034. IV. Modes Of Divine Moral Sensibility.

IV. Modes Of Divine Moral Sensibility. As there are distinctions of divine sensibility in the general or comprehensive sense of the term, so there are distinctions of moral sensibility. Moral feeling in God respects profoundly different subjects, and reveals itself in distinctions of mode answering to that difference of subjects. We may reach the clearer view by studying the question in the light of these several modes. However, there is a truth of moral feeling in God which is deeper than the more definite distinctions of mode—the moral feeling which is intrinsic to the holiness of the divine nature. This is the first truth to be noticed.

1. Holiness.—The Scriptures witness to the holiness of God with the deepest intensities of expression. A few passages may be cited for exemplification. “Who is like unto thee, Lord, among the gods? who is like thee, glorious in holiness, fearful in praises, doing wonders” (Exodus 15:11)? The glory of the divine holiness appears in its manifestation, but the manifestation leads the thought to its plenitude in the divine nature. “Holy and reverend is his name” (Psalms 111:9). The perfection of holiness in God is the reason for the holy reverence in which all should worship and serve him. “Holy Father,” and “O righteous Father” (John 17:11; John 17:25), express in the words of Christ the deep truth of divine holiness. “Who shall not fear thee, Lord, and glorify thy name? for thou only art holy” (Revelation 15:4). These words are responsive to words previously cited: “Who is like thee, glorious in holiness? “In the deepest, divinest sense, God only is holy. The seraphim before the heavenly throne cry one to another, “Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord of hosts;” “and they rest not day and night, saying. Holy, holy, holy. Lord God Almighty, which was, and is, and is to come” (Isaiah 6:3; Revelation 4:8). The holiness of God is not to be regarded simply as a quality of his nature or a quiescent mental state, but as intensely active in his personal agency, particularly in his moral government. In this view holiness is often called righteousness. Hence the righteousness of God is expressed with the same intensity as his holiness. The precepts of moral duty and the judgment and reward of moral conduct spring from his holiness and fulfill its requirements. Through all the forms of instrumental agency he ever works for the prevention or restraint of the evil and the promotion of the good. In every form and in the deepest sense God is righteous. Abraham apprehended this truth in his profound question, “Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right” (Genesis 18:25)? There was a special case in question; but there is no sense of a local or temporary limitation in the meaning of the words. There is a universal and eternal righteousness of the divine agency. “He is the Rock, his work is perfect; for all his ways are judgment: a God of truth and without iniquity, just and right is he” (Deuteronomy 32:4). “Thy righteousness is an everlasting righteousness, and thy law is the truth” (Psalms 119:142). These texts express the same deep sense of an ever-present holiness in the divine moral government. “The law of the Lord is perfect” (Psalms 19:7)—“perfect as the expression of the divine holiness; perfect therefore as the standard of right; perfect in its requirements; perfect in its sanctions. All this is summed into one sentence by St. Paul: ‘The law is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good’ (Romans 7:12). Returning back, however, to the attribute of the Lawgiver, we are bound to believe that all ordinances are righteous: first, with regard to the constitution and nature of his subjects; and, secondly, as answering strictly to his own divine aim.”^[233] The means and the ministries of his moral government are ever in accord with his holy law; and, however his righteousness may for the present be obscured or hidden even, it shall yet be made manifest, and receive a common confession.

^[233]Pope:Christian Theology, vol. i, p. 336.

God will place his providences in the clear, full light. These ideas of a present obscurity and a future manifestation are in the Scriptures. “Clouds and darkness are round about him: righteousness and judgment are the habitation of his throne.” “Even so, Lord God Almighty, true and righteous are thy judgments” (Psalms 97:2; Revelation 16:7).

It should be specially noted here that in the holiness of God as operative in moral government there is the activity of moral feeling. This is the distinctive fact of his moral agency. If the plan of God had terminated with the creation of a mere physical universe there would still have been a great sphere for the activities of intelligence and will, and also for the rational and esthetic sensibilities, but no place for moral feeling. Such a feeling could have no office in a mere physical universe. God would still be the same in his holy nature, with the possible or actual activity of moral sensibility in the conception and purposed creation of moral personalities, with the known possibility of ethically good and ethically evil action. On this supposition, however, there is a reaching of the divine plan far beyond a mere physical universe, and, therefore, it remains true that an original limitation to such a universe would require no activity of moral feeling in its creation and government. There was no such original limitation. In the building of the world, even from the beginning, man was the divinely destined occupant, just as other moral intelligences were destined for the occupancy of other worlds. Creation, therefore, was from the beginning the work of God in his complete personality. There was the activity of his moral sensibility, just as of his intelligence and will. It is specially this truth which discredits the distinction of the attributes into the natural and moral. As we thus find the ultimate purpose and completion of the creation in the existence of free and responsible personalities, so we find a moral realm as really as a physical one. Certainly in the moral God rules in his complete personality, and no more really through the agency of his intelligence and will than in the activities of his moral feeling. There is as absolute a requirement for the latter as for the former. A holy love of the ethically good and a holy hatred of the ethically evil are intrinsic to the divine agency in moral government. We cannot think them apart. To separate them in thought would require us to think God apathetically indifferent as between righteousness and sin. So to think God would be to think him not God. Holiness of action is impossible, even in God, without the proper element of moral feeling. An act may formally square with the law, but can be righteous only through the feeling from which it springs or the motive which it fulfills. The sense of moral feeling in God, as active in his regards of human conduct and in the ministries of his providence, is a practical necessity to the common religious consciousness. It is only the sense of an emotional displeasure in God that can effectively restrain the wayward tendencies to evil; only the sense of an affectionate love that can inspire the filial trust which may become the strength of a loving obedience. There is great practical force in the commands, “Be ye holy; for I am holy,” and “Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father is merciful” (1 Peter 1:16; Luke 6:36), but only with the sense of true feeling in his holiness and mercy. Divest them of true feeling, and let them stand to the religious consciousness simply as pure thought, emotionless intellections, and they become practically forceless. In the divine holiness there is the intensity of holy feeling.

2. Justice.—The more appropriate place for the treatment of justice is in the discussion of atonement. For the present, the treatment is specially in reference to the reality of an element of holy feeling in the divine justice. Justice itself is broadly operative within the realm of moral government, so that the discussion of its offices therein must include much more than belongs to it simply as a question of the divine attributes. The office of justice is the maintenance of moral government in the highest attainable excellence. The aim is the prevention or restraint of sin, the protection of rights, the defense of innocence against injury or wrong, the vindication of the government and the honor of the divine Ruler. Divine legislation is for the attainment of these great ends. But however great and imperative the ends, they cannot justify any arbitrariness of judicial measures for their attainment. Justice has no license of departure from the requirements of the divine holiness and righteousness. Indeed, justice itself is but a mode of the divine holiness. In legislation justice must respect the nature and condition of subjects. Laws must be within their power of fulfillment, whether that power be a native possession or a provision of the redemption in Christ. The sanctions of law in the form of reward and penalty must have respect to the ethical character of subjects. Emphasis should be placed upon this principle in respect of penalty, specially for the reason, first, that the demerit of sin is more manifest than the merit of righteousness, and, secondly, because penalty without demerit or beyond its measure would be more manifestly an injustice than any reward above the merit of righteousness. In the study of the Hebraic theocracy we must admit the presence of measures of expediency, and not only in ritualistic forms, but also in administrative discipline—as in the entailment of both good and evil upon children in consequence of the moral conduct of their parents. Such entailments, however, were not the ministries of distributive justice, but the measures of economical expediency for the attainment of the great ends of the theocracy. Like measures often appear in human governments. In terms of law the high crimes of parents are visited in certain alienations or disadvantages upon their children; certainly not, however, that they are reckoned guilty and punishable in any proper sense of distributive justice, but that the highest good of the government may be attained. That the Hebraic government was a theocracy did not change the character of the people as its subjects. They were still men, with all the tendencies of men under the forms of human government. It was expedient, therefore, that God should use the necessary policies of human governments for the attainment of the great ends of the theocracy. In this mode the entailments of parental conduct upon the children took their place as measures of economical expediency, and not as the ministries of distributive justice, which must ever have respect to the grounds of personal conduct.

Distributive justice is divine justice in the judicial ministries of moral government. It regards men in their personal character, or as ethically good or evil, and rewards or punishes them according to the same. Any departure from this law must require an elimination of all that is distinctive and essential in distributive justice. Nothing vital can remain by which to characterize or differentiate it. We have previously said that the demerit of sin is more manifest than the merit of righteousness. The former reveals itself in the moral and religious consciousness in a clearer and intenser form than the latter. Still the rewardableness of righteousness approves itself in that consciousness. Also, the fact of rewardableness is thoroughly scriptural. Further, it is both clear and scriptural that rewards must have respect to personal righteousness. There may be other blessings, and of large measure, but they cannot be personal rewards, and therefore cannot be accounted the ministry of distributive justice. But sin has intrinsic demerit, and on its own account deserves the penalties legislated against it. Demerit is the only ground of just punishment. There are great ends of penalty in the requirements of moral government, but, however great and urgent, they could justify no punishment except on the ground of demerit. The demerit must be personal to the subject of the punishment. Penalties are therefore in the strictest sense the ministry of distributive justice.

Reward and penalty thus fall in with the judicial or rectoral office of justice, which is the conservation of moral government in the highest attainable excellence. They are means to this high end; just means because of the rewardableness of righteousness and the demerit of sin; and proper means because of fitness for their end.

Distributive justice which thus deals with men on the ground of personal conduct is no abstract principle or law, but a concrete reality in the divine personality. Justice has its seat in the moral being of God, and apart from him is but an ideal conception. The law of moral duty is the transcript of his mind; the sanctions of the law the expression of his judgment of the rewardable excellence of righteousness and the punitive demerit of sin. This judgment is not a mere apathetic mental conception, but includes the intense activity of moral feeling. God lovingly approves the righteousness which he rewards with eternal blessedness, and reprobates with infinite displeasure the sin upon which he visits the fearful penalty of his law. The Scriptures are replete with utterances which express or imply these truths. There is a discriminative judgment of men according to their character: “For there is no respect of persons with God” (Romans 2:11). Respecting the divine regard for the righteous, it is said: “For God is not unrighteous to forget your work and labor of love” (Hebrews 6:10). Over against these words of an affectionate and faithful friendship may be placed the words of displeasure against the wicked: “For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness” (Roman 1:18). In the divine wrath there is an emotional displeasure. This is the terrifying sense of those who would have the rocks and mountains fall on them and hide them “from the face of him that sitteth upon the throne, and from the wrath of the Lamb” (Revelation 6:16). “For thou art not a

God that hath pleasure in wickedness . . . thou hatest all workers of iniquity” (Psalms 5:4-5). Just the opposite is the divine regard for the righteous: “For the righteous Lord loveth the righteous; his countenance doth behold the upright” (Psalms 9:7). In the final ministries of distributive justice there are the activities of divine sensibility: in the “Come, ye blessed of my Father,” an emotional love; in the

“Depart from me, ye cursed,” an emotional wrath (Matthew 25:34; Matthew 25:41). It is thus manifest that we find the justice of God only in his personality, and only with an element of moral feeling.

3. Love.—No theistic truth is more deeply emphasized in the Scriptures than love. No truth has a fuller or more grateful recognition in the Christian consciousness, nor, indeed, with any who have a proper conception of the personality of God and the plenitude of his perfections. Neither the apathetic God of deism, nor the unconscious God of pantheism, nor the God of agnosticism, without any law of self-agency either in his own holy personality or in the responsible freedom of his human subjects, is the God of the Scriptures. “God is love” (1 John 4:16). This is the profound truth which they give us. But, while love is so profound a truth in God, it is never disrupted from his holiness. Indeed, love, as justice itself, is but a mode of his holiness, and in moral administration justice as well as love still has its offices.

Any notion of God without love is empty of the most vital content of the true idea. The very plenitude of other perfections, such as infinite knowledge and power and justice, would, in the absence of love, invest them with most fearful terrors—enough, indeed, to whelm the world in despair. The holiness of God is the implication of love. Neither benevolence nor goodness is possible in any moral sense without love. A deed might confer a great benefit, but could not be ethically beneficent without the impulse and motive of love. In all the benefits which God may lavish upon the universe, he is truly beneficent only with the motive of love. Holy love is the deepest life of all holy action.

It must be admitted that the love of God is for theism, simply in the light of reason, a perplexing question. The perplexity arises in view of the magnitude of physical and moral evil under the providence of an omniscient and omnipotent Creator and Ruler. John Stuart Mill has given the strength of the issue on the side of skepticism.^[234] It is easy to point out a false and misleading assumption which underlies his discussion. It h that the question of evil, and of moral as of physical evil, is purely a question of the divine knowledge and power. The holy personality of God and the moral personality of man, both of which must be a law of the divine agency, are thus entirely omitted from the discussion. This omission must vitiate the argument. However, the pointing out of this fallacy comes far short of eliminating all the difficulties of the question. Great perplexity still remains. We have no theodicy of our own; certainly none simply in the light of reason. Nor have we received any through the work of others. Few questions have been more earnestly and persistently discussed. We find the discussion mostly in works on systematic theology, or in treatises on natural theology. Among the authors who have made special endeavor toward the attainment of a theodicy we might name Leibnitz,^[235] King, ^[236]Bledsoe,^[237] Whedon,^[238] Naville,^[239] McCabe.^[240] Some of these discussions mostly proceed on the grounds of Arminianism as against the determining principles of Calvinism. But the great problem is still on hand; nor do we think its solution possible simply in the resources of the human mind. Revelation does not give the solution.

^[234]Three Essays on Religion.

^[235]Théodicée.

^[236]The Origin of Evil.

^[237]A Theodicy.

^[238]Freedom of the Will.

^[239]The Problem of Evil.

^[240]Divine Nescience of Future Contingencies. The world, with the human race, must have a personal author. The author must possess infinite knowledge and power; for otherwise he could not be a sufficient cause to such dependent existences. He cannot be of malevolent disposition, else the constitution of his creatures would evince a malevolent purpose, and evil be manifold more than it is. That constitution really expresses a benevolent purpose. The provisions for the happiness of animal life above the requirements for mere subsistence are many and manifest. The happiness of animal life immeasurably exceeds its suffering. The comparatively trivial evils may not be wholly avoidable. They must be a liability in a constitution of life with such provisions for its happiness. Clearly, the constitution might have been such that suffering would have been greatly in excess. The real facts in the case arc a manifestation of the divine goodness.

Human suffering is greater than mere animal suffering, and therefore creates a greater perplexity in the question of the divine goodness. But here other elements appear in the question. In his physical nature man still touches the plane of animal life, but in his rational and moral nature constitutes a higher realm of existence. His life in respect of both good and evil is largely conditioned on his own free and responsible agency. Most of the evil, both physical and moral, that he suffers is from himself, not from his constitution, and might be avoided. So far as one’s suffering arises from his own responsible agency, or might be avoided without omission of duty to others, the divine goodness needs no vindication. The assertion of such a need is really the denial of all self-responsibility for one’s own condition in life. The assumption is that God should secure the same common well-being to the idle and “wasteful as to the industrious and provident, to the vicious as to the virtuous, to the criminal as to the upright. This neither should be nor can be. The false assumption re-appears that the providential treatment and condition of men is simply a question of the divine power. But God is a moral Euler, and men his free, responsible subjects. Justice, therefore, must have its offices in the divine administration. Otherwise the interests of the virtuous and upright would deeply suffer—just as in the case of a human government which should provide for the idle, the vicious, and the criminal all the immunities and blessings of life usually enjoyed by the upright and deserving. This would violate the common sense of justice, and in the result sacrifice all the rights and interests which the government should sacredly protect. Such a policy would be utterly subversive of any government, human or divine. In the divine it would be a departure from all the laws of life, physical, rational, and moral, and the substitution of a purely supernatural agency, particularly in providing for the well-being of all such as are reckless of these imperative laws. Nothing could be more extravagant or false in the notion of divine providence. God is the rational and moral Ruler of men as rational and moral subjects. This is the only light in which to view his providence. It follows that neither the secular nor the moral well-being of men is possible against their own agency. Much of human suffering thus arises, and for its existence the divine goodness needs no vindication. Nor is any special defense needed in the case of suffering which arises with the fulfillment of duty to others. To assert such a need is to question or even deny the obligation of duty in all such cases. But the truest and the best ever hold this obligation most sacred, and its fulfillment the highest excellence. Not all suffering, however, is avoidable. The interaction of life upon life, inseparable from the providential relations of humanity, is the source of evil to many. But there is also a counterbalancing good to many through the same law. The law of heredity in like manner works both good and evil. The constitution of humanity renders inevitable the results of these laws. The consequence is that the offices of the present life are largely vicarious. The good suffer from the deeds of the evil, and in turn serve them in the ministries of good.^[241] Such is the providential state of facts; but the facts are not self-explicative so as to clear the question of perplexity respecting the divine goodness.

^[241]Butler:Analogy,part ii, chap. v.

There is no solution of the problem through the solidarity of the race, as this doctrine has been wrought into theology. It is on this ground specially that Naville, previously referred to, attempts to deal with the problem of evil. This is the common Calvinistic position, whether the solidarity of the race is held on the ground of a realistic or a representative oneness. The position is that all are sinners by participation in the sin of Adam, and that, consequently, the evils of this life are a just retribution on the ground of that common sin. There is no light in this doctrine. The realistic view requires an impossible agency of each individual of the race in the sin of Adam. We did not, and could not, so exist and act in Adam as to be individually responsible for that original sin. The representative view concedes the common personal innocence of that sin, but alleges a common guilt of the sin through immediate imputation on the ground of a divinely instituted federal headship in Adam. There is still no light for our reason. Between the conceded personal innocence of the Adamic sin and the common infliction of punishment there intervenes only the immediate imputation of guilt—that is, the accounting to us the guilt of a sin in the commission of which we had no part. It is the doctrine of a common guilt and punishment, without any personal demerit. Personal demerit is a sufficient explanation of the suffering involved in its just punishment; but the merely imputed guilt of another’s sin is no explanation of such suffering. The attempt is often made to reconcile human suffering with the divine goodness on the ground that it is a necessary and valuable discipline of life. That it is a valuable discipline can scarcely be questioned. There are wayward tendencies which it may hold in check or often correct. The graces of gentleness, patience, kindness, and sympathy are nurtured and matured. The fortitude and heroism developed through suffering and peril have been the molding forces in the formation of the best and noblest characters. We have examples in Abraham, and Job, and Moses, and Paul. Neither could have attained the sublime height of his excellence without the discipline of sore trial and suffering. Many of the better and higher graces receive the most effective culture in the necessary and dutiful ministries to the suffering. It is thus plain that in suffering there is a large mixture of good; and the good is of the highest excellence and value. Nor can it be questioned that often the good exceeds the evil. Of course, it is still open for the skeptic to say that, while all this is true, the real difficulty lies in such a providential constitution of human life as to need this severe discipline of suffering. Simply in the light of reason there is strength in this position; but the logical implication is atheistic. Atheism, however, explains nothing, and affords no ground for either faith or hope. An inexplicable mystery of suffering is far more endurable than the hopeless darkness of atheism. There is manifestly great value in the discipline of suffering, but this fact does not clear up the mystery for our reason.

There is light for our faith. The light is in the Gospel. Over against the Adamic fall and moral ruin of the race the Gospel places the redemption of Christ; over against abounding sin, the much more abounding grace of redemption (Romans 5:15; Romans 5:20); over against the suffering of this life, a transcendent eternal blessedness (Romans 8:18; 2 Corinthians 4:17). This blessedness is infallibly sure to all who in simple faith and obedience receive Christ as their Saviour and Lord. Nor shall any fail of it who in sincerity and fidelity live according to the light which they may have (Acts 10:34-35). The condition of this blessedness is most easy, and in its fruition the mystery of suffering will utterly disappear. It is clearly thus with those who through great tribulation have reached the blessedness of heaven (Revelation 7:13-17). Dark as the picture of the world may be for our reason, for oar faith there is light in the Gospel. The darkness is but the background of that picture, while in the light of the forefront the cross is clearly seen. “God so loved the world.” “Herein is love.” “God is love” (John 3:16; 1 John 4:10; 1 John 4:16). The cross is the very outburst of his infinite love.

4. Mercy.—Mercy is a form of love determined by the state or condition of its objects. Their state is one of suffering and need, while they may be unworthy or ill-deserving. Mercy is at once the disposition of love respecting such, and the kindly ministry of love for their relief. This is the nature of all true love—true in the reality and fullness of benevolence. It is profoundly the nature of the divine love.

There are other terms, kindred in sense with mercy, which are equally expressive of the gracious disposition and kindness of love. We may instance compassion or pity, propitiousness or clemency, forbearance or long-suffering. All true love regards its suffering objects with compassion or pity. This is profoundly true of the divine love. It is exemplified in the compassion of Jesus for the multitudes, faint, and scattered abroad, as sheep having no shepherd; and for the poor leper whom he touched and healed (Matthew 9:36; Mark 1:41). Such is the compassion of God for the suffering; even for the unworthy and the ill-deserving (Psalms 86:15; Psalms 109:4; Psalms 145:8; Lamentations 3:22). So the Scriptures emphasize the pity of the Lord, which, equally with his compassion, has respect to the suffering and need of man. Pity is expressed in words of pathetic tenderness (Psalms 103:13; James 3:11). Propitiousness or clemency is the divine disposition to the forgiveness and salvation of the sinful and lost (Psalms 78:33; Isaiah 55:7; Hebrews 8:12). The forbearance or long-suffering of God manifests the fullness and tenderness of his clemency. He is reluctant to punish, and waits in patience for the repentance of the sinful, that he may forgive and save them (Exodus 34:6; Romans 2:4; 2 Peter 3:9; 2 Peter 3:15).

Thus the Scriptures emphasize these terms which are kindred in sense with mercy. In numerous texts they are grouped with mercy, so that all are emphasized together. Still mercy receives its own distinct expression, and often, in terms of the deepest intensity. God is the Father of mercies; his tender mercies are over all his works; and his mercy endureth forever (2 Corinthians 1:3; Psalms 145:9; Psalms 118:1).

There is an emotional clement in mercy, and in all kindred forms of the divine disposition. Mercy, pity, clemency, long-suffering—these are not mere forms of divine thought, but intensities of divine feeling, and would be impossible without an emotional nature in God. Divest them of this sense and they become meaningless, and must be powerless for any assurance and help in the exigencies of suffering and need.

5. Truth.—Truth in God may be resolved into veracity and fidelity.

Veracity is the source of truthfulness in expression, whether in the use of words or in other modes. It is deeper than mere intellect; deep as the moral nature. With all true moral natures veracity is felt to be a profound obligation. Veracity is revered, while falsehood, deceit, hypocrisy are abhorred. In the truest, deepest sense of veracity there is profound moral feeling. The divine veracity is more than truthfulness of expression from absolute knowledge; it is truthfulness from holy feeling. As God solemnly enjoins truthfulness upon men, and severely reprehends its violation, in whatever forms of falsehood or deceit, 80 his own words and ways ever fulfill the requirements of the most absolute veracity. This is the guarantee of truthfulness in the divine revelation, though not the requirement of a revelation of all truth. There may be much truth above our present capacity of knowledge; much that does not concern our present duty and interest. Nor does the divine veracity require such a revelation that it can neither be mistaken nor perverted. Certainly we are not competent to the affirmation of such a requirement. Otherwise we might equally pronounce against all the tests of a probationary life—which is the same as to pronounce against probation itself. “Whether we shall rightly or wrongly interpret the Scriptures in respect to our faith and practice, according to the light and opportunity which we may have, is one of the tests of fidelity to duty in the present probation, and in full consistency with other tests.^[242] Errors in respect to moral and religious truth are mostly the fruit of perverting feeling—such feeling as we responsibly indulge, and might correct or replace with a better disposition toward the truth. “With simplicity of mind and a love of the truth we may find in the Scriptures all the lessons of moral and religious duty requisite to a good life and a blessed immortality (Matthew 6:22; John 7:17; John 8:31; John 8:33; Ephesians 1:17-18; James 1:5).

^[242]Butler:Analogy, part ii, chap. vi.

Fidelity in God specially respects his promises, and is the guarantee of their fulfillment. There are contingencies of failure in human promises. A promise may be deceitfully given. Unforeseen events may effect a change of disposition respecting fulfillment. With abiding honesty in the promise, new conditions may render fulfillment impossible. These contingencies of failure arise out of the possible dishonesty and the actual limitations of men. No such contingencies can affect the divine fidelity. The holiness of God is the infinite sincerity of his promises, and the plenitude of his perfections the absolute power of fulfillment. The Scriptures emphasize these truths (Numbers 23:19; Titus 1:2; Hebrews 6:17-18).

Fidelity in God is thus a truth of priceless value. It is the absolute guarantee of his “exceeding great and precious promises” (2 Peter 1:4). These promises, in the fullness and fitness of their content, are sufficient for all the exigencies of life, and are absolutely sure of fulfillment to all who properly meet their terms. In the faithfulness of God there is an element of holy feeling. A certain measure of fidelity with men may be a matter of conventional pride or personal honor. It is truer and deeper just as it is grounded in moral feeling, and finds its ruling motive in a sense of moral duty. It is the stronger and surer Just in the measure of this moral feeling. Fidelity in God is the more assuring to us with the deeper sense of his holy feeling as its essential element and ruling principle.