131. II. Later Errors.

II. Later Errors. A review of all the modern phases of Christological error would be tedious, and without compensatory result. It will suffice that we consider some of the leading forms of such error.

1. The Socinian Christology.—Socinianism, as a system of theology, originated in the sixteenth century, and took its designation from Laelius Socinus, an Italian, but who spent most of his active life in Poland, because he there found more liberty in the propagation of his peculiar doctrinal views. However, while the original of this system is with Laelius Socinus, his nephew, Faustus Socinus, born 1539, more fully developed and propagated it, and first formed the converts to this faith into a distinct religious body, so that he may properly be regarded as one of the founders of Socinianism.

We here need only the most summary statement of its doctrinal tenets. Mostly, the Scriptures were admitted to be of divine origin, but rather as containing than as being a divine revelation. A strong rationalistic principle was held as a law of biblical exegesis. It was in this mode that Socinianism provided for itself so much liberty of interpretation, that it might the easier wrest the Scriptures from the proof of the orthodox faith and maintain its own opposing views. With all this rationalism, the earlier Socinianism admitted the supernatural in Christianity, particularly in its Christology. It held the miraculous conception of Christ; that he was the subject of supernatural moral and spiritual endowments, and that he was temporarily taken to heaven in order to a better preparation for his great work in the redemption of the world. As Socinianism denied the divinity of Christ, so it denied the doctrine of the Trinity. Its anthropology was Pelagian, and its soteriology admitted no other ground or power of human salvation than the moral influence of the life and lessons of Christ. With these tenets of doctrine in hand, the Christology of the system is easily stated. With all the concession of supernatural facts, as previously stated, the Christ of Socinianism is a man, nothing more. True, he was declared to be more than man, but no sufficient ground was given, or even admitted, for the truth of the declaration. No supernatural fact conceded, nor all combined, could raise him in his own nature or being above the plane of the human. No other ground is given for the assertion that he was more than man. In its Christology, therefore, Socinianism was substantially the same as the old Ebionism. In many instances of its later purely rationalistic or Unitarian forms it has degenerated from the higher views of Christ with which it began. The Christology of Socinianism is utterly false to the Christology of the Scriptures. It denies the divinity of Christ; the reality of the divine incarnation; the union of the two natures in the personal oneness of Christ. All ground of the atonement is excluded from the system.^[593]

^[593] Dorner:Doctrine of the Person of Christ, div. ii, vol. ii, pp. 249-265; Cunningham:Historical Theology, chap, xxiii; Owen: Works (Goold’s), vol. xii. The utter falsity of this and all other forms of Christology grounded in the mere humanity of Christ is fully shown in discussions of the Trinity and the divinity of Christ, to which reference was given under our own treatment of these questions.

2. The Lutheran Christology.—This error lies in the ascription of divine attributes, particularly of omnipresence, to the human nature of Christ. Only in an omnipresence or, at least, multipresence of his human nature could the Lutheran Christology answer to the doctrine of consubstantiation—the doctrine of the presence and communion of the body and blood of Christ in the sacrament of the supper. If in this supper the communicants really partake of the body and blood of Christ, then in some real sense, however obscure its mode, he must be present in his human nature, and, therefore, he must be present in many places at the same time. This is not denied by those who hold the doctrine of the real presence; indeed, it is affirmed.

It has often been said by divines who controvert the Christology of the Lutherans that its construction was determined by the requirements of their doctrine of the real presence. Lutherans, however, deny this, and maintain that their doctrine of the person of Christ was constructed directly upon the ground of the Scriptures, and in the proper interpretation of their Christological facts; yet it is admitted that the one doctrine confirms the other and sets it in a clearer light. Thus, Dr. Gerhart having maintained that the Lutheran doctrine of the person of Christ “was developed from the Lutheran theory of the sacrament,”^[594] Dr. Krauth replies: “If Dr. Gerhart means no more than that God in his providence made the discussions in regard to the Lord’s Supper the means of bringing more fully and harmoniously into a well-defined consciousness and into clearer expression the doctrine of the Scriptures in regard to the person of Christ, we do not object to it; but if he means that the doctrine of our Church on the person of Christ originated in the necessity of defending her doctrine in regard to the Lord’s Supper, we think he is wholly mistaken. The doctrine of our Church rests upon the direct testimony of God’s word; and her interpretation of the meaning of that word is not one of her own devising, but had been given ages before her great distinctive confession, by the fathers and councils of the pure Church.”^{[595] [594]} Bibliotheca Sacra, 1863.

^[595]The Conservative Reformation and its Theology, p. 502.

Theologians of any distinct Christian communion have the right of stating their own case on any such issue; but they have no final authority. That the Lutheran doctrine of the person of Christ was the doctrine of the early fathers and councils is rejected as groundless. Further, it is in the truth of doctrinal history that the Christology of the Lutheran Church has ever been associated with her doctrine of the real presence of Christ in the sacrament of the supper, and that mostly the former has been treated as secondary or subordinate to the latter. It is true that Dorner concedes to Luther a construction of his Christology independently of his doctrine of the Lord’s Supper, but he also says this: “During the sixteenth century it was the doctrine of the supper that gave its direction and character to the concrete development of Christology.”^[596] The Lutheran doctrine is greatly lacking in clearness. Nor is this to be thought strange, especially in view of its peculiar tenets.

^[596]Doctrine of the Person of Christ, div. ii, vol. ii, p. 301.

Further, Lutherans have differed widely among themselves, and this fact greatly hinders the clear apprehension of the doctrine. The contentions on this question within the Lutheran Church were quite equal to those which she maintained with Papists, Zwinglians, and Calvinists. There were two schools of special prominence in these interior doctrinal issues: one in the following of Brentz; the other in the following of Chemnitz. There were other schools, each with its own doctrine, and for which it contended against all opposing views. Among the contending parties there were real differences of doctrine. These contentions were fruitful of much evil. This came to be so clearly seen and deeply felt as to awaken an intense desire for peace and a harmony of doctrinal views. The attainment of these ends was earnestly attempted. The Formula of Concord was the product of this endeavor. The aim was good, but the result brought little satisfaction. The desiderated concord was not attained. Divisions were rather increased than diminished. There was still a Brentzian doctrine, and still a Chemnitzian doctrine. Others were added, notably a Giessen doctrine, and a Tubingen doctrine. There were others, but enough have been named to show the persistence and prevalence of the strife. These facts of division and disputation not only hinder the clear apprehension of the Lutheran Christology, but clearly point to peculiar difficulties of the doctrine, and really disprove it. Where shall we find the doctrine? Naturally, we turn first to the Augsburg Confession; but it is not given in the article which directly concerns this question.^[597] In the article on the Lord’s Supper some facts are given which, if true in themselves, must be determinative of some vital elements of the doctrine.^[598] We note specially the alleged facts that the body and blood of Christ are truly present with the bread and wine, and are communicated to those who partake of the supper. But the determination of the doctrine of the person of Christ from the contents of this article would subordinate it to the doctrine of the supper in a manner to which Lutheran divines strongly object.

^[597]Article iii.

^[598]Article x. The Formula of Concord, while giving a later formulation of the doctrine, and the latest with any claim to authority, still leaves us in uncertainty, and for two reasons: one, that this statement was a compromise among opposing parties; the other, that it has not been held in any unity of faith. Yet we know not any better source to which we may look for the Lutheran doctrine.

Much of the article on the person of Christ is in full accord with the Chalcedonian symbol, but it contains elements article which are peculiar to the Lutheran doctrine.^[599] These eight appear in the ascription of divine attributes to the human nature of Christ. It is not meant that the human nature is deified in any Eutychian sense, but that by virtue of the union of the two natures in Christ the human possesses the attributes of the divine. This is the sense of the communicatio idiomatum, the communion of the attributes of the two natures in Christ. It seems obvious that, if the union is such that the human should possess the attributes of the divine, then, conversely, the divine should possess the attributes of the human. This, however, is denied. Omniscience, omnipotence, and ubiquity are the divine attributes which are more specially ascribed to the human nature of Christ. “Therefore now not only as God, but also as man, he knows all things, can do all things, is present to all creatures, has under his feet and in his hand all things which are in heaven, in the earth, and under the earth.” These facts are central to the Christology of the article, and other facts affirmed are in full accord with them. “What the divine has in its essence and of itself, the human has and exercises through the divine, in consequence of its personal union with it. We might imitate one of our Lord’s own deep expressions in characterizing it, and might suppose him to say: ‘As my divine nature hath omnipresence in itself, so hath it given to my human nature to have omnipresence in itself.’”^[600] If the union of the two natures is valid ground for the omnipresence of the human, the same union must be equally valid for its omniscience and omnipotence.

^[599]Article viii.

^[600]Krauth:The Conservative Reformation and its Theology, p. 479. The statement of such a doctrine seems entirely sufficient for its refutation. The human nature assumed by the Logos in the incarnation remained human, with the attributes of the human. In itself it possessed the capacity for only such knowledge, power, and presence as are possible to the human. How then could it become omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent? The answer is, through the divine nature with which it was united. But if this union answers for such results, either it must give to the finite attributes of the human nature the plenitude of the infinite, or invest that nature with the attributes of the infinite. Attributes of knowledge, power, and presence, such as we here contemplate, are concrete realities of being, not mere notions or names. There can be neither knowledge, nor power, nor presence without the appropriate attribute of being. The being must answer for the character of the attribute, and the attribute must answer for all that is affirmed of it. Only a mind possessing the power of absolute knowing can be omniscient. Omnipotence must have its ground in a will of absolute power. Omnipresence, such as the Lutheran Christology affirms of the human nature of Christ, is possible only with an infinite extension of being. Hence, either the finite attributes of the human nature assumed by the Logos must be lifted into the infinitude of the divine attributes, or the divine attributes must be invested in the human nature, which is intrinsically finite, and which in itself, even as the Lutheran Christology concedes, must ever remain finite.

It is at this point that the doctrine encounters insuperable difficulties, even absolute impossibilities. There is no possibility that the human nature of Christ should possess the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence which the Lutheran Christology ascribes to it. It is properly regarded as an axiom that the finite has not a capacity for the infinite—finitum non capax infiniti. The principle is absolutely true in application to the points which we here make. The finite attributes of the human nature can neither be enlarged to the infinitude of the divine attributes nor receive into themselves the plenitude of the divine. Neither can the finite nature of man receive the investment of these divine attributes. But there can be no omniscience without the attribute of absolute knowing; no omnipotence without a will of absolute power; no omnipresence of being without an infinite extension. Here are the impossibilities which the Lutheran Christology encounters in the ascription of such attributes to the human nature of Christ.^[601]

^[601] Dorner:Doctrine of the Person of Christ, div. ii, vol. ii, pp. 53-115; 266-315; Schmid:Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, § 55; Gerhart:Bibliotheca Sacra, January, 1863; Krauth:The Conservative Reformation and its Theology, article x.

3. The Kenotic Christology.—The seed-thought of kenoticism in Christology is credited to Zinzendorf, but it remained fruitless for a long time after he cast it forth. In later years his thought has been developed into doctrinal form. Indeed, there are several forms of this development. Professor Bruce has carefully noted four leading types of the doctrine, as severally represented by Thomasius, Gess, Ebrard, and Martensen.^[602] With this classification he proceeds to a careful statement and critical review of each type. A study of this discussion is helpful toward a clear insight into the kenotic Christology. We, however, are mainly concerned with the deeper tenets of the doctrine.

^[602]Bruce:The Humiliation of Christ, lect. iv.

Kenoticism is the doctrine that in the incarnation the Logos emptied himself of his divine attributes, or compressed them into the measure and cast of the human; that he parted with his omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence, and subjected himself to the limitations of a merely human life. These are the central ideas of the doctrine, though not all kenoticists hold so extreme a view.

Whether in the incarnation the Logos assumed a human soul as well as a body, or whether in his own humanized form he fulfilled the functions of a human soul in the life of Christ, is a question on which kenoticists are not agreed. The admission of a distinct human soul must mean, for this doctrine, the co-existence of two souls in Christ—two not different in their human cast. In this case there could be no personal oneness of Christ. On the other hand, the denial of a distinct human soul must mean a denial of the divine incarnation. The reality of such an incarnation cannot lie in the assumption of a mere body of flesh and blood. Certainly such a limitation could not answer to the sense of the Scriptures respecting this profound truth. This kenoticism has really no ground in Scripture, though it assumes such ground. The proofs which it brings are not proofs, because it is only by an unwarranted interpretation of the texts adduced that they can give any support to the theory. We give a few instances. “And the Word was made flesh” (John 1:14). This cannot mean any transmutation of the divine Logos into a body of human flesh. Much less can it mean a transformation of the Logos into a man, for this is much farther away from a literal sense than the former. The meaning is simply that in the incarnation the Logos invested himself in a human nature, of which a body of flesh is the visible part. This interpretation places the text in complete accord with other texts of the incarnation. Here are other instances: “God was manifest in the flesh” (1 Timothy 3:16). “Forasmuch then as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise took part of the same” (Hebrews 2:14). These texts give the same doctrine of the incarnation, but without any suggestion of the transformation of the Son into a man. That the Logos was made flesh can mean nothing more than these texts. The special reliance of the theory is on a passage from St. Paul: “Who, being in the form of God, counted it not a prize to be on an equality with God, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men” (Php 2:6-7). We have cited the Revised Version, it being more literal than the Authorized. We gave the meaning of this text in the treatment of the incarnation, and therefore require the less in considering its application to the present question.

“Being in the form of God” must mean an existence of the Son either in the nature of God or in the glory of God. If the former be the true sense, then, on the ground of his divine nature, an equality of glory with the Father was his rightful possession. If the latter be the true sense, then we have simply the fact that the Son rightfully existed in the full glory of God. It should be specially noted that this estate of glory was not his merely in right, but his in actual possession. This meaning is in the words, “counted it not a prize to be on an equality with God, but emptied himself.” This accords with another text: “And now, Father, glorify thou me with thine own self with the glory which I had with thee before the world was” (John 17:5). Here the clear meaning is that the Son actually existed in the glory of the Father prior to his incarnation. Such is the sense of the great text now under special consideration.

What, then, is the truth of the kenosis in this case? The Son emptied himself—έουτόν έκενωσε. But of what? Surely not of his divine nature, nor of his divine perfections, which are inseparable from his nature. Nor can this act of kenosis mean the compression of his perfections into the cast and measure of mere human powers. Such an idea seems utterly foreign to any idea which the terms of the text either express or imply. This act of kenosis has respect to that estate of glory which, on the ground of his divine nature, the Son rightfully possessed in equality with the Father. It means a self-emptying or self-divestment of that glory. This accords with his own words as previously cited: “And now, Father, glorify thou me with thine own self with the glory which I had with thee before the world was.” That glory he once possessed, but had surrendered. The surrender was by the act of kenosis which we have in the text under special consideration. This interpretation brings all the parts of the text into complete harmony. The form of a servant in the likeness of men, which the Son assumed in the incarnation, stands in clear antithesis, not with his divine nature and perfections, but with the estate of glory which he possessed with the Father; which glory he might have rightfully retained, but with which he freely parted, and took instead the form of a servant in the likeness of men. The text gives no support to the kenotic Christology. The aim of kenoticism is twofold: to secure the unity of the person of Christ, and to provide for the human facts of aim of his life. The self-limitation of the Son in the incarnation to a mere human cast and measure is held to be necessary to the personal oneness of Christ, and to the reality of the human facts of his intramundane or historic life. The personal oneness is declared to be impossible on the ground of the traditional doctrine of the divine incarnation. It is readily conceded that this personal oneness is incomprehensible; but surely the mystery is riot solved nor in the least relieved by the theory of a humanized Logos as co-existent with a human soul in Christ. A duality of persons seems absolutely inseparable from such a co-existence; and this attempt to secure and explain the personal oneness of Christ is utterly futile. Further: if, as we formerly pointed out, the deepest truth of the incarnation lies in the divine consciousness of the human, may not this question of personal oneness have for us less pressing concern than we usually concede it? All that we require is such a relation of the divine to the human in Christ as will provide for this consciousness. And may there not be such a relation without the rigid unity of personality which is usually maintained? Let it be observed, however, that, in this hypothetical putting of the case, we do not yield the doctrine of the personal oneness of Christ. But on the ground of this kenoticism there could be no divine consciousness of the human in the incarnation, because the humanized Logos could no longer have any divine consciousness. The implications of this doctrine of the kenosis in Christology are contrary to the deepest truths of Christian theology. If the Son of God could part with his divine attributes Or humanize himself, then divinity itself must be mutable. This consequence can be denied only on a denial of the divinity of the Son. But his divinity is conceded in the very idea of his self-divestment of his divine attributes. The theory is subversive of the divine Trinity. The humanized Son, self-emptied of his divine attributes, could no longer be a divine subsistence in the Trinity. Hence this kenosis of the Son must mean the destruction of the Trinity. The theory is not less subversive of other fundamental truths of Christian theology. No ground of an atonement in the blood of Christ could remain. That the Son once existed in the divine Trinity, and in the plenitude of the divine life, could avail nothing for such an atonement. If self-reduced to the measure of a man, his death could be no more saving than the death of a man. No ground of the sympathy of Christ could remain, as that sympathy is revealed in the Scriptures, and as it must be in order to meet the exigencies of Christian experience. Such a sympathy we have found to be possible only through the divine consciousness of human experiences of suffering and trial. But there can be no such consciousness in the mere human consciousness to which this kenoticism limits the incarnate Logos. A theory with such implications can have no ground of truth in the Scriptures.^[603]

^[603] Bruce:The Humiliation of Christ; Pope:The Person of Christ, note viii; Goodwin:Christ and Humanity; Martensen:Christian Dogmatics, pp. 237-288; Crosby:The True Humanity of Christ; Hodge:Systematic Theology, vol. ii, pp. 430-440; Gess:Scripture Doctrine of the Person of Christ. Translation and additions by Reubelt. This work and Bruce’s Humiliation of Christ are specially useful in the study of this question.