01.03. Chapter 2 Being of God Pt 1
CHAPTER II THE BEING OF GOD. THE fundamental doctrine of Theology is that there is a God; for if this is not true, there can be no science of God. The first duty of Theology, therefore, is to set forth the reasons men have for believing that such a being exists, and is a true object of dependence and worship.
1. GOD CAN BE SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN.
1. It is objected, however, to any science of God, that, if there is a God, he cannot be so known and comprehended as to be a true object of worship.
(1.) If by this is meant that we cannot know the essential nature of God, it proceeds upon a principle upon which we can know nothing, for we do not know the essential nature of anything. We know not even the nature of our own essence. We cannot know that of any existent being or substance, not indeed of the smallest atom of matter. We can only judge what it must be from the qualities it is perceived to possess, or from its outward manifestations. In like manner we can discover something of the nature of God from the different ways in which he has manifested himself in ourselves and in the universe.
(2.) If it is claimed that we cannot know him because his nature may be or must be wholly different from ours, the natural answer is that we do know many things which differ greatly from the mind which takes cognizance of them. Thus our own bodies, though purely material, are known through our mental faculties, and yet we believe mind and matter to be essentially diverse. We comprehend also our modes of existence, and those of other objects in time and space, though these modes are essentially different from the thing which exist in them.
Besides, until we know what God is, we cannot be sure that he is in all respects different from ourselves. If there are any points of similarity, we can know him so far as these exist; and, if it is true that we have been made, in any respect, in the likeness and image of God, our knowledge of God may approach at least to such completeness as to enable us to recognize his more manifest perfections, and to perceive that because of these he ought to be reverenced and worshipped.
Guided by the analogy of our own natures we expect to find it him a personal, conscious, intelligent, and moral being, and this expectation is confirmed by the manifestations of his presence, and operations in the universe. This teaching of analogy is not worthless because it has also led some to believe that God has a material body as has man. Analogy does not furnish proof, but only probability in some instances only possibilities. It does not show what God is, but what he may be. That which it suggests is confirmed or denied by other sources of knowledge. But we are so far taught through its aid that we learn that God must either be a Spirit, such as we are, or that he must have a higher nature to which belong all those attributes of spirit which constitute conscious personality and intelligent purpose.
(3.) Does the objection mean that we cannot know God because we cannot come in contact with him through the senses as we do with our fellow-men, and cannot learn his nature through his conduct and personal action as we do theirs? But it is not only through personal contact with men that we know that they are and what they are; we both know and judge of them by their works, though we have never seen nor known them personally. In like manner through our senses are we brought into contact with God, who though not material, is an artificer in material things, and has displayed before us, in the universe around, the evidences of his wisdom, power and goodness. Surely so great a structure as this, which manifests a grasp of thought, and a power of performance so wonderfully beyond that of any human being, and a minuteness of detail and execution and finish, the limitations of which defy discovery through the most powerful microscope that man can ever make, shows that it has been fashioned, if not created, by some being of personal purposing skill and power immeasurably beyond anything that we can possibly conceive.
(4.) Is it asserted that the outward phenomena of the universe cannot give such mental and spiritual knowledge of God as is essential to our apprehension and worship of him? Even were this true, we get that knowledge through our own spiritual and mental operations. We find in ourselves consciousness of existence, of thought and of purpose, and thus learn not only what these are in other intelligent beings, but that they must exist in every being whose nature is as high as, or higher than, that of man. We perceive that the mind is governed by laws no less binding and effective, no less regular and permanent, than those of matter. In the study of these we learn the nature of mind and spirit, not by direct apprehension of their essence, but, as in matter, by indirectly apprehending them through their phenomena. That nature we ascribe to the Divine Mind and Spirit. The differences of mental and spiritual capacities in men convince us that there are degrees of greater or less in mental and spiritual natures. Hence we assign to God mind and spirit in the highest degree, because as their author he must himself be greater than all his mental and spiritual creations.
But, in addition to this, we have a peculiar source of information. We find our minds capable of intuitive knowledge. Some abstract principles need only to be understood, and the conviction that they are true immediately follows. That "the whole is greater than an one of its parts" is perceived as soon as understood, as is likewise that "a thing cannot be, and not be, at the same time." Whence is this knowledge? We say that the mind is so constituted that it cannot believe otherwise. Who has so constituted it? It must proceed from some one upon whose veracity we rely, when we accept what our nature teaches. But, if from any one, then there is a creating mind, and that mind operates directly upon mind without the intervention of matter, and thus teaches us truth. When, then, we find other convictions of like nature relative to our dependent upon a higher being, our obligations of duty to him, our sense of right, and wrong, and the duty to do the right, and not to do the wrong, we cannot avoid believing that these intuitions come from the same source, and are his instructions to us as to our moral relation and duties to him.
2. But it is further objected that, if there is a God we cannot know him because he must be the Absolute, the Infinite, the Unconditioned, and, therefore, cannot be an object of comprehension to us, whose nature is finite, and whose mode of existence is only relative, finite and conditioned. But the objection itself presents its own refutation. How do we know that God must be such, if there is a God? In whatever way we know this, we know at least that much of God that he must be the Absolute, the Infinite, the Unconditioned. Even before we are supposed to know that he exists, therefore, we know this much of the nature which must be his, and upon the first evidence of his existence have the right to attribute to him all that is therein contained. The characteristics thus ascribed to him, reveal him, therefore, to us, as an infinite existence, without other limitations than are found in his own nature, or essence, who, as Absolute, cannot be dependent, but must be the source and Sovereign of all else; and, as the Unconditioned, cannot be subject to time, and space, and matter, and must therefore exist without possibility of growth, or increase, and without that succession of periods, such as yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow, and those measures of space, and location, which belong to matter. The God, therefore, who is thus proclaimed to be unknowable is at least known as a self-existent spirit, infinite, eternal and unchangeable in all the perfections that belong to his nature. Let but the least evidence appear that there is a God, and at once this nature may be ascribed to him. The recognition and contemplation of such a being, though his other perfections are unknown, awaken the reverence and fear, and conviction of the littleness and dependence of man which enter so largely into the sense of the supernatural and lead men everywhere, when in danger or distress, to call upon God, though not moved to prayer by any promise of answers thereto.
3. Again, it is objected that though we should learn something of God, we can only attain partial knowledge of him. This is readily admitted. But partial knowledge is actual knowledge as far as it goes. We have complete knowledge of nothing. All our knowledge is partial. The child only partially knows its parent. The subject only partially knows his sovereign. Yet enough is known for the recognition of dependence, and of the duties of obedience and love. So, also, with the Heavenly Father, the King of Kings; although we can only know him in part, we know enough to lead us to revere his sovereign power, and gratefully adore his Fatherly affection. The Scripture teaching upon this subject is twofold.
(1) It agrees with Agnosticism in asserting that God cannot be fully known. The questions of Zophar have been, with full reverence for God, and earnest worship for such an one as it is believed that he must be, the language of the pious of all ages. "Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection? It is as high as Heaven; what canst thou do? deeper than Hell; what canst thou know?" Job 11:7-8. Elihu is represented as saying, "Behold, God is great and we know him not." Job 36:26. And Job, after his description of God’s acts of power, declared, "Lo, these are but the outskirts of his ways; and how small a whisper do we hear of him! But the thunder of his power who can understand?" Job 26:14. The Psalmist, referring to the Omniscience and omnipresence of God, cried out, "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is high, I cannot attain unto it." Psalms 139:6.
(2) On the other hand, in opposition to Agnostics, the Bible declares that the partial knowledge of God attained by men is actual knowledge and not some inferior conception. God said through Jeremiah, "I will give them an heart to know me that I am the Lord" (Jeremiah 24:7), and again "they shall all know me from the least of them unto the greatest of them." Jeremiah 25:34. Our Lord himself, in his prayer to the Father, referring to those given to him that to them he should give eternal life declares " This is life eternal that they should know thee the only true God and him whom thou didst send, even Jesus Christ." John 17:3. The apostle who recorded this prayer uses this language, "He that knoweth God heareth us" (1 John 4:6), and also "He that loveth not, knoweth not God." 1 John 4:8. The Bible, therefore, plainly teaches that God may be known, and so known as to be truly worshipped.
II. ALMOST UNIVERSAL BELIEF IN GOD; ITS SOURCES.
Belief in the existence of God has been almost universal among men. The same ideal of perfection has not everywhere been found. Some have gone no farther than to be moved by the sense of the supernatural, and to believe in a power to which they are subject, and upon which they depend. But at least this much is to be found in the lowest, forms of fetish worshippers. Others have multiplied the numbers and forms of those towards whom they have felt this sense of dependence, and have accepted the existence of many gods. Yet, among these polytheists, the traces of the One God have not entirely disappeared, for they have referred the gods themselves to one originating source. Some, following too closely the analogy of man’s nature, have believed God to be the animating soul of the world. The highest spiritual conception of God has been found only in those nations which have been recipients of his revelation. But the most ancient records show that, in the earliest times, the knowledge possessed by all was comparatively simple and pure. So universal has been this belief, that but very few of the millions of the race in all its ages have denied the existence of God. It has been questioned whether these few have been deceived as to their actual convictions, or have been insincere in their avowal of Atheism; because it has seemed so impossible for man not to believe in a God. A greater number still have been skeptical; sometimes led by wishes born of depravity and sin, but, also, sometimes misled by philosophical speculations, and apparently earnestly desirous to know the truth. But the firm conviction of mankind in general that this belief is unavoidable in any man in his normal condition, and that its absence is due to some crushing out or erasure of his necessary moral capabilities, is seen, not only in the general horror which men have for those who profess Atheism, but in the denial to such men of the right to testify in the courts of justice.
1. This almost universal concurrence of men ought to be ascribe primarily to tradition.
Belief in God has been handed down from parent to child through out all past generations. Some theologians are unwilling to recognize this fact or to accept it as a cause of the universal belief in God. Some have sought that cause in the idea of God as innate in the mind. Others have simply rested upon other arguments be God’s existence, and taken the universal consent of mankind as evidence that this is not an idea unnatural to them, since they have yielded ready assent to the proofs of it commonly given. But a recognition of the traditional teaching will not weaken the argument. Even if it does, it is a fact which must be acknowledged. In favour of this as the primary source of this general belief it may be said,
(1.) That this is the natural manner in which every child among us learns about God. Its own questionings, or its parent’s convictions of the importance of this knowledge cause it to be imparted at an early period, and by direct teaching of the fact alone without proof.
(2.) Information obtained by travellers, and especially by Christian missionaries, teaches that our own customs agree with those of heathen nations, as they also do with those of Christendom in general.
(3.) This accounts for the fact, that, while the belief has varied at different times and places, it is held in the same form by almost every one within a single nation at a single period.
(4.) The uniformity, too, in which it has continued among any one people for many generations, is also proof of traditional origin.
(5.) The general existence of it in a purer form the nearer we approach the origin of the race, shows that belief in a God was the primeval belief of man, and has thence been handed down from father to son, until it has reached our own age and ourselves.
(6.) This accounts also for the fact that, when that faith has been corrupted, it has continued in the corrupted form until some new mental or spiritual force has arisen to introduce change, and to give new shape to the belief for some time to come.
2. The belief thus dependent on this traditional teaching is of great value as proof of the truth of this doctrine.
(1.) Its general prevalence shows that this doctrine is suitable to all mankind. It is one that, though worthy of the wisest thought, is not dependent upon philosophical conceptions, or abstract, or logical reasoning for its acceptance. The most ignorant of men have been able to grasp it. It is like that teaching of the Great Master, whom "the common people heard gladly." There has been something, in it, or connected with it, that has made all men believe it. What this is will be hereafter shown. But the fact that this simple teaching, from father to son, throughout all the ages, has been enough to make it dwell as a powerful and controlling influence in the hearts of the masses of mankind, is a strong proof not only of its truth, but also that it has come from God, whose universal gifts are of this simple nature, suitable to all.
(2.) That it has come down through all the ages, shows that it has come in contact with all the best thoughts of the wisest of mankind. That, in its study, the wisest and best, even among the heathen, have approached, in their noblest conceptions of it, to what we believe we have received through the revelation of God, affords a convincing argument, not only in favour of this noblest conception, but of the Divine Word which reveals it. The least that can be said is, that, after being subjected to every variety of thought, and philosophical speculation, this traditional belief has maintained itself as truth, and convincingly withstood every objection that has been brought against it.
(3.) The variety of forms in which it has appeared shows some universal cognition of some one or more fundamental truths which has led all men to believe in the existence of some kind of Divinity. It also teaches that, through the knowledge of no additional truth than such as is afforded by the light of nature only, some have attained more correct ideas approximating, though in very different degrees, that true knowledge which is attainable only through the revelations of Holy Scripture.
(4.) These simplest truths are seen to be a common possession of the higher heathen ideal, and of Divine revelation.
(5.) There is thus manifested, also, the existence of that knowledge of God in all men, which enforces the duty of worship and reverence, and causes accountability to him.
(6.) The continuance of this belief among those whose self-interest, because of sin, would naturally have led them to reject it, is a strong proof of the sincerity with which it has been held.
III. IS THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD INNATE? The knowledge of the insufficiency of mere tradition to prove the truth of any doctrine leads us to seek some other ground of this universal belief of mankind. Tradition has been pointed out as the primary source of this faith. But it is primary, in point of time only, not as the real cause of the general acceptance of the doctrine. Neither does the belief in a God arise from any of the various arguments which have been devised for its support. All men reach conviction on this subject before they ever hear any discussion about it. To the mass of men the arguments have been utterly unknown. While these arguments are, therefore, to be presented as confirmatory proof, we must seek some other cause for this continued general belief of man. The true reason of it is that such is the constitution of the human mind that it naturally accepts as true the idea it has attained of God, and rests upon brief in his existence, as a fact that ought not to be doubted.
1. This is generally expressed by the statement that the idea of God is "innate." But the expression seems to be unfortunate.
(1.) There are no innate truths in the ordinary acceptation of the word innate. The mind possesses no ideas independent of all suggestion, or inward contemplation. No truth becomes truth to the mind, until it is perceived to be truth.
(2.) If the idea of God were innate in the mind, as this word is commonly understood, that idea would be as perfect in one man as in another. But there are evidently various degrees of that perfection. These, therefore, must arise from the different measures of cultivation and thought, as well as from the different circumstances by which the elements which compose that idea in its perfection are suggested.
(3.) Inasmuch as the idea of God, possessed by most men in Christian lands, is the result of the teachings of the Scriptures, or at least of the philosophical studies of men of thought, and is therefore one of the loftier conceptions of God, when the innateness of such an idea is urged as a reason for belief in God, we are naturally met by the avowal, on the part of many, if not all, that they have no such innate idea.
(4.) Any idea of God which we have is not an idea of himself, but of certain relations existing between him, and man, or the universe, or of his relation to certain facts which we perceive in connection with these.
2. A better statement, therefore, is that the belief in God is based upon the intuitive perception by the mind of certain truths, which necessarily involve the existence of God, and of the verity of which it attains absolute conviction.
It has been already stated that man attains intuitive conceptions. He is not confined to a single method of obtaining knowledge. He arrives at truth through sensation. He is taught it by experience He believes testimony. He is conscious of himself. But he is also so constituted as to certain truths, that they are self-evident upon an intelligent conception of what is meant by them. No reasoning about them can make them, more convincing. No study of them, except as to the nature of the things affirmed, gives deeper conviction of their truth. No personal experience, nor testimony of others, gives stronger witness to their reliability. In each individual mind, according to its comprehension of what is meant by the things spoken of, there arises personal conviction of their indubitable truth. This is really what is meant, when it is affirmed that these ideas an innate in man.
All that is necessary, prior to such intuitive conception, is a knowledge of the meaning of the truth which is to be intuitively perceived. Take, for example, the mathematical axiom before quoted, "the whole is greater than any one of its parts." Before the truth of this is perceived, it is necessary to know what is meant by " whole," and "part," and "greater." As soon as these are known, the truth of the affirmation at once appears. It is on this account that the term "God," or the expression "the true idea of God," cannot be a part of an intuitive conception. We cannot know "God." We may know certain things about God. We have not "the true idea of God." We only have some true idea of God. Hence our statement was limited to the assertion, that "such is the constitution of the human mind that it naturally accepts the idea it has attained of God as true."
These intuitive conceptions are originally single. Sir William Hamilton makes simplicity a characteristic of intuitive truth. In opposition to this statement which he quotes, Dr. Charles Hodge contends that "all of the propositions of the First Book of Euclid were as plain at first sight to Newton as the axioms, and the same is true in our moral and religious nature. The more that nature is purified, and exalted, the clearer is its vision, and the wider the slope of its intuitions. * * * If a proposition be capable of resolution into simpler factors, it may still, to a powerful intellect, be seen as self-evidently true. What is seen immediately, without the intervention of proof, to be true, is, according to the common mode of expression, said to be seen intuitively." (Sys. Theol. Vol. 1, p. 193). Both of these writers appear to be right, and both wrong. Hamilton is correct in stating that simplicity is a characteristic of intuitive truth, but incorrect in maintaining, as a consequence, that no complex truth can he intuitively perceived. For the mind, in perceiving separately the correctness of two intuitive truths, may, at the same time, combine them into a single conception, if they are homogeneous, just as we unite the different qualities of any object, as a table, or chair, and express them by a single term. But the mind apprehends these separately before it thus connects them. Indeed, it never so unites them as not still to preserve their separable character, and to cognize them as such. "The clearer is its vision," and "the wider the slope of its intuitions," to use the figurative language of Hodge, the more distinctly separate and the more plainly plural do these intuitions appear.
3. In seeking, therefore, for the intuitive conceptions which enter into the idea of God, we ought not to be surprised that they are simple, and yet that two or more of them may unite in the proof of his existence. Thus is it, that, so far as God is known, his existence is intuitively known, however few or many may be the intuitions involved; for the mind, while originally perceiving them separately, still combines them together, and, as the result of all, as of each, believes that God exists. But the meaning of what is thus affirmed, in relation to a single intuition only, is far less than in relation to two, or three, or all. Of these intuitive conceptions we shall find that only the simpler are universally accepted. Greater intelligence, cultivation and thoughtfulness lead to the knowledge of others by some. Were these so stated to all as to be comprehended, they would be as fully acceptable to all as to any. They are limited as to their reception, not because they are less true, nor because the nature of one man accepts, while that of another rejects them, but because they have either not been suggested to the intellect, or, if suggested, their meaning has not been understood. The more of these that we know, and the higher the nature of the thought conveyed by them, the purer and the greater will be the meaning to us of the being of God.
4. Some of the more manifest of these may be taken as examples of their nature, and of their manner in which men arrive, through them, at the knowledge of God’s existence.
(1.) That which is dependent must have its final support in something purely independent.
(2.) Derived existence must have its ultimate origin in that which is self-existent.
(3.) Every effect must have its cause, either within, or without itself. The truth of the above affirmations must be admitted as soon as their meaning is perceived. But, if the first be true, there is some being upon whom men depend, and to whom, therefore, they are under obligations of duty and obedience, whom they must fear, and whose protection they must seek. This is the most general idea of God. If the second be true, the being upon whom men depend is, also, the one through whom they exist; or there are two beings, the one the source of life, the other the cause of its preservation and support. One of these will be independent, and the other self-existent. That the uncultivated should not perceive that these two are necessarily one, is not a matter of surprise. The possibility of this has allowed the existence of polytheism. But when they are thus united, the idea of God has been that of an independent, self-existent being, which is a complex idea, and is consciously based upon, not one, but two intuitive conceptions, though they are now united together. In like manner the third of these is accepted as soon as comprehended. It is only necessary to know what is meant by the terms "effect," and "cause within or without itself." This is attained through observation and experience. The idea of cause and effect is found even in very young children, who cannot be persuaded that anything has happened without a cause. Nor is it difficult to teach what is meant by "having the cause within or without itself." It may be illustrated by the difference between a clock moving its own hands because of its own mechanism, and the hands of the same clock moved by some person; or by that between a horse which has the power of self-motion, and the cart which moves only because he draws it. The meaning of the terms of this intuitive suggestion has not been difficult to comprehend, consequently the existence of God, as based upon it, has been generally accepted. To the common mind, especially, it has commended itself as teaching that God is the creator of the world, and thus accounting for the existence of all things that have been made. In this ease, also, men have not always associated the things which we see with the one God. In some forms of belief, they have divided the universe among more gods than one. In others, they have conceived of it as made by a god inferior to the Great Supreme, whom they recognized. But, in these varied ways, they have shown a universal acceptance of the idea of causality, and of the intuitive conception which arises upon its comprehension. The only objection made to it, is that of Hume and Kant, who have thought that the knowledge of causation must be limited by our experience. But this is an objection to the amount of evidence we have of the effects of causation, which truly is measured by experience only, but our knowledge of the universal nature of the law comes not from experience, but from intuitive conceptions based upon the knowledge of its meaning.
5. Other intuitive conceptions might be added which are not so simple, but which are as truly believed by those who comprehend them. Take for example some of those which enter into the idea of God as the perfect Being.
(1.) The distinctions of right and wrong must have some absolute standard, which is personal, conscious, unchangeable, and without limitations of time or space. But this is God.
(2.) Moral perfection cannot be merely ideal, but must have some real embodiment; else there could be no imperfection, and, especially, no, degrees of imperfection, since degrees imply the existence of that to which imperfection approaches, or from which it recedes, and this can only he absolute perfection. But absolute perfection is itself God.