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Chapter 53 of 58

52. XLIX. The Hymn of Heavenly Love (1 Corinthians 13)

22 min read · Chapter 53 of 58

XLIX. The Hymn of Heavenly Love (1 Corinthians 13)

(This name is applied to the chapter in the writer’s Pictures of the Apostolic Church, 1910, p. 232 (published 1910 in the Sunday School Times): it is taken from Spenser’s “Hymn of Heavenly Love”.)

Section XLII has the form of a survey of part of his Excellency Dr. Harnack’s remarkable and suggestive study of the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians, the “Hymn of Heavenly Love”. (It appears in an authorised translation from the Berlin Academy’s Sitzungsberichte, published in the Expositor, May and June, 1912.) It is therefore suitable to add here a survey of certain other points in this notable article, which bear on our subject.

Beginning after the thoroughgoing and methodical German fashion from a minute study of text and words, it moves onward to a broad and lofty survey of religious thought; and in the discussion of the words used by the Apostle it sometimes throws a brilliant light on his thought and on his outlook over the world and man and God. One hardly ventures to praise a writer who stands so high as Dr. Harnack. We learn from him, and are thankful to him; but he stands as a classic, above the level of mere laudation. One learns method and nobility of thought from studying him, even when differing from some detail in his interpretation; and the result is to strengthen our conviction that Paul is, in one way, the greatest among those who interpreted to men the religion of Jesus, and that we never understand the Apostle rightly until we take him on the highest moral plane to which human nature is capable of rising. (Pauline and Other Studies, p. 38.) The title “Hymn” is naturally applied by every sympathetic reader to this chapter; das hohe Lied von der Liebe is the name that Dr. Harnack uses. The chapter is not written in plain prose: it has the measured stately movement and rhythm of a hymn. (It is not the rhythm of the rhetorical schools, as taught in Paul’s time: in that we must agree with Deissmann against Blass. Yet there moves through the “Hymn” a natural rhythm, perfectly spontaneous and untaught, accommodating itself to the thought, which Dr. Harnack has rightly recognised and well ascribed in this study. Dr. Deissmann rather scorns the idea that there is any rhythm in Paul. Because the artificial rhythm of the rhetoricians can only be discovered through the too violent process applied by Blass, therefore Deissmann holds that there is no rhythm. The defect lies in the ear and the sense of the modern scholar. Blass had the ear for the rhythm, but being accustomed to think of the Greek rhetorical style, he tried to prove that Paul’s rhythm is identical with that of the schools. It is an equally great error to miss the natural perfection of the Pauline rhythm and to deny its existence. The defect of Dr. Deissmann’s work is that, having got the true idea that Paul wrote letters in the language of the time, he concludes that this is almost purely the language of the uneducated, that Paul was uneducated, non-literary, “unknown” in the fullest sense (see his St. Paul, p. 77 and elsewhere). He cannot feel the delicate irony of Paul’s language in 1 Corinthians 1-4. To Deissmann Paul’s expression, being intended for the uneducated, is couched in their own words. Because Paul’s work takes the form of letters, therefore it is not literature, but rude, unpolished, non-literary. On the contrary the letters are for the most part in the highest class of literature. I appeal from Blass to Wilamowitz, who knows (if any man does) what Greek literature is.) We notice that when Paul’s religious emotion rises to the highest pitch, it has a certain note of enthusiasm — in the literal sense of the Greek word, viz., possession by the Divine power — which tends to impart to the verbal expression a rhythmic flow. This Dr. Harnack brings out by printing the Greek text and his own German rendering in shorter verses and in three longer measures or stanzas.

It is especially when he speaks of the unspeakable and illimitable kindness of God or His love to men that Paul’s expression casts itself in a lyric form. Hence the renewed study of 1 Corinthians 13 only deepens our conviction that the lyrical tone of 1 Timothy 3:16, or of some in Ephesians, springs out of the heart of the writer, and is not due to the verse being quoted from a contemporary hymn. (If there was such a hymn, which is a quite possible and even probable supposition, it is more likely to have been founded on Paul than quoted by him.) Amid marked diversity on the surface the deep-lying psychological resemblance in nature between the Epistles to Timothy and the earlier letters of Paul is the most powerful argument that they are all the work of one mind and heart. (Expositor, April, 1912, p. 359.) The Hymn, as Dr. Harnack says, stands in close relation to the needs and defects of the Corinthian character; and yet rises far above any individual and personal reference to a perfectly universal expression of the nature of God and His relation to men. The quality of which the Hymn sings “embraces the most comprehensive and the strongest kind of good-will to all men, a deep and burning desire to seek after the progress of the race and the benefit of every individual with whom we are brought into relations; it develops the side of our nature in which we can approximate nearest to the Divine nature, because it is the human counterpart of the feeling that God entertains to man”. (Pictures of the Apostolic Church, p. 230.) That is the invariable character of Paul’s letters. He never applied superficial remedies to mere external symptoms. He treated the failing or evil in a congregation as the outward effect of a deep-seated want or misapprehension to which all human nature is exposed; and he tried to raise the Church to a higher view of life by purifying and elevating their conception of the Divine nature. The only way in which a merely individual and external treatment comes into play is when penalty and punishment must be applied: this is apportioned according to the individual action and the circumstances of the particular case. (See Section XXXI.) Otherwise he treats errors by moral and religious principles, which are absolutely universal in their application.

I may be permitted, in gratitude for what I have learned from Dr. Harnack’s study of this Hohe Lied, to add some remarks on three points. In the first, I am obliged to differ from him, not I think in a contrary direction, but rather through proceeding further in the same direction and thus appreciating more highly the perfect harmony and beauty of Paul’s tone. In the other two points, where Dr. Harnack compels perfect assent, my aim is to proceed to certain arguments about the authorship of the Pastoral Epistles. Amid the differences which divide those Epistles from the earlier letters of Paul, there reigns a psychological unity and a real identity of originating heart, which prove the authorship; and Dr. Harnack’s exposition of the Hymn recalls to my mind analogous phenomena in the Pastorals.

I. Dr. Harnack is fully justified in laying much stress on the transition by which Paul passes from the general exposition to this lyric and emotional Hymn, and in studying closely the manner in which this transition is effected in the last verse of 1 Corinthians 12. A strong light is thus thrown on Paul’s character, and on the tact and delicacy of his dealing with the Corinthians. As to one point, however, in Dr. Harnack’s interpretation of the verse of the transition, 1 Corinthians 12:31, I regret to be unconvinced by his reasoning: a view diverse from his seems to place Paul’s thought and tone and method on a higher level. In respect of the construction of this sentence, it may be added that Westcott and Hort differ from him in placing the paragraph division in the middle of 1 Corinthians 12:31, and incorporating the second clause of that verse in the Hymn of 1 Corinthians 13; whereas he (like most scholars) connects closely the two clauses of 1 Corinthians 12:31 (in which he seems to me to be right).

According to the interpretation of 1 Corinthians 12:31, for which Dr. Harnack contends, Paul places his own “super-excellent way” in marked contrast with the Corinthian way. The Corinthians admire spiritual “gifts,” and eagerly desire them as the crown of the Christian career; but Paul, on the contrary, advises these young converts rather to admire and strive after the Christian virtues, and indicates this to them as a more excellent way than theirs of leading the Christian life. They should seek the Christian virtues and not the gifts. Dr. Harnack takes the word χαρίσματα, “gifts,” in 1 Corinthians 12:31 to mean “Christian virtues,” whereas in the rest of the passage χαρίσματα means these gifts. This is violent and awkward; and (as I think) it misses the beauty of the thought.

Such a pointed and strong contrast between the Corinthian and the Pauline way seems, however, not to be in harmony with Paul’s tone in this part of his letter. He here studiously suppresses his own individuality, makes light of his own merits, and avoids anything that could seem like pressing his way on the Corinthians or depreciating their way. Anything of that kind is out of keeping with the tone of 1 Corinthians 13. The delicate and gracious courtesy which lights up this part of the letter is quite remarkable. By a skilful use of the first and the third person he avoids suggesting either that the Corinthians are lacking in love (though their want of it prompts the praise of its excellence and necessity) or that he himself possesses love. “All hint of fault is put in the first person singular”: if I have every merit and good action, but have not love, I am valueless. On the other hand, where he in positive terms praises the quality of love, he avoids the first person singular, lest this should seem like a claim to the possession of it. (Pictures of the Apostolic Church, p. 232 f.) There is no trace in 1 Corinthians 13 of the irony, subtle and polished and gentle as it is, that rules in chapters 1-4. The time for that has passed, or perhaps one should rather say the Apostle’s mood has changed. (That the longer Epistles of Paul were written, not at a single effort, but in parts with some interval between each, seems to me to be the explanation of many of the phenomena in both First and Second Corinthians. A dictated Epistle, which treats of such varied topics in a tone so lofty and legislative and philosophic, was thought out in sections. This was stated in my Historical Commentary on Corinthians, §§ xxxix.-xliv. (Expositor, March, 1901, pp. 220 ff.). This might be illustrated from Spenser’s first letter to Gabriel Harvey; Gregory Smith in his edition recognises that the end of the latter is written a week earlier than the beginning; but my friend Mr. J. C. Smith points out to me that the end of the letter had been written earlier and sent as a separate letter, but was lost on the way, so that Spenser repeats it at the end of his new letter, after explaining the circumstances. The dates are 16 and 5 Oct. 1579.)

Paul sees what is lacking in the Corinthians’ spirit and conduct; but he does not, as yet, criticise or find fault with their way. He merely praises what is good in their way, but gradually leads them up to a higher level of judging and acting.

There is in 1 Corinthians 12:31 no comparison, no direct contrast between Paul’s way and theirs. The adverbial expression, καθʼ ὑπερβολὴν, which at first sight appears rather awkward as attached to a noun, is carefully chosen to avoid any suggestion of contrast. The connection is made by “and” not by “but”; only the word “still,” ἔτι, imparts to the “and” a touch of hesitation and pondering: “and still, along with the excellence of your conduct in desiring eagerly the gifts, you should always remember that there is a way, a super-excellent way,” viz. the way of love, which is then described in the Hymn.

Like the introduction of the Hymn, so is the conclusion, 1 Corinthians 14:1, with which Paul resumes his didactic exposition in plain prose. “Pursue love; hunt it as a hunter seeks his prey, determined to get it; but strive after the spiritual gifts, and especially the gift of prophecy.” Here, again, the two ways are mentioned side by side: both are worthy of eager desire: neither is recommended exclusively or even preferentially (unless διώκειν can be interpreted as a markedly stronger term (Such an interpretation can hardly be justified; both are strong and emphatic terms.) than ζηλοῦτε). The parallel between 1 Corinthians 12:31 and 1 Corinthians 14:1 is perfect, though the order must of course be reversed: in the introduction the way of love has to be mentioned last, in the conclusion it is necessarily placed first.

Hence Paul does not use in 1 Corinthians 12:31 the comparative degree of an adjective; he does not say “I will show you a more excellent way,” for that would suggest a comparison of his own way with the Corinthian way. He does not even employ the definite article, for that form would suggest that he is showing “the super-excellent way,” the one true and supreme way. So perfectly chosen is the language here, that even the addition of that little word “the” would spoil it. Dr. Harnack’s interpretation of “the better gifts” as “the Christian virtues” misses this! Hence he feels the want of the article to be rather awkward: he is a little surprised at the omission of “the,” and even points out that occasionally in Paul the article is omitted carelessly. On the contrary, the language in 1 Corinthians 12:31 is so perfectly chosen that the smallest change would weaken the delicate effect.

We might attempt to express in rough modern words the run of the expression in the end of 1 Corinthians 12 thus: “all the gifts of the spirit are good and desirable, each in its own way: they are, however, diverse, and they vary in dignity, and men cannot possess them all: all cannot be prophets, or teach, or speak with tongues. But strive ye after the gifts in proportion to their worth. They are good. They are excellent. Be eager to attain them. And yet — and still — there is a super-excellent way, and this I show you in the Hymn.” The term “gifts” must therefore be understood in the same sense throughout chapters 12-14. It would be an obscurity very unlike Paul’s style to pass in the middle suddenly to a different sense for the word, and then return to the former sense. The difficulty of his style arises from other causes: his reasoning moves with rapid and long steps which are not easily followed; often he sees intuitively rather than reasons, giving an argument that seems to us arbitrary or far-fetched to justify his intuition; but he does not commonly operate with terms whose meaning he consciously changes completely back and forwards in the chain of his expression.

Still, if the supposition of such rapid change gave a better flow to the passage, we should have to accept it. We find, however, that it lacks the perfect sympathy with the spirit and harmony of Paul’s thought.

Against the uniformity for which we contend in the meaning of the term “gifts” throughout this passage. Dr. Harnack brings the objection that the Apostle, who has recently described the “gifts” as imparted by God according to His free will and choice, could hardly advise the Corinthians to “strive after” those same gifts. There is, however, no real inconsistency, it is only an apparent difference that is felt when one contemplates the situation with too narrowly logical a view. It is truly and perfectly consistent with the Pauline and the Christian philosophy to strive earnestly after the gifts of God: they are the free gift of God, imparted at His own will, and yet men may and should eagerly desire them and strive after them. (We have found abundant occasion to remark the tendency of Pauline thought to express itself in two apparently, yet only apparently, contradictory statements: see Section XLVI and elsewhere from IX onwards.) Such is the nature of the Divine gifts and graces: such is the true relation of the Christian man to his God. The common interpretation of 1 Corinthians 12:31, which Dr. Harnack mentions, is rightly rejected by him: it is indefensible from every point of view, and fails to catch the gracious and lovely current of Paul’s thought. As he says (and I assume that he is right in this: I have not read carefully their exegesis), almost all the commentators understand that, in the first clause of 1 Corinthians 12:31, Paul advises the Corinthians to strive by preference after those spiritual gifts which serve best for edification, i.e. to prefer prophecy or teaching to glossolalia. This is to be rejected for two reasons. In the first place, it disregards the order and natural connection of words: ζηλοῦτε τὰ χαρίσματα suggests forthwith, “strive after the gifts”; then the addition of τὰ μείζονα (κρείττονα) (It is difficult to determine whetherμείζοναof some MSS., orκρείττοναof others, is the true text. We refer to Dr. Harnack’s discussion: he prefersκρείττονα.) gives an almost predicative sense, “according to their degree of excellence”. The force of this sentence is not to be interpreted as if the words were equivalent to τὰ μείζονα χαρίσματα or μείζονα χαρίσματα τῶν χαρισμάτων. In the second place, it is not the Apostle’s purpose here to draw hard and fast distinctions, or to insist that the Corinthians should make glossolalia a secondary matter: what he means is that all gifts are good, and should be sought after in proportion to their goodness. By his form of expression he leaves open for the moment the possibility that some may be better than others; that topic will come later. Yet even when in he gives the preference to prophecy over speaking with tongues, he immediately adds in 1 Corinthians 14:5, “I wish you all to speak with tongues, but still more that you should prophesy”. This is just a re-emphasising of 1 Corinthians 12:31a and 1 Corinthians 14:1; but now, after the distinction has been drawn in , the statement of the thought becomes more definite and precise: “All gifts, however, are good: glossolalia is good: my wish is that you should all have that gift, but still more that you should have the power of prophecy as a higher and greater gift”. This gradual movement towards definiteness about these gifts is evident, when 1 Corinthians 12:31a is correctly interpreted. The movement continues throughout the following passage from 1 Corinthians 14:12, “since ye are eager strivers after spiritual gifts, seek that you may be rich unto the edifying of the church,” to 1 Corinthians 14:39, “strive after the power of prophecy, and forbid not to speak with tongues”. In this last verse prophecy alone is prescribed as the object which one should strive after; and glossolalia is merely “not forbidden”. This is the climax. The whole passage, 1 Corinthians 12:1 to 1 Corinthians 14:40, is concerned with the gifts of the spirit; with infinite courtesy and tenderness Paul tries to raise the Corinthians’ minds to a higher outlook and a nobler aspiration. In the middle of this passage it is not allowable to interpret “the gifts” once in a totally different sense as if it meant the fundamental Christian virtues.

All that I have said regarding the delicacy of Paul’s attitude towards the Corinthians’ way would be falsified, if Weiss’s view were correct that already in 1 Corinthians 12:29 f. Paul “has reproved and found fault with the Corinthians’ habit of ambitiously striving after the higher gifts”. (Nachdem er soeben das chrgeizige Streben nach höheren Gaben surückgewiesen und gemahnt hat . . . (1 Corinthians 12:29f.).) This meaning I cannot gather from Paul’s words. Weiss forces prematurely into 1 Corinthians 12 the depreciation of one gift (not of all gifts), which is expressed very tenderly and very lovingly in : 1 Corinthians 14; and he transforms Paul’s gentle, delicate depreciation into a harsh and brusque condemnation, which has no resemblance to, and no justification in, the kindly, yet emotional, words of the letter.

Weiss’s words would be justifiable if he were expressing his own opinion about the Corinthians in the language that best suited the strength of his personal feeling; but he is here giving a résumé of Paul’s words. One feels obliged to say that the exegesis of Paul which expresses in such strong, sledge-hammer style the courteous and gracious language of the Apostle is dooming itself beforehand to misunderstand Paul’s attitude,

II. Dr. Harnack’s defence (which, in the present writer’s opinion, is perfectly successful and conclusive) of the reading καυχήσομαι in 1 Corinthians 12:3, is one of the most delightful and illuminative things that I have ever read about the character of Paul. It shows us the great Apostle in his relation to the Pharisaic and Judaic view of life; it illustrates the influence which the strictly Pharisaic way of thinking exercised on his mind, and his invariable custom of taking that thought on the highest level of which it is capable; and, finally, it lets us trace his triumphant emergence from the Pharisaic view to a still higher level. This gradual victory over Pharisaism — in other words, the whole life of Paul in his relation to the Pharisaic mode of thinking — might be illustrated at greater length; the path which Dr. Harnack has here indicated might be followed throughout a wide range of ideas; but I here refer to it only in order to draw an inference from it. Without intending it, Dr. Harnack’s exposition makes it easy to see why an idea like this, which is in Paul’s letters so frequently expressed by the verbs καυχάομαι, ἐγκαυχάομαι, and the nouns καύχησις, καύχημα, never occurs in the Pastoral Epistles,

Those Epistles differ as regards vocabulary from the other letters, not merely in using many words not found in the letters, but also to some extent in making little employment of certain ideas and words which are much more frequently used in the earlier letters. None of those four Greek words, which occur fifty-five times in Paul’s earliest eight letters, are found in the three Pastorals.

Now, to quote Dr. Harnack’s own words, “the Pharisaic fashion of thinking was fundamentally amended by Paul, until he at last did away with it entirely”. It is true that this group of words is absent from the Pastorals; but also it is the case that none of them occur in Colossians, and there is only a single occurrence in Ephesians. The Apostle was naturally most prone to use this form of expression where he was most on the defensive, and where he was recommending and fortifying against attack his own conception of the Gospel: therefore the words are most frequent in Second Corinthians. The same way of contemplating his own life was exemplified in the opening words of his Apologia before the Sanhedrin — an Apologia which was never completed — see Acts 23:1, where there is the expression of a strong and self-confident, almost thoroughly καύχημα, though the word itself is not used. If his action were attacked he would defend it, and with good reason glory in the purity of his motives and conduct. Yet, as he grew older, he rose above this way of defence, and used it and the words which express it less and less.

These words are almost wholly confined to Paul in the New Testament. Besides him James thrice uses them, once in the Pharisaic good sense (James 1:9), and twice in the bad sense (James 4:16): James too had something of the markedly Judaic character. In Hebrews also the noun καύχημα is once used; but only as a synonym and completion of παρρησία, which precedes, limits and defends it. (Hebrews 3:6;Hebrews 3:14,ἐάν τὴν παρρησίαν καὶ τὸ καύχημα τῆς ἐλπίδος μέχρι τέλους βεβαίαν κατάσχωμεν.) This word παρρησία, denoting freedom in expression and thought, is the Christian term and idea, which is characteristic of the later books in the New Testament. It originates as a Christian term with Paul, being used by him both in the noun and the derived verb παρρησιάζομαι. In 1 Thessalonians 2:2 the verb is employed in a somewhat hesitating way, conjoined with λαλεῖν, “we used freedom . . . to speak to you the Gospel”. In Ephesians 6:20 the verb is used more freely “to speak boldly (as I ought to speak)”; and Luke in the Acts uses the verb frequently (Only in Acts, not in the Gospel, where he was under the influence of the earlier tradition: the noun occurs once inMark 8:32.) in this sense, catching it from the lips of Paul. The verb is Pauline and Lukan. The noun occurs regularly in the later Pauline letters (Second Corinthians twice, Ephesians twice, Philippians, Philemon, First Timothy). It is also a characteristic word in Luke, (See preceding note.) and still more in John (both in the Gospel nine times and in the first Epistle four times). The mere statement of the facts shows how, in harmony with Paul, the language that expressed to the Church the Christian ethics lifted itself above the Pharisaic standpoint. The word παρρησία is entirely free from the unpleasing connotation of καύχησις. The latter carries with it the suspicion of self-confidence: Paul himself feels this, and apologises for the word and the idea of καύχησις in 2 Corinthians 12:1 and 2 Corinthians 12:5. It commonly has degenerated in Greek speech and acquired a thoroughly bad sense: in 2 Corinthians 10:13 and Ephesians 2:9 there is the suggestion that such degeneration is possible, (“We will not glory beyond measure, but according to the measure of the province which God apportioned to us”: and “Not of works: that no man should glory”.) while in1 Corinthians 5:6 the degeneration is actually exemplified. (“Your glorying is not good.”) Regularly, however, the word has in Paul the better sense vindicated for it by Dr. Harnack in the Hymn, 1 Corinthians 13:3. In James 4:16 the bad sense of καύχησις is complete. (“Ye glory in your vauntings: all such glorying is evil.”) The word thus comes to connote much the same ἀλαζονία or κενοδοχία: the latter is purely Pauline (The noun and the adjective are lumped in the statistics.) (found twice, Phil. and Gal.), the former is found in James, in Romans, in First John, and in Second Timothy (each once). The development in the use of the word καύχησις καύχημα, therefore, is from the use in a good sense of a term that is readily capable and even suggestive of a bad sense to the full and proper distinction between the good and the bad meaning by the use of two contrasted terms, and the disuse of the doubtful word or the condemnation of it to the bad sense alone. The language of the Pastorals stands in this matter on the level of the developed Christian usage. The question is whether there is reason to think that this level was attained in the lifetime of Paul, or not. If not, there would result a probability in favour of the opinion that the Pastorals cannot be the work of Paul; but, on the other hand, if it is probable that Paul himself gradually attained to this level, those Epistles would, so far as this matter is concerned, retain the place which, in our opinion, properly belongs to them as the latest stage in the expression of his thought. The statistics already quoted seem to place the answer beyond question. The middle Epistles approximate to this level, whereas the earlier are remote from it. Dr. Harnack’s argument that Paul was gradually emancipating himself from the Pharisaic point of view, until he triumphed over it completely, is perfectly correct. The group of Epistles of the Captivity approximate to its level. Indeed, if we except Philippians, the three closely connected Asian Epistles come very near it, as there is only one occurrence in them of these words; but even in them the thought still lingers that καύχησις before the judgment of God is justifiable. This process is completed in the Pastorals; but the steps are clearly marked in the preceding Epistles and nearly completed in the latest of them. In this as in so many other matters we need the Pastorals to justify Paul, and to complete and consummate our picture of him. (It should not be omitted that the argument of the great German scholar regarding this reading is a complete vindication of the skill and judgment applied by Westcott and Hort in the formation of their text. Alone among modern scholars (with the partial exception of Lachmann) they preferredκαυθήσωμαιand placed it in the text, relegatingκαυθήσωμαιto the Appendix as “Western and Syrian”.)

III. In the Hymn we find that 1 Corinthians 13:4-7 are a good example of Paul’s way of heaping together a long series of characteristics and modes of action in order to express the real nature of the topic which he is discussing. In doing so he employs a rich vocabulary, and exhibits great carefulness in regard to delicate shades of significance. Any one of these enumerations of a series of words shows the mind of the philosophically educated man. Only a person who has been accustomed to think much and to philosophise can practise such refinement in language. In such a list Paul’s tendency also was to employ strange and rare words, or even to invent new words. It is a Pauline characteristic to be an innovator in language in proportion to the great advance that he made in philosophic thought. Such a characteristic is the mark of a great thinker and great writer, whose thought forges its own lofty expression.

χρητεύομαι is found only here in the New Testament, and in later Christian writers is probably taken from Paul. Dr. Harnack suggests that Paul derived it from a recension of Q, (Q indicates, according to the usual convention, that early document, separate and distinct from Mark’s Gospel, which was freely and abundantly used by both Luke and Matthew. As I believe and have argued in Luke the Physician and Other Studies, p. 71 ff., it was written while Jesus was still living.) which was used and quoted by Clemens Alexandrinus.

περπερεύομαι, is found only here in the New Testament: it is rare in Greek, as is the noun περπερεία.

φυσιόω is never used in the New Testament except by Paul, who has it six times in First Corinthians, and once in Colossians.

ἀσχημονεῖν is never used in the New Testament except twice in First Corinthians. In this place Dr. Harnack follows Clement of Alexandria, and rejects the sense “behave unseemly,” which suits better the other occurrence of the word (1 Corinthians 7:36).

παροξύνομαι occurs only twice in the New Testament. The other instance is in Acts 17:16, where Luke uses it about Paul’s indignation at the idolatry practised in Athens, probably catching it from the Apostle’s own lips. The word was therefore probably a characteristic Pauline word, but it is only once found in his writings. Occasion to use it positively would naturally be rare in Paul’s letters, because the idea occurs rarely in them. Here alone there is a need to use it negatively.

στέγειν, used four times by Paul (twice in First Corinthians) and not elsewhere in the New Testament, has its sense doubtful here: yet it is evidently a characteristic Pauline word like the three preceding. In such a list Paul tends to refinement in language, he seeks out rare words, some of which remain peculiar to himself in the New Testament; and of these some were characteristic of him at one stage of his life and in one letter. Now, if one turns to the Pastorals one finds many such lists of qualities and characteristics. The subject lends itself to them. There also many of the words are rare, and found only once in the New Testament, or found only in one Epistle, or confined to that stage of Paul’s life when he was writing the Pastorals. It was a Pauline characteristic to be an innovator and experimenter in a certain class of philosophic moral terms. This philosophy he was expounding to the world in terms that would be generally intelligible. The fact that the author of the Pastorals is an innovator and experimenter in language is no proof that he was not Paul, but rather affords psychologically a presumption that he was Paul, because he shares with Paul a certain deep-seated character. The Pastoral Epistles cannot be omitted from our estimate of Paul without sacrificing much of the many-sided character of the great Apostle.

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