that they might not want temptation to it), were forced to pay the rent, because they might have had the liberty if they pleased. For a monk or friar to lay aside his habit is a crime, by which he incurs excommunication; and yet if he lay aside his habit that he may commit fornication the more expeditely, without the incumbrance which his monkish weeds would give him in the act, they declare him upon that account freed from censure. Excommunication is not incurred, says Navarre, for every leaving of his habits which is temerarious or deadly, because he incurs it not by laying it aside that he may the more readily indulge himself in fornication.⁴ Sylvester had made such a decision before him, so understanding Paludanus, that he is under excommunication who puts off his habit to disguise himself in reference to others, that he may not be known, but not he that lays it by with a respect to himself, viz., for the pleasure of fornication. So that the censured dismissing of habit is, as he distinguishes, that which is fraudulent, so as to put on another, but not that which is for an hour’s pleasure while he is quite stripped.⁶ Panormitan concludes that an oath is never to be given to him of whom there is vehement suspicion that he will not observe it, and he that gives it in that case sins mortally. Hence Pope Alexander would not have priests bound by oath to forsake their concubines, because it seems there was strong presumption they would venture on perjury rather than leave their whoredom. Hence Erasmus had so much cause to complain, that among so vast multitudes who were unmarried, and under the vow of chastity, so exceeding few did live chastely, so innumerable many did wallow in uncleanness. And Cassander, another moderate papist, says that a man could not find scarce one in a hundred of them that abstained from women.²

Before these, the gloss on the Canon Maximianus, dist. lxxxi., tells us, it is the common opinion that no priest should be deposed for simple fornication, because there are but few priests free from it. If all fornicators had been deprived, their church would have been made desolate, and left in a manner priestless. This was a great reason then, and is, it seems, of the same force still; for at this day, a priest is not to be deprived for simple incontinency. The congregation of cardinals (much concerned for the propagation of the holy church) declared it to be law, that the penalty of deprivation proceeds not for simple incontinency, as Garzias observes; only they must not keep whores in the capacity of concubines.⁴ It may be that came too near marriage to have so much favour as vagrant whoredom. Yet if a priest keep a whore at board and bed, and use her constantly as if she were his wife, he is not therefore irregular; indeed, if he marry her, or an honester woman, all the world cannot excuse him; for though such whoredom never disables a priest, yet chaste marriage utterly spoils him; yea, if he keep in that capacity more whores than one (I know not how many more, for they are not limited to numbers), yet still he is not irregular (as innocent bigamy would make any one though he were an apostle), but the bishop may dispense with him. So Pope Innocent III. determined, and it is now as good law as their church has any; and the more remarkable, because the doctor’s gloss on it would have it noted as admirable, that whoredom has with them more privilege than chastity. Where we may suppose the gloss speaks the sense of such as are strangers to Rome; for that uncleanness should be preferred before chastity is in that church nothing wonderful nor strange at all, but ordinary and obvious. That pope (whom they magnify as the singular glory of their law) decrees that the bishop may dispense with priests who keep many concubines to exercise their office, as he doth also with those who are noted for simple fornication.⁶ And how the bishops were wont to dispense with them is known, their own writings declaring it the custom, as before, to let out those women to them at a yearly rent; and that they were so hard—lords, that if a priest had no mind to the bishop’s tenement, and did not take it, yet he must pay for it no less than the forwardest farmer.

Sodomy abounds most in Italy (for it was requisite that Rome should be, as it is in the prophetic style, Sodom, and not incongruous that the vilest wickedness should thrive best under his holiness’ wing); yet, as if they would have it as common everywhere, and more there than it is, their decisions are exceeding favourable to it, and treat it very indulgently. Married persons may practise sodomy together, the beginnings of it, all of it, bating the last complement of the act, without mortal guilt. Unmarried persons, their clergy, may act it without restraint to the uttermost, and be neither suspended nor irregular. There is no danger of it if they do it but two or three times now and then, yea, they are safe unless they make a custom of it.² The strictest decree that we find any pope ever made against sodomy is that of Pius V., which was yet formed in such terms, on purpose that it should not reach any ecclesiastics, but such only as made a trade of it by continual practice. This Navarre had from the mouth of Gregory XIII. And if they do make a trade of it, yet still they are secure if it be not notorious and public; and it will not be counted notorious, though it may be proved, though it be commonly reported, though it be confessed; nor public, unless it be manifest to all. Thus, if any ecclesiastic will practise sodomy, provided he do it not continually, or if he will make a daily trade of it, yet so he do not keep an open warehouse, the pope has taken special care (even in the severest order that his zeal against this wickedness could ever be brought to make) that the sodomite shall have his liberty without any fear of losing office or benefice in holy church.

Further, they declare that mental heresy is a greater crime than sodomy. As, suppose a man should believe that the public worship of God ought to be in a known tongue (such a heresy as they cannot acquit the apostle Paul of), the secret belief of this, though never manifested by expression or practice, is in their account worse than sodomy. What conscience are they like to make of this while such is their judgment? Moreover, some of them say that the stealing of thirty rials (about fifteen shillings) is a greater sin than sodomy.⁶ Yet theft is wont to be counted one of the least crimes, and this is none of the greatest theft. Of what value the thing stolen must be to make theft a mortal sin, is, they say, to be determined by the judgment of a prudent man. Those who have the reputation of great prudence amongst them, declare that to steal one hundred crowns, in some case, is no mortal crime. If they should any of them determine that the stealing of twenty-nine rials, or thereabouts, is but venial, there will but be about sixpence difference betwixt sodomy and a venial fault. It is true they do not commonly deliver this conceit in the terms expressed, but it is clearly inferred from the doctrine of Aquinas, and Scotus too, generally embraced; for he concludes that justice is a more excellent virtue than chastity;⁸ and that the sin is more heinous which is opposite to the nobler virtue; upon which ground not only sodomy, but copulation with a brute or a devil will be a less sin than petty theft. In short, if their divines (whether followers of Thomas or Scotus, betwixt whom they are all in a manner parted) will be true to these principles, since they cannot deny but there is injustice in stealing one rial, they must hold that sodomy is no more a sin, nor more conscience to be made of it, than of stealing sixpence, when their doctrine of theft has left no conscience of that. Thus far they have advanced to secure sodomy against the laws of God and by those of the church; as for any secular laws, they may laugh at them, for sodomy has ecclesiastical immunity. By the special care of Pope Gregory, sodomites were not mentioned amongst those who are excluded from that privilege. The civil law (I suppose before the unmarried clergy were law-givers) ordains that sodomites should be burned, but the church has provided that no fire may touch them if they can escape that from heaven. Besides other sacred places, the palaces of cardinals and bishops, all monasteries, yea, the house of every parish priest and ecclesiastic, are all sanctuaries for sodomites. They could not well proceed further in favour of this crime, since the eyes of the world was open about them. It is not now so seasonable for the pope’s legate (as he did before) to praise sodomy in print as a pious act. These rules and examples considered, who can think that they count uncleanness of any sort a sin much to be avoided? Or who can wonder if Rome became hereby, in a literal sense, ‘the mother of harlots and abominations’? or yet think strange that they should be most taken with papal holiness who are most addicted to whoredom and uncleanness?

Sect. 9. Further, it is no sin for the Romanists to take from those whom they count heretics (from protestants particularly) all that they have. This will not be theft or robbery, but an act justified by the laws of their church, which oblige them to do it; for this is one of those many punishments which that law will have inflicted on us; the goods of heretics are by sentence of law immediately confiscated. There is no question of this amongst them, only as to the execution there is some doubt, whether heretics are bound in conscience, as soon as they are such, to give up their possession themselves, and deliver all they have to Roman Catholics; or whether they may not, without mortal guilt, keep possession, till the papists see it fit to put them out, and seize on all they have. The famous Panormitan concludes that the heretics are bound, under the pain of deadly sin, to do this execution upon themselves, not expecting any other sentence or executioner.³ And there is a pretty army of doctors (longa doctorum phalanx) do maintain this with him, but Soto and some others determine that they need not be so hasty to give up all they have of their own accord, but may stay for a declaratory sentence, and seizure upon it; but then a general sentence will serve, without particular process or examination who are personally guilty, and a sentence by some ecclesiastical person may suffice.⁵ But all of them agree in this, that heretics lose all title and property in whatever they possess, and that for them and their heirs; and this before any declaratory sentence, even from the first day of their pretended heretical pravity, as the Directory for the Inquisitors determines.² To lose all title to their estates may seem a small matter, considering that they lose all power and jurisdiction, all right to honour and fame (they and theirs being infamous), to liberty also, and life itself; but because loss of property is great in consequence, let us stay a little on it. All that these pretended heretics have, being confiscated, they are liable to a seizure presently, and though their convenience will not serve them to seize on all, a long time after, yet in the interim the poor heretics are responsible for all the mesne profits (it may be in our case for a hundred, or two hundred, years past); and all this while they have no power to alienate or dispose of their goods or estates by gift, sale, will, or otherwise; yea, not of any of it by way of charity, for they are not their own to dispose of. Hence all wills, sales, contracts, for this purpose (it may be for some ages together) are null and void.⁴ And if the heretic will venture to alienate anything he has, he that buys it does it at his peril; for though it pass from hand many years, yet it may be taken away from the purchaser, with whom it is found, without restoring the price that was paid for it,⁶ and he that sells it is a cheat, and sins mortally, if he gives not the purchaser notice of the hazard, and tell him, that when he sells his estate, or goods, he has no right to sell them. If the pretended heretic die, and leave what he has to his children, it is no better than if he left them another man’s goods which he had no title to.⁸ Yea, though the children be catholics, they lose their portion. But who are those that may take from protestants (or others whom they count heretics), what they possess? Why, any that will; authority is given to all whoever to rob, spoil, or bereave us. So Sylvester, and others, quoting the Rabbies of the pontifical law for it. It is their determination, that in point of law and conscience, all that will have authority to spoil us of what we have. What he adds is matter of caution for more plausible proceedings in the spoil and robbery. It seems safe that this be not done but by special edict of the prince, or of the church; this is convenient, lest otherwise one might seem to do it rather out of covetousness or revenge, than out of justice and obedience. By this we may understand in what condition protestants are by the laws of the Romish church, and how papists are obliged to look upon us, and demean themselves towards us. No protestant, from the prince to the meanest subject, has any title to lands, houses, money, or anything else which they possess, or can justly call it their own. All rules of righteousness, which concern property, are void; papists owe them no observance. In reference to us, we are not capable of injury upon this account; whatever they do against us, in respect of our estates, they wrong us not, they sin not, for we have no title. If they take from us anything, or all we have, they steal not aught from us, they rob us not, because they take nothing from us that is our own. If they burn our houses over our heads, and fire towns and cities (as they have done, and their famous Simanca says they may do),³ they do us no injury, they sin not on this account, because the houses and goods consumed are none of ours. If they deprive a protestant prince of his throne and dominions, they sin not; he is by their law and doctrine but a usurper, and had no just title to his crown. If they draw any of his subjects into war against him, at home or abroad, they do him no wrong, for they are not his subjects, no more than the popish clergy, who are sworn to another sovereign.⁵ Or if he entrust them with the commands of forts or garrisons, they may betray them to the Romanists, and not wrong him, because they were not his. If they take all places of trust, or profit, from nobles or commons, they do them no wrong, because they had no right to them, nor had the children after them any, for some generations.² If they pay no debts to protestants, though they were not only under the obligation of a promise, but of solemn oath, they may justify it, they owe them nothing. If trust be reposed in them, or anything be deposited in their hands, or they borrow anything of us, they may detain it; they need not restore it, for they have nothing of ours.⁴ In a word, there can be no parliaments, or convention of the three estates of a nation, because there are none in that capacity. As there are no persons of honour for peers, all being infamous, so can there be no freeholders to choose, or to be chosen, for commons, since there are no proprietors. And as no laws can be made, can be valid, there being none who have any power to make them, so there can be no aids or subsidies granted, or required, since they cannot be given or required of those who have nothing of their own to give.

Thus, by the popish principles, the foundations of the civil constitution in England, and other countries in like circumstances, are quite blown up, as if they had been at the mercy of a Faux. And those who will follow their conduct, must hold that we have no government, no king, no subjects, no parliaments, no laws, no liberties, no property, and, indeed, none of the rest, because not this last. And all that will be true to the doctrine and laws of popery must believe this, and may lawfully deal with us accordingly; they sin not if they do, there is no conscience in the case to hinder them, or secure us; nay, they are bound to do it, if that which they account most sacred can oblige them, and that as soon as they can. That which restrains them is not the fear of God, but of the penalties of our laws, which yet are of no more force by their determination, than the agreement of a company of robbers, or the constitutions of mere usurpers, which will stand in their way no longer than till they can master the power which bears them up, against that which the Roman decrees and edicts have made equity and justice, in despite of the laws of God and nations.

Sect. 10. Moreover, they may bear false witness, either privately or in open court, for their advantage; and if it do not much wrong another, it is but a small fault, so that if it do no wrong at all, it will be less than a small fault. On this account they may bear false witness against a protestant, or any other, whom they count heretics, even when estate or life is concerned; for by their laws and doctrine his life is forfeited, and his goods confiscated, and so though by false testimony he lose both, yet he has no wrong, because he had no right to either. They may use fraud and deceit in bargains, to get what a protestant sells, for little or nothing, yea, or to cheat him of all he has, for the deceit is not considerable in point of conscience, but for the wrong it does; and here is no wrong in the case, for he cheats the heretic of nothing that was his own, and so does him no injury. They may use perfidiousness in breaking compacts, agreements, or promises; for perfidiousness, when it is officious, and does but a little injury to those concerned, is one of the least sorts of faults, by their doctrine; therefore, when it does no injury at all, it is less than the least; but by breaking promises, or any such bond of faithfulness which concerns the estate of a heretic, they do him no injury, because he has no estate of his own, by their account. So that if a papist should make a thousand promises, and confirm each of them with an oath to a heretic, that he will pay what he owes him, or restore to him what is his own, he sins not, though he never pay, nor restore a farthing of it, because nothing is due to a heretic, nor is there any thing he can call his own. And this is not my inference only, but they themselves declare it to be the consequence of their principles, and what they deliver in express terms, amounts to as much as this charge comes to.²

Sect. 11. Thus they leave little that can be sin in papists, one towards another, but less towards protestants. It is no sin not to keep peace or faith, not to observe either truth or honesty, towards heretics. It is no deceit to equivocate with them in private dealing, or public transactions; it is no dishonesty to cheat them of what they have; it is no perjury to break oaths with them; it is no theft to rob or spoil them; it is no inhumanity to burn their houses over their heads; it is no murder to kill them; in a word, it is no sin for all relations to deny them what God hath made their respective duties.

Sect. 12. Finally, natural corruption, after baptism, has nothing in it that can be charged with sin, no, not in wicked men, who afterwards by mortal sin are quite destitute of grace. So that by their doctrine, a fixed averseness and contrariety to God and holiness, an habitual enmity against him, a propenseness to all ungodliness and unrighteousness, is no sin; an inward temper and disposition, though it be most impious, atheistical, rebellious, filthy, treacherous, and bloody, has no sin in it; an inclination to deny God, to speak all evil of him, to depose him, to advance lusts and the devil before him; an inclination to adulteries and beastly uncleanness, to murder and barbarous cruelty, to the most prodigious wickedness against God or man, is no sin. Yea, though it be not transient, but constant and habitual, though it be strong and impetuous, though this corruption be reigning, not subdued or mortified; though it be active and fruitful in all the powers of the soul, though it hurry the lower faculties into rebellious commotions, and follow the superior with frequent and strong impulses, and exert its power and malignancy both in thoughts and affections, yet if the inward motions have not consent, there is no more sin in their acts than in their principles. In all these evils papists may live and die, and in many more, which I purposely posely waive, lest I be too tedious, and many more too, than I have taken notice of, even in plain violations of every part of the divine law, the rule of righteousness and holiness; and yet wipe their mouths, and say they have no sin at all, but are as holy as their church requires them, and as sure of salvation as their doctrine and the power of delusion can make them. Though any protestant, who allows himself but in a very small part of these enormities, we will give them leave (or they may take it from Scripture) to count him an Ungodly and unrighteous wretch, who can have no good conscience towards God or man, nor any hopes of heaven (continuing so) but such as will delude him.

Sect. 13. But if they have not legitimated wickedness enough already, they have expedients at hand to do it, for much more; they are furnished with devices to justify all the sin in the world, or at least in their church, when they please to use them. Let us instance in two or three. That power which they challenge for the pope herein, is notorious. We heard Bellarmine tell us before, that if the pope should command vice, the church must practice vice, or else sin against her conscience. And he says expressly elsewhere, that in a good sense, Christ gave to Peter a power to make that which is sin to be no sin, and that which is no sin to be sin; and what he gave to Peter, they will have us believe he gave to popes. So that it seems, Christ hath given Peter, and consequently his successors the popes, power to authorise any sin and wickedness; only we are to understand this in a good sense, which let any man do if he can. They declare, that he can dispense not only with positive but divine laws, and so make the transgressions thereof to be no sin. To omit the many testimonies for this, produced by others (and which some of themselves count extravagant), let us hear Sylvester, who seems modest in comparison: The pope has power in all things purely positive, and in some pertaining to divine law, because he has all laws in his own breast, as to interpretation and dispensation.² Where, what in his assertion seems restrained, in the reason of it (fetched from the canon law), is unlimited, he has all laws in his own breast; it seems to import that they are all in his power and at his pleasure, so as he may either interpret them, or dispense with them, as he thinks fit. Some of them, in reference to natural and divine laws, make show of denying this in general; but then they grant in particular instances, what is sufficient to make good the general charge. There is no command of the first or second table, wherein they do not hold the pope may dispense, unless it be the first, and to question his power of dispensing there, is no great disparagement to him, since they deny it to God himself. There is no doubt amongst them, but he can dispense with oaths, and make it no sin to break them, though they acknowledge the obligation of an oath to be by divine law.⁴ And no wonder it has been so ordinary a practice, since they hold that this condition is still presupposed in the oaths, if it shall please the pope. And though they conclude vows to be more obliging than oaths, yet they teach, the pope may dispense with the accomplishment of solemn promises made to God, and so can make both sacrilege and perfidiousness to God lawful enough. The pope can dispense not only with rash oaths or vows, but those that are best, and their obligation most unquestionable. If any (says Rosella, after others) do vow or swear anything that may lawfully be observed, the pope should not alter it when there is no cause; yet if he do release such (though without cause) the release holds good, because he is above positive law, and also can dispense against the divine law, so that he dispense not against the gospel and articles of faith, Sum. v. juram. i. ii. 4. But if he do that too, he may stand to it, for many teach that the pope is not forbidden to dispense against the gospel, but only not to destroy the gospel (v. papa. n. 3), and we must conceive (if we can) that he may take away the obligation of the rules of the gospel without destroying it.

However, as to oaths and vows, he can totally (they say) dissolve the obligation, quemadmodum potest ipse Deus, even as God himself can, because it is likely that God, as he had cause, gave his own power to his vicar, otherwise he had not been a good father of his household, if he had left his flock without a shepherd, who could, as occasion serves, provide for them in all (even to license perjury and perfidiousness to God himself), as Pope Innocent argues; but whether with more reason or blasphemy, let others judge. Whereupon, Hostiensis saith, that seeing God and his vicar have the same consistory, the pope can do in a manner all that God can do, the key not erring, for Christ says generally to Peter, ‘Whatever thou shalt bind;’ and saying whatever, he excepts nothing, ibid. n. i.

There is not any thing in the world which they count more inviolable than their vow of religion, yet he may dispense with this, and the reason is considerable; because religion derived its being from the authority of the Roman bishop, he therefore who gave it may take it away. So Pope Innocent and their canonists generally, ibid. n. iv. Hostiensis and others, seem to speak extravagantly when they say, the pope can do as much in a manner as God himself. But this may pass for a modest speech, if they will have him to do more, and more he can do if he can make contradictions to be consistent. One instance of it we have in the question, whether the pope can dispense with a monk to have secular property. Rich. de S. Victore says, it is essential to a monk to want it, and so a contradiction to be a monk, and have it; yet others say the pope can do it, and render those consistent enough, and so make one to be a monk while he is none, Idem. ibid. So for sanctifying of the Lord’s day, there can be no doubt of the papal power herein, since they count the command for it positive, for that he can dispense in all positives,³ is with them unquestionable. Nothing is necessarily required by the precept for sanctifying of this day, but the hearing of mass, and abstaining from servile works. The pope, if he please, may turn these into working days, for he can abrogate them. And since the people, by their divinity, are not obliged to any other public worship but the mass, and that only on these days, he may discharge them from all conscience of public worship, and disengage them from tendering any unto God, for he can dispense with the mass. They make it, indeed, sometimes a character of antichrist, to put down the mass; but it is not fit the pope should want power to be antichrist at pleasure; and why should they be angry with us for thinking him so already, since with them herein he may lawfully be antichrist when he list. And he may do as much for the clergy and monastics; all the solemn worship necessary and proper for them, is that of their canonical hours, but the pope can order that they shall not be obliged to say their service.² So Sylvester, after others, concludes; he adds, indeed, that though the pope can discharge them from this service, yet he cannot disoblige them from making some recompence to their benefactors for not praying for them; but for this (he says) they need not trouble themselves; for the least prayer that can be will suffice for that. So an Ave Mary may serve (that serves generally on all occasions) a prayer (if it may be so accounted) of one petition to the virgin, and not a word to God, not a syllable for their benefactors, they may be as well without it. And so others leave them, determining without any reserve, that the pope may dispense with their divine service, and may do so validly without any cause, too. So that the pope, when he list, may leave no public worship of God in the whole Roman world; and when he does this, it will be no sin wholly to neglect it. He can dispense against the universal state of the church; so the law of their church will have it. Only, says Panormitan, he should not deface it;⁵ but there is no danger of that, though he should destroy it (as he has done indeed; they ascribe no power to him in this, but what he has given the world proof of effectually), for he cannot deface it, unless he change the universal state of it without reason; and this he can never want, so long as his will is good reason, as they say it is.

He can as easily discharge them from all righteousness towards men; he can make it lawful for a son to calumniate his father; or covet all he has, or to wrest it from him by force, yea, to attempt his life, and when he hath reduced him to want and misery, to leave him perishing for want of relief. This office he did for the emperors heretofore, and is commended for it. He can take away any man’s right, and dissolve all bonds, contracts, obligations, whereby one man is bound to another;⁷ and so can make it lawful to act against all faith, truth, justice, and common honesty. Further, those whom God hath joined together in lawful matrimony, the pope (they say) hath power to separate, and sometimes, so as to marry others, and so live in adultery without sin, as he did with the son of the Conde D’Olivares.

If there have been no carnal knowledge, they make no bones at all of the pope’s dissolving marriages, how firmly soever contracted, or solemnly celebrated. No, nor if they have had that full consummation with reluctancy. But there is one rarer feat that the pope can do, he has power to dispense with persons to marry and continue so, not during life, but for such time as they desire, a year or two, or till they can have a child, and then be unmarried again, and freed from all bonds of that state, without any divorce or occasion for it. Jo. Andreas (a principal rabbi of their church Talmud) says, He had disputed this question, whether the pope might not dispense with a king’s only son, being a monk, to marry for a while, till he could get a boy, and after return to his monastery and unmarried condition? He answers, That the pope, whose power is disputed, may resolve it himself, yet he may be advised to forbear, but many maintain, that if he should dispense, the dispensation would stand good (according to whom, the pope is not forbidden to dispense against the gospel, when he sees cause, but only not to destroy it, as before), and this holds especially, if the party would be content to be married for a while, rather than for ever. So Andreas, and the same, it seems, is defended by Jo. Antonius, bishop of Alexandria (in Millain), by Baldus, by Fulgosius, and Baptista Toruamala. Our author will not grant that the pope cannot dispense with a religious person to be married a little, but makes it a question whether he can let him marry during life.

Moreover, he can not only legitimate adultery, but incest; for they teach that he can dispense with marriages in those degrees which God’s law forbids, even such as are acknowledged to be against the dictate of nature. They except no degree of consanguinity, but only the first in the direct line, viz. marriage betwixt parent and child; they say he can license it in the first degree in the collateral line, viz. betwixt brother and sister.

Some indeed stick at this, because they observe not that the pope has dispensed in this case. But the credit of their St Antoninus will not be questioned, who tells us that Pope Martin the Fifth dispensed with one who had married his own sister. Yea, he takes upon him to dispense with sodomy.⁴ Sixtus the Fourth gave license to the whole family of Cardinal St Lucy, that they should use sodomy in the three hotter months, June, July, and August. And Alexander the Sixth gave the cardinal De Valentia leave to buggar the Marquis De Zaneta, his own natural son.⁶ The most modest opinion at first blush (which yet ends little better than the worst) that I have observed amongst them, concerning the pope’s power in reference to the laws of God, is that of Richard De Sancto Victore, as Angelus reports it, that the pope can dispense with the divine precepts when the reason of them ceaseth; otherwise, says he, God (if he had not so empowered him) would not seem to be a good master of his household (not wise, say some; not diligent, say others; for this is a common argument for the papal prerogative). We must take heed how we question the pope’s power herein, for if we do, they may question the government of God. And herein he is followed by Sylvester,² a Dominican, and Angelus, a Franciscan (though in other things they often clash) who tell us that besides divines, all the canonists agree in it, if well understood.⁴ And this the former extends to particular cases, whether in the natural or divine law, and the latter concludes it, not only as to the precepts of the second table, but as to all the commands, both in the Old and New Testament.⁶ All the question is, How one may know when the reason of God’s law ceaseth in any case? To which he answers, That this we sometimes may learn by the examples of God himself, who many times dispensed with his own law. So that in such cases, it seems, the pope may do as much as God himself. But this may not prove enough to serve the pope’s turn. So he adds, when we have not an example of that, or the like dispensation in Scripture, the declaration of it (that is, when the reason of the law fails) in any other case belongs to the pope alone.⁸ Accordingly Sylvester, He may, when there is any doubt, authoritatively explain whether or no in any certain case the reason of the divine or natural precept takes place. The pope, if he were God (as they too often call him) needs not herein desire more power than this; he may declare that the reason of the divine law ceases when he pleases, and so he may dispense with it when he list. Thus the pope might discern the reason of the law for marriage to cease, when Olivares had declared Julian Naleasor his heir, and so gave him leave to marry another wife, when he had one already, lawfully married (yet his holiness might be hastier herein than some doctors would have him, who though they hold the pope can dispense with one to have two, or more wives at once, yet think it not so very fit to be done, while catholics are so plentiful).¹⁰ And he would have seen something more in Harry VIII.’s case, than he let the world know, if the emperor Charles V. had not stood in his light. And so in that against perjury, Clement VII. saw the reason of it cease, when he saw it his interest that Francis I. should break his oath. And Sixtus IV. could well see that the reason of that law against sodomy ceased in the hotter months, and so dispensed with it then, though not in cooler seasons. But what if the pope should mistake in his declaration about the law, and the reason of it, and so err in dispensing with it? This must not easily be supposed. I firmly believe, says Angelus, that if any one seeking a dispensation, in any case against the law of God, not interposing the importunity of gifts and solicitations, do put himself simply into the pope’s hands, with a declaration of his case, that God will not suffer his vicar to err in dispensing. Yet if the worst should come to the worst, and the pope should err herein, that will make no alteration in the case before us; for though it may be a fault to dispense, yet the crime he dispenses with may be no sin to him who has his holiness’s leave to commit it. I judge, says Navarre, that though the dispenser may be in fault; yet he that is dispensed with is excused, if, relying honestly upon the authority of his superior, he thinks it was granted upon just cause, till he be convinced that it was not justly granted.² For all this, Bellarmine has the confidence to affirm that no catholic ever held that the pope could dispense any way with the divine commands, and yet what is it less that himself ascribes to the pope, when he says by his indulgences we are disobliged from the command of bringing forth fruits worthy of repentance? These fruits are, by their own account, all good works; and so in time the pope can make it to be no sin to live without the worship of God, righteousness towards men, and good Works, which respect either.

Sect. 14. But they need not make use of the pope’s authority for this purpose; there are other expedients nearer hand will serve to make any sin lawful. One is probable ignorance, and that, when upon a probable ground, error is conceived to be truth, and that which is sin indeed is taken to be no sin. When upon such a ground one ventures upon a crime, it will not be criminal. Now, they give an account of several things, each of which will serve them herein for a probable ground.

First, a probable reason, when there are arguments pro and con, all probable in his judgment that views them, if he follows that which seems to him most probable, he sins not, though it lead him into sin. They lay great weight upon authority, and think it safe to follow the herd in a common opinion; yet one good reason, they say, is to be preferred before the common judgment of their writers, and one may venture against the stream, being backed with it.⁵ Nor is there need to be very scrupulous about the probability of a reason; it is enough if it seems but probable to him that weighs it, yea, though it seem but so, out of affection to him that offers it. And that may as well pass for more probable, which is more favourable to the inclination of the inquirer, and he may be his own judge in the case, and act against the scruples of his conscience when he has probable reason. But when there are more reasons against it, and but one probable for it, must not the more sway us, since that is safer, and that which is safer is to be chosen, according to the common rule? No, we are not obliged, for that rule even in matters of faith and practice is only a counsel,⁷ not a precept; we are only enjoined to do what is safe, not to what is safer, and a practice upon a probable reason is safe enough.

Sect. 15. Secondly, custom is another probable ground which (with them) will secure a person from sin in doing what is unlawful. It is ordinary with their casuists to conclude a practice innocent when there is custom for it, though otherwise they condemn it as a sin. So Navarre determines that if it were a custom to observe the Lord’s-day only till noon, or till mass were ended in the morning, it would be no sin to spend the rest of it in servile works. And that of Cajetan is observable: he takes notice that it is a practice in the church of Rome to sing to the organ profane and filthy songs when they are at church for worship. This the cardinal reflects upon severely, condemns it as a mortal sin, and a crime of sacrilegious superstition; yet in the conclusion, thinks something of it excusable upon the account of custom and probable ignorance.³ Those who in dancing use habit, gesture, or songs which are notoriously lascivious, as immodest women who wantonly lay open their breasts, and men who expose without due covering their shameful parts; they sin mortally. So De Graffiis had concluded (as any person that is not past shame would do); but then he presently corrects himself: Yet of this, says he, we can pass no certain judgment, but must stand to the custom of the country.⁵ Though so much wantonness seem a mortal sin, yet if it be the custom he cannot certainly judge it any. In like manner Sylvester determines of a habit that will not suffice to hide their shame; if it be a custom, though not laudable, and without ill intention, no general rule can be formed against it. In positive precepts, where things are evil because prohibited, custom will excuse.⁷ And so fornication, which, in the judgment of Durandus and some others, is of this nature, needs nothing but custom to excuse it from being a sin. So much they ascribe to custom that they will have the Scripture not to direct and regulate it, but to follow it and be conformed to it even in its changes, so that the sense and obligation of the divine rule shall be changed, as the Romanists change fashions. This Cardinal Cusanus affirms. The Scripture (says he) is fitted to the time, and variably understood, so that at one time it is expounded according to the current fashion of the church, and when that fashion is changed, the sense of Scripture is also changed; and again, no wonder if the practice of the church do take the Scripture, one time one way and another time another, for the sense of it keeps pace with the practice.⁹ This was urged in the Council of Trent, and judged to be the meaning of the Lateran Council, when it decreed that the Scripture should be expounded according to the doctors of the church, or as custom has approved. Thus it must come to pass, that what the word of God, in its true meaning, did once condemn as a sin, if it become the Roman practice, the divine precept will change its sense, and the act will be no sin. It was a sin once by the word of God to deprive the people of the cup in the eucharist, but since it was the custom of Rome, the Scripture has changed its meaning, and it is now no sin. To worship images was a crime condemned in Scripture, as that which God most abhorred, but being once the practice of the Romanists, the Scripture renounced the former sense, and it is now far from being criminal. It has not only made a change in the word of God, but in the nature of the thing, and the same thing which was idolatry is now no such matter. Of the law against idolatry (says Sylvester), nothing must be said, because now by the grace of Christ it is not in use.² It is not in use, because it is their custom; it is not the same thing that it was to all the world besides, because they use it. And what custom has done in these instances, it may as well do in any other; when all sin is once the practice of that church (as the worst is already), there will be no sin in it.

Sect. 16. Thirdly, Another probable ground is a considerable authority, or the opinion of one whom we may trust; hence this is their doctrine, that he who does what is sinful, following the judgment of an able doctor, is excused from sin. This principle is without ground appropriated to the Jesuits, with the pernicious consequences of it; it was current in the church of Rome before the fathers of that society were infants. Panormitan thus determines: He that follows the opinion of any doctor, not curiously examined, which afterward appears false, is excused from sin, so long as it appears not to be false. In Sylvester, this is confirmed, and he directs to several proofs out of their law for it;⁴ removes what, by mistake, is alleged out of Aquinas against it; and shews that both their great saint and their great abbot agree with others, that this is safe in points which concern either faith or manners, when they are not evident (not clearly and manifestly determined). To him, one doctor may be sufficient. In morals, we must be satisfied with probabilities; and, according to the rule amongst them, a man may probably follow one doctor.⁶ And by a multitude of authors we are not to judge what is better or more equal; the opinion of one, and he worse than the rest, may be preferred before many in some particular. So he, and Angelus⁸ before him, after others. They conclude, in reference to Joachim, who was not accounted a heretic (though his opinions were against the faith), because not condemned by the church, that he is much more to be excused who follows the opinion of a doctor not rejected by the church; and if he thought it not true, would not adhere to it. Certainly (says Angelus) in him there can be no contempt, and so no sin of disobedience.² It is true, that which is maintained by more and better authors seems more probable; but they will not have us always bound to follow that which is more probable; for though this be more secure, yet the rule, that what is safest to be followed, holds not (they tell us) but in points that are properly dubious; and where there is opinion, we are not properly in doubt. Thus Navarre also explains it,⁴ having told us that it is not always necessary to choose what is safer, because it is enough for the fulfilling of the precept to choose that which is safe, even in those things which concern faith and manners; for in other things, it is not so much as under counsel to follow the safest. Accordingly, Metina (in Lopez) says: The opinion of expert divines may be held without sin, although the contrary be more clear and more safe.⁶ In short, that an opinion which is less probable may be followed, is asserted (we are told) both by the greater part and the graver sort of their divines; above forty of their grave doctors are alleged for it, and amongst them, Martin Navarre, Medina, Peter Navarre, Arragon, Bannes, Du Vallius, with others, besides Jesuits. At present, take only the words of Navarre, who speaks fully: In the court of conscience (says he) it is enough, for the avoiding of sin, to take his opinion for true, whom we probably think to be a man of sufficient knowledge and conscience; and quotes their Gloss and Panormitan for it.⁸ To whom let me add Sancta Clara, who not only tells us (as we have heard before) that at this day it seems to be the common opinion of their schools and doctors, that the people erring with their teacher or pastor are wholly excused from all fault, but also, when any has a probable ground for what he does; as when a countryman believes anything to be lawful, induced thereto by the testimony of the parish priest, or of his parents, although he mistake, yet his mistake is void of sin; according to the rule in law, just and probable ignorance ought to be excused.² So that, to make a sin to be no sin, not only the judgment of a grave doctor so determining, but of a parish priest (who are known to be sufficiently ignorant), yea, of parents also (more ignorant than they) will suffice; and herein (says he) the doctors generally concur. In fine, if it be the common opinion that invincible (as divines) or probable ignorance (as the canonists call it) is excused from all sin, and that it is an instance hereof when one is misled by a sufficient author, then this is the common doctrine of the Romanists, and not the extravagancy of some particular sect or order amongst them.

If, then, this principle be so destructive to religion, the souls of men, and human societies, as some of the French Romanists brand it in reference to the Jesuits, the charge falls upon the common doctrine of the Roman church; for there it is generally taught and received, and was so before Ignatius had founded his order. And this prevents their ordinary exception against our alleging particular authors against them; they cannot with reason or modesty make use of this shift longer; for a single doctor is so far authorized by the common doctrine of their chief writers (and so of their church), that any, or all in their church, have warrant to rely on him; and so, in producing a particular author, in esteem with them, we do, in effect, allege their common doctrine. And indeed, by the premises, the opinion of a grave doctor is the doctrine of their church so far, that any of their church are allowed to follow it, both as to belief and practice. Their church (if we know her sense by the declaration of the generality of her approved authors) does allow all Romanists to follow the opinions I have charged them with, though they be plainly destructive of worship, faith, and holiness, both of heart and life. For I have charged them with nothing without a considerable author; and what is so grounded is with them probable, and what is probable is safe, and allowed both as to faith and manners. Or if there be any particular in the charge in which there is not a common concurrence, or which is contradicted, though by a multitude of their writers, yet since there is at least one grave doctor for it, it is in their account safe; and any Romanist has liberty, by the doctrine now insisted on, to follow it (if he please), rather than that which, upon the account of more assertors, may be thought safer. But as to the purpose for which I now take notice of it, this principle serves to rid their church of all sin, that is, of all conscience to avoid any; for if that be safe which is probable, and that will be probable, which is countenanced by the opinion of particular doctors, then all the sins which they, or any of them, have already concluded to be no sins (and these are an infinite number) may be safely committed; and all that any of them hereafter may determine to be no crimes, may be practised with as little conscience, and as much security. So that a train is laid hereby to blow up the whole rule of Christianity, and all innocency and holiness, which consists in conformity thereto. It has done horrible execution already, and what has hitherto escaped is at the mercy of it, being wholly under the mine, and may be despatched whenever the casuists (their engineers), who are daily at work about it, shall think fit.

Sect. 17. Let me but add some of the rules they lay down for the direction and relief of scrupulous consciences. They must persuade themselves that they sin not, though they break the law in a strict sense, if they observe it according to some complaisant interpretation. A benign sense is rather to be put upon any precept, than that which is strict; for the precepts of God and the church are not against that pleasantness which a scrupulous interpretation takes away: and that a person may the better be pleased, he may make the interpretation himself, and so make it as benign as he desires, and as favourable as his inclination and interest would have it; for though, in other courts, the interpretation belongs to him who makes the law, yet, according to their St Antoninus, in the court of conscience, it belongs to every one to do it for his own practice.² Or if he will be so over cautious, as not to rest in his own sense, but inquire the opinion of others (and he may easily meet with those amongst them, who will either make that which he has a mind to, no sin; or will mince it for him so small, that it may go down without hurt), yet he may choose that opinion which is most for his purpose (that which is most complaisant, and so will best serve his turn); and if he thinks it probable, though he fear the contrary, and it be false indeed, yet he may act according to it, and sin without fault.⁴ Nor is he concerned whether the doctor’s opinion be true or no; for though it be false, he may notwithstanding thereupon cast off all scruple, and break the law without sin. Thus if either himself, or any other will give him liberty to sin, when the law gives it not, yet he may take it, and his sin will be no sin.

Secondly, he must persuade himself he sins not when he breaks the law, not only if it be impossible, but if it be very difficult to keep it. Now it may be very difficult to avoid sin, when his employment leads, or when his complexion inclines him to it, or when he has got a habit of sinning, or otherwise when he is under temptation; and if it will be no sin to break the law in these and the like cases, he may make wickedness his daily practice without danger of sinning. But they seem to take difficult or impossible in a great latitude, as though it might be no more than incommodious; and so Sylvester explains it in the place to which he here refers us. Now it may be judged incommodious to observe the commands of God, when they suit not his fancy, or humour, or inclination, or interest, that of his ease or advantage; and if then, it will be no sin not to obey the divine commands, a man may go near to be excused from sinning all his life, though he do little or nothing else but sin. The obligation of the whole law, and gospel too, will be superseded by our conveniences; he may omit what is enjoined, or practise what is forbidden, and it will be no sin, if he judge the observance of the rule too difficult or incommodious.

Thirdly, He must make account that he sins not by breaking the law, when he may be thought a fool for keeping it, or when the observance of it may be ridiculous. Now, when sin is general, and the common usage of the times and places where he is, it may be as ridiculous to avoid it, as to be out of the fashion, or to appear in an antique garb. And those who reap pleasure and advantage by sin, will be ready to account them fools who abstain from it; as Nic. de Clemangis says they did in his time. A blessed time when there could be no sin, because piety and virtue were grown ridiculous!³ He must not think he sins who observes the law according to the common usage of good catholics, and makes that his example and rule, and what conscience he is like to make of sin by this rule, we may understand by the character which the count of Mirandula gave of the good catholics (the chief of them) to Pope Leo. Amongst the most (says he) of the most eminent in our religion, to whose example the silly multitude should be conformed, there is either no worship of God, or certainly very little; no regard at all of good life, no shame, no modesty; righteousness is declined into hatred or favour, and godliness even sunk into superstition.⁵ And if there be danger, it will be accounted folly indeed to expose himself; and whether it be accounted so or not, the apprehension of danger may excuse a man from sin in any case, so Sylvester after others.

There is no need to insist upon their other rules, as that the scrupulous ought to exercise himself in choosing what is less safe (more dangerous) amongst probable opinions, and not to regard (though he cannot answer) the arguments against it; it is enough that he believe what another says. Or this, The confessor may tell him that he should count no sin mortal, but what is manifest to be such, and so manifest sometimes, that he cannot swear it is not; or any else, though they have store of like nature; the former are sufficient to leave no conscience of sin amongst them in ordinary practice, and to encourage sinners commonly to venture upon any violation of the divine rule, with warrant from their doctrine, that it will be no sin to them. Thus they take a course to ease men’s consciences, by leaving them none. And what clearer way can there be to remove scruples, than to persuade them (who would retain some conscience, if they would suffer them) that there is little or no sin to be scrupled at.

Sect. 18. This is abundantly sufficient to make it apparent that the popish doctrine is destructive to holiness of life, since they have warranty thereby, not only to neglect the proper acts and exercises of holiness, but to give up themselves to practices of all sorts, which are directly opposite thereto. It is true, they do not acknowledge those practices to be sins or dangerous; but they may with as good reason justify such acts, which they cannot but condemn for crimes, as they go about to excuse these from being criminal. A son of Belial, that has lived in the neglect of holiness, and in the practice of ungodliness and unrighteousness all his time, will scarce pass at the day of judgment for one that is holy or innocent, because he has had the confidence to think so, or has found out some shift to support his presumption; or because others like himself were of the same mind; nor is he like to escape because he had wit enough to cozen his conscience, or boldness to stifle it, or wariness to keep out the light which would have informed it, or self-love to believe those who flattered him, in what his corrupt inclination led him to, or facileness to follow those blindfold who had no mind to see. Those devices which they have found out to justify innumerable transgressions of the divine law (and may serve as well to justify them all), have no countenance from Scripture, nor from antiquity, faithfully following it. This is not only acknowledged, but charged home by some of the French Romanists, upon a supposition, that these pernicious artifices are peculiarly the Jesuits’; but since it is apparent that the divines and casuists of all orders, and those of universal repute, are no more excusable, the charge is justly fixed upon their church and practical doctrine in general. Nor is their acknowledgment needful, it is plain in the writings of those who have the conduct of their consciences, that they consult not with Scripture in these determinations, no more than with ancient writers; you shall find them very rarely meddle with either. An allegation out of their canon law is an authentic authority that passes for the text. A schoolman or casuist of note, that went before them, is a sufficient conduct; if there be a concurrence of five or six, it is then the common opinion, and they are as secure in it as if they marched with a caravan; but if they have a mind to be singular, and have but something like a reason for it, they supererogate, though the reason be such, that the next who examines it puffs it away as a trifle. Such are the foundations of their practical divinity. The masters of it (the casuists) are followed by the priests and confessors, and the priests are followed by the people; and so the blind follow the blind, and those that see not, those that will not see. But it may be, there was less need to be so long and particular, in shewing how unnecessary it is with them to forsake sin. It is manifest enough by their doctrine of repentance, before insisted on, that there is no necessity they should break off their sins till they be obliged to be contrite; and their doctors cannot agree upon any time for this (though some of them specify the point of death, though then indeed they do not account it indispensably necessary): the people may think themselves excused if they do not resolve to leave their sins till their teachers agree that they must do so, and so live in them, till they can live no longer. If any particular doctor fix a more early period, and bring some reason for it, though they may if they please, yet they are not obliged to believe him, for no reason is brought by any of them for a more timely turning from sin, but is confuted and rejected by some or other among them as slight and insufficient. And it is no sin not to believe him who proposes to them upon frivolous reasons; yea, it would be an act of imprudence to do it, as Sancta Clara assures us, out of Aquinas and Victoria; so they may hereupon go on in their sins till the approach of death; and he, whom they worship as a saint, and reverence as the angel of their schools, may encourage them herein, since he declares that continuance in sin unto death is not a special sin, but only a circumstance of sin.² Nor need they be afraid of this circumstance, as though it would make their case worse; for by their doctrine, to sin (and so to continue in sin) upon confidence that they shall have pardon by confession, is so far from aggravating sin that it extenuates it. So Cajetan and Navarre after him. And that nothing may discourage them from continuing in wickedness, the council of Trent declare (without excepting the sinner’s perseverance in sin unto death) that if he be attrite, the sacrament of confession will secure him, though attrition is confessed not to import so much as any pious or ingenuous purpose to forsake sin.

CHAPTER X The Roman doctrine makes good works to be unnecessary

Sect. 1. But their good works possibly may satisfy for their other defects and extravagancies, and in these they glory above all, and have the confidence to condemn us, upon a pretence (though utterly false and groundless) that we deny the necessity of good works. Is it imaginable that alter this they themselves should hold them to be unnecessary, and so run into the heresy which they charge upon others? I will not desire any to believe this unless I let him see it; but their writings make it visible to any who have a mind to see. They reduce all good works to fasting, prayer, and acts of mercy, or alms-deeds. For their fasting I shall only say this, it is no fast, it is no good work, nor is it in their account necessary. To the making of a fast there must (as they tell us) be the concurrence of these severals. First, there must be no more than once eating. Gregory lies (though both a pope and a saint with them) if this be not true, says Cajetan. Secondly, this eating must not be a dinner. Bellarmine makes this good by scripture, a troop of fathers, and the perpetual custom of the faithful; concluding that it was never heard in the ancient church, that they did eat either till night, or before three at afternoon. Thirdly, what they take must be less nourishing and delicious than their ordinary fare. And so the church forbids that which in its nature, and for the most part, is more nourishing and more pleasing, the end of fasting requires it, which is (says he out of St Austin) to tame and subject the concupiscence of the body.² All these are necessary to the being of a fast, as they affirm, and yet not one of these is observed in their fasting. For first they eat a dinner, a full meal, at noon, or an hour or two sooner if they please, at the same time, and in as great quantity, as they do any other day; yea, if they eat to great excess at a fasting dinner, yet they keep the fast. As to the quantity (says another of their cardinals, who can best tell what belongs to fasting) of a dinner at a fast, there is no certain measure; but though one be very excessive, and transgress the law of sobriety, yet he fasts well enough; and adds, it is lawful to eat more than ordinary at dinner upon a fast day. Others, not of the Society, may hit the sense of the church herein more unquestionably, when they teach, that one who, observing the quality of the meat, stuffs his belly so full as to be so far from any sense of the hardship of fasting, or from repressing the sins of the flesh, that he rather excites and cherishes lust thereby, yet fulfils the precept for fasting. So Covarruvius, Abulensis, Medina, Cajetan, and others, in Bonacina, and he after them,⁴ where, by the help of a distinction or two, intemperance both in quality and quantity, is made perfectly consistent with the fast and temperance of holy church. So that they fast, though they dine, and that lustily, whatever the Scripture, or the fathers, or all the faithful (in Bellarmine) say of the inconsistence of a dinner with a fast. But this is too little for a Roman fast (though many that never dream they fast eat constantly less); they may eat a breakfast too, and yet keep a fast after they have broke it. They may drink ale or wine, and eat bread after it, that the strong drink may not hurt them; or if bread will not serve them (though these together may make a breakfast for a festival) they may eat other things also after their morning’s draught, if it be not beyond measure; and these both at their first and second breakfast. Oh! but thus they eat twice, that the cardinal was aware of, where is then their fast, when it is, as they affirm, essential thereto not to eat twice? Why, says he, a pious construction must be put upon it, it is that the drink may not hurt them; and so taken it seems either they eat not twice, when they eat once and again, or they fast by a pious interpretation, when in the sense of the universal church, and the world too, they fast not.⁶ Thus, that they may be sure to afflict the flesh with a severe abstinence, they may eat a supper too. And no wonder, for if they can excuse the second eating, it will be, as they conclude, no fault to eat a third, or a fourth, or a fifth time, or as often as they please; but three meals may serve them for a fast, and so one supper may suffice. Indeed, they call it by cænula, and will have it pass under a little name, though the quantity allowed be great, even full as big as custom will make it, for that is their rule for fasting suppers, not to eat by any certain measure, but so much as others are wont to do; if it be excessive great, that which custom introduces will justify it. And those that tell us custom is their rule acquaint us also, that it is the custom in divers countries to sup with notorious excess.³ And so they may eat at supper not only for hunger, but out of sensuality, as Panormitan, and others after him. And thus sensuality and the severity of a popish fast, are perfectly reconciled.

Such a supper these fathers may eat in the morning, if they please. This will be but a small fault, though they do it when there is no occasion for it; and they may the better fast after, upon a full stomach, till noon at least; but they need not stay so long, for they may drink every hour, or oftener if they will, and whenever they drink they may eat something too, that the drink may not hurt them; and thus they may break their fast every hour of the day, or more, and yet keep it the whole day well enough. For the quality of their fasting-meat (to say nothing that some flesh is allowed) they may use the most delicious that they can compass, the most curious sweetmeats, the choicest wines, the rarest fish, and that dressed after the most delicate mode, and this at dinner, the meal most repugnant of all to fasting. Oh, how gladly would thousands of our people be condemned to such a maceration of the flesh, for more days in a year than the Romanists are thus pitifully mortified, and never trouble pope or prelate for a dispensation! Nay, they would purchase a license to fast, if any would accommodate them with expedients to do it at such a rate. Besides their meats, they may drink freely, not only at meals, but before or after, though they need it not, and be not thirsty; the drinking of wine out of sensuality breaks not the fast, says Sylvester.⁷ And thus they may drink before the meat they fast on be digested, for though that be intemperance in other cases, as Navarre tells us, it breaks not the fast. Sylvester thinks it possible that intemperance in drinking may be a sin; however, it is lawful for those that fast to drink often, on the same day, for drinking breaks not the fast, either before or after dinner; so he after others. A man may wonder what can break this fast, since neither drinking nor eating so often, and so much, even to excess, and the gratifying of sensuality, in so high a degree can do it. It is wine that they may drink so often when they fast, and yet they acknowledge that wine is more contrary to the nature and end of a fast than flesh. Though wine, says De Graffiis, be more nutritive, and the drinking of wine do more provoke to concupiscence than the eating of flesh, according to that: Proverbs 10:1-32. Wine is a luxurious thing, and Ephesians 5:1-33. Be not drunk with wine in which is luxury; yet, says he, he that on a fast day often drinks wine or water, either sooner or later, does not break the fast.

Thus, as they may eat like gluttons, so (by the doctrine of their chief authors) they may drink till they be drunk, and yet not break their fast, for no drinking (how excessive soever) can break it. The church-fast (they tell us) consists not in abstinence from drink; consequently, he that drinks wine, or other liquor, before or after dinner, breaks not the precept for fasting, though he sin against temperance, and drink excessively. So Bonacina, after Aquinas, Abulensis, Navarre, and others, telling us it is their common doctrine).

I suppose this fast can never be broke; it will be a fast for ever, do what they can, if all they are allowed to do against it cannot make it to be no fast; for so far as I can perceive, they may break their bellies, and yet not break their fast. If one in the ancient church had spoke of his fasting after three such meals, and so much drinking, yea, or but eating a dinner, he would have been thought out of his wits; yet they must not be accounted ridiculous, who tell us gravely that this is fasting, and that they break not a fast unless they dine twice on a fasting day; and indeed some of their writers seem ashamed of this good work, as they do it in their church.⁵ But suppose this were a fast (when indeed it is no such thing), and observed by them, ἐν ξηροφαγία (as Epiphanius explains it), and so that they tasted nothing till three o’clock, or till evening as of old, yet by the Roman order it could be no good work. That it may be such, there must be something religious (for mere abstinence has no more goodness in it than eating); it cannot be religious unless it be subservient to some religious design or employment; but they disjoin it from all things of that nature; we hear not a word from them, of their taking notice of their sins, or confessing them, or afflicting their souls for them; they need not so much as pray when they fast, either in public or private; yea, they are not obliged to hear mass, though that be the employment of every day for worship, so that their fasts are no days for worship, or any religious exercise. They are discharged also from religious ends; two are commonly assigned, the taming of the flesh, and the elevating of the mind to God; but though the flesh be more unruly, and the mind move not in the least towards God on a fasting-day; though they never mind these ends in their abstinence, yet they entirely fulfil the precepts of their church for fasting, as they commonly conclude, upon this ground, because the end of the precept is not commanded.² So that this practice which they call fasting, is a mere bodily exercise amongst them, and thus it is represented by Cajetan, applying that of the apostle to it, 1 Timothy 4:8, ‘Bodily exercise profiteth but little,’ &c. Where he denies it the character of a good work. And since it is neither a true fast nor a good work, if they made it never so necessary, it would be no proof, that by their doctrine there is any necessity either of real fasting or any good work. But, indeed, they declare their pretended fasts needless; for their best writers conclude it to be but a venial fault not to observe them; so that there is no more necessity with them to fast after their mode, than there is to avoid a venial sin, which is none at all. They have so many ways to excuse men from fasting, as leave no necessity of it. This one may serve any that have no mind to fast. If a man have tired himself with any employment (lawful or damnable) not only with honest labour, but with too much gaming, yea, or with excessive whoring, he is thereby exempted from the obligation to fast, though he so wearied himself on purpose that he might be excused. But one thing herein is more intolerable, that this ridiculous piece of mockery which they call fasting, has the glory given it which is peculiar to Christ alone, and is thought sufficient both to satisfy the justice of God, and to merit, by way of condignity, not only grace but eternal glory; an opinion of such malignancy as is enough to poison the best work in the world into deadly guilt. To hold that a person, because he eats not two dinners, or abstains for a day from flesh, though he stuff himself with other delicacies, even to excess, should be worthy of the glorious prerogative of Christ, is a conceit to be entertained with scorn and laughter, if the horror of it did not call for another passion. Yet such are points of faith in that church; and this surely is enough to cloy any man with their fasting.

Sect. 2. Come we to the next of their good works, that is, prayer. This unquestionably is a good work, but then sure it must be good praying; but they are so far from judging it necessary to pray well, that they conclude it sufficient to employ themselves about this work in such a manner as cannot, upon a just account, be called praying at all. The only public prayers necessary for the people, by the Roman orders, are those of the mass, but how they pray therein, I cannot apprehend. They use not the words, they need not hear them, they cannot understand them. Now, can it be imagined that he prays, who neither expresses nor conceives any petitions? They do it not themselves, they join not with the priest, for no man can possibly concur with the words or the sense of him whom he neither hears nor understands. They cannot concur with the priest as men, with rational acts, much less as Christians. The church of Rome has made it not only needless, but impossible, for the people to pray in their public service; they must think something sufficient for them, which is not praying. Let us see what account their authors give of this. Sylvester, proving that it is not needful to pray on the Lord’s day, or any of their days for public worship, tells us what will serve the people instead thereof. It suffices that they stand by the priest praying in the mass, and that is all that is requisite, by virtue of this precept. So that the church requires no more than the presence and posture of the body. And they that can make a prayer of this, may make an image in the church to pray; and if this would be a miracle, it would be as wonderful that the other should be praying; but thus it becomes those who will worship images, as if they were God, to worship God, as if themselves were images. Oh, but they must concur with the priest so far, as either actually or virtually to wish that his prayers may be heard.³ And if this be praying, a man may pray in the church while he is in his bed at home, for actually he may do this if he be awake, and virtually, though he be asleep. There is no prayer, but what is either vocal or mental; what the people do in the mass, is neither; they say nothing, nor do they understand anything, nor need they mind anything, of what is said; and it is much, if a man’s mind can be employed about that which he not only understands not, but minds not at all. The mind must necessarily attend actually in mental prayer, but actual attention is not necessary to what they call praying. So it is neither vocal nor mental, not any at all, unless they can devise a mode of prayer without either voice or mind. They know not what to mind, nor whom, person or thing; they understand not whether the priest be in confession, or at prayer, or in his lauds; no, nor whether he be praying or reading, unless the dumb signification of a posture tell them; nor that way neither, for they need not see, no more than hear, the priest. They know not whether he be addressing himself to God, or to a creature, whether to another divine person than the Father (for they have prayers in the mass to Christ and the Holy Ghost, though an ancient council forbids it); they know not whether he be praying to an angel or to a saint, to a man or to a woman, to an image or to a crucifix, for they have addresses to all. They can in no wise be thought to pray, who do not, who cannot so much as say Amen to a prayer; and this they cannot say, who understand not what is prayed for, as Aquinas himself assures us from the words of the apostle. But the priest who celebrates seems to pray, though the people at mass do not. He seems so, but the church of Rome obliges not him to pray, unless he can be said to pray who only reads the words of a form, without minding anything else which they must necessarily be concerned in who pray indeed. Of the several sorts of attention requisite in prayer, none, with them, is necessary but that which respects the pronouncing of the words right. If the priest mind but this only, so as to read the words right, it is sufficient, he does all the church requires, and fully satisfies the precept of saying mass; this is their common doctrine. So that unless he can be said to pray who neither minds the God he should pray to, nor the things to be prayed for, no, nor the sense of the words he uses, their church requires not the priests to pray, even when they are saying their mass-prayers. Nor is it more needful, on the same account, in the canonical hours, as we have seen before. So that praying indeed is not necessary for priest or people in all the public service of the Romish church; much less is it needful in their private devotions, which are not enjoined; for there they declare it lawful to be more neglectful of all the necessary concerns of prayer than in public. Now that they who mind nothing but the bare saying the words of a prayer do not pray indeed, they themselves will acknowledge in their lucid intervals. Cajetan tells us that if one be corporally present at mass, but lets his mind considerately wander after other things, he satisfies not the precept, because he is but so there as if he voluntarily slept at it; for to be far from the mass by voluntary sleeping and by voluntary wandering are both alike.³ Hence it is clear that priest or people whose minds voluntarily wander at mass, do no more pray there than if they were voluntarily asleep; and consequently, if they wander carelessly, without observing it, they pray no more than if they were carelessly asleep. Yet many of them think the church forbids not voluntary wanderings. He himself thinks she forbids not careless wanderings; therefore all of them must believe that she thinks it sufficient to pray as they may do who are fast asleep, one way or other. And yet none that are awake can well count sleeping to be praying. Bellarmine reckoning the several sorts of prayer, one (says he) is mental, another is both mental and vocal. But when he would add that which is vocal only, he will not have that accounted prayer. A third member of the division ought not to be added, to wit, that which is vocal only; and gives good reason, for that, says he, is of no use to please God, but rather to provoke him to anger, according to that Isaiah 29:1-24, ‘This people honour me with their lips,’ &c. Yet such is the praying in the Roman church, and no other needful in their divine service, as the cardinal himself declares sufficiently in the same book. And if no other praying be needful, no prayer that is a good work is necessary by their doctrine.

Sect. 3. Proceed we to the last sort of their good works, to wit, acts of mercy or charity, comprised in alms-deeds for the relief of the indigent; and we can scarce discover that these will ever be necessary by their doctrine. Cardinal Cajetan (one represented as more favourable to these acts of charity than divers others) tells us that to omit them is no mortal sin (and therefore to do them will not be necessary by any command), but only in two cases; first, when one hath superfluities, both of nature and state, that is, more than either nature or the quality of the person requires; secondly, when the poor are in extreme necessity (not in common want only, but such as is extraordinary). And these two are so described to us that themselves confess they very seldom fall out, and we may think hardly ever, so that rarely or never will this good work be necessary. For the former, that a person may be judged to have anything superfluous (without which he is not bound to relieve others), it must be considered what is requisite for the honourable expenses of himself, his children and family, and what for the munificence of his state and magnificence too, what for common events and casualties, to provide against them, and other things of this nature.³ Upon which he concludes, it will rarely fall out that a man living splendidly, according to his quality, will have anything superfluous. And so very rarely (if he had said never the premises would have borne it) will it be the duty of such as have enough to live gloriously to spare anything for the poor. Less pride and vain-glory, or prodigality, than they allow them to have without any mortal guilt, will leave nothing superfluous, and so quite excuse them from these good works. Navarre is of the same mind, and tells us there are few rich men who have anything superfluous, since neither kings nor great princes can be thought to have superfluities; having said a little before, that it cannot easily be judged that any secular person hath more than is needful for his condition, for he may heap up moneys to purchase more, or to advance his condition higher, and so still have no more than is requisite for his state, and nothing at all will be due for charitable acts. He expresses it more fully elsewhere, and concludes, For all this he cannot be said to have any such superfluities that he should be obliged by any command to give to the poor. So that unless a man have so much as he neither has at present, nor may have for the future, occasion to use—that is, unless he has so much as no man will or can believe he hath,—an act of charity will not be his duty. If he do but desire to have more than he now has, or do but design to rise any higher than he now is, though but in such a degree as is found in all, and may innocently be in any; at least, if he have but anything of covetousness or ambition, though far less than they determine he may have without any deadly guilt (and so without any considerable danger), he is discharged from all obligation to this good work. The other case will make charity no more necessary; it is when the poor are in extreme necessity, and this is only when it is apparent they will die for want of necessaries if we relieve them not. Now such a case rarely happens, and a man may never meet with one in such extremity all his life; but if he do, yet he may be excused for want of evidence that his necesssity is so great; he need not take the party’s word for it, no, not though in public places there seem to be also clear signs of it; he need not take the word of any other, no, not the judgment of his parish priest or confessor (though upon their opinion he may safely venture upon acts of wickedness), unless they can assure him thereof as eye-witnesses, or if he be morally certain of the extremity;³ yet if there be a probability that any other will relieve the person ready to starve, he may leave him to the mercy of others, without doing anything himself towards his relief (for that is another limitation which they add in the case). For example, if he thought it likely that a protestant would relieve the perishing party, a papist (by their doctrine of good works) might reserve his money and charity for another world, nor would it be necessary to exercise one act thereof while he lives. Or amongst themselves, while each one expects that another may do it, the poor may perish, and all that might relieve them are excused. Besides, in this case, they conclude it lawful for the person in extremity to steal, either secretly or openly, from those that have enough;⁵ so that acts of charity will not be necessary among them but when theft is lawful, and no man need relieve the indigent with anything he hath, till they may justly take it from him. But if it were possible in these cases whereto they confine it, to find any place for the necessity of this duty, yet one thing more, added by their prime doctors, dashes all, for they teach that it is not required to relieve the necessitous by giving them anything, but it is sufficient to let, or sell, or lend to them. Navarre concludes it lawful to buy persons in extreme necessity, and lawful for them to consent to it.² His reasons, among others, are because a father in time of extreme hunger may sell his son; also, because no man is bound, to relieve one, though in extreme necessity, gratis, if he can do it sufficiently by loan, exchange, &c. So that if a man were in such extremity for want of food, that he might sell his son to get it for the saving of his life, yet no Christian, in that case, were bound to give him relief freely; by their doctrine it would suffice to let him have money or meat by the sale of his child. We cannot expect they will ever find it a duty to give to the indigent if not in such circumstances; and it is a plain case, where there is no obligation to give, there is no necessity to give alms. But if they did make it necessary to give alms, yet it is not needful by their doctrine to do it so as it will be a good work (or so to fast, or pray, or do any other act which have any goodness in them, or pretend to it; so good works will, by their principles, be still unnecessary. For that any work may be good, it must be from a right principle and for a good end; but both these they make needless. As to the former, there is no necessity, as they teach, to act out of love to God; for though this be the intention of God, and the design of the law in all good acts, as they acknowledge from that 1 Timothy 5:1-25, Romans 13:1-14, yet they have a maxim generally received, The intention of the command is not commanded. Herein they follow Aquinas, and hence they conclude that such a mode of acting out of love to God is not required in any command of the divine law;⁵ but the whole, and every part of it, may be fulfilled, and sin avoided, if that which is required be done, though not out of love to God at all. And particularly Soto takes much pains to argue us out of the love of God in all our actings, and to prove that it is not necessary. And all generally conclude that it is not needful in any acts of piety, mercy, or charity required on their days of worship; since there they determine that there is no need of any act of love, as was shewed before.

It is no wonder therefore (as to the second) if they conclude it needless to act for God in what we do, and make him alone our chief end. In the theory indeed they determine that an act is not good unless there be a concurrence of all conditions requisite thereto, and that the end is the principal (as much in morals as the form is in naturals). So that without a good end that act must be naught, and no good end where God is not chief; yet for practice they discharge them from any necessity to make God their principal end. They conclude it lawful for a man to act principally for his own advantage;² yea, they count it but a venial fault to do the best act principally for a sinful end. Now, to avoid a venial sin, they hold it not necessary by any command of God, and therefore it will not be needful to do anything but principally for an end so far sinful; and, consequently, unless the work can be good, whose principal end is sin, no good work at all will be necessary. But it is a more wicked end, which they openly avow, when they design by what they do to merit grace and glory, and make satisfaction to divine justice. This is to make Christ a leg, while they attempt his crown; to offer him a rush, with an intent thereby to invest themselves in his prerogative. They should shew us how it is possible such acts can be good, before they pretend to account good works necessary.

Sect. 4. But though they find no necessity of good works by virtue of any divine precept ordinarily, yet they seem to make some when they will have the priest to enjoin them for penance (and it is like in this as in other cases, they leave so little or nothing needful that God has commanded, to render their own devices more necessary). But good works, being enjoined as penance, become punishments, and it signifies the church of Rome is no good friend to good works when she counts or makes them punishments; for punishment is properly evil to us, and not to be done, but suffered, and thus she will have good works neither to be good nor to be done. To be sure thus they cannot be done so as to be good, or as becomes Christians to do them; for he that must think it a suffering to do them, does them with the spirit of a slave, not of a Christian. But let us suppose they may be good works, and well done too by way of penance, yet they are not necessary at all in their church upon this account, and so no way. For, first, the priest needs not enjoin good works as penance; he may enjoin nothing at all if he pleases;⁵ or some slight thing, that which is good for nothing, or that which is worse; or what the confitent must have done if he had not sinned;⁷ or he may dismiss him with this general, All the good thou doest, or evil thou sufferest, let it serve for satisfaction; or he may commend something by way of counsel, without obliging him by any injunction;⁹ or he may require him only to avoid the sin he confesses for a while (and when he shrives the woman that he has sinned with, it is like he may not prove very rigorous this way¹¹). Or, secondly, if he should enjoin this, or any good work, the confitent need not accept of, or submit to it, as many of their chief doctors determine. Or, thirdly, if he do accept it, yet he needs not perform it for all that; he may be released by himself; to omit it will be but a small fault (such as he needs not regard, be the good work little or great), if be not out of contempt. Or another may undertake it, and satisfy by suffering it for him;² or a priest may release him, either he that enjoined it or another. However, indulgences will do it effectually, these serve to sweep away all good works (all necessity of them) on this account for ever. This is their special use, to relieve the pope’s subjects from the sad penalty of good works; for though they have dealt hardly with good works, to make them a punishment, yet they will not deal so hardly with catholics as to have it necessary that they should be thus punished. And therefore to ease them of this grievous suffering of doing good, the church in great tenderness has provided indulgences, which they may have at easy rates; and thereby an acquittance, discharging them from the good works they were to suffer! And if the priest should be so rigorous as to enjoin a sinner to be doing good all his life, or so impertinent as to require it for an hundred years, he may meet with indulgences will quit him of it, every moment of his life; and if he will, many thousand years over and above. And if this cannot be had unless he pay for it, yet for his encouragement they teach that it is better to lay out his money for an indulgence that in deeds of charity. So that there is no such goodness or necessity in the best work a priest can enjoin, but it may be better, and more necessary, to give the pope money; and this done, through his indulgence, there may be no need to do any more.

THE CONCLUSION By the premises, it is manifest that popery, by its practical principles, is destructive to Christianity and the souls of men. As to Christianity, whether we consider it in general as religion, or in its specialties as the best religion, it is both ways by the popish doctrine ruined. This plucks up the fundamentals of it, and dissolves the whole structure, and buries and confounds both the necessary materials, and the peculiar excellences thereof, in its rubbish. There can be no religion in reality without real worship, this being essential to it; yet their doctrine declares it needless, either for clergy or people to be real worshippers of God, being so far from engaging them to be reverent or devout, or sincere, or affectionate towards God in religious addresses, that it will not have them obliged so much as actually to mind God when they pretend to worship him. There needs not so much as one act of true and real worship, to make them as religious, and as much Christians, as is necessary by their divinity; so that Christianity, as they form it, is a religion regardless of God, even when, if ever, he should be most observed and honoured, and thereby sunk lower than heathenism, and the notions of natural religion retained by infidels. Further, it discharges those acts and duties of Christianity which are necessary and essential to it; and allows and encourages all that it forbids, and condemns even what is most repugnant to, and inconsistent with it. It makes all Christian acts and duties needless, and all wickedness opposite thereto, safe and practicable, without fear of condemnation; and there needs no more to ruin the religion of Christ. A great part of those duties are by this doctrine mere matter of counsel, and thereby they are made no duties, all obligation to perform them being, in that notion, quite dissolved. The remnant (all conscience of which is not swallowed up in counsels) which they cannot but acknowledge to be duties, yet they will have them to be so but sometimes, and that very rarely, and when that is they cannot tell; it is not certainly known when, and the observance thereof must be correspondent: nobody knows certainly when. Or if they guess at the time, and point some out as probable, yet when the time comes, the acts (though the life of Christianity consists therein, and the salvation of the persons depends thereon) need not to be done, something else will serve instead thereof, some natural act, or faint wish, or false conceit, something or other, though neither truly Christian nor virtuous (with the sacrament at least), will excuse them from all other Christian acts. It is not the accessories of religion only that they make thus bold with; but thus they handle the very vitals of Christianity, and make them unnecessary for Christians. The very acts of faith, and hope, and love, yea, repentance itself, and all the rest with these, are thus made needless, and they may be true Christians (at their rate), and saved (in their conceit) without ever exerting, in a whole life, so little as one act of grace or Christian virtue. The world never saw Christianity, into what hands soever it fell, more clearly stripped, not only of its lustre and ornament, but of its life and being. If this suffice not to make an end of all religion truly Christian, they not only dismiss, as more than needs, what the doctrine of the gospel makes most necessary, but advance and encourage what is most opposite to it, not only ignorance, unbelief, disaffection to Christ, impenitency, but therewith all disobedience unto the gospel. Instead of the holy rules thereof, they have formed a doctrine of licentious maxims, which give security to the practice of any wickedness, and take away (when they had left no other restraint) the fears of hell from those who live and die in damning sins. Whatever it is that Christ forbids, it is with them either no sin, or not dangerous, or the worst of all, by virtue of some devices of their own, not damning; so that they may venture upon any wickedness freely, and persist therein securely till death; and yet, by some evasions which they tell them of, escape the wrath to come (whatever Christ say to the contrary) without either the fruits or acts of repentance. There are many sins, and amongst them horrid and enormous crimes, condemned by the law of God and natural light, and such as the practice of them is reproachful to the Christian name, which yet, with them, pass for no sins; and they are furnished with expedients to make any other so too, when they see occasion, and in these they will discern no shadow of danger. There is a world of wickedness, which by their doctrine is venial, abundance more than enough, utterly to deface Christianity, and to make any who takes but part of the liberty given by their divines, to look more like an atheist, or a brute, a person of no religion, conscience or honesty, than a true Christian. They can gratify any vicious disposition, which way soever it leads, with impiety and debauches enough to fill up a whole life; and yet, if he will be satisfied with anything but the highest degree of wickedness, promise him security.

If he could swallow ten millions of their venials every minute at a gulp, they would not (by their divinity) endanger him, though one that will follow the rules of Christ must choose death rather than venture upon some one of them. There is with them no danger in thus sinning, though the Christian doctrine never discovered anything else in sin; or, if their catholics will be outrageously wicked, and cannot be satisfied with less than the practice of the most mortal crimes, they will not disoblige them (the party must be kept up though their souls sink), they shall have their liberty upon easy terms; deadly sins shall be as free for them, and in a manner as safe as their harmless venials. That which makes venial faults seem less dangerous than mortal, is because they will not damn a man, though he never repent of them; but even herein they have made venial and mortal alike safe; for, by their doctrine he may live in all sorts of deadly wickedness, and die therein without any act of true repentance, and yet escape damnation. They commend to them several evasions to secure impenitent sinners, how damnable soever their neglects or practices have been to the last. But that of the Trent Council must not be doubted of; attrition (which they confess alone to be no sufficient, no saving repentance), with the sacrament of confession, will pass any sinner into a saving state. This one device of their own will serve instead of all that Christ hath prescribed; if this be observed, though they live and die in the neglect of all Christian virtues, and in the practice of all wickedness which Christ condemns, they need not fear; this alone will secure them. The least natural or slavish remorse, and a priest, is all the Christianity that a papist need trouble himself for: if he can but make sure of these at last gasp, he is safe, though all his life he be more like a devil incarnate than a Christian. By this alone Christianity is utterly subverted, all the laws of Christ in effect repealed, and their observance rendered needless, the whole gospel made a cipher, and a way to salvation opened by bold impostors, not only without, but against the gospel, and quite cross to the way, the truth, and the life.

Sect. 2. No more is needful to manifest that the practical part of popery (however it hath passed for more harmless than the other more insisted on) is destructive to the souls of men. It leads them out of the way of salvation, if real Christianity be the way. It obliges them to neglect as needless not only the lesser, but the principal, parts of that way, without which heaven is altogether inaccessible. They that have discovered another hell, may as well fancy another heaven; but the way to that heaven which Christ hath prepared for his people, lies through the knowledge of Christ, love to him, faith in him, that repentance from dead works, and exercise of Christian virtues, that mortification of sin, holiness of life, and real worshipping of God, which, by this doctrine, is abandoned as unnecessary. It tempts them into the way of destruction, encourages them in such practice of wickedness as Christ hath declared to be the broad way. It promises safety therein, and hides the danger from their eyes, it covers the pits (whose descent is into that which is bottomless) with spiders’ webs, and persuades them it is firm ground. It leaves them no sense, nor notice of many sins; no conscience of far the most; no fear of any, no not of the worst, such as themselves call deadly crimes. It gives as much security to such wickedness as a heart that, has sold itself to it need wish. For what need he desire more than assurance, that after a whole life spent therein, there is a very easy way for him to be saved, so easy that he need not trouble himself so much as truly to repent? Such grace as any priest can help a sinner to (an impenitent sinner) at last gasp, will bring him to heaven, though he never once thought of the way to it all his life.

Such being the rules which Roman Catholics have for the conduct of their hearts and lives, and the worst sort of them being as much approved by their church, as any practical doctrine current amongst them, let it be considered what regard that church hath of religion or salvation, which leaves them to such doctrine as is so inconsistent with both, and what regard they have of their souls, who, after notice hereof, will trust them to such a conduct. It gratifies the lusts and corrupt inclinations of the seduced, and serves the interest of the contrivers, drawing the world into the bosom of the pope’s church, and entangling it there by all the charms of such a religion as dissolute persons would make for themselves; but if the God of infinite goodness and truth have given us any certain notice of the ways of eternal life and death, those that believe and practise it will certainly destroy their own souls.

CONTENTS OF THE PRECEDING TREATISE

Chapter I By the doctrine of the Romanists it is not needful to worship God really in public or private. True religion will have God to be worshipped really. Real worship requires the concurrence of mind and heart. In their divine service they require no act of the will, but an intention beforehand to attend their service is enough, though they be not attentive when they are at it. An intention to worship God there is scarce needful. Their intention may be effectual, though they act contrary to it. They may employ both soul and body about other things when they are at their prayers. The act of the mind which they seem to require is attention, but this need not be either spiritual or rational; so that they need not mind God in their prayers, nor the things to be prayed for, nor the sense of the words they use, but only the pronouncing of them, nor need they actually mind that. The church’s holiness supplies their defects, and makes those pass as such that pray devoutly who pray not at all. All due attention in worship is not only unnecessary, but impossible in their way. As attention, so inward reverence and devotion likewise, is not necessary in their service. Hereby their worship is no better than a profane irreligious exercise. They seem satisfied with less worship for God than for their images.

Sect. 1, to p. 234. In the mass, by their doctrine, God may be less minded than in their canonical hours, where they tell us he need not be minded at all. No inward worship requisite in the mass. It is enough if their attendance there be but an human act; nay, the use either of sense or reason is not there required. They may busy themselves in other employments while they are at mass. They may sleep a while, or laugh, if they be not too loud. Or talk of their worldly affairs all the while, say some; others would not have their discourse so serious; yea, it may be immodest, without transgressing the precept. And lascivious or very profane tunes to the organ at mass may be a small fault. The precept for mass (the chief part of their religion) may be fulfilled by mortal wickedness.

Sect. 2, to p. 241. Of their ends in worship. They may lawfully worship God for their own ends. Sin may be their end in worshipping, and that without sin, if not principally intended. It is but a small fault to worship God principally for vain glory. He that comes to mass or prayer with a design to satisfy his lust, or other mortal wickedness, satisfies the command of the church.

Sect. 3, to p. 244.

How unnecessary preaching is counted in their church, and hearing the word, in such circumstances where it would be accounted needful, if ever.

Sect. 4, to p. 245. In their sacraments no good motions or actual dispositions (such as are necessary in real worshippers) are required by that church in any that administer or partake thereof. This shewed as to baptism and penance, the sacraments for the dead; also in the other five for the living. In all, the precepts of the church may be fully accomplished by impious and wicked acts.

Sects. 5 and 6, to p. 248.

Even as to the eucharist (for which they profess they have the highest veneration) they may partake worthily who are without any the least good act of mind or heart. And to shut out good motions from their souls, on set purpose, when they are communicating, is but a venial fault, such as will not hinder the effects of the sacrament. Those vagaries which are inconsistent with attention and reverence, if they be not taken notice of, will be no fault at all; if they be deliberate, will be but slight ones. Not only reverence and devotion are accounted needless at this sacrament, but sobriety and the use of reason. To communicate out of ostentation and vainglory is but a peccadillo. And all holy fervour being excluded by voluntary distraction, to employ their souls vainly or wickedly during the celebration is no fault at all, in reference to the sacrament. Those that communicate unworthily to such a degree as is counted most horridly impious, do fully satisfy the precept of their church for the communion.

Sect. 7, to p. 250. Their doctrine doth not more oblige them to worship God in private. Meditation not necessary, no, not on the holiest seasons or occasions. Reading the word of God scarce tolerated in the people, and that not so freely as the stews.

Sects. 8 and 9, to p. 250.

Private prayer rarely a duty with some, never a duty with others. Not at all by their common doctrine, but by accident, in the article of necessity, which many never meet with; so that many may never pray while they live, and yet be innocent. Some say there is no divine precept for prayer; others, who acknowledge a precept, will not have it oblige them at such times and occasions when, if ever, it would oblige. Even in their article of necessity, when it comes, they have ways to excuse them easily from the obligation, and to make it no special sin to neglect this duty all their life.

Sect. 10, to p. 254. Their church obliges not any to private prayers, not to the least or those of most account among them. Whenever they use private prayer upon any account, as required by precept, or enjoined for penance (for prayer passes commonly with them as a punishment), or voluntary as a work of supererogation, there is no need by their principles to worship God therein. Seeing they are to worship him no more anywhere, the world may judge what religion they have, since that worship is as essential to religion as a soul to a man.

Sects. 11 and 12, to p. 257.

Chapter II

Christian knowledge is not necessary for Romanists by their doctrine. They need not know what they are to pray for. Many of their priests, yea, of their popes, understand not their common prayers.

Sect. 1, to p. 258.

They need not know what they are to believe. The knowledge of all the articles of the small creed, nor of the Trinity, and incarnation of Christ, scarce necessary for all Christians. Ignorance and error in points of faith may not only be innocent but meritorious.

Sect. 2, to p. 263.

They need not know what they are to do. They may merit heaven by following their leaders out of the way. That is the most complete and perfect obedience which is next to brutish, without knowledge and judgment, when they obey their leaders as a beast doth his owner.

Sect. 3, to p. 265. The knowledge of the Scriptures (to which their doctrine and worship is confessed to be repugnant) unnecessary in a manner for all sorts; not only for the people and monastics, but their confessors and preachers. Their bishops afraid to look into the Bible lest it should make them heretics. Therefore very few of their bishops in the council of Trent (who decreed so many new articles of faith) had knowledge in theology. Their popes commonly no divines, many of them understood not Latin, though not only their church-service and laws, but their authentic edition of the Scripture be confined to that language. The people, the further they are from knowledge, the more excusable, if they take no care nor pains to get it.

Sect. 4, to p. 272.

Chapter III Their doctrine makes it needless to love God. There is no command for habitual love to God. The acts of this love are as unnecessary. The imperate acts thereof not enjoined; neither God nor the church requires any to observe the commands of God out of love to him.

Sects. 1 and 2, to p. 274.

How needless the elicit acts of this love are. Some hold there is no command for this actual love (any inward act of it) that binds them, or no special command. Others, who acknowledge a precept, will not have it to bind them upon any occasion when, if ever, it would oblige. Not when they have sinned against him. Not when he expresses his love. Not when he discovers his infinite excellencies to them. Not when they are to worship him. Not at any sacrament, no, not the eucharist. It is too much to love God once a week, or once a year, or once in four or five years. One act of love once in a life may be enough; yea, and more than needs too, for when that time comes (if ever it come) when they will have any obliged to an act of love, yet they then assign something else which will serve instead of it, and so render it needless still. A love which is the issue of nature unsanctified may suffice. Or to love God less than other things, only more than mortal crimes, may be enough. Or to do nothing against this love, though there be no acts of it or from it, may be sufficient. Or external acts may satisfy. Or if a man believes that he loves God above all, though indeed he does not, it may serve the turn. Or attrition (which includes something repugnant to this love) with their sacrament of confession, may excuse him from loving God at the point of death, though he never once loved him in his life before. How extremely pernicious and ridiculous this their doctrine is.

Sect. 3 and 4, to p. 285.

Chapter IV By their doctrine no faith is necessary, but that which is neither justifying nor saving. That which they will have necessary for the ignorant is what they call implicit. A faith which they may have without actually believing any one article of the Christian faith. And is consistent with the belief of what is quite opposite to the Christian belief. And is but such a faith as Jews, Turks, and Pagans have. This was not thought sufficient for Christians till they were thought something like asses, and so expressed by some of their great saints and doctors. How many ways they have to exempt the people from the obligation of all precepts for any other than this brutish faith.

Sect. 1, to p. 289. The faith requisite in the more intelligent to justify them they call explicit. This, as described by them in its object, includes things uncertain, impertinent, false, impossible, and ridiculous, as points that must be certainly believed unto justification. This of itself (as themselves say) deserves not the name of a virtue, is an idle, dead thing, may be found in the worst of men, and in the devils too. Yet it is with them the Christian, the Catholic faith.

Sect. 2, to p. 290.

They see no great necessity of faith. The pope (the head of their church) needs it not. And the body may make a shift without it, if any one among all the members have it but. And one act of it in a whole life may serve. The ruder sort may be helped to this act (which will serve once for all) by making the sign of the cross, as their grave divines direct them.

Sect. 3, to p. 292.

Chapter V No necessity of true repentance for any sort of sins, by their doctrine. Of original sin, or the corruption of our natures, no man can be obliged to repent.

Sect. 1, to p. 293.

It is as needless for those many (and divers of them horrid sins), which they count venial. What pretty expedients they have to expiate these without repentance.

Sect. 2, to p. 294. For mortal sins some teach there is no divine command to repent. And so to live and die impenitently will be no transgression. No need of it any way, either as a duty enjoined, or as a medium.

Sect. 3, to p. 295.

Others who confess there is a command for it, will not have it oblige any sinner presently. No sin nor danger to defer repentance. Nor will they have it needful at such times and occasions which, if any, would be the necessary seasons for it. Not at solemn times of worship. Not on days of fasting. Not when visited with great calamities. Not when sins are brought to their remembrance. Not when they address themselves to their sacraments, no, not that of penance.

Sects. 4 & 5, to p. 299. No need to repent till one be at the point of death. Nor is it so needful then, or any time before, but something else may serve without it. A repentance without any sensible sorrow for, or actual resolution against, sin, is sufficient. Or a penance merely natural may suffice. Or a slight remorse in the lowest degree possible, one act of it, despatched in an instant, and never repeated, will be enough. Or if a man conceive that he truly repents, though really he does not, this may serve the turn. Or if he know that he does not repent sufficiently, yet if he signify that he would grieve more, and is sorry that he does not, this will be effectual. Or attrition with the sacrament will unquestionably justify him. Attrition with them is far distant from true repentance. Several sorts of it. Any of them seem sufficient by the Council of Trent. The general concurrence of their divines for the sufficiency of attrition, yet the best sort of it confessed to be morally evil.

Sects. 6 & 7, to p. 308. When they have excluded true repentance by attrition, they reduce attrition to nothing; yet will have it still sufficient. The least servile dislike of sin, in the lowest degree, though it be gone in a moment, though it be merely natural, is enough. Or if there be but a dislike that this dislike is wanting, Or a willingness to have it in those who have it not. Or a man’s thinking probably that he hath it when he hath it not. Or a willingness without it to receive the sacrament will serve the turn. Yea, even without their sacrament of penance, attrition with the eucharist, or extreme unction, or the mass, or without any sacrament at all, may procure pardon. What ways attrition may secure them when they cannot have a priest, or the rites proper to priests, while they live, or after they are dead without them.

Sect. 8, to p. 358. This doctrine, which makes saving faith, love to God, and true repentance needless, is established by the council of Trent. Their sacrament of penance hath no ground in the word of God. And being taught to depend on it for pardon, and to neglect the things of most necessary importance to salvation, it proves a most damning imposture. Their doctrine thus making repentance needless, plainly destroys Christianity, debauches the lives, and ruins the souls of sinners. And is one of the most pernicious heresies that ever was broached.

Sects. 9, 10, & 11, to p. 313.

Chapter VI Their doctrine leaves no necessity of holiness of life. It is enough to denominate their universal church holy, if there be but one holy man in it. One act of charity, the least of all, may make one a holy man. Other maxims of this tendency. How they destroy the necessity of holy life, by making it needless to exercise virtue and avoid sin.

Sect. 1, to p. 314.

How they make the exercise of Christian virtues unnecessary in general, more particularly hope (one of the three divine virtues) fares no better than faith and love. They leave themselves no good ground of hope. Their hope a conjecture, founded upon a delusion. The precept for hope obliges not but in the more grievous assaults of despair. So that not one of a thousand in popery need have any hope in God. No, not any, since the command for it may be satisfied by other acts.

Sects. 2 & 3, to p. 315. Their doctrine leaves no room for, no ground of, humility, no sense of sinfulness, weakness, unworthiness. It is pregnant with pride and arrogance.

Sect. 4, to p. 317.

Brotherly love unnecessary by their doctrine. No need of love to any, unless in necessity. Nor then, though the necessity be extreme, if we help them, though not out of Christian love. This extended not only to external, but spiritual necessities. If the acts whereby we should relieve their souls be neglected, it may pass for a small fault. Those who have no Christian love, if they believe they have it, may be excused from sin. No precept requires any special act of love to our brethren. No affirmative command for such love. It is enough that we do nothing against them.

Sect. 5, to p. 318. In destroying the necessity of those radical graces instanced in before, they root out the rest. Particularly those that depend upon love to God, viz., delight in God, desires to enjoy him, hatred of sin, sorrow for it as an offence to God, and filial fear. By their common doctrine, there is no special command for any fear of God. So that the want of all fear of God, filial or servile, is no special sin. Since they need not act out of love, they exempt themselves from all acts truly Christian, and any other Christianity than honest heathenism. All exercise of virtues opposite to acts accounted but venially evil, is with them needless. The monstrous consequences of this.

Sects. 6, 7, & 8, to p. 321. A special expedient, whereby they make the exercise of Christian virtues unnecessary, is their turning the commands of God into counsels, such as need not be observed. Such they count many of those excellent rules in Christ’s sermon on the mount. These and many others specified. More instances in virtues which concern ourselves, God, and others, in acts of temperance and contentment, in acts of religion, and in acts of righteousness and mercy. Also mortification, crucifying the world, self-denial, taking up the cross, and all growth in grace, is but matter of counsel. So is every degree of grace above the lowest of all. Yea, all commands for good acts are no more than counsels, but only in the article of necessity. And all acts that have more than moral goodness. And all actings in a virtuous manner, and from a good principle. Exercise of virtue not necessary either in worship or common conversation. Not in those cases where, if in any at all, it would be needful. A way they have for any man to turn whatever precept pinches him into a counsel. There is no danger, nor any sin at all, in rejecting the counsel of God. No, not when conscience dictates that it is good to follow them. No, nor when God further calls thereto by inspirations or motions of his Spirit. They may be neglected out of contempt. And with some abhorrence of them. They may boast and glory in such neglects. They may bind themselves by oaths not to observe God’s counsels.

Sect. 9, to p. 331. No exercise of virtue necessary but only during the pope’s pleasure, for if he should forbid virtue (as he hath done already in divers instances) the church would be bound to believe those virtues to be evils, and so to avoid them. Further, their doctrine encourages the continual practice of such wickedness, as is inconsistent with all holiness of life, reduced to three heads.

Sect. 10, to p. 332.

Chapter VII

Many heinous crimes are virtues, or necessary duties with them. Their blasphemies waived, because insisted on by others. Also a great part of their idolatry. Their plea in excuse of this crime, from the distinction of terminative and transient worship, removed by their own doctrine formerly opened.

Sect. 1, to p. 333. Their idolatry as to relics. These are to be religiously worshipped, though many of them be ridiculous and loathsome, though many thousands be confessed to be counterfeit, and great and detestable impostures be therein acknowledged. To worship false relics, or the devil upon a mistaken belief, is meritorious. What worshipful things miscarriages in the mass furnish them with.

Sect. 2, to p. 335.

They give divine worship to relics, though they give it not the name. They give both name and thing expressly to vast multitudes. All which they count relies of Christ are to have Christ’s honour. Among these they reckon all things that were near him, or touched him on earth, even the earth, water, stones, &c. Not only the things, but persons that touched him, thereby become his relics, and are to have his worship. The Virgin Mary expressly, and thousands more may have it; by the same reason, they will not absolutely except the ass on which he rode. Yea, all the relics of such persons may have it. For they commonly teach that the relics may have the same worship with the person whose they are. The best of their relics impostures, that which passes for the foreskin of Christ, his shirt, coat, blood, the crown of thorns, lance, nails, cross, and its liquor. Their relics numerous beyond account. How they came to be so, their own authors tell us. The devil furnished their church with some of them, and crafty knaves with others. Yet their whole religion in a manner consists in worshipping such things as these, as some of themselves tell us.

Sect. 3, to p. 344.

Perjury necessary by their doctrine. If a prince swear solemnly not to prosecute his supposed heretical subjects, unless he break his oath, he is in danger to be damned. No faith to be kept with heretics. Their doctrine ruins all securities that popish princes or subjects can give to protestants. These can with prudence trust to nothing but what will keep them out of the papal reach.

Sect. 4, to p. 345.

Robbery and murder as necessary a duty. To deprive heretics of estate or life, a meritorious act. All papists, princes, or others, are bound in conscience by that which is most obliging in their religion, utterly to root out all they account heretics, and to seize on all they have. A decree of a general council for it, which encourages the execution with promises of the greatest rewards, and enforces it with threatenings of most dreadful import. They must not be counted catholics unless they do it. It hath been effected or attempted in all countries where the papists had power to do it, or but thought that they had it. The reason why they do it not in England and some other places is, as themselves declare, because they hare not yet power enough.

Sect. 5, to p. 347.

Sorcery and conjuration part of their religion. This manifested in their sacramentals, where by their own rules there is a tacit invocation of the devil. Their excuses here insufficient. Even their mode of praying too like conjuring.

Sect. 6, to p. 350. The chief act of their religion is to destroy Christ, by sacrificing him daily in the mass, which they maintain they do truly and really.

Sect. 7, to p. 353.

Chapter VIII Their doctrine tends to destroy holiness of life, by encouraging the continual practice of all sort of wickedness under the notion of venials. What hatred of God. What acts of infidelity and idolatry. What distrustful cares. What irreligiousness in all religious exercises. What use of witches. Or dealing with the devil. What irreverence towards God in adjuration.

Sect. 1, to p. 354.

What impious swearing almost at every word. In horrid terms. Without offering to break off this ungodly custom. Binding themselves by oaths, and threatening God that they will sin against him. And never comply with his will in things which he commends to them as most excellent. What fraudulent oaths. What perjuries of all sorts, both as to assertory and promissory oaths, not worse for being most frequent and customary.

Sect. 2, to p. 359.

What blasphemies. Out of levity, passion, or inconsiderateness. Or from wicked custom and contempt of a man’s own salvation. The more habitual and customary blaspheming is the better.

Sect. 3, to p. 360.

What profaning of holy time. Where it is manifest, that little or nothing at all of religion need be made conscience of amongst them; even at the only time set apart for the acts and exercises of it.

Sect. 4, to p. 363.

What irreverence in children to parents. They may be ashamed of them. And curse them; as parents may curse them again. What unaffectionateness. They may desire the death of their parents for some outward advantage. Or by accusations procure their death. What disobedience in all things, out of negligence or sensuality. And in matters of greatest importance as to this life. Or in matters which concern their salvation. Parents have no right to oblige their daughters not to be whores.

Sect. 5, to p. 365.

What murder of soul or body. As to acts inward and outward. What hatred. What outrageous anger. What revenge. Desires of the death, not only of enemies, but nearest relations, because they are poor, or not handsome, may be innocent. Actual killing them without deliberation is no fault, when not fully deliberate (when ordinarily many things may hinder it from being so) is but little worse.

Sect. 6, to p. 366.

What uncleanness. Fornication in its own nature not evil with some. Adultery one of the lesser sins. To seek or receive hire for whoredom scarce a fault, even in a nun. The conjugal act before marriage venial. And also to lie with one contracted privately, after a public contract with another. A woman whose chastity is attempted with some force need not cry out, nor make any resistance, but may take natural pleasure in the act. How excused when drawn to it by courtship. Those who are disposed to fornication may innocently be invited to it. Self-pollution may be desired or delighted in as past or future for a good end. To venture upon the occasions. To use hot provoking means, carnal touches. To expose themselves to place, company, sights, persuasions, opportunities that are ensnaring. To use filthy discourse, or a tempting garb, all venial.

Sect. 7, to p. 369.

What stealing in all sorts, children, servants, wives. Mortal theft is so stated that they may make it venial when they please. They may steal little or much. Of these many instances. What cheating in false measures. Or the quality or substance of what they sell. They may promote the cheat with lies or worse. And defraud those who entrust them. Their church laws allow cozening, so it be but as to half of the worth of the commodity.

Sect. 8, to p. 374.

What lying. They may lie merrily, and do it customarily, out of mere pleasure in telling lies, yea out of malice. They may lie whenever it will be for their advantage, if it do no great mischief, or they do but think so. To tell lies for their religion is piety. No sort of lies mortal but by accident, when they do great mischief, as speaking the truth may do. Nor in many cases when they do such mischief. They may use lies in commerce, and confirm them with oaths, both together may be but venial. Also in courts of judicature. How both judge and witnesses may lie there. They may bear false witness in favour of one another. They may delude the court by equivocation or mental reserves. Even a priest may swear he knows nothing of what he has heard in confession, with this reserve, he knows it not as man, but as God. They have lies in their divine office. Abundance of such stuff, or worse, is confessed to be there. Nor would they have all purged out, lest none of their old service should be left. They may tell lies in the pulpit. But some of them would have such rank ones avoided as the hearers may smell out. They may do it even in confession, and delude the priest with lies in much variety. And he may delude them likewise, pretending that he absolves them, when he neither doth it nor intends it. Since they have such liberty to lie everywhere, when can they be trusted?

Sect. 9, to p. 382.

What perfidiousness venial. How they may be perfidious for delight, or advantage. They may make promises outwardly, without intention to be obliged. Yea, they may deny, with oaths too, that they promised. Internal promises, though made in the form of a vow, or with an oath added, oblige them not. How easily they may excuse the worst perfidiousness. The firmest promises bind not but under venial guilt, unless they be in writing or with an oath. Nor then, if they intended not thereby to be obliged.

Sect. 10, to p. 385.

What hypocrisy. To make false shows of sanctity for a good end is no sin. Bare hypocrisy venial, though one delight to play the hypocrite. Yea, when it is for a bad end, though the fault be doubled it is venial still. They reverence hypocrisy as a holy art. It is amongst the commendations of their great saints, and recommended by them to their religious. If they feign more holiness than they have, to edify others, it is rather meritorious than faulty. Their church much concerned for the honour of hypocrisy.

Sect. 11, to p. 386.

What calumniation. How many ways they have to ruin the reputation of others without mortal guilt. Amongst others, if one speak ill of them or their church, though truly, they may charge him with false crimes. A small fault for one to defame himself.

Sect. 12, to p. 389.

What flatteries venial. To praise one for the virtues he never had, or the good he never did. Yea to applaud him for his sins, to gain something by such flatteries. Cursing may be their usual practice. It is scarce any fault when used for honest recreation.

Sect. 13, to p. 390.

What capital sins are with them venial. All covetousness, unless injustice be added. Yea, and with injustice too. They allow them to gain unrighteously. They may gain out of excessive desire of lucre, and make it their principal end, and turn it into a trade. They need not restore what they win by unlawful, or what they call diabolical games. But the loser may steal it from him that wins. Or refuse to pay, though he have sworn to do it, his oath may be easily dispensed with. They may take hire for acting the most abominable wickedness, or unjust judgment, or false depositions, or murder, or consulting with the devil. But then they must be sure to do the fact. No restitution to the poor a duty. Hard-heartedness and unmercifulness to the poor venial. Pure prodigality a less fault than covetousness, though this be next to none.

Sect. 14, to p. 394.

All pride venial, but such as is scarce to be found in the Christian world. The numerous issue of this queen of mortal sins, as they style it, to which they are so favourable. To ascribe what they receive from God to their own merits, is confessed to be mortal pride, yet they make it part of their creed. Arrogance, commonly a venial fault.

Sect. 15, to p. 396.

Ambition venial, unless one would be honoured for a crime, or counted a god.

Sect. 16, to p. 396.

Vain-glory regularly a venial, it imports nothing contrary to the love of God or man. It may be their principal end in all things ordained for the honour of God, otherwise their whole clergy, they say, would be in a dangerous condition. They may take livings and spiritual promotions principally for honour or temporal profit. So we have an account why they may make religion all along subservient to a worldly interest.

Sect. 17, to p. 398.

Loathing of spiritual and divine things venial, unless it be on such an account as rarely happens. All in a manner that is requisite for a true Christian may be abhorred without mortal guilt. Rancour and indignation against any who would draw them to spiritual and divine things, a venial.

Sect. 18, to p. 399.

Anger, though extravagant and revengeful, may be venial. The more excessive it is, the more mischief it may do and be innocent. Disdain of others. Audaciousness, immoderate fear, or wrath. Fool-hardiness. Incontinent desires and lust. Love of the flesh or the world, venial. Envy scarce any worse.

Sect. 19, to p. 401.

Intemperance, comprising gluttony and drunkenness, in its own nature a venial. When they play the epicures like Dives, and resolve to give up their whole life to gluttonous pleasures, it is but near to a mortal sin. When it proceeds to beastliness, and the glutton so burdens nature that it is forced to ease itself by vomiting, or other nasty, loathsome ways, it is still venial. When he eats till he vomit, on purpose that he may be ready to eat again, it is no worse. Drinking till the house in the drunkard’s fancy run round, is venial. Nor will it be worse till reason be totally drowned. The rare virtues of drunkenness; complete drunkenness will make any wickedness then acted to be no sin at all. And half drunkenness will make it to be but a venial.

Sect. 20, to p. 404. The multitude of particular crimes which issue from these seven capitals need not be taken notice of as mortal. They have no warrant from Scripture to count any sin venial. Yet they venture to reduce to this account what the law of God forbids, not only when it is of less but greatest importance. To make a sin mortal requires so very much, that the sinner may easily miss some of it, and so venture upon it without fear that it is deadly. This declared particularly. They shew them a way to pass any mortal crime as venial. How they represent venials as so very harmless, that all have encouragement enough to practise them continually all their life, and even when they are dying. Though some few of them may make any look like monsters in the judgment of a sober pagan.

Sect. 21, to p. 409.

Chapter IX

They conclude many crimes, inconsistent with holiness of life, to be no sins at all, and so warrant all to live in the practice of them. Some particulars of this nature before insisted on, here only pointed at. It is no sin to quench the motions of God’s Spirit, drawing them to the observance of his will any way. Yet may they invite others to wickedness when they are ready for it. They may lawfully deal with the devil divers ways.

Sect. 1, to p. 410.

It is sufficient to pray with the mouth, without the heart.

Sect. 2, to p. 411.

How it is no sin to worship the untensils of worship. Or the word Jesus pronounced or written. Or the accidents of bread and wine in the eucharist. Or the picture of the manger, thorns, or spear which touched Christ. Or the ass he rode on, or the lips of Judas for kissing Christ, though to betray him. Or the imaginary blood of a crucifix. Or to worship any person whatever as the image of God, or any other creature in the world, toad, serpent, or a wisp of straw. Or the apparition of the devil himself in a beam of light, or the form of a crucifix.

Sect. 3, to p. 414.

Perjury no sin. When one takes an oath and intends not to swear. Or swears and intends not to be obliged. Or swears in another sense than he knows is intended in the oath. So they may use equivocation or mental restrictions in swearing. And think this lawful either to gain some advantage, or to avoid any damage. Many instances of such artifice of words or inward reserves which they may use to elude oaths. They may swear with such ambiguities or reserves, when they are swearing not to use them. No oath can be contrived which they may not thus elude.

Sect 4, to p. 419. The irreligion of the Roman church palpable in the observance required of the Lord’s day, and others set apart for holy employments. When the people are discharged from religious duties at other times, nothing is enjoined them on these days but presence at mass. At mass they need neither mind God nor divine things. It would be no sin to employ themselves in servile works on these days if it were but the custom. Nor to give them no observance at all after mass. This may be despatched before sunrise. These days are not profaned by any acts of wickedness. So that all the religiousness which that church requires of their catholics, when they make the best show of it, is consistent with the lewdest acts of ungodliness and debauchery.

Sect. 5, to p. 423. In reference to those whom they count heretics, all relatives are discharged from their respective duties, subjects, wives, children, servants, yea, debtors too. It is no murder to kill a heretic, or those that are excommunicated.

Sect. 6, to p. 424.

Upon what occasion they may kill one another. A man may with impunity kill his wife taken in adultery, or his daughter, or sister, or his own mother, and this though they be big with child. A woman married or unmarried, being unlawfully got with child, may procure abortion, not only to secure her life, but her state and credit. It is lawful to cut up an honest mother quick, and she bound to procure it, that the child in her womb do not want baptism. They may without sin kill any one assaulting them unjustly, not only to secure their life, but to avoid a wound or a blow (a priest may do it while he is celebrating) though the aggressor be frantic, or in drink, or asleep; or though he have had intolerable provocation and be the sufferer. They may kill an innocent to escape themselves. They may kill one before he actually assaults them, though his soul be like to perish with his life, if they know he is prepared for it, or does but design it. So the adulteress may prevent her husband, and kill him first, with the poison or weapon prepared for her. They may kill one to secure their goods, or recover them, when they may be recovered in a legal way. Yea, though they be of small value, worth but three or four ducats, yea, but one crown or less. They may kill men for their reputation. If he sees one approach to assault him, he may kill him rather than retire. A blow with a cudgel or a light switch, yea, or a box on the ear, is a just ground to kill him that gives it, yea, or does but offer at it. They may kill men for ill language, though they allow it to be as common as any they speak. Yea, for an affront by mere signs, though he that gives such an affront runs for it. They speak favourably of duels. But allow them to kill men more privily, and by surprise, when they impeach their reputation publicly or privately, yea, or do but threaten to do it. Jesuits scarce so extravagant here as some of other orders. If the civil laws did but give so much liberty to murder, as their rules for conscience, no man near them could have security for his life.

Sect. 7, to p. 428.

How indulgent their doctrine is to uncleanness. They oblige them not to avoid such occasions of this sin by which they very frequently fall, unless they fall thereby in a manner always. Divers instances. What liberty they give to unclean thoughts. Obscene words. Lascivious writings. Filthy songs. Such ditties sung to the organ at mass. Offered to God in the person of the church for divine praises. This was the custom everywhere in Cajetan’s time, and since. As intolerable obsceneness in their penitential confessions. What licence they give to use such things as provoke lust. Also to immodest touches and shameful sights. No need to be resolute in resisting temptations. How servants may minister to the lust of their superiors. Actual whoredom hath excessive encouragement. The pope builds stews for prostitutes. They pay him a weekly tribute for liberty and accommodation to drive their trade. This condemned as most abominable to God and man, even by barbarians; but the pope consenting to it, it is no sin, not indecency for his holiness to be maintained by the hire of whores. Many things concluded by their divines in favour of them. How punctual in deciding at what rates all sorts of women may set themselves to sale. They oblige them not to restitution, but when their religious make use of them, who are to have it gratis. Public prostitutes compelled by law to commit lewdness with any that will hire them. Hence the people (instructed in their religion) know not that such fornication is a sin. He that keeps a concubine at home is not to be denied the communion. Nor will they oblige him to put her away, if that would impair his estate, or delight, or his reputation, yea, or her’s either. It is enough if he promise not to sin with her, though he keep not promise. Adultery no sin in divers cases. For the clergy, adultery, nor unnatural uncleanness, not so much a sin as marriage. Burning lust, innocent. Better to burn than to marry, whatever the apostle with their adversaries say. The admired chastity of their votaries consists well enough with whoredom, and is only violated by marriage. Their priests have been allowed to keep whores at home, paying a yearly rent for it. And those were to pay it who took not the liberty, because they might. Votaries incur excommunication for laying aside their habit, but not if they lay it aside to commit fornication more readily. Priests in no wise to be obliged by oath to forsake their concubines. Extremely few chaste, by their own confession, of those innumerably many that profess it. A priest not to be deposed for fornication, because there are very few not guilty. Priests who keep many concubines not irregular. How they favour sodomy. Married persons may practise much of it together. Their clergy may act it to the uttermost, and be neither suspended, nor irregular, unless they make a trade of it, and do that so publicly and notoriously, as they can scarce do (by their description hereof), if they had a mind to it. Mere mental heresy a greater crime than sodomy with them. Yea, petty thievery a more heinous sin, with some of them expressly, and in consequence with most. Sodomy hath ecclesiastical immunity. All sorts of religious places amongst them are sanctuaries for sodomites, all sorts of uncleanness having such free and favourable entertainment in their church, no wonder if it be the sink of the Christian world.

Sect. 8, to p. 442.

It is no sin to take from protestants, or any counted heretics, all they have. All their estates are confiscated immediately, before any declarative sentence, from the first day of their pretended heresy. Though the papists make not seizure presently, yet those heretics are in the interim responsible for the mean profits. And they cannot any way alienate or dispose of their estates. All wills, sales, contracts for this purpose, are null and void. All may be taken from the purchaser, without restoring the price he paid. Children, though Roman catholics, lose their portions. Liberty given to all to spoil and bereave them. All rules of righteousness which concern propriety are void here, papists owe them no observance. It is no sin to burn their houses. To deprive a protestant prince of his throne. To draw his subjects into war against him. To betray garrisons to the Romanists. To pay us no debts. To detain what is deposited with them in trust. There can be no lawful parliament among protestants. No king. No peers. No freeholders. No laws that are valid can be enacted. No aids or subsidies can be granted. The fundamentals of the government in England, and other such like countries, quite blown up by their principles.

Sect. 9, to p. 445.

It is no sin with them to bear false witness against protestants, when their life or estate is concerned. Or to use fraud and deceit in bargains, to cheat them of all they have. Or perfidiousness in promises, compacts, &c. They leave little that can be sin in papists towards themselves; less towards protestants, Sects. 10 and 11, to p. 446. An aversation and contrariety to God and holiness, a propenseness and inclination to all ungodliness and unrighteousness in the horridest instances, when it is habitual, reigning, impetuous, active, is no sin at all in the temper and habit; no, nor in the acts and motions, without consent.

Sect. 12, to p. 447.

What expedients they have to justify all sin in the world, or make it no sin. The pope’s power herein. If he command vice, their church is bound to practise it. He can make sin to be no sin. He may dispense in all positive laws, and in the divine law (and against the gospel) at least where God can dispense, particularly with oaths and vows, such as are best, and most inviolable. With the observance of the Lord’s day, so as to turn it into a working day. With all public worship amongst them, both mass and divine service. And against the universal state of the church. He can discharge them from righteousness towards men. Take from any man his right. Dissolve marriages. Legitimate adultery. License persons to be married for a while, and not during life. Authorise incest (dispensing with marriage betwixt any but parents and children) and sodomy. He can dispense with any divine law when the reason thereof ceaseth, and can declare it to cease when he pleaseth. If he should err in dispensing, yet he that makes use of his licence to sin, sins not. He can free any from the obligation to fruits meet for repentance. Thus can he discharge all from acts of religion, righteousness, and good works.

Sect. 13, to p. 452.

He is excused from sin, who ventures on it upon some probable reason, though it seem but probable to him, out of affection to the person that offers it, and there be more reason against it.

Sect. 14, to p. 453.

Custom will excuse from sin, and make it no sin. Divers instances. The sense of Scripture must be conformed to the custom of their church, and vary from what it was, as they change fashions.

Sect. 15, to p. 454.

He sins not who does what is sinful, following the judgment of a grave doctor. One such doctor may suffice (as multitudes of their divines conclude). And will secure him in following his opinion, though both less safe and less probable. This granted to be the common doctrine of their church. So it is unreasonable to except against our alleging the opinion of particular doctors against them, since their common doctrine allows any to follow the opinion of particular doctors, as to belief or practice. Hereby a way is opened to leave no conscience of sin amongst them.

Sect. 16, to p. 457. Their directions for the scrupulous of like tendency. He sins not who breaks the law in a strict sense, if he observe it in some benign sense. He may make the interpretation himself, and so such as will please him, or choose that of others which is best for his purpose, though he fear it is not probable, and it be false indeed. Or when the observance of the law is very difficult or incommodious. And ordinarily he is like to judge it so. Or when the observance of it is ridiculous, as the observing of the divine rule has been (by their acknowledgment) long since in their church. Or when there is apprehension of danger in complying with it. Or when he observes it but according to the common usage of good catholics, when amongst the most eminent of their catholics it is confessed, there is little or no worship of God, no regard of good life, righteousness, or godliness. Their devices for justifyings of much wickedness (to the excluding all holiness of life), where founded.

Sects. 17, 18, to p. 460.

Chapter X

Good works not necessary by the Roman doctrine. This shewed in fasting, prayer, alms-deeds, to which they reduce all good works. They do not, they need not, fast on their fasting days. Their church requires the observance of none of those things, which they say are necessary to the being of a fast. They may eat a dinner, a full meal at noon, may be excessive therein, so as to transgress the laws of sobriety, and to excite and cherish lust, instead of repressing the flesh, and yet fulfil the precept. They may break their fast in the morning (and yet keep it), with ale, wine, bread, or other things. They may eat a supper, too, and that excessive great, as big as custom will have it, when they tell us, it is their custom to sup with notorious excess. They may sup out of sensuality. And may take their supper in the morning. And drink and eat every hour. The quality of their fasting meat most delicious. They may drink at any time, and wine, too (though that is confessed to be more contrary to a fast than flesh). They may drink it till they be drunk, and yet not break their fast. Nothing religious in their fast. Neither religious ends nor employments. And so it can be no good work, nor necessary in their account. Those that have tired themselves with gaming or whoring are excused. Yet this piece of mockery passes with them as satisfactory and meritorious.

Sect. 1, to p. 465. Their praying no good work. The people pray not in the mass. They neither express nor conceive any petitions. Nor concur with the priest, but by presence and posture of the body, as an image may do, or by virtually wishing the priest’s prayers may succeed, which they may do when they are asleep. Nor do their priests pray better in their public service, unless the bare pronouncing of the words (which is all they count necessary) be praying. How far they acknowledge this.

Sect. 2, to p. 467.

Acts of mercy or charity not necessary with them, but in two cases, which seldom or rather never occur, at least together. One is, when they have superfluities both in respect of nature and state; but, they say, it cannot easily be judged that any secular person (no, nor kings and princes), have such superfluities. The other is when the necessity is extreme; except it be such, if any had superfluities, they would not be obliged to part with any thing. When it is extreme, they allow the poor to steal. So charity is not needful but when stealing is lawful. Or then he may be excused so many ways, that he need never find himself obliged to relieve any gratis. Good works not necessary with them, because to act from a good principle, and for a good end, is needless. Their design to satisfy justice, and merit grace and glory by what they do, makes their pretended good works deadly evils. No necessity of good works upon the account of their being enjoined for penance. So they are not done as good, but suffered as evils. Besides, the priest need not enjoin such. Or the sinner need not submit thereto, or need not perform it. But may be released many ways. Especially by indulgencies. It is counted better to give money for these, than in ways of charity Sects. 3 and 4, to p. 471. The conclusion; where from the premises in brief is inferred, that the practical doctrine of the Romanists tends to ruin Christianity, and the souls of all that follow it. To p. 474.

GENERAL INDEX In this and the following Index, the treatise on the Practical Divinity of the Papists is referred to by the letter P., while the number iii. refers only to the former part of the third volume.

Abraham, his prayer for Sodom, i. 215; in what sense he is said to have offered up Isaac, 452.

Absolution, priestly, may be given on a mere presumption of penitence, P. 300.

Acquaintance with God, a preparation for bearing the cross, i. 492.

Acts, according to the Romanists, alone prescribed by the law, not habits or principles, P. 329.

Adam, in innocence, what he might expect from justice, i. 20; whether we must repent of his sin, 39.

Adultery, &c., for a Romanist priest, not so great a sin as marriage, P. 438.

Affections, for mortifying sin, ii. 227; anger, ib.; fear, 228; shame, 229; grief and sorrow, 230; hatred, 231; revenge, ib.

Afflictions, through the righteousness of Christ, made blessings, i. 319; are occasions of thankfulness, 388; are so many stones thrown at the door of the sinner’s heart, ii. 53; how God secures from the evil of, 167; and does us good by, ib.; how we are to be thankful for, 173; the end of, to purge God’s people from their sins, 186; of God’s people, imposed not by a judge, but a father, 188; God’s end in afflicting us should be complied with, 189; otherwise they will be increased, 191; advantage of duly improving, 198; improvement of, incomparably better than deliverance from, 202; why they befall the people of God, 238; to be endured with patience, cheerfulness, thankfulness, 239; the way to attain comfort under, 416; to be used for the promotion of fruitfulness, 438; necessary for the people of God, 466; how ordered and ruled by God, 478.

Against Anxious Carefulness, ii. 137.

Agnus Dei, its virtues described in verse by Urban V., P. 348 Ahab, his repentance, ii. 254.

Albigenses, 200,000 destroyed in some months, P. 346.

All, The Lord Rules over, ii. 454.

All-sufficiency of God, belief of, a remedy against anxious carefulness, ii. 160 Anger, distinction between, and hatred, i. 148; against sin, holy, ii. 228.

Antichrist, his character, ii. 327.

Anxious Carefulness, Against, ii. 137.

Arminians, their inconsistency, i. 321.

Assertions of Scripture, may be applied as promises, i. 188.

Assurance, how it is produced, and the effects of it, i. 91; what they who want, can expect in prayer, 229; how near hypocrites may come to it, ii. 264; means whereby it may be attained, 415; is never but when there is fruitfulness, 416.

Atonement, what it is, iii. 58; the same with propitiation, ib.

Attention, actual, not required of the Romanists in prayer, P. 220; three degrees of, 225; the lowest alone necessary; impossible to most, unnecessary to all, 231.

Attributes of God, obects of faith, i. 177; some are suited to every case and condition, 169; nothing in any of them to discourage faith, 180; consideration of, fitted to produce fear of God, ii. 233.

Attrition is a slender dislike of sin, not as it is an offence against God, but out of some other consideration, P. 247; with penance, will excuse any from actually loving God, 284; not even needful for venial sins, 293; difference from contrition, 306.

Augustine, saved from assassination by mistaking his road, ii. 516.

Baptism, by the Romanist doctrine, valid, by whomsoever administered, P. 246; may be administered by force to the unwilling, ib.

Barrenness and unfruitfulness of England lamented, ii. 392; the cause of God’s controversy with the land, 394; great danger of, 401.

Basil, his stedfastness against Arianism, i. 505.

Believers’ Communion with the Father and the Son, iii. 165.

Believers, true, fear and hate sin, i. 106; have a right to all things promised, 194; have communion with the Father and the Son, iii. 166.

Bellarmine, his objections to the imputation of Christ’s righteousness answered, i. 304.

Belly, how men make it their god, ii. 309.

Bible, reading of, Romanists not only do not deem a duty, but almost regard as a crime, P. 250; reason of their discouraging, 266.

Blessings, spiritual, promised conditionally, i. 217; bestowed not for, but according to, prayer, 225.

Blood of Christ, with the benefits purchased by it, offered to sinners, ii. 42; its preciousness, 43.

Boldly, coming unto the Throne of Grace, iii. 110.

Calamities and Afflictions, God’s end in sending, on his People, ii. 185.

Calamities and afflictions, not to be mortified and reformed by, most dangerous, ii. 191; exceeding sinful, 196 Callings, to be followed in the Lord’s service, i. 396.

Canonical hours, and the divine office, the proper service of the clergy and monastics, P. 219.

Care and industry, essential to soul-worship, ii. 304.

Carefulness, against Anxious, ii. 137.

Carefulness, anxious, about the things of this life, ii. 138; getting and providing them, ib.; keeping, ordering, or securing them, ib; deliverance when losses have surprised us, 139; not all kinds and degrees of, forbidden, ib.; but excess of care, 140; distinctions between care and carefulness, 141; excessive, either draws into sin, or is a temptation to it, 143; is useless, ib.; needless, 144; heathenish, 146; hurtful, 148; very sinful, 150; foolish, 153; incongruous, 155; the ends men have in it, 158; means to secure against, 160.

Ceremonies, and the preaching of the word, cannot stand together, i. 508.

Children of God should not be partakers with others in their Sins, ii. 334.

Children, undue anxiety about, i. 426; of light, what it is to be, ii. 370; what it is to walk as such, ib.

Christ died not for impenitent sinners, i. 28; his sufferings to be considered, to enforce repentance, 55; the object of justifying faith, 77; his terms not hard, 117; easy, not as opposed to difficult, but as opposed to harsh, rigid, unequal, 119; his offices and intercession, encouragements to faith, 182, 204; his blood, how it is a prayer, 207; his excellency, 257; nothing in him but what is excellent, ib.; all the excellencies that are in the creatures are in him, and in a more excellent manner, ib.; innumerable more than are in all creatures are in him alone, 258; what it is to love, 266; what it is to be found in, 273; implies spiritual intimacy in respect of union, ib.; judicial account in respect of representation, ib.; real efficacy in respect of participation, 274; how to be found in, 276; his sufferings imputed to us, and how, 285; his death a punishment, a ransom, a sacrifice, ib.; arguments against the imputation of his righteousness answered, 289; his active obedience imputed, 290; what is meant by the imputation of his righteousness, 293; his obedience and sufferings not to be disjoined, 296; his righteousness the foundation of the covenant of grace, 308; his righteousness the cause of a believer’s interest in the promises, 312; signs of having come to, 340; they who have come to, are sorry that they came not sooner, ib.; are acquainted with his being, ib.; have a high esteem of him, 341; are in a new condition, ib.; walk with him, ib.; are at a distance from sin and the world, 342; have renounced their own righteousness, ib.; those who have not come to, are under the power of Satan, 343; under the guilt of sin, ib.; under the wrath of God, ib.; under the curse, 344; the justice of God engaged to destroy them, ib.; their outward enjoyments uncomfortable, unsanctified, accursed, 345; advantages of coming to, ib.; danger of not coming to, 353; is denied when either faith or obedience is denied, 460; what makes way for his reign, 480; the glory of his majesty inexpressible, ii. 35; his all-sufficiency, ib.; independence, ib.; sovereignty, ib.; his presence twofold: general, as he is governor of the world; and special, as he is a Saviour, 87; special, in respect of manifestations, communications, operations, ib.; his supping with his people implies provision, 94; plenty, 95; variety, ib.; delicacies, ib.; familiarity, 96; complacency, 97; the way to know whether we are in him, 98; the way to get into him, 99; to be without, is to be without union to, 102; without his influence, 103; the way to, lies through the sense of misery, 517; the ardency of his love, iii. 4; how it appears that he loves us, ib.; his love moved him to union with us, 6; his excellency, 21; loves men more than the best of men love one another, 26; more than man loves himself, 27; more than he loves the angels, 28; more than heaven and earth, 29; as himself, and in some respects more, 30; as the Father loves him, 36; his sacrifice of expiation, 51; how touched with our infirmities, 83; comfort of this, 108.

Christiani sunt cruciani (Luther), i. 448.

Christians, must repent of their daily sins, i. 30; who are? 447; how all things are theirs, iii. 9; their imperfections, 19.

Christianity, a harder thing than many suppose, i. 470.

Churches, may be guilty of the sins of particular members, iii. 349; many ruined for unfruitfulness, 408.

Circumcision of heart, in the Old Testament, is renewing and quickening by the Spirit of regeneration in the New, ii. 433.

Circumstantials, not to be given up for persecution, i. 503.

Clitomachus, his modesty, ii. 283.

Coming boldly unto throne of Grace, iii. 110.

Commandments of God, virtually promises, i. 188; Romanists turn into counsels, and so destroy obligation of, P. 321; some greater, some less, 329; some Romanists represent the former, others the latter, to be counsels, ib.

Common assistance, how afforded to natural men, ii. 132.

Communion, Believers’ with the Father and the Son, iii. 165.

Communion with God, includes union, iii. 166; community, ib.; converse, 170; believers have with God, unbelievers with the devil, 173; motives to get and to continue with God, 171; is for God’s glory, ib.; for our good, 176; engaged in the ordinances, 177; affords the sweetest pleasure, 176; the highest honour, 177; the greatest advantage, 179; the chiefest happiness, ib.; means of attaining, 181.

Compassion of Christ, a ground of comfort, iii. 107.

Concupiscence, carnal, held by the Romanists to be sinless, P. 325.

Concurrence with the sins of others is a partaking of them, ii. 335; may be by contriving, ib; consenting, 336; inclination, ib.; rejoicing, ib.; sentence and vote, ib.; assisting, 337; sharing the profits or pleasures, ib.

Condescension, Christ’s, like himself, wonderful, ii. 34.

Conditions, attached to gospel-promises, are not conditions of merit, ii. 65; of dependence 66; of inducement, ib.; of uncertainty, ib.; of obligements, ib.; are no more than necessary antecedents or duties to which the Lord will enable his people before the fulfilment of his promise, ib.

Conference with God, how managed, iii. 172.

Confessional, impurity of, P. 267.

Confessor, qualifications necessary for, P. 267.

Conscience, tenderness of, a preparation for bearing the cross, i. 490; its office to discover sin, ii. 215; must be under God’s rule, 475.

Consecration, magical virtues ascribed to, P. 349.

Constance, council of, decreed against keeping faith with heretics, P. 344.

Contingent, or casual things, ordered by God, ii. 458.

Contrition, distinguished from attrition, P. 306.

Conversion, a turning of the heart towards a new centre, ii. 19; why sinners are so much affected when first converted, 44; a man cannot convert himself, 108; a universal change, 355; the same thing with regeneration, vocation, renovation, ib.; how we may know whether converted or not, 365; condition of the converted safe and comfortable, 368.

Converse of the believer with God includes visits, iii. 170; walking with God, ib.; friendly conference, 172; kind entertainment, ib.

Conviction of Hypocrites, ii. 241.

Conviction, wrought by God, gives a new sense of sin and danger, i. 72.

Corruption of nature, the ground of a sinner’s humiliation, i. 3; is a sin, 4; wherein it consists, 5; is the foundation of our misery, ib; consists in a privation of all that is good, antipathy to God, and propensity to all evil, ib.; extends to all faculties of the soul, 10; its monstrousness and strength, 11; how it propagates itself, 15; mortification of, a preparation for bearing the cross, 489; is all sin in one, ii. 203.

Countenancing the sins of others makes us partakers of them, ii. 344; may be by defending, ib.; by justifying, 345; by extenuating, ib.; commending, 346; conniving at, ib.; by company, 347; by rejoicing, ib.

Covenant, assurance of interest in, an encouragement to prayer, i. 202; of grace, its foundation the righteousness of Christ, 308; why called a testament, 309.

Creation, new, first step in, is of light, ii. 26; requires an infinite power, 28.

Creature, the New, ii. 3.

Cross, taking up the, i. 447.

Cross, he who will not bear, not a Christian, i. 447; includes loss and damage, ib.; shame and reproach, 450; pain and torture, ib.; death itself, ib.; what it is to bear, 451; to be borne patiently, 453; cheerfully, 454; fruitfully, 455; is ordinarily the lot of Christians, ib.; reasons why it is so, 456; embitters the world to them, 459; cannot ordinarily be avoided without sinning against Christ, 460; they who sin ordinarily to avoid, are not Christians, ib.; they do not bear who lay it upon others, 472; who will not forsake their sins for Christ, 473; who will bear but some part of it, ib.; who do not think the gospel worth knowing, 474; who neglect the worship of God, 475; exhortations to bear it, 479; to be prepared for, ib; how this is to be done, 480; the pleas against bearing answered, 502; of Christ, how to be gloried in, ii. 4; sign of, how, according to the Romanists, it teaches all needful doctrine, P. 291.

Curse, Sinners under the, ii. 517.

Curse of God, what it is to be under, ii. 106; can only be removed by Christ, 107; the penalty of God’s violated law, 517; sin brings under it, 518; they who are delivered from, ought to praise and adore their Redeemer, 525.

Damned, their misery for not hearing and obeying the word, i. 435.

Darkness, Unconverted Sinners are, ii. 355.

Darkness, to be in, is to be in sin, the work of darkness, ii. 356; under Satan, the prince of darkness, 357; under the wrath of God, the fruit of darkness, ib.; near to hell, the place of darkness, ib.; fearful, 359; those are in who walk in the ways of darkness, 360; who want spiritual discerning, 361; who act not for God, ib.

Day of grace, when it may be said to be past, i. 142; not past with a sensible sinner, 143.

Death, the end of a wearisome pilgrimage to the Christian, i. 246; of Christ, real, iii 64; violent, ib.; cruel, ib.; shameful, ib.; cursed, 65; the same, as to the main, that was due to us, ib.; was for us, in our stead, 66; the punishment of our sin, ib.; the price of our redemption, 70; a sacrifice of expiation, 71.

Debt of the elect, paid by Christ, i. 274.

Decrees, God’s, unreasonable to pry into, i. 128.

Delight, an act of soul-worship, ii. 304.

Desire after Christ, proceeds from a sinner’s sense of his misery, i. 87; virtually faith, ii. 128; an act of soul-worship, 303.

Despair, only two cases of, recorded in the history of 4000 years (Cain and Judas), ii. 135.

Diogenes, his contempt of the world, ii. 280.

Dispensations of God must be submitted to, ii. 489.

Dissension, a cause of misimprovement of afflictions, ii. 214.

Distractions by worldly cares, a hindrance to profiting by the word preached, i. 437.

Divisions and contentions, the cause of sufferings, i. 465; who are the instruments of, 509.

Dogs, why false teachers are called, i. 247.

Dominicans, required to recite their prayers while dressing, P. 227.

Dominion of God, absolute, ii. 381; justifies election, ib.

Door, at which Christ knocks, is the heart of man, ii. 51; who they are who do not open, 80; who that open deceitfully, 82; motives to open, 84; misery of them who will not open, 90.

Duelling, spoken favourably of by Romanist writers, P. 427.

Duties, to be specially attended to which are too much neglected by professors, ii. 377; for the neglect of which we are reproached, 378; which the providence of God more particularly calls us to, 319; that have a special tendency to endear the ways of God to others, 380; to which we have naturally most averseness, 381; which we are under temptation to neglect, ib.

Dying in Faith, i. 238.

Dying, Christ’s, for Sinners, iii. 63.

Dying in faith, what meant by, i. 238; they who die so, die honourably and comfortably, 239.

Earthly-Mindedness, the Lord’s Ownership of all things, an inducement from, i. 365.

Earthly blessings, how they are promised, i. 408.

Election, doubts about, an impediment to faith, i. 127; cannot be known before faith, ib.

End, God’s, in sending Calamities and Afflictions on his People, ii. 185.

Enemies, God can secure against the power and violence of, ii. 502.

England, God’s judgments upon, ii. 189; wickedness of, 302.

Enjoyments, outward, of unconverted, uncomfortable, unsanctified, accursed, i. 345; afford advantage for fruitfulness, ii. 442.

Enmity of men against God, iii. 18.

Epaminondas the Theban, his frugality, ii. 279.

Equivocations, not peculiar to the Jesuits, P. 416.

Erasmus, his account of the religion of Romanists, P. 344.

Erroneous teachers and seducers described, ii. 3.

Errors and mistakes of brethren to be treated with forbearance, iii. 104.

Essenes, spent their whole time in prayer and meditation, ii. 290.

Esteem, an act of soul-worship, ii. 301.

Eternity, living in the view of, a remedy against anxious carefulness, ii. 170.

Eucharist, in partaking of, Romanists require no actual reverence or devotion, P. 248.

Everything, Pray for, ii. 102.

Evil, a small one, may be great in its consequences, i. 504; how ordered and over-ruled by God, ii. 459.

Evidences for heaven, to be cleared up, i. 241.

Example of sin, in one, may occasion many, ii. 338; of Christ, in forbearance, iii. 104.

Excellent Knowledge of Christ, i. 247.

Experience, an encouragement to faith in prayer, i. 215.

Expiation by legal sacrifices, how it differs from that by the death of Christ, iii. 75.

Faith, i. 63.

Faith, Living by, i. 174.

Faith in Prayer, i. 197.

Faith, Dying in, i. 238.

Faith, the principal condition of life, i. 63; salvation depends on, ib.; what it is, 64; comprises knowledge, ib.; assent, 65; recumbence, ib.; implies coming to Christ, ib.; fleeing to him as to a stronghold, 66; leaning upon him, 67; adhering to him, 68; rolling or casting ourselves upon him, 69; applying him, ib.; receiving him, 70; embracing him, 71; includes in it sense of misery, 72; rejecting of other dependences, 73; submission, ib.; resolution to persist in dependence, 74; support, 75; consent to accept Christ on his own terms, ib.; justifying or saving, its object is Christ, ib.; assents to the whole of Scripture, but does not justify as so assenting, 76; is not an assent to a proposition affirmed, but affiance in a Saviour offered, 77; its principal and proper object the person of Christ, ib.; and that not barely considered, but as clothed with righteousness, ib.; at first relies on Christ, not as having pardoned, but as willing to pardon, 78; wrought by God, ordinarily by several steps, ib.; discovery of sin, ib.; application of the desert of sin, 79; compunction, 80; inquiry, 81; renunciation of all unsafe ways, 82; revelation of Christ, 83; hope, 84; self-abhorrence, 86; valuing of Christ, ib.; strong desires after Christ, 87; persuasion, 89; resolution to comply with the Lord’s invitation, 90; encouragements to, 96; impediments of, 101; historical distinguished from saving, ib; former may be had by hypocrites, reprobates, the actually damned, the devils, 102; impediments to, 101; a conceit that we have faith already, ib.; a conceit that faith is a business of no great difficulty, 115; a conceit that the terms of Christ are hard, 117; resting in our own righteousness, 123; difficulties about election, 127; feeling of unworthiness, 129; want of preparation, 133; fear that it is too late, 138; fear that we have sinned the unpardonable sin, 146; want of fulfilment of the conditions of the promise, 153; its object not a proposition or a promise, but Christ, 154; means of attaining, 156; prayer, 157; hearing the word, 170; living by, what it is, 174; a sense and acknowledgment that we cannot live without God, 175; a reliance upon God for continuance of what we have, and supply of what we have not, ib.; is not an act, but a life of acts, ib.; objects of, 176; divine attributes, ib.; offices of Christ, ib.; mutual relations between God and his people, 177; promises, ib.; providences, ib.; directions how to live by, ib.; asking in, what it implies, 197; discouragements of faith in prayer removed, 218; faith of dependence may constitute a prayer of faith, though assurance be absent, 229; objects on which it is acted, 230; the name of God, ib.; the free offers of Christ, 231; the general promises, ib.; its acts, ib.; renouncing of all supports and refuges but Christ, ib.; submission, ib.; acceptation, 232; appropriation, ib.; resolution, 233; expectation, ib; encouragements to, in reference to the success of prayer, ib.; its difference from presumptuous confidence, 234; the elders died in, 230; direction for dying in, 240; and repentance of the best is imperfect, 312; its power to support under the cross, 498; in what sense the gift of God, ii. 108; in its lowest degree, is a consent to take Christ as God offers him, 122; of formalists may be so like that which is saving and justifying, that both themselves and others may mistake it, 259; wherein it is defective, 266; discouragements to, removed by the sight of God on a throne of grace, iii. 131; though weak, has encouragement to come to the throne of grace, 134; implicit, alone required of Romanists, P. 260; saving, or justifying, not necessary by their doctrine, 285; implicit, sufficient, 286; explicit is impossible, and if it were possible, is not of the nature of justifying, 289.

Fasting, Romanist, is no fasting, is no good work, and is not necessary, P. 460; a ridiculous piece of mockery, 464.

Father and Son, Believers’ Communion with, iii. 165.

Fear of the cross, makes it worse than it is, i. 486; makes a Christian less fit to bear the cross than a weaker one whose fears are less, 487; exposeth to what is far worse than any cross we can meet with, ib.; how to be removed, 488; of sin, a means of preserving us from it, ii. 228; of God, may be great even in natural men, 277; an act of soul worship, 303; of man, how unreasonable, 470.

Feeling of our Infirmities, Christ touched with, iii. 81.

Fig-tree, kind of, in Palestine, bore fruit all through the year, ii. 392.

Formalists, are not in a state of salvation, ii. 295; are exposed to the curse of God, 523.

Free-will, doctrine of, the foundation of all popery (Luther), ii. 128; exempts man from God’s power, 129; refutation of, ib.

Friends, ought to be helpful to one another in discovering sin, ii. 216.

Fruit, Christ seeking, and finding none, ii. 385.

Fruits, good, what they are, ii. 386; must be real, 387; such as import a change of soul, 388; distinguishing, ib.; seasonable, ib.; sound, 389; must be in fulness, ib.; proportionable to the means, 390; increasing, ib.; in variety, 391; lasting, ib.; means to be used for producing, 394, 431; which respect God more particularly are acts of admiration, 445; of subjection, 446; of complacency, ib.; which respect ourselves are temperance, chastity, humility, modesty, contentedness, 447; which respect others must be both in heart and life, 448; some should be cultivated with peculiar care, 449; those to which we are naturally averse, ib.; which are too much out of fashion, 450; which we are specially engaged to bring forth, 452; whose goodness and advantage is most extensive, ib.; which we are most tempted to neglect, ib.

Fruitfulness, advantages of, ii. 412; impediments of, 419; unmortifiedness, ib.; worldliness, 420; privateness of spirit, 422; carnal indulgence, ib.; mistaking that for good fruit which is not, ib.; looking more at comfort than duty, 429; being too much taken up with little things, 430; directions for, 431.

Gain, unlawful, a hindrance to faith, i. 121.

Glory, steps by which fallen man is raised to, i. 256.

God, Children of, should not be partakers with others in their Sins, ii. 334.

God’s end in sending Calamities and Afflictions on his People, ii. 185.

God, his mercy should lead to repentance, i. 57; the owner of all things, 366; of the world in general, ib.; of lands, 367; the fruits of the land, 368; money and clothes, ib; ourchildren, ib.; ourselves, 369; bodies, ib.; souls, ib.; his greatness considered, 379; his right to pass by some, when he chooses others, 380; the freeness of his love, 383; consideration of his attributes a means to bear the cross, 492; his dispensations, are judgments to all who are out of Christ, ii. 107; his giving over a people, the worst of judgments, 192; misconceit of his mercy, an occasion of man’s false hope, 243; his rule over all, 454; objects of his government, 455; heaven and earth, ib.; all the parts thereof, 456; things great and small, ib.; all beings and all motions, ib.; actions and events, 457; substance and circumstances of things and actions, ib.; end and means, ib.; things orderly and confused, 458; things necessary and contingent or casual, ib.; good and evil, 459; things natural and voluntary, ib.; properties of his government, 460; it is supreme, ib.; absolute, 461; irresistible, 462; perfect, ib.; over all things at once, ib.; easy, 463; continual, ib.; his right and ability to rule all, 463; danger of not submitting to, 469; his government in all things must be observed, 492; his government a great support under fears and dangers, 495; is in covenant with his people, through the mediation of Christ, iii. 117; is a God hearing prayer, 118; the manner of his presence with his people, 119.

Gospel, contempt of, disobedience to, unfruitfulness under, the cause of God’s judgments, i. 16; a great mercy, or a great judgment, 430; preached, is the word of God, not of men, 432; is that by which we must be judged, 434.

Grace, Throne of, coming boldly unto, iii. 110.

Grace, in this life, has perfection of parts, but not of degrees, i. 38; its implanting and continuance in the soul is from the righteousness of Christ, 307; is advanced by the cross, 458; low degrees of, not to be rested in, 495, ii. 297; restraining, may be when renewing is not, ii. 8; doctrine of a sufficiency vouchsafed to all men, contrary to Scripture and experience, 79; must first be planted in the heart, and continually fortified and increased, 434; throne of, to come to, at once our privilege and duty, iii. 110; equivalent to mercy-seat, 112; Intimates what God is to us, 115; as a God in Christ, ib.; as a God reconciled, 116; as a God of forgiveness, ib.; as a God in covenant, 117; as a God that will have communion with his people, 119; to be approached with holiness of heart and life, 124; with fear and reverence, 125; with sincerity, ib.; with subjection, 126; with love and affectionateness, ib.; in faith, 127.

Graces, special, for mortification of sin, ii. 232; love to God, ib.; faith, ib.; fear, ib.; and affections, hypocrites may go far in, 252.

Gracious Invitation, Christ’s, to Sinners, ii. 34.

Gratitude, an act of soul-worship, ii. 314.

Grief and sorrow for sin, passionate, is the fruit and not the forerunner of faith, i. 138.

Habits, held by the Romanists not to be commanded or forbidden by the law of God, P. 324.

Hating of relatives, &c., for Christ’s sake, how to be understood, i. 447.

Hatred of sin is an act of repentance, i. 26; whether it may consist with any love of it, 38; an important affection for mortifying sin, ii. 231; of God, according to the Romanists, no sin, P. 279.

Hearing the Word, i. 248.

Hearing the word, a means of attaining faith, i. 170; must be with diligence, 171; without prejudice, ib.; most heed to be given to what is most suitable, 172; should be accompanied with prayer, 174; we must take heed how we hear, 428; an act of eternal consequence, 431; a sin to neglect opportunities of, 434; is a duty enjoined by Christ, 436; impediments to it, ib.; ignorance, ib.; contempt, 437; distractions, ib.; prejudice, 438; obduration, 439; bad ends and principles, ib.; directions for profitable, 440.

Heart, tenderness of, what it is, i. 136; of the sinner shut against Christ, ii. 45; what kind of Christ delights to dwell in, 97; humble, broken, sincere, ib.; not required in Romish worship, P. 223.

Heathen, though they have gone far in outward reformation, come short of true repentance, i. 45; may have moral virtues, but are not new creatures, ii. 9; never refused to admit Christ knocking, 61; how far they may be careful to avoid sin, 282.

Heaven, Soul-Idolatry excludes Men out of, ii. 299.

Heaven, endeared to us by the cross, i. 459; neglected, when men are too careful about the world, ii. 152; many think themselves sure of, who shall never come there, 242; how far professors may go, and yet come short of, 245; the greatest part of those who enjoy the gospel have no right to, 293; children of light should walk in the view of, 383.

Heresy, no kind of reputed a sin by the Romanists, if it be out of ignorance, and without pertinacity, P. 262; is even meritorious if it be adopted from the teaching of a famous preacher or bishop, ib.

Heretics, no faith to be kept with (Council of Constance), P. 344; a virtue to deprive of their estates and lives, 345; have no claim upon any for relative duties, 423; any one may kill, ib.; what they have sold may be taken from the buyer without compensation, 443.

High-priest, Christ discharges all the offices of, by sacrifice and intercession, iii. 82.

Hindering the sins of others, when we can, a duty, ii. 348.

Holiness, necessity of, not lessened by the imputation of Christ’s obedience, i. 297, 304; of life, needless, by the popish doctrine, P. 313.

Holy Ghost, how he intercedes for us, and assists us in prayer, i. 207; his peculiar glory placed in communion with believers, iii. 175.

Hope, how it is supported, i. 84; an act of soul-worship, ii. 303; has great encouragement from the intercession of Christ, iii. 155.

Hopes of heaven, false, grounds of, ii. 242; ignorance and inadvertency, ib.; negligence and slothfulness, ib.; self-love, 243; misapprehensions of God, ib.; vain and insufficient pleas, 244.

Humility, how it may be promoted, i. 437; ground for, swept away by the Romish system. P. 314.

Humiliation for sin, a preparation for Christ, ii. 127.

Hypocrites, The Conviction of, ii. 241.

Hypocrites, whether they can do good works, i. 112; three sorts of, ii. 241; their pleas, 244; many go far in the ways of Christ, and yet come short of heaven, 245; in revelations, dreams, visions, ib.; the gift of prophecy, ib.; miracles, 246; tongues, ib.; knowledge, ib.; graces and affections, 252; some kind of repentance, 254; of faith, 258; of love to God, 269; to Christ, 270; to the people of God, ib.; of joy and delight in spiritual objects. 273; of zeal for God and his concernments, 275; of fear of God, 277; of contempt of the world, 278; in the avoidance of sin, 281: in acts of piety and godliness, 287; in acts of charity, 291; in sufferings, 291.

Idolatry, Soul, Excludes Men out of Heaven, ii. 299.

Idolatry, definition of, ii. 300; two sorts of, ib; soul, all natural men are guilty of, 305; whether the regenerate may be guilty of, 306; danger of, 307; secresy of, 308; different forms of ib.; making a god of the understanding, ib.; the will, ib.; the fancy, the senses, 309; the belly, ib.; pleasures, ib.; credit, ib.; riches, 310; relations, 311; friends and allies, ib.; enemies, ib.; the creatures, ib.; Satan, 312; lusts, ib.; acts of worship rendered to these idols, 313; continuance in, will shut out from heaven, 326; in some sense worse than open idolatry, 327; how to be avoided, 331; of the Romanists, P. 332.

Ignatius, his discipleship, i. 450.

Ignorance, sins of, propositions and distinctions respecting, i. 31; of Christ a pernicious evil, 259; in this land inexcusable, 261; a great impediment to hearing and profiting by the word, 436; inconsistent with being a new creature, ii. 26; a cause of men’s mistaking their condition, 242; wilful, severely dealt with in the judgment, 293; held in high repute by Romanists, P. 257; sum of their doctrine regarding, 265; probable, will make any sin lawful, according to their doctrine, 452.

Imitation of the sins of others, a partaking of them, ii. 334.

Impenitent sinners, apt to think themselves not so great sinners as others, i. 23; characteristics of, 42; he is impenitent who does not leave sin at all, ib.; who does not leave all sin, 43; who leaves sin only outwardly, ib.; who leaves sin only because he cannot commit it, ib.; who leaves it only out of sinister respects, 44; who leaves one sin for another, ib.; who leaves sin but for a time, ib.; who leaves sin, but does not endeavour to subdue it, ib.; who so turns from sin as he doth not turn to God, 45; who never had a full, clear, discovery of sin, 46; who has not some sense of the corruption of his nature, ib.; who is loath that his sin should be discovered, 47; who will not endure a reproof, ib.; their misery, 48.

Impotence of men to do anything without Christ, ii. 104; a total privation of power, ib.; to satisfy justice, ib.; to pacify the hatred and wrath of God, 105; to avoid the curse of the law of God, 106; to escape judgments, 107; to deliver from hell, ib.; to procure or act any grace, 108; to subdue any lust, 110; to improve any ordinance, 111; to remove any spiritual distemper, 112; to do anything as they ought, 113; consistent with endeavour, 131.

Imputation of Christ’s sufferings, equivalent to the acceptance of them for us, i. 285; of his righteousness taught in hundreds of places of Scripture, 289; of his active obedience, 290; views of the Arminians and Papists, 295; of sin to Christ, not unrighteous, iii. 52.

Indifferent things, not to be used to the offence of others, ii. 338.

Infirmities, Our, Christ touched with the Feeling of, iii. 81.

Infirmities, with the feeling of which Christ is touched, are whatever our weak and frail condition makes us subject to suffer by, iii. 82; he knows them all, 83; knows them experimentally, ib.; is affected with them, 84; pities, has compassion on them, ib.; and that with the motions and acts of love, ib.; with an inclination to succour and relieve, ib.; is affected with them as a man, 85; as one very much and nearly concerned in us, 86; affected with them realty and to purpose, 87; with all of them, 88; with those which are the effects of sin, ib.; his sympathy proportionable, 91; constant and perpetual, 92.

Iniquity, purging of, better than outward deliverance, ii. 201.

Insufficiency, Man’s, to do anything of Himself, ii. 101.

Intention, an act of soul worship, ii. 301; virtual, all that is required of the Romish clergy in their offices, P. 221; habitual, held to be sufficient, 222; implicit, held to suffice, ib.; is held to exist, though there be none, provided only there be not an absolutely contrary intention, 224.

Intercession, Christ’s making, iii. 143.

Intercession of Christ, a great encouragement in prayer, i. 204; consists in appearing for us, ib.; presenting our persons to God, ib.; offering our prayers, 205; sanctifying our prayers, ib.; answering all accusations that can be framed against our prayers, ib.; mingling his own prayers with ours, 206; praying for us, ib.; is perpetual, iii. 144; is his appearance in heaven on behalf of his people, 145; as their advocate, ib.; presenting his death as suffered in their stead, 146; his will and desire that his people may have all the purchase of his blood, ib.; is prayer, 147; though with some differences both from ours and from his own while on earth, ib.; is grounded on merit, 148; is acceptable to God, ib.; by virtue of it all believers from the beginning of the world pardoned and saved, 150; its perpetuity, ib.; some difference at the end of the world, but not a cessation, 151; should lead us to admire his loving-kindness, 152; is the one end of his life, ib.; a great encouragement to faith and hope, 155; advantages which flow from, 156; accommodated to all our infirmities, 159; sure to prevail, 161.

Invitation, Christ’s Gracious, to Sinners, ii. 34.

Irreverence in prayer, encouraged by the Romish doctrine, P. 232.

Israel, ten tribes, ruined for sins of which they were ignorant and unconvinced, ii, 205.

Jehu, his zeal for reformation, ii. 276; did more than some of the good kings of Judah, 282.

Jesuits, their practical divinity not more corrupt than that of other Romanists, P. 214 Jezreel, the “scattered of the Lord,” and the “seed of the Lord,” ii. 457.

Joy in spiritual things, hypocrites may have some, ii. 273; wherein it is defective, 275.

Judas, had power to work miracles, ii. 247; the lips of, might, according to the Romanists, be objects of worship, as having kissed Christ, P. 336.

Judgment, the principal part of God’s government, and must be accordingly prepared for, ii. 494.

Judgments, God’s, upon others, what use we should make of, i. 16; upon England, ii. 189; spiritual, inflicted on his own children for not improving temporal calamities, 193; non-improvement of, a heinous sin, 196; in what respect we should be thankful under, 239.

Julian, the apostate, his cunning methods to ensnare the Christians, i. 476.

Justice of God obliges him to punish sin, i. 283; is fully satisfied by Christ’s suffering in our stead, 284; men cannot satisfy, without Christ, ii. 104.

Justification by the Righteousness of Christ, i. 273.

Justification, actual, is not before faith, i. 294; Romanists confound with sanctification, P. 272.

Killing, allowed by the Romanists in many cases where it is clearly murder, P. 424.

Kings, in what respect Christians are, iii. 37.

Knocking, Christ’s, at the door, what it implies, ii. 39; checks of conscience, 52; acts of providence, 53; ministry of the word, 54; motions of his Spirit, 55.

Knowledge of Christ, the Excellent, i. 247.

Knowledge of Christ, characters of that which is excellent, i. 251; it is extensive, appropriating, effectual, ib.; fiducial, 253; useful, ib.; desired by the most excellent creatures on earth and in heaven, ib.; is a knowledge of the glorious excellencies of God, 255; making those excellent that have it, ib.; evil of despising, 258; of not communicating to others, ib.; means of attaining, 261; of increasing, 262; how we may know whether we have attained it, 269; of divine things, unchristian men may have, ii. 246; theirs is not truly experimental, 250; nor efficacious, 251; hypocrites may go far in, 246; wherein theirs comes short of that which is saving, 250; the foundation of almost all that is saving, P. 257; decried by the Romanists, ib.

Law, a non-conformity to the whole, is a transgression of the whole, i. 4; man, in his own person, cannot perfectly obey, ii. 106; we must obey every part of, to manifest our subjection to God, 487; the least part of, more valuable than heaven and earth, 529; a sinner cannot be justified by observance of, 534; commands the act. but not the manner (Aquinas), P. 249.

Leaving all for Christ, the condition of being his disciple, i. 447.

Liberality, a greater blessing than riches, i. 365.

Life everlasting, the reward of faith, i. 97; the present possession of the believer, 98; what it is which they have who come to Christ, 357; another kind of temporal, ib.; spiritual, 359; eternal, 361; marks of spiritual, 363; breath, motion, sense, ib.; eternal, not confined, to heaven, iii. 165.

Light, denotes spiritual knowledge, ii. 362; purity and holiness, ib.; the favour of God, and joy and comfort, ib.; glory and happiness, ib.; is delightful, 365; is accompanied with heat, 366; is progressive, ib.; consolation to those who are in, 368; to be children of, denotes descent, 371; propriety, ib.; distinction, ib.; residence, ib.; constitution, ib.; obligation, ib.; to walk in, is to walk at a distance from darkness, 372; to walk boldly, 373; exemplarily, ib.; cheerfully, 375; directions for walking in, ib.; not according to opinion, ib.; follow the light of the word fully, 377; walk above the world and earthly things, 382; walk in the sight of heaven, 383; motives to walk in, 384; otherwise we walk undutifully, as disobedient children, ib.; cross God’s design, ib.; undermine our hopes, ib.

Living by Faith, i. 174.

Living as Strangers, i. 243.

Living as strangers in the world, necessary in order to dying in faith, i. 243.

Lord, The, Rules over all, ii. 454.

Lord’s day, and other holy days, Romanists hold not to be profaned by any acts of wickedness, P. 422.

Lord’s prayer, addressed by Romanists to saints, male or female, P. 257.

Losing all things to gain Christ, what is meant by, i. 268.

Love of Christ, iii. 3.

Love of God, its freeness, i. 383; to Christ, a mean to bear up under the cross, 481; attained and maintained by thoughts of his love to us, 483; of God, how manifested to sinners, ii. 41; of Christ, ardent, transcendent, everlasting, ib.; to Christ, a sign we are in him, 122; to the brethren, want of, often disguised as zeal for truth, 207; to God, a means to make us hate sin, 232; to God and Christ, what kind of may be in hypocrites, 269; it is not ingenuous, nor superlative, 272; an act of soul-worship, 302; of God, long clouded from the world, appears in the sending of Christ, ib.; of Christ, appears by his expressions, ib.; his thoughts, ib.; by what he has done for us, 5; by what he has given us, 8; by his sufferings by us, 11; with us, 12; for us, ib.; is free, unchangeable, incomprehensible, 14; magnified by the consideration of who are the loved, 15; and who is the lover, 21; and of the manner of the love, 26; is greater than that of the best men for one another, ib.; comprises, and eminently contains, the love of all relations, ib.; is perfect, 27; is more than man’s love of himself, ib.; is more than his love of angels, 28; is more than his love of all heaven and earth, 29; is as his love of himself, in some respects more, 30; is as the Father’s love of him, 36; is distinguishing, 37; personal, 38; how men are rendered capable of, 41; its greatness, 77; its greatness, ib.; should excite love in return, 78; a great love and most extensive, 94; free, 95: lasting, ib.; peerless, ib.; cordial, 96; all-sufficient, 97; to God, not required by Romanists, P. 272; neither habitual, ib.; nor actual, 273; those who say in words that it is necessary, neutralise it, 275.

Lusts, they who will not part with, cannot be Christians, i. 473; reigning, are idols, ii. 360; how men make their gods, 312.

Luther, his stumbling before his conversion, i. 302.

Man by Nature Unwilling to Come to Christ, i. 331.

Man’s Insufficiency to do Anything of Himself, ii. 101.

Man, the most debased of all earthly creatures, i. 14; by nature far from Christ, 332; in respect of knowledge, ib.; cf union, ib.; of participation, 333; of converse, ib.; without Christ, can do nothing, ii. 102, 113; alone of earthly creatures, properly capable of government, 460; nothing in him to attract Christ’s love, iii. 16.

Marcellinus, bishop of Rome, condemned as an apostate, i. 477.

Marius, bishop of Arethusa, an example of consistency, ii. 526.

Martyrdom, in general held by the Romanists to be a work of supererogation, P. 327.

Martyrs suffered far less than Christ, iii. 65.

Mary, Queen, her persecution permitted as a chastisement for not carrying out the Reformation begun by Edward VI., i. 464.

Mass, sacrifice of, its horrid wickedness, iii. 61; the only public service the Romish laity are ordinarily obliged to, P. 219, 234; only presence at it required, 237; no attention of mind needful for, 238; doctrine of, involves the daily slaughter of Christ, 350; blasphemy in the service of the offertory, 352.

Means, of grace, have no efficacy of themselves, ii. 112; God stands in no need of, to accomplish the end he aims at, 458.

Meditation, how far hypocrites may use, ii. 290; not inculcated by Romanists, P. 250.

Mercies, providential, are amongst Christ’s knockings at the door of men’s hearts, ii. 63.

Mercy of God, though infinite, does not lead him to pardon the impenitent, i. 57; the object of faith, 76; the more to be praised and admired, because its object is so contemptible, ii. 454; respects misery in the object, as grace respects unworthiness, iii. 111.

Mercy-seat, what it signified respecting God, iii. 112; a God of a glorious majesty, ib.; of almighty power, 113; of holiness, ib.; of wisdom, ib.; of omniscience, 114; a God in Christ, 115; a God reconciled, 116; a God of forgiveness, ib.; a God in covenant, 117; a God that will have communion with his people, 118; a God that hears prayer, ib.; a God present with his people, 119; a God that will shew grace and mercy to his people, 121.

Mindfulness, an act of soul-worship, ii. 301.

Ministers are sent by Christ, i. 433; inequality amongst, the first step to the papal encroachments, 505; how may be guilty of their people’s sins, ii. 351.

Ministry, one main end of, to convince of misery, ii. 118.

Miracle, what it is, ii. 112; hypocrites may do, 246.

Misery of man without Christ, its elements, i. 3; not only unable to free ourselves from, but insensible of, 7; of man by nature, ii. 47; is in possession of Satan, ib.; under the curse of the law, 48; under the wrath of God, 49; under the sentence of condemnation, ib.; near the confines of hell, ib.; of man without Christ, 118.

Mitre of the Romish bishops, what it is said to signify, P. 58.

Monks, not ordinarily allowed to read the Bible, P. 56.

Morality, hypocrites may go far in, ii. 286.

Mortal sins, reduced by the Romanists to seven, P. 294; true repentance not necessary for, ib; standard of, placed so high, that it is scarcely possible to commit, 390: reduced to seven, ib.; covetousness, 391; pride, 394; vain-glory, 396; acedia, or aversion to divine things, 398; anger, 399; envy, 400; gula, comprehending gluttony and drunkenness, 401.

Mortification, a kind of martyrdom, i. 489.

Natural men far from Christ, i. 332, ii. 58; and therefore miserable, i. 333, ii. 47; consent not to accept Christ on the terms on which he is offered, ib.; are under the power of Satan, ib; impotency, what it is, 104; men, what preparatory acts they may do, in order to receive benefit by Christ, 131; make idols of themselves, 308; things are ordered and ruled by God, 459.

Negligence, the cause of many men’s ruin, ii. 242.

New Creature, the ii. 3.

New creature, he who is not, no privilege or religious duty will avail him, ii. 6; wants faith, ib; is not in Christ, ib.; can do no good, ib.; man is made when the Lord creates new and gracious qualities in his whole soul, 7; not a common work but a creation, 8; not any innovating humour, ib.; not merely a restraint of the old man, ib.; not moral virtues, or good nature, 9; not outward conformity to the law of God, ib.; not a partial change of the inward man, ib.; is a making of the soul new in all its faculties, 10; in the understanding, judgment, and assent, 11; valuations, 12; designs, 13; inventions, 14; reasonings, 15; thoughts, 17; consultations, 18; in the will, 19; its inclinations, ib; intentions, 20; fruitions, 21; elections, 23; consents, 24; applications, 25; resolves, ib.; means and ordinances for becoming, 29; special duties of those who are, 32.

Oaths, Romanist methods of evading the obligagation of, P. 414; none can bind them, 419.

Obedience, threefold, negative, positive, and passive, ii. 281; how far hypocrites may go in, ib.; blind, accounted best by Romanists, P. 263.

Occasioning the sins of others, makes us partakers of them, ii. 338; may be by evil example, ib.; by the offensive use of things indifferent, ib.; by scandalous sins, either in judgment or practice, 339; by provoking, ib.; ensnaring, ib.; leading into temptations, 340; shewing opportunities to sin, ib.; affording matter of sin. ib.; not removing occasions of sin, ib.; authorising, 341.

Offence, of two kinds, given and taken, i. 468; fear of giving, an occasion of suffering, ib.

Offer, Christ’s, of himself is to men, not angels, ii. 36; to sinners, ib.; to enemies, 37; is of his love, 41; himself, 42; his blood, ib.; his comforts, 43; his glory and kingdom, ib.

Offertory of the mass, a blasphemous service, P. 352.

Offices, of Christ, objects of faith, i. 182; civil and ecclesiastical, those who put insufficient men into, are accessory to their miscarriages, ii. 341.

Omission, sins of, are heinous, and expose to the curse of God, ii. 520.

Omnipotence, in what sense it may be said to belong to a Christian, iii. 5.

Opening to Christ, urged by several motives, ii. 84; what it is not, 80, 99.

Opinion, evil of walking according to, ii. 375.

Ordinances are sanctified and made effectual by the righteousness of Christ, i. 315; how we must use in order to the making us new creatures, ii. 29; a special means towards fruitfulness, 435; not an end, but a means, 437.

Original Sin, i. 3.

Original Sin, the ground of a sinner’s humiliation, i. 3; to be repented of, 39.

Ownership, the Lord’s, of all Things, an Inducement from Earthly-Mindedness, i. 365.

Ownership, of God extends to all things, i. 366; founded upon his creating and upholding them, 370; particulars of, 372; in what sense we may be said to have of the things which we reckon ours, 376; of God, a motive to thankfulness, 387; to self-dedication, 391; to patience, 407; to humility, 409; to self-denial, 412; to contentment, 414; an encouragement to all, 422.

Papists, rest in the work done, without respect to the manner of doing it, i. 443; how church government is depraved among, ii. 213; their strictest fast a feast, compared with the best fare of the Essenes, 284.

Paraclete, is both a pleader and a comforter, a comforting pleader and a pleading comforter, i. 209.

Pardon of sin, bestowed when we repent, not because we repent, i. 20.

Parents, who neglect the instruction of their children, compared to the ostrich, i. 259; how they may be guilty of their children’s sin, ii. 351.

Partakers with others in their Sins, Children of God should not be, ii. 334.

Pasquil on the ignorance of bishops, P. 269.

Patience, the exercise of, and advantages by, i. 407; a great support under the cross, and how to be attained, 501; under afflictions a duty, ii 239.

Paul, before his conversion, probably ascribed the miracles of Christ to the working of Satan, i. 152; yet was not guilty of the unpardonable sin, 153; his different carriage in things indifferent, doubtful, and necessary, 248; his grounds of confidence in the flesh, 249.

Penance, admitted by the Romanists not to be a sacrifice of Christ’s institution, P. 311.

People of God, more peculiarly under his government, ii 460.

Perjury, according to the Romanists, a virtue in many cases, P. 344.

Persecution is through the malice of Satan, i. 456; the enmity of the world, 457; permitted by God, to distinguish true disciples from hypocrites and pretenders, ib.; to exhibit his disciples faithfulness and affection to him, ib.; for the advancement of grace, 458; to take us off from the world, 459; to tame the flesh, ib.; to endear heaven to us, ib.; must be prepared for, before it comes, 479; endured by Christ, 501.

Persecutors, are no Christians, i. 472.

Pharisees wore broad hats to shade their eyes from the sight of temptation, ii. 282.

Phocion, forty-five times governor of Athens, his frugality, ii. 279.

Piety and godliness, hypocrites may go far in the acts of, ii. 287.

Pleasures, sinful, must be parted with, i. 120.

Poor, relief of, not a duty by the Romish system, except in cases which can never occur, P. 467.

Popes, not required to be able to read, P. 258; not required to be divines, 270; might determine virtue to be vicious, and vice to be virtuous, and the church would be bound to hold it so (Bellarmine), 331; can make sin to be no sin, 447; can dissolve the obligation of oaths and vows, 448.

Power of God to help his people, easily, iii. 138; instantly, ib.; irresistibly, ib.; advantageously, 139.

Powers of heaven, the greatest of them subject to God’s government, ii. 461; of hell, how God rules over them, ib.

Praise, or blessing of God, consists in acknowledging that to be God’s which is his, i. 365.

Pray for Everything, ii. 172.

Prayer, Faith in, i. 197.

Prayer, a means of attaining faith, i. 157; of an unbeliever, not so sinful as his not praying, 158; a necessary duty, 159; what it is, 160; ii. 172; encouragements to unbelievers to pray for faith, i. 161; pleas which a sensible sinner may use, 165; what it is to pray in faith, 197; may be heard, yet the thing prayed for not granted, or the thing may be granted, and yet not in answer to the prayer, 201; encouragements to faith in, 202; directions to prevent doubting in, ib.; is God’s ordinance, 211; has many transcendent privileges ascribed to it in Scripture, ib.; nature and dignity of, an argument to confirm faith, ib.; is the Lord’s delight, 212; hearing of, is glorious to God, 214; others’ success in, an encouragement to faith, ib.; never wholly denied, ib.; usually more than answered, ib.; may be in faith, though we be not confident that the very thing asked shall be granted, 216; various ways in which it may be answered, 218; may be heard, though not answered presently, 219; the discouragement removed from weakness in, 222; the sinfulness of, considered, 224; how we may know when we pray in faith, 226; a duty incumbent on the unregenerate, ii. 31; two principal parts of, petition and thanksgiving, 172; should be much and often, 176; careful, 177; earnest, 178; spiritual, ib.; in faith, 181; what is meant by praying in the Spirit, 179; motives to excite to, 181; most honourable to God, ib.; most advantageous to us, 182; available in everything, ib.; to be improved for the discovery of sin, 221; hypocrites may be much and affectionate in, 287; encouragement to hope for gracious answers to, from the consideration of Christ’s intercession, iii. 160; family, cashiered by the Romanists from the rank of Christian duties, P. 251; mental, acknowledged a duty, but held to be enough if performed once in a lifetime, 252; prescribed as a punishment, 255.

Prayers, of God’s ancient people, are virtually promises to us, i. 188.

Prayerfulness, honourable to God, ii. 181; advantageous to us, 182.

Praying and believing, the life, breath of a quickened soul, i. 327; discouragement in, answered by the righteousness of Christ, ib.

Preachers, were golden when chalices were wooden, and wooden when chalices were golden, i. 508.

Preaching, or hearing, not required by Romanists, P. 245.

Preparatory acts for receiving Christ, ii. 131; knowledge of men’s sinfulness and misery by nature, ib.; and of our own in particular, ib.; desire of deliverance, ib.; belief that Christ alone can deliver; diligent use of outward means, ib.; outward reformation, ib.; these acts may be done by one out of Christ, 132; though not certainty, yet probability that these will bring to Christ, 134; these not the cause of conversion, nor even necessary antecedents, 136; yet never in vain, ib.

Presence, God’s, with his people, iii. 119; is intimate, special, gracious, glorious, all-sufficient, continuing, ib.

Presumption, an impediment to faith, i. 103; distinguished from faith, ib.; different in their rise, ib.; in their object, ib.; in their grounds, 105; in their effects, 106; in their properties, 109.

Pride, a most absurd and ridiculous evil, i. 409; a perverse and desperate malady, 410; a transcendent weakness, ib.

Priesthood of Christ, superior to the legal, iii. 143.

Priests, Romish, need not have any knowledge of the Scriptures, P. 266.

Private Worship, Public to be preferred before, iii. 187.

Privileges, performances, enjoyments, useless without Christ, i. 275.

‘Probable grounds,’ make any sin lawful, according to the Romanist doctrine, P. 452.

Prodigal, an emblem of a sinner, both in his fall and his recovery by faith, i. 66; his unworthiness did not hinder his acceptance, 129.

Profane persons, who are, ii. 294; those who commit gross acts of wickedness, ib.; those who neglect and slight the worship of God in public or private, ib.

Profession to be held fast, iii. 98; firmly, ib.; affectionately, 99; openly, ib.; entirely, ib.; difficulties of holding, ib.

Professors, the sad condition of many, ii. 72.

Promises of God, objects of faith, i. 76, 187; as the dishes wherein Christ, the bread of life, is set before faith, 76; some conditional, others absolute, 154; ii. 65; how to be improved, i. 189; give encouragement to faith in prayer, 213; their multitude, universality, obligement, ib.; must be treasured up, 241; all made upon account of Christ’s righteousness, 311; are all articles of the covenant of grace, iii. 133; though made on special occasions, may be applied on others, 134; will be performed when seasonable, 135.

Property, to be laid out and employed for God, i. 397; how it is not so employed, ib.; equity and advantage of so employing, 399; danger of neglecting so to employ, 400.

Propriety, how we may be said to have in the things we enjoy, i. 376.

Prosperity, not good for evil men, ii. 465.

Providence of God, affords many encouragements to faith in prayer, i. 210.

Providences, God’s, should be observed, i. 16.

Public Worship to be preferred before Private, iii. 187.

Punishments, God can turn what we most value into, if we sin, ii. 469.

Quakers, a deluded generation, have an appearance of some contempt for the world, ii. 279.

Real worship of God not necessary in the Church of Rome, P. 219.

Reason, is rectified in the new creature, ii. 15; corruption of in the natural man, 16.

Regeneration, by some thought needless, i. 336; whether the regenerate may be guilty of soul-idolatry, ii. 306.

Rejoicing in the Lord, a ground of freedom from anxious cares, ii. 137.

Relation betwixt God and his people, the food of faith, i. 177.

Relations of what God has done for his people, are virtually promises of what he will do for them, i. 188.

Relics, Romish worship of, P. 333; absurdities to which it leads, 335; enormous number of pretended, 337.

Religions, may be measured by the worship they prescribe, P. 244; by this test Romanism condemned, ib.

Religious duties, to be performed by the unconverted, ii. 115.

Repentance. i. 16.

Repentance, an evangelical duty, i. 17; taught by Christ, ib.; excluded by the covenant of works, ib.; required in the gospel, ib.; preached by the apostles, ib.; was the end of Christ’s coming, 18; purchased by his death, ib.; has evangelical promises, ib.; is urged upon evangelical grounds, ib.; is the condition of evangelical mercy, ib.; is confirmed by the seal of the covenant of grace, ib.; is a fundamental of Christianity, 19; is the way to life, ib.; directions for the practice of, ib.; cannot make amends for sin, 20; not only above the power of nature, but contrary to it, 21; is accepted through Christ, ib.; without it men must perish, 24; wherein it consists, 25; in sorrow for sin, ib.; hatred of sin, 26; forsaking sin, 27; must be even for sins unknown, 30; for sins before, and sins after, conversion, and for natural corruption, 32; is an imputed grace, and is to be in constant operation, 33; considerations to enforce, 49; without it all enjoyments are cursed, 55; all sin is unpardoned, 56; all ordinances ineffectual, ib.; God is an enemy, ib.; justice is unsatisfied, ib.; wrath is unavoidable, ib.; death is terrible, ib.; hell is certain, ib.; hopes of heaven are delusive, ib.; danger of delaying, 57; how it is unpleasing, 61; is the gift of God, ii. 109; danger of deferring, ib.; of hypocrites, its defectiveness, 256; not necessary by the Romanist doctrine, P. 292; not for original sin, ib.; nor for venial sins, 293; for mortal sins may be put off till death, 297; and then it may be without sorrow for sin, 300; or with a slight sorrow, 302.

Reservation, mental, not peculiar to the Jesuits, P. 416.

Resignation of ourselves to God, wherein it consists, i. 391; motives to induce us to, ii. 476.

Resolution, is an act of soul-worship, ii. 301.

Revelations and visions, not peculiar to the godly, ii. 245.

Revenge must be exercised against sin, ii. 231.

Righteousness of Christ, justification by the, i. 273.

Righteousness, men’s resting in their own, a hindrance to true faith, i. 123; personal, cannot be the ground of justification, 271; of Christ, more excellent than that of man in innocence, 272; attainable by faith, ib.; is eternal, ib.; which is of the law, what it is, 277; why it cannot justify, 278; confidence in, the ruin of many, 280; different forms of, 281; who they are that have confidence in their own, 300; of Christ, called of faith, 301; of God, 302; how we come to have, 303; its imputation does not supersede the necessity of repentance and obedience, 304; of what use and advantage to us, 305; through it is the pardon of sin, ib.; acceptance of our persons, 306; grace, and the continuance of it, 307; the will and the power to obey, 308; interest in the covenant of grace. ib.; and in the promises, 311; deliverance from the condemning power of the law, 313; the enjoyment and efficacy of ordinances, 315; improvement of temporal enjoyments, 316; blessing in afflictions and death, 319; turns the law into a gospel to the believer, 315; who they are who deny, 321; those who deny the satisfaction of Christ (the Socinians), ib.; who deny the sufficiency of it (Romanists), ib.; who deny the imputation of it (Arminians), ib.; who deny it in effect, while they profess it in words, 322; the necessity of, ib.; how to get an interest in, 323; how to be improved, 326; what kind is insufficient to salvation, ii. 295; a negative righteousness. ib.; a moral righteousness, 296; a religious righteousness, ib.; how Christ’s is imputed to us, iii. 52.

Rome, church of, real worship of God not necessary in, P. 219; Christian knowledge not necessary in, 257; love of God needless in, 272; saving or justifying faith not required, 285; no necessity of true repentance, 292; holiness of life, and the exercise of Christian virtues, no necessity for, 313; many heinous crimes accounted virtues or necessary duties, 332; exceeding great and many crimes are but venial faults, 353; many enormous crimes accounted no sins at all, 409; good works made unnecessary, 460.

Romanism, its practical divinity as bad as its doctrinal, P. 218.

Romanists, some have acknowledged the prevalence of pernicious doctrines among them, P. 213; are wont to disown their own doctrine, 215; required to believe all that the church teaches, yet have no means of knowing what it does teach, P. 258.

Rules over all, The Lord, ii. 454.

Rule, includes authority, power, and actual governing, ii. 455; God’s is over all, ib.; both heaven and earth, ib.; all the parts thereof, 456; both great things and small, ib.; all beings and all motions, ib.; both actions and events, 457; both the substance and the circumstances of things and actions, ib.; both ends and means, ib.; not only things orderly, but those which seem most confused, 458; both things necessary and things contingent or casual, ib.; both good and evil, 459; both things natural and things voluntary, ib; is supreme, ib.; absolute, 461; irresistible, 462; perfect, ib.; is over all at once, ib.; is easy, 463; is continual, ib.; an encouragement to his people, 495.

Rules, God not confined to, ii. 201.

Sabbath, how to be sanctified, according to Romanists, P. 324.

Sabbath-breaking, disguised as gospel liberty, ii. 207.

Sacraments, not held by Romanists to be necessary, except for once, P. 245; some for the dead and others for the living, 246.

Sacrifice, Christ’s, iii. 47.

Sacrifices, under the law, were either eucharistical or propitiatory, iii. 48, 71; Christ’s was of expiation, 49; all that was essential to such a sacrifice, found in this, 51; the sin of the offender, whether a particular person or the people, laid upon the victim, ib.; the penalty due to the transgressor under the law inflicted on the sacrifice, 53; the victim suffered instead of the sinner, 54; made satisfaction to God for the sin, 55; put away civil guilt from the offerer, 59; freed from civil guilt, 75; from ceremonial guilt, ib.; but not from spiritual guilt, except typically, 76.

Saints in Scripture repented of original sin (instances, David and Paul), i. 41; invocation of, began with simple commemoration, 505; there is sin in their best services, ii. 114.

Samaritan, the good, a figure of Christ, iii. 32.

Satan, his two paths, profaneness and self-confidence, i 280; how men make him their god, ii. 312.

Satisfaction, made by Christ for us, cannot be without the imputation of his sufferings and death to us, i. 287; how made by sacrifice, iii. 56.

Saul, king, most impartial in justice, though otherwise a hypocrite, ii. 287.

Secrecy of sin, cannot conceal it from God, ii. 471.

Secundus, his stedfastness in the persecution under Diocletian, i. 476.

Seeking fruit, Christ, and finding none, ii. 385.

Self-denial, promoted by considering God as the owner of all, i. 412; as to our own judgments, ib.; our wills, 413; our ends, ib.; our interests, ib.; our business and employments, ib.; our possessions, 414; to be constantly practised, 484; consists in denying our own worth and excellence, ib; our own judgment and wisdom, ib.; our own reasonings, ib.; our own wills, ib.; our own inclinations, 485; our own interest, ib.; how explained by Bellarmine, P. 326.

Self-examination, obstacles to, ii. 211; self-love, ib.; subtlety, ib.; pride, 212; interest, ib.; the judgment or example of those whom we reverence, 213; dissensions, 114; prejudice against those who tell us of our sins, ib.; the exceeding vileness of others, 215.

Self-love, an obstacle to self-examination, ii. 211; makes men mistake the condition of their souls, 243.

Self-righteousness, an impediment to faith, i. 123; is imperfect, ib.; is no righteousness, 124; is unrighteousness 125; those who rest in, are enemies to all righteousness, 126; marks of, 300.

Service, only acceptable in Christ, i. 21; of men cannot be accepted while they are out of Christ, 275; the power and the will to render any to God, is from the righteousness of Christ, 308.

Sin, Original i. 3.

Sins, Children of God should not be Partakers with Others in, ii. 334.

Sin, a propensity to all, is more or less in every man, i. 6; original not an excuse for, but an aggravation of, actual, 7; is more sinful than any actual, or, in some sense, than all actual transgressions put together, 8; its injury infinite, and cannot be satisfied for by a finite creature, 21; sorrow for must be hearty, 25; and godly, 26; hatred of is well grounded, 26; must be universal, ib.; irreconcilable, ib.; resolution to forsake must be effectual and strong, ib.; impartial, 28; all pardoned on the first act of faith and repentance, 30; sorrow for, should be more than for outward afflictions, 34; effects of, some concern us only, some both God and us, 37; original, is either imputed or inherent, 39; each of them to be repented of, according to its nature, 40; no creature ever got, or can get, advantage by, 49; the least is infinitely evil, and deserves infinite punishment, 50; cannot be expiated without infinite satisfaction, 51; is the cause of all misery, ib.; is the soul’s greatest misery, 52, 351; is God’s greatest adversary, 53; against the Holy Ghost, what it is not, and what it is, 147; the Lord concerned not to let sin go unpunished, 282; its great evil, 385; is the worst we can possibly do against the greatest benefactor, ib; is an abusing of the good things of God against himself, 386; danger of, since we cannot make satisfaction for the injury we do, 387; is the cause of suffering, 463; discovery of the heinousness of, ii. 69; how we may be guilty of other men’s, 206; its disguises, 207; some are mothers, giving life, strength, and motion to many others, 208; what classes are specially to be opposed, 209; mother sins, 208; those we are most subject to, 209; the sins of the times, ib.; those which are less disgraceful amongst professors, ib.; those for which the Lord judges and afflicts, 210; opposition to, must be universal, 223; how to be mortified, 224; of others, partaken of by practising the like evil, 334; by concurrence, though it be but partial, 335; by occasioning, 338; by causing, 342; by countenancing, 344; by not hindering, 348; against knowledge, its heinousness, 400; its criminality, as against the supreme Ruler, 468; its danger, 469; its unreasonableness, ib.; the least, deserves everlasting wrath, 518; none absolutely little, 519; not omissions of duty, 520; nor secret sins, ib.; nor idle words, ib.; nor vain thoughts, 521; nor motions to sin without consent, ib.; small, have in them something of atheism, 526; of idolatry, 527; of murder, ib. the least is a violation of the whole law, 528; is the object of infinite hatred, 530; in the least against God, there is more provocation than in the greatest injuries against men, 531; the least requires infinite satisfaction, ib.; the least is now punished in hell, 532; the least is worse than the greatest suffering, 533; is treason, adultery, murder, iii. 12; of saints more heinous than of reprobates, ib.; original, declared by Council of Trent to be not only pardoned, but abolished by baptism, P. 292.

Sincerity, not to be inferred from extraordinary acts or gifts, ii. 297; nor from every inward act, though holy and spiritual, 298.

Sinfulness of outward acts, derived from inward and unlawful motives, ii. 206.

Sinners, Christ’s Gracious Invitation to, ii. 34, Sinners, Unconverted, are Darkness, ii. 355.

Sinners under the Curse, ii. 517.

Sinners, Christ’s Dying for, iii. 63.

Sinners, impenitent, under-estimate their sinfulness, i. 23; unwilling to come to Christ, 334; reasons of their unwillingness, 335; think they have come already, ib.; do not fully apprehend their need of him, ib.; too busy to come to him, 336; will not part with sin, 337; are possessed with prejudice against him, 338; their hearts shut against Christ, ii. 44; by prejudice, 46; distrust, ib.; disaffection, 47.

Socinians, their impiety, in denying the satisfaction of Christ, i. 238; in effect deny Christ’s righteousness, 321; their evasions, iii 48, 50, 54.

Sodomy, its abundance in Italy, P. 441.

Sorcery and conjuring, passes for an eminent virtue with Romanists, P. 347.

Sorrow, godly, has more joy in it than is in the choicest worldly pleasures, i. 19; for sin, must be greater than for outward afflictions, 34; but may not always appear so, ib.; godly, respects sin mainly as it is against God, 38.

Soul-Idolatry Excludes Men out of Heaven. ii. 299.

Soul, is corrupt as soon as united to the body, i. 5; sanctified, its beauty, iii. 5.

Spirit, his office as a Spirit of supplication, to pray in us, i. 207; stirs us up to pray, 208; teaches us what to pray for, ib.; helps us to expressions, ib.; stirs up suitable affections, 209; acts graces in us, confidence and reverence, ib.; helps us against distempers, 210; is a comforting advocate, a pleading comforter, 209; his assistance in prayer, ii. 179.

Standing, Christ’s, at the door, imports condescension, ii. 57; his approach, 58; his desire, his readiness to enter, ib.; his patience, ib.; his readiness to depart if he be not admitted, ib.

Stedfastness, a property of one who is in Christ, ii. 124.

Strangers, Living as, i. 243.

Strangers and pilgrims, Christians are in respect of their station, the place of their abode, i. 243; their design, ib.; their motive, 244; their enjoyments, ib.; their usage, ib; their continuance, 245; their relations, ib.; directions for living as, 245.

Strength, spiritual, its importance towards bearing the cross, i. 494; means of attaining, 497.

Subjection to God, should be universal, ii. 473; necessity of, 476; equity of, 477; advantages of, ib.; excellency of, 480; a means to redress the disorders of the world, 481; danger of refusing, 482; duties flowing from, 485.

Submission to God, a remedy against anxious carefulness, ii. 168.

Sufferings may be for God, though they be inflicted by those who profess to be the people of God, i. 461; and though they be brought on us by our own sins, 463; positively, what are for Christ, 465; of Christ, were real, penal, vicarious, iii. 57; a threefold evil in, legal, moral, natural, 101.

Superiors, how they are to be obeyed, ii. 468.

Swearing by saints, the rood, the mass, &c., is idolatry, ii. 311.

Sympathy with one another, a duty founded upon Christ’s with us, iii. 102.

Taking up the Cross, i. 447.

Talents, an account must be given how they are improved, i. 434.

Teachers, false, description of, ii. 3.

Temper, sinful, worse than many sinful acts, ii. 203; good natural, wherein it is an advantage, 441.

Temporal enjoyments made comfortable by the righteousness of Christ, i. 317; good things to be prayed for, ii. 175.

Tenderness, threefold, i. 136; of expression in tears and weeping may be where that of heart is not, ib Terms upon which men give themselves up to sin and Satan, compared with those offered by Christ, i. 121.

Terrors, legal, no part of faith or conversion, i. 133; no causes of faith, ib.; no condition of any promise, 134; not necessary antecedents of faith, ib; differ in measure and continuance, ib; preparedness for Christ not to be judged by their strength, 135.

Thankfulness, to be for everything, ii. 173; for afflictions, ib.; for public judgments, because they are mingled with mercy, 174; under temptations, ib.; when we fall into sin, that we are not left to go on in it, ib.

Thief, penitent, his repentance at death no ground to defer repentance till death, i. 59; a solitary example in the history of 4000 years, ib.

Thoughts renewed when a man becomes a new creature, ii. 17; must be under government, 474.

Threatenings are, by just consequence, promises, i. 188.

Throne of Grace, Coming Boldly unto, iii. 110.

Thrones, God hath two, of judgment and of grace, iii. 111; imports glorious majesty, 112; dominion and sovereignty, ib; almighty power, 113; holiness, ib.; wisdom, ib.; of grace, what it declares the Lord to be to us, 115; after what manner we are to come to, 124; God’s offering himself to us, as sitting on the throne of grace, shews he is able and willing to help us, 137.

Thurificati, and libellatici, who? i 466.

Ticket-holders (Libellatici), were reckoned amongst the lapsed, i. 475.

Titles of God, virtually promises, i. 187.

Translations of the Bible allowed by the Romanists, only when they cannot help it, P. 265.

Transubstantiation involves, according to the principles of the Romanists themselves, the constant destruction of Christ, iii. 62.

Trent, council of, its timidity, P. 216; pronounced a curse against any who shall hold that the mass should be celebrated in a known tongue, 258.

Trinity, the carnal man’s, ii. 300; doctrine of, thought to be sufficiently learned by the people in making the sign of the cross (Bonaventure), P. 261

Troubles and sufferings of God’s people, designed to purify them, ii. 186; three classes of, 187; can do no hurt if God forbid them, will do good if he command them, 511.

Trust, an act of soul worship, ii. 302.

Unbelief, the root of all sin, ii. 208.

Unbelievers, their misery, i. 91, 200; negatively, 91; positively, 94; who they are, 96; whether they sin in praying, 158; their encouragement to pray, 161; cannot pray in faith, 198; outward mercies cursed to, 346.

Unblameable, children of light must be in their walk, ii. 373.

Uncleanness, very leniently treated by Romanists, P. 428.

Unconverted Sinners are Darkness, ii. 355.

Unconverted, their misery, ii. 356; how we may know whether we are, 360.

Unfaithfulness, horribly wretched, i. 240.

Unfruitfulness, evils of, ii. 396; is a reproach to the gospel, 397; causes of, 419; unmortifiedness, ib.; worldliness, 420; privateness of spirit, 422; slothfulness, ib.; mistakes, ib.; looking more at comfort than duty, 429; being taken up with little things, 430.

Union with Christ, obtained by coming to him, i. 347; signs of, ii. 120; separation from sin, ib.; likeness, ib.; propinquity, 121; adherence, ib.; participation, ib.; sympathy, 122; growth, 123; pruning, ib.; fruitfulness, 124; stedfastness, ib.; dependence, 125; uniformity, ib.; means of, 127.

Unpardonable sin, described in three passages of Scripture, i. 147; definition of, ib.; what it is not, 151.

Unwillingness, Man’s Natural, to come to Christ, i. 331.

Unworthiness, sense of, an impediment to faith, i. 129; none excluded by Christ on account of, ib; qualifies for Christ, 131; unbelief is the greatest, 133; a discouragement in prayer, 219; how to be obviated, ib.

Urim and Thummim, how the mind of God was made known by, iii. 137.

Venial sins, according to the Romanists, need not be avoided, P. 243; pardon can be procured for in very easy ways, 293; not necessary to forsake in order to salvation, 353; include hatred of God, profane and wicked oaths, 354; blasphemy in many cases, 359; Sabbath-breaking, 360; dishonouring of parents, 363; hatred and enmity, 365; fornication, 366; theft in many cases, 370; falsehood, 374; perfidy, 382; hypocrisy, 385; contumely and detraction, 386; flattery, 389.

Vice may be, by the mere light of nature, mistaken for virtue, ii 299.

Vico, Marquis of, his preference of Christ to riches, ii. 22.

Vineyard, to be planted in the Lord’s, is to have a standing under the means of grace, ii. 386.

Virtues, of heathens, how to be accounted of, ii. 286; not required to be practised by the Romanists, P. 314.

Visitation, time of, is limited, i. 139; sometimes longer, sometimes shorter, ib.; to a particular man, is not always as long as his life, 140; probable signs that it has expired, 141; probable signs that it has not expired, 143.

Voice of Christ, heard principally in the gospel, ii. 67; of command, ib.; threatening, ib.; promising, 68; persuading, ib.; entreating, ib.; reproving, 69; hearing, implies attendance, 70; belief, ib.; application, 71; consideration, ib.; conviction, ib.; persuasion, ib.

Walking with God, what it is, iii. 170.

Wants, God’s sufficiency to supply his people’s, ii. 498; his willingness, 501; Christians can have none, iii. 129.

Washed, what is implied in Christians being, iii. 37.

Wave-offering, its signification, iii. 3.

Wealth, how men make it their god, ii. 310.

Whoredom, a source of revenue to the pope, P. 433.

Wicked men, in what respect their prayers are sinful, ii. 31, 111; why they often enjoy temporal prosperity, 62; prosperity of, not incompatible with God’s government, 465; their blessings are cursed, while the curses of believers are blessed, iii. 8. Will of a man is renewed when he becomes a new creature, ii. 19; in its inclinations, ib.; its intentions, 20; its fruitions, 21: its elections, 23; its consents, 24; its applications, 25; its purposes, determinations, resolves, ib.; of the natural man is impotent, 128; we must subject ours to God’s, 169; and to his rule and government, 474.

Word, Hearing the, i. 428.

Word of God, is the general object of faith, i. 76; hearing of, is a means to obtain faith, 170; importance of hearing aright, 429; difficulties of hearing aright, ib.; evil and danger of neglecting, 434; is not effectual, but when particularly applied, 441; must be mixed with faith to make it effectual, 445; must be received in the love of it, 446; hearing of, unprofitable, when it is heard carelessly, ii. 73; not as the voice of Christ, ib.; without application, ib.; without consideration, ib.; without conviction, 74; without obedience, ib.; its power to discover sin, 218; its commands, ib.; its threatenings, 219; its relations, 220; hypocrites may be diligent and attentive in hearing, 289; must be followed fully, 377.

Works, good, three classes of, represented by fasting, alms-deeds, and prayer, P. 322, 460; all these made by the Romanists works of supererogation, 323.

World, a strange country to the people of God, i. 244; what is meant by living as strangers in, ib.; means to wean us from, 414; danger of having much of, 417; embittered to the Christian by the cross, 459; crucified to the Christian, ii. 4; how far hypocrites may contemn, 287.

Worldly cares compared to thorns, ii. 141; enjoyments of little continuance, 158.

Worldliness, disguised as diligence in a lawful calling, ii. 207; makes men unfruitful under the word, 420.

Worship, Public, to be preferred before Private, iii. 187.

Worship, false, disguised as order, decency, reverence, and submission to authority, ii. 207; due only to God, 300; thirteen acts of soul, 301; public, three things necessary to, iii. 189; God more glorified by public than private, ib.; more of his presence in, 190; clearest manifestations of God in, 191; more spiritual advantage, 192; more edifying, ib.; better security against apostasy, 193; the Lord works his greatest works by, ib.; the nearest resemblance of heaven, 194; most available for procuring the greatest mercies, and removing the greatest judgments, 195; the blood of Christ most interested in, 196; promises of God more to public than to private, ib.; objections answered, 197; reproof of those who undervalue, 202; honour of it to be kept up, 205; how to be used, 208; of God, essential to religion, P. 219, not real, unless mind and heart concur in it, ib.; reduced by the Romanists to nothing, 227; attention to the bare words, without thinking either of their meaning or of the God to whom they are addressed, held to be sufficient, 228; lawful for the clergy and monks to celebrate for worldly ends, 241; or for a sinful end, provided that be not the principal, 242; private, not required by Romanists, 250.

Wrath of God, is the inheritance of men, i. 6; heavier on impenitent sinners under the gospel than on others, ii. 61; consists in displeasure, 105; anger, ib.; wrath, or sublimated anger, 106; hatred, ib.; enmity, ib.; abhorrency, ib.