08.03.05. Chapter 5
Chapter 5: Faith—Its nature—As simplying not only a reasonable conviction of the understanding, but consent and confidence A RIGHT and clear understanding of the office or function of saving faith, may go far to supersede, if not to settle, the question respecting its nature.
II. Let it be remembered, then, that the reason why faith is required or appointed as a step in the accomplishment of the Lord’s purpose, is not any grace or beauty in faith itself, making it generally acceptable to God and useful to man; but this special virtue which it has, that it provides for and secures man’s falling in with what God is doing, and taking the place which God assigns him, whether it be, as in his sanctification, actively to “work out his own salvation with fear and trembling; since it is God which worketh in him both to will and to do of his good pleasure” (Php 2:12-13); or, as in his justification, to appropriate the free gift of God, and make it his own. Now, if we comprehend in our idea of the nature of faith, all that is essential for this office or function which it has to discharge, then, it would seem, besides a rational conviction of the understanding, there must be included in it, or associated with it, some corresponding affection of desire in the heart; otherwise it is not explained how it either acts as a motive, or appropriates as a hand or handle.
There is, indeed, a difference of statement on this point among those who hold substantially the same sound doctrine; which need not, however, occasion much embarrassment, if the parties could always be sure of mutually understanding one another. Thus some are anxious to make the intellectual part of our nature exclusively the seat of faith, properly so called; faith, according to them, being altogether an act or exercise of the understanding, weighing the evidence submitted to it, and drawing the legitimate or necessary conclusions; and faith in God being simply the belief of what God says, and because he says it. There is an advantage, as they think, in thus isolating the bare and simple act of believing, and separating it from any process going before or coming after, and viewing it as simply the state of the mind assenting to certain truths, on the testimony of Him who cannot lie; a state not at all differing, as to the nature of the thing done, from that of the mind assenting to truth of any kind, on the authority of a credible witness. The advantage of this way of considering faith is chiefly twofold. In the first place, it most effectually puts away and puts down the Popish or semi-Popish notion, of implicit faith, or of a blind reliance on the supposed communication of spiritual blessings to the soul by a mystical charm, or sacramental virtue, or some process guaranteed by the priest, of which he who is the subject of it need have no knowledge or cognizance at all. That the faith with which all saving blessings are connected, is a reasonable act of an intelligent mind, not merely taking upon trust the thing said to be done, but understanding and assenting to what is done—is a great scriptural truth, and a great safeguard against the delusions of the Man of Sin. It is sanctioned by such passages as the following, in which, after dwelling on the fact that the gospel system is foolishness to the world, the apostle is careful to explain that it satisfies the reason, and carries the intelligent assent, of the upright or sincere inquirer:—“Howbeit we speak wisdom among them that are perfect; yet not the wisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world, that come to nought;—but we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, even the hidden wisdom, which God ordained before the world unto our glory.” (1 Corinthians 2:6-7) Again, in the second place, this view tends to divest faith of that character of unknown and mysterious peculiarity, which is apt to make it appear, in the eyes of an anxious inquirer, so very recondite an exercise of soul—so very unattainable; a grace. Such a one is told of the necessity of faith, and hears much of its workings and experiences; and conceiving that it must be some high and singular attainment, altogether different from the ordinary actings of the mind, he harasses and perplexes himself in groping after this unknown something, without which, it seems, he cannot be saved; and so, he either involves himself in a labyrinth of inextricable difficulties, or elaborately gets up some frame or feeling which, he thinks, answers the descriptions usually given of faith; whereupon, having got, at last, as he imagines, the key, he seems boldly to enter into the treasury. It is manifest that the alternation, or transition, or vibration, as it were, here, is between absolute helplessness on the one hand, and a subtle form of self-righteousness on the other; and it is a safe and blessed relief for such a mind to have faith presented to it in its very barest and most naked aspect, and to be made to see that there is nothing recondite or mysterious in the act of believing, considered in itself; inasmuch as it is really nothing more than giving to the true God, in reference to things divine and eternal, the same reasonable and intelligent credit that you give to a true man, in reference to the things of time. With these advantages, the intellectual view of the nature of faith comes strongly recommended by its simplicity and clearness; nor would we say that it is practically defective, if we regard it as the isolating, for the purpose of better mental analysis, of what in reality never exists but in a certain combination. For, as in physical science, an analytical chemist may take out of a compound or complex substance one single ingredient, that he may subject it to the test of a separate and searching scrutiny, and verify its character in its purest and most unequivocal form, while still it may be true that the ingredient or element in question is never, as a natural phenomenon, to be found otherwise than in a given union or affinity; so, in the science of mind, the moral analyst may deal with some act or state of the living soul which, though seeming to be one and simple, is yet capable of being resolved into parts. He may detach and clear away, as in a refining crucible, all that may be regarded as the adjuncts, or accessaries, or accompaniments, leaving single and alone the real central and staple article of the mass, round which the rest all cluster, and with which they all combine; and this he may do for the most useful and satisfactory purpose, while he may be himself the readiest to admit that, for ordinary practical uses, it is the mass as a whole with which we have to do.
Thus, to apply this illustration, let it be granted that faith may be resolved ultimately and strictly into intellectual assent or belief on the evidence of divine testimony—still it remains true, as a matter of fact, that his assent or belief, if it is of a saving character, has ever associated and blended with it, on the one hand, a deep sense of sin in the conscience, a clear sight of Christ in the understanding, and a consenting will and longing desire in the heart; and on the other, sentiments of trust, reliance, confidence, or what can only be described as leaning and resting upon Christ; and all these, in actual experience, so enter into combination with the central element of assent or belief, that the whole may be practically considered as making up one state of mind, complex in its ingredients, but simple enough in its acting and out-going—the state of mind, namely, in which, as a poor sinner, I flee away from my guilty self to my righteous Saviour, and roll over the burden of all my iniquities on him who, though he knew no sin, was made sin for such as I am, that such as I, the chief of sinners, might be made the righteousness of God in him.
There are two observations, however, which it seems necessary to make, in the way, not so much of controverting, as of guarding on the one hand, and supplementing on the other, this analytical view, if we may so call it, of the nature of faith. The first is, that it must be understood with an express or implied qualification, recognising the moral character and the moral influence of faith—its moral character, as proceeding from a renewed will, and its moral influence, as determining that renewed will to embrace Christ, or God in Christ, as the chief good. Not only to maintain, untouched, the fundamental principle of man’s responsibility to God for his belief, is this explanation necessary; but with reference, also, to the scriptural view of man’s depravity, as well as of the office or function of the faith which is required of him. All belief is voluntary, in so far as it depends on the fixing of the mind upon the substance of the truth to be believed, and the evidence or testimony on which belief is claimed. To understand what we are expected to assent to, and to weigh the grounds of the assent expected, implies an exercise of attention; and attention is a faculty under the control of the will. Hence, any perverse bias of the will must affect the kind and degree of the attention which is given; and consequently, also, the result attained. On this ground, it may be most consistently maintained, that the renewal of the will is an indispensable preliminary to the believing assent which the understanding has to give to the truth of God. “The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, neither can he know them; because they are spiritually discerned.” (1 Corinthians 2:14) The intellect of fallen man is clouded and struck with impotency, through the entire estrangement of his affections from God, and the enmity of his carnal mind against God, and the impossibility of his willing subjection to God. He is prejudiced, blinded, darkened; and in order that the light may get into his understanding, and bring home to it a conviction of the reality of things divine, there must be a direct work of God in the soul, restoring to it the capacity of discerning and perceiving the truth which God has to reveal. Again, it is presumed, in the principle on which this theory of faith proceeds, that once to carry the understanding, is to carry all. Get the mind, or intellect, enlightened and convinced, and all is gained. Thus it is alleged that a man really understanding and assenting to all that God reveals respecting coming wrath and present grace, cannot but flee from the one, and lay hold on the other; and hence, though neither reliance nor appropriation be held to be of the essence of faith, yet both are secured, if you have the intelligent belief of what God testifies concerning his Son. It is true, there seem to be individuals not a few, whose understandings are well informed in the whole of Christian doctrine, and convinced of the truth of every portion of it, who yet give too palpable evidence of their being still unrenewed. But then, it is said, there must be, unknown to us, and perhaps even to themselves, some mistake or misapprehension in some particular, or a latent incredulity in regard to some point: they cannot really know and believe all the truth; since, if they did, it would be impossible for them to continue, for a moment, impenitent and unreconciled.
Now it is here, if anywhere, that we confess we feel the exclusively intellectual view, as it is called, of the nature of faith, giving way. “We may allow the extreme improbability of a man being able to comprehend, even intellectually, the whole truth of God, in all its terrible and affecting reality, without an inward work of God on his conscience, his mind, his will, his heart; though even in this view it is most painfully instructive to observe how very near, at least, natural intelligence, under the ordinary means of grace and the common operations of the Spirit, may, and does often, come, to a right speculative knowledge, and a real theoretical admission and belief, of all the statements of the Divine Record, without any consciousness, or any satisfactory evidence, of a change of heart; and it is a solemn duty, in a land of privilege and profession, to warn all hearers of the gospel that they may have what at least is commonly understood by an intellectual acquaintance with things divine, and an intellectual conviction of their truth, through the mere use of their natural faculties, under gospel light and gospel opportunities, without being spiritually enlightened so as savingly to know Christ Jesus the Lord. But it is the other aspect of this matter that chiefly strikes us as doubtful. When it is taken for granted that the understanding is the ruling principle of our nature—and that to carry it, is to carry all—we have some fear that man’s depravity is under-rated. Is it so very clear, that a man, knowing and believing all that is revealed of his own lost estate, and the Redeemer’s free and full salvation, will necessarily consent to be saved? Is there no case of a sinner, whose mind is thoroughly enlightened, so far as an acquaintance with all the truth of God is concerned, and thoroughly convinced, so far as intellectual assurance goes, yet, from sheer enmity to God, and unwillingness to own subjection or obligation to God, refusing to accept deliverance, and choosing rather to perish than be indebted, on such terms, to a Being whom he hates—who will not barter salvation with him for a price, and from whom he cannot bring himself to take it as a free gift? Or, if such a case be considered visionary and ideal, and if it be alleged that, in point of fact, such a man cannot really know what it is to perish, or cannot believe in the certainty of his perishing, since, if he did, he could not but seek and be anxious to escape—then, at any rate, we are mistaken, if it be not the earnest feeling of almost every child of God, not only that such a depth of depravity is conceivable, but that it is no more than might have been, and but for a strong pressure from above on his rebellious will and heart, must have been, realized in his own experience. On this account we are rather inclined to consider consent and confidence as not merely flowing naturally and necessarily from faith, but forming its very essence; and giving all due prominence to the share which the understanding has in bringing about that state of mind which we call faith, we would still place its seat in the moral, fully as much as in the intellectual, part of our nature, and make it chiefly consist, not exclusively in the assent or credit given to what God reveals or testifies, but also in our embracing, with a fiducial reliance or trust, Him whom God reveals, and of whom he testifies, as the Lord our righteousness, and the Lord our strength; according to that saying of the apostle, which, though we would not urge it as conclusive, seems, at least, to countenance this view: “With the heart, man believeth unto righteousness.’’ (Romans 10:10)