059. Chapter 10: God In Providence.

Chapter 10 God In Providence. A PROVIDENCE of God is very fully revealed as a fact. The Scriptures are replete with expressions of his government. These expressions are given in such terms of universality, and with such detail, that nothing is omitted. God rules in all the realms of nature, and in their minutiae as in their magnitudes. A few texts will verify these statements. God’s power sustains and rules the mighty orbs of heaven (Isaiah 40:26), The heavens and all their hosts, the earth and the sea, with all they contain, are the subjects of his preserving and ruling providence (Nehemiah 9:6). The thunder and the lightning are his; the frost and hail and snow, and the warm winds which dissolve them, are the determination of his hand (Job 37:2-11). His showers water the earth, soften the furrows, and bless the springing corn (Psalms 65:9-10). He cares for the falling sparrow, and numbers the hairs of our head (Matthew 10:29-30). Such is the providence of God as revealed in the Scriptures. The idea of a providence is not in itself an obscure one. It appears in the light of our own experience and observation. We see it in the government of the State, or in the offices of the ruler of the State. This sense of providence is expressed in the New Testament (Acts 24:2). The idea is yet more clearly and impressively given in the parental care of the family. In the government of the children, in the watch-care over their interests, in the provisions for their good, there is a true parental providence. With such facts ever present in our own life, it is easy to rise to the idea of a divine providence. God is the Creator of all things, our own Creator and Father. He must care for the works of his own hands, even for those without any capacity for either pleasure or pain. Much more must he care for the forms of existence with such capacity. This care must be providential in its offices. We are his offspring and sustain to him the intimate relation of children. Nor are little children in deeper need of the parental care than we are of the providential ministries of the heavenly Father. There is no reason to doubt his care for us. The idea of his providence is just as simple and assuring as the idea of that parental providence which we see in our human life. We read this meaning in the words of the psalmist: “Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear him. For he knoweth our frame; he rememboreth that we are dust” (Psalms 103:13-14). We read it more ‘clearly and deeply in the words which Christ addressed to his disciples for their assurance in the trying experiences of this life: “Your Father knoweth that ye have need of these things” (Luke 12:30). But the providence of God is thus viewed merely as a fact; and it is only in this view that it is clear and simple.

It is useless to assume for this question a simplicity which is not real. It is equally useless to attempt a concealment of its perplexities. They appear all along the history of its doctrinal treatment. Nor are they any less in the more recent issues of the question. Difficulties appear in the diversities of doctrinal view.

Questions arise respecting the nature and extent of the divine agency in the preservation and government of the universe. The answers widely differ. In pantheism God is the only operative force, but as a nature without personal agency. The position of theism must consistently be directly the opposite. The providential agency of God is purely and only personal. As personal, it must be through the rational energizing of his will. On this point theists have not always been sufficiently definite. There is a doctrine of the divine immanence which does not keep sufficiently clear of the pantheistic view. While the personality of God is still maintained, the view that his divine nature as a universal presence is a universal energy finds too much place in the doctrine of providence. Answers differ respecting the extent of the divine agency as well as respecting its mode. The differences range along the whole line from the negative position of deism to the position that God is the only force operative in nature. Again, the answers differ as to whether the divine agency always operates in harmony with the laws of nature, or whether it sometimes so departs from these laws as to prevent their natural results, or to attain results which could not otherwise be achieved. The point is not here to discuss these several views, but simply to note them as signs of the difficulties which beset the doctrinal treatment of the divine providence. The difficulties of a doctrinal treatment have been increased by its implication with questions of modern science. If, as some scientists maintain, the spheres of animate and rational life are one with the material, and all subject to an absolute continuity of physical causality, there is no place for the providence of God as a personal agency. There is in the order of nature, especially, within the physical sphere, a uniformity which is seemingly the determination of purely natural forces. The question thus arises whether there are such forces, and, if so, whether their operation may be, and sometimes is in fact, modified by the divine agency. All such questions now concern the doctrine of providence.

Another question of difficulty arises from the relation of providence to our free moral agency. It is clear that without such freedom there can be neither moral obligation nor responsibility. Both, however, are realities above any reasonable questioning. Moral freedom must be a reality. Hence the real question is the adjustment of such a freedom to the offices of a divine providence in our human life. To many minds this adjustment may seem very simple and easy, but the history of opinions on the question does not warrant such a view.

There is still the difficulty, and perhaps the most perplexing of all, arising from the magnitude of evil, physical and moral. Only a complete theodicy could fully adjust such evil to the doctrine of providence. There is no present attainment of such a theodicy. However, the truth of a divine providence is not so conditioned for our faith. It is so conditioned only for the full comprehension of our reason. This is not necessary to a fully warranted and very sure faith. While there may be no complete explication of present evils, the proofs of a beneficent providence may be clear and sure. The same is true respecting all other questions of perplexity.