John 9

CHAPTER IX

VI. Jesus Attests Himself by Healing a Blind Beggar, 9:1–12

John 9:1

1 All that John reports from 7:14 onward transpired in the Temple, and these Temple scenes are now ended. “Jesus went up into the Temple and was teaching,” 7:14, begins what 8:59 closes, “he went out of the Temple.” For the remainder of his present stay in Jerusalem we hear no more about his appearing in the Temple. Not until his next visit to the city is the Temple again mentioned (10:21). Yet Jesus remains in Jerusalem. Soon after the altercations in the Temple he attests himself by a remarkable miracle. By this deed he shows himself as the Light of the world, who bestows the light of life, just as he had showed it before by his Word (8:12). Those who reject him remain in darkness.

In this instance the Jews do not pounce upon the Sabbath desecration (5:16–18) but endeavor, though vainly, to discredit the miracle itself. This effort marks their progress in hostility and hardening. We see how the breach continues to widen as Jesus proceeds with his self-attestation.

And in passing by he saw a man blind from birth on. “And” (καί) merely “hooks” the new account to the one that precedes (R. 1180) and does not mean that Jesus saw the blind man on leaving the Temple. Moreover, this is the Sabbath (9:14), hardly the same day on which the Jews sought to stone him. Somewhere in the city, while walking along, Jesus came across the beggar blind “from birth on,” a classical phrase found only here in the New Testament in place of the more Hebraistic “from his mother’s womb on,” Acts 3:2. “From birth on” is at once mentioned, because the question of the disciples turns on this point, and then also because the healing of such a case is astonishing in the highest degree. When Jesus saw the man he stopped, and very likely the beggar himself told that he had never seen during his life.

John 9:2

2 And his disciples asked him saying, Rabbi, who did sin, this man or his parents, so that he was born blind? Here for the first time in connection with this visit to Jerusalem John mentions the disciples (2:2). In the two chapters preceding this one their presence required no mention for what John records; but they must have been with Jesus all along, as they were closely attached to their Master, and a rabbi without disciples would have been unusual and not impressive in public teaching. The disciples are perplexed about this beggar’s blindness. From the Old Testament the rabbis deduced that the sins of parents are punished in their children, yet the prophets said that each must bear his own sin. The disciples assume that a specific sin has been committed: “Who did sin?” ἥμαρτε, an aorist, to indicate a definite act of sin.

They are at a loss in regard to the person who committed the sin. If the sufferer himself committed the sin, then, seeing that he has been blind from birth on, his punishment would antedate his sin. On the other hand, if the parents sinned and as a result had a child born blind, the worst part of the penalty for their sin would lie upon the poor child.

On “Rabbi” see 1:38. It seems needless for B.-D. 391, 5 to struggle against the idea that ἵνα expresses actual result. He even advocates a different reading in order to escape this finding. Here, beyond doubt, we have not merely contemplated but actual result: “so that he was born blind.” See the confessions of J. H. Moulton and A. T. Robertson in R. 998. etc. Even the A. V., “that he was,” etc., while it is not decisive enough, is more correct than the R. V., “that he should be,” etc. In noting the inroads that ἵνα has made on the infinitive we must accept the idea that it. usurps the following uses and in this order: final, subfinal, consecutive (first contemplated, then also completed result).

John 9:3

3 Jesus answered, Neither did this man sin nor his parents but in order that the works of God should be made manifest in him. This, Jesus says, is not a case in which a specific sin either on the part of one or another person has produced a specific penalty. He corrects the general idea of the disciples to this extent that they must not consider every serious affliction the penalty for some equally marked and serious sin. At times this is the case (compare 5:14) but not always (compare Luke 13:1, etc.). Sin works out its painful and distressing results in many ways that are beyond our ability to trace. Jesus does not attempt enlightenment on this wide and intricate subject, either here or elsewhere.

Instead, he opens up an entirely new view in connection with the particular case before him. The disciples are not in every case of suffering to look back to find a possible cause of sin but to look forward to the divine purpose which God may have in providentially permitting such suffering to come upon a person. To be sure, all suffering in this sinful world is the outcome of sin in some way or other, but this is only half of the story. The other half is that God governs even in this wide field, and in some instances we are able to trace his purpose, especially those of grace and mercy, in allowing certain afflictions to befall a man. Here, in the man born blind, we have a case of this kind.

The adversative ἀλλά is elliptical: “on the contrary, this man was born blind,” etc. This time ἵνα is plainly final: “in order that,” etc. For the aorist subjunctive φανερωθῇ indicates a future event: “the works of God should be made manifest”; and not like the aorist subjunctive in v. 2, γεννηθῇ, a past event: “was born.” “The works of God” which Jesus has in mind are the ones now about to be wrought, not merely works of omnipotence over against human impotence, but blessed works of mercy and grace for the blind man’s body and his soul. Moreover, these are to affect not only the blind man himself but are to shine out for many others to see. The verb “should be made manifest” implies that the works of God are so often hidden from general view; so this man’s blindness is to serve God in making these works of his public before men.

John 9:4

4 We must work the works of him who did send me while it is day: the night is coming when no one can work. The reading ἡμᾶςδεῖκτλ. is assured: “We” must work, etc., instead of ἐμέ: “I” must work, etc. Jesus thus includes his disciples: they, too, will have works of God to do. These “works of God” are wrought through agents, namely through Jesus and his disciples; yet they remain “God’s” works. When they are now called “the works of him who did send me,” we see that these are the works which comprise the mission of Jesus, for which he had appeared on earth. The share assigned to the apostles will appear after the resurrection of Jesus, on Pentecost.

Here the reading is μέ and not ἡμᾶς: who did send “me.” Invariably the distinctiveness of the sending of Jesus is adhered to: we have only one Redeemer. Always also the Father sent Jesus, and Jesus sends the apostles; a resemblance exists between the acts (καθώς, “as,” John 20:21) but nothing more. Their sending is only an outgrowth of that received by Jesus, wholly subsidiary to his and nothing more. The idiom δεῖ is used to denote all forms of necessity, here according to the context one that is involved in the Father’s sending of Jesus. “To be working (present infinitive) the works,” one by one as required, is to carry out the commission of the greater Sender of Jesus. And these works are “made manifest” (v. 3), displayed for men to see, when they are “worked,” actually performed.

The emphasis is on the temporal clause, “while (ἕως, R. 976) it is day,” for which reason also the thought of this clause is elaborated by pointing to the coming of the night when no one can work. The figure of the day which is terminated by the night must not be pressed beyond the point of comparison intended by Jesus, namely the time allotted to Jesus by the Father for accomplishing his mission. We may refer “the night is coming” to the death of Jesus, in harmony with his cry on the cross, “It is finished!” and with the word in his high-priestly prayer, “I glorified thee on the earth, having brought to a finish the work which thou hast given me to do,” 17:4, etc. The figure is made general by the addition, “when no one can work,” and thus includes also the apostles and the time allotted to them for their work. We must not bring in the work which Jesus does in his glorified state since his death, for this is of an altogether different type, a work which rests on the perfectly completed task performed here on earth. Moreover, Jesus combines his working with that of the apostles, and their work will cease at death with no continuation in an exalted form in heaven.

John 9:5

5 Returning from the reference to all the works he must be busy doing in his mission to the one work which is now in order upon this blind beggar, Jesus adds: As long as I may be in the world I am a light of the world. The use of ὅταν, which generally means “whenever” when it is construed with the subjunctive, is unusual. To say that it has the idea of duration (R. 972) is hardly to the point. The ἐάν in the compound ὅταν rather points to the indefinite length of Jesus’ stay in the world. He expects to stay for a time yet, but he withholds mention of how long this will be. In 8:12 he calls himself “the Light of the world” (subject and predicate being convertible, hence the article with this predicate), i.e., “the light absolutely and forever.” Here he speaks only of the brief time that yet remains of his visible stay in the world of men.

Hence the predicate is without the article: “a light.” It merely states that while he remains as he now is he will shed light. As a light in a dark place he cannot but send forth the radiance of truth and grace. When he enters the glory of heaven and there shines as “the light of the world,” that activity will rest on what he now does and will complete during his earthly mission.

John 9:6

6 At once suiting the act to the word, John reports: Having said these things in explanation of what he intended to do, for the beggar as well as for his disciples to hear, he spat on the ground and made mud of the spittle and put the mud of it on the eyes and said to him, Go wash in the pool of Siloam (which [name] is interpreted, Sent). The αὑτοῦ is to be construed with τὸνπηλόν and not with τοὺςὀφθαλμούς. For the sake of the blind man Jesus here uses sign language. The only answer we know for the question as to why Jesus proceeded in this fashion (as also in Mark 7:33; 8:23) is that he knew best how to is that he knew best how to obtain his object. By placing the mud from his own spittle on the beggar’s eyelids he lets him know that the healing power comes from Jesus. The beggar is not merely to wash off this mud, for which any place that had water would suffice, but to wash it off in the pool of Siloam, which word or name ὅ (neuter) signifies ἀπεσταλμένος, “the One Sent.” For the beggar to act on this strange command with nothing but an implied, promise, requires some degree of faith, which certainly also is intended to be aroused by Jesus as in the analogous case of the ten lepers, Luke 17:14.

We may call these effects on the beggar psychological, if we will. Since the beggar is to cooperate in the procedure of his healing by going and washing in that pool, it is ill-advised to deny these effects on the score that they are psychological.

One is surprised at the strange ideas that have been connected with this proceeding of Jesus. One is that spittle was considered medicinal; but Jesus uses mud. Another is that Jesus wished to create a delay in order to let the crowd scatter: but no crowd is at hand. Still another is that Jesus meant to give the eyes time to develop sight, since this was a case where the man was born blind; but what about the man born with deformed limbs in Acts 3:2, etc.? Finally, we are told that plastering the man’s eyes with mud was symbolical, adding an artificial to his natural blindness by making him close his mud-plastered eyelids over his sightless eyeballs. This is to symbolize that men, who are by nature spiritually blind, are to be brought to a realization of their sad spiritual condition.

Preachers thus often allegorize the miracles of Jesus, because they have no other way of getting anything out of them for their hearers. To turn simple facts, infinitely weighthy as facts, into pictures and allegory is illegitimate in preaching and even worse in exegesis.

The indeclinable Hebrew name Shiloach, “Siloam,” with its masculine genitive article τοῦ, is here translated by John for his Greek readers by the nominative masculine perfect participle ὁἀπεσταλμένος, “the One Sent,” i.e., who, having been sent, has that character and quality. This, of course, is not merely an interesting incidental philological remark that John inserts. On the contrary, John here asks his readers to substitute “the One Sent” for “Siloam”: “the pool of the One Sent,” the pool that belongs to him; for “of Siloam” is the genitive of possession. Both the spring and the pool it formed are called Siloam; but in the combination “the pool of Siloam” the genitive must denote the spring. In v. 11 the beggar repeats the significant name, this time applying it to the pool. What distinguishes this spring is the fact that it flows from the Temple hill and forms its pool at the foot of that hill.

For this reason Isa. 8:6 uses Siloam and its waters as a symbol of the blessings that flow from the Temple; likewise, the water of Siloam was used in the sacred rites of the Feast of Tabernacles as we have seen in connection with 7:38. We must, therefore, say that just as Jesus used the Temple as his own Father’s house, in which he has a Son’s rights, so now he appropriates this Temple pool and its waters for his sacred purposes. How the spring and the pool originally came to be called “Siloam” need not be inquired into; they now became, indeed, the spring and the pool of Jesus, the One Sent. They were appropriated by him and used in his mission of making manifest the works of God and thus sending out light in the world (v. 3 and 5).

We cannot assume that Jesus selected this pool for the beggar’s washing without himself being conscious of the meaning of its name. Too often he speaks of his Sender and thus designates himself as the One Sent. He never acts without the most comprehensive insight. In this instance even the disciples may well have caught the connection: “Wash in the pool of Siloam—of the One sent.” Even the beggar does not afterward say merely, “Go wash!” but, “Go to Siloam and wash!” To apply the name Siloam to the beggar as being “the one sent” is beside the mark; likewise, that the pool is another “one sent,” completing the work of Jesus as also being “One Sent.” To think of some medicinal power in the water of this pool that was great enough to give sight to a man born blind is ridiculous. An elaborate allegory has been attached to the name “Siloam.” The pool is Jesus. “Go to the pool!” means, “Go to Jesus!” The open, sightless eyes are closed with mud to impress the fact that man born blind by nature cannot see. “Siloam,” Jesus, gives man spiritual sight. Clay was used because God’s creative power used clay when he made man in Eden.

Into this allegorical structure is mixed another figure, namely that the beggar’s sight pictures that Jesus is the world’s light. Mud, water, light—strange mixture! This entire structure is shattered at the start when we see that only the name “Siloam” means “the One Sent” in the phrase, “in the pool of Siloam”; the pool itself might have had some other name.

Briefly John reports: He went away, therefore, and washed and came seeing. “Therefore,” οὗν, certainly excludes the notion that the beggar acted on the word of Jesus as so many ignorant people do who are ready to try any questionable means suggested to them to remove some ailment. All that really transpired in his heart, who can tell? Let us not forget that he heard what Jesus said to his disciples, that the very presence and every word and action of Jesus always make a deep impression, that he knew the name of Jesus (v. 11). Possibly he had heard of some of the miracles wrought by Jesus. The almighty power of Jesus wrought the miracle the moment the man washed in accord with the promise implied in the command. The beggar merely “washed,” i.e., dipped up some water and washed the mud off his eyes.

Because the use of εἰς with static verbs and verbs of condition and being in the Koine has become known only quite recently, the idea has long been entertained, and some still hold it, that the beggar plunged into the pool because Jesus says: νίψαιεἰς; or in some other way the notion of “into” is retained. Jesus said, “Wash in the pool!” and here εἰς means nothing but “in.”

John 9:8

8 Naturally the man went home. Jesus, too, had quietly gone on, and the beggar could not have found him. Arrived at home, great excitement ensued. The neighbors, therefore, and they that formerly saw him that he was a beggar were saying, Is not this he that was sitting and begging? Some were saying, This is he; others were saying, No, but he is like him. He was saying, I am he.

The neighbors and others are here mentioned, because of what some of these do, namely take the beggar to the Pharisees (v. 13); we shall hear about the parents later. R. 866 makes the present participle οἱθεωροῦντες gnomic (timeless), which is questionable; B.-D. 330 points to the adverb and to the following imperfect ἦν as turning the time of the present participle back into the past, which may suffice. Since the Greek has no imperfect participle but uses the present instead, why not apply that fact here as being the most natural explanation? All the verbs of saying are imperfects ἔλεγον, etc. When we are merely told that a statement was made, the aorist is used, εἶπεν, “he said”; but when we are to think of how the person was speaking (Schilderung), or when the statement of an indefinite number of persons is introduced, we have the imperfect, B.-D. 329.

The question with οὑχ shows great surprise. “Why shows great surprise. “Why this is the same man—incredible!” The two present participles describe the beggar as they know him, “the one sitting and begging,” for which our idiom demands the past tense. On the article in the predicate see R. 768.

John 9:9

9 Some are sure of the man’s identity, others find only a resemblance to him. The beggar himself openly and joyfully declares that he is, indeed, the man.

John 9:10

10 Naturally these people ask, How then were thine eyes opened? and the beggar narrates the story quite correctly.

John 9:11

11 The previous imperfects of the verbs of saying are now repeated with the simple aorist: He answered: The man that is called Jesus made clay and anointed my eyes and said to me, Go to Siloam and wash. Having gone away, therefore, and having washed, I got to see. We see that Jesus was a stranger to the beggar, who had heard only his benefactor’s name. Too much is read into ὁἄνθρωπος when this is thought to mean “the well-known man.” The variation in quoting the command of Jesus is insignificant and negligible. The Greek would subordinate the subsidiary actions of going and of washing by using two aorist participles and employing a finite verb only for the main action. The English would not make the distinction, saying, “So I went away and washed and got my sight.” The aorist ἀνέβλεψα is ingressive, “I recovered my sight” (ἀνά, after having lost it at my birth).

John 9:12

12 To the further question: Where is he? he is able to reply only: I do not know, this evidently also being the reason why he had gone home.

VII. Jesus’ Attestation Through the Beggar Nonpluses his Opponents, 13–34

John 9:13

13 John devotes considerable space to the story of this beggar, whose name he withholds. In chapter five only the alleged breach of the Sabbath is charged against Jesus; here this breach is repeated, yet the Pharisees make no issue of that point but endeavor to discredit the miracle itself. This marks the advance in their wilful blindness. In chapters seven and eight Jesus shines as the Light of the world by the testimony of his word against which the Jews deliberately close their eyes. Now Jesus shines as the Light by an astonishing miraculous deed. By this deed he “makes manifest the works of God” (v. 3).

It is only incidental that this deed consists in the opening of the eyes of a blind beggar. Hence we should not carry allegory into the miracle. The final words of Jesus on spiritual sight and blindness in v. 39–41, are suggested by the restoration of physical sight to the beggar, yet constitute no allegory. The words are literal and matter-of-fact and, in fact, go far beyond any allegory that might be drawn from the blindness of the beggar and the miraculous gift of sight to him.

No connective joins this account to the preceding, which indicates a lapse of time. They bring him to the Pharisees, him once blind. Possibly several days elapsed. We must note that ἅγουσιν has no subject. It is rather hasty to conclude that the neighbors and others who used to see the blind man begging constitute the subject. Why should they bring the blind man to the Pharisees?

To answer, because their opinions were divided, and because they thus sought an authoritative decision, is conjecture; for the only difference in opinion was as to whether this was really the blind beggar or only somebody who looked like him, who had never been blind at all and was posing as the beggar. This question the beggar himself settled from the start, and if any doubt were yet possible, the man’s parents had certainly removed that. Moreover, the man’s identity is not at all the question brought before the Pharisees. In their investigation no such question is even touched. The effort to read something hostile into the question of v. 12, “Where is he?” is also unwarranted. John records this question and its simple answer only to prepare for the next meeting of Jesus with the beggar, v. 35, etc.

We are also to see how this insignificant beggar, who had come into contact with Jesus but once in his life, stood up before the Pharisees and defended his benefactor most manfully. The account would lose an illuminating point if John had not written verse 12.

This subjectless ἄγουσιν is like the German man brachte ihn—somebody or other did this. The most probable view is that one or the other of the Pharisees had heard about this beggar and had the case brought to the attention of others of his party. Thus we find a gathering of “the Pharisees.” They came together in some convenient place in order to look into this case. Some commentators speak only of a meeting of the Pharisees for some unknown purpose or other. They met in order to investigate this case. This accounts for ἄγουσιν—being too important for any of their standing to go after a mere beggar, they have somebody else bring him before them.

During the whole proceeding with the man we hear of no neighbors or others who ask to have any question settled for them by the Pharisees. These Pharisees are the only ones who show concern, and even they do not know just what they want; for presently they themselves are divided. These Pharisees do not act as a regular court, either as belonging to the Sanhedrin, or as one of the two lesser courts in Jerusalem, each constituted of twenty-three members, or as rulers of a local synagogue. They act only as an incidental gathering of men of the influential Jewish party, just Pharisees who are bent on making their superior influence felt.

John 9:14

14 Now it was a Sabbath on the day when Jesus made the mud and opened his eyes. John does not write γάρ, “for,” as though this were a charge brought forward by somebody or the reason why the Pharisees called in the beggar; he writes δέ, marking this statement as parenthetical, a point he wants us to note so that we may understand what follows. On the phrase ἐνᾗἡμέρᾳ, literally, “on what day,” for “on the day on which,” see R. 718 “incorporation.” To make mud on the Sabbath the Pharisees regarded as a forbidden work; to heal the sick likewise, except in extreme cases, and this case they would not consider extreme—it could wait until Sunday.

John 9:15

15 Again, therefore, the Pharisees were also asking him how he got his sight, just as the people about the beggar’s home did in v. 10. The imperfect ἠρώτων is like those used in v. 8, etc. Due, no doubt, to caution the beggar makes his answer brief. And he said to them, Mud he put upon my eyes, and I washed, and I see. Note the present tense: “and I see.”

John 9:16

16 Some, therefore, of the Pharisees were saying, This man is not from God because he guards not the Sabbath. But others were saying, How can a man (that is) an open sinner do such signs? And there was a division among them. The imperfects permit us to view the scene: Pharisees against Pharisees. The conclusion of the first group is certainly correct: one sent and commissioned by God (παρὰΘεοῦ, from his side) would certainly guard (τηρεῖ, as in 8:52) and observe the Sabbath law in his conduct; but God never ordained the Sabbath traditions set up by the Pharisees and regarded by them as more sacred than the divine law itself. The argument of the second group is equally to the point.

A man who is a ἁμαρτωλός, “an open sinner” in the sight of God such as a breaker of the Sabbath would be, could not possibly do such signs as this one wrought upon the blind beggar. In the ancient epitaphs found in Asia Minor ἁμαρτωλός is used like ἐπάρατος, “cursed,” and ἔνοχος, “guilty,” “let him be a sinner before the subterranean gods,” to be treated as one accursed by the gods, Deissmann, Light from the Ancient East, 115; sceleste, 322, 3. The first group of the Pharisees thus questions the reality of the miracle. By saying that this man who does not observe the Sabbath is not from God, they mean that Jesus could not have wrought a miracle—there must be something phony about the case. This the second group contradicts, accepting the reality of the miracle—and let us note—of others like it in spite of the alleged Sabbath violation, for which they have no satisfactory explanation. The conclusion of neither group is decisive; neither one is able fully to prove its contention.

What is suspicious about the case? How can the Sabbath violation be denied? So the division remained.

John 9:17

17 Both groups are helpless to break the deadlock. They know of nothing else to do but once more to turn to the beggar. They say, therefore, to the blind man again, What dost thou say concerning him, seeing that he opened thine eyes? It sounds significant for John to designate the beggar as “the blind man” in a connection like this—these Pharisees, who considered themselves so far removed from blindness, asking the verdict of a blind man! There is no need to refer λέγουσιν only to one or to the other of the two groups indicated in v. 16. Both are helplessly battling with a difficulty, and so they ask the beggar “again.” There is no need also to inquire what they hoped to obtain from the beggar by asking him again—they themselves probably had no clear idea.

As in 2:18, we regard ὅτι as elliptical: this we ask “since,” or “seeing that,” etc. We must not regard “seeing that he opened thine eyes” as an admission on the part of the Pharisees that Jesus had actually done this—John himself cautions us against that. This clause is spoken from the standpoint of the beggar and merely repeats his testimony.

And he said, He is a prophet. It certainly took courage to give this answer before these authoritative persons. Here we begin to admire the man. He might have hidden his conviction by saying, “I do not know.” He is honest and confesses. That Jesus must be classed as a prophet of God was beyond question to him.

John 9:18

18 Now that the Pharisees had the plain verdict of the beggar, they refuse to accept it and revert to their suspicion of some kind of a collusion between the beggar and Jesus. Their minds cannot let go of the thought that something must be crooked about this apparent miracle. Someone among them hit upon the bright idea of questioning the man’s parents. This might not at all be their blind son, or they may know what is back of the affair. So John informs us: The Jews, therefore, in spite of the beggar’s verdict, did not believe concerning him that he was (formerly) blind and received his sight (as he had testified) until they called the parents of him that received his sight and asked them, etc. John now writes “the Jews” instead of “the Pharisees,” but only to bring out the hostility of these men.

So often in this Gospel “the Jews” has this implication. On the tenses ἦν and ἀνέβλεψεν see R. 1029; we should write pluperfects: “had been blind,” “had received his sight.” Also ἕωςὅτου is merely a set phrase, R. 291. Not that the Jews believed the fact of the miracle after questioning the parents; for they got nothing whatever from them, and “until” never itself implies that the reverse follows afterward.

John 9:19

19 So the parents are brought in, and after the beggar had been ordered out of the room, the Jews asked them, saying, Is this your son, of whom you yourselves say that he was born blind? How, then, does he now see? The point of the first question lies in ὑμεῖς (emphatic) λέγετε. The couple might, indeed, say that this is not at all their son; but for such testimony the Jews have little hope. Hence the stress on the other point: does this couple really mean to say that this son of theirs, if he is their son, was actually born blind? And if this too is true, then the most important point of all: How in the world does he now see?

John 9:20

20 The parents answer each point in turn. They are most excellent witnesses, for they testify only to what they know at firsthand. John, too, introduces their testimony with two finite verbs (see 1:48). His parents, therefore, answered and said, We know that this is our son and that he was born blind.

John 9:21

21 On the third and vital point they are more explicit, for they answer with a double statement and even add a piece of pertinent advice. But how he now sees we do not know; or who opened his eyes we ourselves do not know. Note the emphatic ἡμεῖς, “we ourselves,” in the second statement. They know no more than these Jews or anyone else. What they have heard, the Jews and others have likewise heard. So they add what is certainly to the point if these self-constituted judges desire firsthand testimony: Ask him; he has age (is a grown man); he himself shall speak for himself. To be sure, that is the only correct and sensible thing to do.

John 9:22

22 The carefulness of the parents in assuming no responsibility of any kind before these Pharisees is explained by John. These things his parents said because they were fearing the Jews; for already the Jews had agreed that if anyone should confess him as Christ, he should be one banned. To such a pitch the hatred of the Jews, namely the party of the Pharisees, had already risen that by a general agreement among themselves they had determined on the severest Jewish measures against possible believers in Jesus who should dare to confess him as “Christ,” the promised Messiah. These stern measures were to act as a deterrent. The Pharisees were numerous and powerful enough to carry out their threat. Subfinal ἵνα introduces the substance of the agreement; and ἐάν reads as though the Jews expected such cases to occur. John has two accusatives with ὁμολογεῖν, the second being predicative to the first, R. 480.

To become or to be made an ἀποσυνάγωγος does not refer to one who does not dare to enter a synagogue but to one who is expelled from the religious communion of Israel, cut off from all its blessings, hopes, and promises, like a pagan or Gentile. We have no assurance that the later double ban was known in the times of Jesus, a minor ban lasting for thirty, sixty, or ninety days, and a major ban for all time. The New Testament references read as though the expulsion was permanent. Grave civil and social disabilities were as a matter of course connected with the ban. The aposynagogos would be treated as an apostate who was accursed, under the cherem or ban. No wonder these parents were careful of their words. When they refer the Pharisees to their son they seem to have known that he would be able to take care of himself; at least, he here shows that he can do so.

John 9:23

23 On this account his parents said, He has age, is a grown man; ask him. They have no fears for their son. Thus John points out why they added just these words.

John 9:24

24 Having gained nothing by their second effort and being without any other prospect of success, the Pharisees would like to close the case. So for a second time they called the man that was blind and said to him, Give glory to God: we ourselves know that this man is an open sinner. In all due form as before a court of law the beggar is again brought in. Expectantly he faces these Jews who pose as a court, wondering what they had extracted from his parents. It is John who calls him “the man that was blind” (we should say, “had been blind”). The investigation has ended, the verdict is now handed out, and, though it deals with Jesus, is addressed to the beggar.

One of the Jews acted as spokesman. “Give glory to God” is an adjuration (compare Josh. 7:19; 1 Sam. 6:5) to seal as the truth before God the summary of the whole matter at which these Pharisees have arrived and to which they demand that the beggar should solemnly assent by himself assuming the adjuration plus the finding to which it is attached. The A. V. has, “Give God the praise,” which is generally understood to mean, “Give the credit for your healing to God not to Jesus.” But this is incorrect. In their verdict the Pharisees admit nothing about the healing; they do not even say that God wrought it; they ignore it altogether. What they say is this: “Give glory to God by now telling the truth, and this is the truth, which we now positively know—and we are the people to know, ἡμεῖς—that this man is an open sinner, ἁμαρτωλός (as in v. 16).” They imply that they have sounded this thing thoroughly, that besides the man’s testimony they have heard that of others, and the only correct conclusion of the whole case is what they now state. They count on their superior authority to effect submission on the part of the beggar.

Many others have put forth the same kind of authority and often enough have found submission.

It seems that the second group mentioned in v. 16 yielded their opinion. The reference to Jesus is derogatory throughout, as here “this man,” never deigning to mention so much as his name.

John 9:25

25 But this beggar is a steady disappointment and a growing surprise to the Pharisees. Trench calls him ready-witted, genial, and brave. Really he is far more: honest, grateful, and entirely sincere—and this especially differentiates him from his judges. Not for one moment does he accept their finding as true. The fatal flaw in that finding is the omission of his healing. Instead of uttering the truth regarding that and a true conclusion based on it concerning the healer, it leaves out the healing altogether and from some other premises draws a conclusion that is wholly false.

He on his part (ἐκεῖνος, emphatic subject), therefore, answered, Whether he is an open sinner, I do not know; one thing I do know, that being blind, I now see. Over against the emphatic we know of the Pharisees this beggar puts his own emphatic I do know; and in the clash the beggar wins because his knowledge is real, that of the Pharisees pretended. There he stands with his bright, shining eyes, looking right at the Pharisees. Can they not see those eyes of his? Here, right before them, just as Jesus said (v. 3 “the works of God are made manifest.” But these men deliberately stultify themselves: they will not see what so magnificently challenges their sight.

An indirect question is introduced by εἰ, “whether.” The action of is thrown the past by the adverb “now” and becomes, as R. 892, 1115 says, a sort of imperfect particle. By their foolish proceeding these Pharisees start this beggar toward doing his own simple, straightforward thinking and toward drawing his own truthful conclusions. By trying to oppose the truth they only help to further the cause of truth. It is often thus. When the beggar says that he does not know whether Jesus is an open sinner he means that he has no knowledge on this point, so that he can testify as to that. In a moment we find him saying far more.

We actually see him growing in courage and in conviction. “One thing” he “does know” and again testifies: once blind, he now sees. Facts are facts. And this one is so patent that the Pharisees themselves dare not deny it.

John 9:26

26 The verdict, with which these judges seek to end the case, is smashed. they are back where they were before and as utterly helpless; their state is even worse. All they know is to ask the old questions over again. They, therefore, not knowing what else to say, said to him (whereas he had replied, they only said), What did he to thee? how did he open thine eyes? Are they parleying for time? Attempting to sit as judges, they have plainly lost their hold. Already they are admitting what they are determined not to admit, that Jesus opened this beggar’s eyes.

John 9:27

27 The man takes full advantage of their predicament and of the weak questions they put to him. He answered them, and his answer was an answer. I told you already, and you did not hear. Why do you want to hear again? You, too, certainly do not want to become his disciples? This is a telling thrust. The helplessness of the Pharisees emboldens the beggar. Instead of allowing himself to be put on the defensive by having to go over the story of his healing again before these men, whose only purpose is to catch him up in some way, he puts them on the defensive. The tables are being turned. They, the judges, thought to question him, the defendant; he now becomes the judge and probes them as defendants with telling questions. God helps his own in the tests to which they are put for Jesus’ sake.

“I told you already” means that they already have the truth. “And you did not hear” means that they did not believe that truth. If, then, they did not believe it the first time, why do they want to hear (“be hearing,” present tense) it again? Judicial reason there can be none. Is there perhaps another reason? Two might suggest themselves. The one would compromise these judges badly, namely that they are trying to upset and confound that truth.

To the honest mind of this beggar this answer does not appeal; at least he does not voice it. He takes the other, namely that after all these Pharisees, impressed by beholding the eyes which Jesus had opened, would also like to become his disciples. With μή the beggar suggests that he can hardly think this possible but—strange things happen. He is hardly making only an artful thrust at the Pharisees; his artless simplicity leads him to entertain the thought that possibly these men are willing to change their minds about Jesus. The suggestion about becoming disciples of Jesus is something like an invitation to join the beggar in this; for καί, “you, too,” intimates that he is ready to be such a disciple. Alas, their will (θέλετε) is absolutely contrary.

John 9:28

28 And they reviled him and said, Thou art that fellow’s disciple; but we are disciples of Moses. We know that God has spoken to Moses; but as for this fellow, we do not know whence he is. To revile is all that is left the Pharisees—a sign of complete bankruptcy. They caught the force of καί in the second question of v. 27 and charge the beggar with being a disciple of Jesus. The genitive “of this fellow,” ἐκείνου, is highly derogatory. Hoc vocabulo removent Jesum a sese, Bengel.

By calling the beggar Jesus’ disciple these Pharisees imagine that they are reviling and heaping shame and insult upon him; in reality they could offer no higher testimonial of honor and praise to him. With an emphatic ἡμεῖς they place themselves over against the beggar with the proud and lofty assertion, “We—we are the disciples of Moses!” Here they pronounce sentence upon themselves, and out of their own mouth the Lord will judge them at the last day. Moses himself, on whom they set their hope, will accuse them, 5:45. There is, indeed, a difference between Moses and Jesus; for “the law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ,” 1:17. But all that Moses wrote he wrote concerning Jesus, 5:46; even the law, of which he was the mediator, was to be for us a παιδαγωγός, a boy’s slave-conductor, to lead us to Christ. These Pharisees were the disciples of a fictitious Moses, whom they had invented for themselves, and who did not exist.

John 9:29

29 And now they imitate the beggar’s own words, “I do not know—I do know” (v. 25), but they reverse the two, “We—we know (emphatic ἡμεῖς)—we do not know.” In the first assertion, “We know!” speaks the voice of arrogant authority, seconded by the other assertion, “We do not know!” spoken with the same authority. What we know, that alone counts; what we do not know, regarding that nobody dares to pronounce. And knowledge is our personal prerogative; whoever does not bow to us and our knowledge knows nothing, and whoever presumes to know anything we do not know is a fool. Even to this day the skeptic, the agnostic, and a certain type of scientist take the same attitude. It pretends to intellectuality, but at bottom the intellect is made to voice only the attitude of an ungodly heart.

These Pharisees claim that they know “that God has spoken to Moses,” for instance in Exod. 3:2–4 and in other cases. They lack only the essential thing, a knowledge of what God really said to Moses (“he wrote of me,” 5:46; the Scriptures “testify of me,” 5:39). Many even know much about the Scriptures, and yet their knowledge is empty of the real substance. This the Pharisees themselves declare when they add, “but as for this fellow, we do not know whence he is,” The scornful accusative τοῦτον, while it is the object of the verb, is placed forward, almost as if it were independent; and in what respect they do not know “this fellow” is added by the indirect question, “whence he is,” i.e., who sent him, or by whose authority he comes. The implication, however, is not that perhaps God after all sent him but that somebody else sent him, or that as an impostor he came on his own authority, certainly without God’s commission.

John 9:30

30 Even the simple logic of the man whom the Pharisees seek to override pierces through this flimsy armor. The two verbs: The man answered and said to them mark the importance of the beggar’s reply. Why, just in this is the marvel, that on your part you do not know whence he is, and yet he opened my eyes. We know that God does not hear open sinners; but if anyone be a God-fearing person and do his will, him he hears. From eternity it was never heard that anyone opened the eyes of one born blind. If this man were not from God, he would be able to do nothing.

Boldly the beggar makes an actual speech. It is precipitated by the assertion of the Pharisees that they do not know whence Jesus is, meaning that he is certainly not from God, and that certainly God never spoke to him and gave him a commission, as he did Moses. Instead of bringing their awkward case to something like a satisfactory end, the Pharisees themselves, against their own intentions, stir the beggar up to make this penetrating reply. They have actually only furthered the beggar’s thinking; for while at first he is not ready to discuss whether Jesus is an open sinner or not, now he proves conclusively that he must be the very opposite, “a God-fearing person” who does God’s will. The logic of the little lecture is invincible. It deals with premises which are axiomatic to all Jews, hence the conclusion is inevitable.

The beggar’s parents were wise, indeed, when they told the Pharisees, “Ask him, he has the age!” The tables are completely turned. The judges are judged—and by a beggar!

On the use of γάρ at the head of a new statement see B.-D. 452, 2, and R. 1190. The thing itself is very plain, and the beggar sees it. Jesus had opened his eyes—that shows whence he is; it is a manifest (v. 3, φανερωθῇ) proof that in some way he is from God. The Pharisees refuse to see it, pretend even to deny it. This is “a marvel,” an astonishing thing, indeed—although it has since occurred many times. The beggar supports his simple conclusion by an equally simple deduction.

John 9:31

31 This verse constitutes the major premise and is put in popular form. The point to be proven is that Jesus is connected with God. All present agree that God does not hear flagrant sinners; in fact, the Pharisees themselves had admitted this when they asserted that Jesus is an open sinner (v. 24). A man whose life and conduct are in opposition to God is not heard even if he asks divine help for some work. If God is to hear a man, he must be of a different kind, namely a θεοσεβής (opposite of ἀσεβής), “God-fearing,” and this in the sense that he occupies himself with doing (present subjunctive) God’s will. Such a man, we may assume (ἐάν), God will hear. This is the fundamental principle for deciding the case at issue, so certain and simple that no one would dare to deny it.

John 9:32

32 Now follows the minor premise, a statement of the beggar’s own case in all its greatness. It declares not only that no sinner ever wrought a miracle but that no man (τὶς), no man of God even, ever opened the eyes of a person born blind. A case such as this is absolutely unheard of; even the Old Testament reports no miracles of this kind. The beggar’s argument grows in the very statement of it. The more the man ponders the thing, the nearer he gets to the truth about Jesus, namely that he is not only one of a class (God-fearing and a doer of God’s will) but one altogether exceptional, ἐκτοῦαἰῶνος, “from the eon on,” since the world-age began, ἐκ to indicate the point of departure, R. 597. Jesus had restored to sight eyes that were born blind, whose defect was organic as when the optic nerve is ruined, that were absolutely hopeless and beyond human skill to cure. This is the astounding thing that Jesus has done.

John 9:33

33 Now follows the conclusion. As the minor premise offers far more than the syllogism needs, so the statement of the conclusion with its negative form claims far less than the beggar is entitled to claim. The effect of such a presentation is the more convincing, in fact, it overwhelms. The beggar does not say, “Therefore he is of God,” as many a good logician would be content to say. Or, using the negative form, “Therefore, if he were not of God he would not have been able to open my eyes,” which again is sound logic. With one grand sweep the beggar takes in the deed wrought upon him and all other godly deeds great or small: “If he were not of God he could do—nothing.” The conditional sentence is one of present unreality, εἰ with the imperfect (protasis), the imperfect with ἄν (apodosis, often with ἄν omitted, as here).

This beggar never intended to set himself up as a teacher of men who were his superiors in education, social position, and dignity in the church; they have driven him to it. By trying to quench the light they only forced it to shine the brighter to their own undoing. And the brighter its rays, the greater their fault in not admitting them into their hearts.

John 9:34

34 Now at last the Pharisees make a strong reply, strong, alas, not in truth and logic but only in vituperation and violence. They answered and said to him, In sins thou wast born altogether and dost thou teach us? And they threw him out of the place. Thus they surrender the argument. Since the world began, when men have felt the sting of truth and refused to yield, they have taken their refuge to personal abuse. What the disciples thought possible, and what Jesus roundly denied (v. 2, 3), these Jews make their shameful refuge, namely that this man’s affliction of blindness from his birth proved his wickedness, and that even to the present time. “In sins” is placed forward for emphasis.

They call it an outrage that such a man (emphatic σύ) should pretend to teach them (ἡμᾶς, emphatic—all their dignity being stressed in the word) anything. “Characteristically enough they forget that the two charges, one that he had never been blind and so was an impostor: the other that he bore the mark of God’s anger in a blindness which reached back to his birth, will not agree together but mutually exclude one another.” Trench. They have found a crime that is greater than either of these two: his presuming to teach them—who, indeed, were beyond teaching! And so they threw him out of the building, ἐξέβαλονἔξω, “out,” so that he landed “outside” (preposition plus the adverb, idiomatic).

We have no reason to locate this incident in the Temple before the Sanhedrin, nor in a synagogue before a Jewish minor court. With others the author in The Eisenach Gospel Selections, p. 864, held that this throwing out was the ban mentioned in v. 22, which would make a martyr of this beggar and would lend itself to such reflections as Lightfoot, Trench, and others make. We give this view up because the verb alone is insufficient to yield this thought and because no distinctive term is added as in v. 22. That the ban was inflicted a few days later is, of course, only supposition. The beggar, too, must have seemed too insignificant a person to induce the Pharisees to begin pronouncing the ban on him, and such an act would only help to spread the news of his healing.

VIII. Jesus’ Testimony Concerning Spiritual Sight and Blindness, 35–41

John 9:35

35 When the Pharisees quizzed the beggar, he came close to the confession that Jesus is the Son of God. Jesus himself brings the man to that confession. Jesus heard that they had thrown him out of the place and, having found him, said to him, Thou, dost thou believe on the Son of God? With an aorist verb and an aorist participle John merely reports the facts, that Jesus heard how the beggar had fared, and that presently he found him. That the latter occurred in the Temple is not indicated. Both the hearing and the finding would occur in a perfectly natural way, and yet there is a higher hand behind these acts.

The contact would not end with the miracle; compare the case of the impotent man, 5:14. Jesus would finish the work he had begun. As far as John’s report goes, Jesus proceeds in the most direct manner. It is taken for granted that the beggar knows that he is now looking with his eyes upon the man who had miraculously opened those eyes. The pronoun σύ is emphatic, “Thou, dost thou believe,” etc., when so many important persons are not believing? The question sounds as though it expects an affirmative answer.

Jesus knows the readiness of the beggar to confess, but he nevertheless asks him to make that confession.

“Dost thou believe,” πιστεύεις, dost thou trust with thy heart? The beggar could no longer trust the Pharisees, though they were leaders in the church, for he had seen their deliberate blindness and falseness. Yet Jesus does not ask merely, “Dost thou trust me?” or use only some designation for the pronoun “me.” He asks, “Dost thou trust in the Son of God?” While this question does not intimate that by “the Son of God” Jesus is referring to himself, on the other hand, it certainly also is not abstract as though it was without any vital reference to Jesus. Moreover, the question is deeply personal for the beggar, and is to be understood in the highest religious sense, a parallel to the question whether one trusts in God, relies on him for guidance, enlightenment, help, blessing, yea, heaven itself.

Did Jesus say, “the Son of God,” or, as good texts read, “the Son of man”? In a way this is again a question for the text critics, yet we cannot leave it entirely to them. Neither term stands only for “me.” Certainly, the beggar would trust a benefactor like Jesus—how could he help it? But this would be an inferior trust, dealing only with benefactions such as the one the beggar had received. A prophet (v. 17), a holy man of God (v. 31) might obtain such gifts by prayer to God. Jesus thus had to designate himself so that this beggar would drop all thoughts of a holy prophet or merely human messenger sent from God, so that he would at once lift his thoughts to the person of the divine Messiah, the very Son of God.

For this purpose Jesus might have used “the Son of man” if this designation had been current among the Jews as a name for the Messiah, one that would at once have been understood by the beggar. But it is Jesus alone who uses this name, not even his disciples employ it (see 1:51). It has a mysterious sound, and its real import must be searched out by those who hear it without some previous intimation as to its meaning. However the text critics may explain its introduction in our passage, the internal evidence is too strong for the reading “the Son of God.” This the beggar at once understood, just as did the hearers of the Baptist when he called Jesus “the Son of God” (1:34).

John 9:36

36 He answered and said, And who is it, Lord, in order that I may believe? Although his knowledge of Jesus was limited, this beggar already trusts Jesus to such an extent, that he is at once ready to trust whomever he may point out as the Son of God. The “and” with which the question begins is like the Hebrew υe and hardly connects with an unexpressed idea. Usually it is connected with the question Jesus has just asked. R. 999 makes ἵνα consecutive, contemplated result; B.-D. 483, a case of brachylogy, so that we supply antworte, in order that I may believe. This seems best, especially after a question.

John 9:37

37 Jesus said unto him, Thou hast both seen him, and he who is speaking with thee is he. There is no reason why the first καί should be “even”; “thou hast even seen him.” Why such stress, especially when only ordinary physical seeing is in the commentator’s mind? Here καί … καί is “both … and.” Jesus might have said quite simply, “It is I.” He has a better answer, one that calls out and encourages the beggar’s faith. But it would certainly be inferior if the answer Jesus does give means no more than, “Thou both seest and hearest him.” Either one would be enough. If Jesus meant to refer to the beggar’s newly opened eyes, “Thou seest him” would have been the word. If Jesus had in mind only his person, “Thou hearest him,” or words to that effect, might have done; “It is I,” ἐγώεἰμι, would have been better.

The answer of Jesus contains far more than a reference to the physical senses. Jesus tells the beggar that he has already seen the Son of God; and then he tells him that the person now speaking with him is that Son of God whom he has already seen.

Some do not sufficiently note the difference between the two tenses which Jesus employs: ἑώρακας, perfect, “thou hast seen,” and ὁλαλῶν, present, “he who is speaking.” But John uses many perfects, and always most carefully in the sense of perfects. To be sure, the Greek has a group of perfect forms which are always present in sense, but ἑώρακα is not in this group. If Jesus here means, “thou seest him,” the present tense alone is in order. Jesus might say, “he who has spoken with thee,” recalling to the beggar how he heard Jesus tell him to go and to wash; but as regards physical seeing the beggar has not seen Jesus until just now. Some find a present sense in ἑώρακας because they think of physical seeing alone. The Pharisees, whose physical eyes have always been good, see Jesus thus, but do not at all see “the Son of God,” concerning whom Jesus is asking this beggar. In the very next verses (39–41), where Jesus continues to speak about seeing, not physical but spiritual seeing is the topic.

With the perfect “thou hast seen” Jesus reaches into the beggar’s past when his eyes were opened by the divine power of Jesus—then the beggar caught the first inner glimpse of who his benefactor really is, namely “the Son of God”; and the perfect tense implies that what there dawned upon the beggar remained with him. To arrive at faith in the Son of God requires more than physical eyes with which to look at Jesus. After this significant reminder to the beggar, connecting the miracle at Siloam and what there took place in his heart with “the Son of God,” Jesus directly answers the beggar’s question by adding, “and he who is speaking with thee is he.” This means more than, “I am the one.” That seeing at Siloam was a revelation of the Son of God by means of a deed, to which Jesus now by speaking with the beggar is adding a revelation of the Son of God by means of his Word. This, then, is the answer of Jesus to the beggar’s question as to who the Son of God is: The One whom the beggar has already seen in the miracle, the One who is now speaking to him in his Word.

John 9:38

38 The beggar also answers by word and by deed. And he said, Lord, I believe. And he worshipped him. His act is a definition of his word. The verb προσκυνεῖν means to evidence prostration and adoration, here in the full religious sense of worship due to God. Sometimes the verb means less, namely to pay deep reverence to some man deemed worthy thereof. A lesser sense is shut out where the act is directed to “the Son of God.” The significance of the beggar’s act cannot be reduced by our searching out and weighing just what “the Son of God” actually meant to him when he fell on his knees and touched Jesus’ feet. So much is clear, that this beggar was a Jew with a knowledge of the true God which he had gained from the Old Testament.

John 9:39

39 After calling himself the Son of God, Jesus accepts the beggar’s worship as intended for that Son. In fact, he shows that he is deeply moved by this beggar’s word and act. A remarkable word comes to his lips, one which sums up all that has occurred in the beggar’s case and that lets us feel why John wrote this story at such length. And Jesus said, For judgment I did come into this world, that those not seeing shall be seeing, and those seeing shall become blind. No one is directly addressed. What Jesus says is intended for all who are present.

When he says that he “did come into this world” he speaks as the Son of God, as he who became incarnate (1:14) and thus entered upon his redemptive mission in “this world” (see 8:23) of sinful humanity. Already in 3:19 Jesus speaks of the judgment which results from his mission. There he calls it κρίσις, an act of judgment; now he uses κρίμα, a verdict of judgment. Both terms are neutral, including acquittal as well as condemnation. Yet only in a secondary way does the mission to save the world bring about a judicial verdict which divides mankind. It is only because so many reject the Son whom God sent into the world to save it and spurn the mission which brings them grace and redemption.

With a subfinal ἵνα Jesus states this judicial verdict. Here it is stated in the form of a striking oxymoron: “that those not seeing may be seeing, and those seeing may become blind.” The former are all those who, although by nature they are without spiritual sight and light, let Jesus, who comes to them, give them the light of life by bringing them to faith. In them the saving mission of Jesus is accomplished. The latter are those, who by nature are equally without sight and light and who when Jesus comes to give them the light of life spurn him and his gift by the boast of unbelief that they already have sight and life. In them the saving mission of Jesus is frustrated. The wording which Jesus uses is suggested by the miracle which Jesus wrought on the blind beggar by giving him the sight of his physical eyes.

Yet the miracle is not allegorized, for the Pharisees have not been made physically blind but are left to see physically as well as ever. Jesus is speaking only of spiritual blindness and spiritual sight. His words are formulated so as to fit the Pharisees most exactly as contrasted with the beggar. They are the ones who love to call themselves βλέποντες, men who see—recall their boast: ἡμεῖςοἴδαμεν, “we know.” The beggar knows only what Jesus has done for him and what the Scriptures say, besides that he humbly asks that he may know and believe.

Thus the verdict is: these “shall be seeing,” βλέπωσιν, present subjunctive (durative), have and enjoy spiritual sight forever; those “shall become blind,” γένωνται, aorist subjunctive (punctiliar), shall arrive at a point that fixes them as permanently blind. To begin with, all are alike in the darkness of sin, none see. All would remain alike if Jesus, who is “a light in the world” (v. 5), did not come to them. It is when Jesus comes as “a light” with his enlightening power that a difference results. Some are made to realize that they, indeed, are blind; these arrive at sight, a seeing that remains. Others will not realize that they are blind and boast that they see; they are left devoid of sight, and their blindness remains. It is bad enough that by nature all men are μὴβλέποντες and that in the course of nature they would remain such; it is infinitely worse that, when the Light has come and shines over us and seeks to enter and to give sight to our hearts, we should so oppose that Light as to become fixed in blindness forever.

John 9:40

40 Those of the Pharisees who were with him heard these things and said to him, Certainly (thou dost not mean to say), we too are blind? Some of the Pharisees are at hand, dogging the steps of Jesus and keeping an eye on him. They feel themselves hit by what Jesus says, although he had not addressed them. With a scornful air they repudiate what they think Jesus says as applying to them. It seemed ridiculous to them, who imagined that they were “guides of the blind, a light to them that are in darkness, correctors of the foolish, teachers of the law” (Rom. 2:19, 20), to be called “blind,” so that they must come to Jesus to receive sight. This they indicate with the interrogative word μή and its implication of a negative answer, which, if Jesus in any manner denies it, will make his words meaningless.

With τυφλοί the Pharisees refer to the class designated by Jesus as μὴβλέποντες. If they referred to the second class whom Jesus himself calls τυφλοί, their question would have to be: Have we too “become blind” ? It is conscience and the prick of Jesus’ second statement which makes these Pharisees touch only the first statement. Added to this is their repudiation of Jesus as the one who makes the blind to see. For: “Are we too blind?” means also: “Must we too come to thee for sight?”

John 9:41

41 Jesus said to them, If you were blind you would not have sin; but now you claim, We see. Your sin remains. Jesus turns their own words against them. He takes the word “blind” as they use it and declares that they certainly do not belong to that class. They are perfectly right in assuming that Jesus would not place them into that class. For this is the class that comes to see—Jesus is able to give them sight.

But if they do not belong to this blessed class, where do they belong, where are they placing themselves? Why, in the only other class that is left. There Jesus had placed them; and they had deliberately closed their ears to that part of his word. With a condition of unreality Jesus again tells them where they belong and at the same time exposes their fatal guilt. “If you were blind,” blind only as not seeing, there would be hope for you; but now you are not any longer blind in that sense. Then “you would not have sin,” sin such as the other blindness involves, the sin of deliberately rejecting the Light, the sin of sins, unbelief, which forever shuts out from light and life; but now this sin is upon you; you have it, and it has you.

Against the unreality (the class to which even on their own testimony they do not intend to belong), Jesus sets the reality (the class to which they do belong, whether they intend to or not): “but now you claim, We see.” Here, too, Jesus lets their own testimony speak, λέγετε, “you claim, assert, declare,” As they would not dream of it to be included in the first class, so they are proud to include themselves in the second. The asyndeton makes the final sentence stand out as a verdict by itself: “Your sin remains.” The sin of rejecting the light, the sin of unbelief. It “remains” with all that it involves for their other sins, lies like a curse upon their souls because they want it thus and will not let it be removed from them. This is a fearful word, spoken in advance to these Pharisees by him who will at last sit on the throne of judgment again to render that verdict. Yet as he now utters it, it constitutes another penetrating call to repentance to these men and a warning to all of us who believe in him today. Note the syllogistic form of the κρίμα with the stringency of its conclusion.

Major premise: “If you were blind,” etc. Minor: “But now you claim,” etc. Ergo: That you have no sin does not apply to you—“your sin remains.” In this negative syllogism the conclusion may be stated either way, negatively or positively, either equals the other.

R. A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research, by A. T. Robertson, fourth edition.

B.-D. Friedrich Blass’ Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch, vierte, voellig neugearbeitete Auflage besorgt von Albert Debrunner.