02. Principles of Eastern Regal Government

Principles of Eastern Regal Government

Chapter I As the conditions of kingly power and the usages of royal courts in the east are, in all essential respects, the same now as they were in ancient times, it has seemed that the description of an oriental government and court would supply not only an interesting subject of contemplation in itself, but would incidentally furnish much information, illustrating the numerous allusions to regal functions and usages which the sacred Scriptures contain. When the Israelites rebelled against God in becoming weary of the form of government under which they had lived to the time of Samuel, their avowed desire was to have a king to judge them like the nations, 1 Samuel 8:5. The prophet on whom they urged this demand, concerned that they should not be ignorant of this kind of government, explained to them “the manner of the king that should reign over them,” if they had one such as they desired. The picture which he gives is in all respects that of eastern monarchy at the present day, and as it has existed in all ages. And when the Hebrew state actually became a monarchy, we are at no loss to discover that the form of government, and the customs of the court, gradually, but rapidly, acquired that character which the prophet had, by anticipation, assigned to it—a character of as much conformity as the free habits of the people and the restrictions of the law allowed, to the aspects in which sovereign power and royal life appeared in other countries. It had, indeed, more conformity than these limitations suggest; for many of the Hebrew kings gave no great heed to the restrictions which the law of Moses imposed; and that due regard was not always paid to the free habits of a people trained up in the independence of pastoral life, and under the influences of a theocratic commonwealth, may be seen by the public discontents which embittered the last years of Solomon, and which produced a revolution after his death, under whom the Hebrew court was brought into complete approximation to the standard oriental character. But the Scriptural indications of regal customs and ideas are not confined to those which the thrones of Israel and of Judah offer. Many regalities of Syria and Arabia are brought under our notice, and we are introduced to the great courts of Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, and Persia, many very remarkable customs of which are historically produced. Taking all these portions together, the matters pertaining to kings and courts occupy a considerable part of the sacred volume, which, if from extent alone, is fully entitled to the degree of illustration which may be given to it from a survey of the Court of Persia. The writer has made choice of it for several reasons. The Scripture itself—in the books of Ezra, Nehemiah, and Esther—furnishes more ample accounts of the customs of that court than of any other not of Israel. It is the only ancient court mentioned in the Bible which subsists to this day. Notwithstanding great changes of dynasty and of religion, it has preserved the substance of all its ancient usages. On these and other grounds it may, therefore, seem better suited than any other to suggest such parallels and analogies as may help to the better understanding of those portions of the sacred books which speak of kings and courts. The more eastern realms might afford many interesting illustrations; but climates and products more different from those of Palestine, acting upon institutions and habits of life, prevent them from supplying the same body of illustration as Persia; and, on the other hand, the Ottoman Porte has been more exposed to change, and to the operation of external influences, and although it exhibits many analogous customs derived from the common oriental type, there are none of them which the Persian court does not also offer, while the latter has a great number of peculiarly illustrative usages of its own, which are not to be found in the court of the grand seignior. In turning to this subject, it will not be felt necessary to confine our notice to the modern court of Persia. Such of its ancient historical customs as may serve to illustrate any Scriptural intimations will also be produced, and it will be desired to realize the two-fold result of giving a complete picture of an eastern court, and of illustrating many portions of the sacred volume. In Persia, as in all the other great kingdoms of the east, the person of the sovereign, whether contemplated in ancient or modern history, presents itself as the central point around which everything else revolves. This idea is expressed in the epithet of honor which is very commonly used in addressing the Persian king, Kibla-e-Alem, which some render, “center of the universe,” and others, “point of the world’s adoration.” Neither conveys the exact idea of the term, though both sufficiently express it. Kibla is the point to which the Mohammedans turn when they pray,^[1] and Alem is “the world.” According to the notions of the east, the king is regarded not merely as the ruler of the people, but as the master and proprietor of the land and lives of all.

[1] That is, towards Mecca, or rather the Kaaba, or temple in that place, just as the Jews, in all the countries of their dispersion, turn their faces towards the site of the temple at Jerusalem. On this principle are founded most of those peculiarly Asiatic institutions which, at times, seem all but incomprehensible to Europeans, living in the undisturbed enjoyment of personal freedom and of the rights of property. On the other hand, any different conditions of kingly power are more than equally unintelligible to the Asiatics. Often did the English ambassadors strive to instill into the mind of a late intelligent king of Persia, some notion of the power and action of the limited monarchical institutions under which we ourselves live, and he appears to have studied hard to understand it. At times, he seemed to have a glimpse of the meaning of particular parts, but it does not appear that he was ever able to view it in its breadth, or to grasp its whole scope and significance. So far as he could comprehend it, it seemed to be a kind of utopian theory of government, which might work well somewhere, as he was assured that it did but which was wholly unsuited to the east. On one occasion he said to sir Harford Jones, “I can easily conceive how a country, under such regulations as you state England to be, may do all you say; but I have no idea, if I were to attempt tomorrow to do such things here, how we should all live, or how there would be any government at all. Supposing I were to call a parliament at Tehran, and deliver up to it the whole power of taxation, I should then never get a penny, for no Persian parts with his money unless he is obliged to do it; and more than that, the khans^[2]would be for making the buckalls^[3] pay all, and the buckalls would be for doing the same by the khans. It must take a long time to make such a government and such a people as yours. Our government is simple, and the people know all about it in a day. Our laws are much simpler than yours, and so far they are better; and I know, by experience, that under these laws, and under this government, Persia has improved very much since I came to the throne.”

[2] Nobles.

[3] Burgesses. In this statement there was much truth, and rather less error than might have been expected. The simplicity and intelligible nature of the theory of Asiatic government must be admitted. Nothing can be easier for a man to understand, than that the king is lord of his life and of all that belongs to him; that whatever he exacts must be yielded; and that his commands are laws which must at all hazards be obeyed. It may be, also, that the king was right in thinking absolute government best suited to oriental countries. The general tendency of all oriental history is to impress that conviction, and to show that the utmost political aspiration of the oriental mind is not to establish certain rights, and to set them by public law above the breath of kings but to have for the time being a good master, vested with absolute powers. Whether this arises from the influence of climate and the religion, or from some peculiarity in the eastern mind, it may be hard to say: but the fact seems indisputable, that the Asiatic likes to have a mighty master, and while that master rules well, no exertion of power seems exorbitant or improper. May it please God, in his good pleasure, to hasten that happy time when the nations of the east, no less than of the west, shall be subject to that great King—a man of sorrows once, too wise to err, too kind to injure—too mighty to be gainsaid—whose rule must hereafter extend “from sea even to sea, and from the river even to the ends of the earth;” and under whose beneficent dominion the free man of the west may find something far better than his liberty, and the bondman of the east something far better than the best despotism he knows! Happy they who labor devoutly in his cause, and who stand listening to catch the first sound of his chariot wheels!

Power of all kinds is too dear to the heart of man not to be highly prized. Even good men seek it for the good it may enable them to effect. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at, that, in the conversation recorded above, the king of Persia thought his own condition of power better than any other. That he considered it best for him as a king, best for purposes of government, is clear, and it is probable, though not stated, that he thought it best for his people. It is more extraordinary that the people should be of the same opinion. Their idea of a strong government and of a good reign is, that the king should be powerful; and in their histories and songs they bestow their highest praise, not upon kings clement and merciful, but upon those who are severe in judgment, swift in vengeance, and strong to strike the mightiest wrong-doers down. But there is nothing strange that comes to be thoroughly explained and understood. The power of the king, so absolute to smite the highest in the land, and which is seldom felt in its direct operation but by the nobles and others about the court, is a tower of strength to the great body of the people, who find in that their only refuge against the tyrannies and oppression of the governors of provinces and cities, and their subordinate officers. The only check upon them is in the dread that complaints carried to the throne should excite attention, and bring down swift judgment upon them—a powerful eastern king being seldom unwilling to win popularity by an act of summary judgment upon a great officer or provincial governor, especially as, in that case, the royal treasury will be enriched by the confiscation of whatever wealth his rapacious exactions may have accumulated. The people generally, therefore, exult and glory in the absolute power of their king. Under the present system, the weakness and impotence of the sovereign would be the strength of the great lords who rule the provinces, and who, if left unchecked by the superior force of a despotic imperial authority, would, for their private advantage, grind the people to powder by their exactions. It would not, therefore, be satisfactory to any oriental realm that the power of the crown should be in any degree diminished, unless it were cut off from all the numerous governors and exactors who administer the real business of government. It is not enough to say, that all this secondary power is derived from the crown, and would fall if that of the sovereign were diminished. This might, indeed, be true in some countries, as in Turkey, but not in Persia, among whom the chiefs of the tribes, like the princes of the tribes in Israel, exercise an inherent authority, not derived from the crown, and which would exist were all the powers of the monarch extinct.

It may be well to recommend to consideration, whether the expressions applied to the royal power and the kingly character in the Scriptures are not very much in accordance with these intimations. The expressions are too numerous to quote; but many will occur to the minds of most of our readers, who will seek in vain for any passages of a contrary tenor. The following may be referred to in illustration:—2 Samuel 8:15; Psalms 82:1-4; Psalms 101:4, etc.; Proverbs 16:14-15; Proverbs 19:12; Proverbs 20:2; Proverbs 25:6-7; Proverbs 29:2-4; Proverbs 29:12; Proverbs 29:14; Proverbs 29:26; Ecclesiastes 8:4; Ecclesiastes 10:4; Ecclesiastes 10:20; Isaiah 3:1-3; Isaiah 3:9; Isaiah 3:11; Isaiah 7:2; Jeremiah 22:1-3; Jeremiah 22:15-17; Ezekiel 22:27; Micah 3:1-3; Micah 3:9; Micah 3:11; Micah 7:3; Zechariah 7:9. The condition of the king among the Hebrews was, however, somewhat peculiar, and was more favorable than that of others to the liberties and happiness of the people. The full idea of kingly power was the same as in other Asiatic states; but among them that power was, as it were, divided, and the human monarch was excluded from some of its most important functions. Jehovah himself was the true King of the Hebrew people; and he claimed and exercised—directly or by his ministers—all the functions belonging to that character, some of which are indeed such, as could only be safely exercised by unerring wisdom and, almighty strength. The legislative function He had exercised through Moses, giving to the nation laws which were intended to be in force as long as the nation existed. It was He who was the Supreme Proprietor of the land, and in that character he had ordered its distribution among the families of Israel, from whom it could not be alienated; and a rent was paid, in the shape of tithes and first-fruits, which went for the maintenance of the public worship and of the ministers of religion. Thus, when the Israelites would have a human and visible king, he had been anticipated, as it were, in the legislative function, and found laws which were as binding upon him as upon his people. The land was already appropriated, and he could exercise no fights over that which formed the most substantial property of his subjects. We see how this acted in the case of Ahab, who could not possess himself of the vineyard of Naboth, nor compel that person to sell it, or take an equivalent for it, and obtained it at last only when his infamous wife, Jezebel, had procured the conviction of the owner for blasphemy, whereby his estate became forfeited, it would seem, to the crown. With this fact may be compared the anecdote of the Persian king, Nou Shirwan, surnamed the Just, which shows how the absolute theoretical right of the Persian monarchs over the property of their subjects was limited, practically, by the sense of justice and policy. A Roman ambassador, who had been sent to the court of this king, at Ctesiphon, with rich presents, was admiring the noble prospect from the windows of the royal palace, when he remarked an uneven piece of ground, and asked the reason why it was not rendered uniform. “It is the property of an old man,” said a Persian noble, “who has objections to sell it, though often requested to do so by our king; and he is more willing to have his prospect spoiled than to commit violence.” “That irregular spot,” the Roman replied, “consecrated as it is by justice, now appears to me more beautiful than all the surrounding scene.”

Limited by pre-existing institutions, it is clear that a Hebrew king could only reign rightly as the vicegerent or chief executive officer of the Divine King; and, accordingly, we find, in the history of the realm, that the kings are subject to blame or praise accordingly as they neglected or acted upon the principles of this their subordinate position. Yet the difference in theory, though very great, seems to have been, practically, less considerable than this statement may seem to intimate. This may best be shown by looking at the kingly power of Persia in its threefold character—as legislative, as judicial, and as executive.