175. I. Rational Proofs.

I. Rational Proofs.

1. Reality of a Moral Government.—The reality of a moral government is a matter of common consent and affirmation. The sense of duty, and of responsibility to a divine Ruler, is deeply wrought into the moral consciousness of the race. This is clearly the doctrine of St. Paul: “For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another” (Romans 2:14-15). Such a moral consciousness of the race means the reality of a moral government to which we are responsible.

2. Under a Law of Equity.—The idea of the divine equity is inseparable from the sense of responsibility. It may often be perverted or obscured, but the principle ever asserts itself. Distributive justice must be impartial. There may not be slight penalties for some and severe penalties for others, except as they may differ in the measure of guilt. We are not here concerned with the question respecting the degree of penalty which sin may deserve, nor with the question whether sin must be punished in the full measure of its desert. Whatever may be the truth in these respects, it must be true that divine punishments are administered according to a law of impartiality. Any true conception of God must constrain the admission of such equity. If there be omissions of this law in the present life there must be punishment in a future life, unless forgiveness is here attained.

3. Present Omissions of the Law.—The meaning here is that in the present life penalties are not inflicted according to a law of exact or impartial justice. This position can hardly be questioned. A little discussion will place its truth in a clear light. Punishment may be inflicted or suffered in three modes: in mind; in body; in estate. We do not here raise the question whether the sufferings endured in these modes are punishments in any strict sense. Our position is simply that if we are punished in the present life it must be in one or more of these modes. It is easy to show that punishments are not so administered according to the penal deserts of men.

There is no such punishment in the mental mode. One man suffers an intenser remorse for the theft of a dime than another for the crime of murder. And what is thus true of two persons is true of the same person in different periods of his life. There cannot be exact justice in cases so widely different. Then there are instances of self-justification, even of complacency, in the commission of heinous crime; and here there can be no punishment in the form of mental suffering. Some men are increasingly wicked through a long course of life; therefore they should be the subjects of an ever-deepening remorse, if they are to be thus punished in the measure of their desert. Such, however, is not the case; for there is no such deepening remorse. Indeed, the result is just the contrary; and it is in the very nature of things that it should be so. In a persistent course of sinning the spiritual vision is darkened and the moral feelings hardened into a state of insensibility. Conscience is seared as with a hot iron, and a state is reached which the Scriptures describe as “past feeling.” Such being the results of a persistent course of evil doing, there can be no such remorse as a just punishment requires. There are two forms of bodily suffering: one from the infliction of legal penalties; the other from the visitation of God; but in neither is there any strict ministry of justice according to the penal desert.

There are many sins, deeply heinous in the sight of God, for which human laws have no penalty. Again, in many criminals escape detection and punishment. Further, human courts are subject to many disabilities which often prevent an exact rendering of justice. Finally, the penalties of human laws are not graduated according to the demerit of human sins, as we see plainly in their wide variations in different ages and countries. Indeed, they are not based upon the strictly moral demerit of sin, and therefore cannot be the punishment of sin according to its moral desert. Nor are the bodily conditions of men the award of an exact distributive justice. It seems entirely sufficient to state this. Who would assume to determine the moral character of his acquaintances according to the state of their physical health? We do not adjudge men good or bad just as they may be in a healthy or sickly state. Bodily sufferings are not in any proportion to moral character, and therefore cannot be the means whereby sin is justly punished in this life.

There are instances in which wicked men greatly suffer in matters of estate, but there are also many of abiding affluence. Nor are the experiences of good men obviously different in such matters. Surely there is no uniformity of difference. In this respect all things come alike unto all men. As it happens to the evil, so it happens to the good. Who would presume to determine the moral character of men according to their worldly estate? As such estate, whether of good or evil fortune, is no index to the ethical life of men, so the adversities which the wicked suffer in such matters cannot be the punishment of their sins according to the requirements of an impartial justice. Indeed, the present probationary life is not the sphere of distributive justice, in the strict ministries of which men are punished or rewarded according to their ethical life. We are here so related that the righteous often prevent the sufferings which, otherwise, the wicked would endure, while, on the other hand, the wicked cause much suffering to the righteous. In such a state of things there cannot be an impartial administration of justice.

Here, indeed, is the occasion of much doubt respecting a divine providence. Some even deny such a providence. The mental movement in such cases is obvious. It is the conviction of all minds that a divine moral government must be righteous; but some, limiting the view to the present life, and seeing therein no harmony between the moral character of men and their worldly fortunes, either question or openly deny such a government. And it is only on the ground of a future retribution that we can obviate such reasons of doubt or unbelief. Indeed, this life is not the sphere of an exact ethical justice. If it were, no one would suffer more or less than his moral desert; but the actual facts are far different. Often the wicked, even the heinously wicked, flourish in worldly affluence, in health and ease, while piety and charity, patriotism and philanthropy, suffer in penury or under the heel of oppression. The inequality of rewards in the present life, as viewed in relation to moral character, is no new thought. It was present to the minds of ancient men of God, and caused them no little perplexity. Job was thus deeply perplexed (Job 21:7-15); likewise the Psalmist (Psalms 73), and Solomon (Ecclesiastes 8:14), and Jeremiah (Jeremiah 12:1-2). In these passages there is the fullest recognition of the inequalities in the fortunes of the present life, as viewed in relation to moral character; and the only solution of the perplexity arising from such a state of facts is found in the thought of a future retribution.

4. Requirement of Future Punishment.—Such requirement is consequent to the principles and facts above presented. It is true that we are the subjects of a moral government, which must observe a law of equity or of impartial justice, particularly in the punishment of sin. It is equally true that in the present life there are many omissions of such punishment. Hence there must be a future retribution.