43 - 1Jn 3:9-10a
Πᾶς ὁ γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἁμαρτίαν οὐ ποιεῖ, ὅτι σπέρμα αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ μένει· καὶ οὐ δύναται ἁμαρτάνειν, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ γεγέννηται. Ἐν τούτῳ φανερά ἐστι τὰ τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τὰ τέκνα τοῦ διαβόλου. To the declaration of 1Jn 3:8
Let us first look more closely at the context of 1Jn 3:9. Its recapitulation takes the form of two clauses, each of which has its own reason briefly assigned. It is clear that in the second clause the emphasis rests upon the οὐ δύναται ἁμαρτάνειν [“he cannot sin”], the impossibility that a child of God should sin is made prominent; accordingly, the emphasis in the first clause can fall only on the οὐ ποιεῖ ἁμαρτίαν [“does not practicesin”], that is, upon the actual condition and character of God’s children: this latter, however, not being viewed as a transitory fact; for the present ποιεῖ [“practice”] marks it as an abiding and continuous state. Thus the actual character, and the internal necessity of that character, of the regenerate are the two affirmations of our verse, and to these two main propositions most precisely correspond the two subordinate ones introduced by ὅτι [“that”] to establish the others. In the former of them the emphasis falls on the μένει [“abide”]: because God (we leave for a while unconsidered the σπέρμα [“seed”]) abideth in such a man, his not sinning is a permanent condition or state. In the latter the emphasis is on the Θεοῦ [“of God”]: because he is born of God, in whom there is no alternation of light and darkness, of whom we know that He is essentially and of necessity righteous (1Jn 2:29), therefore the regenerate is necessarily righteous. We observe that the positive ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”], which recurred again and again in the previous verses, is exchanged throughout the present verse for the negative οὐχἁμαρτάνειν [“does not continue to sin”]; and this fact has the same reason as that which governs the predominant negative in the decalogue. Because in man, as he is by nature, evil forms the paramount principle, the negative definition of the new man as one free from sin is more obvious than the positive one of his being righteous.
It has been remarked that 1Jn 3:10
There are only two individual expressions in the verses we now consider which demand elucidation. One is the σπέρματοῦΘεοῦ [“seed of God”] which is said to be in the new man. There is not the slightest justification for referring this phrase to the word of God, after the analogy of Mat 13:24-37 or 1Pe 1:23; for in the context of this passage, and in the Epistle generally, this is not spoken of in any sense. The word is entirely unique here; and the thing intended can be made plain only by entering into the figure used. The human seed is the germ whence a new man proceeds, which developes into man; accordingly the spiritual seed is the divine principle, the divine germ, out of which the new spiritual man is developed. This principle is, according to Joh 3:5, the πνεῦμα [“Spirit”]: the Divine Spirit, viewed as seed or σπέρμα [“seed”], is the power of life entering into the man, the living germ sinking down into his nature. As, through the σπέρμα [“seed”] coming from the human parent, the newly-begotten man becomes a child of his father, because he simply springs from the nature of this man, so we are the children of God in virtue of the community of nature with God, because we have grown out of His I, His Spirit. And thus σπέρμαμένει [“seed remains”], the seed abideth: it is not that a single impulse proceeds from it, and it then is again withdrawn, but it unfolds a continuous energy. And it abides ἐναὐτῷ [“in him”]; it works not as the quickening ray of the sun works upon the plant by energy from without, but it developes its directing and fashioning power and activity from within outwardly. The second expression which demands special attention is that of τέκνα τοῦ διαβόλου [“children of the devil”], 1Jn 3:10. On the one hand, it is clear that this definition is a distinct correlative of the closely connected τέκνατοῦΘεοῦ [“children of God”]; the word τέκνα [“children”] must in the two cases have the same meaning. On the other hand, it is plain that, in the meaning which we attach to the expression τέκναΘεοῦ [“children of God”] in 1Jn 3:1, it can have no distinct correlative. The sonship there we understood to be not merely ethical, but a relation of being, a real communication of the divine nature; and in this sense there can be no τέκνα τοῦ διαβόλου [“children of the devil”]. God can indeed beget life, but Satan cannot. The question then arises, whether we will give up the former explanation of τέκνατοῦΘεοῦ [“children of God”] in favour of a more general meaning, and regard the expression as signifying a purely ethical relation, or whether, considering that in the tenth verse the τέκναΘεοῦ [“children of God”] and διαβόλου [“of the devil”] must necessarily be understood alike, we may assume a different meaning of the term τέκνα [“children”] in the tenth and first verses of the chapter. It is to be taken for granted that any such change in the meaning must receive its warranty in some way from the apostle himself. Now, as to the beginning of this chapter, which is relatively the end of the preceding, we cannot by any means surrender the meaning of the sonship established there. It is certainly Johannaean, it is established by the one expression of the Gospel, “born of water and of the Spirit,” and it will be found confirmed by the fourth chapter of our Epistle. And in our 1Jn 3:1 it is further rendered necessary by the word ἔδωκεν [“he gave”]. An ethical relation is not a gift of God; the moral habit of the man rests naturally not upon a mere divine bestowment, but also upon the human co-operation in act. The ethical relation of the child of God is spoken of from 1Jn 3:3 onward: up to that point the ground of nature which is the condition of that act is alone treated of. Finally, there can be no doubt that in 1Jn 2:29 the γεγεννήσθαιἐκτοῦΘεοῦ [“having been born of God”], the confirmation of which in the deeds of righteousness is in question, cannot be identical with those confirming deeds of righteousness themselves; and, as 1Jn 3:1 resumes that description in τέκναΘεοῦ [“children of God”], it must there have the same meaning. We must therefore hold fast the explanation of sonship given in 1Jn 3:1. But then it is obvious that the description τέκνα τοῦ διαβόλου [“children of the devil”], and accordingly also that of τέκνατοῦΘεοῦ [“children of God”] in 1Jn 3:10, will tolerate only an ethical interpretation. When St. Paul calls Elymas υἱός διαβόλου [“a son of the devil” cf. Act 13:10], and Christ in St. John’s Gospel calls the devil the father of the Jews [cf. Joh 8:44], these expressions say no more than what is elsewhere meant by being ἐκτοῦδιαβόλου [“of the devil”]: the sense is that of an ethical dependence, the being under the influence of the devil, which, however, by no means constitutes the inpouring of a devilish spirit. Accordingly, the expression τέκνατοῦΘεοῦ [“children of God”] in 1Jn 3:10 a will say no more than the parallel ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ [“is of God”] in 1Jn 3:10 b. But how can we reconcile ourselves to accept the same phrase in the same section according to two different meanings? The answer is, because of the changed view of our relation to God which has intermediately entered. As we have seen in the section 1Jn 3:1-3, the apostle shows that sonship as a gift, according to 1Jn 3:1, is not the basis on which the final consummation of the man rests, but the ethical development springing from that as its principle. The objective divine act of begetting requires the subjective unfolding of the new nature on the part of man. Thus also in the tenth verse reference is no longer made to the regenerate ground of nature which is the principle of all religious development, but to the ethical position which the regenerate has acquired, of course always on the ground of that divine principle. Hence it is natural that the phrase τέκνατοῦΘεοῦ [“children of God”] must no longer be taken in that earlier metaphysical sense; the ethical likeness to God is now the predominant idea; and therefore it can be employed as the correlative of τέκνα τοῦ διαβόλου [“children of the devil”].
Let us now look at the section here ended as a whole, and first with regard to its form. We shall find the same scheme of construction which was adopted in chapters 1 and 2: not indeed as if the apostle wrote according to a plan fore-arranged down to the minutest analysis; we see only the clear and methodical spirit of the writer involuntarily adopting an order and measure which appears in the harmonious articulation of his Epistle. We note in 1Jn 3:1-10 two sub-sections, 1Jn 3:1-3 and 1Jn 3:4-10. The former of these gives the substructure of the latter, by showing to what extent at the final judgment, to which 1Jn 2:28 had pointed, works come into consideration: because, namely, the question will then be what we have become through the divine gift of regeneration, in order that it may then be given to him who hath, that he may have more abundance. The second sub-section, which introduces the proof that on the ground of ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”] we become assured of our sonship, is constructed with extreme symmetry. It is complete in four members: 1Jn 3:4-5, 1Jn 3:3-6, 1Jn 3:7-8, 1Jn 3:9-10
Clear and analytical as is the form of the section, and exact as is the logic pervading it, its several clauses are full of difficulties. The whole finds its keenest point in the assertion that he who is born of God cannot sin. When examining 1Jn 3:6, we saw that this proposition seems opposed as well to Christian experience as to St. John’s own doctrine, which, addressed to the regenerate children of God (1Jn 2:13 ff., 1Jn 3:2), nevertheless urges them to the confession of sin. We have also come to the conviction that the force of our passage must not be softened down, as also that Christian experience cannot be explained away. It is resorting to a hopeless expedient to say that the Christian does not practise sin, but suffers it. Such affirmations as these seem excellent enough, but in fact they are unmeaning. It ought not to be denied that in a certain sense sin is actually to the Christian matter of passive endurance—he feels himself under an alien and hostile power. Such was the experience of St. Paul in Rom 7:1-25. But this truth would be applicable in the present case only if the guilt of sin ceased,—that is, if human freedom were not disparaged in connection with these failings: for a mere accident of evil cannot be matter of personal responsibility. But it was not St. John’s intention to teach this; every sin, even of the Christian man, is the free act of the will,—though, it may be, not altogether spontaneous,—and is sin therefore in the fullest sense. Moreover, this distinction between doing and suffering sin is out of the question in our passage, as may be seen in the change between οὐποιεῖνἁμαρτίαν [“does not practicesin”] and the simple ἁμαρτάνειν[“sinning”]. In order to reach the solution of the difficulty, let us look more narrowly at its proper bearing. The edge of it does not lie in the word, “he that sinneth is of the devil,” viewed in itself. If we had this alone, it must appear to us a frightful truth; but we should be constrained in the end to bow before the word of Scripture, and say: “Then are we all, since we all sin, not children of God.” The difficulty lies rather in the opposition between this word and the oft-repeated recognition of our sonship on the part of the apostle. There are, however, two things which serve to throw some light on the embarrassment. One is the distinction between the sense in which St. John speaks of our sonship in 1Jn 3:1, and that in which he speaks of it from 1Jn 3:4 onwards; the other, connected with this, is that in 1Jn 3:4 ff. he takes his stand at the day of judgment. The former point, the twofold meaning of τέκνατοῦΘεοῦ [“children of God”], has forced itself as a necessity on our previous exposition. Our sonship is first considered as a divine gift, independent of all human act (δέδωκεν ἡμῖν ὁ πατὴρ [“the father has given to us”], 1Jn 3:1); in virtue of this gift, which consists of the impartation of His Spirit, God beholds us as His children; in virtue of it we have the forgiveness of sins, for through this Spirit we have become one with Christ, the God-man, whose Spirit He is, members of His body, partakers of all that He has wrought. Through this act of God we are, before any corresponding acts on our part, His children: as He will also have us regarded by men (κληθῶμεν [“we would be called”]). But what we now are as the result of a divine act, we must become as the result of our own deeds; the principle of righteousness which the πνεῦμα [“Spirit”] implants in us must develope itself into realization; the divine gift must be appropriated and made our own. A field which had hitherto borne thorns and thistles, but in which the corn is sown, is, in virtue of the seed in it, a field of wheat; its owner speaks of it as such, and treats it as such. But if the ground is stony, so that the good seed cannot germinate freely, but produces weeds, and only weeds, it is thenceforward, regarded from the result, no field of corn. The owner was justified in regarding it, and bound to regard it, first as a wheat-field; but after the good seed has been choked, the right and obligation so to regard it cease. So is it with men. Through the gift of the Spirit, the σπέρματοῦΘεοῦ [“seed of God”], we are children of God; we are ἅγιοι [“set apart ones”], that is, appointed to His service, καὶ ἠγαπημένοι [“and beloved”], according to the divine act and destination. But as, in the comparison just used, the seed must be developed and productive if the field is to be, not only according to the owner’s purpose, but also in reality, a field of wheat, so we also must place our whole life under the influence of the Spirit, and be swayed altogether by His power, that is, ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”]. Now, that by τέκναΘεοῦ [“children of God”], from 1Jn 3:4 onwards, only those are to be understood who, on the ground of the divine generation of 1Jn 3:1, have become that in their character which they had already been in their destination, we have established in our exposition of the structure of the whole section; it is evident also from the correlation of τέκναΘεοῦ [“children of God”] and τέκνα διαβόλου [“children of the devil”], 1Jn 3:10, and is demanded by the expressions ἑώρακεν [“having perceived”],ἔγνωκεν αὐτόν [“having seen him”] in 1Jn 3:6, both these being appropriating activities by which I receive into my consciousness something objectively existing and real. In this way it becomes clear how the same persons are called children of God, and yet have this name denied to them as sinners: in the one case it is the gift which is meant, in the other the ethical habit. The child of God in 1Jn 3:1 can sin, just as the field sown with corn can bear weeds; the child of God in 1Jn 3:9 cannot sin, for he is by the imparted σπέρμα [“seed”] determined consciously and mightily against it.
If we now examine carefully what the Christian life really is, we shall not find in it a series of distinct and opposite elements, one half of which belong to the kingdom of light, and the other half to the kingdom of darkness. Rather, if we closely watch these particular elements and analyse them, the result will be found, that in every one of them the powers of light and the powers of darkness carry on their work in the man, so that there is no moment in the Christian’s life when he is purely ἐκτοῦΘεοῦ [“of God”], as also by parity no moment when he is purely ἐκτοῦδιαβόλου [“of the devil”]. It may seem hard to reconcile with such a view the energetic way in which St. John in this section lays down the antithesis or the alternative aut . . . aut. But this alternative is a necessary consequence of the position he assumes in speaking; it is that of the final judgment. The question has been ruled by 1Jn 2:28 as that of the last παῤῥησία [“boldness”] in the great day. But then it is plain that no man can be saved on the ground of a mere work of God wrought upon him; if salvation cannot be reached through an opus operatum OF man, neither can it any more be reached through an opus operatum ON man. God can never reckon that man blessed who has not in himself the conditions of blessedness. Further, it is certain that no admixture of good and evil can enter into the inheritance of heaven; that God will apply to human destiny and character not a relative but an absolute standard. Thus he who shall stand in the judgment must be absolutely righteous. The question in the great day will not be concerning a gift imparted by God to man (as in 1Jn 3:1), not concerning a power or principle infused into him, but concerning what he has made of the power he received,—that is, in fact, concerning his works. Hence it is the pervasive biblical doctrine, especially that of the New Testament, and emphatically that of St. Paul, that man will be judged according to his works; compare Mat 16:27; Rom 2:6; 1Co 3:8; 2Co 11:18; Gal 6:7; Rev 2:23; Rev 20:12, Rev 22:12. As in the case of the owner of the field already mentioned, God beholds His children below, and regards them as such, in the hope and in the expectation and to the intent that the germ infused into us will prove itself fruitful. The idea of a υἱοθεσία [“adoption”] in hope suggests that it is only a limited sphere of privilege which points beyond itself. The limit of it is the judgment, and of this the apostle treats. Wilt thou know how thou standest towards thy God, apply to thyself the standard which God will apply in the judgment, the standard of perfected righteousness. St. John gives us that in the words: ὁ ποιῶν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου ἐστὶ [“the one who practices sin is of the devil”]. However terrible the proposition sounds, it approves itself mighty and wholesome in its effects. He who admits that we have not to fight with flesh and blood, but with the kingdom of darkness, must needs also admit that every deed of darkness bears witness to our standing yet in some relation to that kingdom, and that we are not entirely withdrawn from it. Thus judging ourselves according to the test, the absolute test, of the divine judgment, we shall not, as sinning every day, be able to refrain. from confessing that we are yet ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου [“of the devil”], that the kingdom of darkness is still mighty within us. The deed of darkness makes us manifest as children of darkness. We have, so long as we abide on earth, the gift of sonship in an altogether stedfast manner; but that will not be the main test at the day of judgment. It will be asked then how we appropriated the gift and used it. Thus, therefore, the question is with the apostle not as to whether and in what way, at any particular moment of our earthly development, light and darkness are intermingled in the Christian; he only expresses the truth that in the day of awards he will not stand who still in any measure sins; and that we shall have no title then to regard ourselves as τέκνατοῦΘεοῦ [“children of God”] in the ethical sense. Although these thoughts, in the form we give them, do not govern the ordinary Christian consciousness, they nevertheless find in ordinary Christian experience their justification. It is an experienced fact that the most advanced Christians cry to God with a full heart, “Turn Thou me, Lord, and I shall be turned!” They regard themselves, on the evidence of a series of concurring elements, as still not entirely converted. But what other is this than the consciousness that, tested by the true standard of God’s final judgment, they are not yet withdrawn from the ἐξουσία τοῦ σκότους [“power of darkness”]. The difficulties of the section, however, are not in this way altogether solved. If we are thus rigorous in impressing our minds, when sin occurs, with the fact that every such sin manifests us to be τέκνα τοῦ διαβόλου [“children of the devil”], then that παῤῥησία [“boldness”] which it was the apostle’s aim to mature seems altogether cut off and buried out of sight. The τετελειωμένηχαρά [“perfected joy”] promised in the Epistle is exchanged for an ever-renewed and ever-enduring φόβος [“fear”]. For though the experience, constantly confirmed, that we are still ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου [“of the devil”] may urge us to a more full surrender to the Holy Ghost, that the union between Him and our own I may become a perfected reality, yet we know, on the other hand, that down to the end of life we must needs go on sinning again. Now, if St. John infers from every sin that we have not yet seen and known the Lord, it certainly must seem that there is a stamp of unreality and self-deception impressed on any kind of surrender of the heart to the Lord from the very beginning. Thus may it not be said that all our believing and struggling, all our confidence and peace, are rendered doubtful in their very nature? How are we to understand—that is the question of habitual urgency—the appropriation of the divine gift, the perfect coincidence of our human condition and character with the Divine Spirit? First of all, it is certain that a self-surrender to the Lord, in connection with which we have consciously retained any sin, could be of no service to us; that would never inspire anything like παῤῥησία [“boldness”]. Secondly, and conversely, it is equally true that if we actually have yielded up to the Lord the whole sum of our being, and surrendered ourselves absolutely to the illuminating influence of the φῶς ἀληθινόν [“true light”], either all sin must cease, or, supposing it to reappear, it would subject us to the doom of Heb 6:1-12. Between these two hypotheses—a dedication, consciously not entire, to the sanctifying Spirit, and a dedication consciously perfect—there is a third conceivable. We may possess that is, the will to surrender ourselves, with all that we have and are, to the Lord; but yet, in an unconscious manner, as it is now said, the dedication may be imperfect: either as to its extent, so far as sinful parts remain which have either not at all or not rightly been revealed to us as darkness, and therefore have not yet been brought under the searching influence of the light; or as to its intensity—and this is psychologically more exact—so far as our devotion has not reached its full consummation in the perfect energy of the spirit, in the absolutely decisive and influencing power of the will. In such a case the word would hold good of us: “she hath done what she could.” Consecration to the Lord would not indeed be absolutely, but yet relatively, perfect: according, that is, to the measure of our knowledge and the strength of our will. So far, then, as this consecration appears to me perfect, and is perfect in the sense just indicated, there may be a παῤῥησία [“boldness”] at the moment of this consciousness: I am assured that at this moment the light has the victory over the darkness. But if, in the course of further development, sin nevertheless manifests itself, this gives me to see that the last act of consecration to the Lord was, after all, not a complete one, and thus that, in the light of the absolute standard of the judgment, I do not stand as a τέκνοντοῦΘεοῦ [“child of God”]. This experience, then, evermore urges us, with respect to the past, to admit the force of the apostle’s word, οὐκἐγνώκαμεναὐτόν [“has not come to known him”], but only to aim at it all the more diligently. The consequence of this view is obvious, that in the moment of death every man must have come or must come to this perfect devotion, or he cannot stand in the judgment.
It hardly needs to be added, that this exposition of the section does not make it in the most distant way support the merit of good works. These come into view only as confirmation of the εἶναι ἐκτοῦΘεοῦ [“to be of God”]. But most assuredly they are in the apostle’s meaning the test, the standard of self-knowledge, by which we are to measure our relation to God. It cannot be made too emphatic that it is St. John himself, who impresses us always with the predominant inwardness of his spiritual nature, who founds the assurance of sonship on something more than any feeling or consciousness. He leaves the decision to the simple practical question as to the indwelling of sin. When the decision is against us, we are rescued from despair by the needful testimony, given in 1Jn 2:1-2, to Him who is the ἱλασμὸς περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν [“atoning sacrifice for sins”]. To make the works the means of knowing our spiritual state is not Johannaean only, it is Pauline also. We may compare 2Ti 2:19, according to which the firm foundation of God, that is, the Christian church, has for its seal or testing token: ἔγνω Κύριος τοὺς ὄντας αὑτοῦ, καὶ ἀποστήτω ἀπὸ ἀδικίας πᾶς ὁ ὀνομάζων τὸ ὄνομα Χριστοῦ [“the Lord knows those who are his, and everyone who names the name of Christ must abstain from unrighteousness”]. Of these two elements, however, only one falls into the domain of experience, and that is the second: this is therefore the norm or standard of our judgment of ourselves; the former is the source of our consolation. As soon as we view the words of St. John from the point to which they themselves conduct us, all difficulty disappears. Πᾶς ὁ γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐ δύναται ἁμαρτάνειν [“everyone born of God cannot sin”]: this is and must ever be an ideal for us; but it is at the same time the actual requirement, in the presence and by the application of which we can ascertain our position before God.
Πᾶς ὁ μὴ ποιῶν δικαιοσύνην, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ ὁ μὴ ἀγαπῶν τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὑτοῦ. As early as the introduction of his Epistle the apostle announced its twofold aim: to confirm, on the one hand, fellowship with the brethren, and, on the other, fellowship with God. The first part of the document is constructed on this principle of division; and the one we are now examining is similarly divided into two halves. The first and second chapters had treated generally of theκοινωνίατοῦφωτός [“fellowship of light”], the apostle has proceeded in this to the confirmation of the fellowship which produces παῤῥησία [“boldness”]. This confirmation takes place, on the one hand, through the works which are referred to God, that is, through the ποιεῖν τὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”]: this has been discussed in the section just ended, 1Jn 3:4-10 a. It takes place, on the other hand, through the works which approve brotherly love: these are discoursed of in 1Jn 3:10-18. That in a certain way brotherly love also belongs to the obedience to the divine commandments, and thus penetrates into the first section, the apostle had recognised in the second chapter, and it will be seen also in what follows. But it is also self-evident that the commandments of the second table have a relative independence by the side of those of the first. Looking at it from this point of view, St. John connects brotherly love with the exhortations to δικαιοσύνη [“righteousness”] by means of a καί [“and”], which makes it a second and co-ordinate exhortation. But who are the brethren thus to be loved? Are they the other members of the Christian fellowship, or men generally? When we consider that Cain and Abel are adduced as an exemplary warning, who were nevertheless only connected by physical consanguinity, and not by similarity of relation to God; when we find that the unrighteousness of hard dealing with those who are in bodily need is the subject; when the opposition to brotherly love is stated to be, not that the children of the world hate one another, but that the world hates us; when the example of Christ is urged, who, however, died for us when we were yet sinners: all these considerations might induce us to interpret the ἀδελφοὶ [“brothers”] as meaning all men at large. But, on the other hand, the exhortation ἀγαπῶμενἀλλήλους [“let us love one another”] can only refer to the Christian fellowship; for a mutual love between Christians and the world is, according to 1Jn 3:13, impossible, since the world must hate us. Moreover, the entire discussion of the apostle concerning love and hatred looks back to the final discourses of the Lord in the Gospel, and these refer exclusively to the relation of the apostles to each other. The arguments on both sides can have justice clone to them only when we recognise that St. John does not absolutely exclude love to all men, and that lie by no means limits with any care his requirements to the relations of Christians to each other; while, on the other hand, he reflects primarily and expressly only upon these, since the mutual conduct of the brethren lay at the moment nearest his heart. The world comes into view in the present Epistle, not so much as the field of Christian labour, or as a power to be vanquished and Christianized: it is rather the negative pole to the kingdom of God. The former view the apostle does not aim to deny; but he does notbring it directly into notice.