02.00. A Study of the Being and Attributes of God
A Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God, the Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation. by Clarke, Samuel (1675-1729) Glasgow: Printed for Richard Griffin and Co. (1823)
Public Domain A DEMONSTRATION OF THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD, MORE PARTICULARLY IN ANSWER TO MR HOBBES, SPINOZA, AND THEIR FOLLOWERS. WHEREIN THE NOTION OF LIBERTY IS STATED, AND THE POSSIBILITY AND CERTAINTY OF IT PROVED, IN OPPOSITION TO NECESSITY AND FATE. BEING THE SUBSTANCE OF EIGHT SERMONS, PREACHED IN THE CATHEDRAL-CHURCH OF ST PAUL, IN THE YEAR 1704, AT THE LECTURE FOUNDED BY THE HONOURABLE ROBERT BOYLE, ESQ.
Romans 1:20.—For the invisible things of Him from the Creation of the World are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; even his Eternal Power and Godhead: So that they are without excuse. A DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE OBLIGATIONS OF NATURAL RELIGION, AND THE TRUTH AND CERTAINTY OF THE CHRISTIAN REVELATION. IN ANSWER TO MR HOBBES, SPINOZA, THE AUTHOR OF THE ORACLES OF REASON, AND OTHER DENIERS OF NATURAL AND REVEALED RELIGION. BEING SIXTEEN SERMONS PREACHED IN THE CATHEDRAL-CHURCH OF ST. PAUL, IN THE YEARS 1704-5, AT THE LECTURE FOUNDED BY THE HON. ROBERT BOYLE, ESQ. WITH SUPPLEMENTARY MATTER. By SAMUEL CLARKE, D.D.
Late Rector of St James#8217;s, Westminster. A NEW EDITION.
GLASGOW:
PRINTED FOR RICHARD GRIFFIN AND CO.
T. TEGG, G. OFFOR, J. & C. EVANS, J. JONES, R. BALDOCK. T. ROBINSON & CO. C.
SHARPE & SON, AND E. BAYNES, LONDON; E. WEST & CO. AND A. ALLARDICE, EDINBURGH; AND M. JELLET, BELFAST.
1823. TO THE MOST REVEREND FATHER IN GOD,
THOMAS, LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY, AND PRIMATE OF ALL ENGLAND;
SIR HENRY ASHURST, BARONET;
SIR JOHN ROTHERAM, KNIGHT, SERGEANT AT LAW;
JOHN EVELIN, ESQ.
TRUSTEES APPOINTED BY THE HONOURABLE ROBERT BOYLE, ESQ. THIS DISCOURSE IS HUMBLY DEDICATED. THE PREFACE.
THERE being already published many and good books to prove the Being and Attributes of God, I have chosen to contract what was requisite for me to say upon this subject, into as narrow a compass, and to express what I had to offer, in as few words as I could with perspicuity. For which reason I have also confined myself to one only method or continued thread of arguing, which I have endeavoured should be as near to mathematical as the nature of such a discourse would allow; omitting some other arguments which I could not discern to be so evidently conclusive; because it seems not to be at any time for the real advantage of truth to use arguments in its behalf founded only on such hypotheses as the adversaries apprehend they cannot be compelled to grant: Yet I have not made it my business to oppose any of those arguments, because I think it is not the best way for any one to recommend his own performance by endeavouring to discover the imperfections of others who are engaged in the same design with himself, of promoting the interest of true religion and virtue. But every man ought to use such arguments only as appear to him to be clear and strong, and the readers must judge whether they truly prove the conclusion. THE CONTENTS. THE Introduction, concerning the causes of Atheism 1 PROP. I. That Something has existed from Eternity 7 Of the difficulty of conceiving Eternity 8 That Difficulties arising merely from the Nature of Eternity, are not to be regarded, because equal in all Suppositions ibid.
PROP. II. That there has existed from Eternity some one Immutable and Independent Being 10 Of the Absolute Impossibility of an eternal Succession of dependent Beings, existing without any original independent cause at all 11
PROP. III. That that Immutable and Independent Being, which has existed from Eternity, without any external cause of its Existence, must be Self-existent, that is, Necessarily-existing 13 Of the true Idea of Self-existence; That it is the Idea of a Being, the Supposition of whose Non-Existence is an express Contradiction 15 That every Man may be more certain of the Being of a Supreme Independent Cause, than he can be of any thing else besides his own Existence 18 Of the Idea of God, including Self-Existence ibid. That the Material World cannot possibly be the first, original, and independent Being 21 The Form of the World not necessary 22 Nor its Motion ibid.
Mr Toland’s pernicious opinion of Motion being essential to Matter, confuted ibid. The Matter of the World not necessarily existing 23 A Confutation of Spinoza’s opinion concerning one only Substance 25
Concerning the Eternity of the World, and that the opinion of the best Ancient Philosophers in that Matter did not at all favour the Sentiments of Modern Atheists 28
PROP. IV. What the Substance or Essence of that Being, which is Self-existent or Necessarily-existing, is, we have no idea, neither is it at all possible for us to comprehend it 35 Of Infinite Space 36 Of the Vanity of explaining things by such School-terms as have really no Signification at all 37
PROP. V. That though the Substance or Essence of the Self-existent Being is itself absolutely incomprehensible to us, yet many of the Essential Attributes of his Nature are strictly demonstrable, as well as his existence; as, in the first place, that he must of necessity be Eternal 38 Of the manner of our conceiving the Eternity of God with respect to succession ibid.
PROP. VI. That the Self-existent Being must of necessity be Infinite and Omnipresent 40 Of the Simplicity, Unchangeableness, Incorruptibility, &c. of his Nature 41 Of the Manner of our conceiving the Immensity of God 42 PROP. VII. That the Self-existent Being must of necessity be but One 43 Of the Blessed Trinity 44 Of the Absolute Impossibility of two different Self-existent Independent Principles, such as God and Matter ibid. The Error of Spinoza concerning one Uniform Substance ibid.
PROP. VIII. That the Self-existent and Original Cause of all Things, must be an Intelligent Being 46 This the main Question between us and the Atheists ibid. Not easily proved a priori ibid. But demonstrably proved, a posteriori, from the variety and degrees of perfection in things, and the order of Causes and Effects 47 From the Intelligence that created Beings are confessedly indued with 48]
That, if Intelligence be a real distinct Quality or Perfection, and not a mere Effect or Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion, then Beings indued with Intelligence can never possibly have arisen purely out of that which itself had no such Perfection 49 That Intelligence is such a real distinct Perfection, and not possible to be a mere Effect or Composition of Unintelligent figure and motion 51 Mr Hobbes forced to recur to that prodigiously absurd Opinion, that all Matter, as Matter, is indued with Thought 52 The Proposition demonstrated further from the Beauty, Order, and Final Cause of Things 53 From the Original of Motion 55 That the Material World cannot possibly have been Self-existent 56
PROP. IX. That the Self-existent and Original Cause of all Things is not a Necessary Agent, but a Being indued with Liberty and Choice ibid. This Proposition a necessary consequent of the foregoing 57
Proved further from the Arbitrary Disposition of Things in the World, with a full answer to Spinoza’s arguments for the necessity of all things 58 Also from Final Causes 63 And from the Finiteness of Created Beings ibid. And from the Impossibility of an Infinite Succession of Causes 64 That Liberty is not in itself an Impossible and contradictory Notion 66 PROP. X. That the Self-existing Being, the Supreme cause of all things, must of necessity have Infinite Power - 67 Of working Contradictions, and Natural or Moral Evil 68 Of the Power of creating Matter 69 Of the Power of creating immaterial Cogitative Substances, and those indued with Liberty of Will or Choice 70 Of the Immateriality of Human Souls 73 That the Power of Perception is not confined to Bodily Senses 74 Of the Possibility of Communicating to a Creature the Power of beginning Motion 75 Of the Possibility of induing a Creature with Freedom of Will 78 An Answer to Spinoza’s and Mr Hobbes’s arguments against the Possibility of Liberty 80 That there must be somewhere a Beginning of Operation ibid. That Thinking and Willing, neither are, nor can possibly be Qualities or Affections of Matter 82
That, supposing they were Affections of Matter, yet even that most absurd supposition would not at all affect the question about the possibility of Liberty 88 A shameful Fallacy in Mr Hobbes and his Followers arguing, who, when they would prove the Soul to be mere Matter, then they suppose Matter to be a substance capable, not only of Figure and Motion, but also of other unknown properties; and when they would prove the will and all other Operations of the Soul to be necessary, then they divest Matter of all its unknown properties, and make it mere Solidity indued only with Figure and Motion again ibid. Of the Necessity of the Will’s being determined by the last Judgment of the Understanding 90 Of the Certainty of Divine Fore-knowledge, not repugnant to the Liberty of Men’s Actions 94 Of the Original of Evil 98 PROP. XI. That the Supreme Cause and Author of all Things must of necessity be Infinitely Wise 99 Proved a priori 100 And a posteriori, from the Wisdom and Perfection of the Works of God, evidenced more illustriously in the late discoveries in Astronomy and Natural Philosophy 101
PROP. XII. That the Supreme Cause and Author of all things must of necessity be a Being of Infinite Goodness, Justice, and Truth, and all other Moral Perfections, such as become the Supreme Governor and Judge of the World 104 Of Providence 107 The Necessity of God’s Moral Attributes, consistent with perfect Liberty ibid. Of the Necessity of God’s doing always what is Best and Fittest in the whole 109 Of the Impossibility of his doing Evil 110 That Liberty is not in itself an Imperfection, but a Perfection 111 That the highest moral Perfection of Rational Creatures does not exclude Natural Liberty 112 That the Grounds of all Moral Obligations are Eternal and Necessary, and depend not on any Laws ibid. The Conclusion 114 THE EVIDENCES OF NATURAL AND REVEALED RELIGION. The INTRODUCTION 131 Of the Several sorts of Deists 140 The first sort of Deists, and of Providence 141 Human Affairs not beneath the Regard of Providence 144 The second sort of Deists 146 Profane and debauched Deists not capable of being argued with 147 The Third sort of Deists 149 The Fourth sort of Deists 150 That there is now no consistent scheme of Deism in the World 153
PROP. I. That, from the Eternal and Necessary Differences of Things, there naturally and necessarily arise certain Moral Obligations, which are of themselves incumbent on all Rational Creatures, antecedent to all positive Institution and to all expectation of Reward or Punishment 156 That there are Eternal and necessary Differences of Things 157 The absurdity of those who deny the eternal and Necessary Difference of Things 159 An Answer to the Objection drawn from the variety of Opinions of the learned Men, and the Laws of different Nations, concerning Right and Wrong 163 That the will of God always determines itself to act according to the Eternal Reason of Things 165 That all Rational Creatures are obliged to govern themselves in all their actions by the same Eternal Rule of Reason 166 Proved from the Original Nature of Things 167 And from the Sense that all, even wicked Men, unavoidably have of their being under such an Obligation 169 And from the Judgment of Men’s Consciences upon their own past actions 171 Of that Natural Knowledge which Plato thought to be Reminiscence ibid. The most profligate of Men not utterly insensible of the difference of Good and Evil 172
Men’s Natural sense of Eternal Moral Obligations proved further from the Judgment they all pass upon the actions of others 173 An Answer to the Objection drawn from the Total Ignorance of some Barbarous Nations in Matters of Morality 176 Of the Principal Moral Obligations in particular 177 Of Piety, or Men’s Duty towards God 178 Of Righteousness, or the duty of Men one towards another 180 Of Justice and Equity ibid. Of Universal Mutual Benevolence 184 Of Sobriety, or Men’s Duty towards themselves, and of the Unlawfulness of Self-Murder 187 The Law of Nature Eternal, Universal, and Absolutely Unchangeable 191
Eternal Moral Obligations antecedent, in some respect, even to this Consideration, of their being the Will or Command of God himself 195 The Law of Nature Obligatory, antecedent to all consideration of particular Rewards and Punishments 198
Yet it does not from hence at all follow, either that a Good Man ought to have no respect to Rewards and Punishments, or that Rewards and Punishments are not absolutely necessary to maintain the Practice of Virtue in this present World 200 The Manifold Absurdities of Mr Hobbes’s Doctrines concerning the Original of Right, shown in particular 204
PROP. II. That the same Eternal Moral Obligations, which arise necessarily from the Natural Differences of Things, are moreover the Express W 1, Command, and Law of God to all Rational Creatures 218 Proved from the Consideration of the Divine Attributes ibid. And from the Consideration of the Nature of God’s Creation 222 And from the Tendency of the Practice of Morality to the Good and Happiness of the whole World 223
PROP. III. That the same Eternal Moral Obligations, which are of themselves incumbent indeed on all Rational Creatures, antecedent to any respect of particular Reward or Punishment, must yet certainly and necessarily be attended with Rewards and Punishments 226 Proved from the Attributes of God ibid. And from the Necessity there is that there should be some Vindication of the Honour of God’s Laws and Government 227
PROP. IV. That because these Rewards and Punishments are not distributed in the present State, therefore there must of necessity be a Future State 228
That, according to the Original Constitution of Things, Virtue and Vice are attended with Natural Rewards and Punishments 230 But that now, in this present World, the Natural Order of Things is so Perverted, that Vice often flourishes in great Prosperity and Virtue falls under the greatest Calamities of Life 231 That therefore there must needs be a Future State of Rewards and Punishments 233 Of the Stoical Opinion concerning the Self-Sufficiency of Virtue to its own Happiness 234 From whence the Certainty of a Future State is again concluded 236
Why the Wisdom of God is not so Clearly and Plainly seen in his Government of the Moral, as in the Fabric of the Natural World 238 Of the Immortality of the Soul, and the Natural Proofs we have of it 239 The Natural Credibility of the Soul’s being Immortal, of great Use to the Wiser Heathens 243 The Argument for a Future State drawn from Men’s Natural Desire of Immortality 245 Another, drawn from Men’s Conscience or Judgment of their own Actions 246 Another, drawn from Man’s being by Nature an Accountable Creature ibid.
PROP. V. That though the Necessity and Indispensableness of all the great and Moral Obligations of Natural Religion, and also the Certainty of a Future State of Rewards and Punishments, be in general deducible from Right Reason, yet such is the present Corrupt Estate and Condition of Mankind in the World, that very few are able, in reality and effect, to discover these things clearly and plainly for themselves, but Men have great need of Particular Teaching and much Instruction 248 Men Hindered from Discovering and Understanding Religious Truths, by Carelessness and Want of Attention 249 And by Early Prejudices and False Notions 250 And by Sensual Appetites, Passions, and Worldly Business 251 And, above all, by Vicious Habits and Practices 252 Wherefore Men have great need to be Taught and Instructed in Matters of Religion 254 The great Use and Necessity of an Order of Preachers 256
PROP. VI. That all the Teaching and Instruction of the best Heathen Philosophers, was for many Reasons Utterly Insufficient to Reform Mankind ibid. That there have been in the Heathen World some Excellent Teachers of Morality 257 Who seem to have been designed by Providence to bear witness against the Wickedness of the Nations wherein they lived 258 But yet none of these Men were ever able to Reform the World with any considerable success 259 Because they have been but very few that have in earnest set themselves about that Excellent Work 261 And those few were entirely ignorant of some Doctrines absolutely necessary to the bringing about that Great End 263 Particularly, they were Ignorant in what Manner God will be Acceptably Worshipped 265 And in what Method God would be Reconciled to Returning Sinners 267 And other Doctrines absolutely necessary to the same end, they were very doubtful and uncertain about 268 And those things which they were certain of, yet they were not able to prove and explain clearly and distinctly enough 271 And those things which they were able to prove and explain clearly and distinctly enough, yet they had not sufficient authority to enforce in practice 275
PROP. VII. That there was plainly wanting a Divine Revelation, to recover Mankind out of their Universal Degenerate Estate, and that both the Necessities of Men, and their Natural Notions of God, gave them reasonable ground to hope for such a Revelation 278 A Divine Revelation very necessary for the Recovery of Mankind ibid. That it was agreeable to the Dictates of Nature and Right Reason to expect or hope for such a Divine Revelation 280 The Unreasonableness of Modern Deists in Denying the Want and Use of a Revelation 284 The great Necessity and Use of Divine Revelation 285 Yet God was not absolutely obliged to afford men the help of such a Revelation 288 Want of Universality no sufficient Objection against the Truth of a Revelation 289
PROP. VIII. That there is no other Religion now in the World, but the Christian, that has any Just Pretence or Tolerable Appearance of Reason to be esteemed such a Divine Revelation 291 Of the Mahometan Religion 291 Of the Jewish Religion ibid.
PROP. IX. That the Christian Religion has all the Marks and Proofs of its being Actually and Truly a Divine Revelation, that any Divine Revelation, supposing it was true, could reasonably be imagined or desired to have 292 The Marks of a Religion Coming from God ibid.
PROP. X. That the Practical Duties, which the Christian Religion enjoins, are all such as are most agreeable to our Natural Notions of God, and most Perfective of the Nature and Conducive to the Happiness and Well-being of Men 293 Proved in the Several Instances of Duty ibid. This a Great Evidence of a Religion coming from God 296
PROP. XI. That the Motives by which the Christian Religion enforces the Practice of the Duties it enjoins, are such as are most suitable to the excellent wisdom of God, and most answerable to the natural expectations of Men 299 Of the Acceptableness of True Repentance as a Motive to Obedience ibid. Of the Divine Assistance as another Motive to Obedience 300 Of the Clear Discovery of Future Rewards and Punishments, as another Motive to Obedience 301
PROP. XII. That the Peculiar Manner and Circumstances, with which the Christian Religion enjoins the Duties, and urges the Motives before-mentioned, are exactly consonant to the Dictates of Sound Reason, or the Unprejudiced Light of Nature, and most wisely perfective of it 303 Proved by Particular Instances ibid. An Answer to the Objections drawn from the Divisions among Christians 305
PROP. XIII. That all the Credenda, or Doctrines, which the Christian Religion requires our particular assent to, are agreeable to Unprejudiced Reason, have every one of them a Natural Tendency and Direct Influence to Reform Men’s Manners, and do together make up the most consistent and rational Scheme of Belief in the World 306 Of the One Supreme God ibid. Of the Only-begotten Son of God 307 Of the Holy Spirit 308 Of the Creation of the Universe ibid. Of the Formation of the Earth 309 Of the Continual Government of Providence 310 Of Paradise, and the Loss of it by Sin 311 Of the Flood 312 Of God’s Revealing Himself to the Patriarchs, and giving the Law to the Jews 313 Of the other Particulars of Scripture-history in the Old Testament ibid. Of God’s sending his Son into the World, for the Redemption of Mankind 315 That it is not Unreasonable to Suppose God Making a Revelation of his Will to Men 316 That it is not unreasonable to believe that God would appoint a Sacrifice or Expiation for Sin ibid. That it is not unreasonable to believe that a Mediator should be appointed between God and Man 317 Of the Objection drawn from the Dignity of the Person whom we believe to be our Mediator and Redeemer ibid. Of the Objection drawn from the Christian Revelation not being in fact Universal - 322 Of the other Particulars of Scripture-history contained in the New Testament 323 Of the Day of Judgment and Christ the Judge 324 Of the Resurrection of the Body 325 Of the Resurrection of the same Body 326 Of the Eternal Happiness of the Blessed, and the Eternal Punishment of the Damned 328 All the Articles of our Belief agreeable to Right Reason 331 Every one of them has a Direct Tendency and Powerful Influence to Reform Men’s Manners ibid. And all of them together make up the most Consistent and Rational Scheme of Belief in the World 335
PROP. XIV. That the Christian Revelation is positively and directly proved to be sent to us from God by the Miracles which our Saviour worked, by the fulfilling of the Prophecies, and by the Testimony of the Apostles 336 Of the Life and Character of our Saviour, as an Evidence of the Truth of the Christian Revelation 337 Of the Miracles of Christ, as the Evidence of his Divine Commission 338 Of Miracles in General ibid.
That, in Respect of the Power of God, all things are alike easy 339 That therefore Miracles ought not to be defined by any Absolute Difficulty in the Nature of the Things themselves to be done ibid.
What degrees of Power God may have communicated to Created Beings, is not possible for us to determine 340 That therefore a Miracle is not rightly defined to be such an Effect as could not have been produced by any less Power than the Divine Omnipotence ibid.
All things that are done in the World, are done either Immediately by God Himself, or by Created Intelligent Beings, Matter being capable of no laws or powers; and consequently there is, properly speaking, no such thing as the Course or Power of Nature 343 That therefore a Miracle is not rightly defined to be that which is against the Course of Nature, or above the Natural Powers of Created Agents 342 The Unreasonableness of those who deny the Possibility of Miracles in General ibid.
Some Effects prove the Constant Providence of God, and others prove the Occasional Interposition either of God himself or of some Intelligent Being Superior to Men 343
Whether such Interposition be the Immediate work of God, or of some Good or Evil Angel, can hardly be discovered merely by the Work Itself 344 That there is no reason to suppose all the Wonders worked by Evil Spirits to be mere Delusions ibid.
How we are to Distinguish Miracles wrought by God for the Proof of any Doctrine, from the Frauds of Evil Spirits 345 The Difference between those who teach that the Immediate Power of God is, or is not, necessarily requisite to the Working of a Miracle, is not very great at bottom 347 The True Definition of a Miracle ibid. The Strength of the Evidence of our Saviour’s Miracles 348
Concerning the Objection, that we prove in a circle the Miracles by the Doctrine, and the Doctrine by the Miracles ibid. Of the Pretended Miracles of Apollonius and others 350 Of the fulfilling the Prophecies as an Evidence of our Saviour’s Divine Commission 351 Of the Prophecies that went before Concerning the Messiah ibid. Of the Prophecies that Christ Himself delivered concerning things that were to happen after 353 An Answer to Objections against Applying the Prophecies in the Old Testament to Christ 354 Of the Testimony of our Saviour’s Disciples, as an Evidence of the Truth of the Christian Revelation 399 What Things are requisite to make the Testimony of our Saviour’s Disciples a Complete Evidence 400 That the Apostles could not be Imposed upon Themselves ibid. That they could have no design of imposing upon Others 401 That the Apostles’ Testimony has been truly conveyed down to us 403 Of the Authority of the Books of Holy Scripture 404
PROP. XV. That they who will not, by the Arguments and Proofs before-mentioned, be convinced of the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Religion, would not be convinced by any other Evidence whatsoever,—no, not though one should rise on purpose from the dead to endeavour to Convince them 405 That the Evidence which God has afforded us of the Truth of our Religion is abundantly sufficient ibid. That the Cause of Men’s Unbelief is not Want of Better Evidence to prove the great Truths of Religion 406 But that Wickedness and Ungoverned Lusts are the only Causes of Obstinate Infidelity 408 And so long as Men are under the Dominion of their Lusts, they would not be convinced, though the Evidence of Religion was even much Stronger than it is ibid.
Nay, not even though one should Rise on Purpose from the Dead to Convince them 410 That therefore it is Absolutely Necessary in the first place, that Men become Impartially Willing to embrace all Truth, and to obey all Reasonable Obligations 411 That Men of such a Disposition would be Religious, though the Evidences of Religion were much less than they are 412 That God may require us to take notice of some things at our peril 414
Letters from a Gentleman in Gloucestershire relative to some points stated in the foregoing Discourses, with the Answers thereto 418
