05-James P Boyce, D.D., LL.D.

Chapter V James P Boyce, D.D., LL.D.

By Ben M. Bogard, 1900 James Petigru Boyce was born in Charleston, S. C., January 11, 1827. His father was a wealthy banker and planter; said to be the richest man in South Carolina. James P. Boyce was an exception to the rule that rich men’s sons never amount to much. There have been very few sons of poor men who have become the equals of James P. Boyce. The rich man’s boy, as a rule, turns out bad, but God elected otherwise in this case, and few men have labored so unselfishly for the good of mankind and the glory of God. His earliest religious impressions were received under the preaching of that excellent and powerful preacher, Basil Manly, Sr., the father of Dr. Basil Manly, so long connected with the Seminary, and for a number of years President of Georgetown College, Ky. Dr. Boyce’s father never made a public profession of faith in Christ and died out of the church. He was never fully reconciled to his son’s becoming a preacher, looking upon it as throwing himself away. Under the preaching of that wonderful preacher, Richard Fuller, Boyce was converted, and on the 22d of April, 1846, he was baptized and became a member of the church in Charleston, S. C. It means a great deal to a man to be brought under the influence of such a man as Richard Fuller at the very beginning of his religious life. It necessarily set before Boyce a high ideal and possibly inspired him with a lofty purpose. If we had more Fullers to preach we might have more Boyces converted. He graduated at Brown University, September, 1847. Dr. Broadus, in his "Memoir of James P. Boyce," says: "It was a sad disappointment to Mr. Ker. Boyce when he found * * * that James was immovably resolved to be a minister. Besides a natural ambition that his son might become distinguished as a lawyer, and perhaps as a statesman - for both of which pursuits the father’s insight discerned in him peculiar qualifications - he began already to hope * * * that James would be the man to take charge of his large estate and carry on his great business undertakings for the benefit of the whole family * * * it was hard for him to acquiesce in the youth’s determination to ’throw away’ all his practical powers and possibilities upon the work of a minister." On the 14th of September, 1847, he was authorized by the church in Charleston to preach the Gospel "wherever God in his providence might call him." He married Miss Lizzie L. Ficklen, December 20, 1848, and he at once settled in his native town, Charleston. For about one year he was editor of the Southern Baptist, and showed his ability in a number of excellent editorials. Dr. Broadus says of him: "For one so young, with little experience in preaching, and no regular study of theology, Mr. Boyce had done remarkably well as an editor. Had he thought proper to continue in this line of work, his great administrative talent, wide and eager reading, special interest in practical enterprises, * * * and rapidity of composition, would sooner or later have made his editorial life a marked success." Dr. Boyce was a great theologian, and his work on Systematic Theology is one of the best books of its kind. An extract from this excellent work is published at the close of this sketch. His position on election and predestination is hyper-Calvinistic, and is somewhat extreme for a Baptist, yet no one will be willing to say that Dr. Boyce has not very ably defended that position, and, after all, how much difference is there between hyper-Calvinism and plain Calvinism? For five years Dr. Boyce was pastor at Columbia, S. C. This was during the years of 1851-1855. During this pastorate a good, substantial church house was built, largely with Boyce’s money. There was a steady growth in the membership during his pastorate. While in this work he gave a great deal of attention to the religious welfare of the Negro slaves, and while all the North was agitated about the imaginary cruelty meted out to the black man of the South, such men as Broadus, Richard Fuller, Robert Ryland and Boyce were earnestly looking after the Negro’s spiritual welfare. There were, no doubt, many evils connected with slavery, but the malicious misrepresentations found in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin are slanders too vile for even a wretch such as the slave owner was represented to be. Let us rejoice that the Union of States was preserved and that people of all sections of our great Republic willingly rally around one flag, yet, in the behalf of such men as Boyce, we demand that misrepresentation cease. In November, 1854, he was elected Moderator of the historic Charleston Association, and after that he was frequently called on to preside at denominational gatherings. He was on several occasions elected President of the Southern Baptist Convention. His ability as a presiding officer was exceptional. His first work as teacher of theology was in Furman University. This position he held until he succeeded in establishing the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, which is a monument to his energy and zeal. For thirty years he bent every energy of his powerful life in establishing this great school and putting it on a solid basis. Dr. Boyce undertook to establish a seminary for the reason, to use his own words, that "historians who have professed to write the history of the church have either utterly ignored the presence of those of our faith, or classed them among fanatics and heretics; or, if forced to acknowledge the prevalence of our principles and practice among the earliest churches, have adopted such false theories as to church power and the development and growth of the truth and principles of Scripture, that by all, save their most discerning readers, our pretentious to an early origin and a continuous existence have been rejected." The foregoing language is found in his address on "Three Changes In Theological Institutions." If this language means anything it means that Boyce believed in the "continuous existence" of Baptists from Christ, and that for this reason a seminary should be established to train men to defend the Baptist position. This is the more clearly brought out in the next few sentences of this same great address. He further says: "The Baptists in the past have been entirely too indifferent to the position they thus occupy. They have depended too much on the known strength of their principles. * * * We owe a change to ourselves - as Christians, bound to show an adequate reason for the differences between us and others; as men of even moderate scholarship, that it may appear that we have not made the gross errors in philology and criticism which we must have made if we do not right; as the successors of a glorious spiritual ancestry, illustrated by heroic martyrdom, by profession of noble principles, by the maintenance of true doctrines; as a Church of Christ, which he has ever preserved as the witness for his truth, by which he has illustrated his wonderful ways, and shown that his promises are sure and steadfast." His belief in the "continuous existence" of the Baptists from Christ to the present could not have been more unmistakably asserted. And this is one of the reasons why he wanted to establish a seminary, that men might be trained to defend that position. To this end he gave his noble life, and it would be enough to well-nigh cause the grand old man to turn over in his grave if he could know what efforts have been made, by those in authority, to destroy the very idea for which he gave his life, and to so change the purpose of the seminary as to make it stand for the exact opposite of what he intended. Dr. Boyce, in numerous private conversations, asserted that he got these ideas, which he gave in this remarkable address, from Pres. Francis Wayland, of Brown University. (See Broadus’ Memoir of Boyce, p. 142.) If this is true it follows that he was not alone in his orthodox Baptist position. It has been charged that there are some things in the Abstract of Principles of the Seminary which are not altogether in harmony with these ideas. While this has not been satisfactorily shown, yet, if it be granted to be true, it does not follow that Dr. Boyce did not hold these avowed positions, since Dr. Manly wrote this Abstract of Principles, and inasmuch as it was written at a time when all Baptists believed in the "continued existence" of Baptists from Christ, it may not be as guarded in its statements on this point as it might be. While connected with the Seminary he was pastor at different times of small country churches, as was his illustrious colleague, John A. Broadus. Although great in mental power and rich in purse, he was not above preaching the Gospel to the poor. During the civil war Dr. Boyce was a chaplain in the Confederate army and preached to the soldiers. He was opposed to the South’s seceding, but when his State seceded he went with his State and cast his lot with the Confederacy. His experience in the army greatly helped his preaching, as he was forced to speak extempore when his habit had been to stick closely to his manuscript, which does not comport with the best preaching. At one time he was offered $10,000 per annum to accept the presidency of a South Carolina railroad; at another time he was offered the same amount to become president of a banking company. At any time he could have commanded a handsome salary at other employment, but he turned away from it all for Christ’s sake. This is another answer to the slander that men go to preaching when they cannot succeed at anything else. Dr. Boyce was opposed to alien immersion (immersion performed by others than Baptists), and had Dr. Williams removed from the chair of Church Government in the Seminary, and took the place himself, because Dr. Williams believed that Baptists might receive the immersions of other denominations as valid baptism. (Memoir, p. 226, by Broadus.) Besides this, he publicly opposed the reception of a candidate for membership in the Louisville Broadway Baptist Church, who wanted to come in on his alien immersion, and his opposition was sufficient to keep the person from being received, although the pastor, Dr. J. L. Burrows, favored the reception of the candidate. (See Memoir, p. 284, by Broadus.) Dr. Boyce was a sound Baptist, a pillar of orthodoxy, and he has left his impress on thousands who came under his influence. He went to his reward from Pau, France, whence he had gone in search of health, December 28, 1888. His body awaits the resurrection in Cave Hill Cemetery, Louisville, Ky.
The Doctrine of Divine Decrees By James P. Boyce [Extract from Boyce’s Theology] The doctrine of the decrees of God, or, as it is frequently called, predestination, is justly considered one of the most difficult of all the doctrines in which Christians believe. It involves some things hard to be understood, and the ignorant and unlearned have often wrested the doctrine to their own destruction. The difficulty of the doctrine and its dangers are, however, no good reason for refusing to study it. Least of all can any one afford, on this account, to refuse to accept it. The sole question with us is whether it is taught in the word of God. If so, it must be a part of our creed. For God would not have revealed it to us if he had not meant to have us receive it. In considering this doctrine we will first try to state plainly what the doctrine is. We will then present the Scripture proof for the view taken. We will then examine the objections, or theories, that are urged against the doctrine, and we will conclude our consideration with some practical suggestions concerning the manner of holding and teaching the doctrine. The Doctrine Stated The decrees of God may be defined as that purpose or plan by which eternally and within himself, God determines all things whatsoever that come to pass. Let us see now just what points are involved in this definition. God determines all things whatsoever that come to pass. Let us see now just what points are involved in this definition. 1. God’s Purpose Or Plan. These decrees are defined to be God’s purpose or plan. The term "decree" is liable to some misapprehension and objection, because it conveys the idea of an edict, or of some compulsory determination. "Purpose" has been suggested as a better word. "Plan" will sometimes be still more suitable. The mere use of these words will remove from many some of the difficulties or prejudices which make them unwilling to accept this doctrine. They perceive that in the creation, preservation and government of the world, God must have had a plan, and that that plan must have been just, wise and holy, tending both to his own glory and the happiness of his creatures. They recognize that a man who has no purpose or aim, especially in important matters, and who cannot, or does not, devise the means by which to carry out his purpose, is without wisdom and capacity, and unworthy of his nature. Consequently, they readily believe and admit that the more comprehensive, and, at the same time, the more definite is the plan of God, the more worthy is it of infinite wisdom. Indeed they are compelled to the conclusion that God cannot be what he is without forming such a purpose or plan. 2. Formed Eternally and Within Himself. Any such plan or purpose of God must have been formed eternally and within himself. (1) It must have been eternally purposed. For God’s only mode of existence, as has been heretofore proved, is eternal, and therefore his thoughts and purpose and plan must be eternal. The fact also that his knowledge is infinite, and cannot be increased, forbids the forming of plans in time, which, as they become known to him, would add to that knowledge. It is also to be remembered that the plan must precede its execution, but as time began with that execution, the plan could not have been formed in time, and must be eternal. (2.) In like manner, also, was it formed within himself. He needed not to go without himself, either for the impulse which led to it, or the knowledge in which it was conceived. He had all knowledge, both of the actual and the possible, all wisdom as to the best end and means, all power to execute what he devised in the use, or without the use, of appropriate secondary means, and free will to select, of all possible plans and means, whatever he himself should please; and the impulse which moved him existed alone in that knowledge and will. 3. Embraced All Things That Should Come To Pass. It is as the result of this plan, or purpose, that things come to pass. According to this doctrine of decrees, God assumes a certain responsibility for the universe. This, as we shall see, is the most difficult feature in the doctrine. Nevertheless we cannot hold to any real doctrine of decrees and deny this feature. We should, however, make a distinction at this point. When we say that God determines whatever comes to pass, we should distinguish between an efficacious determination and a permissive determination. Some of the things which come to pass are the outcome of an efficacious decree on the part of God, that is, they come to pass because God determined not only that they might come to pass, but that he himself would bring them to pass. As to these things God, in decreeing them,, took upon himself the responsibility of their coming to pass. There are other events, however, which may be truly said to have been in the decrees of God, and yet God repudiates responsibility for their ever coming to pass. His decree concerning these is a permissive decree. These things were in his plan or purpose as truly as the others. But the purpose as to these was a purpose to permit and not to effect. God did not simply foreknow these events. He actually made a place for them in his plan. In a true sense he intended them to occur. But he did not intend to bring them about. Such, for example, is the entrance of sin; such also are all sinful acts that have ever occurred. This distinction between efficacious and permissive decrees may not be altogether satisfactory. It may be difficult for us to see how God could plan to take sin in and not be himself responsible. But some such distinction we are bound to hold. For it is clear that God has not taken all events into his plan in just the same way and with the same sort of purpose or decree. In one or the other of these ways, however, God has decreed all things whatsoever that come to pass - not some things only, but all things; not all things in general, but each thing in particular. It is useless, we repeat, to try to evade this conclusion if we hold to any real doctrine of a plan, or purpose, on God’s part concerning the universe which he has created. For so interwoven are the events of the universe that a lack of purpose as to any one event would involve a lack of purpose as to a multitude of others also - indeed as to every other event in any wise connected with the one not purposed. Events do not happen without sufficient cause or causes. If, therefore, a particular event is purposed, then the antecedent event or events which caused that particular event must have been purposed also. And if any particular event was not purposed, then the antecedent event or events that caused this particular event were not purposed either. To such an extent is the force of this realized that it is admitted by all that in the mechanical universe, and even in the control of the lower animals, everything that comes to pass is purposed, or decreed. But the free agency of man, and of other rational and moral agents, is supposed to prevent God’s purposing, or willing, all things with reference to them. It is said that such purposing would take away that free agency and consequent responsibility. The Scriptures, however, recognize the sovereignty of God and his control of man, and also the free agency and accountability of man. Consciousness also assures us of the latter. The nature of God, as has just been shown, proves the former. The Bible makes no attempt to reconcile the two. Paul even declines to discuss the subject, saying, "Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?" (Romans 9:20.) The two facts are plainly revealed. They cannot be contradictory, they must be reconcilable. That we cannot point out the harmony between them is a proof only of our ignorance and limited capacity, and not that both are not true. It is certain, however, that whatever may be the influences which God exercises or permits to secure the fulfillment of his purposes, he always acts in accordance with the nature, and especially with the laws of mind that he has bestowed upon man. It is equally true that his action is in full accord with that justice and benevolence which are such essential attributes of God himself. II. Proof that this Doctrine is True But for the fact that this doctrine seems to lead to certain consequences that are hard to explain or receive, it woiildvery likely not have been called in question, or at least would not have been so violently opposed. The difficulties connected with it, however, and the opposition to it make it necessary to marshal with special clearness and force the proof in favor of it. 1. A Reasonable Doctrine. This is, first of all a reasonable doctrine in itself. If one can divest himself in his thought of the supposed hard conclusions that follow from the doctrine, he must see that it is reasonable. For if God is really the eternal, all-wise, omnipotent ruler of the universe, he assuredly has had a plan concerning his universe. If he is really omniscient he must have known everything that would come to pass. It is not possible that God could have been surprised by anything that has over occurred. But if he foreknew that everything would come to pass, and did not in any wise interpose to prevent, then he must at least have purposed to permit those things to come to pass. And so there is absolutely no rational way by which anything can be thought of as not coming at least permissively under God’s decrees. [This rational view is greatly strengthened when we remember that God is not simply a spectator of the universe, foreknowing what will happen, but its actual ruler, and that he upholds all things by his power, and that absolutely nothing can happen independently of him. If everything that exists draws its existence and its support from God, and is able to act only by reason of the fact that God upholds it in its acting, how can it be that anything has ever come to pass without some kind of purpose on God’s part concerning it? The difficulty, from a rational point of view, is not in accepting the doctrine that everything that ever comes to pass has been always in God’s plan. The real difficulty is to see how anything, even sin, has come to pass without God’s having been responsible for it. This difficulty will be solved if we ever understand fully the nature of God’s rational creatures and the element of freedom and responsibility which God has lodged in them. But meantime there is no difficulty, from a rational point of view, in holding that the plan, or purpose, of God includes all things whatsoever that come to pass. This seems to be the only reasonable conclusion.] 2. Sustained by the Scriptures. This doctrine is not only a reasonable doctrine, it has also the clear support of the Scriptures. This scriptural authority for the doctrine will appear from the following statements and references, gathered with slight modifications from Hodge’s "Outlines," pp. 205-213: (1) God’s decrees are eternal: Acts 15:18; Ephesians 1:4; Ephesians 3:11; 1 Peter 1:20; 2 Thessalonians 2:13; 2 Timothy 1:19; 1 Corinthians 2:7. (2) They are immutable: Psalms 33:11; Isaiah 46:9. (3) They comprehend all events. a. The Scriptures assert this of the whole system in general embraced in the divine decrees: Daniel 4:34-35; Acts 17:26; Ephesians 1:11. b. They affirm the same of fortuitous events: Proverbs 16:33; Matthew 10:29-30. c. Also of the free actions of men; Ephesians 2:10-11; Php 2:3. d. Even the wicked actions of men : Acts 2:23; Acts 4:27-28; Acts 13:29; 1 Peter 2:8; Jude 1:4; Revelation 17:17. As to the history of Joseph, compare Genesis 37:28 with Genesis 45:7-8 and Genesis 50:20. See also Psalms 17:13-14; Isaiah 10:5; Isaiah 10:15. (4) The decrees of God are not conditional: Psalms 33:11; Proverbs 19:21; Isaiah 14:24; Isaiah 14:27; Isaiah 46:10; Romans 9:11. (5) They are sovereign: Isaiah 40:13-14; Daniel 4:35; Matthew 11:25-26; Romans 9:11; Romans 9:15-18; Ephesians 1:5; Ephesians 1:11. (6) They include the means : Ephesians 1:4; 2 Thessalonians 2:13; 1 Peter 1:2. (7) They determine the free actions of men: Acts 4:27-28; Ephesians 2:10. (8) God himself works in his people that faith and obedience which are called the conditions of salvation: Ephesians 2:8; Php 2:13; 2 Timothy 2:25. (9) The decree renders the event certain: Matthew 16:21; Luke 18:31-33; Luke 24:46; Acts 2:23; Acts 13:29; 1 Corinthians 11:19. (10) While God has decreed the free acts of men, the actors have been none the less responsible: Genesis 50:20; Acts 2:23; Acts 3:18; Acts 4:27-28. III. Objections to the Doctrine Owing to a belief that the purpose of God accomplishing his will in his rational creatures is inconsistent with their free agency, several classes of theologians have presented theories in opposition to the scriptural doctrine of decrees above set forth. 1. Theory of the Socinians. The most objectionable theory is that of the Socinians, who deny that God can know what a free agent will choose or do before he acts or wills. They maintain that the will is, at the moment of its choice, in such perfect equilibrium that there are no tendencies in any direction which prevent an absolute freedom of choice. No knowledge, therefore, of the will itself, nor of the circumstances which surround its action, will enable any one to say, before it is exercised, what will be its choice. Hence its act is entirely undetermined and undeterminable until the free agent wills. It cannot even be known beforehand by God himself. The objections to this theory are obvious: (1) It is based upon a wrong conception of the nature of free agency; for it supposes each act of the will to be an arbitrary choice. But such arbitrary choice is not found even in God. As regards man, we know, from consciousness and experience, that his will is influenced by motives. Indeed, so truly is it governed by the nature of the man, and the attendant influences, that even we can predict his will and action in many cases, and only fail to do so perfectly in all because of our limited knowledge. The omniscient God cannot fail to know everything that affects the decision, and therefore what the decision will be. (2) This theory is also opposed to the independence of God. It supposes him to have made beings of such a nature that his own actions and will must depend upon theirs, and that he must await their decision, wherever it will have any influential bearings on anything future, before he can know or purpose what he himself will do. (3) As is also manifest from what has been said under the first objection, this theory is opposed to the omniscience of God. It expressly puts a limitation upon that omniscience by declaring that he is limited in his knowledge, at least so far as not to know beforehand the decision of the will of his creatures. But ignorance of this would also involve ignorance of all things in the future with which it may be connected. This would, in a world inhabited by free agents, constitute no small part of all that will occur. (4) It is opposed to the many instances mentioned in Scripture of the prediction beforehand by God of even the bad actions of certain men. See as to Pharaoh, Exodus 7:3-4; Hazael, 2 Kings 7:13; Judas, Matthew 26:21; Peter, Matthew 26:34, etc. 2. Theory of some Arminians. Another theory has been advanced by some Arminians, who maintain that God does not know the free actions of men, not because he cannot know them, but because he chooses not to do so. (1) The first objection to this theory is that, were it true, it would not give greater freedom to the will than does the orthodox statement. Though this theory honors God more than the former, it is inferior to it with respect to the object for which it is introduced. If it could be true, as the first theory claims, that so indeterminate is the future will of a free agent that even God cannot know it, then that future will would certainly be entirely under the control of the free agent, and he would, to the utmost extreme, be free. His will would be in absolute equilibrium in the act of choosing. Neither would any motive exist to influence that choice. It would be thoroughly arbitrary, and so would not be a matter of God’s decree at all. But this second theory has not this advantage, for it does not suppose this condition of equilibrium. In claiming that God does not choose to know what he might know if he should so choose, it admits the certainty of the event. For the certainty of what will occur is as much fixed as it could be if actually known to God. For the supposition is that God could know it if he chose so to do. (And it is clear that even God is not able to know an event as something that will occur, if it were not certain that it will actually occur. We object to this theory then, first, on the ground that it has no advantage whatever over the orthodox theory. If it is said that the fact that God could know the event does not make God in any wise responsible for the event, it can be answered that, according to the orthodox theory of God’s permissive decrees, God is fully as free from responsibility for the events which he only decrees to permit as he is, according to this theory, for the events which he is supposed to decree not to know. Moreover, this Arminian theory makes just as really a place for God’s decree and influence in the free acts of his creatures as does the theory which we have shown to be the Scripture doctrine. For this Arminian theory does not try to rule out a free exercise of influence on God’s part to bring about any result that he desires or purposes. And so man, under the divine influence, is left not a whit more free, according to this theory, than he is under the theory which we have shown to be the doctrine of the Scriptures. (2) A second and chief objection to this theory is that it is based upon a wrong conception of the relation of the will of God to his nature. That will does not confer the attributes of his nature, nor does it control them, but is itself influenced by them. God knows all things, not because he wills to know them, but because, from his nature, he has infinite knowledge - knowledge of all things possible, and knowledge of all things certain. If by his will he could refrain from knowing, he would change his nature. As well speak of a man not choosing to see with his eyes open the objects presented to his sight, as of God not choosing to know anything, whether that is only something which is possible or something which in any way has been made certain. 3. Ordinary Arminian Theory. There is, besides the theories already referred to, the ordinary Arminian theory. This is that God knows all things that will come to pass, but does not decree all, but only some of them. The decisions of free agents are among those things which he is supposed not to decree. This theory aims to provide for the larger freedom of God’s rational creatures. But - 1. A manifest objection to the theory is that it does not accord with the statements of the Bible. This has already been made clear by the passages of Scripture which have been advanced in proof of the various points involved in the ordinary Calvinistic theory. 2. A second objection will be found in the fact that this theory does not thus secure that freedom from certainty in the decisions of free agents, which is the great reason for the objections to the decrees of God concerning them. For if God knows that any event will occur, and can prevent it and does not, it is evident that he purposes that it shall exist, and makes it a part of his plan. The event is as absolutely certain to occur (if God actually knows it as an event that "will come to pass") as it could possibly be under any purpose that God could have to bring it about. What God knows "will come to pass" is certain to come to pass. Otherwise he would know a thing as future which may not be future. His knowledge of it would be false. He would be himself deceived. (3) A third objection to this theory is that it fails to accomplish another object for which it is introduced, namely, to secure such a relation of God to any free act of man as will take away all influence exerted upon that act by God’s decree. We have seen that, so far as the permissive decree is concerned, the knowledge of the event does indeed render it certain that the event is going to happen. But it is only when the decree is effective, and introduces means for its accomplishment, that the free; agency is affected. As to this case also, the Arminian theory is no whit better than that of the Calvinist. The Arminian holds as firmly as does the Calvinist that God is sometimes directly active in hi» gracious influences upon men. Both hold that in all such gracious acts God is both merciful and just. Calvinists extend these gracious acts or influences no farther than do Arminians, for they deny as strenuously as others that God acts effectively to lead men to wicked decisions and deeds. So far as the nature of God’s actions upon free agents is concerned, both parties agree. But the Arminian theory, in asserting foreknowledge without purpose, and in alleging that the foreknowledge is all that there is in God, is contrary to the relations of God’s will to his knowledge, as well as to the statements of Scripture about the decrees of God; and while it leaves the event equally certain, supposes fully as much influence over the will of the creature and has equal difficulty in reconciling the free agency and consequential responsibility with the inevitable certainty of the event. (4) Chief Objection. The chief objection to the doctrine of decrees arises from the existence of sin. According to that doctrine sin has not occurred accidentally, neither was it simply foreknown; it was a part of the plan and purpose of God that it should exist. But for this difficulty the doctrine would seem a most natural one. It is not likely that any one woiild object to a doctrine of decrees such as this if it applied only to heaven, or to a realm where there is absolutely no sin. But when it is said that the coming and the existence of sin were, in any sense, a part of the plan or purpose of God, then there is a disposition to shrink back and say it cannot be so. The difficulty here is freely admitted. And in this respect the dispensation of God is surrounded with "clouds and darkness." The following statements, however, may be made: (1) That its being a part of the purpose or plan of God renders its presence no more difficult of explanation than that he should have foreknown its appearance, and not exerted his unquestioned power to prevent it. (2) That amid all the darkness we can yet see that God is so overruling sin as to cause it greatly to redound to his glory and the happiness of his creatures. (3) That even without any, explanation of it, we can rest in our knowledge of the justice, wisdom and goodness of, God. (4) That we cannot see how its possible entrance into the world could have been prevented, consistently with the creation and putting upon probation of beings with moral natures, endowed with free will, and necessarily fallible because mere creatures.*