073. II. Primary Questions Of Mosaic Narrative.

II. Primary Questions Of Mosaic Narrative. The simple narrative of creation, even from the beginning, moves on in sublime strain; but when the creation of man is reached a deeper tone is heard. Up to this stage there is for rational thought no completeness of nature. The same stars are in the sky; the same sun illumines the world; there are the same living orders, with all the wonders of organic constitution; but there is no mind within this scale of nature for the rational cognition of these orderly forms of existence; none which may rise in thought to a divine Mind as their only true and sufficient original. “Within their own limitation no sufficient reason for their existence can be given. Their end is not in themselves.^[435] This deficiency is the prophecy of a rational culmination, and the prophecy is fulfilled in the coming of man. That distinct and deeper tone is first heard in the narrative of his creation, and signifies his true headship (Genesis 1:26-28). Such completion of the scale is the satisfaction of rational thought.

^[435]Dwight:Theology, vol. i, pp. 348, 349; Watson:Theological Institutes, vol. ii, p. 8. A few particulars of the Mosaic narrative require brief attention before we come to the deeper questions of doctrinal anthropology.

1. Constituent Natures of Man.—On the face of the sacred narrative there are two distinct natures, body and mind, in the original constitution of man. This fact itself decides nothing respecting the theory of trichotomy, but is so far the obvious truth of the Mosaic narrative. Man is certainly dichotomic. “And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul” (Genesis 2:7). There must here be the sense of two distinct natures. The body is material like the earth out of which it is formed. The chemical elements combined in its constitution belong to the same earth. The body can easily be resolved into these common elements. Such a resolution is in constant process, as certain particles, having fulfilled their use, are ever being eliminated, while others are ever taking their place by a process of assimilation. While the body possesses all the qualities of matter, it is subject to the same methods of chemical and mechanical treatment. Its purely material nature is thus at once the clear sense of the Mosaic narrative and the determination of physical facts. In the formation of Adam there was no such divine operation as man must put forth in working a batch of clay into a human form. There was no divine manipulation of material. So crude a notion never entered into any clear theistic conception. Yet we find such a notion urged as an objection to the origin of man in an immediate divine formation. “Pre-adamitism . . . admits that Adam was ‘created,’ but substitutes for manual modeling of the plastic clay the worthier conception of origination according to a geneticmethod.”^[436] Whether put as an objection to the orthodox conception of man’s creation, or as an argument for his evolution, the answer is already given: the crude notion of a “manual modeling of the plastic clay” never appears in that conception. The divine agency in this case, as in all others, is in the energizing of the divine will. The immediate formation of primitive man through this agency is the whole truth of the orthodox theory.

^[436]Winchell:Pre-adamitesp. 385. The formation of the body was only a part of the divine work in the creation of man. There followed the divine inbreathing: God “breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul.” The body might have been complete in its organic constitution without the living state, and this divine inbreathing might primarily signify its vitalization, with the inception of respiration as necessary to the maintenance of life. Some expositors find this lower sense in the plural form of the original text, as signifying “the breath of lives.” There is, however, in this distinct view of vitalization a trichotomic implication which seems mostly to have been overlooked. In the deeper sense the divine operation must mean the creation of the rational mind. The divine inbreathing signifies this creative agency. However, there is no outward form of action. So far the expression is anthropomorphic. The deep and true meaning is none the less clear. There is no impartation of divine essence as constitutive of the human soul. It is an immediate creation in the most originative sense of the term. This is the deeper meaning of the divine inbreathing in the creation of man.

Rational mind is the distinction of man as an order of existence. Without this distinction he must be classed merely as an animal. He might still be the highest grade, but could not be a distinct order. The utmost exaltation, exaggeration even, of animal intelligence leaves it in an infinitely lower plane than that of rational mind. The characteristics and achievements of human intelligence are the sufficient proof. The reality of mind is given with its faculties. Such faculties must have a ground in being. The essential distinction of the mind and the body is given in the profound distinction of qualities. In the one we find the properties of matter, with their complete subjection to chemical and mechanical laws; in the other, the faculties of intelligence and personal agency under a law of freedom. The two classes are in such thorough distinction, contrariety even, that they cannot have a common ground in being. Otherwise properties signify nothing as to the nature of their ground. But if they have no meaning for its nature, neither have they any for its reality. “We should thus fall into the most abject phenomenalism or positivism. Reason, however, still asserts, and will forever assert, the reality of being as the ground of properties, and equally asserts a distinction of grounds in accord with the fundamental distinction of properties. Thus reason affirms the reality of spiritual being as the ground of mental faculties. Hence the divine inbreathing was the creation of a spiritual nature in man.

2. The Question of Trichotomy.—Trichotomy is the doctrine of three distinct natures in man—body, soul, spirit—ςώμα, ψυχή, πνεύμα. Body and spirit are defined and discriminated in the same manner as in the dichotomic view. There is unavoidable indefiniteness respecting the soul when thus held as a nature distinct from each of the others. We can readily define and differentiate material and mental natures by their respective and essentially different qualities, but we cannot so treat a nature which is neither, and is without definitive and differentiating qualities of its own. Dr. Bush, with others, designates it as a tertium quid, and assumes to find the evidence of its reality in a set of qualities in man which are neither material nor mental in any distinctive sense. These qualities appear in what constitutes the animal life in man in distinction from the intellectual or rational life.^[437] The use of the indefinite tertium quid for the designation of this intermediate nature fully concedes its indefiniteness. Mere indefiniteness, however, is not conclusive against its reality. A thing is definite as its qualities are open to our mental cognition, and indefinite when they are not open. With hidden qualities there might still be the reality of being; though in such case we could not affirm the being. Whether the qualities of the animal or sentient life of man require as their ground a tertium quid, a nature neither physical nor mental, is far from self-evident. It may not be possible to prove the contrary. It follows that the question of trichotomy cannot be decided in this mode.

^[437]Bush:Anastasis, p. 78. In the early history of the Church trichotomy flourished mostly in the school of Alexandria, and was introduced into Christian theology through the Platonic philosophy. For a while it seemed fairly on the way to a common acceptance, when adverse influences checked its progress and brought it into disrepute. Tertullian strongly opposed it, and his influence was very great. Even the seeming indifference of Augustine was indirectly much against it; for his influence was so great on all doctrinal questions that nothing without his open support could hold a position of much favor in the more orthodox thought of the Church. Besides these facts, trichotomy was appropriated in the interest of the Apollinarian Christology and the Semi-Pelagian doctrine of sin. Very naturally, though not very logically, the strong antagonism to these heresies turned all its force against the trichotomy so appropriated.^[438] The doctrinal relation of trichotomy to these heresies is worthy of brief notice. The pointing out of this relation requires a statement of the heretical elements of the doctrines concerned.

^[438]Delitzsch:Biblical Psychology, p. 106; McClintock and Strong:Cyclopaedia, “Trichotomy.” The Christology of Apollinaris denied to Christ the human mind in its distinct rational sense, and provided for its functions in his personality by the presence of the Logos as the divine reason. Such a view requires the trichotomic anthropology, for the presence of the Logos in the place of the rational mind could not account for the sensibilities of Christ in the likeness of our own. In the absence of the rational mind, the soul must have been present as the ground of the manifold affections which lie below the purely rational life. Therefore the soul must be a distinct existence, for otherwise it could not be thus present in the absence of the rational mind. Such being the facts in the case, the only relation of trichotomy to the Apollinarian Christology is that it is the requirement and the possibility of such a Christology. On the other hand, this heresy is in no sense the logical implication or consequence of the trichotomy. Hence, with entire consistency, many trichotomists are thoroughly orthodox in their Christology. It follows that this heretical appropriation of trichotomy is no evidence against its truth, and no reason for the disrepute which it suffered in consequence. The Semi-Pelagian doctrine of original sin, while holding much truth as against pure Pelagianism, fell far short of the Augustinian doctrine. It specially differed from the latter, and fell short of it, in excepting the purely spiritual nature of man from the effect of Adamic sin. Yet his mere physical nature could not be the ground of all that was suffered. The soul as a distinct nature is necessary to such sufficient ground. Hence it must exist in man as a real nature in distinction from his purely spiritual nature. It thus appears that trichotomy is related to the Semi-Pelagian doctrine of sin precisely in the manner of its relation to the Apollinarian Christology. If the spiritual nature is excepted from the effect of Adamic sin, trichotomy must be true because it is the requirement of facts in the case of such exception. This exception, however, is no logical implication of the trichotomy. Hence trichotomy has no direct doctrinal concern with the Semi-Pelagian doctrine of original sin. Indeed, it does not seriously concern any important doctrine of Christian theology. It is a question of speculative interest in biblical psychology, but has no doctrinal implications decisive of either its truth or falsity. A dichotomic view of man is clearly given in the Scriptures. We give by reference a few texts out of many (Ecclesiastes 12:7; Matthew 10:28; 1 Corinthians 6:20; James 2:26). The dust and the spirit, body and soul, body and spirit are the terms of these texts, which seem at once inclusive of the whole man and thoroughly distinctive of his natures. In this view man is only dichotomic. Yet we can hardly regard these texts as decisive of the question; and for the reason that, even with an intermediate nature, the very profound and specially open distinction between our bodily and spiritual natures justifies their designation in the same comprehensive sense as if really constitutive of our whole being. It is not the manner of the sacred writers, as it is not that of any writer, to be always thoroughly analytic. In the treatment of subjects it mostly suffices that chief characteristics be set forth, and the more prominent distinctions be made. Usually this is the actual and the better method. This may be the method in these formally dichotomic texts, and hence they are not conclusive against trichotomy.

There are also trichotomic texts—such at least in form. Two are in special favor with the advocates of trichotomy (1 Thessalonians 5:23; Hebrews 4:12). In the first we have the three distinctive terms “spirit, and soul, and body;” in the other, “soul and spirit,” with other terms, “joints and marrow,” which clearly signify the body. In this prayer of Paul for the Christians of Thessalonica the central and ruling idea is the entireness of their sanctification and their blameless preservation therein. With his usual force and fullness of expression, naturally, in such a case he would use words comprehensive of the whole man as the subject of the gracious sanctification and preservation. The intentional meaning of three distinct natures in man is no necessary part of such comprehension. Indeed, such a formal analytic view is hardly consistent with the intensity of the ruling idea of a complete wholeness. Such is the case in the great commandment (Luke 10:27). With the simple idea of loving God with our utmost capacity of loving, this commandment receives its greatest force; while, on the other hand, it must suffer loss of force by any analysis of heart, soul, and mind into ontological distinctions. The other text is open to similar observations. Soul and spirit are here viewed, not as essentially distinct, but as together the seat of thought and affection. In this view a third term, heart, has the same meaning as the other two. As the word of God is quick and sharp, and pierces even to the sundering of soul and spirit, so it comes to discern the thoughts and intents of the heart. This substitution of the one term heart for the two terms soul and spirit denies to them any ontological distinction ; for otherwise we must allow a third distinction for the heart, and the three, with the body, would give us a tetrachotomous division of natures in man. Such an outcome would itself be fatal to trichotomy.

If the original terms, וֶפֶש and ψυχή, on the one hand, and ךוּחַ and πυεύμα, on the other, were used with uniformity of discrimination, the former for the ground of the animal life and the latter for the ground of the rational and religious life, the fact would constitute a strong argument for trichotomy. Such, however, is not the case. Indeed, the contrary is the fact. The former two often signify the ground of the rational life, while the latter two often signify the ground of the animal life. A few references may suffice for the verification of this position. We give the leading meanings of וֶפֶש: Life (Genesis 1:20; Genesis 1:30); life or spirit (Genesis 35:18; 1 Kings 17:21); intellect, as manifest in its predicates or functions: joyful love (Isaiah 42:1); gladness (Psalms 86:4); piety toward God (Psalms 103:1-2); sinning (Leviticus 4:2); faculty of knowledge (Psalms 139:14; Proverbs 19:2); the personal self (Leviticus 5:1-2; Leviticus 5:4; Leviticus 5:15; Leviticus 5:17; Job 9:21; Psalms 3:2; Isaiah 51:23). It is thus made clear that this term has no restricted lower sense which can serve the interest of trichotomy, but is freely used in the highest sense of personal mind. We find the same meanings in the use of ךוּחַ: breath (Job 4:9); animal life (Job 12:10); the one life and spirit respectively of man and beast (Ecclesiastes 3:19; Ecclesiastes 3:21); the intellect, understanding (Isaiah 29:24); the immortal spirit (Ecclesiastes 12:7). It thus appears that, while the former term rises to the highest sense of the latter, the latter sinks to the lowest sense of the former. This absence of all distinction in their application to the animal and rational sides of human life denies to their use any support of trichotomy. It will not be questioned that πυεύμα often signifies the highest nature of man. Instances of such use are many and clear. With the spirit we rejoice in God our Saviour (Luke 1:47). Ourspirit witnesses jointly with the Holy Spirit to our gracious sonship (Romans 8:16). The glorified saints are spirits made perfect (Hebrews 12:23). Only as the personal mind can the πυεύμα be the subject of such predications. This same term, however, means breath or breathed air (2 Thessalonians 2:8); also the wind (John 3:8). On the other hand, ψυχή rises to the highest meaning of πυεύμα. The soul is the man, the personal self (Acts 2:43; Acts 3:23; Romans 2:9). With the soul we must love God supremely (Matthew 22:37), which is the highest form of personal action. The martyrs already with God aresouls (Revelation 6:9; Revelation 20:4). We thus find a concurrence of meanings in the Scripture use of soul and spirit which precludes any essential distinction between them.

It was previously stated that a uniform distinction of Hebrew and Greek terms for the designation of the animal and the rational life of man would constitute a strong argument for trichotomy. In the total absence of such discrimination there is no such argument. On the other hand, the indiscriminate and interchanging use of these terms may fairly be claimed as an argument for the dichotomic view of man. We do not think it conclusive. It follows that we have reached no dogmatic conclusion on the question of trichotomy. We are not concerned for the attainment of such a result, and for the reason previously stated, that the question does not seriously concern any important truth of Christian theology.^{[439] [439]} Heard:Tripartite Nature of Man; Beck:Biblical Psychology; Delitzsch:System of Biblical Psychology, pp. 103-119.

3. Original Physiological Constitution.—This question must be determined in the light of relative facts as given in the Scriptures. In this view it is clearly seen that in chemical elements, in physiological constitution, and in the provision for subsistence, the body of Adam was much like our own. There must have been lungs for respiration, an alimentary system for the digestion and assimilation of food, an organism of veins for the circulation of the blood, and of nerves for sensation and locomotion. With these facts there must have been the same osteological and muscular systems.

It is a pure gratuity to think that such a body could be naturally exempt from the susceptibilities and liabilities of our own. With the highest degree of bodily perfection in Adam, he must still have been naturally liable to the ordinary casualties of our physical life. His bones could be broken, his blood poisoned, his flesh suffer lesion. He would have suffered from any excess of either fasting or eating. Such a bodily constitution is naturally liable to suffering and death. Any exemption in either case must depend upon a specially providential economy. Such an exemption was no doubt available for Adam on the condition of obedience to the divine will. In accord with these views suffering and death are accounted to man through the sin of disobedience (Genesis 2:17; Romans 5:12).

4. Intellectual Grade of Primitive Man.—Here again the truth is to be sought in a rational interpretation of relative exaggerated facts. The popular view has been molded rather by the views extravagance of Milton than by the moderation of Moses. The theological mind has not been free from much exaggeration. “An Aristotle was but the rubbish of an Adam.”^[440] In this manner the vigorous South expresses his lofty conception of the mental endowments of primitive man. Mr. Wesley is not less extravagant in his view, that Adam reasoned with unerring accuracy—if he reasoned at all. The supposition is that he possessed the faculties of immediate insight into all subjects, and was in no need of either experience or reasoning as a means of knowledge. No doubt he possessed a faculty of immediate insight into primary truths, but there is no evidence of any such insight into truths which we can acquire only through experience and reasoning. We may concede him a very high grade of mental powers, yet they were merely human, just like our own in kind, and operative under the same laws.

^[440]South:Sermons, vol. i, p. 25.

There is nothing in the naming of the animals which, on any proper interpretation, contradicts this moderate view of Adam’s mental powers (Genesis 2:19-20). The perplexity of this case need not be aggravated by the assumption of an absolute universality in the term which designates the number of animals brought to Adam for naming. “The Hebrew word כּל, kol, it is well known, does not invariably mean all in the largest sense, but sometimes many or much; and that it was designed to be received with some limitation in the instance under review is evident from the fishes of the sea not being specified, and from the inutility of making a vocabulary of such animals as were to inhabit distant regions of the globe, and which Adam would never see again after his nomination of them. It is also uncertain whether the assemblage consisted of those only which were within the precincts of the garden of Eden, or included others; inasmuch as the expressions, ‘every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air,’ may only denote of the field and climate of Paradise.”^[441] Another mode of limitation may be cited, which obviates the chief objection urged against the narrative when taken in a universal sense: “It will be more satisfactory, however, if it can be shown that the objection rests only on a misapprehension of the narrative, which by no means affirms that all the creatures, or even many of them, were congregated before the man. ‘Out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field, and fowl of the air,’ and ‘brought to the man,’ not ‘brought them,’ as in the English version, but ‘brought to the man,’ which is evidently equivalent to brought of them, the universalevery referring only to the formation. Should it, however, be objected that the next verse adds, ‘the man gave names to all cattle,’ etc., this will admit of easy explanation, for the correct rendering of the passage is, ‘to all the cattle,’ evidently to as many as were thus brought before him.”^{[442] [441]} Holden:The Fall of Man, pp. 98, 99.

^[442]Macdonald: Creation and the Fall, p. 367. With this restricted sense, however, the naming of the animals remains much the same as it respects the original faculties of Adam. The names given might be viewed either as arbitrary or as descriptive. In the former case they would signify nothing respecting the nature of the animals, while in the latter case they would express severally the natures of the different classes. For an arbitrary naming the requirements would be simply a sufficient vocabulary and a ready use of words. Adam could have had no such qualifications through his faculties, unless we postpone this event for many years after his creation. Language is not gained by intuition. The ready use of words in articulate speech is gained only through long practice. What Adam might have done through divine inspiration is a question quite apart from the present one which concerns his own capacities. By common agreement of the best thinkers the origination of language is a difficult problem; and not a few have found its sufficient source only in the divine agency.^[443] It was simply impossible for Adam in the mere exercise of his own faculties to acquire almost instantly the vocabulary and the use of words necessary to the naming of the animals, however much we may restrict their number. In the view of descriptive names, all the previous difficulty, as it respects the natural ability of Adam, remains, while very much is added. The giving of such names required an insight into the nature of the various animals. Such an immediate insight has been freely attributed to Adam. We give a single instance: “Adam gave names; but how? From an intimate knowledge of the nature and properties of each creature. Here we see the perfection of his knowledge; for it is well known that the names affixed to the different animals in Scripture always express some prominent feature and essential characteristic of the creatures to which they are applied. Had he not possessed an intuitive knowledge of the grand and distinguishing properties of those animals he never could have given them such names.”^[444] It is hardly thinkable that such intuition can belong to any finite mind. To attribute it to Adam is to place him out of all proper homogeneity with ourselves. It must mean that the highest and most distinctive power of primitive man is entirely lost to his race. There is no such original unlikeness, no such loss of original faculty; and it is far more consistent with all the relative facts to account this naming of the animals to a divine inspiration. “To suppose it otherwise, and to imagine that Adam at the first was able to impose names on the several tribes of animals, is to suppose, either that he must from the first have been able to distinguish them by their characteristic marks and leading properties, and to have distinct notions of them annexed to their several appellations, or that he applied sounds, at random, an names of the animals, without the intervention of such notions. But the latter is to suppose a jargon, not a language; and the former implies a miraculous operation on the mind of Adam, which differs nothing in substance from the divine instruction here contended for.”^{[445] [443]} Magee:On the Atonement, dissertation liii.

^[444]Clarke:Commentary, in loc.

^[445]Magee:On the Atonement, dissertation liii.

We thus find in Adam no evidence of a superhuman mental grade. However high his intellectual powers, they were not other in kind than our own; and, if left to himself, his progress, even in the rudiments of empirical knowledge, must have been very slow. There is no evidence that he was so left; and it is far more rational to think that he was divinely instructed and helped forward, that he might the sooner be prepared for the throne of the world assigned him (Genesis 1:26-28).

5. Created in the Image of God.—In the divine ideal of man as a purposed creation he was to be the image of God. “And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness” (Genesis 1:26) The record of such an actual creation immediately follows (Genesis 1:27).

Very naturally differences of opinion respecting the likeness of man to God early appeared in Christian thought. With a common agreement that man himself was the image of God, there was still the cardinal question as to what really constituted man. Some could not dispense with the body as an essential part, and therefore assumed for it a likeness to God. This required the assumption of some form of corporeity in God; for it is not to be thought that a physical nature can bear the likeness of a purely spiritual being. With the burden of such an assumption, the notion of a bodily similitude could not command a wide acceptance; and the prevalent opinion placed the image of God in the spiritual nature of man. Opinions also divided on the question whether image and likeness, or the original words so rendered, have different meanings or only serve conjunctly to intensify the expression of the one truth. Occasion was found for a distinction of meanings. “As there is a great difference between the mere natural dispositions and their development by the free use of the powers which have been granted to men, several writers, among whom Irenaeus, and especially Clement and Origen, distinguished between the image of God and resemblance to God. The latter can only be obtained by a mental conflict (in an ethical point of view), or is bestowed upon man as a gift of sovereign mercy by union with Christ (in a religious aspect).”^[446] Such a view is utterly discredited by the fact that this likeness of man to God was an original creation, not any subsequent attainment through either the free agency of man or the sovereignty of divine grace. A distinction of meanings in the two original terms is again discredited by the fact that in other places only one is used, sometimes one and sometimes the other, and in a manner to give to each the full meaning of both in the primary instance of their conjunct use (compare Genesis 1:27; Genesis 5:1; Genesis 9:6).

^[446]Hagenbach:History of Doctrines, vol. i, p. 157.

It should be distinctly noted, and the fact should be emphasized, that man was originally made in the image of God. Hence this image must be in what he was originally, just as he came from the creative hand of God. We thus exclude every thing extraneous to the man himself, and equally every thing subsequent to his creation, whether from the divine agency or as the fruit of his own action. We thus exclude the dominion assigned to man (Genesis 1:28), which has often been set forth as the great fact of his likeness to God. Man was constituted in himself, not in his dominion, the image of God himself, not of his dominion. His dominion was an assignment subsequent to his creation in the image of God, which image constituted his fitness for such dominion.

We may find the true sense of this image rather in a complex of facts than in a single fact. The spiritual nature of man is the deepest fact of this likeness—the deepest because necessary to all other facts of likeness. But we should not place it so deep that it shall stand related to the divine likeness in man Just as the canvas is related to the painting which it bears, or merely “as precious ground on which the image of God might be drawn, and formed.”^[447] The spiritual nature was itself of the original likeness of man to God. Ontologically, spirit is like spirit, though one be finite and the other infinite. The intellectual and moral endowments of primitive man constituted a measure of his likeness to God. Again we are face to face with the profound distinction between the finite and the infinite; but such distinction does not preclude a profound truth of likeness. In God there is an intellectual, an emotional, and a moral nature. Such qualities of nature were in primitive man; in these facts he was the image of God. Personality is the central truth of man’s original likeness to God. As a person he was thoroughly differentiated from all lower orders of existence, and in the highest sense lifted up into the image of God.

^[447]Witsius:The Covenants, vol. i, p. 34. The original image of God in man no doubt had the implicit sense of holiness. Hence in the New Testament it came to signify holiness. This appears in the fact that the regeneration of man, his transformation from depravity into holiness, is represented as a recreation in the image of God after which he was originally made (Ephesians 4:24; Colossians 3:10). But this question of primitive holiness so deeply concerns important doctrinal issues that it requires a separate treatment.