II. The Doctrine Of Philo

II. THE DOCTRINE OF PHILO
THE LITERATURE[2622]
[2622] For the older literature see Fabricius-Harles iv. 721-727. Comp. also Freudenthal “Zur Geschichte der Anschauungen über die jüdischhellenistische Religionephilosophie” (Monatsschr. für Gesch. und Wissensch. des Judenth. 1869 pp. 399-421).
Stahl “Versuch eines systematischen Entwurfs des Lehrbegriffs Philo’s von Alexandrien” (Eichhorn’s Allgemeine Bibliothek der biblischen Litteratur vol. iv. paragraph 5 1793 pp. 765-890).
Grossmann Questiones Philoneae. I. De theologiae Philonis fontibus et auctoritate quaestionis primae particula prima. II. De λόγῳ Philonis. Quaestio altera. Lips. 1829.
Gfrörer Philo und die alexandrinische Theosophie (also under the title Kritische Geschichte des Urchristenthums) 2 vols. Stuttgard 1831.
Dähne Geschichtliche Darstellung der jüdisch-alexandrinischen Religions-Philosophie 2 vols. Halle 1834. Comp. also his art. “Philon” in Ersch and Gruber’s Encyklopädie.
Ritter Geschichte der Philosophi vol. iv. (1834) pp. 418-492.
Georgii “Ueber die neuesten Gegensätze in Auffassung der Alexandrinischen Religionsphilosophie insbesondere des Jüdischen Alexandrinismus” (Zeitschr. für die histor. Theol. 1839 No. 3 pp. 3-98 No. 4 pp. 3-98).
Lücke Commentar über das Evang. des Johannes vol. i. (3rd ed. 1840) p. 272 sqq.
Keferstein Philo’s Lehre von den göttlichen Mittelwesen zugleich eine kurze Darstellung der Grundzüge des philonischen Systems Leipzig 1846.
Bucher Philonische Studien Tübingen 1848.
Niedner De subsistentia τῷ θείῳ λόγῳ apud Philonem tributa quaestionis Parts i. ii. Lips. 1848 1849 (also in the Zeitsch. für die histor. Theol. 1849).
Lutterbeck Die neutestamentlichen Lehrbegriffe vol. i. (1852) pp. 418-446.
Dorner Entwickelungsgesch. der Lehre von der Person Christi vol. i. pp. 21-57.
Wolff Die philonische Philosophie in ihren Hauptmomenten dargestellt 2nd ed. 1858.
Joel “Ueber einige geschichtliche Beziehungen des philonischen Systems” (Monatsschr. für Gesch. und Wissensch. des Judenth. 1863 pp. 19-31).
Frankel “Zur Ethik des jüdisch-alexandrinischen Philosophen Philo” (Monatsschr. für Gesch. und Wissensch. des Judenth. 1867 pp. 241-252 281-297).
Keim Gesch. Jesu i. 208-225.
Lipsius art. “Alexandrinische Religionsphilosophie” in Schenkel’s Bibellex. i. 85-99.
Zeller Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung Part iii. Div. 2 (3rd ed. 1881) pp. 338-418.
Heinze Die Lehre vom Logos in der griechischen Philosophie (1872) pp. 204-297.
Stein Sieben Bücher zur Geschichte des Platonismus Part iii. (1875) pp. 3-17.
Soulier La doctrine du Logos chez Philon d’Alexandrie Turin 1876 (comp. Theol. Litztg. 1877 101).
Réville Le Logos d’après Philon d’Alexandrie Genève 1877 (see Bursian’s Philol. Jahresber. xxi. 35 sq.). The same La doctrine du Logos dans le quatrième évangile et dans les oeuvres de Philon Paris 1881.
Nicolas “Etudes sur Philon d’Alexandrie” (Revue de l’histoire desreligions vol. v. 1882 pp. 318-339; vol. vii. 1883 pp. 145-164; vol. viii. 1883 pp. 468-488 582-602 756-772).
Comp. also the works and articles mentioned above p. 321 sq. of Steinhart J. G. Müller Ewald Ueberweg Hausrath Siegfried Hamburger Zöckler.
The survey already given of Philo’s works is sufficient to show the many-sidedness of his culture and of his literary efforts. That which applies to the representatives of Judaeo-Hellenism in general viz. that they combined in themselves both Jewish and Hellenic culture is pre-eminently true of him. It must be admitted that Greek philosophy comes the most prominently into the foreground.[2623] He was a man saturated with every means of culture afforded in his age by the schools of the Greeks. His diction was formed by the Greek classical authors; and especially “may the influence of Plato’s works upon Philo in even a lexical and phraseological respect be called very considerable.”[2624] He was intimately acquainted with the great Greek poets Homer Euripides and others whom he occasionally quotes.[2625] But it is the philosophers whom he most highly esteems. He calls Plato “the great;”[2626] Parmenides Empedocles Zeno Cleanthes are in his eyes divine men and form a sacred society.[2627] But it is his own view of the world and of life which shows more than aught else how highly he esteemed the Greek philosophers. It agrees in the most essential points with the great teachers of the Greeks. Nay Philo has so profoundly absorbed their doctrines and so peculiarly worked them up into a new whole as himself to belong to the series of Greek philosophers. His system may on the whole be entitled an eclectic one Platonic Stoic and Neo-Pythagorean doctrines being the most prominent. Just in proportion as now one now the other was embraced has he been designated at one time a Platonist at another a Pythagorean.[2628] He might just as correctly be called a Stoic for the influence of Stoicism was at least as strong upon him as that of Platonism or Neo-Pythagoreanism.[2629]
[2623] Comp. on this and especially on Philo’s linguistic culture Siegfried Philo von Alexandria pp. 31-141. Also Zeller iii. 2. 343 sqq.
[2624] Siegfried Philo p. 32.
[2625] A list of Greek classics quoted by Philo is given by Grossmann Quaestiones Philoneae i. p. 5. Siegfried Philo p. 137 sqq.
[2626] De providentia ii. 42 p. 77 ed. Ancher (Richter 8th small vol.). Comp. also Quod omnis probus liber ii. 447 Mangey (Richter 5th small vol.) where according to the cod. Mediceus (one of the best manuscripts) τὸν ἱερώτατον Πλάτωνα is the reading instead of τὸν λιγυρώτατον Πλάτωνα.
[2627] De providentia ii. 48 p. 79 ed. Aucher (Richter 8th small vol.): Parmenides Empedocles Zeno Cleanthes aliique divi homines ac velut verus quidam proprieque sacer coetus. Comp. Quod omnis probus liber ii. 444 Mang. (Richter 5th small vol.): τὸν τῶν Πυθαγορείων ἱερώτατον θίασον.
[2628] A Platonist in the well-known proverb: ἢ Πλάτων φιλωνίζει ἢ Φίλων πλατωνίζει (Hieronymus vir. illustr. c. 11. Suidas Lex. s.v. Φίλων. Photius Bibliotheca cod. 105). Clemens Alex. calls him a Pythagorean and that in the two passages in which he is characterizing his philosophical tendency Strom. i. 15. 72: διὰ πολλῶν ὁ Πυθαγόρειος ὑποδείκνυσι Φίλων. Strom. ii. 19 100: ὥς φησιν ὁ Πυθαγόρειος Φίλων. Eusebius brings forward both his Platonism and his Pythagoreanism H. E. ii. 4. 3: μάλιστα τὴν κατὰ Πλάτωνα καὶ Πυθαγόραν ἐζηλωκὼς ἀγωγήν.
[2629] Zeller and Heinze in particular have pointed out the strong influence of Stoicism. Stein in opposition to them seeks to lay more stress on Platonism. But comp. Heinze Theol. Litztg. 1877 112 (in the discussion on Stein’s Geschichte des Platonismus).
Notwithstanding however this profound appropriation of Greek philosophy Philo remained a Jew: and the wisdom of the Greeks did not make him unfaithful to the religion of his fathers. Nor must his Jewish education be depreciated in presence of the philosophical culture which certainly appears the more prominent.[2630] He was not indeed fluent in the Hebrew tongue and he read the Old Testament exclusively in the Greek translation. Still he had a respectable knowledge of Hebrew as is shown by his numerous etymologies which indeed often appear absurd to us but are in truth not worse than those of the Palestinian Rabbis.[2631] He had indeed no accurate knowledge of the Palestinian Halachah. But that he had a general acquaintance with it is proved not only by a single decided intimation[2632] but especially by his whole work de specialibus legibus.[2633] In the Haggadic interpretation of Scripture he was quite a master. For the whole of his allegorical commentary is with respect to form nothing else than a transference of the method of the Palestinian Midrash to the region of Hellenism. It is just by this means that Philo gains the possibility of showing that his philosophical doctrine already exists in the Old Testament. Many close approximations are also found with respect to substance though these are much slighter than the agreement in method.[2634] For his legendary embellishment of the life of Moses Philo expressly appeals to the tradition of the πρεσβύτεροι who “always combined oral tradition with what was read aloud.”[2635]
[2630] Comp. Siegfried pp. 142-159.
[2631] Comp. the collections of Vallarai and Siegfried named above (note 103).
[2632] Euseb. Praep. evang. viii. 7.6 (from the first book of the Hypothetica). Philo having here given by way of example a series of commands says there are also μυρία ἄλλα ἐπὶ τούτοις ὅσα καὶ ἐπὶ ἀγράφων ἐθῶν καὶ νομίμων κἂν τοῖς νομίμοις αὐτοῖς.
[2633] See above p. 343 and Ritter’s work Philo und die Halacha 1879 there named; also Siegfried p. 145.
[2634] Comp. Siegfried p. 145 sqq. Also much in Frankel Ueber den Einfluss der palästinischen Exegese auf die alexandrinische Hermeneutik (1851) especially pp. 190-200.
[2635] Vita Mosis lib. i § 1 (Mang. ii. 81): Ἀλλʼ ἔγωγε … τὰ περὶ τὸν ἄνδρα μηνύσω μαθὼν αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκ βίβλων τῶν ἱερῶν … καὶ παρά τινων ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθνους πρεσβυτέρων. Τὰ γὰρ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἀναγινωσκομένοις ἀεὶ συνύφαινον.
Philo has nowhere given a systematic statement of his system. He has at most developed single points such as the doctrine of the creation of the world with some degree of connection. As a rule he gives the ideas he has worked out in conjunction with the text of the Old Testament This is consistent with the formal principle of his whole theology viz. the assumption of the absolute authority of the Mosaic law. The Thorah of Moses is to him as to every Jew the supreme nay the sole and absolutely decisive authority: a perfect revelation of Divine wisdom. Every word written in Holy Scripture by Moses is a divine declaration.[2636] Hence no word in it is without definite meaning.[2637] The Scriptures also of the other prophets in conjunction with those of Moses contain Divine revelations. For all the prophets are God’s interpreters who makes use of them as instruments for the revelation of the Divine will.[2638] With this formal principle of the absolute authority of Holy Scripture and especially of the Mosaic law is connected the further assumption that all true wisdom was actually contained just in this source of all knowledge. In other words Philo deduces formally from the Old Testament all those philosophical doctrines which he had in fact appropriated from the Greek philosophers. Not in Plato Pythagoras and Zeno but above all in the writings of Moses is to be found the deepest and most perfect instruction concerning things divine and human. In them was already comprised all that was good and true which the Greek philosophers subsequently taught. Thus Moses is the true teacher of mankind and it is from him—as Philo like Aristobulus presupposes—that the Greek philosophers derived their wisdom.[2639]
[2636] Vita Mosis ii. 163 ed. Mangey (Richter 4th small vol.): Οὐκ ἀγνοῶ μὲν οὖν ὡς πάντα εἰσὶ χρησμοὶ ὅσα ἐν ταῖς ἱεραῖς βίβλοις ἀναγέγραπται χρησθέντες διʼ αὐτοῦ (scil. Μωϋσέως).
[2637] In De profugis i. 554 Mangey (Richter 3rd small vol.) we are told of Philo that the expression θανάτῳ θανατοῦσθαι instead of the simple θανατοῦσθαι Exodus 21:12 disquieted him because he well knew ὅτι περιττὸν ὄνομα σὐδὲν τίθησιν.—For other examples see De Cherubim i. 149 Mangey (Richter 1st small vol.). De agricultura Noe i. 300 Mangey (Richter 2nd small vol.).
[2638] The extent of Philo’s Canon cannot be defined as to details. It is quite certain that the Thorah of Moses has in his view quite a different importance to the rest of Holy Scripture. But the latter also i.e. the most important of the Nebiim and Kethubim are quoted by him as prophetic and sacred writings. For further particulars see Gfrörer i. 46 sqq. On the inspiration of the prophets see De monarchia ii. 222 Mang. (Richter 4th small vol.): προφήτης θεοφόρητος θεσπιεῖ καὶ προφητεύσει λέγων μὲν οἰκεῖον οὐδέν· οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰ λέγει δύναται καταλαβεῖν ὅγε κατεχόμενος ὄντως καὶ ἐνθουσιῶν. Ὅσα δὲ ἐνηχεῖται διελεύσεται καθάπερ ὑποβάλλοντος ἑτέρου. Ἑρμηνεῖς γάρ εἰσιν οἱ προφῆται θεοῦ καταχρωμένου τοῖς ἐκείνων ὀργάνοις πρὸς δήλωσιν ὧν ἂν ἐθελήσῃ. Comp. also De specialibus legibus ii. 343 Mangey (Richter 5th small vol.). Quis rerum divinarum heres. i. 511 Mangey (Richter 3rd small vol.). For more on Philo’s doctrine of inspiration see Gfrörer i. 54-68.
[2639] So Heraclitus (Leg. allegor. i. 65 Mang. Richter 1st small vol. Quis rerum divinarum heres. i. 503 Mang. Richter 3rd small vol.). Zeno (Quod omnis probus liber ii. 454 Mang. Richter 5th small vol.).
The scientific means by which it was possible for Philo to adhere to and carry out these assumptions is allegorical interpretation.[2640] This was no invention of Philo but one which had already been perfected and wielded by others.[2641] Hence it was for him a quite self-evident process which he nowhere thought it necessary to justify although he occasionally extols its value and declares it indispensable. By the help of this process he was able to read out of the primitive history of Genesis those profound philosophical theories especially in the department of Psychology and Ethic which really grew up in the soil of Greek philosophy. The most external occurrences of scriptural history become in his hands mines of instruction concerning the supreme problems of human existence.
[2640] Comp. Gfrörer i. 68-113. Zeller iii. 2. 346-352; and especially Siegfried. Philo pp. 160-197.
[2641] Zeller iii. 2. 265 sq.
Only by means of this method could the double mission be in fact fulfilled which Philo saw allotted to him. He thus became to his Jewish co-religionists with whom he shared the presupposition of the Divine authority of the Mosaic law the medium of the philosophic culture of the Greeks; showing them that Moses had taught just what appeared to him true and valuable in Greek philosophy. On the other hand he proved to the Greeks by the same means that all the knowledge and intuition for which they so highly esteemed their own philosophers were already to be found in the writings of Moses. It was not they but Moses who was both the best of lawgivers and the first and greatest of philosophers. These two tendencies are it may be plainly perceived the mainsprings of Philo’s extensive literary activity. Being himself both Jew and Greek he desired to act upon both to make the Jews Greeks and the Greeks Jews. His religious assumptions are in the first place those of Judaism with its belief in revelation. But these religious assumptions underwent a powerful and peculiar modification by the elements which he derived from the Greek philosophy. And as he combined both in himself he desired to set up a propaganda on both sides.
No strictly completed system of Philo can in truth be spoken of. The elements of which his view of the world is compounded are too heterogeneous to form a strictly completed unity. Nevertheless his several views exhibit a connected whole whose members mutually condition one another. In the following attempt to give a brief sketch of this whole we shall leave out of consideration his specifically Jewish assumptions and confine ourselves to his philosophical views. The characteristic feature of his standpoint is just this that his philosophy i.e. his entire view of the world may be completely stated without the necessity of mentioning any Jewish particularistic notions. His Judaism virtually consists in the formal claim that the Jewish people are by reason of the Mosaic revelation in possession of the highest religious knowledge—one might almost say of the true religious illumination. In a material respect Greek views have gained the upper hand. For even his theology is only so far Jewish as to insist on monotheism and on the worship of God apart from images. In this however it stands in opposition only to the polytheism of the heathen religions but not to the idea of God of Greek philosophy which on the contrary Philo very closely follows. Thus his Judaism is already very powerfully modified. Moreover the specifically Jewish i.e. the particularistic notions are embraced by him in a form which is tantamount to their denial. It is just this which makes it possible entirely to disregard them in a sketch of his view of the world.[2642]—The following survey follows chiefly the excellent exposition of Zeller certainly the best we now have.
[2642] With regard to detail the following remarks may suffice. Philo firmly adheres to the obligation of the Mosaic law. But only because it is in his eyes the most perfect just and reasonable because its moral demands are always the purest its social institutions the best and most humane its religious ceremonies the most consistent with the Divine intelligence. In this sense it is that he exhibits it in his work de specialibus legibus. He also adheres to the prerogative of the Jewish people: the Jews are the privileged people of God (Gfrörer i. 486 sq. Dähne i. 428 sq.). But they owe their privileges to their own and their forefathers’ virtues. God makes no distinction between men as such. Hence too the Messianic promise i.e. the promise of earthly prosperity to which also Philo adheres (see § 29) applies not to Israel according to the flesh but to all who are converted from idolatry to the only true God (see especially de execrationibus § 8 Mang. ii. 435). We see that Jewish particularism is here everywhere in course of dissolution. Judaism is on the contrary the best religion just because it is cosmopolitan (comp. below note 179).
1. The Doctrine of God.[2643] The fundamental thought from which Philo starts is that of the dualism of God and the world. God alone is good and perfect the finite as such is imperfect. All determinations which are adapted to finite existence are therefore to be denied of God. He is eternal unchangeable simple free self-sufficing.[2644] He is not only free from human faults but exalted above human virtuss He is better than the good and the beautiful.[2645] Nay since every determination would be a limitation He is devoid of qualities ἄποιος without a ποιότῃς[2646] and thus His nature is undefinable. We can only say that He is not what He is.[2647]—It is true that together with these purely negative definitions which advance almost to an absence of attributes is found also a series of positive assertions on the nature of God by which assertions of the former kind are again abolished. This contradiction however is not to be wondered at. For the object of this assertion of an absence of attributes is merely to remove all limitation all imperfection from God. And therefore Philo makes no difficulty in placing beside it the other assertion: that all perfection is combined in God and derived from Him He fills and comprises everything.[2648] All perfection in the creature is derived solely and only from Him[2649]
[2643] Comp. Gfrörer i. 113 sqq. Dähne i. 114 sqq. Zeller iii. 2 pp. 353-360.
[2644] Eternal ἀΐδιος De mundi opificio i. 3 Mang. (Richter small vol. 5); De caritate ii. 386 Mang. (Richter small vol. 5) and elsewhere. Unchangeable ἄτρεπτος De Cherubim i. 142 Mang. (Richter small vol. 1); Legum alleyoriae i. 53 Mang. (Richter small vol. 1) and the whole work Quod deus sit immulabilis i. 272 sqq. Mang. (Richter small vol. 2).—Simple ἁπλοῦς Legum allegor. i. 66 Mang. (Richter small vol. 1).—Free De somniis i. 692 Mang. (Richter small vol. 3).—Self-sufficing χρῄζων οὐδενὸς τὸ παράπαν ἑαυτῷ ἱκανός αὐταρκέστατος ἑαυτῷ Legum allegor. i. 66 Mang. (Richter small vol. 1); De mutatione nominum i. 582 Mang. (Richter small vol. 3); De fortitudine ii. 377 Mang. (Richter small vol. 5).
[2645] De mundi opificio i. 2 Mang. (Richter small vol. 1): ὁ τῶν ὅλων νοῦς—εἰλικρινέστατος καὶ ἀκραιφνέστατος κρείττων τε ἢ ἀρετὴ καὶ κρείττων ἢ ἐπιστήμη καὶ κρείττων ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν.
[2646] Legum allegoriae i. 50 Mang. (Richter small vol. 1): ἄποιος—ό θεός.—Ibid. i. 53: ὁ γὰρ ἢ ποιότητα οἰόμενος ἔχειν τὸν θεὸν ἢ μὴ ἔνα εἶναι ἢ μὴ ἀγέννητον καὶ ἄφθαρτον ἢ μὴ ἄτρεπτον ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖ οὐ θεόν.—Quod deus sit immutabilis i. 281 Mang. (Richter small vol. 2): God must be withdrawn from all determination (quality) (ἐκβιβάζειν—πάσης ποιότητος).
[2647] Vita Mosis ii. 92 Mang. (Richter small vol. 4): Ὁ δὲ· Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον λέγε φησίν αὐτοῖς· Ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὢν ἵνα μαθόντες διαφορὰν ὄντος τε καὶ μὴ ὄντος προσαναδιδαχθῶσιν ὡς οὐδὲν ὄνομα ἐπʼ ἐμοῦ τὸ παράπαν κυριολογεῖται ᾧ μόνῳ πρόσεστι τὸ εἶναι—Quod deus sit immutabilis i. 282 Mang. (Richter small vol. 2): ὁ δʼ ἄρα οὐδὲ τῷ νῷ καταληπτός ὅτι μὴ κατὰ τὸ εἷναι μόνον. Ὕπαρξις γάρ ἐσθʼ ὃ καταλαμβάνομεν αὐτοῦ τὸ δὲ χωρὶς ὑπάρξεως οὐδέν.—De mutatione nominum i. 580 Mang. (Richter small vol. 3).—De somniis i. 655 Mang. (Richter small vol. 3).
[2648] Legum allegoriae i. 52 Mang. (Richter small vol. 1): τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐπιδεῆ καὶ ἔρημα καὶ κενὰ ὄντα πληρῶν καὶ περιέχων αὐτὸς δὲ ὑπʼ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου περιεχόμενος ἅτε εἷς καὶ τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸς ὤν.—Ibid. i. 88. Mang.: Πάντα γὰρ πεπλήρωκεν ὁ θεὸς καὶ διὰ πάντων διελήλυθεν καὶ κενὸν οὐδὲ ἔρημον ἀπολέλοιπεν ἑαυτοῦ.—Ibid. i. 97 Mang.—De confusions linguarum i. 425 Mang. (Richter small vol. 2).—De migratione Abrahami i. 466 Mang. (Richter small vol. 2).—De somniis i. 630 Mang. (Richter small vol. 3).—Gfrörer i. 123 sqq.—Dähne i. 282 sqq.
[2649] Legum alleg. i. 44 Mang. (Richter small vol. 1): Παύεται γὰρ οὐδέποτε ποιῶν ὁ θεὸς ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ἴδιον τὸ καίειν πυρὸς καὶ χιόνος τὸ ψύχειν οὕτω καὶ θεοῦ τὸ ποιεῖν· καὶ πολύ γε μᾶλλον ὅσῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄπασιν ἀρχὴ τοῦ δρᾶν ἀστίν.
2. The Intermediate Beings.[2650] God as the absolutely Perfect cannot enter into direct contact with matter. All contact therewith would defile Him.[2651] An acting therefore of God upon the world and in the world is according to Philo only possible through the intervention of intermediate causes of interposing powers who establish an intercourse between God and the world. For the more precise definition of these intermediate beings four notions suited to this purpose offered themselves to Philo; two belonging to the philosophical two to the religious region. These were the Platonic doctrine of ideas the Stoic doctrine of active causes the Jewish doctrine of angels and the Greek doctrine of daemons. All these elements but chiefly the Stoic doctrine of powers were used by Philo in constructing his peculiar doctrine of intermediate beings. Before the creation of this world of the senses he teaches God created the spiritual types of all things.[2652] These types or ideas must however be conceived of as active causes as powers which bring disordered matter into order.[2653] It is by means of these spiritual powers that God acts in the world. They are His ministers and vicegerents the ambassadors and mediums between God and things finite[2654] the λόγοι or partial powers of the universal reason.[2655] By Moses they are called angels by the Greeks daemons.[2656] If according to this they appear to be conceived of as independent hypostases nay as personal beings other assertions again forbid us to take them for decidedly such. It is expressly said that they exist only in the Divine thought.[2657] They are designated as the infinite powers of the infinite God[2658] and thus regarded as an inseparable portion of the Divine existence. But it would again be a mistake on the ground of these assertions to deny definitely the personification of the λόγοι or δυνάμεις. The truth is just this that Philo conceived of them both as independent hypostases and as immanent determinations of the Divine existence. And it is an apt remark of Zeller’s that this contradiction is necessarily required by the premisses of Philo’s system. “He combines both definitions without observing their contradiction nay he is unable to observe it because otherwise the intermediary rôle assigned to the Divine powers would be forfeited even that double nature by reason of which they are on the one hand to be identical with God that a participation in the Deity may by their means be possible to the finite and on the other hand different from Him that the Deity notwithstanding this participation may remain apart from all contact with the world.”[2659]
[2650] Comp. Gfrörer i. 143 sqq. Dähne i. 161 sqq. 202 sqq. Zeller iii. 2 pp. 360-370. Keferstein’s above-named Monograph.
[2651] De victimas offerentibus ii. 261 Mang. (Richter small vol. 4): Ἐξ ἐκείνης γὰρ [τῆς ὕλης] πάντʼ ἐγέννησεν ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτός· οὐ γὰρ ἦν θέμις ἀπείρου καὶ πεφυρμένης ὕλης ψαύειν τὸν ἴδμονα καὶ μακάριον.
[2652] De mundi opificio i. 4 Mang. (Richter small vol. 1): Προλαβὼν γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἅτε θεὸς ὅτι μίμημα καλὸν οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο καλοῦ δίχα παραδείγματος οὐδέ τι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀνυπαίτιον ὃ μὴ πρὸς ἀρχέτυπον καὶ νοητὴν ἰδέαν ἀπεικονίσθη βουληθεὶς τὸν ὁρατὸν τουτονὶ κόσμον δημιουργῆσαι προεξετύπου τὸν νοητὸν ἵνα χρώμενος ἀσωμάτῳ καὶ θεοειδεστάτω παραδείγματι τὸν σωματικὸν τοῦτον ἀπεργάσηται πρεσβυτέρου νεώτερον ἀπεικόνισμα τοσαῦτα περιέξοντα αἰσθητὰ γένη ὅσαπερ ἐν ἐκείνῳ νοητά. Comp. the work De mundi opificio.
[2653] De victimas offerentibus ii. 261 Mang. (Richter small vol. 4): ταῖς ἀσωμάτοις δυνάμεσιν ὧν ἔτυμον ὄνομα αἱ ἰδέαι κατεχρήσατο πρὸς τὸ γένος ἕκαστον τὴν ἁρμόττουσαν λαβεῖν μορφήν.—De monarchia ii. 218 sq. Mang. (Richter small vol. 4).
[2654] De Abrahamo ii. 17 sq. Mang. (Richter small vol. 4): ἱεραὶ καὶ θεῖαι φύσεις ὑποδιάκονοι καὶ ὕπαρχοι τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ.—De somniis i. 642 Mang. (Richter small vol. 3).
[2655] Legum alleg. i. 122 Mang. (Richter small vol. 1): τοὺς ἀγγέλους καὶ λόγους αὐτοῦ.—De somniis i. 631 Mang. (Richter 3): τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ λόγους ἐπικουρίας ἕνεκα τῶν φιλαρέτων ἀποστέλλει.—Ibid. i. 640: ψυχαὶ δέ εἰσιν ἀθάνατοι οἱ λόγοι οὗτοι.—On the identity of the λόγοι with the ideas see Heinze Lehre vom Logos p. 220.
[2656] De somniis i. 638 Mang. (Richter 3): ἀθανάτοις λόγοις οὓς καλεῖν ἔθος ἀγγέλους.—Ibid. i. 642: ταύτας (viz. pure souls) δαίμονας μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι φιλόσοφοι ὁ δὲ ἱερὸς λόγος ἀγγέλους εἴωθε καλεῖν.—De gigantibus i. 263 Mang. (Richter 2): Οὓς ἄλλοι φιλόσοφοι δαίμονας ἀγγέλους Μωϋσῆς εἴωθεν ὀνομάζειν· ψυχαὶ δέ εἰσι κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα πετόμεναι.
[2657] De mundi opificio i. 4 Mang. (Richter 1): As the ideal city whose plan the artist sketches exists only in his mind τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδὲ ὁ ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν κόσμος ἄλλον ἂν ἔχοι τόπον ἢ τὸν θεῖον λόγον τὸν ταῦτα διακοσμήσαντα.—Ibid. i. 5 Mang.: Εἰ δέ τις ἐθελήσεις γυμνοτέροις χρήσασθαι τοῖς ὀνόμασιν οὐδὲν ἂν ἕτερον εἴποι τὸν νοητὸν εἶναι κόσμον ἢ θεοῦ λόγον ἤδη κοσμοποιοῦντος.
[2658] De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini i. 173 Mang. (Richter 1): ἀπερίγραφος γὰρ ὁ θεός ἀπερίγραφοι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ.
[2659] Philosophie der Griechen iii. 2 p. 365.
With this ambiguous view of the nature of the δυνάμεις the question as to their origin must also necessarily remain undecided. It is true that Philo frequently expresses himself in an emanistic sense. But yet he never distinctly formulates the doctrine of emanation.[2660] The number of the δυνάμεις is in itself unlimited.[2661] Yet Philo sometimes gives calculations when comprising the individual powers under certain notions of species.[2662] He mostly distinguishes two supreme powers: goodness and might[2663] which again are combined and reconciled by the Divine Logos which so far as it is reckoned among the powers at all is the chief of all the root from which the rest proceed the most universal intermediary between God and the world that in which are comprised all the operations of God.[2664]
[2660] Comp. Zeller pp. 366-369.—Emanistic e.g. De profugis i. 575 Mang. (Richter 3): God is ἡ πρεσβυτάτη πηγή. Καὶ μήποτʼ εἰκότως. Τὸν γὰρ σύμπαντα τοῦτον κόσμον ὤμβρησε.—Also De somniis i. 688 Mang. (Richter 3).
[2661] De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini i. 173 Mang. (Richter 1): ἀπερίγραφοι αἱ δυνάμεις.—De confusione linguarum i. 431 Mang. (Richter 2): Εἷς ὤν ὁ θεὸς ἀμυθήτους περὶ αὑτὸν ἔχει δυνάμεις.
[2662] In de profugis i. 560 Mang. (Richter 3) he counts in all six viz. besides the θεῖος λόγος the five following: ἡ ποιητική ἡ βασιλική ἡ ἵλεως ἡ νομοθετική … (the last is wanting).
[2663] Ἀγαθότης and ἀρχή (De Cherubim i. 144 Mang. Richter 1; De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini i. 173 Mang. Richter 1) εὐεργεσία and ἡγεμονία or ἡ χαριστική and ἡ βασιλική (both de somniis i. 645 Mang. Richter 3) ἡ εὐεργέτις and ἡ κολαστήριος (de victimas offerentibus ii. 258 Mang. Richter 4) also ἡ ποιητική and ἡ βασιλική (because God created the world in consequence of His goodness so de Abrahamo ii. 19 Mang. Richter 4. Vita Mosis ii. 150 Mang. Richter 4).
[2664] De profugis i. 560 Mang. (Richter 3). Quaest. in Exod. ii. 68 p. 514 sq. (Richter 7). Contrary to Zeller who attempts to understand certain passages as saying that the Logos is to be conceived of not as the root but as the product or result of the two supreme powers (p. 370); see Heinze Die Lehre vom Logos p. 248 sqq.
3. The Logos.[2665] “By the Logos Philo understands the power of God or the active Divine intelligence in general; he designates it as the idea which comprises all other ideas the power which comprises all powers in itself as the entirety of the supersensuous world or of the Divine powers.”[2666] It is neither uncreated nor created after the manner of finite things.[2667] It is the vicegerent and ambassador of God;[2668] the angel or archangel which delivers to us the revelations of God;[2669] the instrument by which God made the world.[2670] The Logos is thus identified with the creative word of God.[2671] But not only is it the mediator for the relations of God to the world but also for the relations of the world to God. The Logos is the High Priest who makes intercession for the world to God.[2672] But notwithstanding this apparently undoubted personification of the Logos what has been said above of the Divine powers in general applies here also. “The definitions which according to the presuppositions of our thought would require the personality of the Logos are crossed in Philo by such as make it impossible and the peculiarity of his mode of conception consists in his not perceiving the contradiction involved in making the idea of the Logos oscillate obscurely between personal and impersonal being. This peculiarity is equally misunderstood when Philo’s Logos is regarded absolutely as a person separate from God and when on the contrary it is supposed that it only denotes God under a definite relation according to the aspect of His activity. According to Philo’s opinion the Logos is both but for this very reason neither one nor the other exclusively; and he does not perceive that it is impossible to combine these definitions into one notion.”[2673] “But Philo cannot dispense with these definitions. With him the Logos like all the Divine powers is only necessary because the supreme God Himself can enter into no direct contact with the finite; it must stand between the two and be the medium of their mutual relation; and how can it be this unless it were different from both if it were only a certain Divine property? In this case we should have again that direct action of God upon finite things which Philo declares inadmissible. On the other hand the Logos must now indeed be again identical with each of the opposites which it was to reconcile it must likewise be a property of God as a power operative in the world. Philo could not without contradiction succeed in combining the two.”[2674]
[2665] Comp. Gfrörer i. 168-326. Dähne i. 202 sqq. Zeller iii. 2 pp. 370-386 and the above-named Monographs especially those of Heinze and Soulier.
[2666] Zeller iii. 2 p. 371.
[2667] Quis rerum divinarum heres. i. 501 sq. Mang. (Richter 3): οὔτε ἀγέννητος ὡς ὁ θεὸς ὤν οὔτε γεννητὸς ὡς ὑμεῖς ἀλλὰ μέσος τῶν ἄκρων ἀμφοτέροις ὁμηρεύων.
[2668] Quis rer. div. her. l.c.: πρεσβευτὴς τοῦ ἡγεμόνος πρὸς τὸ ὑπήκοον.
[2669] Leg. allegor. l. 122 Mang. (Richter 1): τὸν ἄγγελον ὅς ἐστι λόγος.—De confusione linguarum i. 427 Mang. (Richter 2): τὸν πρωτόγονον αὐτοῦ λόγον τὸν ἄγγελον πρεσβύτατον ὡς ἀρχάγγελον πολυώνυμον ὑπάρχοντα.—De somniis i. 656 Mang. (Richter 3).—Quis rer. div. her. i. 501 fin. (Richter 3).—Quaest. in Exod. ii. 13 p. 476 (Richter 7).
[2670] Leg. allegor. i. 106 Mang. fin. (Richter 1): Σκιὰ θεοῦ δὲ ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ ἐστίν ᾧ καθάπερ ὀργάνῳ προσχρησάμενος ἐκοσμοποίει.—De Cherubim i. 162 Mang. (Richter 1): Εὑρήσεις γὰρ αἴτιον μὲν αὐτοῦ [τοῦ κόσμου] τὸν θεὸν ὑφʼ οὗ γέγονεν· ὕλην δὲ τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα ἐξ ὧν συνεκράθη· ὄργανον δὲ λόγον θεοῦ διʼ οὗ κατεσκευάσθη· τῆς δὲ κατασκευῆς αἰτίαν τὴν ἀγαθότητα τοῦ δημιουργοῦ.
[2671] Leg. alleg. i. 47 Mang. (Richter 1). De sacrif. Abel. et Cain. i. 165 Mang. (Richter 1). Heinze Die Lehre vom Logos p. 230.
[2672] De gigantibus i. 269 Mang. fin. (Richter 2): ὁ ἀρχιερεὺς λόγος ἐνδιατρίβειν ἀεὶ καὶ σχολάζειν ἐν τοῖς ἁγίοις δώμασι δυνάμενος.—De migratione Abrahami i. 452 Mang. (Richter 2): τὸν ἀρχιερέα λόγον.—De profugis i. 562 Mang. (Richter 3): λέγομεν γὰρ τὸν ἀρχιερέα οὐκ ἄνθρωπον ἀλλα λόγον θεῖον εἶναι πάντων οὐχ ἑκουσίων μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκουσίων ἀδικημάτων ἀμέτοχον.—Quis rer. div. her. i. 501 Mang. fin. (Richter 3): Ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς ἰκέτης μέν ἐστι τοῦ θνητοῦ κηραίνοντος ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄφθαρτον.—Vita Mosis ii. 155 Mang. (Richter 4): Ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἦν τὸν ἱερωμένον τῷ τοῦ κόσμου πατρὶ παρακλήτῳ χρῆσθαι τελειοτάτῳ τὴν ἀρετὴν υἱῷ πρός τε ἀμνηστείαν ἁμαρτημάτων καὶ χορηγίαν ἀφθονωτάτων ἀγαθῶν.
[2673] Zeller iii. 2 p. 378.
[2674] Zeller iii. 2 p. 380 sq.
Philo was as it seems the first to postulate under the name of the Logos such an intermediate being between God and the world.[2675] Points of contact for his doctrine lay in both Jewish theology and Greek philosophy. In the former it was chiefly the doctrine of the wisdom of God and in the second place that of the Spirit and the Word of God which Philo took up. From the Platonic philosophy it was the doctrine of ideas and of the soul of the world which he utilized for his purpose. But it is the Stoic doctrine of the Deity as the active reason of the world which is the nearest to his. “We need only to strip off from this Stoic doctrine of the Logos its pantheistic element by distinguishing the Logos from the Deity and its materialistic element by distinguishing it from organized matter to have the Philonean Logos complete.”[2676]
[2675] In the Wisdom of Solomon the Divine word is certainly once personified as elsewhere wisdom is. But this is merely a poetical personification not an actual bypostatification. The author applies the term Wisdom of God to represent the notion of an intermediary hypostasis so far as he entertains it Comp. also Grimm on the passage. In the Targums the “word of God” (Memra) certainly plays a rôle similar to that of the Logos in Philo. But these were very probably already under his influence.
[2676] Zeller iii. 2 p. 385.
4. The creation and preservation of the world.[2677] All existence cannot however the intermediate beings notwithstanding be traced back to God. For the evil the imperfect can in no wise not even indirectly have its cause in God.[2678] It originates from a second principle from matter (ὕλη or stoically οὐσία). This is the formless lifeless unmoved unordered mass devoid of properties from which God by means of the Logos and the divine powers formed the world.[2679] For only a forming of the world and not creation in its proper sense is spoken of in Philo since the origin of matter is not in God but it is placed as a second principle beside Him. And the preservation of the world as well as its formation is effected by means of the Logos and the Divine powers. Nay the former is in truth but a continuation of the latter; and what we call the laws of nature are but the totality of the regular Divine operations.[2680]
[2677] Comp. Gfrörer i. 327 sqq. Dähne i. 170 sqq. 246 sqq. Zeller iii. 2 pp. 386-393.
[2678] Comp. Zeller iii. 3 p. 386 note 1.
[2679] De mundi opificio i. 5 Mang. (Richter 1): Matter is ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ἄτακτος ἄποιος ἄψυχος ἑτεροποιότητος ἀναρμοστίας ἀσυμφωνίας μεστή.—Quis rerum divinarum heres. i. 492 Mang. fin. (Richter 3): τήν τε ἄμορφον καὶ ἄποιον τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν.—De profugis i. 547 Mang. (Richter 3): τὴν ἄποιον καὶ ἀνείδεον καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον οὐσίαν.—Ibid.: ἡ ἄποιος ὕλη.—De victimas offerentibus ii. 261 Mang. (Richter 4): ἄμορφος ὕλη.—Ibid.: ἀπείρου καὶ πεφυρμένης ὕλης.—De creations principum ii. 367 Mang. (Richter 5): Μηνύει δʼ ἡ τοῦ κόσμου γένεσίς τε καὶ διοικησις. Τὰ γὰρ μὴ ὄντα ἐκάλεσεν εἰς τὸ εἶναι τάξιν ἐξ ἀταξίας καὶ ἐξ ἀποίων ποιότητας καὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίων ὁμοιότητας καὶ ἐξ ἑτεροτήτων ταὐτότητας καὶ ἐξ ἀκοινωνήτων καὶ ἀναρμόστων κοινωνίας καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ ἐκ μὲν ἀνισότητος ἰσότητα ἐκ δὲ σκότους θῶς ἐργασάμενος. Ἀεὶ γάρ ἐστιν ἐπιμελὲς αὐτῷ καὶ ταῖς εὐεργέτισιν αὐτοῦ δυνάμεσι τὸ πλημμελὲς τῆς χείρονος οὐσίας μεταποιεῖν καὶ μεθαρμόζεσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἀμείνω.
[2680] Comp. Zeller iii. 2 p. 389 sq.
5. Anthropology.[2681] It is in anthropology where Philo chiefly follows the Platonic doctrine that the dualistic basis of his system comes most strongly to light. Philo here starts from the assumption that the entire atmosphere is filled with souls. Of these it is the angels or demons dwelling in its higher parts who are the mediums of God’s intercourse with the world.[2682] Those on the contrary who remain nearer to the earth are attracted by sense and descend into mortal bodies.[2683] Consequently the soul of man is nothing else than one of those Divine powers of those emanations of Deity which in their original state are called angels or daemons. It is only the life-sustaining sensitive soul that originates by generation and indeed from the aeriform elements of the seed; reason on the contrary enters into man from without.[2684] The human πνεῦμα is thus an emanation of Deity: God breathed His spirit into man.[2685]—The body as the animal part of man is the source of all evil it is the prison to which the spirit is banished[2686] the corpse which the soul drags about with it[2687] the coffin or the grave from which it will first awake to true life.[2688] Sense as such being evil sin is innate in man[2689] No one can keep himself free from it even if he were to live but a day.[2690]
[2681] Comp. Gfrörer i. 373-415. Dähne i. 288-340. Zeller iii. 2 pp. 393-402.
[2682] De somniis i. 642 Mang. (Richter 3).
[2683] De gigantibus i. 263 sq. Mang. (Richter 2).
[2684] De mundi opificio i. 15 Mang. (Richter 1): Ἡ δὲ [ἡ κίνησις] οἰα τεχνίτης ἢ κυριώτερον εἰπεῖν ἀνεπίληπτος τέχνη ζωοπλαστεῖ τὴν μὲν ὑγρὰν οὐσίαν εἰς τὰ τοῦ σώματος μέλη καὶ μέρη διανέμουσα τὴν δὲ πνευματικὴν εἰς τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις τήν τε θρεπτικὴν καὶ τὴν αἰσθητικήν. Τὴν γὰρ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τανῦν ὑπερθετέον διὰ τοὺς φάσκοντας θύραθεν αὐτὸν ἐπεισιέναι θεῖον καὶ αΐδιον ὄντα.
[2685] Quod deterius potiori insidiatur i. 206 sq. Mang. (Richter 1).—De mundi opificio i. 32 Mang. (Richter 1).—De specialibus legibus ii. 356 Mang. (Richter 5).—Quis rerum divinarum heres. i. 480 sq. 498 sq. Mang. (Richter 3).
[2686] Δεσμωτήριον De ebrietate i. 372 fin. Mang. (Richter 2). Leg. allegor. i. 95 sub. fin. Mang. (Richter 1). De migratione Abrahami i. 437 sub fin. Mang. (Richter 2).
[2687] Νεκρὸν σῶμα Leg. allegor. i. 100 sq. Mang. (Richter 1). De gigantibus i. 264 med. Mang. (Richter 2). Τὸν ψυχῆς ἔγγιστα οἶκον ὃν ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἄχρι τελευτῆς ἄχθος τοσοῦτον οὐκ ἀποτίθεται νεκροφοροῦσα De Agricultura Noe i. 305 Mang. (Richter 2).
[2688] Λάρναξ ἢ σορός De migratione Abrahami i. 438 sub fin. Mang. (Richter 2).—σῆμα Leg. allegor. i. 65 sub fin. Mang. (Richter 1).
[2689] Vita Mosis ii. 157 Mang. (Richter 4): παντὶ γεννητῷ καὶ ἂν σπουδαῖον ᾖ παρʼ ὅσον ἦλθεν εἰς γένεσιν συμφυὲς τὸ ἁμαρτάνον ἐστίν.
[2690] De mutatione nominum i. 585 Mang. (Richter 3): Τίς γὰρ ὡς ὁ Ἰώβ φησι καθαρὸς ἀπὸ ῥύπου καὶ ἂν μία ἡμέρα ἐστὶν ἡ ζωή (Job 14:4 sq.).
6. Ethic.[2691] According to these anthropologic assumptions it is self-evident that the chief principle of ethic is the utmost possible renunciation of sensuousness the extirpation of desire and of the passions. Hence among philosophical systems the Stoic must be most of all congenial to Philo in the matter of ethic. It is this that he chiefly embraces not only in its fundamental thought of the mortification of the senses but also in single statements as in the doctrine of the four cardinal virtues[2692] and of the four passions.[2693] Like the Stoics he teaches that there is only one good morality;[2694] like them he requires freedom from all passions[2695] and the greatest possible simplicity of life;[2696] like them he also is a cosmopolitan.[2697] But with all this affinity Philo’s ethic still essentially differs from the Stoic. The Stoics refer man to his own strength; according to Philo man as a sensuous being is incapable of liberating himself from sensuousness: for this he needs the help of God. It is God who plants and promotes the virtues in the soul of man. Only he who honours Him and yields himself to His influence can attain to perfection.[2698] True morality is as Plato teaches the imitation of the Deity.[2699] In this religious basis of ethic Philo is very decidedly distinguished from the Stoics. Political activity and practical morality in general have a value only so far as they are a necessary medium for contending against evil.[2700] But knowledge also must subserve this one object and hence ethic is the most important part of philosophy.[2701] Nevertheless the purity of life attained by such self-knowledge is not the ultimate and supreme object of human development. On the contrary the origin of man being transcendental the object of his development is likewise transcendental. As it was by falling away from God that he was entangled in this life of sense so must he struggle up from it to the direct vision of God. This object is attainable even in this earthly life. For the truly wise and virtuous man is lifted above and out of himself and in such ecstasy beholds and recognises Deity itself. His own consciousness sinks and disappears in the Divine light; and the Spirit of God dwells in him and stirs him like the strings of a musical instrument.[2702] He who has in this way attained to the vision of the Divine has reached the highest degree of earthly happiness. Beyond it lies only complete deliverance from this body that return of the soul to its original incorporeal condition which is bestowed on those who have kept themselves free from attachment to this sensuous body.[2703]
[2691] Comp. Gfrörer i. 415 sqq. Dähne i. 341-423. Zeller iii. 2 pp. 402-416. Frankel in the above-cited article. Kähler Das Gewissen i. 1 (1878) p. 171 sqq.
[2692] Φρόνησις σωφροσύνη ἀνδρία δικαιοσύνη Leg. allegor. i. 56 Mang. (Richter 1) and frequently.
[2693] Leg. allegor. i. 114 sub fin. Mang. (Richter 1).
[2694] Μόνον εἶναι τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν De posteritate Caini i. 251 init. Mang. (Richter 2).
[2695] Leg. allegor. i. 100 Mang. (Richter 1): Ὁ δὲ ὄφις ἡ ἡδονὴ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ἐστὶ μοχθηρά. Διὰ τοῦτο ἐν μὲν σπουδαίῳ οὐχ εὑρίσκεται τὸ παράπαν μόνος δὲ αὐτῆς ὀ φαῦλος ἀπολαύει.—Ibid. i. 113 init.: Μωϋσῆς δὲ ὅλον τὸν θυμὸν ἐκτέμνειν καὶ ἀποκόπτειν οἴεται δεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ μετριοπάθειαν ἀλλὰ συνόλως ἀπάθειαν ἀγαπῶν.
[2696] De somniis i. 639-665 Mang. (Richter 3).—Leg. allegor. i. 115 Mang. (Richter 1).—Quod deterius poliori insidiatur i. 198 init. Mang. (Richter 1).
[2697] See Zeller iii. 2 p. 404.
[2698] Leg. allegor. i. 53 init. Mang. (Richter 1): πρέπει τῷ θεῷ φυτεύειν καὶ οἰκοδομεῖν ἐν ψυχῇ τὰς ἀρετάς.—Ibid. i. 60: Ὅταν ἐκβῇ ὁ νοῦς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἀνενέγκῃ θεῷ ὥσπερ ὁ γέλως Ἰσαάκ τηνικαῦτα ὁμολογίαν τὴν πρὸς τὸν ὄντα ποιεῖται. Ἕως δὲ αὑτὸν ὑποτίθηται ὡς αἰτιόν τινος μακρὰν ἀφέστηκε τοῦ παραχωρεῖν θεῷ καὶ ὁμολογεῖν αὐτῷ. Καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ ἐξομολογεῖσθαι νοητέον ὅτι ἔργον ἐστὶν οὐχὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ τοῦ φαίνοντος αὐτῇ θεοῦ τὸ εὐχάριστον.—Ibid. i. 131: αὐτὸς γὰρ [ὁ χύριος] πατήρ ἐστι τῆς τελείας φύσεως σπείρων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ γεννῶν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν.
[2699] De mundi opificio i. 35 init. Mang. (Richter 1).—De decalogo ii. 193 init. Mang. (Richter 4).—De caritate ii. 404 init. Mang. (Richter 5).—De migratione Abrahami i. 456 med. 463 Mang. (Richter 2).
[2700] See Zeller iii. 2 p. 406 sq.
[2701] De mutatione nominum i. 589 Mang. (Richter 3): καθάπερ δένδρωυ οὐδὲν ὄφελος εἰ μὴ καρπῶν οἰστικὰ γένοιτο τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον οὐδὲν φυσιολογίας εἰ μὴ μέλλοι κτῆσιν ἀρετῆς ἐνεγκεῖν κ.τ.λ.—De agricultura Noe i. 302 Mang. (Richter 2). In both passages Philo compares physics to the plants and trees; logic to the hedges and fences; ethic to the fruits. He praises the Essence for exclusively occupying themselves with ethic (Quod omnis probus liber ii. 458 Mang.).
[2702] Philo thus addresses the soul in Quis rerum divinarum heres. i. 482 Mang. (Richter 3): σαυτὴν ἀπόδραθι καὶ ἔκστηθι σεαυτῆς καθάπερ οἱ κορυβανιῶντες καὶ κατεχόμενοι βακχευθεῖσα καὶ θεοφορηθεῖσα κατά τινα προφητικον ἐπιθειασμόν. Ἐνθουσιώσης γὰρ καὶ οὐκ ἔτι οὔσης ἐν ἑαυτῇ διανοίας ἀλλʼ ἔρωτ οὐρανίῳ σεσοβημένης καὶ ἐκμεμηνυίας κ.τ.λ. Quis rerum divinarum heres. i. 508 sqq. Mang. (Richter 3) especially i. 511 (where Philo dilates at length upon the ecstatic state).
[2703] De Abrahamo ii. 37 Mang. (Richter 4): Wisdom teaches τὸν θάνατον νομίζειν μὴ σβέσιν ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ χωρισμὸν καὶ διάζευξιν ἀπὸ σώματος ὅθεν ἦλθεν ἀπιούσης. Ἦλθε δὲ ὡς ἐν τῇ κοσμοποιΐᾳ δεδήλωται παρὰ θεοῦ.—Leg. allegor. i. 65 (Richter 1): Εὖ καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος κατὰ τοῦτο Μωϋσέως ἀκολουθήσας τῷ δόγματι· φησὶ γὰρ· “Ζῶμεν τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον τεθνήκαμεν δὲ τὸν ἐκείνων βίον” ὡς νῦν μὲν ὅτε ἐνζῶμεν τεθνηκυίας τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ὡς ἂν ἐν σήματι τῷ σώματι ἐντετυμβευμένης· εἰ δὲ ἀποθάνοιμεν τῆς ψυχῆς ζώσης τὸν ἴδιον βίον καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένης κακοῦ καὶ νεκροῦ τοῦ συνδέτου σώματος. For those who have not freed themselves from sense Philo has to accept after the occurrence of natural death a transition to another body that is a transmigration of souls. See Zeller iii. 2. 397
Philo’s influence upon the two circles which he had chiefly in view viz. Judaism and heathenism was impaired by the fact that from his time onward Jewish Hellenism in general gradually lost in importance. On the one hand the Pharisaic tendency gained strength in the Dispersion also on the other Hellenistic Judaism was in respect of its influence upon heathen circles repressed nay altogether dissolved by Christianity which was now in its prime. Hence Judaeo-Hellenistic philosophy had gradually to give place to its stronger rival in both regions. Its influence was nevertheless still considerable. Jewish Rabbis and heathen neo-Platonists were more or less affected by it. Its strongest and most enduring influence was however exercised in a direction which still lay outside Philo’s horizon upon the development of Christian dogma. The New Testament already shows unmistakeable traces of Philonean wisdom; and almost all the Greek Fathers of the first century the apologists as well as the Alexandrians the Gnostics as well as their adversaries and even the great Greek theologians of subsequent centuries have some more some less either directly or indirectly consciously or unconsciously drawn from Philo. But to follow out these traccs lies beyond the province of this work.