J 03 Tlic Connection Adams Race
3. Tlic Connection of Adams Sin with that of the Race. To this inquiry different answers have been returned, the chief of which I shall endeavour to classify and state. They fall into two great classes, according as the effects of Adam s sin on his posterity are viewed as Natural or Penal.
(i.) Of the first there is
1. The Pelagian Hypothesis. This, though bearing the name of Pelagius (Morgan?), a British monk of the fifth century, found its most logical expounder and defender in Coelestius, a pupil and friend of Pelagius. According to this hypothesis, no evil result flows to Adam’s posterity from his sin, except that which is inseparable from their being born into a world in which sin and misery already are; there is no penalty to which they are exposed, no vitium oriyinis under which they suffer. 1
2. The Arminian or Remonstrant Hypothesis. According to this, Adam is only the remote source of that natural propensity to sin which all men exhibit, the immediate source being each man’s parents; so that sinfulness is pro pagated, from Adam just as any other disease, defect, or morbid quality might be, the connection of mankind with him being simply that of natural descent. Death also comes on all men from Adam, not as a penal infliction, but simply as a natural inheritance.
It is, however, hardly just to Arminius to connect this opinion with his name; for, so far as he gave utterance to his views on the subject, he seems to have held that the conse quences of Adam’s sin to his posterity were penal. " Original sin." says he, " is not that actual sin by which Adam trans gressed the law concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and on account of which we have all been constituted sinners, and rendered (ret) obnoxious or liable to death and condemnation." 2 But his followers of the Remonstrant party are very distinct in their announcement of the doctrine above imputed to them. Thus Limborch: " Mors ha>c non habet rationem pcenoe proprie dicta? in posteris; sed est naturalis tantum moriendi necessitas, ab Adamo, mortis pcena punito in ipsos derivata." " Effectum peccati Adami in posteris est impuritas qiuedam naturalis, qua? tamen non est peccatum
1 In the list of tenets for which Pelagius was condemned by the Council at Cartilage in 412, there are the following bearing on the subject before us. He taught, "Adanium mortalem factum, qui, sive peccaret sive non peccaret, fuisset moriturus; " that " peccatum Adse ipstmi solum Iresit, et non humanum genus ;" that "Infantes, qui nascuntur, in eo statu sunt in quo Adanius fuit ante prevaricatioiiem." It would appear that Pelagius himself thought his disciple went too far when he asserted that no harm had come to the race from Adam’s sin: " Ipse dicit non tantum prinio homini, sed etiam human o generi primum illud obfuisse peccatum, non propagine sed exemplo" (Augustine, DC Pecc. Orig. c. xv. ). He held, however, strenuously "ut sine virtute ita et sine vitio procrearnur, atque ante action em proprire voluntatis id solum in hominc est quod Deus condidit " (ibid. c. xiii.). See Boris’s Histor. Pelaf/iana, etc.; Wiggers, Versuch ein. Prarjmat. Darstelluny des Auyustinwmus und Pelagianismus; Neander’s Church History, 4:313-322, Eng. transl.
2 Works, by Nicholls, ii. 375, 717 proprie dictum; " and again, " fateraur infantes nasci minus puros quam Adamus fuit creatus, et cum quadam propensione ad peccandum: illam autem habent non tarn ab Adamo quam a proximis parentibus." ! Adam is thus only the remote source of man’s natural propensity to sin: to each man his parents are the immediate source, just as some remote ancestor may have introduced a disease into his family, but which afflicts each man only through his parents.
(ii.) The second class of answers which have been given to the question as to how Adam’s sin has become the source of sin to the race, embrace those who hold that the effects of his sin upon men are penal. These fall into two sub-classes, according as they retain or reject the doctrine of imputation.
1. We begin with the latter, under which we include the
(1.) View of some Socinians. For the most part, the Socinians hold the view of Pelagius on this subject; but some, and among them F. Socinus himself, hold that in consequence of Adam’s sin men are penally liable to death, not from any mortal effect in the sin itself, nor that man was created at first naturally immortal, but that in consequence of Adam’s sin his posterity have come penally under the actual power of death, to which naturally they are liable, but from which they would otherwise have been protected. 2
(2.) Identification Hypothesis. According to this, Adam s descendants are held to have been so identified with him that they sinned his sin, are guilty of his guilt, and fell in his fall. By some who use this language nothing more seems to be intended than that, as the apostle says, Levi paid tithes in Abraham, for he was in the loins of his father when Melchizedek met him; so the race sinned with Adam in the sense that they are involved in the consequences of his sin; and it may be doubted whether any of those who have spoken as if they meant to identify the race with Adam in
1 TheoL Christ., Bk. iii. c. iii. sec. 1, 4. See also Whitby, De. Imputations Peccati, and Comment, on Rom. v.; Adam Clarke, Comment, on Rom. v.
2 " Concludimus . ex peccato illo primi parentis nullam labem aut gravitatem universo generis human! necessario ingenitum esse, nee aliud malum exprimo illo delicto ad posteros omnes necessario manasse quam moriendi omnimodum necessitatem, non quidem ex ipsius delicti vi, sed quia cum jam homo natura mortalis est." F. Socinus, Prcelect. c. iv. Comp. Taylor, Doct. of Orig. Sin, Part I. pp. 51-55; Par. on Romans 5:12. his act of sinning, really intend their words to be taken for what they express. Their language, however, is such that we feel constrained to assign the opinion it utters a place in this scheme, and for want of a better name we have called it the Identification hypothesis.
" Manifestum est alia esse propria cuique peccata . aliud hoc unum in quo omnes peccaverunt, quando omnes ille unus homo fuerunt." 1 " Quia [Adam] . per liberum arbitrium Deum deseruit justinn judicium Dei expertus est, ut cum tota sua stirpe quo} in illo ad hue posita tota cum illo peccaverunt, damnaretur." 2 " Ut cum omnes posteri ex primo parente ceu ex radice ortum suum trahunt generis humani imiversitas cum stirpe non aliter quain unicum aliquod totum, sive unica massa considerari potest, ut non sit aliquid a stirpe diversum, et non aliter ab ea differunt posteri ac rami ab arbore. Exquibus facile patet quo modo stirpe peccante omne illud quod ab ea descendit et cum ea aliquod totum efficit, etiam peccasse judicari possit, cum a stirpe non differat sed cum ea unum sit." 3
(3.) Hypothesis of a Vitium Originis. In the opinion of many the effect of Adam’s sin on his posterity as a penalty was to poison, pollute, vitiate their moral nature, or so to injure it that the lower propensities became strengthened against the higher powers, and thus man enters the world not only a fallen, but a positively depraved being.
" Ille in quo omnes moriuritur proeter quod eis qui prseceptum Domini voluntate transgrediuntur imitationis exemplum est, occulta etiam tabe carnalis concupiscentise siue tabificavit in se omnes cle sua stirpe venientes." 4
Some, whilst they repudiate this notion, that a positively vitiated nature has been entailed on men by Adam’s sin, yet think that an increased susceptibility to evil has thence resulted in the race, or that his descendants have received such dispositions and affections as greatly incline them to yield to those inducements to sin in the world in which they are placed. ^ Some have gone the length of supposing the 1 Augustin, De Pecc. Mer. et Remiss., i. 11.
2 De Corrept. et Gratia, c. x.
3 Stapfer, TheoL Polem., i. p. 236.
4 De Pecc. Mer. et Remiss. , i. 9.
6 See Moses Stuart, Comment, on Romans 5:19 forbidden fruit possessed a lethiferous arid morally vitiating power, which has been transfused into the race by natural descent, and so has brought all under the power of depravity and death. 1
Having stated the various opinions on the connection between Adam’s sin and the race which has sprung from him, held by those who believe that the effects of that sin to men are natural, and by those who, though holding them to be penal, yet reject the doctrine of imputation, we now come to consider the views of imputation held by those who accept that doctrine.
2. The term Imputation, though of frequent use in sys tematic theology, like many other terms similarly employed, does not occur in Scripture. The cognate verb, however, is frequently used; and it is possible that the ideas intended to be conveyed by the term may be taught in Scripture, though the word itself is not to be found there. I propose therefore, in the first instance, to examine the usage of the verb in those passages in which it occurs, so as to obtain a just view of the ideas it is employed by the sacred writers to express; I shall then state the doctrine of imputation as held by systematic divines of different schools; and, in fine, I shall attempt to determine how far this doctrine is, in its various modifications, sanctioned and sustained by the word of God, the only sure criterion by which theological opinion can be tested, the Lapis Lydius by which alone any dogma can be proved genuine and precious.
(1.) The English verb "impute," in our version, is repre sented in the original texts principally by the Hebrew verb strn i n the O. T., and by the Greek verb Xoyi^o^ai in the LXX. and the N. T. In one passage (1 Samuel 22:15) where our version gives "impute," we have in the Hebrew a part of the verb Dib , " to put, place, or lay; " and with this verb, which frequently occurs elsewhere in similar connections where it is variously rendered in our version, we shall com mence our examination. Take the following instances :
Joshua 9:24, "their blood shall be laid upon Abimelech;"
Deuteronomy 22:8, " that thou bring not blood upon thine house; " ver. 17, "and he hath given occasion against her;" Job 4:18, 1 See Knapp’s Christian Theology, p. 239 if.
"and His angels He charged with folly." In all these passages, the meaning of the word, though it is differently translated, is substantially the same. Blood is laid upon a man when he is made to bear the blame of shedding it, and is dealt with accordingly; so blood is brought on a house when a fatal accident, occasioned by its being insufficiently built, is held to be equivalent to an intentional offence on the part of the proprietor, and he is consequently made to bear the blame and pay the penalty of such offence; occasion is given against a person when some thing is laid to his charge which involves blame and exposes to suffering as a penal consequence; and beings are charged with any defect or crime when they are held blameworthy, or unworthy of commendation on account of it, and are treated accordingly. These usages of the verb cib> in such connections all involve the same idea, that of holding a person to the penal or, at least, painful consequences of a certain act or state for which he is held to be blameworthy.
We may infer, therefore, that in the passage where the verb, with an exactly analogous construction in the original, is rendered in our version " impute," this term has probably the same signification. And so we find it to be. It is Abimelech who, addressing Saul in that passage, says in reference to David’s having been sheltered and aided by him, " Let not the king impute anything to his servant." The meaning plainly is, " Do not blame me and expose me to punishment for what has happened; " and the reason he assigns is, partly that he did not do what was laid to his charge, and partly that what he did for David was done in ignorance of his being in arms against Saul. To " impute," then, in this case is to adjudge blame to a man, and decree punishment on him for offences of which he is held to have been guilty; and not to impute is to exempt him from blame and punishment on the ground that he has either not committed the offence, or done it in such a way as to be morally blameless.
Let us now consider the usage of the verb 2K; n, which is commonly rendered in our version by " impute."
According to Ftirst, whose etymological renderings are usually very trustworthy, this word means primarily " to bind; " hence as all thought is a putting of two or more notions together so as to arrive at a judgment, it came to signify " to think," and so it is frequently used in Scripture.
Further, as all thought is a judgment, it came to denote the thinking, accounting, or declaring one thing to be another, a man to be so arid so, or to have such and such qualities or characteristics. Hence, by a natural transition, it came to express the attributing or imputing such to a man; then, attributing to a man that by which such qualities are caused or produced; and finally, by the treating of a man, to whom anything is imputed, accordingly. As illustrative of this class of usages we adduce the following instances: (1) Where it simply denotes the ascribing to a person of a certain quality or condition; 2 Samuel 19:19: "Let not my lord impute iniquity unto me," where Shimei, confessing what he had done against David, asks him not to ascribe to -him the iniquity of that conduct, but to pass him by and treat him as if his conduct had not been iniquitous. So also Psalms 32:2: " Blessed is the man to whom the Lord irnputeth not iniquity (ity & nirp ab ir &6)," i.e. to whom Jehovah does not ascribe iniquity for what he has done, so as to hold him guilty and liable to punishment. (2) Where it denotes the ascribing to a person of something that produces a certain quality, though that quality does not actually belong to him. Leviticus 17:4: " Blood shall be imputed unto that man; " i.e. The guilt which the shedding of blood causes shall be ascribed to that man; he shall be held guilty of murder, and treated accordingly, that man shall be cut off from among his people. Numbers 18:27: "And this your heave-offering shall be reckoned (imputed, ^ro) unto you as though it were the corn of the thrashing-floor, and as the fulness of the winepress," where the quality that would result from the presenting of the whole of the Israelites produce to God is held to belong to him, though he presents only a tithe of it as a heaveofYering; as it is afterwards expressed, " they shall bear no sin by reason of it, when they have heaved from it the best of it; " by offering this they were dealt with as if they had consecrated the whole. Under this head fall such passages as Genesis 15:6: "And he believed in God; and He counted it to him (imputed it to him, v njtt JT) for (or as) righteousness; " and Psalms 106:31 : " And that was counted unto him (Phinehas) for righteousness," etc. p npn ^{Tfh 6). These passages are best understood in connection with such a passage as Deuteronomy 6:25: "And it shall be our righteousness, if we observe to clo all these commandments before the Lord our God as He hath commanded us." Here is laid down a principle of the divine administration. The righteous Lord loveth righteousness, and will reward it. Now this righteousness is obtained normally by the keeping of His commandments. But in the case of Abraham his simple trust in God, and in the case of Phinehas his prompt and vigorous vindication of the divine authority, were held as tantamount to a meritorious obedience, and were consequently followed by the reward which God bestows on this. The Greek equivalent to 2^ n j’s \oyigo/j,ai, and by this term is the former rendered by the LXX. in all the passages I have quoted. In the 1ST. T. it occurs repeatedly in the writings of Paul. In Romans 4:3 we have a quotation of Genesis 15:6, and in the 8th verse of that chapter a quotation of Psalms 32:2. In the intermediate verses Paul repeatedly uses the verb \oyi^o^ai } and in our version it is sometimes translated " count," sometimes " reckon/ and sometimes " impute." The meaning, however, is in every case substan tially the same. The apostle is showing that justification is not of works but of grace, and he argues from the case of Abraham that it is so. Abraham had found righteousness with God. How? By works? No; for then would he have ground for boasting before God, inasmuch as there would then have been ascribed to him merit, and the reward would have been of right or debt, and not of favour. Abraham obtained righteousness, i.e. a legal, meritorious claim to bless ing, solely by favour; and how was this accomplished? By God’s taking an act of Abraham’s which had no legal merit in it whatever, and holding it as if it had, i.e. He gave Abraham blessing on the ground of what in itself gave him no title or claim to blessing. This Paul calls imputing righteousness to him; and in the same sense he explains David’s expression. His doctrine seems to be: Eighteousness entitles a man to blessing; but God, in order to deal graciously with man, who is destitute of righteousness, takes that which is not in itself righteousness, and holds it as equivalent in legal claim to righteousness, and on that ground gives blessing. So, on the other hand, when he speaks of God as not imputing sin, he plainly means that God does not ascribe to a man the quality or character which sin gives to a man, in other words, regards and treats him as if that quality did riot belong to him. Imputa tion is thus in Paul’s sense the ascribing to a man of a position, quality, or title to which he has no real claim; and nonimputation is the ignoring or non-recognition of a quality, liability, or character that does belong to him. The grounds of imputation and the effects of imputation may differ in different cases; but the fundamental idea of the thing itself is the same in all, and is such as I have just expressed.
Except for illustration, it is unnecessary to adduce such a usage of the verb as we have in 1 Corinthians 13:5, when the apostle says of Agape, " ov \oyl^eraL TO KCLKOV" The sense here is not as our verson gives it, " thinketh no evil," but " impute th no evil," i.e. does not ascribe to a man the quality of evil when that does not really belong to him as an evil doer; or does not treat an evil-doer as he actually deserves, does not hold his evil against him, but forgives it. This latter meaning seems the preferable one. It is that given by Chrysostom and Theodoret, and followed by Beza, Eiickert, Meyer, and others. It is undeniably in this sense that the apostle uses the verb in 1 Timothy 4:16, when, speaking of the conduct of some who had treated him unworthily, he says, " pi) avrols \oyia6eit)" " may it not be imputed to them," i.e. as our version gives it, "may this [their misconduct to me] not be laid to their charge; " may it not be held as attaching to them a quality such as shall bring penalty upon them. The only other word used in the N". T. besides \o^i^o^ai in the sense of " imputing " is e\\oyeco. This word, rarely used in the classics, occurs only twice in the apostolic writings, Romans 5:13 arid Philemon, verse 18. In the former, where Paul says, " Sin is not imputed when there is no law," we have the word used plainly in the same sense as that in which he uses Xoyl^o/jiai, in the 4th chapter: Whatever be a man’s conduct, the quality of guilt and consequent liability to penal consequences cannot be ascribed to him save where his conduct is a violation of law. In the latter passage the usage is somewhat different, and hence the passage is an important one for our present purpose. In writing to Philemon, Paul says (ver. 18), concerning Onesimus, "If he hath wronged thee, or oweth thee ought, put that on mine account (TOVTO e/uol eXXoiyet)." Here the meaning plainly is, " Let something belonging to him be ascribed to me, and exact of me the corresponding result, so that he may go free."
Xo stress can be laid on the fact that the verb here is a part of e\\o<ya), not of Xo^/foyatu, for the two are perfectly synony mous; or, if there be any difference, it can only be expressed thus, that while \oyL%o/jiai is used much more frequently than eXXo^e to, and used under different shades of meaning, eXXcyyeco is used only in the sense of imputing. That Paul regarded them as synonymous, the passage just cited from Romans 5:13 clearly shows.
Having collated and sifted our instances, we are now in circumstances to declare the sense in which the sacred writers speak of imputation or imputing. In the general, it means the ascribing to an individual of a certain quality, either involving exposure to a penalty or entitling to a privilege, as the case may be. More specifically, and in view of the grounds on which the ascription is made, it signifies one of three acts: (1) The act of ascribing to a man a quality which really belongs to him, on the ground that he is or has done something from which that quality accrues; or (2) The act of ascribing to a man a quality which does not belong to him, on the ground that be is or has done something which is held as equivalent to what would have conferred on him that quality; or (3) (in the singular case in the Epistle to Philemon) The act of ascribing to a man a quality which does not belong to him, on the ground that it belongs to another, and is transferred to the former from the latter for the advantage of the latter. These have been technically distinguished in various ways. The first has been called imputatio moralis, sive facti, because in it the actual doer of a deed is held to have done it sua spontc, and consequently to have merited the penalty or reward attached to it; whilst the second and third have been denominated in contradistinc tion from this imputatio regalis, sive juris, because in them a privilege is conferred or a penalty adjudged by a simple act of regal or rectoral administration. In the former case, also, it is said that the word imputation is taken improperly, i.e. out of its just meaning, whilst in the latter it is said to be used properly. On these distinctions of appellation, however, it does not seem necessary to dwell.
(2.) I pass on now, therefore, to the second branch of my inquiry, under which it was proposed to state the doctrine of imputation as held by systematic divines. This will be best elicited by viewing it in connection with those special cases to which they have applied the term " imputation." a. Theologians speak of the imputation of Adam’s sin to his posterity, the race of mankind as such. Thus, to begin with the divines of the Lutheran Church, Hollaz says: " The first sin of Adam . is imputed for blame and penalty to all his posterity truly, and by the just judgment of God." 1
Quenstedt says: " The fall of Adam, meaning thereby precisely his transgression in the matter of the forbidden tree, becomes ours by imputation alone." " Reinhard sums up the doctrine of the older Lutheran Church as follows :
" The imputation of Adam’s sin to his posterity is that judgment of God by which Adam’s first sin is turned to the faultiness of all men." 3 By most later divines of the Lutheran Church the dogma is repudiated. So Doderlein, Reinhard, Hahn, Bretschn eider, Wegscheider, Arnmon, etc. In the Reformed Church the doctrine has found almost universal acceptance. Calvin, both in his Institutes and in his Commentaries, repeatedly asserts it: " All can become guilty by the sin of one," says he, " only by the imputation of that sin. M Beza says on Romans 5:12: "The apostle is treating in this passage of the propagation of guilt, in contrast with which the imputation of the obedience of Christ is set forth. Hence it follows that that guilt which precedes corruption is by the imputation of Adam’s disobedience; as the remission of sins and the abolition of guilt is by the imputation of the obedience of Christ." Zanchius: " We 1 Exam. Theol., etc.
2 Theol. Didact. ii. 53.
3 Dogmatik, 81. Instit., ii. 1. say that that disobedience of Adam which was not ours in act yet as to the fault and guilt, became ours by imputation." J Turretine: " The question is whether the actual sin of Adam is so imputed in reality to all that on account of it they are held guilty, or at least are deemed deserving of punishment." Marckius: " The cause of this corruption is the fault of Adam imputed to his posterity, as it is said in one all have sinned, and by the disobedience of one have many been constituted sinners." The following passage from Dr. Payne sets forth very clearly the doctrine on this subject held by many modern divines: " The imputation of Adam’s sin to the race is not otherwise to be regarded than as the legal visitation upon the race of the consequences of that sin." 4 b. Theologians speak of the imputation of our sins to Christ, and of His righteousness to us. By the former, they mean that Christ, though Himself sinless, was regarded and treated as if He had committed the sins of the human race; and by the latter, they mean that we are regarded as having ourselves fulfilled the law and endured the penalty of sin, in consequence of Christ having done so. I shall quote here only the statement of Turretine: " Paul says that Christ was made sin for us, that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him, i.e. as the sins whereby we have violated the law are imputed to Christ, so the actions of righteousness by which He fulfilled it for us are imputed to us." 5 This latter part of the subject he more fully states elsewhere thus :
" When, then, we say that the righteousness of Christ is im puted to us for justification, and that we, by that imputed righteousness, are just before God, . we mean nothing else than that the obedience of Christ, rendered to God the Father in our name, is so put to our account by God that it is really deemed ours, and that it is the one and sole righteousness on account of which, and by the merit of which, we are absolved from the guilt of our sins and obtain right to life." G These passages may suffice to show in what sense the term imputation is used by theologians. With them it means the 1 De Redemption e, i.
2 Loc. ix. qu. 9, 9.
3 Medulla, xv. 31.
4 On Original Sin, p. 126.
5 Loc. xiv. qu. 13, 21. 6 Ibid. xvi. <iu. 3, 9. ascribing to a person of a quality, with its attendant con sequences, beneficial or penal, which does not properly belongto him, and which he has done nothing directly to acquire, but which has been acquired by another and transferred to him.
It will be seen at once that there is a material difference between the sense thus attached to imputation and that in which it is commonly used in Scripture. In seeking to determine precisely this difference, it is necessary to keep in view the distinction between the ad of imputation and the (/round of imputation. In respect of the former, the imputa tion of theology does not essentially differ from that of Scrip ture; in both cases (save where the imputation is an imputatio fact I and as such impropriety it is an ascribing to a party of a quality which does not actually belong to him. But in respect of the hitter, the only instance in Scripture which bears analogy to the imputation of theology is that of Paul when he asks the debt of Onesimus to be imputed to him; and even this case is not wholly analogous, for the ground of imputation here is Paul’s voluntary susception on himself of the indebtedness of Onesimus, whereas in the cases sup posed by theologians, the ground of imputation is found in some extraneous arrangement or constitution existing indepen dent of the spontaneous volition of the parties. The imputa tion of man’s sins to the Saviour may seem an exception to this, inasmuch as He undertook that burden voluntarily; but it is only in appearance that this is an exception, for our Lord’s voluntariness, in this respect, is never represented in Scripture as siwntaneous, but always as a cheerful and rejoicing submission to the will, the scheme, the constituted plan of the Father.
(3.) We have now to inquire how far this theological doctrine of imputation is sanctioned in its doctrine by Scrip ture. We have seen that in form it has little or no sanction; but this does not prove that it is not really taught there, for a theological dogma may be substantially in Scripture, though the terms used to express it may not be found there at all, or found expressing something different. We have to ask now, then, not whether the word imputation, as used by theologians, is legitimately used by them, but whether the thing that word is used to express is in accordance with Scripture. And here I shall confine myself to the one point of the imputation to mankind of Adam’s sin, as that is the subject for the sake of which I have entered on this disquisition.
Theologians say that the first sin of the first man has been imputed to all his posterity: What do they intend this phraseology to convey? The answer to this question brings before us the existence of a diversity of doctrine among theologians on this head. By all who hold the doctrine of imputation in any sense, it is maintained that men universally are involved in the con sequences of Adam’s sin; but there is difference of opinion, both as to the nature of these consequences, and as to the ground on which the imputation of them to the race rests. As respects the consequences, some hold that it is merely the temporal consequences of Adam’s sin that have descended to his posterity; while others maintain that men are involved also and primarily in the spiritual consequences; and within the latter class opinions range from the holding that all men actually sinned in Adam, in the sense of being guilty of his sin and personally liable to all the penal consequences thereof, to the holding that only certain privative results have ensued to the race from Adam’s guilt, such as the want of positive righteousness, and of the advantages Adam enjoyed in Paradise for pursuing a holy and happy course. There are differences of opinion also as to whether the consequences to mankind of Adam’s sin are purely legal or purely moral, or a union of both; some contending that it is merely certain chartered blessings that we have lost, certain legal disadvantages under which we have been brought by the sin of Adam; others, that it is a moral vitiosity of nature that has been thereby entailed on us; and others, that through the sin of Adam all men have become both legally proscribed and morally corrupt.
Then, as to the ground of imputation, some find that in a federal constitution established by God, in which Adam represented and acted for the race, so that nil his posterity are involved in the consequences of his act on the juridical principle " quod cdiquis facit per alium facit per sc ;" whilst others resolve the ground of imputation into the natural con nection of Adam as the progenitor of mankind with his posterity, to whom he has transmitted character and condition by a natural and unavoidable process. In the above digest I have taken no notice of the doctrine of those who teach that God’s imputation to mankind of Adam’s sin is simply His determination to deal with all men who sin as He dealt with the author of the first sin; for this, though dignified by theologians with the title of Imputatio metaphysical, is in reality no imputation at all, but a mere evasion of the whole subject under a specious name. a. Disregarding minor and unessential differences, the theory of imputation as applied to the existence of sin in our race, emerges in two principal forms that of Imputatio ad rcatum, and that of Imputatio ad poznam.
(a.) Imputatio ad reatum. By this is intended that men, the descendants of Adam, are regarded by God as lying under guilt and blame because of Adam’s sin. This opinion does not necessarily involve what we may call the identification hypothesis, according to which all men are held to have been so identified with Adam that they sinned his sin, are guilty of his guilt, and fell in his fall. It may be doubted, indeed, whether any man ever really held this opinion as literally construed, for it seems impossible to attach to it any intelligible meaning. At the same time some very able writers have expressed themselves as if they not only held this view, but deemed the holding of it essential to a just appre hension of the whole scheme of evangelical truth. Augustine, for instance, fluctuates between this and the opinion that Adam’s sin reaches us not by imputation, but by the com munication of an " occult infection (or poison) of carnal con cupiscence," which leads all to sin; or rather, perhaps, I should say, Augustine held both opinions, regarding Adam’s sin as having not only vitiated our nature, but also entailed on us guilt. It is his doctrine on the latter of these alone that we are now concerned with, and here such statements as the following meet us in his writings: " Because he [Adam] in the exercise of his free will deserted God, he experienced the just judgment of God to be condemned with his whole race, which as yet lying wholly in him sinned with him." * What follows enunciates this view still more explicitly: " In whom 1 De Correptione et Gratia, 100:10.
[Adam] all have sinned, since all were that one man (omnes illc unus homo fuerunt*)." 3 The following is Stapfer’s statement of what he regarded as the orthodox doctrine on this head :
" The root having sinned, all that descends from it and with it constitutes one whole may also be judged to have sinned, since it is not different from the root, but one with it." 2 But by no one, perhaps, has this view been more strongly stated than by Mr. Haldane: " The sin of Adam," says he, " was ours, as really and truly so as it was the sin of Adam himself; so that every believer is bound to acknowledge and confess that he is guilty of Adam’s sin." 3
Under such extreme views the idea of imputation in its proper theologic sense disappears. It is no longer Adam s sin that is imputed to us but our own sin, in some mysterious way committed not by us but by our first parent, which is held against us. Of such a doctrine taken thus literally, it may suffice at present to say that such an identification of the race with the first man is in the nature of things impossible, that to affirm that Adam’s sin was ours in the same sense as it was his is simply absurd, and that to confess ourselves guilty of a sin which we know we did not commit, is alike contrary to reason and conscience, to truth and good morals.
Among the more reasonable upholders of the doctrine of the imputation of Adam’s guilt to his posterity this language is used to convey the idea that God, on account of Adam’s sin, holds all men as if they had themselves committed that sin, i.e. holds them guilty and deserving of punishment. Along with this it is also generally held that men, through this con nection with Adam, are universally partakers of a vitiated moral nature. This opinion is expressed thus in the Con fession of the Westminster Assembly: " Our first parents being the root of all mankind, the guilt of their sin was im puted, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature con veyed to their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation." This may be regarded as the prevailing opinion of modern Calvinists. This is what has been called Immediate Imputation, There is, however, a mediate imputation held by many excellent 1 DePeccat. Mer. et Remiss., i. 10.
2 Theol. Pokm., i. p. 236, 3 Comment, on Romans, vol. i. p, 440. writers, according to which man, inheriting from Adam a fallen and corrupt nature, commences his moral existence by appropriating to himself as it were, Adam’s sin, in other words, actually sinning in the same way as he sinned, by rebellion against God, and that all men thus incur the same guilt as he, and the same penalty as was pronounced on him. This opinion is advocated by Venema in his valuable Institutes of Theology (pp. 519-526). Dwight also favours it (Theology, Serm. 32).
Dr. "Wardlaw, who advocates the doctrine of immediate im putation, also advocates this as not incompatible with the other (Systematic Theology, ii. p. 267). The only remark which I would offer at present on this doctrine is, that whether it expresses a truth or not, it is improperly offered as being a form of the doctrine of imputation. Mediate imputa tion, as above explained, is no imputation at all in the sense in which that term is used by theologians. The whole amount of guilt and blame which it supposes to attach to any indi vidual is derived from his own sin, and his connection with Adam is adduced simply as accounting for the fact of his possessing a nature that leads him to sin. This is not in any sense the imputation to him of Adam’s guilt it is simply the accounting for his individual depravity, and ascribing that to his connection with the first man. The imputation of guilt necessarily involves the holding of the party in some sense as legally involved in the blame and punishment of the act, the guilt of which is imputed to him.
(&) Imputatio ad poenam. According to this view, God does not impute guilt to men on account of their first parents transgression, nor does He send men into the world with a positively vitiated nature, but He treats them penally in consequence of Adam’s sin, as if they had committed it, by withholding from them all those supernatural gifts and chartered blessings which Adam enjoyed, the consequence of which is that they, through the native operation of their own lusts and passions, fall under the power of sin, and so become personally guilty before God. This is the view advocated by Dr. Payne in his able work on Original Sin. According to him, Adam’s transgression " rendered us liable to the loss of that sovereign and efficacious influence without which life in either sense of the term has never been known to exist" (p. 108). In another place lie thus explains the phrase " chartered blessings," by which he describes the benefits which Adam lost by his sin: They are " blessings which God was not bound in equity to bestow and to continue, blessings which had their exclusive source in Divine Sovereignty, which might, of course, be withdrawn at any time, and in any way that should seem meet to God Himself, of which the continued and permanent enjoyment might be suspended on any conditions He should see fit to appoint "
(pp. 48, 49). This is substantially the view of Edwards, so tar at least as imputation is concerned; though he differs from Dr. Payne in holding with Augustine, that a positive vitiosity of nature has been derived from Adam to his posterity. It is somewhat singular (and the fact has not been noticed, so far as I am aware) that the opinion advocated by Dr. Payne is almost identical with that advanced by Bellarmine as the doctrine of the liomish Church: " The penalty, which properly corresponds as its counterpart to the first sin, was the loss of original righteousness, and of the supernatural gifts with which God had endowed our nature.
. Corruption of nature flowed not from the want of any gift, nor from the accession of any evil quality, but solely from the loss of supernatural gifts, on account of the sin of Adam." The " supernatural gifts " of the Romish divine answer to the " chartered blessings " of Dr. Payne. Among the schoolmen, the views of Anselm and the Scotists approximated to that expressed by Bellarmine, whilst Aquinas sustained the doctrine of Augustine.
I. In proceeding to test these views by the teaching of Scripture, there are two remarks of a preliminary nature which I would offer. The first is, that as by the supposition it was through Adam’s sin that evil came upon his posterity, the nature and degree of that evil as affecting them cannot essentially differ from the evil he brought on himself by his sin; it must be evil of the same kind as came on him, and not greater in degree than that. This seems to flow neces sarily out of the very idea of it, as evil resulting from his fall. The second remark I would make is, that as what was purely personal to Adam could not in any judicial way descend to his posterity, we must look to something public and legal in his relation to them as the source of the trans mission from him to them of legal disabilities.
These remarks seem to indicate the course of inquiry which it behoves us to pursue in order to obtain satisfaction on the point now before us. We have, first, to ascertain what penalty Adam brought on himself by his sin; we have then to consider in what capacity he acted when this penalty was incurred by him; and we have, in fine, to determine how and to what extent his posterity suffer in consequence of their relation to him. To facilitate our investigation, I shall propose a series of questions to which I shall endeavour to find the just Biblical answer.
(a.) What was Adam’s position in Paradise as respects its bearing on the question now before us? Now, in answer to this, I think the one point that we are concerned with is his being subjected to a positive test of obedience, on his meeting and satisfying which depended his continuance in that state in which he had been created. Much is often said in inquiries such as that in which we are engaged about the supernatural gifts and endowments with which Adam was invested in Paradise; and of late it has become customary in certain quarters to speak of these as chartered blessings. That Adam enjoyed in Paradise certain privileges and blessings of a peculiar kind cannot be denied; he had immunity from suffering, from the sight of moral evil, from the corrupting influence of evil example, and such like, and he enjoyed the favour of God and free intercourse with Him; and if it is these that are intended when chartered blessings ore spoken of, there need be no dispute about the matter, though a phrase less liable to be misunderstood might with advantage have been used. But it is evident that the phrase is meant to convey the existence of privileges beyond these privileges not arising out of man’s condition and his natural relation to his Creator, but privileges conveyed by God’s sovereign bounty to man, and of a supernatural kind.
Now, in reference to this I feel constrained to ask, On what statement of Scripture is the assertion founded that Adam possessed any supernatural gifts or chartered blessings in Paradise? I confess I can find none. It is true that Adam was made in the image and likeness of God, and I freely admit that that expression includes moral as well as intellec tual resemblance to God purity as well as intelligence; nor can we suppose, even apart from this, that from the good and holy aught but a good and holy being could immediately proceed. But moral strength is a matter of degree, and we cannot, I think, suppose that it was possessed in any very high degree by our first parents. If we apply to them the best test of moral strength with which we are acquainted, viz. The power to resist temptation, we must pronounce their moral strength very small not much beyond that of a child; for the temptation under which they fell was about the smallest to which an intelligent agent could be exposed.
I cannot, therefore, regard them as having very extraordinary or supernatural gifts. Had they possessed the moral strength of even any of us, they surely would have stood a longer siege, and some severer assaults would have been necessary before they capitulated to the foe. They were good and holy simply because they had been made so, and knew nothing else; but they could not have possessed this quality in any high not to say supernatural degree, or they would have successfully resisted the slight trial to which they were exposed.
I may here glance, in passing, at Dr. Payne’s statement as to the special or chief of those blessings to which he has applied the term " chartered." He signalizes as one the presence in Adam of the Divine Spirit, and the influence of that Divine Agent on Adam’s mind, whereby he was raised to a high degree of holiness and purity. Now, it seems to me strange that it did not occur to so acute a thinker to ask, If this boon was possessed by Adam, how came Adam to fall? According to Dr. Payne’s theory, it was the loss of this which constituted the principal effect of Adam’s fall, and the consequent absence of this which is the cause of sin to Adam’s posterity. We sin, he tells us, because we want, through Adam’s fault, this union of the soul with God, with out which man cannot live so as to please God. But if the want of this causes us to sin, the presence of this would keep us from sin; for nothing can be more evident than that if the want of anything causes a particular result, the removal of that want would prevent that result. But Adam had this blessing, according to Dr. Payne, for this constituted, in his view, the supreme boon of Paradise. How, then, came Adam to sin at all? If he possessed that, the want of which is the sole cause of sin, how came he to be a sinner? The conclusion is, I think, inevitable that Adam did not possess this so-called chartered blessing. To this conclusion the circumstance already noticed, viz. The ease with which our first parents were seduced into sin, adds strength. A soul in union with the Divine Spirit, and naturally holy, could not have yielded at so slight an attack of the tempter. Who of us would not stand in doubt of any man’s having the Spirit of God in union with his soul, if he sank as readily under temptation as Adam did? And if we judge thus of men encompassed with infirmity and accustomed to sin, how much more must we judge so of one who thus fell when ignorant of sin, and surrounded by all the hallowed influences of a sinless world?
I am forced to conclude, then, that the common notion that Adam enjoyed in Paradise a supernatural degree of holiness and moral power, is a notion without solid founda tion. I would further remark, however, that supposing this notion better founded than it is, it seems incompetent to bring such endowments into consideration in the question now before us. For whatever were the moral and spiritual excellences conferred on Adam, these were purely personal, arid could have no bearing on his position as under trial, excepting as they may have increased his individual personal responsibility. The special feature of Adam’s position, which it behoves us to keep in view, is his being placed under a positive prohibitory enactment, on his obedience to which his continuance in happiness depended. He was, of course, bound to keep every part of God’s law, and any transgression of that law would have been followed by consequences of a penal kind to himself. So far as the history goes, however, it was only to the transgression of this law that the threatened penalty was attached, and we have no right to conclude that the same consequences which flowed from this would have flowed from any other breach of the divine law.
It seems important to a just view of this whole subject that this should be kept distinctly in view, that it was not merely because Adam sinned, but because he sinned in this particular case, by breaking this one prohibition, the appointed test of his obedience, that he fell and brought on his race so many evils.
(ft.) Let us now ask, What was the consequence to Adam of his transgression? The history makes it very plain that a great, an immediate, and most calamitous change passed upon Adam after he had sinned. Without travelling beyond the record, or indulging in any speculative inferences, we may unhesitatingly assert that the following evils were incurred by Adam in consequence of his sin: First, he fell under the divine displeasure, and incurred the penalty which had been denounced against disobedience, viz. death. Secondly, he came under the influence of distrust of God and want of reverence and love for God; as is evident from his hiding himself from God’s presence, and from his sullen and almost insolent answers to God’s questioning of him. Thirdly, he became subject to the power of the tempter the serpent, the prince of darkness, who, having once acquired a victory over him, would ever after seek to use him as his thrall. This is evident from the nature of the promise of deliverance, which was in reality a promise that the serpent’s persistent and persevering tyranny over man should ultimately be destroyed; the bruising of the serpent’s head being not the destruction of Satan’s person, but the destruction of his power over man.
Now of these evils that came on Adam, the only one that came on him directly, immediately, and exclusively, in con sequence of his eating the forbidden fruit, was the first viz. the penalty of death. This was the predicted and denounced penalty of transgression: " In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." His incurring death, therefore, was the direct and the only direct legal consequence of his sin. Other evils came upon him incidentally, and were the natural rather than the statutory effects of his transgression. They were therefore personal evils, not public disabilities, and cannot come into question as forming any part of what he entailed on his posterity. But what are we to understand by the " death " which came upon Adam by his sin? In reply to this some have contended that it was only temporal death the death of the body; whilst others with equal eagerness have contended that it was death in the most comprehensive sense death temporal, spiritual, and eternal. I cannot help thinking that a great deal of ingenuity, and not a little temper, has been improfitably expended on this discussion. If, instead of diverging into general speculation and debate, we keep close by the Mosaic narrative, I feel assured that we shall reach satisfac tion by a shorter and surer process. From this narrative I gather, in the outset, and as a certain fact, that the penalty of death denounced against sin was one which our first parents immediately incurred. The words of the threatening are most precise: " In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." According to the law, then, immediate death Avas the penalty to be inflicted 011 Adam if he ate the forbidden fruit. The law does not say, "In that day thou shalt become mortal, and so at some future period die; " nor does it say, " Thou shalt then enter upon a state of progres sive degradation, which shall ultimately culminate in eternal death; " it says simply, " In that day thou shalt die." We must believe, therefore, that Adam, having committed the forbidden deed, incurred the penalty actually threatened, and in that day did die unless we would impute to God a trifling with His own edict which is incompatible with justice, or a carelessness of expression in the framing of His edict which is incompatible with the idea of a perfect law.
I am well aware of the attempts which have been made to show that the words " In the day thou eatest thereof " do not mean " in that very day," but may receive an interpretation compatible with the supposition that a long interval might elapse between the commision of the sin and the suffering of the penalty; but these attempts are for the most part of such a kind that it is impossible for any one who has been at all accustomed to a just method of interpreting Scriptures to treat them with respect. The only attempt to place this on an exegetical basis is that of those who affirm that had it been intended that Adam was to die on the very day that he broke the command, the words used would have been, not simply DV3, but nrn ova or sinn DV3. This argument is advanced by Mr. Holden and adopted by Dr. Payne. It is founded, however, on a gross mistake a double mistake; for, in the first place, it is not true that in order to express the idea of an event happening on that very day in which something else happened or might happen, the Hebrews never used the simple DV3; instances to the contrary are Leviticus 7:35; Isaiah 11:16; Lamentations 3:57; and, in the second place, it has been overlooked that in Genesis 2:17, where we have the words of threatening, DV1 is in construction with the verb butt, the expression being IJOK D ^?, which is definite, and does not admit of the insertion of either run or Ninn.
Besides, this argument is virtually given up by Dr. Payne in the very context in which he adduces it, for he goes on to say that the words of the threatening mean "instant and necessary exposure to the infliction of death." According to this the words " in the day " are equivalent to " in the instant," so that all the criticism expended on them to show that they cannot mean this is virtually rendered superfluous.
What would have been more to the point would be to have shown that the words " thou shalt surely die " mean not "instant and certain death," as they seem to do, but "instant and necessary exposure, to the infliction of death," as Dr. Payne says they mean. This neither he nor any one, so far as I am aware, has attempted.
Taking the narrative then as it stands, I feel constrained to believe that as God threatened Adam with instant and certain death in case of transgression, Adam did instantly die when he transgressed. And this may enable us to say with some degree of confidence what it was that under this penalty Adam incurred. The word " death " is used in Scripture in a variety of meanings; but instead of diverging into general speculation or inquiry on this head, if we are sure that the death Adam incurred was something that actually befell him, we have only to ask what did befall him to get an answer to our question. Now, on this point the history leaves us in no great uncertainty. Adam lost by his transgression (immedi ately and directly) all the privileges of Paradise, including immediate intercourse with God and the enjoyment of His favour and image; he was sent into a world covered with briars and thorns, and he was doomed to a life of pains and sorrows to be terminated by death. This was for one whoso true life consisted in being like God and enjoying His favour really to die. Here a real penalty was incurred, a real evil endured. The mere cessation of animal life is not necessarily an evil, any more than mere existence is necessarily a good.
All depends on the state morally and physically in which the being exists; and as for man the only real good is to be at one with God, to have fellowship with Him, and to enjoy His favour and the happiness which that brings, to be deprived of these is for man to endure the sorest privation, is to be deprived of his true life, is, in the saddest sense, to die.
Death in Scripture is used emphatically to designate a state the opposite of felicity, dignity, and purity, of which state the dissolution of the union of soul and body, and the return of the latter to the ruin and gloom of the grave, is the visible type. In the Epistle to the Romans the apostle puts the death which came as the consequence of Adam’s sin in con trast with the grace or favour of God (v. 15), and with the gift of righteousness or acceptance with God (v. 17), and he represents it as the opposite of eternal life (vi. 23) obtained through Jesus Christ our Lord. In such a connection it would be absurd to restrict the term to mere natural decease. That is not death as opposed to righteousness, to the enjoy ment of God’s favour, and to eternal life through Christ. The death of which the apostle writes is that state of moral and physical dishonour, suffering, and decay which is the opposite of that state of holiness, dignity, and blessedness which Adam enjoyed whilst he lived in God’s favour and obeyed His will. Into this state of death Adam entered when he sinned; on the very day on which he ate the for bidden fruit he died; he lost the divine favour; he became subject to evil, physical and moral; and he received into his frame the seeds of mortality, decay, and dissolution. This is the penalty of guilt; and this penalty Adam incurred by his transgression.
(c.) In what relation to his posterity did Adam stand whilst sustaining this probation and enduring this penalty? The reply to this is, That of federal head and representative, who appeared and acted not for himself alone, but for his posterity.
It is true he was also their natural progenitor, and as such naturally transmitted to them certain qualities and conditions of a natural kind. Beyond such natural effects, however, his relation to them as progenitor could not extend. Effects reaching them in consequence of his conduct as under a positive constitution, under a dispensation, could reach them only if in this condition he acted as their representative or covenant or dispensational head.
We may illustrate this by supposing the case of two men standing at the head of a family; both of whom have certain marked natural peculiarities, but one of whom has advantages which are personal though capable of being transferred, such, for instance, as wealth; while the other has advantages which he owes solely to his living under a certain constitution, such, for instance, as rank, titles, aristocratic privileges, which come to him solely in virtue of his being the subject of some specific arrangement or political system under which he lives. On comparing these two cases you will see at a glance that whilst both may and probably will transmit to their children their natural peculiarities, the former is at liberty to transmit any or all of his personal advantages as he pleases, or to alienate them from his children altogether; whilst the latter can transmit his advantages only if his position has been a representative one, only if he has held them in trust for his race, and in this case he cannot hinder them from descending to his family. A wealthy merchant may or may not make his children the heirs of his wealth; a titled nobleman cannot but transmit his dignities and privileges to his descendants, or if he should have forfeited these by misconduct he cannot but transmit to his posterity, however personally innocent, the degradation and forfeiture of privilege he has incurred. This difference arises solely from the one set of advantages being personal, whilst the other set is constitutional, and the party receiving or sustaining them bears a representative or federal character.
Applying this to the matter before us, it is easy to see that Adam could entail on his posterity his dispensational advantages or penalties (as the case came to be through his sin) only on the supposition that he sustained, whilst enjoying these advantages or receiving these penalties, a representative character. It comes, therefore, to be necessary to inquire whether there be any sufficient reason for believ ing that Adam bore such a character; and this can be answered only by an examination of the statements of Scripture bearing on the subject.
There is one consideration, however, of a general kind which, before proceeding to examine passages, it is worth while to ponder. It cannot be denied that as the children of Adam we suffer disadvantages on account of his sin.
However low we reduce the estimate of the evil which has come on us through his conduct, it cannot be denied that evil of some sort has come on us thereby. Even if we allow no more than, with Pelagius and Socinus, that the native mortality of man has thereby been suffered to come into operation, still, as this is an evil from which Adam was exempt in Paradise, it is thereby admitted that we are sufferers through his act. But if we suffer, whether it be in the way of privation or in the way of infliction in consequence of Adam’s sin, this can be reconciled with equitable administration only on the supposition that Adam appeared and acted as our representative. If he did so, then, as all jurists allow, our suffering through his sin is perfectly equitable; it is a thing which, under a legal constitution, could not be avoided; the principle qiiocl facit per alium facit per se covers it and justifies it. But it is otherwise if he was not our representative. We are, in that case, in no way involved in his doings, and have a right to be exempt from the penal consequences of them. It will not do to say, These come upon us naturally, as the diseased constitution of the drunkard descends to his child. The two cases are not parallel. The disease of the drunkard descends to his child because it is disease, not because his drunkenness is a sin. Had the position been that Adam’s sin produced in him a diseased state of body which was found also in his descendants, it might be contended on physiological grounds that in their sufferings there was nothing beyond a natural effect. But this is not the position. The position is that Adam’s sin, as sin, entailed on his posterity a penalty under which they suffer, and this we maintain is reconcilable with equity of administration only on the supposition that he appeared and acted in a representative capacity. This at the outset renders it extremely probable that Adam sustained in Paradise a representative character, and that the penalty he in that character incurred has necessarily descended to all his posterity. Of the passages of Scripture which support and establish this conclusion, the most weighty are found in Paul’s Epistle to the Romans. The concluding half of the fifth chapter of that Epistle bears especially on this subject. There we find the apostle first expressly stating, not only that by one man sin entered the world and so death by sin, but that this has taken place because in that one man’s sin all have sinned.
It is not necessary in order to substantiate this reasoning that we should resort to the exegesis of Augustine and others who render the concluding clause of ver. 12, " in whom [i.e. The one man, Adam] all have sinned; " at best this is of doubtful legitimacy, both linguistically and as a matter of construction; and it is unnecessary for the purpose of bringing out the meaning of the apostle’s words as above given. Adhering to the render ing in the A. V. as that best supported, viz. " for that [or be cause] all have sinned," we ask, To what does this refer? to the actual sins of the individuals of our race, or to their sin in Adam? That it cannot refer to the former we are constrained to conclude, from the fact that the apostle makes the inci dence of the sin here spoken of coextensive with the incidence of death. " Death," saith he, " hath passed upon all, because all have sinned; " the latter fact is the cause of the former. Wherever the effect, then, is found there must be the operation of the cause; wherever there is death there must be this sin of which Paul speaks. But we find death where there is no actual sin, as in the case of infants; from all which it clearly follows that it cannot be of actual sin that Paul here speaks. But if not of actual sin, then it must be of representative sin of sin committed virtually in Adam by his posterity that he speaks. And with this tallies his whole statement in this verse. How jejune and empty his words if we understand this last clause of actual sin com mitted personally by men ! " By one man sin entered the world, and death by sin; and so death hath passed upon all men, because all have committed sin." One does not see the force of the " so " here; nor, indeed, the need of the latter part of the verse at all; for if death and sin are inseparable, of course, if all commit sin all must die. It is to be noted, moreover, that the sentence in ver. 1 2 is incomplete; we have a comparison where nothing is expressly compared.
"As by one man sin entered the world, and death by sin; and so death hath passed on all men, because all have sinned," here the sentence stops, and the question naturally arises, As wliat? The apostle does not say, but leaves us, I apprehend, to supply the apodosis of his sentence from what goes before.
Some, indeed, propose to find the close of the sentence and the completion of the comparison in ver. 18: " Therefore, as by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men to justification of life." But not only is this a violent expedient, it is withal an unsatisfactory one; for still the sentence in ver. 12 remains unfinished, and cannot possibly be completed grammatically from ver. 18, which is no more than complete in itself, and has nothing to spare for the completion of any other sentence. The " there fore " with which ver. 1 8 commences plainly connects it, not with ver. 12, but with the verses immediately preceding, the loth to 17 tli; and, indeed, the whole train of the apostle s reasoning is dislocated and disturb