04.02. Appendix 2. GLOSSOLALIA AND PSYCHOLOGY

APPENDIX II GLOSSOLALIA AND PSYCHOLOGY ON page 204 it is stated that glossolalia is unintelligible speech. The statement is sufficiently correct, and to discuss it in the text would have been a needless discursiveness, but the point deserves some further explanation. That glossolalia was in the main unintelligible is clear from St. Paul’s words in 1 Corinthians 14:1-40: “He that speaketh in a tongue edifieth himself, but he that prophesieth edifieth the congregation” (1 Corinthians 14:4). “He that prophesieth is greater than he that speaketh with tongues, except he interpret” (1 Corinthians 14:5). “If I pray in a tongue my spirit prayeth, but my understanding is unfruitful” (1 Corinthians 14:14). “If all speak with tongues and there come in men unlearned or unbelieving, will they not say that ye are mad?” (1 Corinthians 14:23). “If any man speaketh in a tongue… let one interpret” (1 Corinthians 14:27). These passages are meaningless if glossolalia was not a form of generally unintelligible speech. At the same time, certain other facts have to be considered which tend to show that in some cases glossolalia took a different form. In the first place, the evidence of St. Paul throws a little further light on the question. It is significant that in 1 Corinthians 13:1 he further defines “tongues” as “tongues of men and angels.” It is therefore probable that some forms of glossolalia were regarded as the speech of a spirit, speaking through a human being, but using angelic, not human, speech. Moreover, the mention of interpreters in 1 Corinthians 14:1-40 suggests that some people were able to understand the otherwise unintelligible speech of those who used glossolalia.

Secondly, the narrative of the day of Pentecost in Acts 2:1-47 shows, at the least, that St. Luke was acquainted with some form of glossolalia which was intelligible, though not the usual language of the speaker. This narrative presents several difficulties, but for the present purpose the points of importance can be shortly presented. Taking the narrative as it stands, it presents the difficulty that some of those who heard the Christians speak with tongues thought that they were drunk, and St. Peter’s speech is directed against this accusation. Others, however, were annoyed to hear them speaking foreign languages. Now, it is quite certain that intelligible speech in a foreign language showing forth the wonderful work of God has never been regarded as the effect of strong drink. Two explanations are possible: either St. Luke has misunderstood the situation, and has converted what was originally an ordinary instance of glossolalia, into speech in a foreign language, or the Apostles really did use language which, to those who knew it, was intelligible, but to others appeared to be gibberish—the sort of verdict which St. Paul actually warned the Corinthians that an outsider would pass on their glossolalia. It is unnecessary to discuss these possibilities, for even if we take the view that St. Luke misunderstood the situation, this implies that he was acquainted with glossolalia which took the form of speaking a foreign language, otherwise why should he have misunderstood the original narrative? Thus, whatever critical view we take of the narrative in Acts it has to be admitted that it points to glossolalia in foreign languages. The questions now arise: (1) Can we trace anything similar to this glossolalia in other times? (2) Can we at all explain what it is?

Traces of glossolalia in other circles than that of Apostolic Christianity, though not common, are sufficient to show that it existed at other times, and to throw some light on its nature. A very remarkable light on “the tongues of angels” is thrown by the Testament of Job. In this (Job 17:1-16) Job is represented as showing his three daughters a wonderful girdle which had been divinely given him. This, he says, will bring them into “the greater world” (τὸν μείζονα αἰῶνα), to live in the heavens. When his daughters put it on they each received a new heart, and began to speak in superhuman language. According to Dr. James’ text, the first, called Hemera, spoke the angelic tongue (ἀγγέλικῃ διαλέκτῳ), the second, called Kasia, spoke in the tongue of “principalities” (ἀρχῶν), and the third, Amalthia, spoke in the tongue of “those on high” (τῶν ἐν ὕψει), or, as it is also called, the tongue of the cherubim. The magical papyri also go far towards clearing up the problem. Part of the magic consisted of the use of strange words which might be equally regarded as magical charms to affect a spirit who would understand and be compelled by their hidden meaning, and as the language which was used by the spirit who was in possession of an inspired person. Some of these words appear to be taken from Semitic languages, some to be merely gibberish. For instance, in the often-quoted Leiden papyrus Hermes is invoked. πάσῃ φωνῃ καὶ πάσῃ διαλέκτῳ … ἀχεβουκρωμυ, ὅ μηνύει τοῦ δίσκου τὸν φλόγα καὶ τὴν ἀκτῖνα οὗ ἡ δόξα ααα ηηη ωωω … κτίζων τὸν κόσμον υι ααα ωωω, ἐν ᾦ δὲ ἔστησας τὰ πάντα σαβαωθ αρβαδ Ἰάω Ζαγουρη, κ.τ.λ., and in cod. Paris. 2316 a hymn of Moses begins βελὼν θαβὼρ ἀκανθὰ ναμελὰ λαμβαλὰ ἀριμισαὶ βισαασμά, κ.τ.λ. That glossolalia continued for a long time among Christians can be seen from Irenaeus and Tertullian.

Irenaeus says, “Propter quod et Apostolus ait: Sapientiam loquimur inter perfectos; perfectos dicens eos qui perceperunt Spiritum Dei quemadmodum et ipse loquebatur. Quemadmodum et multos audivimus fratres in ecclesia, prophetica habentes charismata, et per spiritum universis linguis loquentes (καὶ παντοδαπαῖς λαλούντων διὰ του πνεύματος γλώσσαις, —the Greek is quoted by Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. 5, 7, 6).” Tertullian challenges Marcion to equal the deeds of the Church, and says, “Edat aliquem psalmum, aliquam visionem, dumtaxat spiritalem, in ecstasi, id est amentia, si qua linguae interpretatio accessit; haec omnia a me facilius proferuntur.” By the time of Chrysostom, however, glossolalia and prophecy were apparently unknown in the Church, and he expresses his difficulty in explaining what it was. later generations glossolalia has appeared spasmodically at times of great religious excitement. Probably research would show that no “revival” has been without something like glossolalia, but the two clearest and most famous examples have been supplied by the history of the Camisards in France and the Irvingites in England. The most remarkable instances of glossolalia in recent times are supplied by the Camisards and the Irvingites, and, curiously enough, while the one illustrates glossolalia of the kind which resulted in unusually clear speech, the other illustrates the purely unintelligible form. The Camisards were a sect of French Protestants among the peasantry of the Cévennes, who, in the beginning of the eighteenth century, carried on a fierce resistance to the persecution which ensued on the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. A full account of their remarkable psychological characteristics will be found in D. A. Bruey’s Histoire du fanatisme, 1737, vol. i., especially pp. 148 ff. The main points are that various persons, sometimes children, were seized with slightly convulsive attacks, ending in unconsciousness, during which they uttered exhortations in good French, although, in their ordinary state of consciousness, they were incapable of speaking anything but the Romance patois of the Cévennes. It should be noted that they were acquainted with French through their devotional use of the Huguenot Bible. The Irvingites are a still better known instance. In the early years of the nineteenth century the glossolalia in Edward Irving’s chapel was notorious, and attracted the curiosity of, among others, George Greville. His account is that the voice of the speaker, “after ejaculating three ‘Ohs,’ one rising above the other in tones very musical, burst into a flow of unintelligible jargon, which whether it was in English or gibberish I could not discover. This lasted five or six minutes, and, as the voice was silenced, another woman, in more passionate and louder tones, took it up. This last spoke in English, and words, though not sentences, were distinguishable.… She spoke sitting under great apparent excitement, and screamed on till, from exhaustion as it seemed, her voice gradually died away, and all was still.” The parallel to the account of glossolalia at Corinth could scarcely be closer, and Greville adequately represents the ἄπιστος ῆ ἰδιώτης, against whose unfavourable judgment St. Paul warned the Corinthians.

Turning to the question of the immediate cause of glossolalia as a psychological phenomenon, it is important to notice that two main types can be recognized: (1) Intelligible speech in a foreign language; (2) Unintelligible speech in a known or unknown language. The connecting link between these two classes is that in neither case is the speech under the complete control of the speaker, though sometimes the lack of control is partial, sometimes absolute. It is this lack of control which is the further connecting link with prophecy in which intelligible speech is used in a known language, but the speaker says, not what he wishes, but what he feels that he must. Thus the psychologist, just as the early Christian did, regards prophecy and glossolalia as cognate phenomena; the difference is in the explanation which he offers. So far as the consideration of the immediate cause of the phenomena is concerned, these cases do not present much difficulty to those who are in any degree acquainted with modern pathological psychology. They are merely three instances of the disturbance of the speech centres of the brain under stress of emotion, and of the influence of the subliminal consciousness as soon as the normal working of the mind has been temporarily impeded. One of the real advances of knowledge in pathology has been the certain establishment of the fact that the intelligent exercise of human functions, such as movement, sight, and speech, is under the control of definite parts of the brain. If you impede the part of the brain, known as the speech centre, which controls language, you produce either dumbness or, if the centre be not wholly destroyed, aphasia, that is, an inability to use certain words, or paraphasia, that is, a tendency to confuse words. These are common phenomena in some of the most ordinary types of paralysis, in which the immediate cause of the disease is a lesion of some sort affecting the speech centre. For instance, if a man has an apoplectic fit caused by the breaking of a small blood-vessel in the brain, if the blood be effused at the speech centre, his speech will be destroyed or impaired, until the blood be absorbed. If the absorption be complete, his speech will recover completely; if not, he will speak badly for the rest of life, unless, which is believed sometimes to happen, another “centre” takes over the work of the injured part of the brain. In the same way anything which, generally speaking, increases the activity of the speech centre will increase the power of speech. This is what is actually accomplished by some forms of education, and still more by some professions. Forms of teaching which constantly demand quick and ready answers vivâ voce develop the speech centre, and so do the professions of barristers, or of clergymen. The most important point, however, for the present purpose, is that the speech is readily though temporarily affected, in a precisely similar manner, by the stress of emotion, of whatever kind. The exact form of the affection depends on two variables, the degree of the emotion, and the nature of the person. In some cases it works favourably: emotion seems to stimulate the speech and cognate centres, and the result is that the speaker is conscious that he is speaking well. He enjoys the comfortable assurance that, whereas under normal conditions he has scarcely enough words to say what he wishes, under the stimulus of slight emotion he is temporarily blessed with the power of seeing synonyms at once, and of being able to pick and choose his expressions without either haste or hesitation. In other cases (and almost always if it be carried too far), emotion works unfavourably. It disturbs the speech centre by an excess of stimulus, and the result is confused expression, obscure utterance, and in the end temporary paraphasia.

These effects are produced by any emotion: they prove the presence of emotional disturbance, but not its character. Love or hate, pathos or humour, the highest spiritual religion or the lowest immorality, all have their emotional side; and the emotions which they arouse produce in the end the same symptoms.

It is plain that this is the explanation of that type of glossolalia which consists of unintelligible language. It was, in more or less technical language, temporary paraphasia induced by religious emotion. In the same way, some forms of prophecy are to be explained as a temporary and favourable excitement of the speech and cognate centres, induced by religious emotion. But this does not explain the other features of some cases. It does not explain the belief that the prophet utters things which he did not previously know; nor does it explain the rare cases of speech in a foreign language.

It is here that the much discussed and often exaggerated “subliminal consciousness” helps us to the outlines of an explanation. The point is this: besides our ordinary waking consciousness there is a wider sphere, which only occasionally comes into the field of our observation. Roughly speaking, one may say that reason, memory, and effort, work in the sphere of the ordinary, or supraliminal, consciousness, while instinct and habit work in the sphere of the subliminal consciousness. Usually speech, and most of the actions of daily life, are under the control of the supraliminal consciousness. But when we act instinctively our actions are controlled by the subliminal consciousness. For instance, an Englishman riding a bicycle on the Continent for the first time knows that he ought, contrary to his usual practice, to keep to the right; but if a sudden emergency arises, and he acts instinctively, he will certainly swerve to the left, in spite of his consciousness that this is wrong. Some actions, again, especially in the world of sport, are an extremely complicated mixture of instinct and reason, or of the supraliminal and subliminal consciousness; very interesting, for instance, is the psychological analysis of the act of bowling at cricket.

What the precise relations are between the supraliminal and subliminal consciousness, psychologists have apparently not yet determined. It is, however, an established fact that, by the exertion of strain on any given centre of the brain, the supraliminal consciousness can be partially or completely “thrown out of gear,” and that in such cases people do and say exceptional things of which neither they themselves nor any one else ever thought them capable. The importance of this for the present purpose is that it sometimes happens in such cases that when the supraliminal consciousness has been “thrown out of gear,” the person affected suddenly develops a power of expressing new thoughts, and shows a knowledge of facts which no one, even himself, thought that he possessed. It is obvious that this covers tolerably well the facts of prophecy; especially does it illuminate the difference between prophecy and preaching. The preacher announces to the best of his ability the truths which he has learnt: he knows beforehand what he is going to say, and the limits of his message are those of his own ordinary supraliminal consciousness. The prophet does not always know beforehand what he is going to say: his words are only partly under his own control: sometimes he is as much surprised as any one else at what he says: for the limits of his message are those of his subliminal consciousness, which in ordinary circumstances is in abeyance, and as little known to his own ordinary intelligence as to that of other persons.

Quite rare, but still quite sufficiently attested, are exceptional cases in which, under the influence of strain bringing the subliminal consciousness into active working, persons have suddenly began to speak and understand foreign languages; usually it has been possible to show that they had either in childhood or in some other way had opportunities of learning them. This covers the indications that among the early Christians glossolalia sometimes took the form of speaking foreign languages. The importance of these results is that they tend to show that prophecy and glossolalia, which the early Christians connected so closely with each other, are really cognate psychological phenomena due to stress caused by religious emotion. In this way psychology really does explain the symptoms, and explains them better than did the ancient hypothesis of obsession by spirits. At the same time, it must be remembered that the question remains, what is the cause of the religious emotion which gives rise to these symptoms? Psychology explains the immediate cause of the phenomena; but what is the ultimate cause? that is to say, what is religion? To discuss this problem would be outside the limits of the present book, which have perhaps been already passed, but I cannot refrain from saying that if I do not mistake the signs of the times the really serious controversy of the future will be concerned with this point, even among those who are agreed in assigning the highest value to religion, and that the opposing propositions will be: (1) that religion is the communion of man, in the sphere of the subliminal consciousness, with some other being higher than himself; (2) that it is communion of man with his own subliminal consciousness, which he does not recognize as his own, but hypostasizes as some one exterior to himself. Those who wish to prepare for this controversy will do well to study on the one hand the facts of religion—not of theology—and on the other the principles of psychology.

Literature.—The best treatment will be found in J. Weiss, Der erste Korintherbrief, pp. 335–339, but: according to him a book will shortly be published on Das Zungenreden by Edison Mosiman, giving a full history of the phenomena in all ages. Important also are Feine’s article on Zungenrede in the Realencyclopadie fü prot. Theologic, ed. 3, and Reitzenstein’s Poimandres (esp. p. 55). The psychological facts are clearly stated in James’ little Textbook of Psychology or in his larger Principles of Psychology, as well as in more technical books written from a more exclusively medical standpoint. 

¹ Texts and Studies, v.1, Apocrypha Anecdota II. by M. R. James, pp. 134 ff.

¹ See J. Weiss, Der erste Korintherbrief, p. 338 ff.

² Iren., Adv. Haer., v. 6, 1. Tert., Contra Marc., v. 8. Cf. also Justin Martyr, Apol. ii. 6, and other passages mentioned by Harvey in his note on the passage from Irenaeus; but they do not exactly cover glossolalia so much as prophecy and other miraculous χαρίσματα πνευματικά. Attention may also be drawn to the hostile account of Palestinian prophets given by Celsus (Origen, Contra Celsum, vii. 9): οἱ δὲ … ἐπιφοιτῶντες πόλεσιν ἢ στρατοπέδοις, κινοῦνται δῆθεν ὡς θεσπίζοντες· πρόχειρον δʼ ἑκάστῳ καὶ σύνηθες εἰπεῖν, ἐγὼ ὁ Θεός εἰμι, ἢ Θεοῦ παῖς, ης πνεῦμα Θεῖον … ταῦτα ἐπανατεινάμενοι προστιθέασι ἐφεξῆς ἄγνωστα, καὶ πάροιστρα, καὶ πάντῃ ἄδηλα, ὦν τὸ μὲν γνῶμα οὐδεὶς ἂν ἔχων νοῦν εὑρεῖν δύναιτο, κ.τ.λ., and the equally hostile account of Gnostic glossolalia given by Irenaeus (Adv. Haer., I. xiii. 3 (Massuet)) “… concalefaciens animam a suspicione quod incipiat prophetare, cum cor ejus multo plus quam oporteat palpitet, audet, et loquitur deliriosa, et quaecunque evenerint omnia, vacue et audacter,” etc.

¹ Τοῦτο ἅπαν τὸ χωρίον σφόδρα ἐστὶν ἀσαφές. τὴν δὲ ασάφειαν ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων ἄγνοιά τε καὶ ἔλλειψις ποιεῖ τῶν τότε μὲν συμβαινόντων, νῦν δὲ οὐ γινομένων. Cramer’s Catena, v. p. 223.

¹ Memoirs, III. chap. 12. I am indebted to Mr. Conybeare for showing me this passage. Cf. Myth, Magic, and Morals, p. 93.

¹ By increasing the activity of the speech centre I include, of course, both the quickening of the connections with other centres, and also the removal of the normal inhibition. The latter point is rather interesting. One of the factors in controlling, and sometimes hindering speech, is the normal inhibitory influence of such things as instinctive caution, perception of the possibility of misunderstanding, etc. If this be removed an unusual freedom of speech ensues. One of the first symptoms of alcoholic intoxication is this removal of inhibition. Hence in vino veritas, and hence the fact that a glass of champagne produces fluency (in some persons), while a bottle produces incoherence. Psychologically, what happens is that a small quantity of alcohol tends to remove the normal inhibition, while a large dose disturbs and ultimately paralyzes the working of the speech centre.