003. II. Sources of Theology.

II. Sources of Theology. On this question, as on many others, opposing theories have been pushed to extremes beyond the truth in either. When it is said that both nature and revelation are sources of theology there is truth in both views; but when it is said, on the one hand, that nature is the only and entirely sufficient source, and, on the other, that revelation is the only source, neither position is true. These are the opposite extremes of error. The one theory maintains that whatever we need to know of God and his will and of our own duty and destiny may be discovered in the light of nature; the other, that nature makes no revelation of God and duty, and, at most, can only respond to the disclosures of a divine revelation. The former position is naturally assumed by infidels who yet hold the existence of God and the moral and religious constitution of man. It is necessary for them to exalt the light of nature. Christianity early encountered this position of infidelity. Notably was it the position of the leading deists of England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Christian apologists have not been entirely free from the opposite tendency. Some have seemed reluctant to concede any resource of religious truth in the light of nature, lest they might jeopard the strongest ground of defense against the assaults upon the Christian faith. There was very little of this tendency with the great champions of revelation against the English deists. Near the close of this great debate, however, and especially at a later period, the position was assumed which logically excludes all grounds of a natural theology. Such is really the position of Watson.^[9] No doubt the philosophy of Locke contributed much to this tendency, though he himself wrote on Christianity with an apologetic aim and fully admitted a light of nature, but controverted its sufficiency.^{[10] [9]} Theological Institutes, vol. i, chaps, iii-viii.

^[10]The Reasonableness of Christianity, Works, vol. vii. On the broadest division there are two sources of theology—nature and revelation. They are very far from any equality; in fullness, clearness, and authority fairly comparable only by contrast. Some great truths of Christian theology are peculiar to revelation. Yet the first question of all religion, the existence of God, must be taken first to nature. The best Christian thinkers agree in these two sources. For the present we are merely stating them. The question of secondary sources will follow their more direct treatment.

1. Nature a Source of Theology.—By nature we here mean all things and events other than the divine revelation as distinctively such and which may, in any mode or degree, manifest God or his will or any other truth which is properly theological in its content. Whether such truth is an intuition of the primary reason, or a conclusion of the logical reason, or a product of the moral and religious consciousness, it is a truth through the light of nature. For the present we omit the Christian consciousness as a specific form of the religious consciousness, because it has been placed in such relation to this question as to require a separate consideration. There is a sense in which all knowledge is from God. He is the Author of our faculties and their correlations to objective truths which render knowledge possible. As between nature and revelation there is still the profound difference in the modes of knowledge: in the one case its acquisition in the use of human faculties; in the other its immediate communication by the divine agency. Our intuitions of truth are no exception. In this case the mode of acquisition is as purely human and as really different from its immediate divine communication as in the acquisition of knowledge in the use of the logical faculties. In the one case the discovery of truth is mediated by the use of our own faculties; in the other it is immediately given by the supernatural agency of God. It is important thus sharply to discriminate these two modes of truth, for only thus can we properly distinguish nature and revelation as sources of theology.

These statements may suffice for the present, for we are not yet studying the theology of nature, but simply defining and discriminating nature as a source of theology. How far this source may be valid and available for a knowledge of God and of our relations to him is for future inquiry. Without any incongruity of method we might here consider the religious ideas everywhere disclosed in human history—ideas of God or of some supernatural Being, whose providence is ever over mankind and whom men should worship and obey; ideas of moral obligation and responsibility, of future existence and retribution. And, further, we might consider the evidence that these ideas are traceable to the light of nature and rationally traceable to no other source. With these facts established, and with the manifest theological content of these ideas, we should have the truth of a theology in the light of nature. But as these questions must arise with the question of theism it is better to defer them.

It is proper here to point out that the Scriptures fully recognize the works of nature and the moral constitution of man as manifestations of God and various forms of religious truth. This is so clearly the case that it may well be thought singular that any who accept their supreme authority, and, particularly, that assume to find in a supernatural revelation the only true original of theological truth, should either overlook this recognition as a fact or its conclusive significance for a natural theology.

Nature in its manifold forms is a manifestation of the perfections, providence, and will of God. “The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament showeth his handiwork” (Psalms 19:1). The orderly forms of the heavens, their magnitude and magnificence, are a manifestation of the wisdom and power of God, a mirror in which his glory shines. The manifestation is unto all people. ‘‘Lift up your eyes on high, and behold who hath created these things, that bringeth out their host by number: he calleth them all by names by the greatness of his might, for that he is strong in power; not one faileth” (Isaiah 40:26). This is God’s appeal to men, that ill the heavens they would behold his power and wisdom and providence. It would be useless to look upon the heavens for any such purpose if they are not a manifestation of these perfections in God. In the view of Paul facts of nature witnessed for God unto men in the darkness of heathenism: “Nevertheless he left not himself without witness, in that he did good, and gave us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness” (Acts 14:17). These facts could be witnesses of God unto men only as manifestations of his being and providence. The great words of Paul uttered on Mars’ Hill are replete with the same ideas (Acts 18:24-28). His words in vindication of the divine judgments upon the wicked heathen are specially noteworthy: “Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath showed it unto them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse” (Romans 1:19-20). Words could not well be more to the point. The Scriptures assert a common moral responsibility under the light of nature. This fact is the more decisive of the sense of Scripture on the present question, because the responsibility asserted is not such as might arise under atheism or pantheism, but such as requires the idea of God as a moral ruler. This is clearly seen in the appropriate texts: “For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness. . . . Because that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened” (Romans 1:18; Romans 1:21). The application is to the heathen under the light of nature, just as to men under a formally revealed law. This is clear from the whole connection, and particularly from the omitted Romans 1:19-20. It is thus the sense of the apostle that under the light of nature men may so know God and his will as to be morally responsible to him. It is upon this ground that divine retribution is visited upon the Gentiles as upon the Jews, whose lives are in common given to wickedness (Romans 2:1-11). “Gentiles without the law may yet by nature fulfill its moral duties. In this they are a law unto themselves, and show the work of the law written in their hearts. The conscience of such is active in either self-approval or self-condemnation, and equally in the moral judgment of others (Romans 2:14-15). All this means a moral responsibility under the light of nature—such a responsibility as can arise only with the idea of God as moral ruler. Thus in two modes—by an appeal to the works of nature as a manifestation of God and his will and providence, and by the fact of moral responsibility under the law of nature—the Scriptures fully recognize the light of nature as a source of theology. It is yet the sense of the Scriptures that there is a profound moral need of higher forms of religious truth which the light of nature cannot disclose.

2. Revelation the Source of Theology.—We here need a definitive sense of revelation, though not an exact distinction between revelation and inspiration. Religious truth communicated through a supernatural agency of God is a revelation. In this view the supernatural divine agency is the defining fact of revelation, and will fully answer for the present requirement. The mode of this agency in the communication of religious truth, except that it must be supernatural, is indifferent to its definitive function. Whether the communication is by sign, or word, or immediate inspiration, the agency is equally supernatural and the communication equally a divine revelation. This supernatural agency as the defining fact of revelation thoroughly distinguishes it from nature as a source of theology.

It follows that revelation has no necessary biblical limitation. Relative facts neither require such a limitation nor justify its assumption. In all generations sincere and devout souls have been seeking for God and truth. In a profound sense of need and out of the thick darkness they have cried to Heaven for light and help. Who shall say that no such prayer has ever been answered? According to the defining fact of revelation, as above stated, any religious truth divinely given in such answer, though not verified to the recipient as from God, is yet a revelation. And to this source we would trace the higher religious truths reached by heathen minds, rather than to unaided reason and the light of nature, or to tradition. Yet, the highest truths even so readied fall infinitely below the moral and religious needs of mankind, and equally below the truths given in the Scriptures. Besides, they lack the seal of a divine original, and, therefore, the certainty and authority necessary to their truest religious value. While, therefore, we cannot question the divine communication of some religious truth to devout minds, yet in a stricter sense, as in the common theological view, revelation and the Scriptures are one. The Holy Scriptures are one source, and by all pre-eminence the source, of theology. Whether a divine revelation or not, or whatever their source, they contain the highest religious truths ever attained by mankind. Let a comparison be made with all that poets have sung and philosophers uttered, with all that is contained in the sacred books of other forms of religion, and the theology of the Scriptures will stand only in the clearer light of peerless excellence. If tested by the purest moral and religious intuitions, or by the sharpest inquisition of the logical reason, or by the profoundest sense of religious need, or by the satisfaction which its truths bring to the soul, or by its sublime power in the spiritual life, the theology of the Scriptures rises infinitely above all other theologies of the world. That they are a direct revelation from God, with the seal of a divine original clearly set upon them, gives to their theology a certainty and sufficiency, a grace and value, specially divine.

3. Mistaken Sources.—Under this head we may point out three mistaken sources of theology, severally designated as the confessional, the traditional, and the mystical. A confessional source is omitted by many, but finds a place in the analysis and classification of some.^[11] It should be noted that where creeds or confessions of faith are classed as a source of theology they are accounted such only in a secondary sense. This qualified sense, however, goes beyond the truth, or, if kept within the truth, loses all proper meaning of a source of theology. In the treatment of historical theology we stated the value of creeds and confessions to systematic theology. They embody the results of much preparatory work, and furnish much valuable material; but they have no authoritative quality, and therefore cannot be reckoned a source of theology. They are true or false in doctrine just as they are true or false to the Scriptures; and this fact of subordination denies to them all proper place among the sources of theology. Van Oosterzee’s own explanatory statement really accords with this view: “The confessional writings of the Church (fons secundarius) cannot possibly be placed on a line with Holy Scripture, but must, on the contrary, be tested by, and if necessary altered according to, this latter. They contain no law for, but are expressions of, the belief which the Christian Church since the earliest times has constantly confessed.” Dr. Smith reaches the same view: “Confessions are the voice of the Church, to which Christ promised his Spirit. But neither experience nor confessions can create new doctrines.” This limitation denies to confessions any place among the proper sources of theology. It is better not to place among these sources any thing which does not possess the quality of a true source.

^[11]Van Oosterzee;Christian Dogmatics, vol. i, pp. 18-21; Smith: Introduction to Christian Theology, p. 61. In Romanism tradition is held to be co-ordinate with the Scriptures in matters of faith and morals. This is the doctrine decreed by the Council of Trent. “The sacred and holy, œcumenical, and general Synod of Trent, . . . following the example of the orthodox fathers, receives and venerates with an equal affection of piety and reverence all the books both of the Old and of the New Testament—seeing that one God is the author of both —as also the sacred traditions, as well those pertaining to faith as to morals, as having been dictated, either by Christ’s own word of mouth or by the Holy Ghost, and j)reserved in the Catholic Church by a continuous succession.”^{[12] [12]} Schaff:Creeds of Christendom, vol. ii, pp. 79, 80.

Tradition—παράδοσις—properly means any instruction delivered from one to another, whether orally or in writing. Within a proper limitation of time and under favorable conditions even oral tradition may be of value. It was so in apostolic times and even later. So Paul exhorted the Christians of Thessalonica to observe the traditions received from him, whether by word or epistle, and to withdraw from any who refused this observance (2 Thessalonians 2:15; 2 Thessalonians 3:6). The earlier fathers appealed to apostolic traditions, and might do so with safety and profit. They were still near the apostles, whose sacredly treasured words might be securely transmitted through the succession of Christian teachers. But the time-limit of this law was soon passed, and the favoring conditions gave place to perverting influences; so that no ground is conceded to the Romish doctrine of tradition, which makes it co-ordinate with the Scriptures and asserts its perpetuity through the papacy. “In coming to a decision on this question every thing depends upon making the proper distinctions with regard to time. In the first period of Christianity the authority of the apostles was so great that all their doctrines and ordinances were strictly and punctually observed by the churches which they had planted. And the doctrine and discipline which prevailed in these apostolic churches were, at that time, justly considered by others to be purely such as the apostles themselves had taught and established. This was the more common, as the books of the New Testament had not, as yet, come into general use among Christians. Nor was it, in that early period, attended with any special liability to mistake. . . . But in later periods of the Church the circumstances were far different. After the commencement of the third century, when the first teachers of the apostolic churches and their immediate successors had passed away and another race came on, other doctrines and forms were gradually introduced, which differed in many respects from apostolical simplicity. And now these innovators appealed more frequently than had ever been done before to apostolical tradition, in order to give currency to their own opinions and regulations. Many at this time did not hesitate, as we find, to plead apostolical traditions for many things at variance not only with other traditions, but with the very writings of the apostles, which they had in their hands. From this time forward tradition became naturally more and more uncertain and suspicious.”^{[13] [13]} Knapp:Christian Theology, p. 39.

Romanism could not trust these traditions to the ordinary mode of transmission. All trustworthiness would long ago have been lost. As any special rumor, often repeated from one to another, loses its original character and certainty, so the apostolic traditions, if transmitted simply by repetition through all Christian centuries, could no longer be trustworthy or possess any authority in either doctrines or morals. To meet this exigency Romanism assumes for itself an abiding inspiration—such an inspiration as rendered the apostles infallible teachers and perpetuates its own infallibility. Tradition is thus guarded and guaranteed.^[14] This abiding inspiration is now held to center in the papacy. “As Peter held the primacy in the circle of apostles, so the pope holds it in the circle of bishops. In the doctrine of the primacy the system of Catholicism reaches its climax. From the Roman chair the apostle is still speaking on whom, according to the will of the Lord, his Church was to be built; here the Church has an infallible testimony of the truth elevated above all doubt; for, as the central organ of inspiration, the pope has unlimited authority and power to ward off all heresy. In so far as he speaks ex cathedra his consciousness is a divine-human consciousness, and he is so far vicarius Christi. As Peter once said to the Redeemer, ‘Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life,’ so all Christendom turns in the same way—not to Christ, but to the successor of Peter.”^[15] Such extravagances come along with the inspiration which Romanism assumes as the guarantee of its doctrine of tradition.

^[14]Martensen:Christian Dogmatics, p. 28.

^[15]Ibid. , p. 29. The doctrine is open to destructive criticism. There is no promise of any such inspiration of the ministry that should succeed the apostles. There is no evidence of any such inspiration in the line of the papacy, but conclusive evidence of the contrary. The disproof is in the many errors of Romanism. If endowed with apostolic inspiration it could not lapse into error. This is its own doctrine. Yet its errors are many. There is the apostasy from the Nicene creed into the Arian heresy. There is the full and hearty acceptance of the Augustinian theology, and then there are very serious departures from it. Whether this system is true or false Romanism must have been in error either in the first case or in the second. The worship of Mary, transubstantiation, the sacrifice of the mass, the priesthood of the ministry, the saving efficacy of the sacraments, purgatory—all these are errors of doctrine and practice in Romanism, and the disproof of its apostolic inspiration.^{[16] [16]} Hodge:Systematic Theology, vol. i, pp. 144-149. The doctrine means the incompleteness and obscurity of the Scriptures. If tradition is their necessary complement they must be incomplete and insufficient for the requirements of faith and duty. Such a view degrades them and openly contradicts the divine testimony to their sufficiency. The Scriptures are ‘‘profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness; that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works.” (2 Timothy 3:16-17). What need we more? And these are among the last words of Paul. The doctrine of tradition, more than all else, leads to a denial of the Scriptures to the people. The law of this consequence is easily disclosed. If the papacy is endowed with an infallible inspiration in order to determine and interpret the apostolic traditions it must be the sole interpreter of the Scriptures. The one fact follows from the other. There can be no right of private interpretation in the presence of infallibility. The people must have no Judgment as to the sense of the Scriptures. Therefore the people should not have the Scriptures. This simply completes, in a practical way, the denial of the right of private judgment. There must be an absolute subjection of the people to this hierarchy. It is hard to think of any high manliness or real fitness for civil liberty under such ecclesiastical abjectness. The detriment to the spiritual life must be great. Religion can no longer be viewed as a living union with Christ, but must be viewed as an outward conformity to the requirements of the Church, The doctrine of infallibility “must react upon the community in this way, that the subject may now the more easily think to determine his obedience to God by his obedience to the Church, its dogmas, and its morality, and to possess in that way true Christianity. This has happened, if in different forms, in both the Greek and Romish communions.”^[17] The dismission of this mistaken source from the position it has so long held would greatly serve the interests of theology and the Christian life.^{[18] [17]} Dorner:Christian Doctrine, vol. i, p. 83.

^[18]Goode:Divine Rule of Faith and Practice; Elliott:On Romanism, vol. i, chaps, ii-vi.

We named mysticism as a third mistaken source of theology. It would be more accurate to speak of the source which mysticism assumes than of itself as such a source. Mysticism is the doctrine of an immediate insight into truth. This deeper principle is readily carried into the sphere of religion, which, indeed, is its special sphere. It is a philosophy in which the mind seeks repose from the unrest of skepticism. In the view of Cousin the movement of philosophic thought is through sensationalism and idealism into skepticism.^[19] Morell follows him in this view.^[20] It was no difficult task for Hume and Berkeley to deduce idealism from sensationalism. Nor was it more difficult for Hume to resolve idealism into skepticism. But there can be no mental rest in skepticism. Another philosophy is an imperative requirement. The next movement is into mysticism. Here truth will stand in the open vision, especially in the sphere of religion. The immediate insight into truth is through some form of divine illumination.

^[19]History of Modern Philosophy, vol. i, pp. 343-364.

^[20]Modern Philosophy, Introduction, sec. v.

Mysticism appears in different forms, and its definitions vary accordingly. “Whether in the Vedas, in the Platonists, or in the Hegelians, mysticism is nothing more nor less than ascribing objective existence to the subjective creations of our own faculties, to ideas or feelings of the mind; and believing that by watching and contemplating these ideas of its own making it can read in them what takes place in the world without.”^[21] This may accurately give the principle of mysticism and all the actual mental facts, but does not give all the assumed facts in its higher religious forms. In these the mind is divinely illuminated and lifted above its natural powers, and truth and God are immediately seen. “Mysticism in philosophy is the belief that God may be known face to face, without any thing intermediate. It is a yielding to the sentiment awakened by the idea of the infinite, and a running up of all knowledge and all duty to the contemplation and love of him.” ^[22] “Mysticism despairs of the regular processes of science; it believes that we may attain directly, without the aid of the senses, and without the aid of reason, by an immediate intuition, the real and absolute principle of all truth, God.”^[23] “Mysticism, whether in religion or philosophy, is that form of error which mistakes for a divine manifestation the operation of a merely human faculty.”^{[24] [21]} Mill:Logic, book v, chap, iii, sec. iv.

^[22]Krauth-Fleming:Vocabulary, Mysticism.

^[23]Cousin:History of Modern Philosophy, vol. ii, p. 114.

^[24]Vaughan:Hours with the Mystics, vol. i, p. 22.

There are elements of truth in mysticism, while its errors are mostly by exaggeration. The sensibilities, particularly the moral and religious, have a value for knowledge not usually accorded them; but when they are exalted above reason and revelation truth is lost in the exaggeration. This is specially true of Christian mysticism. There is a communion of the soul with God, and an activity of religious feeling which is the very life of that communion. There is a divine illumination which lifts the soul into a higher capacity for knowing God and truth; but there is no new revelation. Mysticism has rendered good service in emphasizing the interior spiritual life and the communion of the soul with God in a conscious experience, but has added nothing to the Scriptures in the form of wholesome doctrine. There is no higher privilege of the interior spiritual life than the Scriptures clearly open. Here is the fellowship with the Father, and with his Son Jesus Christ (1 John 1:3), the love and indwelling of the Father and the Son (John 14:21; John 14:23), the work of the Spirit which gives strength to the inner man, the indwelling of Christ by faith, the rooting and grounding of the soul in love, the knowing the love of Christ which passeth knowledge, the being filled with all the fullness of God (Ephesians 3:16-19). No healthful doctrine of the divine communion transcends these privileges. But there is here no promise of a vision of God which shall supersede the Scriptures or bring higher truth to the soul. There are promises of divine inspiration as the mode of higher revelations of truth, but definitely and exclusively to the chosen mediums of such inspiration and revelation. This, however, is a work of the Spirit entirely apart from his offices in the personal Christian life, and, while vital to a divine revelation, means nothing for a state of personal attainment in the Christian life which shall be the source of doctrinal truth.

While we find some good in mysticism we do not find it clear of Evil. It is not questioned that mysticism furnishes examples of a pure and elevated Christian life. We may instance Tauler, Gerson, Boehm, Fenelon, Madame Guyon, Thomas a Kempis. The Friends have furnished many such examples. Still, the deeper principles of mysticism easily run into excesses which are not clear of evil. With the assumption of a spiritual state above the usefulness of reason and revelation, a state in which the soul is so lost in God as to be wholly subject to his supernatural guidance, religious feeling may readily be kindled to intensity, when the prudence and wisdom which should ever rule the Christian life must sink beneath a rashness and arrogance of spirit which easily run into evil excesses. The tendency is, on the one hand, to a reckless fanaticism; on the other, to a quietism, a state of absorbing contemplation or religious reverie, quite apart from the practical duties of the Christian life. In the extremer forms of mysticism, and forms not unnatural to its deeper principles, it has sometimes run into the impious heresy of antinomianism. Mysticism is in no true sense a source of theology.^[25]

^[25] Jouffroy;Introduction to Ethics, vol. i, lect. v; Cousin:The True, the Beautiful, and the Good, lect. v; Morell:Modern Philosophy, part ii, chap, vii; Vaughan:Hours with the Mystics.

4. Concerning the Christian Consciousness.—The question is whether the Christian consciousness is in any proper sense a source of theology. Those who assume the affirmative differ widely respecting the measure in which it is such a source. Some claim so little as scarcely to reach the idea of a source of theology, while others make religious feeling the norm and source of the whole system of doctrines. In the moderate view it is held that certain facts of Christian experience witness to the truth of certain correlate tenets of doctrine. For instance, it is claimed that in Christian experience there is the consciousness of a sinful nature which deserves penal retribution, and, therefore, that the doctrine of such a form of native sinfulness is true. Such an argument often appears in the interest of the Augustinian anthropology. But no source of theology is thus reached. Such a form of sinfulness, even if a reality, could not directly become a fact of consciousness. The philosophy of consciousness so decides. There might still be the moral conviction that inherited depravity is of the very nature of sin, but only after the doctrine of such a form of sin is placed in one’s creed. In this case the moral conviction would simply be the response of the conscience to the moral judgment embodied in the creed. But a doctrine which must precede a particular form of consciousness as its necessary condition cannot even find its proof, much less its source, in such a consciousness. What is true in this case is equally true in all like cases.

We are more concerned with the stronger view of the religious consciousness as related to theology. This view is of comparatively recent development, and has its chief representation in Schleiermacher. “It is only in the present century, and chiefly through the influence of Schleiermacher, that the Christian consciousness began to be considered a source of dogmatics. He started with his investigation from man’s feeling of his unlimited dependence. Dogma is for him the development of the utterances of the pious self-consciousness, as this is found in every Christian, and is still more determined by the opposition between sin and grace. In other words, it is the scientific expression of the pious feeling which the believer, upon close self-examination, perceives in his heart. Thus this consciousness is here the gold-mine from which the dogmas must be dug out, in order to ‘found’ them afterward, as far as possible, in Holy Scripture. In the individu.al it is the result of the spirit of the community, as this is a revelation of the Spirit of Christ. Of this ‘Gemeingeist’ Schleiermacher allows, it is true, that it must continually develop and strengthen itself by the words of Scripture, but not that it must find in the latter its infallible correcting rule. For him the highest principle of Christian knowledge is thus something entirely subjective, and the autonomy of his self-consciousness is the basis of his entire system.”^[26] This citation’ is valuable, not only in its historic aspect, but specially as a statement of the stronger view of the Christian consciousness as a source of theology.

^[26]Van Oosterzee:Christian Dogmatics, vol. i, pp. 23, 23.

There is a Christian consciousness. This is not a mere speculation, but a fact of experience. The conditions of this consciousness are obvious. It is clearly impossible without the central truths of Christianity. No soul ever reached it, or ever can reach it, through reason or the light of nature. It is impossible under any other form of religion. In every state of consciousness respecting any objective truth or reality, such truth or reality must be mentally apprehended before there can be any such response of the sensibilities as shall constitute the state of consciousness. This law conditions the active state of the sensibilities; and it is only in their active state that they can have any place in consciousness. In any such state of love, hatred, resentment, hope, fear, sympathy, or reverence the proper object must be present to thought as in perception or in some form of mental representation. This is the invariable and necessary order of the facts: first, the mental apprehension of objective truths or realities; and, second, the response of the sensibilities in active forms of feeling, according to the character of their respective objects as mentally viewed. The religious sensibilities are subject to the same laws.

We may view the religious consciousness as far broader than the Christian. In this view the latter is a specific type of the former. There are, indeed, many specific types, as may readily be seen in the religions of the world. There are variations of the religious consciousness, according to the variations of these religions. We may instance Confucianism, Brahmanism, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Mohammedanism, Judaism; each has its own appropriate form of the religious consciousness. The Christian consciousness differs widely from each of the others. There are also differences in the Christian consciousness, as between Romanism and Protestantism, Trinitarianism and Unitarianism, Calvinism and Arminiauism. The question is to account for such differences. The real point is that they cannot be accounted for on any theory which makes religious feeling the source of theology, and, further, that the true account disproves such a source. The theory which makes religious feeling the source of theology places the feeling before the ideas or truths which constitute the theology. In this order of the facts, instead of the doctrines determining the cast of the feeling, the feeling determines the form and content of the doctrines. If this be the case religious feeling must be purely spontaneous to our nature, neither evoked nor modified by any religions ideas or doctrinal views. It is itself the norm and ruling principle of religion. Why then should it so vary in the forms of its development? The theory can make no answer to this question. It allows nothing back of this feeling which can determine these variations. Their explanation must come from the opposite position. The religious consciousness varies in different forms of religion because they differ in the tenets of doctrine. There are different views of God and man, of duty and destiny. These views act upon the feelings and determine the cast of the religious consciousness. A thorough analysis of these religions will find in each a form of consciousness in accord with its doctrines. The doctrinal view of God is specially a determining force in the religious consciousness. So far from this consciousness determining the view of God just the contrary is the truth; the view of God determines the east of the consciousness.^[27] The Christian consciousness is peculiar to Christianity and impossible to any other form of religion, because many of its doctrines, particularly in the fullness of their unfolding, are peculiar to itself. Only in this manner can we explain the variations of the Christian consciousness as previously noted. Romanism and Protestantism, Trinitarianism and Unitarianism, Calvinism and Arminianism, differ in ruling doctrines, doctrines to which the religious feelings respond, and from the influence of which they receive their own cast. This is the law of variations in the Christian consciousness.

^[27]Walker:Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation. Miley: “The Idea of God as a Law of Religious Development,”Methodist Quarterly Review, January, 1865. In view of the facts above given the conditions of the Christian consciousness are manifest. There is no possibility of the feelings which constitute this consciousness without the central truths of Christianity. These truths must not only be in the mental apprehension, but must also be accepted in faith. Only thus can they have power in the religious consciousness. “When so apprehended and believed, they have such power because they are thus seen to be truths of profound interest. Now the religious nature responds to them in appropriate forms of feeling. This is the law of the Christian consciousness in the general view, and of its variations in different schools of theology. To assume the religious feelings as first in order, and then to find in them the central truths of theology, is to reverse the logical and necessary order of the facts. Clearly a knowledge of the central truths of Christianity conditions the Christian consciousness and must be first in order. It may still be true, and indeed is true, that we more fully grasp these truths of doctrine through the response of the religious sensibilities, but this simply concerns our capacity for the clearest knowledge, and has nothing to do with the fixed order of the facts in the Christian consciousness. As the Christian consciousness is thus conditioned by the possession of the central truths of Christian theology, it is impossible to deduce these truths from that consciousness. Back of these truths there is no Christian consciousness to begin with. The theory under review tacitly admits this by beginning, back of this specific form of consciousness, simply with religious feeling, the feeling of absolute dependence upon God. But there is no source of Christian theology in such a feeling. It has no content from which may be deduced the doctrine of the Trinity, the Christian doctrine of sin, the atonement in Christ, justification by faith, or regeneration and a new spiritual life through the agency of the Holy Spirit. There is apologetic value in the Christian consciousness, but no source of Christian theology. “To the Christian truth, in accordance with the Gospel believed and confessed by the Church, the Christian consciousness gives a witness, with reason estimated highly. Only when objective truth finds a point of contact in the subjective consciousness docs it become the spiritual property of mankind, and can it be thus properly understood and valued. So far, and so far only, does the Christian consciousness deserve a place among the sources of dogmatics. But since the doctrine of salvation can be derived neither from reason, nor from feeling, nor from conscience, and the internal consciousness only attests and confirms the truth, after having learned it from Scripture, this last must always be valued as the principal source.”^[28]

^[28] Van Oosterzee:Christian Dogmatics, vol. i. p. 22. We highly commend the treatment of this question by the author just cited.