50 - 1Jn 3:19-20
Καὶ ἐν τούτῳ γινώσκομεν ὅτι ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐσμέν. καὶ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ πείσομεν τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν, ὅτι ἐὰν καταγινώσκῃ ἡμῶν ἡ καρδία, ὅτι μείζων ἐστὶν ὁ Θεὸς τῆς καρδίας ἡμῶν, καὶ γινώσκει πάντα.
There is certainly in the following words an advance in the thought: this is clear on the first glance. But wherein the progress consists, and how these verses are therefore related to what goes before, cannot be decided at the outset. Expositors are so divided as not to know whether the passage refers to forgiveness or condemnation, whether brotherly love or ποιεῖν τὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”] is the subject; and this division shows the importance of considering the expressions in detail before we can gain even a preliminary point of view whence to understand the whole connection.
First of all we must settle the readings, which itself will be a great gain for the exposition. The καί [“and”] beginning 1Jn 3:19 is indeed wanting in many influential manuscripts, especially Codex A and Codex B; but it is otherwise extremely well attested. The decision as to its genuineness would be really important only if on it depended the answer to the question whether 1Jn 3:19 introduces an altogether new thought, or is connected with what precedes. But the καί [“and”] has no such critical weight as this: certainly 1Jn 3:19 does spring from the preceding words, as ἐντούτῳ [“by this”] in the beginning shows, which must necessarily be referred to them. For otherwise, if ἐντούτῳ [“by this”] is to be referred to the following ὅτι [“that”], the condensed statement would be simply, we may know our εἶναι ἐκτοῦΘεοῦ [“to be of God”] by this, that God is greater than our heart. But it is plain that the proposition taken in this general way proves too much, and therefore nothing. Laid down thus, and without any cautionary guards, it might be used to demonstrate that even the υἱὸςτῆςἀπωλείας [“son of perdition”] is of the truth. But if the substance of the ἐντούτῳ [“by this”] is what precedes, and the connection of our verse with the foregoing is held fast, then it is a matter quite irrelevant whether the καί is or is not read in the beginning of the verse. Similarly, it is of little moment whether we read γινώσκομεν [“we know”] or γνωσόμεθα [“we will know”]. As to the internal grounds, the genuineness of the present tense may be argued from the probability that copyists, having before them the future immediately following, πείσομεν [“we will persuade”], which is co-ordinated with the γινώσκομεν [“we know”], would be likely to change this latter also into a future through mere lapsus memoriae; while, on the other hand, that the future γνωσόμεθα [“we will know”] was the original reading, might be argued from the fact that the phrase or turn ἐντούτῳ γινώσκομεν [“by this we know”] is so current with St. John that the transcribers would naturally choose to write it. If internal reasons are to decide, we must judge by the strength of the evidence as it appears to us; and the future seems more likely to have been the primitive reading. The two futures, γνωσόμεθα [“we will know”] and πείσομεν [“we will persuade”], are then to be explained, not so much from the cohortative tone of the section (“we should know,” and so on), but in their strictly logical sense, as deduction from the conditions laid down by the apostle to be at once explained: “under these suppositions shall we, as a necessary result, know.” Finally, it is of no importance whether at the end of 1Jn 3:19καρδίας [“heart”] or καρδίαν [“hearts”] is to be read, but the former is to be preferred. On the other hand, everything depends on our striking out, or otherwise, the second ὅτι [“that”] in 1Jn 3:20, that before μείζων [“greater”]. But it happens that here we have good grounds, both external and internal, for decision. While the external testimonies are in favour of keeping it, we can much more easily understand that the transcribers, taking it as purely epanaleptic, left it out, than that they inserted it where it was not, since its insertion has greatly embarrassed the passage.
Let us now proceed to the exposition itself. After what has been discussed we may assume that ἐντούτῳ [“by this”] looks back to what has just preceded, and there its meaning is plain enough: it is the true and inward brotherly love to which it refers as the ground of the γινώσκειν [“to know”]. We have perceived that the design of the whole section from 1Jn 2:28 onwards has been to exhibit the demonstration of divine sonship in work as its sure criterion. First, there was a requirement of ποιεῖν τὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”] as it respects God; then it was shown that the lack of this gives birth to hatred towards brethren; and conversely, that love to brethren gives sufficient evidence of the ποιεῖν τὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”] as a character. Consequently the inference is a sound one, that true brotherly love, as demanded in 1Jn 3:18, gives assured evidence (ἐντούτῳ γινώσκομεν [“by this we know”]) of the right relation to God. Here, however, this is not, as before, described as εἶναι ἐκτοῦΘεοῦ [“to be of God”], but as εἶναι ἐκτῆςἀληθείας [“to be of the truth”]. Primarily, we may suppose, because so much prominence had just been given to truth and semblance. We must love ἐν ἀληθείᾳ [“in truth”], and only when we do this are we ἐκτῆςἀληθείας [“of the truth”]. But, further, this expression probably was intended to indicate that only in virtue of the consciousness that we are of the truth can we have tranquillity in thinking of the divine judgment. He who is Himself the truth must acknowledge those as His who by genuine brotherly love approve themselves as ἐκτῆςἀληθείαςὄντες [“being of the truth”]. This position of confident assurance as in regard to God, the apostle expresses by the words, ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ πείσομεν τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν [“we will persuade our hearts before him”].
There is a controversy about the meaning of the πείθειν [“to persuade”]. If we translate it “persuade to something,” it may be asked what it is that we persuade our hearts to accept. The omission of the object itself would not be so strange; but in the present connection nothing has been spoken of to which we might be supposed to persuade our hearts; for the brotherly love which had been the matter of discourse is taken for granted in our verse (ἐντούτῳ[“by this”]), and we have no need to persuade ourselves of that. Moreover, it is not to be denied that “to persuade our heart to anything” is very artificial; it would come to this in the end, that we are supposed to form some purpose: but it is obvious that it would be extremely forced to describe that by πείθειν τὴνκαρδίαν [“to persuade hearts”]. Besides this one, there are two other significations of πείθειν [“to persuade”] which are suggested: “convince” and “soothe.” Now here again we have, in respect to the former of these, the same difficulty of finding an object concerning which we are thought to convince ourselves. The most obvious course would then be to take the clause ὅτι μείζων ἐστὶν ὁ Θεὸς τῆς καρδίας ἡμῶν [“for God is greater than our heart”] as this object. And the preliminary inquiry must be the reference and meaning of the second ὅτι [“that”] in 1Jn 3:20, which must be decided before we can decide the other point. This may be understood as either a causal particle (because) or as defining the object (that). Let us begin with the second of these possibilities. In that case the ὅτι [“that”] would introduce the objective matter of the πείθειν [“to persuade”]; and it would be declared concerning what we τὴνκαρδίαν πείσομεν [“we persuade the heart”]. Now, if we take πείσομεν [“we persuade”] with the meaning “convince,” we must translate: “we shall convince our heart of this, that God is greater than our heart.” But then it must not be forgotten that the proposition μείζων ὁ Θεὸς τῆς καρδίας ἡμῶν [“God is greater than our heart”] is so clear in itself, that there could be no necessity of our being in any manner persuaded of it. It might indeed be used as a premiss from which a conclusion should be drawn; but certainly not as a thesis which itself needed to be demonstrated. But, that being the case, on what principle should we here have to be convinced of it? Is it that the apostle looks back on the ἐντούτῳ[“by this”], so that in the consciousness of brotherly love we are supposed to penetrate to this assurance of God’s greatness? But what in all the world has brotherly love to do with the divine greatness and our conviction of it? Thus this translation is altogether untenable.
Now let us try the second possible interpretation, and take ὅτι [“that”] as defining the object; but taking πείθειν [“to persuade”] in the sense of “soothing or allaying.” Then the meaning would be: “we shall encourage our heart as to the fact that God is greater than it.” It is clear that in this case μείζων [“greater”] refers to the greater severity of God; for, in relation to His greater mildness, we should not need any special solace. But then again it would be incomprehensible how this soothing should take effect: however conscious of brotherly love we might be, the simple thought of the greater severity of God must needs make every such solace impossible. To this must be added that, even if we admit the meaning of soothe or solace to be right generally (of which hereafter), yet πείθειν [“to persuade”] with this meaning is always used absolutely, never with on following it; that at least “comfort concerning” must be expressed. Thus it is perfectly impossible to understand the clause with ὅτι [“that”] as objective; and we are forced to revert to the causal meaning of the ὅτι [“that”]. But then it becomes impossible to translateπείθειν [“to persuade”]as convincing of something. For if, as we have shown, we do not find the object of theπείθειν [“to persuade”]in the clause with ὅτι μείζων [“because greater”],there is generally none to be found. Yet some such objective is peremptorily necessary if we take the meaning “to persuade or convince:” we must be convinced of something. The question then arises, whetherπείθειν [“to persuade”]may not have a meaning which will allow its being without a substantial object after it. Such a meaning would be the “soothing” already mentioned, if only it can be defended on other grounds. Classical Greek is supposed to furnish many instances in its favour; but in most of the cases (especially those out of the Iliad,1.100,9.112, 181, 386) this signification is at least not obligatory, since the connection allows us to translate “persuade,” the object of the per suasion being invariably supplied in the context. On the other hand, the passage cited in Plato,de Rep. iii.390, probablyHesiodic,seems to us to establish the meaning of “soothe:” δῶρα θεοὺςπείθει, δῶρ’ αἰδοίους βασιλῆας [“Giftspersuadegods, gifts
Accordingly, as we cannot take the ὅτι [“that”] opening 1Jn 3:20 as a causal particle, it only remains that we take it as a relative, and resolve ἐάν [“if”] into the simple ἄν.fn Certainly the combination ὅστιςἐάν [“if whatever”], ὅ,τιἐάν [“if that which”] is not frequent; indeed, it is very remarkable that it is not found uncontradicted in any passage of the New Testament. Yet the reading ὅ,τιἐάν [“if that which”] seems to us secure enough in Gal 5:10 and Col 3:17, where the preponderant probability is in favour of retaining the ἐάν [“if”], though even the two other passages, Acts 3:23;[N]Col 3:23;[N] must be struck out. The interpretation of the ὅτι ἐάν [“if that”] in this manner in our passage is not only demanded by the sense, but it is grammatically admissible; since καταγινώσκειν [“to condemn”] elsewhere occurs with the accusative, not to say that the pronoun even with such verbs as generally require other cases may stand in the accusative. Moreover, the generalizing ὅ,τιἐάν [“if that which”], instead of the usual ὅἐάν [“if that”], is here peculiarly appropriate; for it expresses the idea that in all instances in which our hearts may happen to condemn us, we may solace them. The two verses under consideration might therefore be thus translated: “Herein, by this love ἐν ἔργῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ [“in deed and truth”], rests our consciousness that we are of the truth; and hereby (the ἐντούτῳ [“by this”] belongs also to πείσομεν [“we will persuade”]) may we soothe our hearts, in all cases in which our heart condemns us (that here the singular καρδία [“heart”] enters is very refined: each heart has its own particular accusations, and the individual is in the apostle’s view), for God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things.”
After all this, we have only as yet busied ourselves about the mere vesture of St. John’s thought: we have now to look at the very thought itself. Two things the apostle takes for granted: one, in theἐντούτῳ[“by this”]of1Jn 3:19, that we have brotherly love; the other, in the clause onὅτι ἐάνκαταγινώσκῃ κ.τ.λ.[“that if it condemns, etc.”],that in some measure our hearts reproach us. According to the explanation given, we are supposed to have, in the consciousness of brotherly love, the means whereby we may allay the reproaches of our conscience. But this thought is, as it appears, quite an alien one to the Christian sentiment. The accusations of my heart certainly can have reference only to sins and thesinfulnessof which I know myself to be a partaker: concerning that, am I supposed to take comfort simply in this way, and in this way alone? and if so, could that consolation lie in the possession of brotherly love? does not this lead to the most superficial and vapid Rationalism ?The Apostle James says that he who keeps the whole law, and yet sins in one particular, is guilty of the whole law. Does not St. John here say the very opposite: if you only keep the commandment of brotherly love, you may leave all else behind you with confidence? Not in any work wrought by us, but in the blood of Christ or the grace of God we are accustomed to see the only genuine ground of our hearts’ pacification. But it is God who comes primarily into view here; for the wordsμείζων ἐστὶν ὁ Θεὸς τῆς καρδίας ἡμῶν [“God is greater than our heart”]can, according to the interpretation given above, be brought into consideration only as the ground that justifies our taking comfort to our hearts. Consequently the much-contested question, whether theμείζων[“greater than”] refers to the condemning severity of God or His pardoning kindness, is made easy at the very outset: having become convinced thatπείθειν [“to persuade”] must be understood in the sense of “soothe,” and ὅτι [“that”] with a causative signification, it is clear that the clause ὅτι μείζων[“that greater than”] must, as containing matter of consolation, exhibit not the greater strictness of God, but His greater tenderness. For the sake, however, of the deep importance of the matter itself, and to become still more convinced of the soundness of our interpretation, let us look at the other way of taking the μείζων ὁ Θεὸς [“God is greater than”].Referring it to the greater severity of God, we must make the meaning of the verse this: we condemn ourselves, God will much more condemn us. There would then be found a contrast between the subject-ideas, God and we; but the predicate would apply to both, though it may be in a different degree: both condemn. But such an antithesis as this is assuredly not supported by the arrangement of the words: the wordsὁΘεὸς [“God”] and καρδίαἡμῶν [“our heart”]have by no means any emphasis on them—rather come in among different ideas. Observing the καταγινώσκῃ [“it condemns”],placed first in the subordinate clause, this might appear to be the strength of the antithesis; and then the condemnation would require to have a non-condemnation set over against it. Further, the view ofὅ,τιἐάν [“if that which”]as a relative, which we have established, would not so well harmonize with the end of the verse,γινώσκειπάντα [“he knows all things”],on any other principle of interpretation. For, that we thereby come to the persuasion that God is greater than our heart, in the matter of its condemnation, is not logically and strictly demonstrated by the proposition that Godknowethall things, but by the proposition that He more fully knows the thing in question. Of course it may be said against that, that this is naturally included in theγινώσκειπάντα [“he knows all things”];but there would be a certain inconcinnity, nevertheless. We therefore adhere to the conclusion thatμείζων[“greater than”]must be understood to exhibit the greater gentleness of God. The gentleness of God is not regarded as absolutely and in all matters a valid ground of consolation; but it is such as based upon His omniscience(γινώσκειπάντα [“he knows all things”]).Thus, if our conscience condemns us, we can find solace for ourselves only if we have made ourselves worse than we really are, or thought ourselves more entirely sundered from God than is actually the case,—than could indeed actually be the case, since God knows everything. Notwithstanding the accusations of our heart, we are not altogether rejected of God; we are ἐκτῆςἀληθείας [“of the truth”] and can determine that we are so. But in what way? ἐντούτῳ[“by this”],by the fact of our having brotherly love in deed and in truth. When we measure ourselves by the terms of the whole previous section, especially from1Jn 3:1-10, we must see that we are wanting in the first token ofsonship,theποιεῖν τὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”]:our heart condemns us on that account, because we find much unrighteousness still clinging to our lives. Now we perfect the self-judging, in the way the apostle has taught us; and place ourselves in the position of the last day; and recognise that we cannot stand before God,—that, measured by so strict and absolute a standard, we are not yet altogether withdrawn from the sphere of darkness. But, so long as we live below, we shall never attain to any such maturity as to fix us absolutely on the one side of the religious alternative; we are yet in the process of a development, in the course of a conflict between light and darkness; and it is essential to the idea of such a struggle that the territory contended about belongs not altogether either to the one or to the other of the several powers. In other words: though we must day by day measure ourselves by the standard of the goal set before us, theοὐδύναταιἁμαρτάνειν [“not able to sin”].we may, on the other hand, know where in the course we are now found; we must needs be assured whether or not we have made a good beginning towards the final victory. This is the question considered and determined in the present verse.
1Jn 3:19 and the following contain a summary of what goes before; but only in a preliminary way. The question was about the παῤῥησία [“boldness”] on the day of judgment: if we would know whether that will be ours or not, we must judge ourselves according to our works. If on such a judgment our heart does not condemn us, we have already now, and already here, the parrhesia: that is the substance of 1Jn 3:21. But if—and this is the other possibility—our hearts condemn us, we being not as yet conscious of the δικαιοσύνην [“righteousness”], what then? is the question of 1Jn 3:20. The confidence or parrhesia of a period and secure trust we assuredly cannot, in any case have; but something less than this is possibly,—we may be joyful in hope if we have only made a good beginning, as evidenced by the required outward practice corresponding to the divine gift within. And this good beginning is brotherly love. It is the first and easiest commandment: for how can he who closes his heart against his brother (1Jn 3:17) love his God? It is the first stage and first test of the love of God. He who has this ἐν ἔργῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ [“in deed and truth”] will be able to conclude from his having it that there is the commencement of that love in him as the evidence of his fellowship with God; and even supposing him to be not for the moment conscious of it, God is greater and sees deeper: He knows this very beginning that may be concealed from ourselves. True, that in the absolute judgment of eternity no mere beginning will avail; there must be an entire and perfected holiness: thinking on this, we must evermore say that we have not yet attained. But it is, nevertheless, a great thing to know that we have at least made a beginning; for from that springs the confidence that ἐν ὑμῖν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν, ἐπιτελέσει ἄχρις ἡμέρας Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ [“he who began a good work in you will perfect it until the day of Christ Jesus”] (Php 1:6). And this very passage demands for the day of Christ the same that St. John demands in our Epistle, 1Jn 2:28: the perfection of religion. But it may be repeated, that the beginning of the good work itself inspires the hope that its completion will not be wanting at the last. Thus our verse (1Jn 3:20) contains the counterpart of that fearfully solemn doctrine of the judgment to which the apostle had led up in the previous verse; and, indeed, a necessary counterpart, since, unless we bring this also into prominence, the solemnity of the judgment might well lead us to despair.
But, that the consolation which the apostle now administers to those whom he had previously smitten is not sought, as in1Jn 2:1, in the remembrance of the propitiatory death and intercession of the Lord, has its reason in the bearing and motive of the whole section. The question in it is only of the confirmation of fellowship with the Lord,—a fellowship the existence of which must always and only be known by its fruits. As to the reality of my faith, the depth of my devotion to Him, I may deceive myself; I dare not base my security on my feeling; the energies and actings of faith alone give me a sufficient guarantee for my confidence. If these are found in an absolute degree, so that my heart no longer condemns me, then I have the perfectparrhesia;but if they are present in their beginnings only, in vigorous brotherly love, that affords me the consolation of knowing that as to my relation to God the way is fairly open before me. And the inference which I only thus deduce is naked and open before the eyes of Him whoπάντα γινώσκει [“he knows all things”]. Thus our verse takes its place in the unity of the chapter as a perfectly homogeneous constituent; and at the same time gives us additional security for the correctness of our interpretation of what goes before. In conclusion, we may turn our attention for a moment to the word καρδία [“heart”]. In express terms and by inference this word has been accepted as interchangeable with συνείδησις [“conscience”]. This latter word is, as we are aware, unknown to the Johannaean phraseology; for Joh 8:9 must not come into consideration, on account of its suspected genuineness. It might therefore be regarded as possible or probable that the apostle expressed the more special idea of the conscience by the more general one of the heart. But καρδία [“heart”] itself occurs comparatively seldom in St. John’s writings; in no case, however, with the meaning of conscience. It rather signifies, especially in those passages which are closely dependent on the Old Testament,—that is, in the Apocalypse (Rev 2:23[N]Rev 17:17, Rev 18:7), and in the citation of Joh 12:40 ff.,—the entire inner man, the interior of the nature, corresponding to the quite general לֵב [“heart”] In other instances of his use, it signifies particularly the life of feeling and sentiment, Joh 14:1, John 14:27, John 16:6, John 16:22. The only question then is, whether we may take it here in the latter of the senses just mentioned, or must needs limit it to the express idea of συνείδησις [“conscience”]. This term συνείδησις [“conscience”] itself occurs in the New Testament with a double application. One is in harmony with the classical συνειδός[LSJ] [“to be privy to”], as the knowledge of anything, especially of an action past: as in Heb 10:2, where συνείδησιςτῶνἁμαρτιῶν [“conscience of sins”] is simply the consciousness that my sin is a certain fact of the past, as is made quite clear by the parallel ἀνάμνησις [“remembrance”] of Heb 3:3. Similarly the ἀγαθὴσυνείδησις [“good conscience”] of Act 23:1,[N] which is simply the consciousness of the ἀγαθόνεἶναι [“being good”] of the past conversation. In this and similar passages συνείδησις [“conscience”] defines the moral judgment concerning the ethical position of a person, whether he is good or whether he is evil. On the other hand, St. Paul attaches to συνείδησις [“conscience”] a more abstract notion: it means the measure of moral discernment which is peculiar to any man,—that is, the consciousness of what is good and evil, not the consciousness of my being good or evil. So, for example, in Rom 2:15: the συνείδησις [“conscience”] of the Gentiles is not the judgment or verdict which they pronounce on their own conduct, but the moral consciousness, the moral discernment which belonged to them, out of which that verdict sprang. For, not until after the apostle had first ascribed to them generally such a theoretical knowledge does he in the clause τῶν λογισμῶν κατηγορούντων ἢ καὶ ἀπολογουμένων [“their thoughts alternately accusing or else defending them”] declare the sentence which they themselves pronounce upon their own concrete actions in virtue of that moral consciousness. So, too, in the first Epistle to the Corinthians it is plain we are not to understand by the συνείδησιςτῶν ἀσθενούντων [“those with a weak conscience” cf. 1Co 8:7,1Co 8:10], who would eat no sacrificed flesh, that they considered this particular thing as sin; the phrase indicates in general the weakness of their moral perception, which allowed them to detect sin, as in other things so in this. To be brief, συνείδησις [“conscience”] signifies first the abstract moral consciousness, which is quite independent of my own moral conduct, which may be very strong even in ethical wicked ness and very weak even in great moral earnestness; and, secondly, the judgment which I pronounce on my own deport ment as the result of this my moral discernment. It follows that, if we would make the word καρδία [“heart”] in our passage strictly parallel with συνείδησις [“conscience”], we must hang to the latter of the two meanings above, for the καταγινώσκειν[“to condemn”] is certainly an actus forensis. But it is also made plain how little the Johannaean ideas induce such a strict parallelization with those of St. Paul. They do not entirely coincide or cover each other; hence we do well to consider the καρδία [“heart”] as meant simply and generally of the inner man, in which inner man St. John does not so rigorously as St. Paul distinguish between the νοῦς [“mind”], the λογισμόι [“reasoning”], and theσυνείδησις [“conscience”]. footnotes Homer Illiad, Book 1
100 τότε κέν μιν ἱλασσάμενοι πεπίθοιμεν
100 thus we might propitiate and persuade him.
Homer Illiad, Book 9
112ὥς κέν μιν ἀρεσσάμενοιπεπίθωμεν
112 thus we might propitiate and persuade him
Homer Illiad, Book 9
181πειρᾶν ὡςπεπίθοιενἀμύμονα Πηλεΐωνα.
181 how he attempts to persuade the noble son of Peleus
Homer Illiad, Book 9
386οὐδέ κεν ὧς ἔτι θυμὸν ἐμὸνπείσει᾽Ἀγαμέμνων
386 not even so shall Agamemnon any more persuade my soul