075. I. Nature Of Holiness In Adam.
I. Nature Of Holiness In Adam.
1. Determining Law of Limitation.—Holiness is here viewed as a primitive quality of Adam, such as he possessed in the beginning of his existence. Therefore it must have been simply a quality of his nature, or such as might be an accompanying gift of his creation. It certainly could possess no proper ethical element, such as can arise only from free personal action. This is a determining law of limitation respecting the nature of primitive holiness. To pass this limit is to fall at once into the error of thinking that an ethical holiness may be divinely created in man. Directly following this is the error of thinking that a mere nature, the nature with which we are born, can be the subject of an ethical sinfulness and demerit—just such sinfulness and demerit as arise from personal violations of the divine law. An observance of this law of limitation will protect us against such errors.
2. Fundamental Distinctions of Holiness.—In a true godly life, such as that of Daniel, in a true Christian life, such as that of Paul, there is personal holiness, the holiness of character, with the ethical qualities of righteous action. Such holiness has ethical worth before the divine law. The quality of holiness and the moral worth arise from free moral action in obedience to the divine will. In such a godly or Christian life there is an inner life answering to the outer; an inner life of holy aspirations and aims, which indeed are the inspiration and true worth of the outer life. But in these inner activities there is still the free use of personal faculties, and therefore the truest form of ethical action. The holiness of such an inner life is of the truest ethical character, and therein profoundly different from the possible holiness of a primitive nature.
Below this inner life there is the nature, with its spontaneous tendencies. As matter has its properties, so mind has its powers and tendencies. However metaphysical the distinction between the nature and its tendencies, it is yet real for thought. Tendencies of nature are specially exemplified in the animal orders. The natural disposition is the determining law of the animal life. The distinctions of life are from differences of natural tendency. We thus note, at once, the reality and the differences of natural tendency in the lion and the lamb. In like manner we may note the reality, and the differences, of natural tendency in men whose lives are morally opposite. With the one the spontaneous disposition is to the good; with the other, to the evil. Such is the difference between a regenerate or sanctified nature and a nature yet corrupt and vicious. We thus find differences of moral tendency. On the ground of moral tendency we allege a moral quality of the nature; on the differences of such tendency, we qualify the one nature as good and the other as evil, but only in the sense in which a nature may be good or evil. With a spontaneous disposition to the good the nature is holy. There is such a subjective holiness in distinction from all holiness really ethical in its character.
3. Nature of Adamic Holiness.—After the previous analysis, the truth in this question is close at hand. The holiness of Adam, as newly created and before any personal action of his own, was simply a subjective state and tendency in harmony with his moral relations and duties. But such a state, however real and excellent, and however pleasing to the divine mind, could not have any true ethical quality, or in any proper sense be accounted either meritorious or rewardable. A deeper analysis which reaches the most determinate moral principles must eliminate from theology the ideas of ethical character without free personal action. This question should not be confused by any difficulty, or inability even, to fix the exact line where spontaneous tendency passes over into ethical action. Nor should this line be ignored in order to place such quality in something back of it. Theological speculation is not free from such mistakes.
“Adam was brought into existence capable of acting immediately, as a moral agent, and therefore he was immediately under a rule of right action; he was obliged as soon as he existed to act right. And if he was obliged to act right as soon as he existed, he was obliged even then to be inclined to act right. . . . And as he was obliged to act right from the first moment of his existence, and did do so till he sinned in the affair of the forbidden fruit, he must have had an inclination or disposition of heart to do right the first moment of his existence; and that is the same as to be created or brought into existence, with an inclination, or, which is the same thing, a virtuous and holy disposition of heart.”[448] Not only is there here an overlooking of all distinction between purely spontaneous tendency and proper ethical action, but it is attempted to prove an original ethical holiness of Adam from its necessity to the moral obligation which was instant upon his existence. The assumption of such instant obligation is a pure gratuity. The requisite knowledge was not a product of the divine action which gave existence to Adam. Even the gift of mature powers is not the gift of such knowledge. Whether he was at once so endowed, or placed under training and gradually inducted into the moral sphere, we do not know. On these questions the Scriptures are silent. Reasonably, there was sufficient time for the knowledge and sensibility necessary to moral obligation. The assumption of an active disposition so instant upon the very existence of man as to be beforehand with an instant obligation, and not only the same in ethical quality as a free moral act, but a necessity to any holy volition, is far more replete with metaphysical subtlety than psychological and ethical analysis. The profound distinction between mere spontaneous tendency and personal action under obligation and law still remains. It is as real as the deepest ethical principles. It is none the less real for any inability to fix the exact line of distinction, xi mere initial tendency to the good in Adam could have no ethical character. It could not become an active disposition until duty in some form was presented. Simply as spontaneously active it could constitute only a motive, not an ethical action. Else to be tempted is to sin, and in every instance of temptation. Motive, whether to the good or the evil, takes on ethical character only where approved or entertained. Here it is that personal agency comes into action. Previous to this there is no ethical character, and the subtleties of Edwards are futile for the proof of the contrary.[449] [448]
Both Whedon and Bledsoe very fully and very ably discuss the principles of this question, and both conclude against the possibility of any moral character, such as involves either merit or demerit, previous to free moral action.[450] The application of these principles to the present question is in this manner: “We may suppose a being, like Adam, created with soul perfectly right. His preferential feelings anterior to action accord with the divine law. His sensibilities are so under easy volitional control, his mind is so clear and pure, that all in its primitive undisturbed state is right. His will is able to hold his whole being in subordination to the moral imperative. He is, in his grade of being, perfectly excellent; and his excellence is not mechanical merely or aesthetical, but ethical. It is moral excellence; it is created moral excellence, and perfect in its kind, yet wholly unmeritorious.”[451] [450]
[451]
4. Possibility of Holiness in Adam.—There may be holiness of the moral nature previous to free moral action. If not, such a quality of the nature must forever be impossible. Whatever it might become by good conduct, such it might be constituted in its original creation. This must be clear if we still hold in view the fundamental distinctions of holiness. In ethical character we become by free personal action what we could not be constituted by the divine agency. Only in the former mode can moral merit or demerit arise. The case is different respecting the nature in distinction from the personal agent. Whatever quality the nature might possess subsequent to holy action, or as consequent to such action, with such quality it could be originally endowed. Otherwise all moral quality must arise from personal conduct, and must belong to man as a personal agent, without any possible application to his nature.
It would follow that moral beings, however opposite their lives, differ only in deeds, not at all in their natures. Some may love and worship God, while others blaspheme and hate, but such is the only difference between them. Nero may be cruel and vile, and Paul consecrated to the best and noblest life, but they are without any difference in subjective quality. There cannot be any difference in respect to holiness, because such quality can have no place in the nature. Under such a law even God could not be holy in his nature. A theory with such implications must be false. With opposite habits of moral life there must be a difference of natures. In the one case the spontaneous tendency is to the good; in the other, to the evil. The tendency to the good we call subjective holiness—holiness of the nature in distinction from holiness of the life. With such a nature Adam could be created. The determining principle of this question is clearly given in the words of our Lord: “Either make the tree good, the tree and his fruit good; or else make the tree corrupt, and his fruit corrupt: for the tree is known by his fruit” (Matthew 12:33). In distinction from the fruit the tree has a quality in itself, for otherwise the quality of the tree could not determine the quality of the fruit. Nor could there be any meaning in making the tree good and its fruit good, or the tree corrupt and its fruit corrupt. For the common intelligence, and for the most critical as well, there is very real meaning in such facts. We know the quality of a tree by the quality of its fruit. The principle is the same in the case of man. This indeed is the meaning and application of these words of the Master. The deeds of men, as good or evil, answer to their moral nature and express its quality as good or evil, just as in the case of the fruit and the tree. The same idea of a moral quality of our nature is present in many texts which set forth the facts of regeneration. The transformation of the life is through a renewal of the moral nature. That renovation of the nature is a moral purification, and imparts to it a quality of holiness (Psalms 51:7; Psalms 51:10; Ezekiel 36:25-27; 2 Corinthians 5:17; Galatians 6:15; Ephesians 4:23-24; Colossians 3:9-10). It thus appears that the question of primitive holiness is not a merely speculative one, but one which vitally concerns the deepest truth and reality of regeneration. If there be no moral quality of our nature regeneration loses its meaning for the Christian life. Its profound reality carries with it the reality of such a quality. Hence Adam as newly created could be holy in his nature.