Part 1, Chapter 4

PART I - DIVINE FOREORDINATION

CHAPTER IV.
OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF DIVINE FOREORDINATION ANSWERED,
AND THE INCONSISTENCIES OF ARMINIANISM POINTED OUT. The evidence appears conclusive, that, according to the Scriptures, God hath foreordained whatsoever cometh to pass. Against this doctrine, however, several objections are urged. Let us give them a careful consideration.

1. This doctrine, it is confidently affirmed, is inconsistent with the free agency and accountability of man. Those who press this objection, must, if they are consistent, hold the doctrine of man’s free agency, must believe that such is the nature of the human mind, that it is capable of choosing and refusing. Free Agency is nothing more nor less than acting without compulsion, and in accordance with one’s desires or inclinations. The mind is free, if it is capable of considering the motives to action which may be placed before it, and of choosing its own course. The word motives is sometimes used to signify the reasons or inducements placed before the mind, tending to lead to certain choices or actions; and sometimes, to designate the feelings under which men make certain choices, or perform certain actions. Used in the former sense, that which would be a powerful motive in the view of one mind, would be no motive at all in the view of another. The offer of a bribe would be a sufficient motive to induce one judge to decide a case contrary to law and evidence; whilst to another, such an offer, so far from being a motive to such a course, would be highly offensive. The temptation presented by Potiphar’s wife, which was firmly resisted by Joseph, would have been a motive of sufficient power to have ruined many a youth of less purity of heart. An external motive can have no influence over the choices and conduct of men, except as it makes an appeal to feelings existing in the mind; and all the affections of the human heart are, in their very nature, free. The idea of compelling a man either to love or to hate any object, is perfectly absurd. We hold, then, that man is, from the very nature of his mind, a free moral agent,-that he is capable of looking at all the motives presented before him, and of acting, in view of them all, freely and without compulsion. That every one will choose what, on the whole, he prefers, is certain. To assert the opposite, would be a contradiction in terms. It would be the same as to say, that the mind chooses what, on the whole, it does not prefer, or does not choose. But all the choices of the intelligent mind are free and unconstrained.

Now if man’s free agency is destroyed in any case, it must be by some force ab extra,-from without, which is brought to bear upon the mind. This will not be disputed. Suppose, then, the doctrine true, that God has foreordained whatever comes to pass, does this foreordination bring such a force to operate on the mind? The government of the world, as we remarked in a preceding chapter, is naturally divided into the government of matter and of mind. Amongst men there are two classes,-the righteous and the wicked. As we have proved, God is, in an important sense, the author of all the pure affections and virtuous actions of men. The righteous are declared to be "his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works."[Ephesians 2:10] And "it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure."[Php 2:13] And concerning all that is truly good in any man, he must say, with the Apostle Paul,-"But by the grace of God I am what I am."[1 Corinthians 15:10] Now, that God can and does exert on the minds of men a supernatural purifying influence, producing virtuous affections and prompting to virtuous actions, the more evangelical class of Arminians admit and teach. In the Articles of Religion adopted by the Methodist Episcopal Church, we find the following language: "The condition of man after the fall of Adam is such, that he cannot turn and prepare himself, by his own natural strength and works, to faith, and calling upon God; wherefore we have no power to do good works, pleasant and acceptable to God, -without the grace of God by Christ preventing us, that we may have a good will, and working with us when we have that good will." This influence of Divine grace, as our Methodist brethren believe, results in multitudes of instances in the conversion of men from the service of Sin and Satan to the service of God; and they of course hold, that the free agency of the persons is not thereby destroyed or impaired. They therefore agree with us, that God can and does exert upon the minds of men a supernatural influence, which in a great number of instances results in their regeneration, and that their free agency is left unimpaired. Now, the only question necessary to be decided here is, whether without interfering with the free agency of men, God can exert such an influence as will certainly lead to conversion in all cases where it is put forth; for if he can, he can fulfill all his purposes concerning the salvation of men without interfering with their freedom. Mr. A., for example, under the preaching of the gospel, was convicted of sin, and, in a few days, became a converted man and a happy Christian. Our Methodist brethren will agree with us in ascribing his conviction and his regeneration to the supernatural influence of the Holy Spirit. The influence which God graciously exerted on his mind, was sufficient, and God knew it would be sufficient, to lead him to Christ. But here is Mr. B. Can God, without interfering with his free agency, exert upon his mind an influence which will lead to the same result? Who will venture to say, he cannot? Perhaps it will be said, a more powerful influence will be necessary to bring Mr. B. to repentance, than was required in the case of Mr. A. Let us for the present admit that it may be so. Then the matter presents itself to us thus:-that Divine influence which is necessary to bring the mind of Mr. A. to a certain state, is perfectly consistent with his free agency; but that Divine influence, somewhat greater, which is necessary to bring the mind of Mr. B. to the same state, is destructive of his free agency. Now, upon what principle of philosophy or of Scripture can any one make such an assertion? Is it not evident, that if the greater influence on the mind of Mr. B. would destroy his freedom of choice, the lesser influence on the mind of Mr. A. would produce the same effect,-the only difference being, that the freedom of the latter is more easily destroyed than that of the former? But all that is said about the destruction of man’s free agency by Divine influence, is mere assertion without a particle of evidence. No man knows how the Spirit operates on the human heart; and therefore no man can possibly know how far such operation is consistent with freedom of choice. "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the Spirit." The Scriptures nowhere authorize the assertion, that God cannot quicken whom he will; and all assertions of the kind are both unfounded and irreverent. Admitting, as our Methodist friends do, a supernatural influence terminating in many cases in the regeneration of men, it certainly devolves on them to prove that God cannot, without impairing their freedom, exert an influence which will so result in all cases. We might, then, with propriety ask them to tell us precisely what amount or degree of supernatural influence is consistent with free agency. Can any one fix the limit? If not, how can he determine when that limit is passed? So far, then, as the virtuous affections and actions of men are concerned, the doctrine of Divine Decrees is not liable to the charge of destroying the free agency of man. Indeed the language of the Scriptures is calculated to rebuke all such attempts to limit the power of Divine grace. "We are his workmanship," says Paul, "created in Christ Jesus unto good works." Regeneration is here represented as a new creation. Does the thing created assist in its own creation? Or does it require a greater power to perform one creative act than another? The same Apostle says,-"Even when we were dead in sins, God hath quickened us together with Christ." Does the being who is quickened or made alive, assist in his own quickening? Did Lazarus co-operate in raising himself from the dead? Or does it require greater power to impart life to one being than to another? But as the discussion of this subject comes more properly under the head of Election, the fuller consideration of it will be reserved for the second part of this work. But it is asserted that the doctrine under consideration destroys the free agency of sinners, and makes God the author of their sins. And in enforcing this objection, the following questions are pressed, viz: Can anything possibly come to pass which God has not foreordained?-and, Can anything which he has foreordained fail to come to pass? These questions we of course answer in the negative; and then we are asked, How can men be free in their choices and actions, when they could do nothing more and nothing less than they in fact do? Men often confuse their own minds, as well as the minds of others, by using, with reference to the exercises of the mind, language which is borrowed from material bodies. If it is said, that nothing can happen which was not foreordained, the idea of compulsory influence is immediately attached to the words can and cannot. But our Arminian brethren, at least many of them, believe that God does with infinite certainty foreknow all the events that will ever come to pass, the free actions of men as well as all others. Now let us ask them the same questions they press upon our attention, viz: Can anything possibly come to pass which God has not foreknown?-and, Can anything fail to come to pass which he has foreknown? They must answer these questions in the negative; and then we may ask them, How then can the choices and actions of men be free, when they do only what was infallibly foreknown, and what, therefore, they could not but do? But all such reasoning is fallacious. As we have already remarked, if the free agency of men is destroyed, it must be by some external force brought to act upon their minds, which are naturally free. The question then arises,-Does the doctrine of Divine foreordination imply any such force upon the minds of wicked men? Or in other words,-Can God exert upon the minds of wicked men such an influence as to bring to pass by their instrumentality his own wise and holy purposes without interfering with their free agency and just accountability? If any one assert that he cannot, we ask him to prove the truth of his assertion, either from reason or from the Bible. As we have already stated, God, in order to fulfill his purposes, exerts upon the minds of sinful men a restraining influence, a softening influence, a directing influence, and a hardening influence. Now let us inquire, whether by either of these influences the free agency of men is destroyed or impaired.

God often restrains men from doing that to which their natural appetites or passions strongly incline them. Thrice in the year all the males of the Jews were required to attend the annual festivals in Jerusalem. To encourage them to do this, God said,-"For I will cast out the nations before thee, and enlarge thy borders: neither shall any man desire thy land, when thou shalt go up to appear before the Lord thy God thrice in the year."[Exodus 34:24] On this passage, Matthew Henry has the following note: "All hearts are in God’s hands, and under his check; he can lay a restraint not only upon men’s actions, but upon their desires. Canaan was a desirable land, and the neighboring nations were greedy enough; and yet God says ’they shall not desire it.’" Abimelech, king of Gerar, sent and took Sarah, Abraham’s wife, whilst they sojourned with him. And when he protested that he was not aware of doing what was unlawful, God said," Yea, I know that thou didst this in the integrity of thy heart; for I also withheld thee from sinning against me: therefore suffered I thee not to touch her."[Genesis 20:6] On this passage, Henry thus appropriately remarks: "It is God that restrains men from doing the ill they would do; it is not from him that there is sin, but it is from him that there is not more sin, either by his influence upon men’s minds, checking their inclination to sin, or by his providence, taking away the opportunity to sin." God purposed that Abraham and his wife should dwell safely in Gerar; and therefore, whilst he permitted the king to send to take Sarah to his palace, he restrained him from proceeding further. Now in what manner God exerted this restraining influence, we cannot comprehend; and, therefore, it is impossible for us to have any evidence that it interfered with Abimelech’s freedom of choice. But since the Scriptures clearly teach that such an influence was exerted, the objection that it interferes with free agency would be against the Scriptures themselves, not simply against Calvinism; and therefore it is an objection which cannot be consistently urged by those who believe in the inspiration of the Bible.

2. God often exerts on men what may be called a softening influence, disposing them to do what is according to his will and for the glory of his name. Thus he gave Joseph favor with the keeper of the prison where he was confined. Thus, in order to fulfill his decree concerning the restoration of the Jews and the rebuilding of the temple, he "stirred up the spirit of Cyrus king of Persia," that he made a proclamation throughout all his kingdom, in which he used the following remarkable language: "The Lord God of heaven hath given me all the kingdoms of the earth; and he hath charged me to build him a house at Jerusalem, which is in Judah. Who is there among you of all his people? his God be with him, and let him go up to Jerusalem, which is in Judah, and build the house of the Lord God of Israel, (he is the God,) which is in Jerusalem."[Ezra 1:1-3] And at a later period, God put it into the heart of Artaxerxes to beautify the temple, and to favor the labors of Ezra.[Ezra 7:27-28] It matters not, so far as the doctrine of Divine Decrees is concerned, what instrumentalities were employed in affecting the hearts of these sinful men. The fact is clear, that God had certain important purposes to accomplish, and that he brought such influences to bear upon their minds, that they aided in the fulfillment of his purposes. How these influences were exerted, no one can comprehend; and, therefore, no one can have the least evidence that they impaired the free agency of the men upon whom they were exerted. And if any one persist in asserting the incompatibility of such influences with human accountability, his controversy is with the Bible, not with Calvinism.

3. God exerts upon men a directing influence. The same affection or passion in the human mind might lead to the performance of any one of fifty acts, or to any one of several courses of conduct. A man, for example, is ambitious. There are many ways in which he may have the prospect of gratifying his ambition,-as by the accumulation of wealth, by filling important civil offices, by military exploits, by literary attainments, etc. Now the peculiar character of his ambition, and the circumstances in which he may be placed, will determine his course of action; and if God in his providence arrange these circumstances, he will thereby direct his course of conduct. A man is covetous; but there are many ways in which his love of money may be gratified. He may labor industriously; he may speculate boldly; he may gamble; he may become a highway robber. "The love of money," says Paul, "is the root of all evil." It is the prolific source from which crimes of all kinds proceed. Now, what course of conduct a covetous man will pursue, depends upon the influences under which his moral character is formed, and the circumstances that surround him. We hold not that God produces avaricious feelings in the heart of such a man, but that he gives such direction to his conduct that good and not evil shall result. The Ishmaelitish merchants who purchased Joseph and sold him to Potiphar, were avaricious men; but God gave such direction to their conduct, that by their instrumentality he sent Joseph into Egypt, and thus made them instruments in fulfilling a most important purpose.

Now, will any one venture the assertion that God cannot exert a directing influence over the conduct of wicked men without destroying or impairing their free agency? Without understanding the nature of that influence, no one can assert or deny in the matter; and no one can understand it. If, however, any one persist in the objection, his quarrel is with the Word of God, which teaches abundantly that such influence is exerted. Of this we have given some evidence, and will furnish more before closing this chapter.

4. God is said sometimes to harden the hearts of men, and thus to accomplish his purposes. Concerning Pharaoh, king of Egypt, God said: "Even for this same purpose have I raised thee up, that I might show my power in thee, and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth."[Exodus 9:16] In carrying out this purpose God said: "I will harden his heart, that he shall not let the people go."[Exodus 4:21] Pharaoh was a wicked man, but was doubtless, like other wicked men, restrained and softened in some degree by divine influence. God chose now to withdraw that influence and leave him to himself, whilst yet he commanded him to let his people go; and thus he hardened his heart. But was Pharaoh’s free agency destroyed by his being left to his own will? To say so, would be ridiculous; for if the human mind is naturally free, it of course never enjoys liberty more complete than when left to itself. And equally ridiculous would it be to assert that because he was left to his own will, and God overruled his wicked designs for good, he was not free.

It is, then, perfectly clear, I think, that neither of these four classes of Divine influences interferes in the slightest degree with man’s free agency and accountability; and by these are all the decrees of God connected with the agency of wicked men fulfilled. We have abundant evidence in God’s word, that he can and does so control wicked men as to bring to pass his purposes. "The king’s heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water: he turneth it whithersoever he will."[Proverbs 21:1] Now, it will not be pretended either that kings are not free and accountable beings, or that He who can turn the king’s heart whithersoever he will, cannot as easily turn the hearts of others. "A man’s heart deviseth his way: but the Lord directeth his steps."[Proverbs 16:9] If the Lord can direct the steps of men, and yet leave their hearts free to devise their way, it is clear that he can so control their conduct that his purposes will be accomplished without infringing their liberty. We have in the tenth chapter of Isaiah’s prophecy, a remarkable proof and illustration of the harmony of the doctrines of Divine Decrees and Free Agency. "O Assyrian, the rod of mine anger, and the staff in their hand is mine indignation. I will send him against a hypocritical nation, and against the people of my wrath will I give him a charge, to take the spoil, and to take the prey, and to tread them down like the mire of the streets. Howbeit he meaneth not so, neither doth his heart think so; but it is in his heart to destroy and cut off nations not a few. For he saith, Are not my princes altogether kings? etc. Wherefore it shall come to pass, that when the Lord hath performed his whole work upon Mount Zion and on Jerusalem, I will punish the fruit of the stout heart of the king of Assyria, and the glory of his high looks. For he saith, By the strength of my hand I have done it, and by my wisdom; for I am prudent, etc. Shall the axe boast itself against him that heweth therewith? or shall the saw magnify itself against him that shaketh it? as if the rod should shake itself against them that lift it up, or as if the staff should lift up itself, as if it were no wood." What is the obvious meaning of this language? It does most unequivocally teach, in the first place, that the king of Assyria, though a proud and ungodly man, was an instrument in the hands of God, just as the axe, the saw, or the rod in the hands of a man, to execute his purposes upon the Jews; and that God had perfect control of him. It teaches, in the second place, that the free agency of the king was not destroyed or impaired by this control, but that he was perfectly free to form his own plans and to be governed by his own desires. For it is declared that he did not design to execute God’s purposes, but to promote his own ambitious projects. "Howbeit he meaneth not so, neither doth his heart think so; but it is in his heart to destroy and cut off nations not a few." It consequently teaches, thirdly, that the king was justly held accountable for his pride and wickedness, although God so overruled him that he fulfilled his wise purposes. God decreed to chastise the Jews for their sin. He chose to employ the king of Assyria to execute his purpose, and therefore sent him against them. He would afterwards punish the king for his wicked plans. Is it not evident, then, beyond all cavil, that the Scriptures teach that God can and does so control men, even wicked men, as to bring to pass his wise purposes without interfering with their free agency? The objection we are considering is, therefore, wholly without force.

Again: The Scriptures contain many examples both confirmatory and illustrative of the truth that God can and does fulfill his purposes by the instrumentality of even wicked men; and consequently of the consistency of Divine Decrees and Free Agency. One of the most remarkable of these examples is found in the history of Jacob’s family, already referred to. Let us look, first, at the decree, and then at its fulfillment. God said to Abram,-"Know of a surety that thy seed shall be a stranger in a land that is not theirs, and shall serve them; and they shall afflict them four hundred years. And also that nation whom they shall serve, will I judge: and afterward shall they come out with great substance."[Genesis 15:13, Genesis 15:14] Here is the decree. The descendants of Abraham were to go and sojourn, and be afflicted in Egypt. How was this decree fulfilled? There are a number of links in the chain of its fulfillment. The first is the partiality manifested by Jacob for Joseph, the son of his old age. The second link is the consequent hatred of Joseph’s brethren. The third is his dreams, which increased their hatred. The fourth is his being sent by his father to see how they were doing, and his following them to the place to which they had removed their flocks. When they saw him coming, they conspired to murder him, but were prevented by Reuben. He was placed in a pit; and just then came along Ishmaelitish merchants going to Egypt. Joseph is sold to them, and by them to Potiphar, an officer of Pharaoh. He is slandered and thrown into prison, where, the Lord giving him favor with the keeper, he meets with Pharaoh’s two servants, and interprets their dreams; and thus ultimately he becomes known to Pharaoh, and becomes the second man in authority in Egypt.

Now Joseph said, that God sent him to Egypt to preserve many lives.[Genesis 45:7] He sent him in fulfillment of a benevolent purpose. How did he send him? By the instrumentality of a number of persons, good and bad. God permitted his brethren to hate him. He so ordered things, that the merchants passed along just at the proper time, and were going to the country to which he purposed to send Joseph; and he permitted them to sell him. Link after link of the chain of events is formed, and everything is overruled to the entire fulfillment of God’s purpose. And yet it will not be pretended, that Joseph’s brethren, and the others who were actors in this chain of events, were deprived of their freedom, nor that their guilt was at all diminished by the fact that God brought great good out of their intended evil. Joseph said to them,-"But as for you, ye thought evil against me; but God meant it unto good, to bring to pass, as it is this day, to save much people alive."[Genesis 50:20] In the exercise of their free agency they formed their purposes, and they were evil; but God also had his purposes, and they were good. They deserved condemnation, and they condemned themselves for their sin; but God was to be praised for his merciful designs. Throughout this interesting history, we have the most striking illustrations of the perfect harmony of divine sovereignty and free agency. It is truly astonishing that any one who has ever read it with attention, should urge the objection we are now considering.

Mr. Watson says, "it was predicted that Babylon should be taken by Cyrus in the midst of a midnight revel, in which the gates should be left unguarded and open;" and he argues, that "all the actions which arose out of the warlike disposition and ambition of Cyrus," were foreknown, "because the result of them was predicted."[Theol. Inst., pt. 2, ch. 4] Now it is rather singular, that it did not occur to Mr. Watson, that the taking of Babylon by Cyrus was not predicted simply as an event which God foresaw, but as an event which he had foreordained. Of the destruction of Babylon, Isaiah employs the following language:-“The burden of Babylon, which Isaiah the son of Amoz did see. Lift ye up a banner upon the high mountain, exalt the voice unto them, shake the hand, that they may go into the gates of the nobles. I have commanded my sanctified ones, I have also called my mighty ones for mine anger, even them that rejoice in my highness. The noise of a multitude in the mountains, like as of a great people; a tumultuous noise of the kingdoms of nations gathered together: the Lord of hosts mustereth the host of the battle. They come from a far country, from the end of heaven, even the Lord, and the weapons of his indignation, to destroy the whole land."[Isaiah 13:1-5] Again:-"For I will rise up against them, saith the Lord of hosts, and cut off from Babylon the name, and remnant, and son, and nephew, saith the Lord. I will also make it a possession for the bittern, and pools of water: and I will sweep it with the besom of destruction, saith the Lord of hosts. The Lord of hosts hath sworn, saying, Surely as I have thought, so shall it come to pass; and as I have purposed, so shall it stand: That I will break the Assyrian in my land, and upon my mountains tread him under foot: then shall his yoke depart from off them, and his burden depart from off their shoulders. This is the purpose that is purposed upon the whole earth: and this is the hand that is stretched out upon all nations. For the Lord of hosts hath purposed, and who shall disannul it? and his hand is stretched out, and who shall turn it back?"[Isaiah 14:22-27] Jeremiah, describing the same terrible event, says:-" For every purpose of the Lord shall be performed against Babylon, to make the land of Babylon a desolation without an inhabitant."[Jeremiah 51:29] Not only the destruction of Babylon, but the instruments by which, and the manner in which, it should be accomplished, were foreordained. "Behold," saith God, "I will stir up the Medes against them, which shall not regard silver." "Go up, O Elam : besiege, O Media," etc.[Isaiah 13:17; Isaiah 21:2] Of Cyrus, God said:-"He is my shepherd, and shall perform all my pleasure: even saying to Jerusalem, Thou shalt be built; and to the temple, Thy foundation shall be laid." But before Cyrus could restore the Jews, and cause the city of Jerusalem and the temple to be rebuilt, he must conquer Babylon, and take possession of it. And therefore God said:-"Thus saith the Lord to his anointed, to Cyrus, whose right hand I have holden, to subdue nations before him; and I will loose the loins of kings, to open before him the two-leaved gates, and the gates shall not be shut; I will go before thee, and make crooked places straight: I will break in pieces the gates of brass, and cut in sunder the bars of iron: And I will give thee the treasures of darkness, and hidden riches of secret places, that thou mayest know that I, the Lord, which call thee by thy name, am the God of Israel. For Jacob my servant’s sake, and Israel mine elect, I have even called thee by thy name: I have surnamed thee, though thou hast not known me."[Isaiah 44:28; Isaiah 45:1-4] From these and other explicit declarations of prophecy, it is evident beyond all controversy, that the taking of Babylon by an army of Medes and Persians, commanded by Cyrus, and the return of the Jews to Jerusalem by permission and decree of Cyrus, were foreordained; and so, of course, were all the counsels and acts which led to these results. It is certain that these events were foreordained; and consequently we are obliged to conclude, either that the doctrines of Divine Decrees and Free Agency are perfectly consistent, or that all the persons by whose instrumentality these events were brought to pass, were deprived of their free agency and accountability. Indeed; Mr. Watson himself, forgetting surely what he had elsewhere written, admits that "Cyrus was elected to rebuild the temple."[Theol. Inst. pt. 2, ch. 26] In making such an admission, he has unwittingly overthrown the most plausible argument urged by Arminians against the doctrine of Divine foreordination. For if God’s election of Cyrus to fulfill his purposes relative to the Jews did not interfere with the free agency of Cyrus, the election of any other man or number of men to fulfill any other of the Divine purposes would leave them as free as Cyrus. Our Arminian opponents must either deny that God ever foreordained any one event brought about by a free agent, or abandon the objection we are considering. The Lord Jesus Christ was crucified by wicked men; and yet no one, it would seem, can doubt that his crucifixion was foreordained. Upon that event hung the hopes of a lost world. Every bleeding victim on the Jewish altar foretold the sufferings of the great Antitype, and all the prophets predicted the great event. Peter declares that he "verily was foreordained before the foundation of the world" to this work;[1 Peter 1:20] and to the Jews he said:-"Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain."[Acts 2:23] And the apostles, in their prayer for protection against their persecutors, use this remarkable language: "For of a truth against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done."[Acts 4:27, Acts 4:28] Precisely in accordance with these declarations, is the language of Isaiah: "Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him; he hath put him to grief"[Isaiah 53:10] It is absolutely certain that the crucifixion of Christ was foreordained, and that in his crucifixion the Jews and Romans did but fulfill the Divine purpose; and yet it is certain that they were in the perfect exercise of their free agency. The crucifixion of Christ was, therefore, charged upon them as a crime; and they were commanded to repent of it. They meant evil against him; but God intended good. He made the wrath of man to praise him; and the remainder of wrath he restrained.

I might multiply, to any extent, examples of events certainly foreordained, yet brought to pass by the free and accountable agency of men; but it is unnecessary. One example is as good as ten thousand; for if, in one single instance, men have fulfilled the decree of God, and were yet free and accountable, it is certain that the decrees of God are not inconsistent with man’s free agency. The objection we are considering, is consequently without the least force. Let it be distinctly understood, that they who urge this objection must deny that any one event brought to pass by the free agency of man, was foreordained! Is any Christian prepared for this? Mr. Watson asserts, that the whole body of prophecy is founded upon the prescience of the free or contingent acts of men. With more truth he might have said, that the whole body of prophecy was founded on the foreordination of the free acts of men; for prophecy is, for the most part, but the revelation of God’s purposes concerning individuals and nations.

Here we might let the argument rest; but the objection under consideration has been so often and so plausibly urged, that we are determined to sift it to the bottom and expose its weakness.

If God has foreordained whatsoever comes to pass, it is maintained, man is not a free agent, but acts from necessity. As we have more than once remarked, if the freedom of the human mind is destroyed or impaired, it must be by some force from without; because it is naturally free. Now what is there in a purpose or decree of God, which brings such a force to bear? Let us, if you please, analyze a Divine decree, and see if we can find in it such a force. In a decree of God we may find three things, viz: the decree or purpose itself, as it exists in the Divine Mind; the certainty of the event decreed; and the manner in which, or the influence by which, it is brought to pass.

Let us first consider the decree or purpose itself. A Divine Decree, as already explained. so far as rational creatures are concerned, is a determination by God to dispose them to do something good, or to permit and overrule their evil acts to his own holy ends. Such a purpose, we will say, God has formed. It exists in the Divine Mind; but it has not been revealed, nor has any single act in accordance with it been put forth. Now is it not self-evident, that so long as that purpose remains in the Divine Mind, not revealed nor acted upon, it cannot bring a force to bear upon the mind of any man? If God had even determined to influence or dispose Pharaoh to hate and oppress the Israelites, still that purpose could not have affected his free agency, until some act was put forth. The purpose itself effects nothing, just as the purpose of a man to build a house effects nothing until some act is put forth in accordance with the purpose. This is too plain to require illustration, or to admit of proof. But it may be said, if God has decreed an event, it will certainly come to pass; and if it is certain and cannot be otherwise, how can man be free to act or not to act in reference to it? To this objection we have two answers to make: 1. There is no force in mere certainty; and therefore the simple fact that an event will certainly happen, cannot put a force upon the mind which will destroy or impair its liberty. 2. If the certainty of a future event is inconsistent with the free agency of those employed in bringing it to pass, then the foreknowledge of God destroys that free agency; for whatever actions or events are foreknown, will certainly come to pass. The Saviour foreknew that Judas would betray him; for "as they did eat, he said, Verily I say unto you, that one of you shall betray me."[Matthew 26:21] And he foreknew that Peter would deny him; for he said to him, "Verily, I say unto thee, that this night, before the cock crow, thou shalt deny me thrice."[Matthew 26:34] Both these events were absolutely certain. The former, indeed, was foretold a thousand years before Judas was born.[Acts 1:16] Was the free agency of Judas and Peter destroyed? They certainly did not think so, for Judas said: "I have sinned in that I have betrayed the innocent blood."[Matthew 27:4] "And Peter remembered the word of Jesus, which said unto him, Before the cock crow, thou shalt deny me thrice. And he went out, and wept bitterly."[Matthew 26:75] The crucifixion of Christ was foreknown and foretold; and Paul says: -“They that dwell at Jerusalem, and their rulers, because they knew him not, nor yet the voices of the prophets which are read every Sabbath-day, they have fulfilled them in condemning him. And when they had fulfilled all that was written of him, they took him down from the tree, and laid him in a sepulchre."[Acts 13:27, Acts 13:29] Did the certainty of his crucifixion destroy or impair the freedom of those who fulfilled, though they knew it not, all that was written of him? It is clear as the shining light, that the certainty of a future event interferes not with the free agency of those by whose instrumentality it will be brought to pass.

Here again we are happy to call to our aid Rev. Richard Watson, who, as we have seen, contends earnestly and conclusively for the doctrine, that God does certainly foreknow all the free actions of his creatures, and unanswerably refutes the absurd and mischievous theories of Dr. Adam Clarke and others, who deny such prescience. "The whole body of prophecy," he remarks, "is founded on the certain prescience of contingent actions, or it is not prediction, but guess and conjecture,-to such fearful results does the denial of the Divine prescience lead! No one can deny that the Bible contains predictions of the rise and fall of several kingdoms; that Daniel, for instance, prophesied of the rise, the various fortune, and the fall of the celebrated monarchies of antiquity. But empires do not rise and fall wholly by immediate acts of God; they are not thrown up like new islands in the ocean, they do not fall like cities in an earthquake, by the direct exertion of Divine power. They are carried through their various stages of advance and decline, by the virtues and vices of men, which God makes the instruments of their prosperity or destruction. Counsels, wars, science, revolutions, all crowd in their agency; and the predictions are of the combined and ultimate results of all these circumstances, which, as arising out of the vices and virtues of men, out of innumerable acts of choice, are contingent. Seen they must have been through all their stages, and seen in their results, for prophecy has registered those results. The prescience of them cannot be denied, for that is on record; and if certain prescience involves necessity, then are the daily virtues and vices of men not contingent. It was predicted that Babylon should be taken by Cyrus in the midst of a midnight revel, in which the gates should be left unguarded and open. Now, if all the actions which arose out of the warlike disposition and ambition of Cyrus were contingent, what becomes of the principle that it is impossible to foreknow contingencies? Our Lord predicts most circumstantially, the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans. If this be allowed, then the contingencies involved in the conduct of the Jews who provoked that fatal war, in the Roman Senate who decreed it,-in the Roman Generals who carried it on, in the Roman and Jewish soldiers who were engaged in it,-were all foreseen, and the result of them predicted; if they were not contingencies, that is, if they were not free actions, then the virtues and vices of both parties, and all the acts of skill, and courage, and enterprise, and all the cruelties and sufferings of the besieged and the besiegers, arising out of innumerable volitions, and giving rise to the events so circumstantially marked in the prophecy, were determined by an irreversible necessity." Mr. Watson concludes, that "though an uncertain action cannot be foreseen as certain, a free, unnecessitated action may; for there is nothing in the knowledge of the action, in the least, to affect its nature."[Theol. Inst., pt. 2, ch. 4] The certainty of a future event, then, as Mr. Watson agrees with Calvinists, cannot interfere with the freedom of those by whose agency it is brought to pass. The only other thing in a Divine decree is the manner in which, or the agency by which the event decreed is brought to pass. And if the doctrine of Divine Decrees is destructive of free agency, this is the point where the difficulty occurs. Here, if anywhere, a compulsory force is brought to bear upon the mind. Indeed it is only the certainty that the necessary means will, in due time, be employed, that makes any foreordained event certain. All the purposes of God concerning men are fulfilled either by his providence or by his regenerating and sanctifying grace. Christ Jesus is "head over all things to the Church;" and the Holy Spirit is sent to convince and convert men, that they may enter the Church. All God’s purposes, therefore, are fulfilled by that particular providence which, as we have seen, extends to all things and to all events, or by that blessed Spirit who works in his people to will and do. The whole matter, therefore, resolves itself into the two questions: 1. Can God exercise over men a particular providence, so as to bring to pass his wise purposes, without destroying or impairing their free agency? 2. Can God exert upon the minds of men, providentially and by his Spirit, a Divine influence that will certainly lead them to Christ, and induce them to persevere in his service, without interfering with their liberty? These questions have already been answered. We have seen, that the providence of God extends to all things and events, and that he can so govern even wicked men as to fulfill his purposes without interfering with their freedom of choice. We have seen, too, that he does exert on the minds of men a supernatural sanctifying influence, "working in them to will and to do of his good pleasure," yet leaving their free agency unimpaired. It is clear, therefore, that the decrees of God do not interfere with the free agency of men.

It has been too generally admitted, I cannot but think, by Calvinists, that we cannot reconcile the doctrines of Divine Decrees and Free Agency. It has been common to insist, that since both these doctrines are taught in the Scriptures, they are certainly true, and therefore consistent, and ought to be received, though we, with our limited powers and knowledge, cannot see how they harmonize. This position is certainly tenable; for there evidently are many things presented in nature and in revelation, which, as to the mode of their being, and as to their consistency with other things equally clear, are above human comprehension. But it is not wise to admit even an apparent inconsistency in the doctrines under consideration, unless truth and candor require it.

Now I cheerfully admit, that there is in this general subject something to us incomprehensible; but I insist, and am prepared to prove, that the difficulty lies, not against the points on which Arminians differ from us, but against those in reference to which they agree with us. That a mere purpose existing in the Divine Mind, not yet revealed or acted out, cannot interfere with the free agency of any one, is self-evident; for it brings no force of any kind to bear upon the mind. It is equally clear, that the mere certainty of a future event does not impair the freedom of those by whose agency it will be brought to pass. The certainty that Cyrus would take Babylon, did not interfere with his free agency in planning and executing his wars. The certainty that Peter would deny his Lord, did not interfere with his liberty and accountability in that act. On this point, as we have seen, Rev. Richard Watson precisely agrees with us. If, then, the free agency of men is destroyed, this is done not by the Divine purposes abstractly considered, nor by the certainty of the events decreed, but by the influences by which those purposes are fulfilled. But all the purposes of God concerning men, are fulfilled either by his particular providence or by the renewing and sanctifying influence of the Holy Spirit. The question; therefore, concerning the consistency of Divine Decrees and Free Agency, as already remarked, resolves itself into the two following questions, viz: 1. Can God exercise over men a particular providence without interfering with their freedom? 2. Can he renew and sanctify the hearts of men without impairing their liberty? The first of these questions Rev. John Wesley, the father of Methodism, answers in the affirmative, as we have already shown, strongly insisting upon the doctrine of a particular providence over all men and things. And Rev. Richard Watson contends for the renewing influence of the Holy Spirit. Precisely at this point the difficulty occurs. Let any one explain to me, how a particular providence and a divine influence on the hearts of men are consistent with free agency, and I pledge myself to explain how the doctrine of divine purposes is consistent with free agency. How did God so order things that Cyrus took Babylon and restored the Jews, without interfering with the liberty of those who fulfilled his purposes? How did he send Joseph into Egypt without impairing the liberty of those by whose instrumentality the result was brought about? How does God quicken those dead in trespasses and sins, and work in his people to will and to do, without interfering with their liberty? Answer these questions, and I will at once show how Divine Decrees and Free Agency are reconcilable. The difficulty is not concerning the divine purposes, but concerning a particular providence and divine influence on the hearts of men. But Arminians, at least many of them, hold both these doctrines. The difficulty, therefore, arises not about points on which they differ from us, but concerning Divine providence and Divine influence, in reference to the existence of which they agree with us.

Let it, then, be distinctly understood, that our Arminian friends must either withdraw the objection, that the doctrine of Divine Decrees is destructive of free agency, or they must deny the doctrines of a particular providence and divine influence, For it is by a controlling, providence and divine influence that all the purposes of God concerning the conduct of men, are fulfilled; and if the free agency of men is destroyed, it is by these influences. We must, then, charge the Arminian system with being wholly inconsistent with the fundamental doctrines of Divine providence and Divine influence. God in his providence fulfills his purposes; and if his purposes destroy free agency, he cannot exercise a providence over men; much less can he "work in them to will and to do of his good pleasure."

Now think what would be the condition of our world, if there were no providence and no divine influence upon the hearts of men. Deny these doctrines, and what is left that is better than blank Atheism? But our Arminian friends will not reject them; they earnestly contend for them. If, then, they will not be chargeable with gross inconsistency, they must withdraw the objection, that Divine Decrees are destructive of Free Agency. The doctrines which they hold, labor under the precise difficulty they charge upon ours. The plain truth on this whole subject is, that we know absolutely nothing concerning the manner in which God operates on the human heart; and therefore we can know nothing at all concerning the consistency of the divine operations with human freedom, save what we learn from the Scriptures and from our own consciousness. From neither of these sources do we learn, that God cannot so control men as to fulfill his purposes without destroying their free agency. A man may say, that he cannot see how the two things are consistent; and this may be true; for he cannot see how God operates on the mind. But his ignorance does not authorize him to affirm, that they are not consistent.

II. It is objected, that this doctrine makes God the author of sin. This objection has already been substantially answered. It is based upon the objection just refuted, that the doctrine of Divine Decrees is destructive of man’s free agency. But if, as we have proved, the doctrine leaves man’s free agency untouched, it is clear that his accountability is perfect, and he is the exclusive author of his own sins. Let the explanation of the doctrine already given, be kept in view. God, for wise reasons, was pleased to permit our first parents to be tempted and to fall. This permission, it is most evident, did not make him the author of their sin. He chose to overrule this sin to his own holy ends. This overruling of the sin which he permitted, certainly did not make him the author of the sin. God permitted Joseph’s brethren to hate him and to sell him. This permission did not make him the author of that hatred, or of their act in selling him. God purposed to overrule their wickedness for good. The fact that he brought good out of their intended evil, did not make him the author of their evil. God decreed that Cyrus should take Babylon; but since he only permitted and controlled the unhallowed ambition of Cyrus, he did not thereby become the author of the sins committed by Cyrus. He decreed the crucifixion of Jesus Christ, and he permitted and overruled for good the wrath of the Jews against him. But he was not the author of the sin committed by them in crucifying Christ. The objection is founded upon an entirely false view of the doctrine, viz: that the Divine Decree is the necessitating cause of sin, or of the sinful acts of men. It is perfectly refuted, therefore, by simply giving a correct statement of the doctrine.