The doctrine of manners, or the science of moral philosophy. the word is formed from mores, "manners, " by reason the scope or object thereof is to form the manners.
See MORALS.
from
5. History, profane, civil, and political" (Peemans, Introd. ad Philosoph. page 96). Ethics, then, covers the science of all that is moral, whether it relates to law or action, to God or the creature, to the individual or the state. It goes wherever the ideas of right and wrong can enter.
I. Ethical science may be divided into philosophical ethics, theological ethics, and Christian ethics.
(a.) Philosophical Ethics. — The science, in this aspect, must find its root and its life, its forms and its authority, in the depths of the human constitution This leads necessarily to the idea of God. We do not affirm that ethics cannot be discussed at all without bringing in the notion of a supreme being. On the contrary, it is undeniable that we find in man a moral nature; whatever may be the character of his morality, the very doubts about that imply the fact of morality. He manifestly has relations to virtue and vice, to right and wrong, to blame and praise, to guilt and innocence. True, if he does not accept the idea of God, morals seem to lose their foundation. Why should a man obey the dictates of his nature, even when obedience seems to be right and useful, unless his nature is a product of wisdom, and reveals the law and the nature of an infinite intelligence? But truth is stubborn, and even a fragment of it, swinging in the air without a foundation, will live. Pulled up out of the soil of the doctrine of God, the moral ideas, however shorn of their strength and withered, still assert their authority and insist on obedience, from motives of utility, or fitness, or happiness. A genuine philosophical ethics, however, will find a Creator from the study of the creature, and will raise from the nature of man a law which will ground itself in the idea of God.
(b.) Theological Ethics. — This is grounded upon acme religion or theology. But in this aspect the science is broad enough to cover every religion. The ethics might be theological, and at the same time Buddhistic, or Mohammedan, or Brahminical. Theological ethics, therefore, might be a system on which the fundamental principle of morals had been perverted by the admixture of cruel and impure superstitions, just as a so-called philosophical ethics might be atheistic or pantheistic.
(c.) Christian Ethics. — Christian ethics is theological ethics limited by Christianity. As thus stated, it might appear to be narrower than either philosophical or theological ethics, but in reality it is far otherwise. Philosophical ethics is Christian so far as it is true and just, and, from the very nature of Christianity, as containing a complete account of human duty, it must even be broader and deeper than all human philosophies which relate to it. As to the relation of Christian ethics to any other supposed theological ethics, or to all other theologies in their moral aspects taken together, its position must be that of judge among them all; it must measure them all, eliminating whatever is false, restoring what is lacking, or rather supplanting them one and all as the only standard of moral truth and duty.
Besides, Christian ethics, considered as a science, and hence as a field for speculation, covers the whole ground. Philosophy and theology, in their ethical relations, are entirely within its scope. It must judge them both wherever it touches them. It has made ethics, and indeed all speculation, a different thing from what it was before it entered into human thought, and it aims to master all human thinking within its sphere. It is, to be sure, amenable to philosophical thought, and cannot repel the tests of right reason; it readily enters into the struggle with every adverse intellectual tendency, carrying with it a divine confidence that alone contains the infallible and indestructible norm of humanity regarded as moral. Christian ethics, indeed, considered as speculative, is not infallible. God has given the ethical norm, but man is obliged to speculate for himself Evidently the complete form of Christian ethics, considered as philosophical, has not yet been reached. Its condition is yet militant, both in relation to false systems and to its own development. The genuine Christian ethics, in the scientific sense, lies scattered in various human treatises, in part is yet to be born, and remains to be evolved in the coming ages, and to be wrought into a system of beneficence and beauty which shall settle down on the whole human race, at once an atmosphere )f divine and filial love, and an antidote to discord, injustice, and all impurity.
"As between theological and philosophical speculation, so between theological and philosophical ethics, in so far as they are speculative, we must make a strong distinction. The latter pair differ precisely as the former do. But, much as philosophical and theological ethics differ, they are not opposites. Within the Christian world, Christian ethics, like philosophy in general, must always be’ essentially Christian. It has always been so, as the result of an inviolable historical necessity, but in different degrees at different periods of time, and in the several stages of its progress. There may, indeed, arise a relative hostility between philosophical ethics and the contemporaneous Christian teaching, or even a hostility between ethical writers and Christianity in general; or, rather, such a hostility is unavoidable precisely in the degree in which humanity fails to be penetrated by Christianity. But, so long as this continues to be the case, it must be a proof of imperfection, not in philosophy only, but also in Christian piety. For even if Christian piety, looking at the doctrine in itself, should be convinced that it possessed the true results, yet she possesses her treasure without the scientific ability to understand it, or; to vindicate it to the understanding of others. It is, therefore, as science, still imperfect. A result of this will be that theological ethics will share in the imperfection. So long as the moral consciousness of the Christian, which is specifically determined by the church of which he is a member, does not clearly recognize itself in the forms of morality prevailing in his circle, a Christian ethical philosophy must remain a want — a desideratum. This, however, is only to say that this want will last while the general moral sentiment and that of the Church remain apart. The more nearly each approaches perfection in its own sphere, the nearer they come to being one. If we conceive of each as perfect, they remain two only in form, i.e., not different in their method, but only in the order according to which, under the same method, they scientifically arrange themselves.
"What has now been said of the relation between philosophical and theological ethics, holds of the latter only so far as it is conceived of as speculative. In other modes of treating theological ethics, especially in the traditional, it is easy to conceive that the relation would be different... . It must be distinctly affirmed that a Christian character belongs to philosophical ethics throughout the Christian world. We do not mean that it ought to be so, but that it really is so; not, indeed, always in the highest and fullest sense, and as it ought to be, but still, in such a sense, whatever men may be conscious of, that without Christianity it never could have been what it is. In the Christian world there is no element of the moral or intellectual life which is not associated with some result of Christianity, itself undeniably the ground-principle of the historical development of our whole, Christian times. It can never be sufficiently remembered, especially in our own times, that what is actually Christian, and, indeed, what is essentially and specifically Christian, reaches, in all the relations of life, far beyond the sphere to which usage gives the name of Christian, or of which the present generation is at all conscious as Christian. The Christian element inheres in the very blood of that portion of humanity which passes under the name of Christendom. This is not the less true because certain individuals belonging to the Christian community may not feel its regenerating power. Besides, that would be a poor ethical system, considered as philosophy, which should ignore the great facts through which morality becomes Christian, and which should refuse to those facts the controlling position which actually belongs to them in making the moral world what. in point of science, it has become. These great facts, let men close their eyes as they will, are the breaking out of sin and the development of its destructive power in the world on the one hand, and the entrance of Jesus, the God-man, and the historical redeeming power proceeding from him on the other. Even philosophical morality, if it would not degenerate into mere unphilosophical abstractions, must make the moral life, considered as historical and concrete, scientifically comprehensible; the concrete historical form of the moral world, however, is, for us at least, before everything else, Christian, just as general history since the time of Christ is itself Christian.
"But, so long as we follow Schleiermacher, and, in explaining the relation between philosophical and theological ethics, make the religious consciousness the opposite of speculation, we shall never escape confusion. The religious consciousness finds its antithesis not in speculation, but in the not religious, and speculation finds its opposite not in piety, but in empirical reflection: empirical reflection and speculation stand in very similar relations to piety. The larger number of theological writers are still of the opinion that the distinction between philosophical and theological ethics lies in the former being the universal, the abstract, the ethics of humanity, and the latter the concrete and specifically Christian, because it rests on history. Thus Schmid and Wuttke. These writers hold that the great facts which form the angles of the Christian theory of the world, namely, sin and redemption by Christ, are, according to their nature, inadequate as the basis of any purely a priori or speculative theory. They lay great stress on this. But why reason thus? At bottom, because they start with the presupposition that there is no other necessity but the necessity of nature. But, in spite of all the confident assertions of the contrary, we cannot doubt that from the specifically Christian consciousness of God, which is the subject treated here, sin and redemption should be deduced as a logical necessity" (Rothe, Theologische Ethik, 1:57).
II. Position of Ethics in Theology. — "Ethics is a part of systematic theology, which also includes dogmatics. As systematic science, it is to be distinguished from exegetical and historical theology. Its office is not merely to show what is the original, and thus normative Christian ethics, nor what has been accepted as such, but rather to teach that Christian ethics is the genuine ethical truth." ... . "On the other hand, ethics must be separated from the various branches of practical theology among which it has often been placed. The two sciences are different both in scope and aim. Ethics embraces the whole Christian idea of good, and not merely the Church, in which it finds only its culmination, and points away from itself to practical theology, the aim of which is, of course, practical" (Herzog’s Real-Encyklop. art. Ethik).
Place in Systematic Theology. — "In ancient times, and down to the Reformation, it was not independent, but held a subordinate place in the science of dogmatics. From the 17th century the two have been separated, and, following P. Ramus, most writers have distinguished between them as between theory and practice. In point of fact, dogmatics has practical importance, and ethics, as the science of the good, has a theory" (Herzog’s Real-Encyklop. art. Ethik). "Dogmatics and ethics are as certainly independent disciplinae as God and man are separate beings. Only a point of view like that of Spinoza, in his Ethics, which denies the existence of a real creation and a moral world separate from God, can controvert the independent position of ethics by the side of dogmatics" (idem).
These views are substantially correct. "Christian ethics has a right to an independent position in the sphere of systematic theology, and it and dogmatics are as certainly distinct as are God and man." Still it is none the less true that, God and man conceived to be such as they are, ethics cannot be practically separated from religion. Ethics finds its highest sanctions in religion, as religion must consist largely in prescribing ethics. God and man being presented to the mind, ethics must cover the character of each, and also the relation between them.
III. The Ethical Faculty — Conscience. — There has been a great waste of controversy on the question whether or not conscience is a distinct and separate faculty of the soul, or only an application of the reason or judgment to moral subjects. The truth is that, the mind being a unit, all its faculties are only so many powers of applying itself differently according to demand. A faculty is a power of doing or acting, and a separate faculty is the power of acting in a particular, direction, as distinguished from other directions. The mind is as certainly and distinctly moral as it is intellectual, on imaginative, or volitional. Each of these expresses a distinct power of the one mind.
This faculty of forming moral judgments we call conscience and, if the views now expressed be correct, there is little propriety in discussions respecting the origin of conscience. It has no origin but that of its possessor; it is born with him, though from its nature it is only developed farther on in life, just as reason and imagination are. It has been asked, in reply to this view, whether conscience is not made what it is in any given case by the circumstances about it — In teaching, by the man’s own acts — in short, by all the influences brought to bear upon him. We answer it is as to its form but there was first conscience, a moral faculty in the man to be shaped. We concede that neither moral ideas nor ideas of any sort, are innate; lent the capacity, nay, the constitutional necessity for moral ideas is innate.
IV. The Ethical Standard is, of course, according to Christianity, to be found in the Scriptures, but there is still in the sphere of science a wide diversity as to their meaning. But when the standard is supposed to be understood on a given question, and the conscience submits to it, there must follow a perfect self-abnegation; degradation miust result fronc disolbedience. In the case of a conflict between the conscience and the law of the state, for example, in which case the conscience of the lawgiving majority collides with the individual conscience, who shall yield? The answer, from the very nature of the case, is neither. They must fight it out. The state, from its nature, is supreme, and cannot yield; but for the man the conscience is also supreme. The man can only die, or make some other atonement, and thus maintain allegiance to the highest tribunal.
V. History of Ethics. —
(a.) The sources of knowledge here are Christ, his person and teaching; also the writings of flee apostles, as shown in the New Testament. In the Old Testament the whole contents are authoritative, except as modified or repealed by the New Testament. By the side of these objective sources we have a subjective source in the New Covenant; it is the influence of the Holy Spirit in the faithful. To this Barnabas, Justin, and Clement of Alexandria bear witness. This life of the Spirit in the Church was by-and-by supplanted by the supposed efficacy of ordination, by which the Spirit was bound to the priesthood exclusively. There came now an outward law of the Church to modify the New Testament, and it controlled the ethical consciousness of Christendom until the Reformation.
(b.) Abundance of ethical material is found in the apostolical fathers, who base ethics on individual personality, on marriage, the family, etc. The most effective of the earlier writers was Tertullian (220). His ethical writings were very numerous, such as concerning spectacles, concerning the veiling of virgins, monogamy, penitence, patience, etc. His idea of Christianity was that it was a vast and defiant war power, separated from all the heathen customs of the Old World, and resolved to bring upon that world the judgment of Heaven. Cyprian, with his high claims for the episcopate, exercised great influence on the ethical sphere of the Church. He concentrated the truth of the Church in the episcopacy, in which he saw the vehicle of the Holy Ghost, and the instrument by which unity and the Holy Spirit should be assured to the Church forever. He, carried this idea of the dignity of the episcopate, and the sanctity and sanctifying power of orders, to a ridiculous extent. His doctrine of the efficacy of orders and the dignity of bishops was set over against certain sects — Novatians, Montanists, Donatists — who held that the holiness and unity of the Church demanded that none but holy persons should be members. Augustine fell heir to this controversy. As the Church grew into an earthly kingdom, her ethics took more and more the direction of a so-called higher virtue, whose chief forms were celibacy, poverty, conventual life, and self- imposed torture.
Asceticism not only formed a part of the Church life, it became also the center from which the Christian life was forced to receive rule and law. It determined what was sin, and what was right and good: it dictated to councils; and, getting control of the state, it dispensed at will its spiritual and temporal awards; penitential books in great numbers were compiled, and, bad as the system was, in itself, it became a powerful instrument in bringing to order the various heathen peoples. For the books and writers on these subjects, see Herzog’s Real-Encyclop. 4:194, where the relation of asceticism to mysticism is well presented, and it is shown that all these terrible struggles had their root in the consciousness of the infinite demerit of sin, and found their happy solution in Luther’s doctrine of faith.
The Reformation not only conquered the prevailing errors b) leading men back to the holy Scriptures, but it established positively the real principle of Christian ethics. It did this through justifying faith which, working by love, creates the possibility of Christian ethics. Love, springing from faith, is the fulfilling of the law. It is ethics in the soul, ready to take shape in noble action. This, working in time community inwardly, proceeds to mold all relations, private and public-marriage, family, church, state, science, art, and culture. The great reformers did not write complete ethical treatises, though they discussed many ethical subjects, such as prayer, oaths, marriage, etc.; but they especially discussed ethics in their explanations of the Decalogue in the Catechism. Indeed, the original form of Christian ethics is the Catechism. See Paul of Eitzen, Ethicae doctrinae, lib. 4 (1751), with later additions; also David Chytrdus, 1600, Virtutum descriptiones in praepta Decalogi distributae (1555); Lambert Daneau (t 1596), Ethices Christianae, lib. 3 (Geneva, 1577); Thomas Venatorius, De Virtuto Christiana, lib. 3; comp. Schwarz, Thomas Venatorius, and the beginnings of Protestant ethics, in connection with the doctrine of justification, Stud. u. Krit. (1850), heft. 1. See also Melancthon, in his Philosophia Moralis (1539), his Enarratio aliquot librorum Aristotelis (1545), and his Phiysica. Add to these Keckerncaun, Systema ethicae tribus liris adornatum (Geneva, 1614); Weigel, Johann Arndt, Valentin Andrea, Spener, Nitzsch, Henry Muller, Scriver, and others, all mystics. The Reformed have also done something in this line, especially G. Voetius, C. Vitringa, H. Witsius, Amesius, Amyraldus (Morale Chretienne, 6 volumes, 1652-1660).
Three men, according to J.A. Dorner (in Herzog’s Real-Encyklop. 4:199), form the transition stage to the emancipation of philosophy — Hugo Grotius (De jure pacis et belli), Puffendorf; with his school, and Christian Thomasius. Then come Wolf, Mosheim (in his Moral, 9 volumes), Steinhart, Bahrdt, Buddeus, Chr. Aug. Crusius and J.F. Reuss (Elementa theolegia Moralis, 1767). Even the Roman Catholic Church of the last two centuries has felt the influemlce of the modern philosophy; the following Romanist writers are Wolfians: Luby, Schwarzhuber, Schanza, and Stadler; and the following are Kantians: Wanker, Mutschelle, Hermes, with his disciples Braun, Elvenica, and Vogelsang. Weiller is a Schellingian; independent. and, at the same time, mild and evangelical, pious and rich in thought, are Michael Sailer and Hirscher. Geishuttner is a Fichtian.
Kant’s "practical reason," the metaphysics of ethics, occupies in the philosophy of morals a most important place, and, notwithstanding certain defects, it has the immortal honor to have discovered that the most certain of all things is the conscience in its relation to the practical reason, and to have made an end of the eudaemonism of ethics by means of the majesty of the moral law, which he compares with the glory of the starry heavens. To his "categorical imperative" certain rationalistic Kantians adhere; for example, J.W. Schmid, Karl Christian Schmid, and Krug. Some of the supernaturalists,: as Staudlin and Tieftrunk, Ammon and Vogel, incline to Jacobi’s philosophy, See also Fichet, System of Ethics (1797). To the Jacobi-Friesian school belong De Wette (Christliche Sittenlehre, 4 bde. 1819-23), Kahler, and Baumgarten-Crusius. To the school of Hegel belong Michelet (System der Philosoph. Moral, Berlin, 1828), L.V. Henning (Princip. der Ethik in historischer Entwicklung, 1824), Vatke, Von der menschl. Freiheit im Verhaltniss zu Suinde und Gnade, 1843); Marheineke (Christliche Moral, 1847), Daub (Christliche Moral, 1840). Of this school, yet more under the influence of Schleiermacher, are Martensen (Syst. Moral Philos. 1841), Wirth (Sys. specul. Ethik, 1841), H. Merz (Syst. Christl. Sittenlehre, nach den Grundsatzen des Protestantismus, etc., 1841). The activity of Schleiermacher in Christian ethics, as in other departments of theology, was immense. From 1819 he published his treatises on "the idea of virtue," "the idea of duty," and on "the relation between the moral law and the law of nature;" also on the idea of what may be "allowed" and the "chief good." His system was not further published by himself, but after his death A. Schweizer edited his Philos. Ethik in 1835, and Jonas his Christl. Sitte in 1843. See also Sartorius, Heil. Liebe; Harless, Christliche Ethik; and especially Rothe, Theolog. Ethik (2d edit. 1867). Rothe (translated by Morrison, Clark’s Library, Edinlurgh, 1888, 8vo) seeks to combine Hegel’s standpoint of objective knowledge with Schleiermacher’s fine moral tact and organizing power, and to excel them both in his highly original method. See also Ritenick’s Christl. Stenlehrle (1845); Gelzer, De Religion im Leben, etc. (1854); Schwarz, Evan. Chr. Ethik (1836, 3d ed.); Wendt, Kirchliche Ethik v. Standpunkte d. christl. Fr iheit (2 volumes, 8vo, Leipz. 1864-65); Culman, D. christliche Ethik (Stuttgardt, 1864-66, 2 volumes, 8vo). This sketch of the history of ethics is chiefly condensed from Dorner’s article (Ethik) in Herzog, Real-Encyklop. 4:165 sq. (B.H.N.)
Appendix. — It is proper to add to the above a brief account of the history of ethics, or moral philosophy, in England. A survey of this field will be found in Mackintosh, General View of the Progress of Ethical Philosophy (Encyc. Britannica, Prelim. Diss.), separately printed in his Miscellaneous Works (Lond. 1851, 12mo), and in a separate volume (Phila. 1832, 8vo); also in Whewell, Lectures on the Hist. of Moral Philosophy in England (Lond. 1852, 8vo); there is also a summary sketch of the history in Brando, Dictionary of Science, Literature, and Art, 1:821 sq. (Lond. 1865, 3 volumes, 8vo). From these, and other sources we condense the following sketch:
The modern English theories may be classed as selfish or disinterested, according as they found virtue on a selfish or a benevolent principle. The Selfish theory is advocated by Hobbes (1679), who makes self-love the exclusive passion, and considers pleasure the only motive to action (see his Human Nature, his Leviathan, and our article SEE HOBBES ). The same theory is adopted in substance by Jeremy Bentham (t 1832), who assumes Hobbes’s principle as self-evident, that every object is indifferent, except for its fitness to produce pleasure or pain, which he declares are the sole motives to action. "Bentham is the most distinguished propounder of the principle of utility as the basis of morals, a principle explained by him as in contrast, first, to asceticism, and next to ’sympathy and antipathy,’ by which he meant to describe all those systems, such as the moral-sense theory, that are grounded in internal feeling, instead of a regard to outward consequences. In opposing utility to asceticism, he intended to imply that there was no merit attaching to self-denial as such, and that the infliction of pain or the surrender of pleasure could only be justified by being the means of procuring a greater amount of happiness than was lost" (Chambers, s.v.). See Bentham, Treatise on Morals and Legislation; and our article SEE BENTHAM, JEREMY.
Locke (t 1704) denied the existence of a separate faculty for perceiving moral distinctions. In his Essay on the Human Understanding (book 1, chapter 3), he maintains that virtue is approved of, not because it is innate, but because it is profitable. Paley (t 1805) also rejected the doctrine of a moral sense, and held, in substance, the utilitarian theory, maintaining that "virtue is the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness" (Moral and Political Philosophy). The utilitarian theory is taught by all the recent English writers of the materialistic school: see James Mill, Analysis of the Human Mind (Lond. 1829; SEE MILL, JAMES ) ; Austin, Province of Jurisprudence determined (2d ed. London, 1861); John Stuart Mill, Dissertations and Discussions (1859); and his Utilitarianism, reprinted from Fraser’s Magazine (1862; 2d ed. 1864); Bain, The Emotions and the Will (Lond. 1859); The Senses and the Intelect (Lond. 1855); also his Mental and Moral Science (Lond. 1868, 8vo), where he teaches that conscience is solely the product of education. See also in reply to these writers, The North British Review, September, 1867, art. 1; The British Quarterly January, 1868, art. 6.
Opposed to the utilitarian theory there are two theories, which may be called the instinctive and the rational. The former refers the moral principle to the sensitive or emotive part of man’s nature; the latter, to the perception of moral good and evil by the intellect. To the first class belongs Adam Smith (t 1790), whose Theory of the Moral Sentiments (Glasgow, 1759; London, 1790, and often) refers the moral sense to sympathy. His view is thus stated by Mackintosh (Ethical Philosophy, Philadelphia, 1832, page 149): "That mankind are so constituted as to sympathize with each other’s feelings, and to feel pleasure in the accordance of these feelings, are the only facts required by Dr. Smith, and they certainly must be granted to him. To adopt the feelings of another is to approve them. When the sentiments of another are such as would be excited in us by the same objects, we approve them as morally prosper. To obtain this accord, it becomes necessary for him who enjoys or suffers to lower his expression of feeling to the point to which the bystander can raise his fellow-feelings, on which are founded all the high virtues of self-denial and self-command; and it is equally necessary for the bystander to raise his sympathy as near as he can to the level of the original feeling. In all unsocial passions, such as anger, we have a divided sympathy between him who feels them and those who are the objects of them. Hence the propriety of extremely moderating them. Pure malice is always to be concealed or disguised, because all sympathy is arrayed against it. In the private passions, where there is only a simple sympathy — that with the original passion — the expression has more liberty. The benevolent affections, where there is a double sympathy — with those who feel them and those who are their objects — are the most agreeable, and may be indulged with the least apprehension of finding no echo in other breasts. Sympathy with the gratitude of those who are benefited by good actions prompts us to consider them as deserving of reward, and forms the sense of merit; as fellow-feeling with the resentment of those who are injured, by crimes leads us to look on them as worthy of punishment, and constitutes the sense of demerit. These sentiments require not only beneficial actions, but benevolent motives for them; being compounded, in the case of merit, of a direct sympathy with the good disposition of the benefactor, and an indirect sympathy with the person benefited; in the opposite case with the precisely opposite sympathies. He who does an act of wrong to another to gratify his own passions must not expect that the spectators, who have none of his undue partiality to his own interest, will enter into his feelings. In such a case he knows that they will pity the person wronged, and be full of indignation against him. When, he is cooled, he adopts the sentiments of others on his own crime, feels shame at the impropriety of his former passion, pity for those who have suffered by him, and a dread of punishment from general and just resentmment. Such are the constituent parts of remorse. Our moral sentiments respecting ourselves arise from those which others feel concerning us. We feel a self-approbation whenever we believe that the general feeling of mankind coincides with that state of mind in which we ourselves were at a given time.
’We suppose ourselves the spectators of our own behavior, and endeavor to imagine what effect it would in this light produce in us.’ We must view our own conduct with the eyes of others before we can judge it. The sense of duty arises from putting ourselves in the place of others, and adopting their sentiments respecting our own conduct. In utter solitude there could have been no self-approbation. The rules of morality are a summary of those sentiments, and often beneficially stand in their stead when the self delusion of passion would otherwise hide from us the nonconformity of our state of mind with that which, in the circumstances, can be entered into and approved by impartial bystanders. It is hence that we learn to raise our mind above local or temporary clamor, and to fix our eyes on the surest indications of the general and lasting sentiments of human nature. ’When we approve of any character or action, our sentiments are derived from four sources: first, we sympathize with the motives of the agent; secondly, we enter into the gratitude of those who have been benefited by his actions; thirdly, we observe that his conduct has been agreeable to the general rules by which these two sympathies generally act; and, last of all, when we consider such actions as forming part of a system of behavior which tends to promote the happiness either of the individual or of society, they appear to derive a beauty from this utility not unlike that which we ascribe to any well-contrived machine"’ (Theory, 2:304, Edinb. 1801).
Lord Shaftesbury (t 1713) published in 1699 his Inquiry concerning Virtue (also London, 1709, and in his Characteristics), which, according to Mackintosh, "is unquestionably entitled to a place in the first rank of English tracts on moral philosophy, and contains more intimations of an original and important nature on the theory of Ethics than perhaps any preceding work of modern times." This praise rests on the fact that Shaftesbury developed the doctrine of a moral sense. The "most original, as well as important of his suggestions is, that there are certain affections of the mind which, being contemplated by the mind itself through what lie calls a reflex sense, become the objects of love, or the contrary, according to their nature. So approved and loved, they constitute virtue or merit as distinguished from mere goodness, of which there are traces in animals who do not appear to reflect on the state of their own minds, and who seem, therefore, destitute of what he elsewhere calls a moral sense. These statements are, it is true, far too short and vague. He nowhere inquires into the origin of the reflex sense. What is a much more material defect, he makes no attempt to ascertain in what state of mind it consists. We discover only by implication, and by the use of the term sense, that he searches for the fountain of moral sentiments, not in mere reason, where Cudworth and Clarke had vainly sought for it, but in the heart, whence the main branch of them assuredly flows. It should never be forgotten that we owe to these hints the reception into ethical theory of a moral sense, which, whatever may be thought of its origin, or in whatever words it may be described, must always retain its place in such theory as a main principle of our moral nature. His demonstration of the utility of virtue to the individual far surpasses all attempts of the same nature, being founded, not on a calculation of outward advantages or inconveniences, alike uncertain, precarious, and degrading, but on the unshaken foundation of the delight, which is of the very essence of social affection and virtuous sentiment; on the dreadful agony inflicted by all malevolent passions upon every soul that harbors the hellish inmates; on the all-important truth that to love is to be happy, and to hate is to be miserable; that affection is its own reward, and ill-will its own punishment; or, as it has been more simply and more affectingly, as well as with more sacred authority, taught, that to give is more blessed than to receive, and that to love one another is the sum of all human virtue" (Mackintosh, History of Ethical Philosophy, page 95).
Bishop Butler (t 1752) sets forth his moral doctrine in his Sermons (often reprinted), which have been recently published as a text-book by the Reverend J.C. Passmore, under the title Bishop Butler’s Ethical Discourses (Philadelphia, 1855, 12mo). He is undoubtedly the greatest of modern English writers on the true nature of ethics. "Mankind,” he says, "have various principles of action, some leading directly to the private good, some immediately to the good of the community But the private desires are not self-love, or any form of it; for self-love is the desire of a man’s own happiness, whereas the object of an appetite or passion is some outward thing. Self-love seeks things as means of happiness; the private appetites seek things, not as means, but as ends. A man eats from hunger, and drinks from thirst; and though he knows that these acts are necessary to life, that knowledge is not the motive of his conduct. No gratification can imideed lie imagined without a previous desire. If all the particular desires did not exist independently, self-love would have no object to employ itself about, for there would be no happiness, which, by the very supposition of the opponents, is made up of the gratification of various desires. No pursuit could be selfish or interested if there were not satisfactions first gained by appetites which seek their own outward objects without regard to self, which satisfactions compose them mass which is called a man’s interest. In contending, therefore, that the benevolent affections are disinterested, no more is claimed for them than must be granted to mere animal appetites and to malevolent passions. Each of these principles alike seeks its own object for the sake simply of obtaining it. Pleasure is the result of the attainment, but no separate part of the aim of the agent. The desire that another person may be gratified seeks that outward object alone, according to the general course of human desire. Resentment is as disinterested as gratitude or pity, but not more so.
Hunger or thirst may lee, as much as the purest benevolence, at variance with self-love. A regard to our own general happiness is not a vice, but in itself an excellent quality. It were well if it prevailed more generally over craying and short-sighted appetites. The weakness of the social affections and the strength of the private desires properly constitute selfishness, a vice utterly at variance with the happiness of him who harbors it, and, as such, condemned by self-love. There are as few who attain the greatest satisfaction to themselves as who do the greatest good to others. It is absurd to say with some that the pleasure of benevolence is selfish because it is felt by self. Understanding and reasoning are acts of self, for no man can think by proxy; but no one ever called them selfish. Why? Evidently because they do not regard self. Precisely the same rule applies to benevolence. Such an argument is a gross confusion of self, as it is a subject of feeling or thought, with self considered as the object of either. It is no more just to refer the private appetites to self-love because they commonly promote happiness, than it would be to refer them to self-hatred in those frequent cases where their gratification obstructs it. But, besides the private or public desires, and besides the calm regard to our own general welfare, there is a principle in man, in its nature supreme over all others. This natural supremacy belongs to the faculty which surveys, approves, or disapproves the several affections of our minds and actions of our lives. As self-love is superior to the private passions, so conscience is superior to the whole of man.
Passion implies nothing but an inclination to follow it, and in that respect passion differs only in force. But no notion can be formed of the principle of reflection or conscience which does not comprehend judgment, direction, superintendency. Authority over all other principles of action is a constituent part of the idea of conscience, and cannot be separated from it. Had it strength as it has right, it would govern the world. The passions would have their power but according to their nature, which is to be subject to conscience. Hence we may understand the purpose at which the ancients, perhaps confusedly, aimed when they laid it down that virtue consisted in following nature. It is neither easy, nor, for the main object of the moralist, important to render the doctrines of the ancients of modern language. If Butler returns to this phrase too often, it was rather from the remains of undistinguishing reverence for antiquity than because he could deem its employment important to his own opinions. The tie which holds together religion and morality is, in the system of Butler, somewhat different from the common representations, but not less close. Conscience, or the faculty of approving or disapproving, necessarily constitutes the bond of union. Setting out from the belief of theism, and combining it, as he had entitled himself to do, with the reality of conscience, he could not avoid discovering that the being who possessed the highest moral qualities is the object of the highest moral affections. He contemplates the Deity through the moral nature of man. In the case of a being who is to be perfectly loved, ’goodness must be the simple actuating principle within him, this being the moral quality which is the immediate object of love.’ ’The highest, the adequate object of this affection, is perfect goodness, which, therefore, we are to love with all our heart with all our soul, and with all our strength.’ ’We should refer ourselves implicitly to him, and cast ourselves entirely upon him. The whole attention of life should be to obey his commands’ (Sermon 13, On the Love of God). Moral distinctions are thus presupposed before a step can be made towards religion: virtue leads to piety; God is to be loved, because goodness is the object of love; and it is only after the mind rises through human morality to divine perfection that all the virtues and duties are seen to hang from the throne of God" (Mackintosh, History of Ethical Philosophy, 116 sq.).
To the same school belong Hutcheson (t 1747), who taught that moral good is simply what the word itself expresses, which is not explicable by any other phrase. From this he argues that moral good must be perceived by a sense, because the senses alone are percipient of simple qualities (see his Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, Glasgow, 1725, and often). Hume (Inquiry concerning the Principles of Moral,) asserts, indeed, that general utility constitutes a uniform ground of moral distinctions, and that reason judges of the utility of actions. But he asserts also that we approve of good and disapprove of evil in virtue of a primary sentiment of our nature (distinct from self-love), which he calls benevolence or humanity, but which is identical with conscience, or the moral sense. As to the idea of moral obligation, he makes it simply a judgment of the understanding that happiness flows from obedience to the moral faculty rather than from obedience to self-love. For the doctrines of Mackintosh, we must refer our readers to his admirable sketch (so often cited in this article) of the History of Ethical Philosophy. Of the so-called Rational school, the distinctive characteristic is "that it considers the idea of good to be an a priori conception of reason, in which the idea of obligation is necessarily and essentially implied. As to the nature of the idea itself, two opinions have been held, viz. 1, that it is simple and immediate; 2, that it derives its explanation and authority from some higher notion of the intellect. The most distinguished representatives of the latter opinion are Clarke and Wollaston, while the former has found able advocates in Cudworth, Price, and Stewart" (Brande, 1.c.).
Dr. M’Cosh (American Presbyt. Review, January 1868, art. 1) classes the modern views on ethics in Great Britain into the two schools of Sensational and Rational (or priori), "corresponding to the two schools of philosophy which have divided Europe since Descartes and Locke." Under the latter he classes Cudcworth, Clarke, Coleridge, Reid, Stewart, and Sir W. Hamilton; "none of them, however, except Coleridge, taking up so high a priori grounds as Descartes and Cousin in ’France, or Kant and Hegel in Germany." The Protestants of England, in the main, at this time, according to the same writer, do not agree with those Roman Catholic writers who deny an independent morality apart from the authority of the Church; while, on the other hand, they do not agree with the philosophers who assert not only the independence, but the sufficiency of ethnic or natural morality. (See the article cited for a view of the relations Of the modern sensational doctrine to theology and religion.)
Among American writers, Jonathan Edwards (t 1758) is first to be named in this field. In his Dissertation concerning the End of true Virtue, and that On the End for which. God created the World (both contained in his Works, N.Y. ed. volume 2), he sets forth an ethical theory marked by the subtlety and originality which characterize all his speculations. Mackintosh sums it up as follows: "True virtue, according to him, consists in benevolence, or love to being ’in general,’ which he afterwards limits to ‘intelligent being,’ though sentient would have involved a more reasonable limitation. This good will is felt towards a particular being, first, in proportion to his degree of existence (for, says he ’that which is great has more existence, and is farther from nothing, than that which is little’); and, secondly, in proportion to the degree in which that particular being feels benevolence to others. Thus God, having infinitely more existence and benevolence than man, ought to be infinitely more loved; and for the same reason, God must love himself infinitely more than he does all other beings. He can act only from regard to himself, and his end in creation can only be to manifest his whole nature, which is called acting for his own glory." See also, on his ethical theory, the article SEE EDWARDS in Appleton’s Cyclopedia, 7:18; and the Bibliotheca Sacra, April 1853, page 402 sq. There are many excellent manuals, prepared for text-books, by American writers, such as those of Adams, Wayland, Alexander, Haven, Alden, Hopkins, etc., for farther mention of which we have not space. Hickok (System of Moral Science, 1853, 8vo) treats the subject froan the a priori point of view, and also in its relations to Christian theology, in a very masterly manner.
He makes duty an end in and of itself. The voice of conscience is imperative. "There is an awful sanctuary in every immortal spirit, and man needs nothing more than to exclude all else, and stand alone before himself, to be made conscious of an authority he can neither dethrone nor delude. From its approbation comes self-respect; from its disapprobation comes self-contempt. A stern behest is ever upon him that he do nothing to degrade the real dignity of his spiritual being. He is a law to himself, and has both the judge and executioner within himself, and inseparable from him." "We may call this the imperative of the reason, the constraint of conscience, or the voice of God within him; but, by whatever terms expressed, the real meaning will be that every man has consciously the bond upon him to do that, and that only, which is due to his spiritual excellency." "To be thus worthy of spiritual approbation is the end of all ends; and as worthy of happiness, this many now righteously be given and righteously taken, but not righteously paid as price or claimed as wages. The good is to be worthy, not that he is to get something for it. The highest good — the summum bonum — is worthiness of spiritual approbation" (Moral Science pages 45-49).
Christian ethics, as distinguished from moral philosophby in general, has not received the same attention from English and American writers as from German. The earlier Looks on Casuistry (q.v.) and Cases of Conscience, however, belong under this head. Most of the standard English and American writers commingle philosophical morals with Christian ethics. Butler brings out with clearness the relations of ethics to the Christian religion. Wardlaw’s Christian Ethics (Od ed. Lond. 1837, Boston; 5th ed. Lond. 1852) asserts that "the science of morals has no province at all independently of theology, and that it cannot be philosophically discussed except upon theological principles (Boston ed. page 367, note). Watson (Theolog. Instzt. part. 3) treats of Christian ethics under the title "The Morals of Christianity," and denies the is priori method (see Cocker, in Meth. Quart. January 1864). Spalding (Philippians of Christian Morals, Lond. 1843, 8vo) has "recourse both to science as derived from an examination of mcan’s moral nature, and to revelation as derived from an examination of the Scriptures."
In France, the orthodox Romaim Catholic writers have generally confirmed themselves to the so-called Moral Theology (q.v.). The Cartesian school SEE DES CARTES, cultivated Ethics in the new philosophical spirit; its best representative is Malebranchme. Virtue he defines to be the love of universal order, as it eternally existed in the divine reason, where every created reason contemplates it. Particular duties are but the applications of this love. He abandoned the ancient classification of four cardinal virtues, and for it substituted the modern distinction of duties toward God, men, and ourselves. The French school of Sensualismi, of which Condillac was the head SEE CONDILLAC, regarded all intellectual operations, even judgment and volition, as transformed sensations; and Helvetius, applying the theory to morals, held that self-love or interest is the exclusive motor of man, denied disinterested motives, made pleasure the only good, and referred to legislative rewards and punishments as illustrating the whole system of individual action. La Mettrie maintained an atheistic Epicunanism, and Condorcet wished to substitute an empirical education for the ideas and sanctions of religion and morality. The most complete and logical elaboration of the materialism, atheism, and fatalism of the period, which had pleasure for its single aim and law, was given in D’Holbach’s Systeme de la nature. Of the later French writers, Jouffroy is perhaps the most important. He gave a peculiar explanation of good and evil. Every thing is good in proportion as it aids in the fulfillment of our destiny. The problem of human destiny, therefore, lies at the foundation of morality. There can be no a prior judgment as to the moral quality of actions, since that is relative to the agent, depending on the influence they may have on the destiny for which he was created. Good, in the case of any particular being, is the fulfillment of its own specific destiny; good, in itself, is the fulfillment of the destiny of all beings; and an interruption in the accomplishment of destiny constitutes evil. His system of Ethics is chiefly laid down in his Cours dam Droit naturel (2 volumes, Par. 1835; a third volume was edited after his death by Damriron, 1842), his most eloquent work, which, besides ethics, treats of psychology and theodicy. Some points are more fully developed in a series of essays, which first appeared in periodicals, and of which subsequently two collections (Melanges philosophiques and Nouveaux melanges philosophiques) were published.
See, besides the authors named in the course of this article, A Sketch of the History of Moral Philosophy, in the introduction to St. Hilaire’s translation of Aristotle’s Politics (Politique d’Aristote, Paris); Meiners, Allgem. Krit. Geschichte d. alteren u. neueren Ethik (Gottingen, 1801, 2 volumes); Hagrenbach, Encyclop. u. Methodologie, § 92; Cousin, OEuvr. Philosophiques (Paris, 1846-52); Bautain, Morale (Paris, 1842, 2 volumes); Damiron, Cours de Philosophie, volumes 3 and 4 (Paris, 1842); Jouffroy, Introd. to Ethics, transl. by Channing (Boston, 1840, 2 volumes, 8vo); Janet, Hist. des ides morales et politiques (Paris, 1856); Neander, Vorlesungen ui. d. Geschichte d. christl. Ethik (Berl. 1865, 8vo); Neander, Relations of Grecian to Christian Ethics; Christ. Exam. 29:153; 30:145; Bibl. Sac. 1853, 476 sq.; article Ethics in Chambers’ Encyclopcedia, and in the Penney Cyclopaedia, both in the interest of the sensational philosophy; North British Review, December 1867, arts. 4; Wuttke, Handbuch der christl. Sittenlehre (2 volumes, 8vo, 1861-62; 2d edit. 1866); Maurice, Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy; Maurice, The Conscience: Lectures on Casuistry (London, 1868). On the nature of evil, SEE EVIL; SEE SIN. On liberty and necessity, SEE WILL. For the Roman Catholic way of treating ethics, SEE MORAL THEOLOGY.
See Agapistic ethics; Christian ethics; Ethical egoism; Ethical relativism; Existential ethics; Deontological ethical theory; Normative ethics; Teleological ethical theory; Agapism Ethics of mysticism; Descriptivist ethics; Emotivism; Ethics of power; Situation ethics; Compatibilism; Imperativist ethics; Incompatibilism; Emotivism; Moral conscience, ethics based on; Naturalistic ethics; Non-naturalistic ethics; Power, ethics; Religious ethics; Situation ethics; and Teleological ethics
ETHICS.—A very little reflexion will reveal the unusual difficulties that lurk in a subject like the present—the Ethics of Jesus, or, of the Gospels. Even the uninitiated is aware that we cannot in strictness speak of the ‘Ethics’ of Jesus at all—in the sense, that is, of a doctrine systematically developed according to principles, and exhaustively applied to the facts of life. For His was no scientific or methodical spirit; His significance lies rather in the realm of personality, in the unique quality of His moral feeling and judgment, in the peculiar way in which men and things moved Him, and in which He reacted upon them. Hence we need not look for either an orderly arrangement of, or even an approximate completeness in, His ethical ideas. From the drama of His life we are unable to compile a system of morals, but we may see how a great Personality creates a moral standard by what He does and suffers, and how He elucidates it in His words.
But are we justified in connecting with Him the term ‘ethical’ at all? We speak accurately of Ethics or Moral Science only when we regard the conduct of men in their mutual relations as something by itself, abstracted from religious feeling and action, and when ethical ends and maxims are disengaged from religion, in virtue of their inherent worth; and such an independent position of Ethics, whether it appear worth attaining or not, is simply beside the mark in the case of Jesus. His moral and His religious principles are so closely interwoven, His moral feeling, e.g. His love for man, is so inseverable from the religious basis of His belief in the Fatherhood of God, that it would seem to be impossible to delineate His ‘Ethics’ without at the same time treating of, say, the Kingdom of God, the Divine grace, or the final judgment. And if, nevertheless, we venture upon the task, we must never lose sight of the connecting lines that run between His ethical teaching and His religious principles.
Then there is the question whether our sources are at all sufficient for the full and accurate representation of the moral personality of Jesus. In restricting ourselves to the Synoptic Gospels, we are doing nothing more than recognizing the claims of historical science. But now, to what extent can we regard the three older Gospels as adequate sources for our theme? If we investigate the oldest of all, viz. Mark, we find that it nowhere makes any attempt to portray the Ethics of Jesus as such. In reporting His conflict and controversy with the Judaism of His time, it casts but an indirect light upon this side of His character, and that, moreover, in a series of isolated scenes. Of these the most outstanding are the Rabbinical disputations regarding the Sabbath (Mar 2:23 to Mar 3:6), purity (Mar 7:1-23), divorce (Mar 10:1-12); then come the important passages narrating the conversation with the rich man (Mar 10:17-27) and regarding the ‘first commandment’ (Mar 12:28-34). Various other aspects of His conception of life are vividly illustrated by such utterances as that to the paralytic (Mar 2:5 f.), about the physician and the sick (Mar 2:17) the true kinship (Mar 3:35), children (Mar 10:15 f.), and tribute-money (Mar 12:13-17). In the section dominated by the three predictions of His death (Mar 8:27 to Mar 10:45) we have a mass of admonitions to the disciples—concerning readiness to suffer, loyalty, courage, humility, reverence for childhood, etc. We have here something of the nature of a primitive Christian catechism; not instructions (as in the Didache, let us say) for tranquil seasons and everyday life, but rather articles of war for the ecclesia militans of the persecutions, a manuale crucis.* [Note: J. Weiss, Das älteste Evangelium (1903).]
An entirely different kind of appeal is made by the Sermon on the Mount in Matthew 5-7. In its extant form the Sermon is the promulgation of a great programme, in which the Evangelist seeks to give a definitive and approximately complete statement of Jesus’ relation to the Law, with a reference, moreover, to the representatives of the anti-legalistic standpoint, who think that He is come ‘to destroy the law.’ It is the purpose of the writer to convince these that Jesus, being in a general way the Fulfiller of Prophecy, is, as a lawgiver, the fulfiller of the prophecy regarding the second Moses, whom God was to raise up in the last days (Deu 18:15), and who, so far from abrogating the Law, will rather consummate and even transcend it.† [Note: J. Weiss, Die Schriften des NT, neu ubersetzt und für die Gegenwart erklart (1905), i. i. p. 236 ff.] In our reading of the Sermon we cannot afford to ignore this design of the writer; we must draw a distinction between what its words purported to him, and what they meant in the tradition he utilized. Similarly, in reading St. Luke’s version of the Sermon on the Mount, we must bear in mind that he has materially abridged his material, not alone by discarding the Jewish and preserving only the typically human elements, but by considerably transforming it under the influence of his pronounced ascetic view.‡ [Note: p. 413 ff.] Both Mt. and Lk. thus throw us back upon the source of our Lord’s words, in which the primitive Jewish-Christian community had grouped the Logia of Jesus for its own instruction. Hence we are forced to distinguish between the Ethics of the Evangelists and the Ethics of their source. Further, we must make a searching examination of the characteristically Lukan tradition as it appears in the parables of the Rich Man and Lazarus, the Good Samaritan, etc.;§ [Note: p. 380.] only so shall we be justified in attempting to answer the question, What was the ethical position of Jesus? An extremely complicated critical process must thus be gone through before we use our present authorities as documents for the solution of our problem. But as it is impossible to reproduce here the details of such investigation, only the results can be stated, with references to other works of the present writer.
In an account of the Ethics of Jesus, the reader also looks for a comparison and contrast between Him and His Jewish, perhaps also His Graeco-Roman, contemporaries. The fresh and original elements in His moral thought and feeling must be set over against traditional views. The favourite procedure in this connexion, that, namely, of placing His luminous figure on a background as sombre as possible, is one we cannot follow. Above all, the task of describing the ethical conditions of contemporary Judaism would take us beyond our allotted space, and is, moreover, beyond our capacity. Often as it has been tried, in more or less ingenious sketches, to reproduce some cross-section through the moral conditions of later Judaism, it has never been accomplished without subjective caprice and violent tendency-interpretations. Nor is this result to be wondered at; for it is quite impossible to describe faithfully, or estimate justly, the characteristic ethical complexion of a period so extensive as the two and a half centuries from b.c. 180 to a.d. 70, of the inner history of which we still know so little, which is represented by a literature so multiform, and of which the dominant currents veered so much—a period, moreover, meagrely equipped with first-rate or distinctly recognizable personalities. True, we can observe the behaviour of the circles from which sprang the Psalms of Solomon, we can lay our hand upon the devout breast of the pseudo-Ezra, we can enter into the spirit of the author of 1 Maccabees or Sirach; but how diverse are even these few casual types, and how impossible is it to make them fit into one harmonious picture! What, again, do we know of the Ethics of the Greek or Sadducean party? What vogue had the Essenes among the people? Are the Pharisees of the Psalms of Solomon identical with those of the time of Jesus? And, above all, what significance for our problem has the Talmud, so often named, so little known? Here, in sober truth, so many unsolved enigmas await the historian, that one cannot but marvel at the assurance of those who, in face of them all, are ready to sketch the Ethics of later Judaism as a foil for the Ethics of Jesus. We for our part renounce any such design. We have not the daring to institute a comparison between the Ethics of Jesus and the complicated historical phenomena of the period, and then, as impartial judges, to proceed to measure out the light and shade. We content ourselves with the question, How did Jesus regard and estimate the Judaism of His time? It is beyond doubt that His moral sense was chafed by many things, and in particular by Pharisaism, and that a material part of His teaching was formulated in antagonism to the Rabbis. We too must feel this antagonism, if we are ever to understand Him.
If, again, we are required to answer the question as to wherein consists the new and original element in the Ethics of Jesus, we are brought to a complete standstill. In His conflict with Rabbinism He is in close alliance with the Prophets, and is certainly not outside their influence. But to assume that a great gulf is fixed between the religion of the Prophets and Psalmists and that of later Judaism, is to forget that a goodly part of both the Prophets and the Psalms was a contribution of the post-exilic period, and, above all, to overlook the fact that these writings form the background, or, we might even say, the native soil of Judaism. However profoundly they were misunderstood, still it was not possible to prevent the intermittent welling up, from the soil, of many a copious spring; and many a document of the later period bears clear testimony to their influence. Thus we can do full justice to the moral creed of Jesus only by giving adequate consideration to the circumstance that He lived in intimate sympathy and steadfast accord with the noblest and devoutest thoughts of His people’s Bible. Hence, if in view of these facts we inquire concerning the originality of Jesus, the result will be a surprise. For we shall find that of almost all His ethical ideas there are anticipations, precedents, and even parallels in the OT, as also in contemporary Judaism. A mere glance at any collection of parallels, such as that of Wetstein, will be sufficient to purge us of the notion that the uniqueness or greatness of Jesus consists in the novelty of His ethical teaching. Theology is still tainted with the propensity, inherited from Rationalism, to see in the production of ideas the all but exclusive factor in the making of history or the progress of man. It often fails to realize how plentiful ideas are in times that are spiritually alive, or how in all ages humanity has been enabled to take a step in advance only by the emergence of a personality who, with unwonted energy, sincerity, and enthusiasm, absorbed, elaborated, and formed anew from his individual experience the choicest products of his age. So with Jesus; His ideas as such are neither so novel nor so revolutionary as to create a new world; they derive their procreative virtue solely from the fact that He made them His own, lived them, and died for them.
From these preliminaries we turn to the exposition proper, premising that we shall on principle forego any systematic or exhaustive development of the material from a fundamental idea. Our purpose is to survey the figure of Jesus in its specific operation, and what better situation for this can we find than the actual scene of His conflict with His environment? It was the friction with that environment which kindled the fire within Him; it was His unconformity with it that gave Him the conviction of His peculiar heritage. Just as His anger at the profanation of the Temple moved Him to an involuntary display of a religious feeling superior to, and more delicate than, that of His fellows, so His collision with the leading representatives of Judaism evokes from Him not merely an indignant criticism, but also a manifestation of His own inherent character. In this connexion the great discourse against the Scribes and Pharisees in Matthew 23 (cf. Luk 11:39-52) furnishes invaluable testimony. Even if its artificial form (cf. the seven Woes) be derivative, still the majority of the sayings grouped in it, so expressive of individual feeling, so original in form, unmistakably show the characteristic touch of Jesus. In any case the discourse clearly reveals the distinction He drew between Himself and the Rabbis, and the traits in the latter by which the disciples, filled with His spirit, felt themselves repelled. It is, above all things, the insincerity of their practice, the contrast between the reality and the appearance, which is so vividly brought out in the metaphor of ‘whited sepulchres’ (Mat 23:27). The supreme business of the scribes,—to which they apparently devoted themselves with surpassing zeal,—viz. the instruction of the people in the law of God (Mat 23:4), they discharged in such a way as to superinduce the very reverse of what was intended: instead of bringing men into the Kingdom (Mat 23:13) they keep them out by imposing intolerable burdens, in the bearing of which they render not the slightest help. It is, in fact, evident that the work of leading men to God was for them a matter of no consequence whatever. A glaring light is thrown likewise upon the propaganda of the Pharisees (Mat 23:15): under their tutelage a proselyte becomes a child of hell, twice as wicked as themselves (or, as it was probably spoken at first, twice as wicked as he was before). These severe verdicts show at a glance how highly Jesus estimated the sacred and responsible office of the leaders of the people, which they so direly abused. With keen moral indignation He passes sentence upon the complacent and self-seeking father-confessors, who, on the pretext of pastoral zeal, with ‘long prayers’ devour widows’ houses (Mar 12:40). He shows inimitably the unscrupulousness of their over-scrupulosity: straining out gnats and swallowing camels, they are squeamish and strait-laced in regard to trifles, in the great moral matters lax for themselves and lenient to others, even to the point of apathy—and such has ever since been the practice of a hierarchy clothed with authority (Mat 23:24). In these utterances Jesus reproves chiefly the scribes’ insensibility to the primary moral sanctions; they keep cup and platter clean, but are indifferent to the nature of the contents; non olet, even though it has been accumulated by selfishness and greed, and is gorged with unbridled self-indulgence (Mat 23:25). While with painful precision they attend to the tithing of the meanest garden produce, they neglect the weightiest matters of the Law—justice, mercy, and faithfulness (Mat 23:23). In harmony with Mic 6:8 He enunciates the principle that the primary imperatives of morality surpass all ceremonial prescriptions in importance and urgency—a truth which, though ancient, needs ever to be emphasized anew. There can be no dubiety as to the purport of ‘justice’ or ‘mercy’ in this passage; they are meant to cover the great social obligations of the ruling to the dependent classes—the non-perversion of the Law, the succour of widows and orphans, the relief of the poor. As to the third injunction, the Evangelists do not seem to have been sure of its meaning; for ‘faithfulness’ St. Luke (Luk 11:42) substitutes the ‘love of God,’ probably interpreting
Mt. has in this verse inserted a clause (Mat 23:23 b) which should almost certainly be deleted from Lk. (Luk 11:42), as a gloss involving a certain modification of the command. The preceding verses might lead us to infer that Jesus did not only set less store by the ceremonial law, but was willing to do away with it altogether. This, however, says St. Matthew, is not His meaning: ‘These (moral duties) ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone.’ The Evangelist is, in fact, keenly solicitous lest Jesus be regarded as hostile to the Mosaic law, as he shows also in Mat 5:17 and the prefatory words Mat 23:2 f. (neither passage in Lk.), implying that the teaching of the scribes is good, but that their works are evil, since they do not practise what they preach. Taking into consideration the writer’s date and point of view, we can quite well understand the words; but we naturally ask whether this conciliatory and conservative attitude towards the ceremonial law truly represents the mind of Jesus?
The words about the cleansing of cups and platters, and about the tithing of mint, anise, and cummin, certainly sound so contemptuous as to compel us to ask whether Jesus set any value whatever upon the ceremonial side of the Law, and, in particular, upon the special casuistical precepts of the scribes. The question may be answered provisionally and generally: Jesus was not a Pharisee, and this means that His attitude towards many of the scribal maxims was a dissentient one; He was not a Judaean, but a son of the Galilaean peasantry, who knew how to evade the authority of Pharisaic doctors and lawyers, and who were, in consequence, liable to the curse merited by those who ‘know not the law’ (Joh 7:49); and, accordingly, He regards Himself and His followers likewise as above the Pharisees’ rules about purifying. But we also find explicit remonstrances against the ‘traditions of the elders’ so dear to the scribes (Mar 7:5; Mar 7:9; Mar 7:13); He characterizes them summarily as the ‘prescriptions’ (Authorized and Revised Versions ‘tradition’) of men (Mar 7:8), thus contrasting them with the commandments of God. In this He evinces His independent attitude, for a genuine Pharisee could live only by the belief that the additions to and amplifications of the Law, even if devised by human teachers, were yet expressive of God’s will. But Jesus goes still further, affirming positively that in their concern for these traditions the scribes reject, pervert, and even make void the commandment of God (Mar 7:8; Mar 7:13). He gives as an example the gross case of one who evades the plain human duty of supporting his parents by the manœuvre of dedicating to the Temple the money he might have spared for them: once the fateful word ‘Corban’ is spoken, then every penny so consecrated belongs to God, and is, as sacred property, interdicted from all secular uses, and so from that of the parents. It is bad enough that a son should so act; but that jurists and theologians should permit him henceforward to turn his back upon father and mother, should declare his pledge to be inviolable, and refuse to ‘release’ him from it, is neither more nor less than the disannulling of the Fifth Commandment.* [Note: J. Weiss, op. cit. i. 1, p. 124]
Now the assertion that the great moral demands of God’s law are of more importance than any ceremonial obligations, is primarily directed only against the traditions and prescriptions of the Rabbis; in reality, however, it is a principle which threatens the very foundations of the Mosaic system. Already in the OT we see the strained relations between prophetic piety and priestly legality—brothers again and again at variance. In the personality and preaching of Jesus the prophetic religion reappears with unparalleled force and clearness, and braces itself to the work of overthrowing the fabric of Levitical ceremonialism. To treat the ethical and the ritual law as of equal validity belongs to the very nature of the priestly theocracy: the moment the former is placed on a higher level the whole edifice becomes insecure. In this reference St. Mark preserves a short but pregnant saying of Jesus (Mar 7:15), viz. ‘There is nothing from without the man that going into him can defile him, but the things which proceed out of the man are those which defile him.’ As He is here speaking of clean and unclean meats, He says, ‘Nothing going into the man,’ but He might equally well say, and certainly means, ‘Nothing from without the man coming to him,’ i.e. coming into contact with him. But this is the reverse of what stands in the Law. For the whole complex of the Mosaic-Levitical legislation rests upon the postulate that a man is defiled by outer contact and contamination, or by partaking of certain foods, i.e. that he thereby becomes separated from God, is excluded from the sanctuary and segregated from the sacred community. Now the principle enunciated by Jesus cuts the ground from under all the particular commandments of the ceremonial law. It carries, indeed, a dissolving and explosive force. But His standpoint differs from mere rationalistic ‘illuminism’ by having a profoundly religious basis. Jesus had so intense a conception of man’s relation to God as an ethical one, that He could not tolerate the thought that God would exclude any one from His presence merely because he had touched a corpse or eaten swine’s flesh. It is the evil will, the impure heart, the false nature, that separate men from God.
All this, of course, is self-evident to us; but when Jesus uttered it, and acted upon it, He found Himself at cross purposes with the most exemplary personages of His generation, and compelled to resist the drift of an age-long tradition. He raised His voice not only against the scribes, but against the very spirit of the Law they expounded. Moreover, in actual practice, His bearing towards the Law is quite unconstrained. He adds to the exceptions already conceded by the Rabbis (e.g. works of necessity on the Sabbath), and allows both Himself and His disciples a certain freedom, without taking counsel of the specialists. When challenged, He appeals to the example of David (Mar 2:23-26). It is manifestly gratifying to the narrator that Jesus was able to justify His action so adroitly by the methods of Rabbinical exposition. But this is only an ex post facto justification, of which the disciples certainly were not thinking as they plucked the corn; they had acted without deliberation, simply availing themselves of the freedom which their fellowship with Jesus had made a matter of course. We learn the true meaning of Jesus from the twofold declaration subjoined by St. Mark (Mar 2:27 f.). Doubtless what the writer means is that the ‘Son of man,’ i.e. the Messiah, is Lord of the Sabbath, and can absolve His disciples from its observance; but originally the saying must have run thus: ‘Man has full power also over the Sabbath,’ which, again, is of essentially the same tenor as the other, viz. ‘the Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath.’* [Note: See J. Weiss, op. cit. i. 1, p. 87.] This saying, too, is more than an article in a confession; it is really a declaration of war against Mosaism. Scribe and doctor regard the Law as an end in itself, and obedience to it as the final purpose of human life, even if such obedience involve sacrifice, and indeed the surrender of life itself. But the assertion of Jesus that the Law is given for man’s sake, as something designed for his benefit, and the inference that he is free from it whenever its observance conflicts with his welfare, proceed from an entirely different point of view, and have far-reaching implications. The rigid and doctrinaire aspect of the Law is thus cancelled; its behests are viewed as means for the realization of God’s purposes of love towards men. All this, however, shows but the birth-struggle of an entirely new religious conception, destined in its further growth to do away altogether with the Law as law. A similar instance is the declaration (Mar 10:1 ff.) that the Mosaic regulation regarding divorce was a concession to the Israelites’ hardness of heart, and that it stands in antithesis to the statute originally promulgated in Paradise, which alone is the will of God and the precedent for man. Here the Mosaic ordinance is represented as something adventitious, as merely marking a stage meant to be left behind.
The boldness of Jesus in thus essaying to make a distinction within Scripture itself, and to discriminate between the law of God and human accretions, is of great moment for us. He has recourse to a mode of criticism which might be called subjective, but which really merits the attribute prophetic. This ‘Prophet,’ filled with Deity, this great religious Personality, ever directly conscious of His nearness to God, does not shrink from giving judgment as to what is the actual purpose of the Most High. Just as He fervidly announces the royal benignity of God towards both the evil and the good, just as He confidently speaks to the contrite of the Divine forgiveness, and without misgiving assures the wretched of the Divine succour, so He also undertakes, in face of the law of Moses, ‘that which was spoken to the fathers,’ to set forth a new law, in the glad conviction that He is thus expressing the will of God. Hence it is a misapprehension of the tenor and scope of the ‘antitheses’ in the Sermon on the Mount to imagine that in these Jesus is merely impugning the prevailing exegesis of the Law, or merely endeavouring to bring to light the real design of its promulgator. No; the rhythmical repetition of the phrase, ‘But I say unto you,’ makes it abundantly clear that Jesus is here reaching beyond Moses. And this undoubtedly corresponds to the historical situation. Take, for instance, the first two enactments, viz. regarding murder and adultery; it is clear that what Jesus means is that God asks more than mere abstention from these crimes: He demands perfect self-control and integrity of heart. The unheeded moments when the animal nature starts up in a fit of anger or of impure desire are grievously sinful in the eyes of God, as well as the actual misdeeds.
The religious-historical situation is as follows. The Jewish people were under a theocracy, and for them the Law of Moses was by no means restricted to religious or moral matters; it was at once a civil and a penal code, an order of legal procedure and a manual for the priesthood. Now it is the bane of a theocratic constitution that the Divine law, ingrafted as it is upon common life, tends to lose its majesty and inviolability. It has to adapt itself to the varied facts of existence by means of saving clauses and casuistical methods; and such a régime fosters above all the notion that the will and judgment of God reach no further than the arm of the civil magistrate, and that it is only the completed act, and not the intention, that God brings to judgment. Thus the moral relation of man to God sinks to the level of a legal one. Such a deterioration and externalizing of the religious life must all but inevitably ensue when its regulation and guardianship are committed to priests and jurists. It is the ‘Prophet,’ however, who now takes up the word. With incisive force He makes it clear that God looks upon the heart, the thought, the secret motions of the soul, and brings these things before His judgment-seat, and that the sin of intention passes with Him for no less than the overt act. To assert such equivalence of thought and deed may seem to us almost to overshoot the mark; for we rightly place a high value upon the self-command which keeps desire from passing into action. But the apparently partial view is to be regarded as the natural reaction of the heart and the conscience against the legalistic ossification and externalization of religion.
The verdict of Jesus upon divorce points in the same direction. The argument upon which He bases His prohibition of the separation permitted by Moses merits our attention. The statute laid down in Paradise is to be preferred, as the law of God, not merely in virtue of its great antiquity, but also on intrinsic grounds. When a husband puts away his wife, he places her in a position of moral jeopardy; for, should she associate herself with another man, whether in a second marriage or in a passing act of immorality, she thereby completes the dissolution of the first marriage, which hitherto was legally binding. The noteworthy element in this utterance is not that the ruptured matrimonial union is still binding, but in particular that the man is morally responsible for his wife, even after his dismissal of her; he must bear the guilt of her sin. Such is the only judgment possible, if marriage is to be regarded not merely as a legal bond, under the control of the civil magistrate, but as a moral covenant, for whose inviolability men are responsible, not to one another, but to God. See Divorce.
The profoundly irreligious subtlety of the lawyers is also exposed in Jesus’ prohibition of oaths. First of all He shows that the evasions and periphrases by which those who swear hope to escape the danger of profaning God’s holy name, are of no avail; every oath is and remains an adjuration of God. But more: to the finer religious feelings, every oath is a gratuitous and irreverent bringing down of the Most High into the sordid and trivial concerns of the hour—the grossest case being that of the impulsive Oriental who puts his head in pledge, as if he had power over life and death, forgetting his complete dependence upon God, and that life and death proceed from Him alone. Thus Jesus supersedes the scrupulous anxiety and the petty evasions of the Rabbis by a much deeper religious motive: the oath, in truth, is but an element in a world under the domination of sin and Satan (Mat 5:37), and he who feels God’s majesty and purity in his inmost soul will have a sacred fear of bringing God upon such a scene, and will honour Him best by the plain and simple word of truth.
Of an entirely different character are the two final antitheses, viz. those relating to non-resistance and love of enemies, as given in Mat 5:38-48. In the foregoing precepts we have simply the utterances of a more earnest moral sensibility; here we have the language of exultant and heroic enthusiasm, not meant to be judged by commonplace standards. In lieu of the typically Jewish principle of retaliation, which was applied both in legal and in personal affairs, viz. ‘eye for eye, tooth for tooth,’ Jesus demands the entire renunciation of self-defence or self-vindication. Nay more; it is not mere tranquil endurance that He enjoins, but a readiness to present to the assailant the other cheek, to give more than what is asked, to surrender the cloak as well as the coat. These injunctions differ from those of St. Paul in Rom 12:19-21 in that they involve no thought of shaming or overcoming the adversary by pliancy and patience. St. Paul would seem, in fact, to have interpreted the words of Jesus in the practical didactic sense of certain Stoic admonitions. But the distinctive feature of the passage in the Sermon on the Mount is that the demands are made without any reason being assigned or any subordinate aim proposed, precisely, indeed, as if their authority must have been perfectly self-evident to the disciples. A theological exegesis has barred the way towards a right understanding of them by always starting from the question what these words mean for us, and how we shall obey them. And as a literal obedience to them seems to us impossible, recourse is had to new interpretations and modifications, by which the strength of their tremendous claims is sapped. Instead of putting such questions, we would rather ask how the words are to be understood in their original setting, and how Jesus came to utter them in that form. Now it is evident that their essential feature is a thorough aversion to the principle of retaliation by which the ignobler instincts of the Jewish national spirit were sustained and intensified. This aversion on the part of Jesus is so strong that the most emphatic utterance of the opposite quality is for Him precisely the right thing; a consummate zeal for forbearance and renunciation whets His demands to their sharpest point. But what is the source of this enthusiasm? It is no mere reformer of Jewish morals that speaks here, no legislator for centuries yet unborn, but the herald and apostle of the imminent dissolution of the world and of the Kingdom of God already at the door! Hence a man can prepare himself for that day in no more worthy or more earnest way than by the surrender of all the present life is based upon—earthly repute, business capacity, personal property; all these are but obstacles and fetters. Whoso renounces willingly, whoso suffers gladly—he is truly free, and ready for the great day that is at hand. We can appreciate and vindicate the words only if we interpret them by the mood appropriate to the twelfth hour.
‘If so, they take our life,
Goods, honour, children, wife—
Let these things vanish all!
Their profit is but small:
The Kingdom still remaineth.’
The same enthusiasm pulsates through the words about love to enemies. It is unnecessary to paint the background of Judaism too black, to cavil at the Jewish ‘love to one’s neighbour’ as narrow and partial, or even to lay too great a stress upon the ‘hatred of one’s enemies,’ in order to feel that the demand of Jesus is not only something ‘new,’ but also a puissant, transcendent, superhuman ideal. He says, indeed, that the man who so acts will be perfect even as God is perfect, a worthy child of the all-loving Father. Now it cannot be sufficiently urged that this obligation to love one’s enemies neither issues from nor can be fulfilled amidst the normal emotions of everyday life. If it is to be real to us, i.e. truly realized and not merely assumed, then it demands an enthusiasm which, if not ‘contrary to the nature,’ is certainly ‘beyond the power’ of the natural man. None but the possessor of a spirit profoundly religious and animated by the love of God, could possibly love his enemies, at all events according to the special sense which Jesus gave to the universal command, viz. ‘Love them which hate you, pray for them which despitefully use you.’
Our view of this supreme command of Jesus thus brings us to the twofold law of love (Mar 12:29 ff., Luk 10:25 ff.). It is beyond question that neither this conjoining of love to God and love to one’s neighbour, nor the focusing of the whole Divine law in that ‘summa’ is a specifically original thought of Jesus. According to the oldest form of the narrative (Luk 10:25 f.),* [Note: J. Weiss, op. cit. i. 1, p. 172 ff.] He elicits it from a scribe. Possibly enough there were earnest and pious Rabbis who, amid the jungle of thousands upon thousands of precepts, sought for some leading idea, and found in the requirement of love to God and man the nucleus of God’s primal revelation: but none of them was ever able to carry such unification and simplification into full effect. Here again it is not the mere thought which matters, nor the fact that Jesus gave it utterance. The great thing is that, over and above, He furnished in His own life such an embodiment of the Law as carries conviction to all. In His personification of the ideal He welded the love of God and the love of man in an indissoluble union, in which they might foster and strengthen each other. He expressed the ideal in a perfect form, and stamped it upon the soul of the race. Since His day it has become obvious that the highest form of religion is that from which there radiates the soothing, genial, meek, and helpful love of mankind; obvious also, that that love of man is the deepest, the truest, the most enduring, the most exacting, which has its roots in the depths of a soul pledged to the Most High, a soul which is permeated by His truth, and has been apprehended by His holy and gracious will.
Literature.—J. Weiss, Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes; Bousset, Jesu Predigt in ihrem Gegensatz zum Judentum; Jacoby, NT Ethik, bk. i.; R. Mackintosh, Christ and the Jewish Law.
Johannes Weiss.
(
By: Kaufmann Kohler, Emil G. Hirsch, Executive Committee of the Editorial Board., Isaac Broydé
The science of morals, or of human duty; the systematic presentation of the fundamental principles of human conduct and of the obligations and duties deducible therefrom. It includes, therefore, also the exposition of the virtues and their opposites which characterize human conduct in proportion to the extent to which man is under the consecration of the sense of obligation to realize the fundamental concepts of right conduct. Ethics may be divided into general, or theoretical, and particular, or applied. Theoretical ethics deals with the principles, aims, and ideas regulating, and the virtues characterizing, conduct—the nature, origin, and development of conscience, as attending and judging human action. Applied ethics presents a scheme of action applicable to the various relations of human life and labor, and sets forth what the rights and duties are which are involved in these relations. Ethics may also be treated descriptively; this method includes a historical examination, based upon data collected by observation, of the actual conduct, individual or collective, of man, and is thus distinct from ethics as dynamic and normative, as demanding compliance with a certain standard resulting from certain fundamental principles and ultimate aims. Philosophical ethics embraces the systematic development of ethical theory and practise out of a preceding construction (materialistic or idealistic) of life and its meaning (optimistic or pessimistic). Religious ethics finds the principles and aims of life in the teachings of religion, and proceeds to develop therefrom the demands and duties which the devotee of religion must fulfil.
Jewish ethics is based on the fundamental concepts and teachings of Judaism. These are contained, though not in systematized formulas, in Jewish literature. As it is the concern of Jewish theology to collect the data scattered throughout this vast literature, and construe therefrom the underlying system of belief and thought, so it is that of Jewish ethics to extract from the life of the Jews and the literature of Judaism the principles recognized as obligatory and actually regulating the conduct of the adherents of Judaism, as well as the ultimate aims apprehended by the consciousness of the Jew as the ideal and destiny set before man and humanity (see Lazarus, "Die Ethik des Judenthums," pp. 9 et seq.). This entails resort to both methods, the descriptive and the dynamic. Jewish ethics shows how the Jew has acted, as well as how he ought to act, under the consecration of the principles and precepts of his religion. Jewish ethics may be divided into (1) Biblical, (2) Apocryphal, (3) rabbinical, (4) philosophical, (5) modern; under the last will be discussed the concordant, or discordant, relation of Jewish ethics to ethical doctrine as derived from the theories advanced by the various modern philosophical schools.
—Biblical Data:
The books forming the canon are the sources whence information concerning the ethics of Bible times may be drawn. These writings, covering a period of many centuries, reflect a rich variety of conditions and beliefs, ranging from the culture and cult of rude nomadic shepherd tribes to the refinement of life and law of a sedentary urban population, from primitive clan henotheism to the ethical monotheism of the Prophets. The writings further represent two distinct types, the sacerdotal theocracy of the Priestly Code and the universalism of the Wisdom series—perhaps also the apocalyptic Messianism of eschatological visions. It would thus seem an unwarranted assumption to treat the ethics of the Bible as a unit, as flowing from one dominant principle and flowering in the recognition of certain definite lines of conduct and obligation. Instead of one system of ethics, many would have to be recognized and expounded in the light of the documents; for instance, one under the obsession of distinctively tribal conceptions, according to which insult and injury entail the obligation to take revenge (Gen. iv. 23, 24; Judges xix.-xx.), and which does not acknowledge the right of hospitality (Gen. xix.; Judges xix.); another under the domination of national ambitions (Num. xxxi. 2 et seq.), with a decidedly non-humane tinge (Deut. xx. 13, 14, 16, 17). But it must be remembered that the ultimate outcome of this evolution was ethical monotheism, and that under the ideas involved in it Biblical literature was finally canonized, many books being worked over in accordance with the later religious conviction, so that only a few fragmentary indications, remain of former ethical concepts, which were at variance with those sprung from a nobler and purer apprehension of Israel's relation to its God and His nature.
The critical school, in thus conceding that the canon was collected when ethical monotheism had obliterated all previous religious conceptions, is virtually at one, so far as the evidential character of the books concerning the final ethical positions of the Bible comes into play, with the traditional school, according to which the monotheism of the Bible is due to divine revelation, from which the various phases of popular polytheism are wilful backslidings. It is therefore permissible in the presentation of Biblical ethics to neglect the indications of anterior divergences, while treating it as a unit, regardless of the questions when and whether its ideal was fully realized in actuality. The treatment is more difficult on account of the character of the Biblical writings. They are not systematic treatises. The material which they contain must often be recast, and principles must be deduced from the context that are not explicitly stated in the text.
Autonomous in Sanction.
With these cautions and qualifications kept in view, it is safe to hold that the principle underlying the ethical concepts of the Bible and from which the positive duties and virtues are derived is the unity and holiness of God, in whose image man was created, and as whose priest-people among the nations Israel was appointed. A life exponential of the divine in the human is the "summum bonum," the purpose of purposes, according to the ethical doctrine of the Biblical books. This life is a possibilityand an obligation involved in the humanity of every man. For every man is created in the image of God (Gen. i. 26). By virtue of this, man is appointed ruler over all that is on earth (Gen. i. 28). But man is free to choose whether he will or will not live so as to fulfil these obligations. From the stories in Genesis it is apparent that the Bible does in no way regard morality as contingent upon an antecedent and authoritative proclamation of the divine will and law. The "moral law" rests on the nature of man as God's likeness, and is expressive thereof. It is therefore autonomous, not heteronomous. From this concept of human life flows and follows necessarily its ethical quality as being under obligation to fulfil the divine intention which is in reality its own intention. Enoch, Noah, Abraham, and other heroes of tradition, representing generations that lived before the Sinaitic revelation of the Law, are conceived of as leading a virtuous life; while, on the other hand, Cain's murder and Sodom's vices illustrate the thought that righteousness and its reverse are not wilful creations and distinctions of a divinely proclaimed will, but are inherent in human nature. But Israel, being the people with whom God had made His covenant because of the Patriarchs who loved Him and were accordingly loved by Him—having no other claim to exceptional distinction than this—is under the obligation to be the people of God (
, Ex. xix. 5 et seq.) that is to illustrate and carry out in all the relations of human life, individual and social, the implications of man's godlikeness. Hence, for Israel the aim and end, the "summum bonum," both in its individuals and as a whole, is "to be holy." Israel is a holy people (Ex. xix. 6; Deut. xiv. 2, 21; xxvi. 19; xxviii. 9), for "God is holy" (Lev. xix. 2, et al.). Thus the moral law corresponds to Israel's own historic intention, expressing what Israel knows to be its own innermost destiny and duty.
Israel and God are two factors of one equation. The divine law results from Israel's own divinity. It is only in the seeming, and not in the real, that this law is of extraneous origin. It is the necessary complement of Israel's own historical identity.
God is the Lawgiver because He is the only ruler of Israel and its Judge and Helper (Isa. xxxiii. 22). Israel true to itself can not be untrue to God's law. Therefore God's law is Israel's own highest life. The statutory character of Old Testament ethics is only the formal element, not its essential distinction. For this God, who requires that Israel "shall fear him and walk in all his ways and shall love and serve him with all its heart and all its soul" (Deut. x. 12, Hebr.), is Himself the highest manifestation of ethical qualities (Ex. xxxiv. 6, 7). To walk in His ways, therefore, entails the obligation to be, like Him, merciful, etc. This holy God is Himself He that "regardeth not persons, nor taketh reward: He doth execute the judgment of the fatherless and widow, and loveth the stranger" (Deut. x. 17-18), qualities which Israel, as exponential of His unity and power and love, must exhibit as the very innermost ambitions of its own historical distinctness (Deut. x. 19 et seq.).
Family Ethics.
Hence great stress is laid on reverence for parents (Ex. xx. 12; Lev. xix. 3). Central to the social organism is the family. Its head is the father; yet the mother as his equal is with him entitled to honor and respect at the hands of sons and daughters. Monogamy is the ideal (Gen. ii. 24). Marriage within certain degrees of consanguinity or in relations arising from previous conjugal unions is forbidden (Lev. xviii. 6 et seq.); chastity is regarded as of highest moment (Ex. xx. 14; Lev. xviii. 18-20); and abominations to which the Canaanites were addicted are especially loathed. The unruly and disrespectful son (Ex. xxi. 17) is regarded as the incarnation of wickedness. As virtue and righteousness flow from the recognition of the holy God, idolatry is the progenitor of vice and oppression (Ex. xxiii. 24 et seq.). For this judgment history has furnished ample proof. Hence the ethics of the Pentateuch shows no tolerance to either idols or their worshipers. Both being sources of contamination and corruption, they had to be torn out by the roots (Lev. xix. 4; Ex. xx. 3 et seq.; Deut. iv. 15-25 et seq.). Marriages with the aboriginal tribes were therefore prohibited (Deut. vii. 3), for Israel was to be a "holy" people. To the family belonged also the slaves (Deut. xvi. 14). While slavery in a certain sense was recognized, the moral spirit of the Pentateuchal legislation had modified this universal institution of antiquity (see Cruelty; Slavery). The Hebrew slave's term of service was limited; the female slave enjoyed certain immunities. Injuries led to manumission (Ex. xxi. 2-7, 20, 26). Man-stealing (slave-hunting) entailed death (Ex. xxi. 16). The stranger, too, was within the covenant of ethical considerations (Ex. xxii. 20 [A.V, 21]; Lev. xix. 33). "Thou shalt love him as thyself," a law the phraseology of which proves that in the preceding "thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (Lev. xix. 18) "neighbor" does not connote an Israelite exclusively. There was to be one law for the native and the stranger (Lev. xix. 34; comp. Ex. xii. 49). As was the stranger (Ex. xxiii. 9), so were the poor, the widow, the orphan, commended to the special solicitude of the righteous (see Interest; Poor Laws; Usury; Lev. xix. 9 et seq.; Ex. xxii. 24 et seq., xxiii. 6).
Altruistic Virtues.
In dealings with men honesty and truthfulness are absolutely prerequisite. Stealing, flattery, falsehood, perjury and false swearing, oppression, even if only in holding back overnight the hired man's earnings, are under the ban; the coarser cruelties and dishonesties are forbidden, but so are the refined ones; and deafness and blindness entitled to gentle consideration him who was afflicted by either of these infirmities (Lev. xix. 11-14). The reputation of a fellow man was regarded as sacred (Ex. xxiii. 1). Tale-bearing and unkind insinuations were proscribed, as was hatred of one's brother in one's heart (Lev. xix. 17). A revengeful, relentless disposition is unethical; reverence for old age is inculcated; justice shall be done; right weight and just measure are demanded; poverty and riches shall not be regarded by the judge (Lev. xix. 15, 18, 32, 36; Ex. xxiii. 3). The dumb animal has claims upon the kindly help of man (Ex. xxiii. 4), even though it belongs to one'senemy. This epitome of the positive commandments and prohibitions, easily enlarged, will suffice to show the scope of the ethical relations considered by the Law. As a holy nation, Israel's public and private life was under consecration; justice, truthfulness, solicitude for the weak, obedience and reverence to those in authority, regard for the rights of others, strong and weak, a forgiving and candid spirit, love for fellow man and mercy for the beast, and chastity appear as the virtues flowering forth from Pentateuchal righteousness.
Motive of Morality.
It has often been urged that the motive of ethical action in the Pentateuch is the desire for material prosperity and the anxiety to escape disaster. This view confounds description of fact with suggestion of motive. The Pentateuchal lawgiver addresses himself always to the nation, not to the individual. In his system Israel is under divine discipline, intended to make it in ever greater measure worthy and fit to be a holy nation exponential of the holy God. The physical and political disasters which, from the point of view of modern critics, were actual experiences in the time of the Deuteronomist, were consequences of Israel's disloyalty. Only repentance of its evil ways and adoption of ways concordant with its inner historic duty would put an end to the divinely appointed and necessary punitive discipline. The motive of Israel's ethical self-realization as the "holy people," nevertheless, is not desire for prosperity or fear of disaster. It is to be true to its appointment as the priest-people. From this historical relation of Israel to God flows, without ulterior rewards or penalties, the limpid stream of Pentateuchal morality.
Prophetic Ethics.
For the Prophets, too, the distinct character of Israel is basic, as is the obligation of all men to lead a righteous life. The ritual elements and sacerdotal institutions incidental to Israel's appointment are regarded as secondary by the preexilic prophets, while the intensely human side is emphasized (Isa. i. 11 et seq., lviii. 2 et seq.). Israel is chosen, not on account of any merit of its own, but as having been "alone singled out" by God; its conduct is under more rigid scrutiny than any other people's (Amos iii. 1-2). Israel is the "wife" (Hosea), the "bride" (Jer. ii. 2-3). This covenant is one of love (Hosea vi. 7); it is sealed by righteousness and loyalty (Hosea ii. 21-22). Idolatry is adulterous abandoning of God. From this infidelity proceed all manner of vice, oppression, untruthfulness. Fidelity, on the other hand, leads to "doing justly and loving mercy" (Micah vi. 8). Dissolution of the bonds of confidence and disregard of the obligation to keep faith each man with his fellow characterize the worst times (Micah vii. 5). Falsehood, deceitfulness, the shedding of blood, are the horrors attending upon periods of iniquity (Isa. lix. 3-6; Jer. ix. 2-5). Truth and peace shall men love (Zech. viii. 16-17). Adultery and lying are castigated; pride is deprecated; ill-gotten wealth is condemned (Jer. xxiii. 14, ix. 22-23, xvii. 11; Hab. ii. 9-11). Gluttony and intemperance, greed and frivolity, are abhorred (Isa. v. 22; Jer. xxi. 13-14; Amos vi. 1, 4-7). The presumptuous and the scoffers are menaced with destruction (Isa. xxix. 20-21; Ezek. xiii. 18-19, 22). But kindness to the needy, benevolence, justice, pity to the suffering, a peace-loving disposition, a truly humble and contrite spirit, are the virtues which the Prophets hold up for emulation. Civic loyalty, even to a foreign ruler, is urged as a duty (Jer. xxix. 7). "Learn to do good" is the key-note of the prophetic appeal (Isa. i. 17); thus the end-time will be one of peace and righteousness; war will be no more (Isa. ii. 2 et seq.; see Messiah).
In Psalms and Wisdom Literature.
In the Psalms and the wisdom books the national emphasis is reduced to a minimum. The good man is not so much a Jew as a man (Ps. i.). The universal character of the Biblical ethics is thus verified. Job indicates the conduct and principles of the true man. All men are made by God (Job xxix. 12-17, xxxi. 15). The picture of a despicable man is that given in Prov. vi. 12-15, and the catalogue of those whom God hates enumerates the proud, the deceitful, the shedder of innocent blood, a heart filled with intrigues, and feet running to do evil; a liar, a false witness, and he who brings men to quarrel (Prov. vi. 16-19). The ideal of woman is pictured in the song of the true housewife (Prov. xxxi. 8 et seq.), while Psalms xv. and xxiv. sketch the type of man Israel's ethics will produce. He walketh uprightly, worketh righteousness, speaketh truth in his heart. He backbiteth not. The motive of such a life is to be permitted "to dwell in God's tabernacle," in modern phraseology to be in accord with the divine within oneself. The priesthood of Israel's One God is open to all that walk in His ways. The ethics of the Bible is not national nor legalistic. Its principle is the holiness of the truly human; this holiness, attainable by and obligatory upon all men, is, however, to be illustrated and realized by and in Israel as the holy people of the one holy God.
The temper of the ethics of the Bible is not ascetic. The shadow of sin is not over earth and man. Joy, the joy of doing what "God asks," and what the law of man's very being demands, willingly and out of the full liberty of his own adaptation to this inner law of his, is the clear note of the Old Testament's ethical valuation of life. The world is good and life is precious, for both have their center and origin in God. He leads men according to His purposes, which come to pass with and without the cooperation of men. It is man's privilege to range himself on the side of the divine. If found there, strength is his; he can not fall nor stumble; for righteousness is central in all. But if he fails to be true to the law of his life, if he endeavors to ignore it or to supersede it by the law of selfishness, which is the law of sin, he will fail. "The way of the wicked He turneth upside down" (Ps. i.). Ethics reaches thus beyond the human and earthly, and is related to the eternal. Ethics and religion are in the Bible one and inseparable.
—In Apocryphal Literature:
Ethics in systematic form and apart from religious belief is as little found in apocryphal or Judæo-Hellenistic literature as in the Bible, though Greek philosophy has greatlyinfluenced Alexandrian writers such as the authors of IV Maccabees and the Book of Wisdom (see Cardinal Virtues), and, above all, Philo. Nevertheless decided progress is noticeable both in the conception and in the accentuation of theoretical ethics from the time the Jews came into closer contact with the Hellenic world. Before that period the Wisdom literature shows a tendency to dwell solely on the moral obligations and problems of life as appealing to man as an individual, leaving out of consideration the ceremonial and other laws which concern only the Jewish nation. From this point of view Ben Sira's collection of sayings and monitions was written, translated into Greek, and circulated as a practical guide (
Of a higher character are the ethical teachings which emanated from Ḥasidean circles in the Maccabean time, such as are contained in Tobit, especially in ch. iv.; here the first ethical will or testament ("ẓawwa'ah") is found, giving a summary of moral teachings, with the Golden Rule, "Do that to no man which thou hatest!" as the leading maxim. There are even more elaborate ethical teachings in the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, in which each of the twelve sons of Jacob, in his last words to his children and children's children, reviews his life and gives them moral lessons, either warning them against a certain vice he had been guilty of, so that they may avoid divine punishment, or recommending them to cultivate a certain virtue he had practised during life, so that they may win God's favor. The chief virtues recommended are: love for one's fellow man; industry, especially in agricultural pursuits; simplicity; sobriety; benevolence toward the poor; compassion even for the brute (Issachar, 5; Reuben, 1; Zebulun, 5-8; Dan, 5; Gad, 6; Benjamin, 3), and avoidance of all passion, pride, and hatred. Similar ethical farewell monitions are attributed to Enoch in the Ethiopic Enoch (xciv. et seq.) and the Slavonic Enoch (lviii. et seq.), and to the three patriarchs (see Barnes, "The Testaments of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob," in "Texts and Studies," ii. 144, Cambridge, 1892).
The Hellenistic propaganda literature, of which the didactic poem under the pseudonym of Phocylides is the most characteristic, made the propagation of Jewish ethics taken from the Bible its main object for the sake of winning the pagan world to pure monotheism. It was owing to this endeavor that certain ethical principles were laid down as guiding maxims for the Gentiles; first of all the three capital sins, idolatry, murder, and incest, were prohibited (see Sibyllines, iii. 38, 761; iv. 30 et seq.; comp. Targ. Yer. Gen. xiii 13, et al.); then these so-called Noachian Laws were gradually developed into six, seven, and ten, or thirty laws of ethics binding upon every human being (Sanh. 56a, b; see also Commandments). Regarding the ethical literature for converts see Didache.
—Rabbinical:
The whole rabbinical system of ethics is based upon humanitarian laws of righteousness. "Rather than commit any one of the three capital sins—idolatry, adultery, murder—man (even the Gentile) should give up his life" (Sanh. 74a, b); by disregard of this prohibition the heathen forfeits his claim upon human compassion and love ('Ab. Zarah 2b; Sanh. 108a), while the solemn acceptance of it secures him the claim to love and support (Sifra, Behar, vi. 5; Pes. 21b). It was with reference to the Gentile world that the Golden Rule was pronounced by Hillel as the cardinal principle of the Jewish law (Shab. 31a; Ab. R. N., text B, xxvi.; ed. Schechter, p. 53). Akiba is more explicit: "Whatever thou hatest to have done unto thee do not unto thy neighbor; wherefore do not hurt him; do not speak ill of him; do not reveal his secrets to others; let his honor and his property be as dear to thee as thine own" (Ab. R. N., text B, xxvi., xxix., xxx., xxxiii.).
The scope of Jewish ethics embraces not only the Jew, but man, the fellow creature (see Creature). This is strongly emphasized by Ben Azzai when he says: "The Torah, by beginning with the book of the generations of man [Gen. v. 1], laid down the great rule for the application of the Law: Love thy neighbor as thyself" (Lev. xix. 18; Gen. R. xxiv., end). "Love the creature!" is therefore Hillel's maxim (Abot i. 12), and "hatred of the creature" is denounced by R. Joshua (ib. ii. 11).
Ideal and Motive.
The source and ideal of all morality is God, in whose ways man is to walk (Deut. xi. 22). As He is merciful and gracious so man should be (Sifra, Deut. 49; Mek., Beshallaḥ, to Ex. xv. 2; Soṭah 14a, with reference to Deut. xiii. 5). This is in accordance with Abraham's being singled out "to command his children and his house after him, to observe the way of the Lord, to do righteousness and justice" (Gen. xviii. 19, Hebr.). The motive of moral action should be pure love of God (Sifra, Deut. 48, after xi. 22), or fear of God, and not desire for recompense. "Be not like the servants that serve their master for the sake of getting a share, but let the fear of God be upon you" (Abot i. 3).
The cardinal principle of rabbinical ethics is that the very essence of God and His law is moral perfection; hence the saying of R. Simlai (see Commandments): "Six hundred and thirteen commandments were given to Moses; then David came and reduced them to eleven in Psalm xv.; Isaiah (xxxiii. 15), to six; Micah (vi. 8), to three; Isaiah again (lvi. 1), to two; and Habakkuk (ii. 4), to one: 'The just lives by his faithfulness'" (A.V."faith"; Mak. 23b). "The heathen nations, lacking the belief in a divine ideal of morality, refused to accept the law of Sinai enjoining the sacredness of life, of marriage, and of property" (Mek., Yitro, 5).
Religion and ethics are, therefore, intimately interwoven, for it is the motive which decides the moral value, the good or evil character of the action."The words 'I am the Lord thy God,' following a Biblical command, express the idea that God judges men by the motive which springs from the heart and which escapes the notice of man" (Sifra, Ḳedoshim, iii. 2; B. M. 58b; comp. "God desires the heart": Sanh. 106b; Men. xiii. 11). "An evil deed done from a good motive is better than a good deed inspired by an evil [selfish] motive" (Naz. 23b; Yer. Peah i. 15c); hence "the resolve to sin is of greater consequence than the sin itself" (Yoma 29a). Every good act must therefore be done for the sake of God—"le-shem shamayim"—or of His law—"lishmah" (Abot ii. 12; Ber. 16a). Man has a free will (Abot iii. 15): "Do His will as if it were thy will, that He may do thy will as if it were His; annul thy will before His will, that He may annul other men's will before thine" (Abot ii. 4). "The righteous have their desires in their power; the wicked are in the power of their desires" (Ber. 61b).
Rabbinical ethics, the ethics of the Pharisees, while adopting the rigorous views of the Ḥasidim in principle, modified them by paying due regard to the whole of life and opposing the ascetic tendencies of the Essenes, and greatly deepened and enlarged the sense and the scope of morality and duty by infusing new ethical ideas and motives into both the laws and the stories of the Bible, lifting the letter of the Law to a high standard of spirituality. The fine ethical types created by the Ḥasidim out of the lives of the Patriarchs and of the ancient leaders of Israel became traditional prototypes and models, and each Mosaic law, having been greatly amplified in Ḥasidean practise, received a deeper meaning in the sphere of duty and responsibility. On the other hand, the Essene contempt for woman and home and the comforts of life was strongly opposed by the Pharisees, and consequently rabbinical ethics developed a healthy, practical, and vigorous spirit of morality which has nothing of the sentimentalism and otherworldliness of other systems, and is not absorbed by mere socialistic or altruistic concepts of life. Its character is best described by Hillel's maxim: "If I am not for myself, who is for me? and, being only for myself, what am I? and if not now, when?" (Abot i. 15).
Duty of Self-Assertion.
Man as child of God has first of all duties in regard to his own self. "He who subjects himself to needless self-castigations and fasting, or even denies himself the enjoyment of wine, is a sinner" (Ta'an. 11a, 22b). Man has to give account for every lawful enjoyment he refuses (Yer. Ḳid. iv. 66d). Man is in duty bound to preserve his life (Ber. 32b, after Deut. iv. 9; Sifra, Aḥare Mot, xiii.) and his health (B. Ḳ. 91b; Shab. 82a). Foods dangerous to health are more to be guarded against than those ritually forbidden (Ḥul. 10a). He should show self-respect in regard to both his body, "honoring it as the [sanctuary of the] image of God" (Hillel: Lev. R. xxxiv.), and his garments (Shab. 113b; Ned. 81a). He must perfect himself by the study of the Law, which must be of primary importance (Sifre, Deut. 34). "The third question God asks man at the Last Judgment is whether he studied the Law" (Shab. 31a). But study must be combined with work (Abot ii. 2; Ber. 35b). "Greater is the merit of labor than of idle piety" (Midr. Teh. cxxviii. 2). "Love labor" (Abot i. 10); "it honors man" (Ned. 49b; see Labor). One must remove every cause for suspicion in order to appear blameless before men as well as before God (Yoma 38a). Man is enjoined to take a wife and obtain posterity (Yeb. 63b; Mek., Yitro, 8). "He who lives without a wife lives without joy and blessing, without protection and peace"; he is "not a complete man" (Yeb. 62a, 63a), and for it he has to give reckoning at the great Judgment Day (Shab. 31a). For this accentuation of the dignity and sanctity of domestic life see Woman.
Justice and Righteousness.
Social ethics is best defined by R. Simeon b. Gamaliel's words: "The world rests on three things: justice, truth, and peace" (Abot i. 18). Justice ("din," corresponding to the Biblical "mishpaṭ") being "God's" (Deut. i. 17), it must, according to the Rabbis as well as Mosaism (Ex. xxiii. 3), be vindicated at all costs, whether the object be of great or small value (Sanh. 8a). "Let justice pierce the mountain" is the characteristic maxim attributed to Moses (Sanh. 6b). They that blame and ridicule Talmudism for its hair-splitting minutiæ overlook the important ethical principles underlying its entire judicial code. It denounces as fraud every mode of taking advantage of a man's ignorance, whether he be Jew or Gentile; every fraudulent dealing, every gain obtained by betting or gambling or by raising the price of breadstuffs through speculation, is theft (Tosef., B. Ḳ. vii. 8-13; Tosef., B. M. iii. 25-27; B. B. 90b; Sanh. 25b; Ḥul. 94a); every advantage derived from loans of money or of victuals is usury (B. M. v.; Tosef., B. M. iv.); every breach of promise in commerce is a sin provoking God's punishment (B. M. iv. 2); every act of carelessness which exposes men or things to danger and damage is a culpable transgression (B. Ḳ. i.-vi.). It extends far beyond the Biblical statutes responsibility for every object given into custody of a person or found by him (B. M. ii. and iii.). It is not merely New Testament (Matt. v. 22), but Pharisaic, ethics which places insulting, nicknaming, or putting one's fellow man to shame, in the same category as murder (B. M. 58b), and which brands as calumny the spreading of evil reports even when true, or the listening to slanderous gossip, or the causing of suspicion, or the provoking of unfavorable remarks about a neighbor (Pes. 118a; B. M. 58b; 'Ar. 16a).
Truth and Peace.
"The first question man is asked at the Last Judgment is whether he has dealt justly with his neighbor" (Shab. 31a). Nor is the mammon of unrighteousness to be placated for charitable or religious purposes (B. Ḳ. 94b; comp. Didascalia in Jew. Encyc. iv. 592; Suk. iii. 1), the Jewish principle being, "A good deed ["miẓwah"] brought about by an evil deed ["'aberah"] is an evil deed" (Suk. 30a). The Jewish idea of righteousness ("ẓedaḳah") includes benevolence (see Charity), inasmuch as the owner of property has no right to withhold from the poor their share. If he does, he acts like Sodom (Abot v. 10; comp. Ezek. xvi. 49); like an idolater (Tosef., Peah, iv. 20); or like a thief (Num. R. v., after Prov. xxii. 20). On the other hand, the Rabbisdecreed, against Essene practise, that no one had a right to give more than the fifth of his possessions to charity (Ket. 50a; 'Ar. 28a; Yer. Peah i. 15b). The twin sister of righteousness is truth, and here too the Ḥasidim were the first to insist that swearing should not be resorted to, but that a man's yea should be yea, and his nay, nay (Ruth R. iii. 18; see Essenes). "God shall punish him who does not abide by his word" (B. M. iv. 2). "He who prevaricates is as one who worships an idol instead of the God of truth" (Sanh. 92a). One should be careful not to deviate from the truth even in conventionalities or in fun, was the teaching of Shammai (Ket. 17a; Suk. 46b). "Teach thy tongue to say, 'I do not know,' lest thou be entangled in some untruth" (Ber. 4a). "God hates him who speaks with his tongue what he does not mean in his heart." "It was the father of the Canaanites who taught them to speak untruth" (Pes. 113b). "Truth is the signet of God" (Yer. Sanh. i. 18a; see Truth).
While peace is everywhere recommended and urged as the highest boon of man (Num. R. xi.; Pes. i. 1; 'Uḳ. iii. 12), hatred, quarrelsomeness, and anger are condemned as leading to murder (Derek Ereẓ Rabbah, xi.; Yoma 9b; Yer. Peah i. 16a). The highest principle of ethics, rabbinical as well as Biblical, is holiness, that is, separation from, and elevation above, everything sensual and profane (i.e., everything in animal life that is contaminating or degrading). The words which stand at the head of the principal chapter on ethics in the Mosaic law, "Ye shall be holy: for I the Lord your God am holy" (Lev. xix.2), are explained (Sifra, Ḳedoshim, i.) as: "Be separated ["perushim"] from a world that is addicted to the appetites and passions of the flesh, in order to sanctify Me by emulating My ways." "Keep away from everything leading to impurity" (Lev. R. xxiv.). "God's holiness is manifested in His punitive righteousness, which consumes wrong and sin" (Tan., Ḳedoshim, ed. Buber, 1, 4). From this principle emanated the necessity of a people consecrated to the service of a holy God (Tan. l.c.; Ex. xxii. 3; Lev. xx. 26; Deut. xiv. 2; comp. Mekilta, Sifra, Sifre, and Rabbot on the passages), and the whole Mosaic legislation, with its hygienic and marriage laws, gave a high ethical meaning and purpose to the entire life of the Jew. Similarly the Sabbath holiness (Ex. xx. 8; Mek.; see Pesiḳ. R. 23) lifted domestic and social life to a higher ethical level. The very minute precepts of rabbinical law spiritualized every part of life. So when washing of the hands before and after each meal was made obligatory, it was "to sanctify" the body and the table of the Jew (see Ablution). The Sabbath joy was also to be "hallowed" by wine (see Ḳiddush).
From the thought of a holy God emanated these four virtues: (a) The virtue of Chastity ("ẓeni'ut" = "bashfulness"; Deut. xxiii. 14; Ned. 20a, after Ex. xx. 20), which shuts the eye against unseemly sights and the heart against impure thoughts (Sifre, Shelaḥ Leka, to Num. xv. 14). Hence R. Meïr's maxim (Ber. 17a): "Keep thy mouth from sin, thy body from wrong, and I [God] will be with thee." (b) The virtue of humility. As God's greatness consists in His condescension (Meg. 31a), so does the Shekinah rest only upon the humble (Mek., Yitro, 9; Ned. 38), whereas the proud is like one who worships another god and drives God away (Soṭah 4b). (c) Truthfulness. "Liars, mockers, hypocrites, and slanderers can not appear before God's face" (Soṭah 42a). (d) Reverence for God. "Fear of God leads to fear of sin" (Ber. 28b), and includes reverence for parents and teachers (Ḳid. 31d; Pes. 22b).
Ḳiddush and Ḥillul ha-Shem.
Thus the idea of God's holiness became in rabbinical ethics one of the most powerful incentives to pure and noble conduct. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God" (Deut. vi. 5) is explained (Sifre, Deut. 32; Yoma 86a) to mean "Act in such a manner that God will be beloved by all His creatures." Consequently Israel, being, as the priest-people, enjoined like the Aaronite priest to sanctify the name of God and avoid whatever tends to desecrate it (Lev. xxii. 32), is not only obliged to give his life as witness or martyr for the maintenance of the true faith (see Isa. xliii. 12,
Ethical Relations.
The fundamental idea of Jewish ethics is accordingly that of true humanity, without distinction of race or creed (comp. Sifra, Aḥare Mot, to Lev. xviii. 5). "The righteous" (not "priests, Levites, and Israelites") shall enter "the gate of the Lord" (Ps. cxviii. 20). "It is forbidden to take advantage of the ignorance of any fellow creature, even of the heathen" (Ḥul. 94a; comp. Shebu. 39a; comp. Mak. 24a: "He only dwells in God's tent who takes usury neither from Gentile nor from Jew"). "No one can be called righteous before God who is not good toward his fellow creatures" (Ḳid. 40a). Respect for one's fellow creatures is of such importance that Biblical prohibitions may be transgressed on its account (Ber. 19b). Especially do unclaimed dead require respectful burial (see Burial in Jew. Encyc. iii. 432b: "met miẓwah"). Gentiles are to have a share in all the benevolent work of a township which appeals to human sympathy and on which the maintenance of peace among men depends, such as supporting the poor, burying the dead, comforting the mourners, and even visiting the sick (Tosef., Giṭ. v. 4-5; Giṭ. 64a).
The relation between man and woman is in rabbinical ethics based upon the principle of chastity and purity which borders on holiness. It is theinheritance of the Ẓenu'im, or Ḥasidim, who strove after the highest standard of holiness (see Yer. Yeb. i. 3d; Lev. R. xxiv.; Essenes). No other vice appears to the Rabbis as detestable as obscene speech ("nibbul peh"; Shab. 33a); and of him who is not bashful they say that "his fathers were not among those who received the Law from God on Sinai" (see Woman). This idea of the holiness of the marriage relation is seen in the very name for marriage—"kiddushim" = "consecration" (see Frankel, "Grundlinien des Eherechts," p. xxix.; Niddah 71a; Marriage). The relations of children and parents are based upon the principle that God placed the fear and honor due to parents in the same category as those due to Himself, parents being for the child the representatives of God (Ḳid. 30b et seq.). The relations of the pupil to the (religious) teacher rank still higher, inasmuch as preparation of his pupil for the life eternal is involved (B. M. ii. 11). "The fear of thy teacher should be like the fear of God" (Abot iv. 12). Reverence is due likewise to all superiors in wisdom, and it should extend to the heart as well as the outward form (Sifra, Ḳedoshim, vii.; see Parents; Reverence; and Teachers).
Tender compassion is enjoined on the master in the treatment of his servant; he should not deprive him of any enjoyment, lest he may not feel that he is of like nature with his master (Sifra, Behar, vii.; Ḳid. 22a, based upon Lev. xxv. 40 and Deut. xv. 16; See Master and Servant; comp. R. Johanan's regard for his servant; Yer. B. Ḳ. viii. 6a, with reference to Job xxxi. 15). Brotherly love extends even to the culprit, who should be treated humanely (Sifre, Deut. 286; Sanh. 52a).
Friendship is highly prized in the Talmud; the very word for "associate" is "friend" ("ḥaber"). "Buy thyself a companion" (Abot i. 6). "Companionship or death" (Ta'an. 23a).
The Biblical commands regarding the treatment of the brute (Ex. xx. 10; Lev. xxii. 28; Deut. xxv. 4; Prov. xii. 10) are amplified in rabbinical ethics, and a special term is coined for Cruelty to Animals ("Ẓa'ar ba'ale ḥayyim"). Not to sit down to the table before the domestic animals have been fed is a lesson derived from Deut. xi. 15 (Giṭ. 62a). Compassion for the brute is declared to have been the merit of Moses which made him the shepherd of his people (Ex. R. ii.), while Judah ha-Nasi saw in his own ailment the punishment for having once failed to show compassion for a frightened calf. Trees and other things of value also come within the scope of rabbinical ethics, as their destruction is prohibited, according to Deut. xx. 19 (Shab. 105b, 129a, 140b, et al.). A leading maxim of the Rabbis is not to insist on one's right, but to act kindly and fairly "beyond the line of mere justice" ("lifnim mi-shurat ha-din"), in order that "thou mayest walk in the way of good men and keep the paths of the righteous" (Prov. ii. 20; B. M. 83a; Mek., Yitro, to Ex. xviii. 20). R. Simlai summarized the Law in the words: "Its beginning is the teaching of kindness, and so is its ending" (Soṭah 14a).
Ethical Literature of the Rabbis.
In this spirit the ethical sayings of the ancient rabbis have been collected into special works, the oldest of which is the mishnaic treatise Pirke Abot, and into the Gemara-like commentary Abot de-Rabbi Natan, into Derek Ereẓ Rabbah and Derek Ereẓ Zuṭa, and into Masseket Kallah. The original part of Tanna debe Eliyahu, which appears to have contained the text and the Gemara commentary of a Mishnat Ḥasidim, belongs to the same class of ethical works of the tannaitic period as does Pirḳe di Rabbenu ha-Ḳadosh, which begins with a farewell address of Judah ha-Nasi to his children. All these are probably survivals of an ancient Ḥasidean literature, and therefore lay especial stress on the virtues of Essenism, chastity, humility, and saintliness.
It is therefore not merely accidental that the ethical works ("sifre musar") in medieval Jewish literature present the same features of extreme piety, or Ḥasidism, since they were written by German mystics who claimed to be adepts in the Essenic traditions or Cabala coming from older Oriental authorities. The oldest one among these works, belonging to the middle of the eleventh century, bears the title "Ethical Will of R. Eliezer the Great," because it starts with a farewell address of R. Eliezer b. Hyrcanus; but it is really a work of Eliezer B. Isaac of Worms entitled "Orḥot Hayyim." The most elaborate and popular ethical work of this kind is the "Sefer Ḥasidim" of Judah b. Samuel, the Ḥasid of Regensburg. His pupil, Eleazar b. Judah of Worms, wrote a halakic-ethical work under the title of "Roḳeaḥ." Asher ben Jehiel wrote an ethical will addressed to his children; so did his son Judah b. Asher (see Wills, Ethical). An anonymous ethical work, under the title of "Orḥot Ẓaddiḳim," which Güdemann believes to have been composed by Lippman Mülhausen, appeared in the fifteenth century in Germany. Abraham ha-Levi Horwitz's "Yesh Noḥalin," at the close of the sixteenth century, and the popular ethical work "Ḳab ha-Yashar," by Hirsh Kaidenower, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, belong to the same class of German ethical works with a tinge of Ḥasidean mysticism. More systematic, though not philosophical, are the ethical works "Menorat ha-Ma'or," by Israel Alnaqua, a large part of which has been embodied in Elijah b. Moses di Vidas' "Reshit Ḥokmah," and the popular "Menorat ha-Ma'or," by Isaac Aboab. Regarding these and other ethical works see Zunz, "Z. G." pp. 122-157, which contains examples of each; also Bäck, "Die Sittenlehrer vom 13ten bis 18ten Jahrhundert," in Winter and Wünsche, "Die Jüdische Literatur," iii. 627-651, where examples are also given; and Abrahams, "Chapters on Jewish Literature," 1899, pp. 189-199. All these medieval ethical books have one characteristic trait: they teach compassion and love for Jew and Gentile alike, and insist on pure, unselfish motives, and on love toward God and man, instead of on hope for paradise.
Bibliography:
M. Lazarus, The Ethics of Judaism, vols. i. and ii., Philadelphia, 1901-02 (transl. from the German);
E. Grünebaum, Die Sittenlehre des Judenthums, Strasburg, 1878;
L. Lazarus, Zur Characteristic der Talmudischen Ethik, Breslau, 1877;
M. Bloch, Die Ethik der Halacha, Budapest, 1886;
M. Mielziner, Ethics of the Talmud, in Judaism at the World's Parliament of Religions, pp. 107-113;
Morris Joseph, Jewish Ethics, in Religious Systems of the World, pp. 695-707, London, 1892;
K. Kohler, The Ethics of the Talmud, in American Hebrew, Nov., 1893-March, 1894;
Perles, Boussets Religion des Judenthums Kritisch Untersucht, Berlin, 1903;
Fassel, Ẓedeḳ u-Mishpaṭ: die Rabbinische Tugend und Rechtslehre, Vienna, 1848.
—Philosophical:
The term "Philosophical ethics" is here understood to mean the philosophical principles on which Jewish thinkers endeavored to base the ethics of Judaism. The first of these thinkers was Philo. The discussion of moral questions enters very largely into his writings; and although his treatment is unsystematic, his doctrines can be traced easily. Like almost all other Greek philosophers, Philo considers the end of moral conduct to be the desire for happiness. The so-called external and corporeal "goods," such as wealth, honors, and the like, are only "advantages," not in reality good ("Quod Deterius Potiori Insidiari Soleat," ed. Mangey, pp. 192-193). Happiness, then, must consist in the exercise of, and the actual living in accord with, excellence, and, naturally, in accord with the very highest excellence—namely, with that which is the best in man. This best is the soul, which, being an emanation of the Deity, finds its blessedness in the knowledge of God and in the endeavor to imitate Him as far as possible ("De Migratione Abrahami," i. 456). The opposite of this "summum bonum" is the mental self-conceit which corresponds in the moral sphere to self-love ("Fragmenta," ii. 661). It consists in ascribing the achievements in the domain of morality to man's creative intellect (
Responsibility and Free Will.
In order that man may be responsible it is necessary that he should possess the knowledge of right and wrong. In fact nothing is praiseworthy even in the best actions unless they are done with understanding and reason ("De Posteritate Caini," i. 241). Man therefore was endowed with conscience, which is at the same time his accuser, judge, and adviser. Another condition which is essential to man's responsibility is freedom of choice between opposing motives ("De Posteritate Caini," i. 236). Man has a twofold mind: (1) the rational, directed toward the universal, and (2) irrational, which seeks the particular and transient ("De Opificio Mundi," i. 17). The latter, which is the real moral agent, is, in its original condition, morally neutral, and has the choice between good and evil. Therefore praise is reserved for conduct which requires some exertion of the will, and involuntary offenses are blameless and pure.
The source of evil is the body, which plots against the soul ("De Allegoriis Legum," i. 100). Closely connected with the body are the senses and their off-spring, the passions, which, although, as a divine gift, they are not evil in themselves, are in antagonism to reason. The highest principle of morality is therefore that taught by Plato and the Stoics; namely, the utmost possible renunciation of sensuality and the extirpation of desire and the passions (ib.). This does not mean, however, the adoption of asceticism ("De Abrahamo," ii. 4, 14). Before addicting one-self to a contemplative life he must have discharged the duties toward mankind—toward relatives, friends, members of the tribe, country, and race—and even toward animals.
("De eo Quod Deterius Potiori Insidiari Soleat," i. 195)
"If you see any one," says Philo, "refusing to eat or drink at the customary times, or declining to wash and anoint his body, or neglecting his clothes, or sleeping on the ground in the open air, and in these ways simulating self-control, you should pity his delusions, and show him the path by which self-control may really be attained".
Cardinal Virtues.
Like Plato, Philo recognizes four Cardinal Virtues and considers goodness to be the highest of them. This idea is represented by the river which watered paradise. As this river is said to have divided into four great streams, so goodness comprises four virtues; namely, prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice ("De Allegoriis Legum," i. 56). Elsewhere Philo describes the chief virtues as piety and humanity ("Human." ii. 39) or as piety and justice ("Prœmiis et Pœnis," ii. 406). Of these piety takes the leading place. It consists in loving God as the Benefactor, or at least fearing Him as the Ruler and Lord ("De Vict. Offer." ii. 257). "A life according to God is defined by Moses as a life that loves God" ("De Post. Caini," i. 228). The virtue of temperance is of great importance. It is typified by the brazen serpent; for if the mind, having been bitten by pleasure, the serpent of Eve, is able to behold the beauty of temperance, the serpent of Moses, and through it to see God, it shall live ("De Allegoriis Legum," i. 80). Closely connected with temperance is self-control, which is also the enemy of pleasure and desire ("De Opificio Mundi," i. 39). As waging war against pleasure, Philo, in opposition to Greek philosophers, considers labor as a means of human progress ("De Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini," i. 168). Fortitude, according to Philo, does not consist in martial but in moral courage (comp. Abot iv. 1). He values prayer greatly, which is the fairest flower of piety; but it must be sincere and inward; for piety does not consist in making clean the body with baths and purifications ("Cherubim," i. 156). Those who mistake bodily mortifications for temperance, and ritual for holiness, are to be pitied ("De eo Quod Deterius Potiori Insidiari Soleat," i. 195).
Characteristics of Saintliness.
The four characteristics of a pious soul are hope (which is connected with prayer), joy, peace, and forgiveness. "Behave to your servants," says Philo, "as you pray that God may behave to you. For as we hear them so shall we be heard, and as we regard them so shall we be regarded. Let us show pity for pity so that we may receive back like for like" ("Fragmenta," ii. 672). Philo recognizes the efficacy of repentance. "Never to sin," says he, "is the peculiar quality of God, perhaps also of a divine man; to repent is the quality of a wise man" ("De Profugis," i. 569).
No Moral Philosophy in Talmud.
For the doctors of the Talmud, the Saboraim, and the Geonim of the time of Saadia the ruling principlesof life were derived from the current conception of God and of the relation in which the Jewish people stood toward Him. Morality was to these Jewish philosophers the embodied will of God. Their maxim was: "It is not speculation that is essential, but practise"; and for the practise of morality the Jews had to follow the injunctions of the Bible and Talmud. Under the influence of Greek and Arabic philosophy, Jewish thinkers turned their attention to the ethical side of Judaism also, the underlying principles of which they endeavored to systematize and to bring as far as possible into accordance with the ethical teachings of the philosophers. Saadia in several passages of his religio-philosophical work "Ha-Emunot weha-De'ot" deals with ethical questions, as those of free will, providence, and others, and devotes his last chapter to human conduct. That happiness is the result of morality is assumed by him as a fact; the only question for him is, which is the highest virtue leading thereto. Accordingly he points out thirteen different views on the highest virtue, and warns against adopting any one of them. For him the ideal order of life lies in the cooperation of all the legitimate inclinations suggested by the two ruling faculties of the soul, love and aversion, with each inclination in its due place and proportion; the third faculty of the soul, the faculty of discernment (
) being the judge that is to control the other two. Saadia condemns complete asceticism, and disapproves of the total neglect of the world's pursuits even when such neglect is due to the desire for learning.
Ibn Gabirol's Ethics.
However, Saadia's excursion in the field of ethics was of small importance. He touches very slightly upon the qualities which result from the forces of the soul, and thus leaves his readers in the dark as to one-half of the system which he proposes to construct. A system of the principles of ethics, independent of religious dogma or belief, was given by Solomon ibn Gabirol in a special work entitled "Tiḳḳun Meddot ha-Nefesh" (The Improvement of the Moral Qualities), in which he deals with the principles and conditions of virtue, the goal of life, and the particular circumstances, phenomena, and results of moral conduct. Man is, according to Gabirol, the final object of the visible world. He has two divine gifts in common with angels—speech and reason. Like Plato, Gabirol holds that evil is not innate in man; the immortal and rational soul comes pure from the hands of God; only the vegetative soul is the home of sensual desires, which are the source of all evil. The aim of man therefore must be to restrain his sensual desires to the indefensible minimum. This can be done by the acquisition of knowledge of his own being and of the ultimate cause, and by moral conduct. The qualities of the soul, or the virtues and vices, are ascribed by Gabirol to the five senses, which are constituted by the five humors. As the humors may be modified one by another, so can the senses be controlled, and the qualities of the soul be trained unto good or evil. The goal of human endeavor is to bring about the union of man's soul with the higher world. The more he divests himself of bodily sensuality the nearer his soul approaches to an immediate vision of the highest stages of the spiritual world. Ibn Gabirol's system has the defect of being one-sided, in that it treats only of the five physical senses and not of the intellectual senses, such as perception and understanding, which partake of the nature of the soul.
Baḥya's Ethics.
A system of ethics was propounded by Ibn Gabirol's contemporary, Baḥya ben Joseph ibn Paḳuda, in his work "Ḥobot ha-Lebabot." It has many points in common with the system of Gabirol; but it is more definitely religious in character, and deals more with the practical side of Jewish ethics. Like Ibn Gabirol, Baḥya teaches that man is the final object of this visible world, distinguished alike by his form, activity, and intellect. The aim and goal of all ethical self-discipline he declares to be the love of God. Amid all the earthly attractions and enjoyments, the soul yearns toward the fountain of its life, God, in whom alone it finds happiness and joy. Study and self-discipline are the means by which the soul is diverted from the evil passions. The standard of morality is the Law; but one must penetrate into the sentiments embodied in the 613 precepts which show the "via media," equally removed from sensuality and from contempt of the world, both of which are abnormal and injurious. Like Philo, Baḥya values hope highly, and shares the opinion of Ibn Gabirol that humility is the highest quality of the soul; it causes its possessor to be gentle toward his fellow men, to overlook their shortcomings, and to forgive injuries. The characteristic feature of Baḥya's ethical system is his tendency toward asceticism, which, although not directly advocated, may be seen in every line. He recommends fasting, withdrawal from the world, and renunciation of all that is not absolutely necessary.
Abraham bar Hiyya.
Abraham bar Ḥiyya followed Baḥya. In his homily in four chapters on repentance, entitled "Hegyon ha-Nefesh," he divides the laws of Moses, to correspond with the three classes of pious men, into three groups, namely: (1) the Decalogue, the first commandment of which is merely an introduction accentuating the divine origin and the eternal goal of the Law; (2) the group of laws contained in the second, third, and fourth books of Moses, intended for the people during their wandering in the desert or during the Exile, to render them a holy congregation; (3) the Deuteronomic legislation, intended for the people living in an agricultural state and forming a "kingdom of justice." All these laws are only necessary while sensuality prevails; but in the time of the Messianic redemption, when the evil spirit shall have vanished, no other laws than those given in the Decalogue will be necessary. The note of asceticism is still more accentuated in the "Hegyon ha-Nefesh" than in "Ḥobot ha-Lebabot," and Abraham bar Ḥiyya went so far as to praise celibacy, which is in direct opposition to the law of Moses. According to Ḥiyya, the non-Jew may attain as high a degree of godliness as the Jew ("Hegyon ha-Nefesh," 8a).
As the firm adversary of any kind of speculation,Judah ha-Levi is not much concerned with ethical philosophy; and when, under the influence of his time, he treats philosophically some ethical questions, such as free will, rewards, and punishment, he follows the beaten tracks of his predecessors, especially Saadia. The versatile Abraham ibn Ezra in his "Yesod Moreh" laid down the important doctrine that the fundamental moral principles which relate to all times and peoples were "known by the power of the mind before the Law was declared by Moses," or, in other words, ethical laws are universal (comp. Kant's "Categorical Imperative"). He furthermore declared that the motive leading to right acting was internal.
The Ethics of Maimonides.
A new departure in the field of ethics was taken by Maimonides. As in metaphysics, he closely follows Aristotle. Maimonides' ethical views are to be found in his introduction and commentary to Abot, in various passages of the "Sefer ha-Miẓwot," and in his "Yad ha-Ḥazaḳah," especially in the "Hilkot De'ot" and "Hilkot Teshubah." In Maimonides' opinion ethics and religion are indissolubly linked together, and all the precepts of the Law aim either directly or indirectly at morality ("Peraḳim," iv.; "Moreh Nebukim," iii. 33). The final aim of the creation of this world is man; that of man is happiness. This happiness can not consist in the activity which he has in common with other animals, but in the exercise of his intellect which leads to the cognition of truth. The highest cognition is that of God and His unity; consequently the "summum bonum" is the knowledge of God, not through religion, but through philosophy. This is in accordance with the teachings of the philosopher and, according to Maimonides, of the prophet Jeremiah, who praises (ix. 23) neither bodily perfection, nor riches, nor ethical perfection, but intellectual perfection. The first necessity in the pursuit of the "summum bonum" is to subdue sensuality and to render the body subservient to reason.
Moral and Intellectual Virtues.
In order that man should be considered the aim and end of the creation of this world he must be perfect morally and intellectually. Neither the wise lacking virtue nor the virtuous lacking knowledge can be perfect. Virtue and vice have their source in the five faculties of the soul: the nutritive, the sensitive, the imaginative, the appetitive, and the deliberative. The soul is to the intellect what matter is to form: it is susceptible to both good and evil, according to the choice made by the deliberative faculty. Human excellence is either of the appetitive faculty (moral virtues); or of the deliberative faculty (intellectual virtues). The appetitive virtues are numerous, and include courage, temperance, magnanimity, truthfulness, etc. The vices of the appetitive faculty consist in the opposites of the appetitive virtues; for instance, cowardice and rashness are the opposite extremes of courage), and both are vices. However, to make virtue deserving of praise and vice deserving of blame there must be deliberate preference. Man possesses a natural capacity for judging good and evil, and he is perfectly free in his choice (see Free-will). Therefore the rewards or punishments promised for the observance or infraction of the precepts fall also upon him who has not been forewarned by revelation or religion. Intellectual perfection is to be reached by the study of philosophy, beginning with the preparatory study of mechanics and mathematics. Maimonides distinguishes seven degrees in the religious and intellectual development of man; the lowest being that of barbarism, the highest that of the true knowledge of God, attained only when one's intellectual energy is so predominant that all the coarser functions of the body are held in abeyance.
These are the main principles upon which Maimonides based the general ethical system of Judaism. They are essentially those of Aristotle, but clad in a Jewish garb and supported by quotations from the Bible and Talmud. In the field of personal ethics Maimonides established rules deduced from the teachings of the Bible and of the Rabbis. These rules deal with man's obligations to himself and to his fellow men. To the obligations of man to himself belong the keeping of oneself in health through leading a regular life, by seeking medical advice in sickness, by observing cleanliness of the body and of clothing, by earning a livelihood, etc. The requisites for the soundness of the soul are peace (contentment), moderation in joy and in grief. Maimonides considers as a noble characteristic of the soul the disinclination to receive presents. Pity is a generous quality of the soul. To develop this sentiment the Law forbade cruelty to animals. Mutual love and sociability are necessary for men. The sentiment of justice prescribed by the Law consists in respecting the property and honor of others even though they be one's slaves.
Shem-Ṭob Falaquera wrote four works on various ethical questions, namely: "Iggeret Hanhagat ha-Guf weha-Nefesh," on the control of the body and the soul; "Ẓeri ha-Yagon," on resignation and fortitude under misfortune; "Reshit Ḥokmah," treating of moral duties; "Sefer ha-Ma'alot," on the different degrees of human perfection. In all these works Shem-Ṭob followed closely the teachings of Maimonides.
In the Cabala.
Ethics occupies a prominent place in the Cabala. According to the cabalists, moral perfection of man influences the ideal world of the Sefirot; for although the Sefirot expect everything from the En Sof, the En Sof itself is dependent upon man: he alone can bring about the divine effusion. The dew that vivifies the universe flows from the just. By the practise of virtue, by moral perfection, man may increase the outflow of heavenly grace. Even physical life is subservient to virtue. This, says the Zohar, is indicated in the words "for the Lord God had not caused it to rain" (Gen. ii. 5), which mean that there had not yet been beneficent action in heaven because man had not yet given the impulsion.
The Virtues of the Just.
The necessary requirements for deserving the title of "just" are love of God, love of man, truth, prayer, study, and fulfilment of the precepts of the Law. Love of God is the final object of the being of the soul. "In love is found the secret of the divine unity; it is love that unites the higherand lower stages, and that lifts everything to that stage where all must be one" (Zohar ii. 216a). The life beyond is a life of complete contemplation and complete love. Love, which by the action of the Sefirah "Grace" spreads order and harmony in the ideal world, must also bring order and harmony into the earthly world, especially into the society of man. Truth is the basis of the world. To use the very words of the cabalists, it is the great seal by which the human spirit was engraved on matter; and as an earthly king likes to see his effigy on the coins of his realm, the King of the universe likes to see the stamp of truth on man. In the act of prayer the body cooperates with the soul, and by this the union of this world with the ideal is effected. The divine wisdom which governed the creation of the world finds its expression in human knowledge. Accordingly, knowledge of the Law, in its ethical as well as religious aspects, is a means toward influencing the ideal world. Moreover, through study man escapes the seductions of evil. Evil lies in matter, and is conscious of itself; therefore it can be conquered. Evil is necessary, for without it there can be no good. The Zohar says that every man should so live that at the close of every day he can say, "I have not wasted my day" (i. 221b).
The later philosophic writers, e. g., Gersonides and Albo, mainly repeat the ethical views of Maimonides till the epoch-making appearance of Spinoza, who neither in source nor in influence is strictly Jewish.
Bibliography:
For Philo: Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, iii. 2, pp. 402-416;
Drummond, Philo Judœus, ii. 283 et seq.;
Frankel, Zur Ethik des Jüdischen Alexandrinischen Philosophen Philo, in Monatsschrift, 1867, pp. 241-252;
Hamburger, in Popular Wissenschaftliche Monatsblätter, v. 153, 177, 207, 231;
Claude Monteflore, in Jewish Quarterly Review, vii. 481 et seq.;
Tiktin, Die Lehre der Tugenden und Pflichten bei Philo, Breslau, 1901;
Schürer, Gesch. iii. 378. For the Judæo-Arabic period: Brüll, Jahrbucher, v. 71 et seq.;
Dukes, Solomo ben Gabirol aus Malaga und Ethischen Werke Desselben, Hanover, 1860;
A. Frankl-Grünn, Die Ethik des Juda Halevi;
Horovitz, Die Psychologie Ibn Gabirol's, Breslau, 1900;
Geiger, Die Ethische Grundlage des Buches über die Herzenpflichten, in ed. Baumgarten, xiii.-xxii.;
Kaufmann, Die Theologie des Bahya Ibn Pakuda;
idem, Die Sinne;
Rosin, in Jew. Quart. Rev. iii. 159;
idem, Die Ethik des Maimonides, Breslau, 1876;
J. Guttman, Die Philosophie des Solomon Ibn Gabirol, Göttingen, 1889;
idem, Die Religiousphilosophie des Saadia, Göttingen, 1882;
Wise, The Improvement of the Moral Qualities, New York, 1901;
M. Wolf, Moses ben Maimun's Acht Kapitel, Leipsic, 1863.
For the ethics of the Cabala, see Cabala.
—Modern:
Under this heading it is proposed to treat of the agreements and differences between the concepts and theories and the resulting practises of Jewish ethics and those of the main ethical schools of modern times. The fundamental teachings of Judaism base ethics on the concept that the universe is under purpose and law—that is, that it constitutes a moral order, created and guided by divine will, a personal God, in whom thought, will, and being are identical and coincident, and who therefore is the All-Good, his very nature excluding evil. Man, "created in the image of God," is a free moral agent, endowed (1) with the perception which distinguishes right from wrong, right being that which harmonizes with the moral order of things and serves its purposes, wrong being that which is out of consonance with this order and would conflict with and oppose it; and (2) with the will and the power to choose and do the right and eschew and abandon the wrong.
The moral law, therefore, is autonomous; man finds it involved in his own nature. Man being composed of body and soul, or mind, moral action is not automatic or instinctive. It has to overcome the opposition arising from the animal elements (appetites, selfishness), which are intended to be under the control, and serve the purposes, of the mind and soul. Recognition of right, the resolve to do it, and the execution of this resolve, are the three moments in the moral act. The impelling motive is not what outwardly results from the act (reward or punishment), but the desire and intention to be and become what man should and may be. Man thus is a moral personality, as such able to harmonize his conduct with the purposes of the All, and through such concordance lift his individual self to the importance and value of an abiding force in the moral order of things. Every man is and may act as a moral personality; the "summum bonum" is the realization on earth of conditions in which every man may live the life consonant with his dignity as a moral personality. This state is the "Messianic kingdom" (
). The assurance that this kingdom will come and that right is might has roots in the apprehension of the universe and the world of man as a moral cosmos. Israel, by virtue of being the historic people whose genius flowered (1) in the recognition of the moral purposes underlying life and time and world (see God), and the ultimate (
) triumph of right over wrong, as well as (2) in the apprehension of man's dignity and destiny as a moral personality, derives from its history the right, and is therefore under obligation, to anticipate in its own life the conditions of the Messianic fulfilment, thus illustrating the possibility and potency of a life consonant with the implications of the moral order of things, and by example influencing all men to seek and find the aim of human life in the ambition to establish among men the moral harmonies resulting from the recognition that man is a moral personality, and that the forces of the universe are under moral law.
I. Intuitional.
Jewish ethics, then, differs from the Christian in insisting that man, now as in the beginning, still has the power to discern between right and wrong and to choose between them. The consciousness of sin, and the helplessness of the sinner, are not taught or recognized. Therefore Jewish ethics is not tinged with quietism or Asceticism. Resignation and submission are not among the tendencies it fosters or justifies. Resistance to evil, and its discomfiture by remedial and positive good, is the keynote of Jewish morality, individual as well as social. Pessimism and optimism alike are eliminated by a higher synthesis; the former as negative of the inherent godliness (or morally purposed creation) of the universe and the essential worthiness of human life, the latter as ignoring the place assigned to man in the economy of things, and, with its one-sided insistence that "whatever is, is right," paralyzing man's energies. Meliorism, the conscious effort at improvement, perhaps expresses the character of Jewish ethics.
II. Autonomous.
Neither is Jewish ethics on the same plane as the common-sense moralism of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, or that of Wolff and the school of the "Aufklärungsphilosophie." Theirs is a system of moral hedonism, which reduces the moral life to an equation in happiness, gross or refined, sensual or spiritual. The desire for happiness is not the true basis of ethics. Nor is it true, as insisted on by this school, that happiness, except in the sense of the feeling of inner harmony with the implications and obligations of human personality, attends moral action as does effect follow upon cause. Like all hedonism, that of the moralists, too, verges on utilitarianism, the theory that what is useful (to oneself, or to the greater number) is moral. In the modification of the original equation between utility and morality, which makes the "happiness of the greater number" the test of goodness and the motive of moral action, utilitarianism has virtually abandoned its main contention without explaining why, in cases of conflict between individual interest and the welfare of the greater number, the individual should forego his immediate or ultimate advantage; for the contention that egotism always is shortsighted, reaching out for immediate and cheaper pleasure at the loss of remoter but more precious advantages, virtually denies the efficiency of utilitarianism as normative of human conduct and relations. Jewish ethics does not deny that spiritual pleasure is a concomitant of moral action, nor that moral conduct leads to consequences redounding to the welfare of society. But, contrary to the doctrine of hedonism and utilitarianism, Jewish ethics does not regard these attending feelings or resulting consequences as other than morally inconsequential. They are not proposed as motives or aims. In other words, worthiness (holiness) is the aim and the test of moral conduct, according to Jewish ethical teaching.
This reveals how far Jewish ethics agrees with that of Kant, who more than any other has left his impress upon modern ethical thought. Kant, in insisting that no ulterior purpose should determine human action—going even to the extreme of holding that the degree of repugnance which must be overcome, and the absence of pleasure and delight, alone attest the moral value of a deed—was moved, on the one hand, by his dissent from the shallow "hedonism" of the "moralists" (intuitionalists), and on the other by a psychology still under the influence of the Christian dogma of original sin. Nothing is good but the "good will." But man's will is not naturally good. The "good" man, therefore, must struggle against his natural inclination. The absence of gratification, the amount of the unwillingness overcome, are indicative of the goodness of the will. Christian and hedonistic predications of rewards and punishments (temporal or eternal), for good and evil conduct respectively, led Kant to the demand that purpose be eliminated altogether from the equation of moral conduct. Jewish ethics shares with Kant the insistence that consequences, temporal or eternal, shall not determine action. But the psychology upon which Jewish ethics is grounded recognizes that while pleasure and delight, or social utility, are not to be lifted into the potencies of motives, they are possible results and concomitants of moral action. As with Kant, Jewish ethics is based on the solemnity and awfulness of the moral "ought," which it regards as the categorical imperative, implied and involved in the very nature of man.
But Jewish ethics sees in this immediate fact of human consciousness and reason a relation, beyond the human, to the essential force of the universe (God). Because man is created in the image of God he has, with this consciousness of obligation, "conscience," the sense of harmony, or the reverse, of his self with this essential destiny of man. The fundamental maxim of Jewish as of Kantian ethics insists upon such action as may and should be imitated by all. But in Jewish ethics this applicability is grounded on the assurance that every man, as God's image, is a moral personality, therefore an agent, not a tool or a thing. Equally with Kant, Jewish ethics insists on the autonomy of the moral law, but it does this because this moral law is in God and through God; because it is more inclusive than man or humanity, having in itself the assurance of being the essential meaning and purpose of all that is realizable. It is not a mere "ought" which demands, but a certainty that man "can" do what he "ought to do," because all the forces of the universe are attuned to the same "ought" and are making for righteousness. This view alone gives a firm basis to the moral life. It gives it both reality and content. The categorical imperative as put by Kant is only formal. Jewish ethics fills the categorical imperative with positive content by holding that it is man's duty as determined by the ultimate destiny of the human family, and as purposed in the moral order of things, to establish on earth the Messianic kingdom, or, in Christian ethics, "the community of saints," the "kingdom of God."
III.
Jewish ethics deduces and proclaims its demands from the freedom of man's will. Determinism in all its varieties denies human freedom for the following reasons:
Free Will.
(1) Because the "soul" is dependent upon, and therefore controlled and limited by, the body. The contention of the determinists has not been proved. The material elements are substrata of the human person; as such they are factors of his being. But the "soul" or "will" nevertheless has the power to resist and neutralize the effects of the material factors. The latter, within certain extent, hamper or help; but whether increasing the difficulties or not, which the "will" encounters in asserting itself, the material elements may be and are under the will's control, even to their destruction (e. g., in suicide). The materialistic constructions have not weakened the foundations of Jewish ethics.
(2) Because empirically invariable regularity of human action has been established by moral statistics. At most the tables of moral statistics prove the influence of social conditions as brakes or stimuli to human will-power; but, confronted by the crucial question, Why does one individual and not another commit the (irregular) act? the theory fails ignominiously. It does not prove that social conditions are permanent. Man has changed them at his own will under deeper insight into the law of his moral relationsto other men. Hence the arguments derived from moral statistics do not touch the kernel of the Jewish doctrine of the moral freedom of man.
(3) Because will is determined by motives, and these arise out of conditions fixed by heredity and environment. The utmost this contention establishes is that men are responsible for the conditions they bequeath to posterity. These conditions may render difficult or easy the assertion of the will in the choice of motives, but they can not deprive the will of the power to choose. Environment may at will be changed, and the motives arising from it thereby modified. Jewish ethics is not grounded on the doctrine of absolute free will, but on that of the freedom of choice between motives. Man acts upon motives; but education, discipline, the training of one's mind to recognize the bearing which the motives have upon action and to test them by their concordance with or dissonance from the ideal of human conduct involved in man's higher destiny, enable man to make the better choice and to eliminate all baser motives. Even conceding the utmost that the theory of determining motives establishes, Jewish ethics continues on safe ground when predicating the freedom of the human will.
(4) Because human freedom has been denied on theological grounds as incompatible with the omnipotence and prescience of God (see Luther; Manicheans; Predestination; comp. Koran, sura xvii.; D. F. Strauss, "Die Christliche Glaubenslehre," i. 363: Spinoza's "immanent" God). The difficulties of the problem have been felt also by Jewish philosophers (see Stein, "Das Problem der Willensfreiheit"). Still, the difficulties are largely of a scholastic nature. Jewish ethics gives man the liberty to range himself on the side of the divine purposes or to attempt to place himself in opposition to them. Without this freedom moral life is robbed of its morality. Man can do naught against God except work his own defeat; he can do all with God by working in harmony with the moral purpose and destiny underlying life.
IV. Relation to Evolutionist Ethics.
Jewish ethics is not weakened by the theories that evolution may be established in the history of moral ideas and practise; that the standards of right and wrong have changed; and that conscience has spoken a multitude of dialects. Even the theory of Spencer and others that conscience is only a slow accretion of impressions and experiences based upon the utility of certain acts is not fatal to the main principles of the Jewish ethical theory. Evolution at its best merely traces the development of the moral life; it offers no solution of its origin, why man has come to develop this peculiar range of judgments upon his past conduct, and evolve ideals regulative of future conduct. Human nature, then, in its constitution, must have carried potentially from the beginning all that really evolved from and through it in the slow process of time. Man thus tends toward the moralities, and these are refined and spiritualized in increasing measure. Jewish ethics is thus untouched in its core by the evolutional method of treatment of the phenomena of the moral life of man.
V. Based on Religion.
Jewish ethics and Jewish religion are inseparable. The moral life, it is true, is not dependent upon dogma; there are men who, though without positive dogmatic creeds, are intensely moral; as, on the other hand, there are men who combine religious and liturgical correctness, or religious emotionalism, with moral indifference and moral turpitude. Furthermore, the moral altitude of a people indicates that of its gods, while the reverse is not true (Melkarth, Astarte, Baal, Jupiter, reflect the morality of their worshipers). Nevertheless, religion alone lifts ethics into a certainty; the moral life under religious construction is expressive of what is central and supreme in all time and space, to which all things are subject and which all conditions serve. God is, in the Jewish conception, the source of all morality; the universe is under moral destiny. The key to all being and becoming is the moral purpose posited by the recognition that the supreme will of the highest moral personality is Creator and Author and Ruler of All. In God the moral sublimities are one. Hence the Jewish God-concept can best be interpreted in moral values (see God's thirteen Middot). Righteousness, love, purity, are the only service man may offer Him. Immorality and Jewish religiosity are mutually exclusive. The moral life is a religious consecration. Ceremonies and symbols are for moral discipline and expressive of moral sanctities (see M. Lazarus, "Jüdische Ethik"). They appeal to the imagination of man in a way to deepen in him the sense of his moral dignity, and prompt him to greater sensitiveness to duty.
VI. Religious Basis Necessary.
The ethical teachings of religion alone, and especially the Jewish religion, establish the relation of man to himself, to his property, to others, on an ethical basis. Religion sets forth God as the Giver. Non-religious ethics is incompetent to develop consistently the obligations of man to live so that the measure of his life, and the value and worth of all other men, shall be increased. Why should man not be selfish? Why is Nietzsche's "overman," who is "beyond good and evil," not justified in using his strength as he lists? Religion, and it alone, or a religious interpretation of ethics makes the social bond something more comprehensive than an accidental and natural (material) compact between men, a policy, a prudential arrangement to make life less burdensome; religion alone makes benevolence and altruism something loftier than mere anticipatory speculations on possible claims for benefits when necessity shall arise, or the reflex impulse of a subjective transference of another's objective misery to oneself, so that pity always is shown only to self (Schopenhauer). Religion shows that as man is the recipient of all he is and has, he is the steward of what was given him (by God) for his use and that of all his fellow men.
On this basis Jewish ethics rests its doctrines of duty and virtue. Whatever increases the capacity of man's stewardship is ethical. Whatever use of time, talent, or treasure augments one's possibilities of human service is ethically consecrated. Judaism, therefore, inculcates as ethical the ambition to develop physical and mental powers, as enlargement ofservice is dependent upon the measure of the increase of man's powers. Wealth is not immoral; poverty is not moral. The desire to increase one's stores of power is moral provided it is under the consecration of the recognized responsibility for larger service. The weak are entitled to the protection of the strong. Property entails duties, which establish its rights. Charity is not a voluntary concession on the part of the well-situated. It is a right to which the less fortunate are entitled in justice (
). The main concern of Jewish ethics is personality. Every human being is a person, not a thing. Economic doctrine is unethical and un-Jewish if it ignores and renders illusory this distinction. Slavery is for this reason immoral. Jewish ethics on this basis is not individualistic; it is not under the spell of other-worldliness. It is social. By consecrating every human being to the stewardship of his faculties and forces, and by regarding every human soul as a person, the ethics of Judaism offers the solution of all the perplexities of modern political, industrial, and economic life. Israel as the "pattern people" shall be exponential, among its brothers of the whole human family, of the principles and practises which are involved in, pillared upon, and demanded by, the ethical monotheism which lifts man to the dignity of God's image and consecrates him the steward of all of his life, his talent, and his treasure. In the "Messianic kingdom," ideally to be anticipated by Israel, justice will be enthroned and incarnated in institution, and this justice, the social correlative of holiness and love, is the ethical passion of modern, as it was of olden, Judaism.
ETHICS.—The present article will be confined to Biblical Ethics. As there is no systematic presentation of the subject, all that can be done is to gather from the Jewish and Christian writings the moral conceptions that were formed by historians, prophets, poets, apostles. The old history culminates in the story of the perfect One, the Lord Jesus Christ, from whom there issued a life of higher order and ampler range.
I. OT Ethics.—As the dates of many of the books are uncertain, special difficulty attends any endeavour to trace with precision the stages of moral development amongst the Hebrews. The existence of a moral order of the world is assumed; human beings are credited with the freedom, the intelligence, etc., which make morality possible. The term ‘conscience’ does not appear till NT times, and perhaps it was then borrowed from the Stoics; but the thing itself is conspicuous enough in the records of God’s ancient people. In Gen 3:5 we have the two categories ‘good’ and ‘evil’; the former seems to signify in Gen 1:31 ‘answering to design’ and in Gen 2:18 ‘conducive to well-being.’ These terms—applied sometimes to ends, sometimes to means—probably denote ultimates of consciousness, and so, like pain and pleasure, are not to be defined. Moral phenomena present themselves, of course, in the story of the patriarchs; men are described as mean or chivalrous, truthful or false, meritorious or blameworthy, long before legislation—Mosaic or other—takes shape.
1. In Hebrew literature the religious aspects of life are of vital moment, and therefore morals and worship are inextricably entangled. God is seen: there is desire to please Him; there is a shrinking from aught that would arouse His anger (Gen 20:6; Gen 39:9). Hence the immoral is sinful. Allegiance is due—not to an impersonal law, but to a Holy Person, and duty to man is duty also to God. Morality is under Divine protection: are not the tables of the Law in the Ark that occupies the most sacred place in Jehovah’s shrine (Exo 40:20, Deu 10:5, 1Ki 8:9, Heb 9:4)? The commandments, instead of being arbitrary, are the outflowings of the character of God. He who enjoins righteousness and mercy calls men to possess attributes which He Himself prizes as His own peculiar glory (Exo 33:18-19; Exo 34:6-7). Hosea represents the Divine love as longing for the response of human love, and Amos demands righteousness in the name of the Righteous One. Man’s goodness is the same in kind as the goodness of God, so that both may be characterized by the same terms; as appears from a comparison of Psa 111:1-10; Psa 112:1-10.
2. The OT outlook is national rather than individual. The elements of the community count for little, unless they contribute to the common good. A man is only a fractional part of an organism, and he may be slain with the group to which he belongs, if grievous sin can be brought home to any part of that group (Jos 7:19-26). It is Israel—the people as a whole—that is called God’s son. Prayers, sacrifices, festivals, fasts, are national affairs. The highest form of excellence is willingness to perish if only Israel may be saved (Exo 32:31-32, Jdg 5:15-18). Frequently the laws are, such as only a judge may administer: thus the claim of ‘an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth’ (Deu 19:21), being a maxim of fairness to be observed by a magistrate who has to decide between contending parties, is too harsh for guidance outside a court of law (Mat 5:38-39). When Israel sinned, it was punished; when it obeyed God, it prospered. It was not till Hebrew national life was destroyed that individual experiences excited questions as to the equity of Providence (Job, Psa 37:1-40; Psa 73:1-28) and in regard to personal immortality. In the later prophets, even when the soul of each man is deemed to be of immense interest (Eze 18:1-32), national ideals have the ascendency in thought. It is the nation that is to have a resurrection (Isa 25:8, Eze 37:1-14, Hos 13:14, Zec 8:1-8). This ardent devotion to corporate well-being—a noble protest against absorption in individual interests—is the golden thread on which the finest pearls of Hebrew history are strung.
3. The Covenant is always regarded as the standard by which conduct is to be judged. Deference to the Covenant is deference to God (Hos 6:7; Hos 8:1, Amo 3:1-3). As God is always faithful, His people prosper so long as they observe the conditions to which their fathers gave solemn assent (Exo 24:8; Exo 24:7). The Decalogue, which is an outline of the demands made by the Covenant on Israel, requires in its early clauses faith, reverence, and service; then (Exo 20:1-26, Commandments 5 to 9) the duty of man to man is set forth as part of man’s duty to Jehovah, for Moses and all the prophets declare that God is pleased or displeased by our behaviour to one another. The Tenth Commandment, penetrating as it does to the inward life, should be taken as a reminder that all commandments are to be read in the spirit and not in the letter alone (Lev 19:17-18, Deu 6:5-6, Psa 139:1-24, Rom 7:14). Human obligations—details of which are sometimes massed together as in Exo 20:1-26; Exo 21:1-36; Exo 22:1-31; Exo 23:1-33, Psa 15:1-5; Psa 24:1-10–include both moral and ceremonial requirements. Nothing is more common in the prophets than complaints of a disposition to neglect the former (Isa 1:11 f., Jer 6:20; Jer 7:21 f., Hos 6:6, Amo 5:21 f.). The requirements embrace a great number of particulars, and every department of experience is recognized. Stress is laid upon kindness to the physically defective (Lev 19:14), and to the poor and to strangers (Deu 10:18-19; Deu 15:7-11; Deu 24:17 ff., Job 31:16 ff., Job 32:1-22, Psa 41:1, Isa 58:6 ff., Jer 7:5 ff; Jer 22:3, Zec 7:9 f.). Parents and aged persons are to be reverenced (Exo 20:12, Deu 5:16, Lev 19:32). The education of children is enjoined (Exo 12:26 f., Exo 13:8; Exo 13:14, Deu 4:9; Deu 6:7; Deu 6:20-25; Deu 11:19; Deu 31:12-13; Deu 32:46, Psa 78:5-6). In Proverbs emphasis is laid upon industry (Pro 6:6-11), purity (Pro 7:6 etc.), kindness to the needy (Pro 14:21), truthfulness (Pro 17:7 etc.), forethought (Pro 24:27). The claims of animals are not omitted (Exo 23:11, Lev 25:7, Deu 22:4; Deu 22:6; Deu 25:4, Psa 104:11-12; Psa 148:10, Pro 12:10, Jon 4:11). Occasionally there are charming pictures of special characters (the housewife, Pro 31:1-31; the king, 2Sa 23:3-4; the priest, Mal 2:5-7). God’s rule over man is parallel with His rule over the universe, and men should feel that God embraces all interests in His thought, for He is so great that He can attend equally to the stars and to human sorrows (Psa 19:1-14; Psa 33:1-22; Psa 147:3-6).
4. The sanctions of conduct are chiefly temporal (harvests, droughts, victories over enemies, etc.), yet, as they are national, self-regard is not obtrusive. Moreover, it would be a mistake to suppose that no Hebrew minds felt the intrinsic value of morality. The legal spirit was not universal. The prophets were glad to think that God was not limiting Himself to the letter of the Covenant, the very existence of which implied that Jehovah, in the greatness of His love, had chosen Israel to be His peculiar treasure. By grace and not by bare justice Divine action was guided. God was the compassionate Redeemer (Deu 7:8, Hos 11:1; Hos 14:4). Even the people’s disregard of the Law did not extinguish His forgiving love (Psa 25:6 ff; Psa 103:8 ff., Isa 63:9, Jer 3:12; Jer 31:3; Jer 33:7 f., Mic 7:18 f.). In response to this manifested generosity, an unmercenary spirit was begotten in Israel, so that God was loved for His own sake, and His smile was regarded as wealth and light when poverty and darkness had to be endured. ‘Whom have I in heaven but thee?’ ‘Oh, how I love thy law!’ are expressions the like of which abound in the devotional literature of Israel, and they evince a disinterested devotion to God Himself and a genuine delight in duty. To the same purport is the remarkable appreciation of the beauty and splendour of wisdom recorded in Pro 8:1-36.
II. NT Ethics.—While admitting many novel elements (Mat 11:11; Mat 13:17; Mat 13:35; Mat 13:52, Mar 2:21-22, Joh 13:34, Eph 2:15, Heb 10:20, Rev 2:17; Rev 3:12; Rev 5:9), Christianity reaffirmed the best portions of OT teaching (Mat 5:17, Rom 3:31). Whatsoever things were valuable, Christ conserved, unified, and developed. The old doctrine acquired wings, and sang a, nobler, sweeter song (Joh 1:17). But the glad and noble life which Jesus came to produce could come only from close attention to man’s actual condition.
1. Accordingly, Christian Ethics takes full account of sin. The guilty state of human nature, together with the presence of temptations from within, without, and beneath, presents a problem far different from any that can be seen when it is assumed that men are good or only unmoral. Is our need met by lessons in the art of advancing from good to better? Is not the human will defective and rebellious? The moral ravages in the individual and in society call for Divine redemptive activities and for human penitence and faith. Though the sense of sin has been most conspicuous since Christ dwelt among men, the Hebrew consciousness had its moral anguish. The vocabulary of the ancient revelation calls attention to many of the aspects of moral disorder. Sin is a ravenous beast, crouching ready to spring (Gen 4:7); a cause of wide-spreading misery (Gen 3:15-19; Gen 9:25; Gen 20:9, Exo 20:5); is universal (Gen 6:5; Gen 8:21, 1Ki 8:46, Psa 130:3; Psa 143:2); is folly (Prov. passim); a missing of the mark, violence, transgression, rebellion, pollution (Psa 51:1-19). This grave view is shared by the NT. The Lord and His Apostles labour to produce contrition. It is one of the functions of the Holy Spirit to convict the world of sin (Joh 16:8). It is not supposed that a good life can be lived unless moral evil is renounced by a penitent heart. The fountains of conduct are considered to have need of cleansing. It is always assumed that great difficulties beset the soul in its upward movements, because of its past corrupt state and its exposure to fierce and subtle temptations.
2. In harmony with the doctrine of depravity is the distinctness with which individuality is recognized. Sin is possible only to a person. Ability to sin is a mark of that high rank in nature denoted by ‘personality.’ Christianity has respect to a man’s separateness. It sees a nature ringed round with barriers that other beings cannot pass, capacities for great and varied wickednesses and excellences, a world among other worlds, and not a mere wave upon the sea. A human being is in himself an end, and God loves us one by one. Jesus asserted the immense value of the individual. The Shepherd cares for the one lost sheep (Luk 15:4-7), and has names for all the members of the flock (Joh 10:14). The Physician, who (it is conceivable) could have healed crowds by some general word, lays His beneficent hands upon each sufferer (Luk 4:40). Remove from the Gospels and the Acts the stories of private ministrations, and what gaps are made (Joh 1:35 ff., Joh 1:3-4, Act 8:25-39; Act 8:16, etc.). Taking the individual as the unit, and working from him as a centre, the NT Ethic declines to consider his deeds alone (Mat 6:1-34, Rom 2:28-29). Actions are looked at on their inner side (Mat 5:21-22; Mat 5:27-28; Mat 6:1; Mat 6:4; Mat 6:6; Mat 6:18; Mat 12:34-35; Mat 23:5; Mat 23:27, Mar 7:2-8; Mar 7:18-23, Luk 16:15; Luk 18:10-14, Joh 4:23 f.). This is a prolongation of ideas present to the best minds prior to the Advent (1Sa 16:7, Psa 7:9; Psa 24:3-4; Psa 51:17; Psa 139:2-3; Psa 139:23, Jer 17:10; Jer 31:33).
3. The social aspects of experience are not overlooked. Everyone is to bear his own burden (Rom 14:4, Gal 6:5), and must answer for himself to the Judge of all men (2Co 5:10); but he is not isolated. Regard for others is imperative; for an unforgiving temper cannot find forgiveness (Mat 6:14-15; Mat 18:23-35), worship without brotherliness is rejected (Mat 5:23-24), and Christian love is a sign of regeneration (1Jn 5:1). The mere absence of malevolent deeds cannot shield one from condemnation; positive helpfulness is required (Mat 25:41-45, Luk 10:25-37; Luk 16:19-31, Eph 4:28-29). This helpfulness is the new ritualism (Heb 13:16, Jas 1:27). The family with its parents, children, and servants (Eph 5:22 to Eph 6:9, Col 3:18 to Col 4:1); the Church with its various orders of character and gifts (Rom 14:1-23; Rom 15:1-33, Gal 6:1-2, 1Co 13:1-13; 1Co 14:1-40; 1Co 15:1-58); the State with its monarch and magistrates (Mar 12:14-17, Rom 13:1-7, 1Ti 2:1-2), provide the spheres wherein the servant of Christ is to manifest his devotion to the Most High. ‘Obedience, patience, benevolence, purity, humility, alienation from the world and the “flesh,” are the chief novel or striking features which the Christian ideal of practice suggests’ (Sidgwick), and they involve the conception that Christian Ethics is based on the recognition of sin, of individuality, of social demands, and of the need of heavenly assistance.
4. The Christian standard is the character of the Lord Jesus Christ, who lived perfectly for God and man. He overcame evil (Mat 4:1-11, Joh 16:33), completed His life’s task (Joh 17:4), and sinned not (Joh 8:46, 2Co 5:21, Heb 4:15, 1Pe 2:22, 1Jn 3:5). His is the pattern life, inasmuch as it is completely (1) filial, and (2) fraternal. As to (1), we mark the upward look, His readiness to let the heat of His love burst into the flame of praise and prayer, His dutifulness and submissiveness: He lived ‘in the bosom of the Father,’ and wished to do only that which God desired. As to (2), His pity for men was unbounded, His sacrifice for human good knew no limits. ‘Thou shalt love God’; ‘thou shalt love man.’ Between these two poles the perfect life revolved. He and His teachings are one. It is because the moral law is alive in Him that He must needs claim lordship over man’s thoughts, feelings, actions. He is preached ‘as Lord’ (2Co 4:5), and the homage which neither man (Act 10:25-26) nor angel (Rev 22:8-9) can receive He deems it proper to accept (Joh 13:13). Could it be otherwise? The moral law must be supreme, and He is it. Hence alienation from Him has the fatal place which idolatry had under the Old Covenant, and for a similar reason, seeing that idolatry was a renunciation of Him who is the righteous and gracious One. Since Jesus by virtue of His filial and fraternal perfectness is Lord, to stand apart from Him is ruinous (Luk 10:13-16, Joh 3:18; Joh 8:24; Joh 15:22-24; Joh 16:8-9, Heb 2:3; Heb 6:4-8; Heb 10:26). Wife or child or life itself must not be preferred to the claims of truth and righteousness, and therefore must not be preferred to Christ, who is truth and righteousness in personal form (Mat 10:37-39, Luk 9:59-60; Luk 14:26-27). To call oneself the bond-servant of Jesus Christ (Rom 1:1, Jas 1:1, 2Pe 1:1) was to assert at once the strongest affection for the wise and gracious One, and the utmost loyalty to God’s holy will as embodied in His Son. The will of God becomes one’s own by affectionate deference to Jesus Christ, to suffer for whom may become a veritable bliss (Mat 5:10-12, Act 5:41, 2Co 4:11, Php 1:29, 1Th 2:14, Heb 10:32-34).
5. Christian Ethics is marked quite as much by promises of assistance as by loftiness of standard. The kindliness of God, fully illustrated in the gift and sacrifice of His Son, is a great incentive to holiness. Men come into the sunshine of Divine favour. Heavenly sympathy is with them in their struggles. The virtues to be acquired (Mat 5:1-16, Gal 5:22-23, Col 3:12-17, 2Pe 1:5-7, Tit 2:12) and the vices to be shunned (Mar 7:21-22, Gal 5:19-21, Col 3:5-9) are viewed in connexion with the assurance of efficient aid. There is a wonderful love upon which the aspirant may depend (Joh 3:16, Rom 5:7-8, 2Co 5:19 f.). The hearty acceptance of that love is faith, ranked as a virtue and as the parent of virtues (2Pe 1:5, Rom 5:1-2, 1Co 13:1-13, Heb 11:1-40). Faith, hope, love, transfigure and supplement the ancient virtues,—temperance, courage, wisdom, justice,—while around them grow many gentle excellences not recognized before Christ gave them their true rank; and yet it is not by its wealth of moral teaching so much as by its assurance of ability to resist temptation and to attain spiritual manhood that Christianity has gained preeminence. Christ’s miracles are illustrations of His gospel of pardon, regeneration, and added faculties (Mat 9:5-6). The life set before man was lived by Jesus, who regenerates men by His Spirit, and takes them into union with Himself (Joh 3:3; Joh 3:6; Joh 8:36; Joh 15:1-10, Rom 8:2; Rom 8:9; Rom 8:29, 1Co 1:30, 2Co 5:17, Gal 5:22-23, Php 2:5; Php 2:12-13, Col 3:1-4, Jas 1:18, 1Pe 2:21, 1Jn 2:6). The connexion between the Lord and the disciple is permanent (Mat 28:20, Joh 14:3; Joh 14:19; Joh 17:24, Heb 2:11-18, 1Jn 3:1-3), and hence the aspiration to become sober, righteous, godly (relation to self, man, and God, Tit 2:12-14) receives ample support. Sanctity is not only within the reach of persons at one time despised as moral incapables (Mar 2:16-17, Luk 7:47; Luk 7:15; Luk 19:8-9; Luk 23:42; Luk 23:48, 1Co 6:11, Eph 2:1-7), but every Christian is supposed to be capable, sooner or later, of the most precious forms of goodness (Mat 5:1-10), for there is no caste (Col 1:28). Immortality is promised to the soul, and with it perpetual communion with the Saviour, whose image is to be repeated in every man He saves (Rom 8:37-39, 1Co 15:49-58, 2Co 5:8, Php 3:8-14, 1Th 4:17, 1Jn 3:2-3, Rev 22:4).
The objections which have been made to Biblical Ethics cannot be ignored, though the subject can be merely touched in this article. Some passages in the OT have been stigmatized as immoral; some in the NT are said to contain impracticable precepts, and certain important spheres of duty are declared to receive very inadequate treatment.
(i.) As to the OT, it is to be observed that we need not feel guilty of disrespect to inspiration when our moral sense is offended; for the Lord Jesus authorizes the belief that the Mosaic legislation was imperfect (Mat 5:21 ff., Mar 10:2-9), and both Jeremiah and Ezekiel comment adversely on doctrines which had been accepted on what seemed to be Divine authority (cf. Exo 20:5 with Jer 31:29-30 and Eze 18:2-3; Eze 18:19-20). It is reasonable to admit that if men were to be improved at all there must have been some accommodation to circumstances and states of mind very unlike our own; yet some of the laws are shocking. While such institutions as polygamy and slavery, which could not be at once abolished, were restricted in their range and stripped of some of their worst evils (Exo 21:2 ff., Lev 25:42-49, 1Ch 2:35, Pro 17:2), there remain many enactments and transactions which must have been always abhorrent to God though His sanction is claimed for them (Exo 22:18-20; Exo 31:14-15; Exo 35:2-3, Lev 20:27, Num 15:32-36; Num 15:31, Deu 13:5; Deu 13:16; Deu 17:1-5; Deu 18:20; Deu 21:10-14, 2Sa 21:1-9). Had men always remembered these illustrations of the fact that passions and opinions utterly immoral may seem to be in harmony with God’s will, the cruelties inflicted on heretics in the name of God would not have disgraced the Church’s history; and, indeed, these frightful mistakes of OT days may have been recorded to teach us to be cautious, lest while doing wrong we imagine that God is served (Joh 16:2). The limited area of the unworthy teaching would be noticed if care were taken to observe that (1) some of the wicked incidents are barely recorded, (2) some are reprobated in the context, (3) some are evidently left without comment because the historian assumes that they will be immediately condemned by the reader. In regard to the rest, it is certain that the Divine seal has been used contrary to the Divine will. It must be added that the very disapproval of the enormities has been made possible by the book which contains the objectionable passages, and that it is grossly unfair to overlook the high tone manifested generally throughout a great and noble literature, and the justice, mercy, and truth commended by Israel’s poets, historians, and prophets, generation after generation.
(ii.) As to the NT, it is alleged that, even if the Sermon on the Mount could be obeyed, obedience would be ruinous. This, however, is directly in the teeth of Christ’s own comment (Mat 7:24-27), and is due in part to a supposition that every law is for every man. The disciples, having a special task, might be under special orders, just as the Lord Himself gave up all His wealth (2Co 8:9) and carried out literally most of the precepts included in His discourse. The paradoxical forms employed should be a sufficient guard against a bald construction of many of the sayings, and should compel us to meditate upon principles that ought to guide all lives. It is the voice of love that we hear, not the voice of legality. The Christian Etnic is supposed to be careless of social institutions, and Christianity is blamed for not preaching at once against slavery, etc. Probably more harm than good would have resulted from political and economic discourses delivered by men who were ostracized. But it is improbable that the Christian mind was sufficiently instructed to advance any new doctrine for the State. Moreover, the supposition that the world was near its close must have diverted attention from social schemes. The alienation from the world was an alienation from wickedness, not indifference to human pain and sorrow. The poverty of believers, the scorn felt for them by the great, the impossibility of attending public functions without countenancing idolatry, the lack of toleration by the State, all tended to keep the Christian distinct from his fellows. Mob and State and cultured class, by their hatred or contempt, compelled Christianity to move on its own lines. At first it was saved from contamination by various kinds of persecution, and the isolation has proved to be a blessing to mankind; for the new life was able to gather its forces and to acquire knowledge of its own powers and mission. The new ideal was protected by its very unpopularity. Meanwhile there was the attempt to live a life of love to God and man, and to treasure Gospels and Epistles that kept securely for a more promising season many sacred seeds destined to grow into trees bearing many kinds of fruit. The doctrine of the Divine Fatherhood implicitly condemns every social and political wrong, while it begets endeavours directed to the promotion of peace among nations, and to the uplifting of the poor and ignorant and depraved of every land into realms of material, intellectual, and moral blessing. There is no kind of good which is absent from the prayers: ‘Thy kingdom come’; ‘Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven.’
W. J. Henderson.
(Greek: ethos, character)
The natural science of the morality of human acts, which considers the moral actions or conduct of man primarily in the light of human reason rather than in the light of supernatural revealed truth. Moral theology is sometimes termed Christian Ethics. The deliberate free actions of man in their relation to right rational nature and the Divine Reason form its subject matter. The liberty of the human will and the existence of God, the Creator, End, and Rewarder of man, constitute its two most important fundamental postulates. God is the surety for morality, and without free will man could perform no ethical acts either good or bad; there would be no responsibility, no imputability, no virtues or vices, merit nor guilt, no eternal reward for a life of self-sacrifice and virtue. Ethics is preeminently a practical and directive science, setting before man not only the absolute obligation of doing good and avoiding evil, but indicating as well how he is to act if he wishes to be morally good and attain the end of his being. The establishment of the right rules of human conduct and their embodiment in everyday life then forms the primary purpose of ethics, which is generally classified as general or theoretical ethics, dealing with the nature of morality, the end of conduct, its norm, laws, etc., and special or applied ethics, dealing with the relation of such principles and rules to man’s personal everyday activities whether individual or social. Every phase of free human activity, personal, social, economic, political, and international, comes within the scope of ethics, and is regulated by the moral law and made to harmonize with right rational nature or the moral order as Divinely constituted.
1. DefinitionMany writers regard ethics (Gr. ethike) as any scientific treatment of the moral order and divide it into theological, or Christian, ethics (moral theology) and philosophical ethics (moral philosophy). What is usually understood by ethics, however, is philosophical ethics, or moral philosophy, and in this sense the present article will treat the subject. Moral philosophy is a division of practical philosophy. Theoretical, or speculative, philosophy has to do with being, or with the order of things not dependent on reason, and its object is to obtain by the natural light of reason a knowledge of this order in its ultimate causes. Practical philosophy, on the other hand, concerns itself with what ought to be, or with the order of acts which are human and which therefore depend upon our reason. It is also divided into logic and ethics. The former rightly orders the intellectual activities and teaches the proper method in the acquirement of truth, while the latter directs the activities of the will; the object of the former is the true; that of the latter is the good. Hence ethics may be defined as the science of the moral rectitude of human acts in accordance with the first principles of natural reason. Logic and ethics are normative and practical sciences, because they prescribe norms or rules for human activities and show how, accordng to these norms, a man ought to direct his actions. Ethics is pre-eminently practical and directive; for it orders the activity of the will, and the latter it is which sets all the other faculties of man in motion. Hence, to order the will is the same as to order the whole man. Moreover, ethics not only directs a man how to act if he wishes to be morally good, but sets before him the absolute obligation he is under of doing good and avoiding evil.A distinction must be made between ethics and morals, or morality. Every people, even the most uncivilized and uncultured, has its own morality or sum of prescriptions which govern its moral conduct. Nature had so provided that each man establishes for himself a code of moral concepts and principles which are applicable to the details of practical life, without the necessity of awaiting the conclusions of science. Ethics is the scientific or philosophical treatment of morality. The subject-matter proper of ethics is the deliberate, free actions of man; for these alone are in our power, and concerning these alone can rules be prescribed, not concerning those actions which are performed without deliberation, or through ignorace or coercion. Besides this, the scope of ethics includes whatever has reference to free human acts, whether as principle or cause of action (law, conscience, virtue), or as effect or circumstance of action (merit, punishment, etc.). The particular aspect (formal object) under which ethics considers free acts is that of their moral goodness or the rectitude of order involved in them as human acts. A man may be a good artist or orator and at the same time a morally bad man, or, conversely, a morally good man and a poor artist or technician. Ethics has merely to do with the order which relates to man as man, and which makes of him a good man.Like ethics, moral theology also deals with the moral actions of man; but unlike ethics it has its origin in supernaturally revealed truth. It presupposes man’s elevation to the supernatural order, and, though it avails itself of the scientific conclusions of ethics, it draws its knowledge for the most part from Christian Revelation. Ethics is distinguished from the other natural sciences which deal with moral conduct of man, as jurisprudence and pedagogy, in this, that the latter do not ascend to first principles, but borrow their fundamental notions from ethics, and are therefore subordinate to it. To investigate what constitues good or bad, just orjunjust, waht is virtue, law, conscience, duty, etc., what obligations are common to all men, does not lie within the scope of jurisprdence or pedagogy, but of ethics; and yet these principles must be presupposed by the former, must serve them as a ground-work and guide; hence they are subordinated to ethics. The same is tre of political economy. The latter is indeed immediately concerned with man’s social activity inasmuch as it treats of the production, distribution and consumption of material commodities, but this activity is not independent of ethics; industrial life must develop in accordance with the moral law and must be dominated by justice, equity, and love. Political economy was wholly wrong in trying to emancipate itself from the requirements of ethics. Sociology is at the present day considered by many as a science distinct from ethics. If, however, by sociology is meant a philosophical treatment of society, it is a division of ethics; for the enquiry into the nature of society in general, into the origin, nature, object and purpose of natural societies (the family, the state) and their relations to one another forms an essential part of Ethics. If, on the other hand, sociology be regarded as the aggregate of the sciences which have reference to the social life of man, it is not a single science but a complexus of sciences; and among these, so far as the natural order is concerned, ethics has the first claim.II. Sources and Methods of EthicsThe sources of ethics are partly man’s own experience and partly the principles and truts proposed by other philosophical disciplines (logic and mataphysics). Ethics taes its origin from the empirical fact that certain general principles and concepts of the moral orderare common to all people at all times. This fact has indeed been frequently disputed, but recent ethnological research has placd it beyond the possibility of doubt. All nations distinguish between what is good and what is bad, between good men and bad men, between virtue and vice; they are all agreed in this: that the good is worth striving for , and that evil must be shuned, that the one deserves praise, the other, blame. Though in individual cases they may not be one in denominating the same thing good or evil, they are neverthless agreed as to the general principle, that good is to be done and evil avoided. Vice everywhere seeks to hide itself or to put on the mask of virtue; it is a universally recognized principle, that we should not do to others what we would not wish them to do to us. With the aid of the truths laid down in logic and mataphysics, ethics proceeds to give a thorough explanationof the this undeniable fact, to trace it back to its ultimate causes, then to gather from fundamental moral principles certain conclusions which will direct man, in the various circumstances and relations of life, how to shape his own conduct towards the attainment of the end for which he was created. Thus the proper method of ethics is at once speculative and empirical; it draws upon experience and metaphysics. Supernatural Christian Revelation is not a proper source of ethics. Only those conclusions properly belong to ethics which can be reached with the help of experience and philosophical principles. The Christian philosopher, however, may not ignore supernatural revelation, but must at least recognise itas a negative norm, inasmuch as he is not to advance any assertion in evident contradiction to the revealed truth of Christianity. God is the fountain-head of all truth -- whether natural as made known by Creation, or supernatural as revealed through Christ and the Prophets. As our intellect is an image of the Divine Intellect, so is all certain scientific knowledge the reflex and interpretation of the Creator’s thoughts embodied in His creatures, a participation in His eternal wisdom. God cannot reveal supernaturally and command us to believe on His authority anything that contradicts the thoughts expreseed by Him in his creatures, and which, with the aid of the faculty of reason which he has given us, we can discern in His works. To assert the contrary would be to deny God’s omniscience and veracity, or to suppose that God was not the source of all truth. A conflict, therefore, between faith and science is impossible, and hence the Christian philosopher has to refrain from advancing any assertion which would be evidently antagonistic to certain revealed truth. Should his researches lead to conclusions out of harmony with faith, he is to take it for granted that some error has crept into his deductions, just as the mathematician whose calculations openly contradict the facts of experience must be satisfied that his demonstration is at fault.After what has been said the following methods of ethics must be rejected as unsound.Pure Rationalism. -- This system makes reason the sole source of truth, and thereforse at the very otset excludes every reference to Christian Revelation, branding any such reference as degrading and hampering free scientific investigation. The supreme law of science is not freedom, but truth. It is not derogatory to the true dignity and freedom of science to abstain from asserting what, according to Christian Revelation, is manifestly erroneous. Pure Empiricism, which would erect the entire structure of ethics exclusively on the foundation of experience, must also be rejected. Experience can tell us merely of present or past phenomena; but as to what, of necessity, and universal, must, or ought to, happen in the future, experience can give us no clue without bringing in the aid of necessary and universal principles. Closely alied to Empiricism is Historicism, which considers history as the exclusive source of ethics. What has been said of Empiricism may also be applied to Historicism. History is concered with what has happened in the past and only too often has to rehearse the moral aberrations of mankind. Positivism is a variety of Empiricism; it seeks to emancipate ethics from metaphysics and base it on facts alone. No science can be constructed on the mere foundation of facts, and independently of metaphysics. Every sciencemust set out from evident principles, which form the basis of all certain cognition. Ethics especially is impossible without metaphysics, since it is according to the metaphysical view we take of the world that ethics shapes itself. Whoever considers man as nothing else than a more highly developed brute will hold different ethical views from one who discerns in man a creature fashioned to the image and likeness of God, possessing a spiritual, immortal soul and destined to eternal life; whoever refuses to recognize the freedom of the will destroys the very foundation of ethics. Whether man was created by God or possesses a spiritual, immortal soul which is endowed with free will, or is essentially different from brute creation, all these are questions pertaining to metaphysics. Anthropology, moreover, is necessarily presupposed by ethics. No rules can be prescribed for man’s actions, unless his nature is clearly understood. Another untenable system is Traditionalism, which in France, during the last half of the nineteenth century, counted many adherents (among others, de Bonald, Bautain), and which advanced the doctrine that complete certainty in religious and moral questions was not to be attained by the aid of reason alone, bt only by the light of revelation as made known to us through tradition. They failed to see that for all reasonable belief certain knowledge of the existence of God and of the fact of revelation is necessarily presupposed, and this knowledge cannot be gathered from revelation. Fideism, or, as Paulsen designated it, the Irrationalism of many Protestants, also denies the ability of reason to furnish certainty in matters relating to God and religion. With Kant, it teaches that reason does not rise above the phenomena of the visible world; faith alone can lead us into the realm of the supersensible and instruct us in matters moral and religious. This faith, however, is not the acceptance of truth on the strength of external authority, but rather consists in certain appreciative judgments, i.e. assumptions or convictions which are the result of each one’s own inner experiences, and which have, therefore, for him a precise worth, and corrspond to his own peculier temperament. Since these persuasions are not supposed to come within the range of reason, exception to them cannot be taken on scientific grounds. According to this opinion, religion and morals are relegated to pure subjectivism and lose all their objectivity and universality of value. III. Historical View of EthicsAs ethics is the philosophical treatment of the moral order, its history does not consist in narrating the views of morality entertained by different nations at differnt times; this is properly the scope of the history of civilisation, and of ethnology. The history of ethics is concerned solely with the various philosophical systems which in the course of time have been elaborated with reference to the moral order. Hence the opinions advanced by the wise men of antiquity, such as Pythagoras (582-500 B.C.), Heraclitus (535-475 B.C.), Confucius (558-479 B.C.), scarcely belong to the history of ethics; for, though they proposed various moral truths and principles, they dis so in a dogmatic and didactic, and not in a philosophically systematic manner. Ethics properly so-called is first met with among the Greeks, i.e.in the teaching of Socrates (470- 399 B.C.). According to him the ultimate object of human activity is happiness, and the necessary means to reach it, virtue. Since everybody necessarily seeks happiness, no one is deliberately corrupt. All evil arises from ignorance, and the virtues are one and all but so many kinds of prudence. Virtue can, therefore, be imparted by instruction. The disciple of Socrates, Plato (427-347 B.C.) declares that the summum bonum consists in the perfect imitation of God, the Absolute Good, an imitation which cannot be fully realised in this life. Virtue enables man to order his conduct, as he properly should, according to the dictates of reason, and acting thus he becomes like unto God. But Plato differed from Socrates in that he did not consider virtue to consist in wisdom alone, but in justice, temperance, and fortitude as well, these constituting the proper harmony of man’s activities. In a sense, the State is man writ large, and its function its function is to train its citizens in virtue. For his ideal State he proposed the community of goods and of wives and the public education of children. Though Socrates and Plato had been to the fore in this mighty work and had contributed much valuable material to the upbuilding of ethics; nevertheless, Plato’s illustroius disciple, Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), must be considered the real founder of systematic ethics. With characteristic keenness he solved, in his ethical and political writings, most of the problems with which ethics concerns itself. Unlike Plato, who began with ideas as the basis of his observation, Aristotle chose rathe to take the facts of experience as his starting-point; these he analysed accurately, and sought to trace to their highest and ultimate causes. He set out from the point that all men tend to happiness as the ultimate object of all their endeavours, as the highest good, which is sought for its own sake, and to which all other goods merely serve as means. This happiness cannot consist in external goods, but only in the activity proper to human nature - not indeed in such a lower activity of the vegetative and sensitive life as man possesses in common with plants and brutes, but in the highest and most perfect activity of his reason, which springs in turn from virtue. This activity, however, has to be exercised in a perfect and enduring life. The highest pleasure is naturally bound up with this activity, yet, to constitute perfect happiness, external goods must also supply their share. True happiness, though prepared for him by the gods as the object and reward of virtue, can be attained only through a man’s own individual exertion. With keen penetration Aristotle therupon proceeds to investigate in turn each of the intellectual and moral virtues, and his treatment of them must, even at the present time, be regarded as in great part correct. The nature of the State and of the family were, in the main, rightly explained by him. The only pity is that his vision did not penetrate beyond this earthly life, and that he never saw clearly the relations of man to God. A more hedonistic (edone, "pleasure") turn in ethics begins with Democritus (about 460-370 B.C.), who considers a perpetually joyous and cheerful disposition as the highest good and happiness of man. The means thereto is virtue, which makes us independent of external goods -- so far as that is possible -- and which wisely discriminates between the pleasures to be sought after and those that are to be shunned. Pure Sensualism or Hedonism was first taught by Aristippus of Cyrene (435-354 B.C.), according to whom the greatest possible pleasure, is the end and supreme good of human endeavour. Epicurus (341-270 B.C.) differs from Aristippus in holding that the largest sum total possible of spiritual and sensual enjoyments, with the greatest possible freedom from displeasure and pain, is man’s highest good. Virtue is the proper directive norm in the attainmemt of this end.The Cynics, Antisthenes (444-369 B.C.) and Diogenes of Sinope (414-324 B.C.), taught the direct contrary of Hedonism, namely that virtue alone suffices for happiness, that pleasure is an evil, and that the truly wise man is above human laws. This teaching soon degenerated into haughty arrogance and open contempt for law and for the remainder of men (Cynicism). The Stoics, Zeno (336-264 B.C.) and his disciples, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and others, strove to refine and perfect the views of Antisthenes. Virtue, in their opinion, consist in man’s living according to the dictates of his rational, and, as each one’s individual nature is but a part of the entire natural order, virtue is, therefore, the harmonious agreement with the Divine Reason, which shapes the whole course of nature. Whether they conceived this relation of God to the world in a pantheistic or a theistic sense, is not altogether clear. Virtue is to be sought for its own sake, and it suffices for man’s happiness. All other things are indifferent and are, as circumstances require, to be striven after or shunned. The passions and affections are bad, and the wise man is independent of them. Among the Roman Stoics were Seneca (4 B.C. -- A.D. 65), Epictetus (born about A.D. 50), and the Emperor Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 121-180), upon whom however, at least upon the latter two, Christian influences had already begun to make themselves felt. Cicero (106-43 B.C.) elaborated no new philosophical system of his own, but chose those particular views from the various systems of Grecian philosophy which appeared best to him. He maintained that moral goodness, which is the general object of all virtues, consists in what is becoming to man as a rational being as distinct from the brute. Actions are often good or bad, just or unjust, not because of human institutions or customs, but of their own intrinsic nature. Above and beyond human laws, there is a natural law embracing all nations and all times, the expression of the rational will of the Most High God, from obedience to which no human authority can exempt us. Cicero gives an exhaustive exposition of the cardinal virtues and the obligations connected with them; he insists especially on devotion to the gods, without which human society could not exist.Parallel with the above-mentioned Greek and Roman ethical systems runs a sceptical tendency, which rejects eery natural moral law, bases the whole moral order on custom or human arbitrariness, and frees the wise man from subjection to the ordinary precepts of the moral order. This tendency was furthered by the Sophists, against whom Socrates and Plato arrayed themselves, and later on by Carnea, Theodore of Cyrene, and others.A new epoch in ethics begins with the dawn of Christianity. Ancient paganism never had a clear and definite concept of the relation between God and the world, of the unity of the human race, of the destiny of man, of the nature and meaning of the moral law. Christianity first shed full light on these and similar questions. As St. Paul teaches (Romans 2:24 sq.), God has written his moral law in the hearts of all men, even of those outside the influence of Christian Revelation; this law manifests itself in the conscience of every man and is the norm according to which the whole human race will be judged on the day of reckoning. In consequence of their perverse inclinations, this law had to a great extent become obscured and distorted among the pagans; Christianity, however, restored it to its prestine integrity. Thus, too, ethics received its richest and most fruitful stimulus. Proper ethical methods were now unfolded, and philosophy was in a position to follow up and develop these methods by means supplied from its own store-house. This corse was soon adopted in the early ages of the Church by the Fathers and ecclesiastical writers, as Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, but especially the illustrius Doctors of the Church, Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine, who, in the exposition and defence of Christian truth, made use of the principles laid down by the pagan philosophers. True, the Fathers had no occasion to treat moral questions from a purely philosophical standpoint, and independently of Christin Revelation; but in the explanation of Catholic doctrine their discussions naturally led to philosophical investigations. This is particularly true of St Augustine, who proceeded to thoroughly develop along philosophical lines and to establish firmly most of the truths of Christian morality. The eternal law (lex aterna), the original type and source of all temporal laws, the natural law, conscience, the ultimate end of man, the cardinal virtues, sin, marriage, etc. were treated by him in the clearest and most penetrating manner. Hardly a single portion of ethics does he present to us but is enriched with his keen philosophical commentaries. Late ecclesiastical writers followed in his footsteps.A sharper line of separation between philosophy and theology, and in particular between ethics and moral theology, is first met with in the works of the great Schoolmen of the Middle Ages, especially of Albert the Great (1193-1280), Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), Bonaventure (1221-1274), and Duns Scotus (1274-1308). Philosophy and, by means of it, theology reaped abundant fruit from the works of Aristotle, which had until then been a sealed treasure to Western civilization, and had first been elucidated by the detailed and profound commentaries of St. Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas and pressed into the service of Christian philosophy. The same is particularly true as regards ethics. St. Thomas, in his commentaries on the political and ethical writings of the Stagirite, in his "Summa contra Gentiles" and his "Quaestiones disputatae, treated with his wonted clearness and penetration nearly the whole range of ethics in a purely philosophical manner, so that even to the present day his wors are an inexhaustible source whence ethics draws its supply. On the foundations laid by him the Catholic philosophers and theoologians of succeeding ages have continued to build. It is true that in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, thanks especially to the influence of theco-called Nominalists, a period of stagnation and decline set in, but the sixteenth century is marked by a revival. Ethical questions, also, though largely treated in connexion with theology, are again made the subject of careful investigation. We mention as examples the great theologians Victoria, Dominicus Soto, L. Molina, Suarez, Lessius, and De Lugo. Since the sixteenth century special chairs of ethics (moral philosophy) have been erected in many Catholic universities. The larger, purely philosophical works on ethics, however do not appear until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as an example of which we may instance the production of Ign. Schwarz, "Instituitiones juris universalis naturae et gentium" (1743).Far different from Catholic ethical methods were those adopted for the most part by Protestants. With the rejection of the Church’s teaching authority, each individual became on principle his own supreme teacher and arbiter in matters appertaining to faith and morals. True it is that the Reformers held fast to Holy Writ as the infallible source of revelation, but as to what belongs or does not belong to it, whether, and how far, it is inspired, and what is its meaning -- all this was left to the final decision of the individual. The inevitable result was that philosophy arrogantly threw to the winds all regard for revealed truth, and in many cases became involved in the most pernicious errors. Melanchthon, in his "Elementa philosophiae moralis", still clung to the Aristotelean philosophy; so, too, did Hugo Grotius, in his work, "De jure belli et pacis". But Cumberland and his follower, Samuel Pufendorf, moreover, assumed, with Descartes, that the ultimate ground for every distinction between good and evil lay in the free determination of God’s will, a view which renders the philosophical treatment of ethics fundamentally impossible. Quite an influential factor in the development of ethics was Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). He suposes that the human race originally existed in existed in a rude condition (status naturae) in which every man was free to act as he pleased, and possessed a right to all things, whence arose a war of all against all. Lest destruction should be the result, it was decided to abandon this condition of nature and to found a state in which, by agreement, all were to be subject to one common will (one ruler). This authority ordains, by the law of the State, what is to be considered by all as good and as evil, and only then does there arise a distinction between good and evil of universal binding force on all. The Pantheist Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) considers the instinct to self-preservation as the foundation of virtue. Every being is endowed with the necessary impulse to assert itself, and, as reason demands nothing contrary to nature, it requires each one to follow this impulse and to stive after whatever is useful to him. And each individual possesses power and virtue just in so far as he obeys this impulse. Freedom of the will consists merely in the ability to follow unrestrainedly this natural impulse. Shaftesbury (1671-1713) bases ethics on the affections or inclinations of man. There are sympathetic, idiopathic, and unnatural inclinations. The first of these regard the common good, the second the private good of the agent, the third are opposed to the other two. To lead a morally good life, war must be waged upon the unnatural impulses, while the idiopathetic and sympathetic inclinations must be made to harmonize. This harmony constitutes virtue. In the attainment of virtue the subjective guiding principle of knowledge is the "moral sense", a sort of moral instinct. This "moral sense" theory was further developed by Hutcheson (1694-1747); meanwhile "common sense" was suggested by Thoms Reid (1710-1796) as the highest norm of moral conduct. In France the materialistic philosophers of the eighteenth century -- as Helvetius, de la Mettrie, Holbach, Condillac, and others -- disseminated the teachings of Sensualism and Hedonism as understood by Epicurus.A complete revolution in ethics was introduced by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). From the wreck of pure theoretical reason he turned for rescue to practical reason, in which he found an absolute, universal, and categorical moral law. This law is not to be conceived as an enactmnt of external authority, for this would be heteromony, which is foreign to true morality; it is rather the law of our own reason, which is, therefore, autonomous, that is, it must be observed for its own sake, without regard to any pleasure or utility arising therefrom. Only that will is morally good which obeys the moral law under the influence of such a subjective principle or motive as can be willed by the individual to become the universal law for all men. The followers of Kant have selected now one now another doctrine from his ethics and combined therewith various pantheistical systems. Fichte places man’s supreme good and destiny in absolute spontaniety and liberty; Schleiermacher, in co-operating with the progressive civilization of mankind. A similar view recurs substantially in the writings of Wilhelm Wundt and, to a certain extent, in those of the pessimist, Edward von Hartmann, though the latter regards culture and progress merely as means to the ultimate end, which, according to him, consists in delivering the Absolute from the torment of existence.The system of Cumberland, who maintained the common good of mankind to be the end and criterion of moral conduct, was renewed on a positive basis in the nineteenth century by Auguste Comte and has counted many adherents, e.g., in England, John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick, Alexander Bain; in Germany, G.T. Fechner, F.E. Beneke, F. Paulsen, and others. Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) sought to effect a compromise between social Utilitarianism (Altruism) and private Utilitarianism (Egoism) in accordance with the theory of evolution. In his opinion, that conduct is good which serves to augment life and pleasure withut any admixture of displeasure. In consequence, however, of man’s lack of adaptation to the conditions of life, such absolute goodness of conduct is not as yet possible, and hence various compromises must be made between Altruism and Egoism. With the progress of evolution, however, this adaptability to existing conditions will become more and more perfect, and consequently the benefits accruing to the individual from his own conduct will be most useful to society at large. In particular, sympathy (in joy) will enable us to take pleasure in altrusitic actions.The great majority of non-Christian moral philosophers have followed the path trodden by Spencer. Starting with the assumption that man, by a series of transformations, was gradually evolved from the brute, and therefore differs from it in degree only, they seek the first traces and beginnings of moral ideas in the brute itself. Charles Darwin had done some preparatory work along these lines, and Spencer did not hesitate to descant on brute-ethics, on the pre-human justice, conscience, and self-control of brutes. Present-day Evolutionists follow his view and attempt to show how animal morality has in man continually become more perfect. With the aid of analogies taken from ethnology, they relate how mankind originally wandered over the face of the earth in semi-savage hordes, knew nothing of marriage or the familt, and only by degrees reached a higher level of morality. These are the merest creations of fancy. If man is nothing more than a highly developed brute, he cannot possess a spiritual and immortal soul, and there can no longer be question of the freedom of the will, of the future retribution of good and evil, nor can man in consequence be hindered from ordering his life as he pleases and regarding the weel-being of others only in so far as it redounds to his own profit.As the Evolutionists, so too the Socialists favour the theory of evolution from their ethical viewpoint; yet the latter do not base their observations on scientific principles, but on social and economic considerations. According to K. Marx, F. Engels, and other exponents of the so-called "materialistic interpretation of history", all moral, religious, juridical and philosophical concepts are but the reflex of the economical conditions of society in the minds of men. Now these social relations are subject to constant change; hence the ideas of morality, religion, etc. are also continually changing. Every age, every people, and even each class in a given people forms its moral and religious ideas in accordance with its own peculiar economical situation. Hence, no universal code of morality exists binding on all men at all times; the morality of the present day is not of Divine origin, but the product of history, and will soon have to make room for anoter system of morality. Allied to this materialistic historical interpretation, though derived from other sources, is the system of Relativism, which resognizes no absolute and unchangeable truths in regard to ethics or anything else. Those who follow this opinion aver that nothing objectively true can be known by us. Men differ from one another and are subject to change, and with them the manner and means of viewing the world about them also change. Moreover the judgments passed on matters religious and moral depend essentially on the inclinations, interests, and character of the person judgng, while these latter are constantly varying. Pragmatism differs from Relativism inasmuch as that not only is to be considered true which is proven by experience to be useful; and, since the same thing is not always useful, unchangeable truth is impossible.In view of the chaos of opinions and systems just described, it need not surprise us that, as regards ethical problems, scepticism is extending its sway to the utmost limits, in fact many exhibit a fromal contempt for the traditional morality. According to Max Nordau, moral precepts are nothing but "conventional lies"; according to Max Stirner, that alone is good which serves my interests, whereas the common good, the love for all men, etc. are but empty phantoms. Men of genius and superiority in particular are coming more and more to be regarded as exempt from the moral law. Nietzsche is the originator of a school whose doctrines are founded on these principles. According to him, goodness was originaly identified with nobility and gentility of rank. Whatever the man of rank and power did, whatever inclinations he possessed were good. The down-trodden proletariat, on the other hand were bad, i.e. lowly and ignoble, without any other derogatory meaning being given to the word bad. It was only by a gradual process that the oppressed multitude through hatred and envy evolved the distinction between good and bad, in the moral sense, by denominating the characteristics and conduct of those in power and rank as bad, and their own behaviour as good. And thus arose the opposition between the morality of the master and that of the slave. Those in power still continued to look upon their own egoistic inclinations as noble and good, while the oppresed populace lauded the "instincts of the common herd", i.e. all those qulaities necessary and useful to its existence -- as patience, meekness, obedience and love of one’s neighbour. Weakness became goodness, cringing obsequiousness became humility, subjection to hated oppressors was obedience, cowardice meant patience. "All morality is one long and audacious deception." Hence, the value attached to the prevailing concepts of morality must be entirely rearranged. Intellectual superiority is above and beyond good and evil as understood in the traditional sense. There is no higher moral order to which men of such calibra are amenable. The end of society is not the common good of its members; the intellectual aristocracy (the over-man) is its own end; in its behalf the common herd, the "too many", must be reduced to slavery and decimated. As it rests with each individual to decide who belongs to this intellectual aristocracy, so each man is at liberty to emancipate himself from the existing moral order.In conclusion, one other tendency in ethics may be noted, which has manifested itself far and wide; namely, the effort to make all morality independent of all religion. It is clear that many of the above-mentioned ethical systems essentially exclude all regard for God and religion, and this is true especially of materialistic, agnostic, and in the last analysis, of all pantheistic systems. Apart, also, from these systems, "independent morality", called also "lay morality", has gained many followers and defenders. Kant’s ideas formed the basis of this tendency, for he himself founded a code of morality on the categorical imperative and expressly declared that morality is sufficient for itself, and therefore has no need of religion. Many modern philosophers -- Herbart, Eduard von Hartmann, Zeller, Wundt, Paulsen, Ziegler, and a number of others -- have followed Kant in this respect. For several decades practical attempts have been made to emanicpate morality from religion. In France religious instruction was banished from the schools in 1882 and moral instruction substituted. This tendency manifests a lively activity in what is known as the "ethical movement", whose home, properly speaking, is in the United States. In 1876, Felix Adler, professor at Cornell University, founded the "Society for Ethical Culture", in New York City. Similar societies were formed in other cities. These were consolidated in 1887 into the "Union of the Societies for Ethical Culture." Besides Adler, the chief propagators of the movement by word of mouth and writing were W.M. Salter and Stanton Coit. The purpose of these societies is declared to be "the improvement of the moral life of the members of the societies and of the community to which they belong, without any regard to theological or philosophical opinions". In most of the European countries ethical societies were founded on the model of the American organization. All these were combined in 1894 into the "International Ethical Asociation". Their purpose, i.e. the amelioration of man’s moral condition, is indeed praiseworthy, but it is erroneoud to suppose that any such moral improvement can be brought about without taking religion into consideration. In fact many members of the ethical societies are openly antagonistic to all religions, and would therefore do away with denominational schools and supplant religious teaching by mere moral instruction. Even upon purely ethical considerations such attempts must be unhesitatingly rejected. If it be true that even in the case of adults moral instruction without religion, without any higher obligation or sanction, is a nonentity, a meaningless sham, how much more so is it in the case of the young? It is evident that, judged from the standpoint of Christianity, these efforts must meet with a still more decided condemnation. Christians are bound to observe not only the prescriptions of the natural law, but also all the precepts given by Christ concerning faith, hope, love, Divine worship, and the imitation of Himself. The Christian, moreover, knows that without Divine grace and, hence, without prayer and the frequent reception of the sacraments, a morally good life for any considerable length of time is impossible. From their earliest years, therefore, the young must not only receive thorough instruction in all the Commandments, but must be exercised and trained in the practical use of the means of grace. Religion must be the soil and atmosphere in which education develops and flourishes.While, among non-Catholics ever since the Reformation, and especially since Kant, there has been an increasing tendency to divorce ethics from religion, and to dissolve it into countless venturesome and frequently contradictory systems, Catholics for the most part have remained free from these errors, because, in the Church’s infallible teaching authority, the Guardian of Christian Revelation, they have always found secure orientation. It is true that towards the end of the eighteenth, and at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Illuminism and Rationalism penetrated here and there into Catholic circles and attempted to replace moral theology by purely philosophical ethics, and in turn to transform the latter according to the Kantian autonomy. This movement, however, was but a passing phase. With a reawakening of the Church’s activity, fresh impetus was given to Catholic science, which was of benefit to ethics also and produced in its domain some excellent fruits. Recourse was again had to the illustrius past of Catholicism, while, at the same time, modern ethical systems gave occasion to a thorough investigation and verification of principles of the moral order. Taparelli d’Azeglio led the way with his great work "Saggio teoretico di diritto naturale appogiato sul fatto" (1840-43). Then followed, in Italy, Audisio, Rosmini, Liberatore, Sanseverino, Rosselli, Zigliara, Signoriello, Schiffini, Ferretti, Talamo, and others. In Spain this revival of ethics was due to, among others, J. Balmes, Donoso Cortés, Zefirio Gonzalez, Mendive, R. de Cepeda; in France and Belgium, to de Lehen (Institutes de droit naturel), de Margerie, Onclair, Ath, Vallet, Charles Périn, Piat, de Pascal, Moulart, Castelein; in England and America, to Joseph Rickaby, Jouin, Russo, Hollaind, J.J. Ming. In German-speaking countries the reawakening of Scolasticism in general begins with Kleutgen (Theologie der Vorzeit, 1853); Philosophie der Vorzeit, 1860), and of ethics in particular with Th. Meyer (Die Grundsätze der Sittlichkeit und des Rechts, 1868; Institutiones juris naturalis seu philosophiae moralis universae, 1885-1900). After them came A. Stöckl, Ferd, Walter, Moy de Sons, C. Gutberlet, Fr. J. Stein, Brandis, Costa-Rossetti, A.M. Weiss, Renninger, Lehmen, Willems, V. Frins, Heinrich Pesch, and others. We pass over numerous Catholic writers, who have made a specialty of sociology and political economy.IV. Outlines of EthicsIt is clear that the following statement cannot pretend to treat thoroughly all ethical questions; it is intended rather to afford the reader an insight into the most important problems dealt with by ethics, as well as into the methods adopted in their treatment. Ethics is usually divided into two parts: general, or theoretical ethics, and special, or applied ethics. General ethics expounds and verifies the general principles and concepts of the moral order; special ethics applies these general principles to the various relations of man, and determines his duties in particular.Reason itself can rise from the knowledge of the visible creation to the certain knowledge of the existence of God, the origin and end of all things. On this fundamental truth the structure of ethics must be based. God created man, as he created all things else, for His own honour and glory. The ultimate end is the proper motive of the will’s activity. If God were not the ultimate object and end of His own activity, he would depend upon His creatures, and would not be infinitely perfect. He is, then, the ultimate end of all things, they are created for His sake, not, indeed, that he can derive any benefit from them, which would be repugnant to an infinitely perfect being, but for His glory. They are to manifest His goodness and perfection. Irrational creatures cannot of themselves directly glorify God, for they are incapable of knowing Him. The are intended as means to the end for which rational man was created. The end of man, however, is to know God, to love Him and serve Him, and thereby attain to perfect and unending happiness. Every man has within him an irresistible, indestructible dersire for perfect happiness; he seeks to be free from every evil and to possess every attainable good. This impulse to happiness is founded on man’s nature; it is implanted there by his Maker; and hence will be duly realised, if nothing is wanting on the part of man’s own individual endeavour. But perfect happiness is unattainable in the present life, if for no other reason, at least for this, that inexorable death puts an early end to all earthly happiness. There is reserved for man a better life, if he freely chooses to glorify God here on earth. It will be the crown of victory to be conferred upon him hereafter, if at present he remains subject to God and keeps His Commandments. Only from the viewpoint of eternity do this earthly life and the moral order acquire their proper significance and value. But how does mna, considered in the natural order, or apart from every influence of supernatural revelations, come to know what God requires of him here below, or how he is to serve and glorify Him, in order to arrive at eternal happiness? -- By means of the natural law.From eternity there existed in the mind of God the idea of the world, which he determined to create, as well as the plan of government according to which He wished to rule the world and direct it to its end. This ordination existing in the mind of God from all eternity, and depending on the nature and essential relations of rational beings, is the eternal law of God (lex aeterna Dei), the source from which all temporal laws take their rise. God does not move and govern His creatures by a mere external directive impetus, as the archer does the arrow, but by means of internal impulses and inclinations, which He has bound up with their natures. Irrational creatures are urged, by means of physical forces or natural impulses and instincts to exercise the activity peculiar to them and keep the order designed for them. Man, on the other hand, is a being endowed with reason and free will; as such, he cannot be led by blind impulses and instincts in a manner conformable to his nature, but must needs depend on practical principles and judgments, which point out to him how he is to order his conduct. These principles must somehow or other be manifested to him by nature. All created things have implanted in their natures certain guiding principles, necessary to their corresponding activities. Man must be no exception to this rule. He must be led by a natural inborn light, manifesting to him what he is to do, or not to do. This natural light is the natural law. When we speak of man as possessing a natural, inborn light, it is not to be understood in the sense that man has innate ideas. Innate ideas do not exist. It is true, nevertheless, that the Creator has endowed man with the ability and the inclination to form many concepts anf develop principles. As soon as he comes to the use of reason, he forms, by a natural necessity, on the basis of experience, certain general concepts of theoretical reason -- e.g. those of being and not being, of cause and effect, of space and time -- and so he arrives at universal principles, e.g. that "nothing can exist and not exist at the same time", that "every effect has its cause", etc. As it is in the theoretical, so also in the practical order. As soon as reason has been sufficiently devloped, and the individual can somehow or other practically judge that he is something more than a mere animal, by an intrinsic necessity of his nature he forms the concept of good and evil, i.e. of something that is proper to the rational nature which distinguishes him from the brute, and which is therefore worth striving for, and something which is unbecoming and therefore to be avoided. Adn, as by nature he feels himself attracted by what is good, and repelled by what is evil, he naturaly forms the judgments, that "good is to be done and evil avoided", that "man ought to live according to the dictates of reason", etc. From hid own reflections, especially when assisted by instruction from others, he easily comes to the conclusion that in these judgments the will of a superior being, of the Creator and Designer of nature, has its expression. Around about him he perceives that all things are well ordered, so that it is very easy for him to discern in them the handiwork of a superior and all-wise power. He himself has been appointed to occupy in the domain of nature the position of lord and master; he, too, must lead a well regulated life, as befits a rational being, not merely because he himself chooses to do so, but also in obedience to his Creator. Man did not give himself his nature with all its faculties and inclinations; he received it from a superior being, whose wisdom and power are everywhere manifest to him in Creation.The general practical judgments and principles: "Do good and avoid evil", "Lead a life regulated according to reason", etc., from which all the Commandments of the Decalogue are derived, are the basis of the natural law, of which St. Paul (Romans 2:14) says, that it is written in the hearts of all men. This law is an emanation of the Divine law, made known to all men by nature herself; it is the expression of the will of nature’s Author, a participation of the created rational being in the eternal law of God. Hence the obligation it imposes does not arise from na’s own autonomy, as Kant held, nor from any other human authority, but from the will of the Creator; and man cannot violate it without rebelling against God, his master, offending Him, and becoming amenable to his justice. How deeply rooted among all nations this conviction of the higher origin of the natural law was, is shown by the fact that for various violations of it (as murder, adultery, erjury, etc.) they did their utmost to propitiate the angered deity by means of prayers and sacrifices. Hence they looked upon the deity as the guardian and protector of the moral order, who would not let the contempt of it to go unpunished. The same conviction is manifested by the value all nations have attached to the moral order, a value far surpassing that all other earthly goods. The noblest among the nations maintained that it was better to undergo any hardship, even death itself, rather than prove recreant to one’s duty. They understood, therefore, that, over and above earthly tresures, there were higher and more lasting goods whose attainment was dependent upon the observance of the moral order, and this not by reason of any ordinance of man, but because of the law of God. This being premised, it is clearly impossible to divorce morality from religion without robbing it of its true obligation and sanction, of its sanctity and inviolability and of its importance as transcending every other earthly consideration.The natural law consists of general practical principles (commands and prohibitions) and the conclusion necessarily flowing therefrom. It is the peculiar function of man to formulate these conclusions himself, though instruction and training are to assist him in doing so. Besides this, each individual has to take these principles as a guide of his conduct and apply them to his particular actions. This, to a certain extent, everybody does spontaneously, by virtue of an innate tendency. As in the case of all practical things, so in regard to what concerns the moral order, reason uses syllogistic processes. When a person, e.g., is on the point of telling a lie, or saying what is contrary to his convictions, there rises before his mental vision the general precept of the natural law: "Lying is wrong and forbidden." Hence he avails himself, at least virtually, of the following syllogisim: "Lying is forbidden; what you are about to say is a lie; therefore, what you are about to say is forbidden." The conclusion thus arrived at is our conscience, the proximate norm of our conduct. Conscience, therefore, is not an obscure feeling or a sort of moral instinct, but a practical judgment of our reason on the moral character of individual acts. If we follow the voice of conscience, our reward is peace and calm of soul, if we resist this voice, we experience disquiet and remorse.The natural law is the foundation of all human laws and precepts. It is only because we recognize the necessity of authority for human society, and because the natural law enjoins obedience to regularly constituted authority, that it is possible for a human superior to impose laws and commands binding in conscience. Indeed all human laws and precepts are fundamentally the conclusions, or more minute determinations, of the general principles of the natural law, and for this very reason every deliberate infraction of a law or precept binding in conscience is a sin, i.e. the violation of a Divine commandment, a rebellion against God, an offence against Him, which will not escape punishment in this life or in the next, unless dult repented of before death.The problems hitherto mentioned belong to general, or theoretical, ethics, and their investigation in nearly all cases bear upon the natural law, whose origin, nature, subject- matter, obligation, and properties it is the scope of ethics to explain thoroughly and verify. The general philosophical doctrine of right is usually treated in general ethics. Under no circumstances may the example of Kant and others be imitated in severing the doctrine of right from ethics, or moral philosophy, and developing it as a seperate and independent science. The juridical order is but a part of the moral order, even as justice is but one of the moral virtues. The first principle of right: "Give every man his due"; "Commit no injustice"; and the necessary conclusions from these: "Thou shalt not kill"; "Thou shalt not commit adultery", and the like, belong to the natural law, and cannot be deviated from without violating one’s duty and one’s neighbour’s rights, and staining one’s conscience with guilt in the sight of God.Special ethcis applies the principles of general, or theoretical, ethics to the various relations of man, and thus deduces his duties in particular. General ethics teaches that man must do good and avoid evil, and must inflict injury upon no one. Special ethics descends to particulars and demonstrates what is good or bad, right or wrong, and therefore to be done or avoided in the various relations of human life. First of al, it trest of man as an individual in his relations to God, to himself, and to his fellow-men. God is the Creator, Master, and ultimate end of man; from these relations arise man’s duties toward God. Presupposing his own individual efforts, he is, with God’s assistance, to hope for eternal happiness from Him; he must love God above all things as the highest, infinite good, in such a manner that no creature shall be preferred to Him; he must acknowledge Him as his absolute lord and master, adore and reverence Him, and resign himself entirely to His holy Will. The first, highest, and most essential business of man is to serve God. In case it is God’s good pleasure to reveal a supernatural religion and to determine in detail the manner and means of our worship of Him, man is bound by the natural law to accept this revelation in a spirit of faith. and to order his life accordingly. Here, too, it is plain that to divorce morality from religion is impossible. Religious duties, those, namely, which have direct reference to God, are man’s prinicpal and most essential moral duties. Linked to these duties to God are man’s duties regarding himself. Man loves himself by an intrinsic necessity of his nature. From this fact Schopenhauer drew the conclusion that the commandment concerning sel-love was superflous. This would be true, if it were a matter of indifference how man loved himself. But such is not the case; he must love himself with a well-ordered love. He is to be solicitous for the welfare of his soul and to do what is necessary to attain to eternal happiness. He is not his own master, but was created for the service of God; hence the deliberate arbitrary destruction of one’s own life (suicide), as well as the freely intended mutilation of self, is a criminal attack on the proprietary right God has to man’s person. Furthermore, every man is supposed to take a reasonable care to preserve his health. He has certain duties also as regards temperance; for the body must not be his master, but an instrument in the service of the soul, and hence must be cared for in so far only as is conducive to this purpose. A further duty concerns the acquisition of external material goods, as far as they are necessary for man’s support and the fulfillment of his other obligations. This again involves the obligation to work; furthermore, God has endowed man with the capacity for work in order that he might prove himself a beneficial member of society; for idleness is the root of all evil. Besides these self-regarding duties, there are simial ones regarding our fellow-men: duties of love, justice, fidelity, truthfullness, gratitude, etc. The commandment of the love of our neighbour first received its true appreciation in the Christian Dispensation. Though doublessly contained to a certain extent in the natural law, the pagans had so lost sight of the unity of the human race, and of the fact that all men are members of one vast family dependent upon God, that they looked on every stranger as an enemy. Christianity restored to mankind the consciousness of its unity and solidarity, and supernaturally transfigured the natural precept to love our neighbour, by demonstrating that all men are children of the same Father in heaven, were redeemed by the same blood of the same Saviour, and are destined to the same supernatual salvation. And, better still, Christianity provided man with the grace necessary to the fulfillment of this precept and thus renewed the face of the earth. In man’s intercourse with his fellow-men the precepts of justice and of the other allied virtues go hand in hand with the precept of love. There exists in man the natural tendency to assert himself when there is question of his goods or property. He expects his fellow-men to respect what belongs to him, and instinctively resists any unjust attempt to violate this proprietorship. He will brook an injury from no one in all that regards his life or health, his wife or child, his honour or good name; he resents faithlessness and ingratitude on the part of others, and the lie by which they would lead him into error. Yet he clearly understands that only then can he reasonably expect others to respect his rights when he in turn respects theirs. Hence the general maxim: "Do not do to others, what you would not wish them to do to you"; from which are naturally deduced the general commandments known to all men: "Thou shalt not kill, nor commit adultery, nor steal, nor bear false witness against thy neighbour", etc. In this part of ethics it is customary to investigate the principles of right as regards private ownership. Has every man the right to acquire property? Or, at least, may not society (the State) abolish private ownership and assume possession and control of all material goods either wholly or in part, in order to thus distribute among the members of the community the products of their joint industry? This latter question is answered in the affirmative by the Socialists; and yet, it is the experience of all ages that the community of goods and of ownership is altogether impracticable in larger commonwealths, and would, if realiszd in any case, invlolve widespread slavery.The second part of special, or applied, ethics, called by many sociology, considers man as a member of society, as far as this can be made the subject of philosophical investigation. Man is by nature a social being; out of his innate needs, inclinations, and tendencies the family and State necessarily arise. And first of all the Creator had to provide for the preservation and propagation of the human race. Man’s life is brief, were no provision made for the perpetuation of the human species, the world would soon become an uninhabited solitude, a well-appointed abode without occupants. Hence God has given man the power and propensity to propagate his kind. The generative function was not primarily intended for man’s indicidual well-being, but for the general good of his species, and in its exercise, therefore, he must be guided accordingly. This general good cannot be perfectly realized except in a lasting indissoluble monogamy. The unity and indissolubility of the marriage bond are requirements of the natural law, at least in the sense that man may not on his own authority set them aside. Marriage is a Divine institution, for which God Himself has provided by means of definite laws, and in regard to which, therefore, man has not the power to make any change. The Creator might, of course, dispense for a time from the unity and indissolubility of the marriage tie; for, though the perfection of the married state demands these qualities, they are not of absolute necessity; the principal end of marriage may be attained to a certain degree without them. God could, therefore, for wise reasons grant a dispensation in regard to them for a certain length of time. Christ, however, restored marriage to the original perfection consonant with its nature. Moreover He raised marriage to the dignity of a sacrament and made it symbolic of His own union with the Church; and had he done nothing more in this respect than restore the natural law to its prestine integrity, mankind would be bound to Him by an eternal debt of gratitude. For it was chiefly be means of the unity and indissolubility of the married life that the sanctuary of the Christian family was established, from which mankind has reaped the choicest blessings, and compared with which paganism has no equivalent to offer. This exposition of the nature of marriage from a theistic standpoint is diametrically opposed to the views of modern Darwinists. According to them, men did not primitively recognize any such institution as the married state, but lived together in complete promiscuity. Marriage was the result of gradual development, woman was originally the centre about which the family crystallized, and from this latter circumstance there arises an explanation of the fact that many savage tribes reckon heredity and kinship between families accoding to the lineal descent of the female. We cannot dwell long upon these fantastic speculations, because they do not consider man as essentially different from the brute, but as gradually developed from a purely animal origin. Although marriage is of Divine institution, not every individual is obliged, as a human being, to embrace the married state. God intends marriage for the propagation of the human race. To achieve this purpose it is by no means necessary for each and every member of the human family to enter upon marriage, and this particularly at the present time, when the question of over-population presents so many grave difficulties to social economists. In this connexion certain other considerations from a Christian point of view arise, which do not, however, belong to philosophical ethics. Since the principal end of marriage is the procreation and education of children, it is encumbent upon both parents to co-operate according to the requirements of sex in the attainment of this end. From this it may readily be gathered what duties exist between husband and wife, and between parents and their children.The second natural society, the State, is a logical and necessary outcome of the family. A completely isolated family could scarcely support itself, at all events it could never rise above the lowest grade of civilization. Hence we see that at all times and in all places, owing to natural needs and tendencies, larger groups of families are formed. A division of labour takes place. Each family devotes itself to some industry in which it may improve and develop its resources, and then exchanges its products for those of other families. And now the way is opened to civilization and progress. This grouping of families, in order to be permanent, has need of authority, which makes for security, order, and peace, and in general provides for what is necessary to the common good. Since God intends men to live together in harmony and order, He likewise desires such authority in the community as will have the right to proc
ure what is needful for the common good. This authority, considered in itself and apart from the human vehicle in which it is placed, comes immediately from God, and hence, within its proper sphere, it imposes upon the consciences of the subjects the duty of obedience. In the light of this interpretation, the exercise of public power is vested with its proper dignity and inviolability, and at the same time is circumscribed by necessary limitations. A group of families under a common authoritive head, and not subject to any similar aggregation, forms the primitive State, however small this may be. By further development, or by coalition with other States, larger States gradually come into existence. It is not the purpose of the State to supplant the families, but to safeguard their rights, to protect them, and to supplement their efforts. It is not to forfeit their rights or to abandon their proper functions that individuals and families combine to form the State, but to be secured in these rights, and to find support and encouragement in the discharge of the various duties assigned them. Hence the State may not deprive the family of its right to educate and instruct the children, but must simply lend its assistance by supplying, wheneer needful, opportunities for the better accomplishment of this duty. Only so far as the order and prosperity of the body politic requires it, may the State circumscribe individual effort and activity. In other words, the State is to posit the conditions under which, provided private endeavour be not lacking, each individual and each family may attain to true earthly happiness. By true earthly happiness is meant such as not only does not interfere with the free performance of the individual’s moral duties, but even upholds and encourages him therin.Having defined the end and aim of the State, we are now in a position to examine in detail its various functions and extent. Private morality is not subject to State interference; but it is the proper function of the State to concern itself with the interests of public morality. It must not only prevent vice from parading in public and becoming a snare to many (e.g. through immoral literature, theatres, plays, or other means of seduction), but also see to it that the public ordinances and laws facilitate and advance morally good behaviour. The State may not affect indifference as regards religion; the obligation to honour God publicly is binding upon the Sate as such. It is true that the direct supervision of religious matters in the present supernatural order was entrusted by Christ to His Church; nevertheless, it is the duty of the Christian State to protect and uphold the Church, the one true Church founded by Christ. Of course, owing to the unfortunate division of Christians into numerous religious systems, such an intimate relation betwen Church and State is at the present day but rarely maintained. The separation of Church and State, with complete liberty of conscience and worship, is often the only practical modus vivendi. In circumstances such as these the State must be satisfied to leave the affairs of religion to various bodies, and to protect the latter in those rights which have reference to the general public order. The education and instruction of children belongs per se to the family, and should not be monopolized by the State. The later has, however, the right and the duty to suppress schools which disseminate immoral doctrine or foster the practice of vice; beyond such control it may not set limits to free individual endeavour. It may, however, assist the individual in his efforts to secure an education, and, in case these do not suffice, it may establish schools and institutions for his benefit. Finally, the State has to exercise important economical functions. It must protect private property and see to it that in man’s industrial life the laws affecting justice be carried out in all their force and vigour. But its duties do not stop here. It should pass such laws as will enable its subjects to procure what is needed for their respectable sustenance and even to attain a moderate competency. Both excessive wealth and extreme poverty involve many dangers to the individual and to society. Hence the State should pass such laws as will favour the sturdy middle class of citizens and add to their numbers. Much can be done to bring about this desirable condition by the enactment of proper tax and inheritance laws, of laws which protect the labouring, manufacturing, and agricultural interests, and which supervise and control trusts, syndicates, etc.Although the authority of the State comes immediately from God, the person who exercises it is not immediately designated by Him. This determination is left to the circumstances of men’s progress and development or of their modes of social aggregation. According as the supreme power resides in one individual, or in a privileged class, or in the people collectively, governments are divided into three forms: the monarchy; the aristocracy; the democracy. The monarchy is hereditary or elective, according as succession to supreme power follows the right of primogeniture of a family (dynasty) or is subject to suffrage. At the present day the only existing kind of monarchy is the hereditary, the elective monarchies, such as Poland and the old German Sovereignty, having long since disappeared. Those States in which the sovereign power resides in the body of the people are called polycracies, or more commonly, republics, and are divided into aristocracies and democracies. In republics sovereignty is vested in the people. The latter elect from their number representatives who frame their laws and administer the affairs of government in their name. The almost universally prevailing form of government in Europe, fashioned upon the model created in England, is the constitutional monarchy, a mixture of the monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic forms. The law- making power is vested in the king and two chambers. The members of one chamber represent the aristocratic and conservative element, while the other chamber, elected from the body of citizens, represents the democratic element. The monarch himself is responsible to no one, yet his governmental acts require the counter-signature of the ministers, who in turn are responsible to the chamber.With regard to its appointed functions the government of the State is divided into the legislative, judiciary, and executive powers. It is of primary importace that the State enact general and stable laws governing the activities of its subjects, as far as this is required for the good order and well-being of the whole body. For this purpose it must possess the right to legislate; it must, moreover, carry out these laws and provide, by means of the administrative, or rather executive, power for what is needful to the general good of the community; finally, it has to punish infractions of the laws and authoritively settle legal disputes, and for this purpose it has need of the judiciary power (in civil and criminal courts). This right of the State to impose penalties is founded on the necessity to preserve good order and of providing for the security of the whole body politic. In a community there are always found those who can in no other way be effectually forced to observe the laws and respect the rights of others than by the infliction of punishment. Hence the State must have the right to enact penal statutes, calculated to deter its subjects from violating the laws, and the right, moreover, to actually inflict punishment after the violation has occurred. Among the legitimate modes of punishment is capital punishment. It is considered, and rightly so, a step forward in civilization, that nowadays a milder practice has been adopted in this regard, and that capital punishment is more rarely inflicted, and then only for such heinous crimes as murder and high treason. Nevertheless humanitarian sentimentalism has no doubt been carried to an exaggerated degree, so much so that many would on principle do away with capital punishment altogether. And yet, this is the only sanction sufficiently effective to deter some men from committing the gravest crimes.When it is asserted, with Aristotle, that the State is a society sufficient for itself, this is to be considered true in the sense that the State needs no further development to complete its organization, but not in the sense that it is independent in every respect. The greater the advance of mankind in progress and civilization, the more necessary and frequent the communication between nations becomes. Hence the question arises as to what rights and duties mutually exist between nation and nation. That portion of ethics which treats thisquestion from a philosophical standpoint is called the theory of international law, or of the law of nations. Of course, many writers of the present day deny the propriety of a philosophical treatment of international law. According to them the only international rights and duties are those which have been established by some positive measure either implicitly or explicitly agreed upon. This, indeed, is the position that must be taken by all who reject the natural law. On the other hand, this position precludes the possibility of any positive international law whatever, for lasting and binding compacts between various States are possible only when the primary principle of right is recognized -- that it is just and obligatory to stand by lawful agreements. Now this is a principle of natural law; hence, those who deny the existence of natural law (e.g. E. von Hartmann) must consequently reject any international law properly so called. In their opinion any international agreements are mere conventions, which each one observes as long as he finds it necessary or advantageous. And so we are eventually led back to the principle of ancient paganism, which, in the intercourse between nations, too often identified right with might. But Christianity brought the nations into a closer union and broke down the barriers of narrow-minded policy. It proclaimed, moreover, the duties of love and justice as binding on all nations, thus restoring and perfecting the natural law. The fundamental principles: "Give each one his due", "Do injury to no man", "Do not to others what you would not have them do to you", etc., have an absolute and universal value, and hence must obtain also in the intercourse between nations. Purely natural duties and rights are comon to all nations; the acquired or positive ones may vary considerably. Various, too, are the rights and duties of nations in peace and in war. Since, however, there are, under this head, many details of a doubtful and changeable character, the codification of international law is a most urgent desideratum. Besides this an international court should be established to attend to the execution of the various measures promulgated by the law and to arbitrate in case of dispute. The foundations of such an intenational court of arbitration have been laid at The Hague; unfortunately, its competence has been hitherto very much restricted, and besides, it exercises its functions only when the Powers at variance appeal to it of their own accord. In the codification of international law no one would be more competent to lend effective cooperation and to maintain the principles of justice and love which should exist between nations in their intercourse with one another, than the pope. No one can offer sounder guarantees for the righteousness of the principles to be laid down, and no one can exert greated moral influence towards carrying them into effect. This is even recognized by unprejudiced Protestants. At the Vatican Council not only the many Catholic bishops present, but the Protestant David Urquhart appealed to the pope to draw up a schedule of the more important principles of international law, which were to be binding on all Christian nations. Religious prejudice, however, places many difficulties in the way of realizing this plan.-----------------------------------V. CATHREIN Transcribed by Brendan Byrne The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume VCopyright © 1909 by Robert Appleton CompanyOnline Edition Copyright © 2003 by K. KnightNihil Obstat, May 1, 1909. Remy Lafort, CensorImprimatur. +John M. Farley, Archbishop of New York
I. Nature and Function of Ethics
1. Rise of Ethics
2. Ethics as a Science
3. A Normative Science
4. Relation to Cognate Sciences
(1) Ethics and Metaphysics
(2) Ethics and Psychology
The “Ought”
5. Relation of Christian Ethics to Moral Philosophy
(1) Not an Opposition
(2) Philosophical Postulates
(3) Method
6. Relation of Christian Ethics to Dogmatics
(1) The Connection
(2) The Distinction
(3) Theological Postulates
(a) The Christian Idea of God
(b) The Christian Doctrine of Sin
(c) The Responsibility of Man
II. Historical Sketch of Ethics
1. Greek Philosophy
(1) Sophists
(2) Socrates
(3) Plato
(4) Aristotle
(5) Stoics and Epicureans
(6) Stoicism
(7) Stoicism and Paul
2. Scholasticism
3. Reformation
Descartes and Spinoza
4. English Moralists
5. Utilitarianism
6. Evolutionary Ethics
7. Kant
8. German Idealists
(1) Hegel
(2) Watchwords: Pleasure and Duty
III. Principles and Characteristics of Biblical Ethics
1. Ethics of the Old Testament
(1) Religious Characteristics of Hebrew Ethics
(a) The Decalogue
(b) Civil Laws
(c) Ceremonial Laws
(d) Prophecy
(e) Books of Wisdom
(f) Apocryphal Books
(2) Limitations of Old Testament Ethics
(a) As to Intent
(b) As to Extent
2. Outline of New Testament Ethics
(1) Ethics of Jesus and Paul
(2) Character
(3) Inwardness of Motive
(4) Ultimate End
3. The Ethical Ideal
(1) Holiness
(2) Christlikeness
(3) Brotherhood and Unity of Man
4. The Dynamic Power of the New Life
(1) The Dynamic on Its Divine Side
(2) The Dynamic on Its Human Side
5. Virtues, Duties and Spheres of the New Life
(1) The Virtues
(a) The Heroic Virtues
(b) The Amiable Virtues
(c) The Theological Virtues
(2) The Duties
(a) Duties toward Self
(b) Duties in Relation to Others
(c) Duties in Relation to God
(3) Spheres and Relationships
6. Conclusion
Absoluteness, Inwardness and Universality
Literature
In this article, which proposes to be of a general and introductory character, we shall first deal with the nature and function of ethics generally, showing its difference from and relation to other cognate branches of inquiry. Secondly, we shall sketch briefly the history of ethics in so far as the various stages of its development bear upon and prepare the way for Christian ethics, indicating also the subsequent course of ethical speculation. Thirdly, we shall give some account of Biblical ethics; treating first of the main moral ideas contained in the Old Testament, and enumerating, secondly, the general principles and leading characteristics which underlie the ethical teaching of the New Testament.
I. Nature and Function of Ethics
Ethics is that branch of philosophy which is concerned with human character and conduct. It deals with man, not so much as a subject of knowledge, as a source of action. It has to do with life or personality in its inward dispositions, outward manifestations and social relations. It was Aristotle who first gave to this study its name and systematic form. According to the Greek signification of the term, it is the science of customs (
1. Rise of Ethics
Men live before they reflect, and act before they examine the grounds of action. So long as there is a congruity between the habits of an individual or a people and the practical requirements of life, ethical questions do not occur. It is only when difficulties arise and new problems appear as to right and duty in which the existing customs of life offer no solution, that doubt awakes, and with doubt reflection upon the actual morality which governs life. It is when men begin to call in question their past usages and institutions and to read-just their attitude to old traditions and new interests that ethics appears. Ethics is not morality but reflection upon morality. When, therefore, Aristotle, following Socrates and Plato, employed the term, he had in view not merely a description of the outward life of man, but rather the sources of action and the objects as ends which ought to guide him in the proper conduct of life. According to the best usage the names Moral Philosophy and Ethics are equivalent and mean generally the rational explanation of our nature, actions and relations as moral and responsible beings. Ethics therefore may be defined as the systematic study of human character, and its function is to show how human life must be fashioned to realize its end or purpose.
2. Ethics as a Science
But accepting this general definition, how, it may be asked, can we speak of a science of conduct at all? Has not science to do with necessary truths, to trace effects from causes, to formulate general laws according to which these causes act, and to draw inevitable and necessary consequences? But is not character just that concerning which no definite conclusions can be predicted? Is not conduct, dependent as it is on the human will, just that which cannot be explained as the resultant of calculable forces? If the will is free then you cannot decide beforehand what line it will take, or predict what shape character must assume. The whole conception of a science of ethics, it is contended, must fall to the ground if we admit an invariable and calculable element in conduct. But this objection is based partly upon a misconception of the function of science and partly upon a too narrow classification of the sciences. Science has not only to do with cause and effect and the laws according to which phenomena actually occur. Science seeks to deal systematically with all truths that are presented to us; and there is a large class of truths not belonging indeed to the realm of natural and physical events which, however, may be studied and correlated. Ethics is not indeed concerned with conduct, as a natural fact, as something done here and now following from certain causes in the past and succeeded by certain results in the future. It is concerned with judgments upon conduct - the judgment that such conduct is right or wrong as measured by a certain standard or end. Hence, a distinction has been made between the physical sciences and what are called normative sciences.
3. A Normative Science
The natural or physical sciences are concerned simply with phenomena of Nature or mind, actual occurrences which have to be analyzed and classified. The normative sciences, on the other hand, have to do not with mere facts in time or space, but with judgments about these facts, with certain standards or ends (norms, from norma, “a rule”) in accordance with which the facts are to be valued. Man cannot be explained by natural law. He is not simply a part of the world, a link in the chain of causality. When we reflect upon his life and his relation to the world we find that he is conscious of himself as an end and that he is capable of forming purposes, of proposing new ends and of directing his thoughts and actions with a view to the attainment of these ends, and making things subservient to him. Such an end or purpose thus forms a norm for the regulation of life; and the laws which must be observed for the attainment of such an end form the subjects of a normal or normative science. Ethics therefore has to do with the norm or standard of right or wrong, and is concerned primarily with the laws which regulate our judgments and guide our actions.
4. Relation to Cognate Sciences
Man is of course a unity, but it is possible to view his self-consciousness in three different aspects, and to regard his personality as constituted of an intellectual, sentient and volitional element. Roughly corresponding to these three aspects, one in reality but separable in thought, there arise three distinct though interdependent mental sciences: metaphysics, which has to do with man’s relation to the universe of which he forms a part; psychology, which deals with the nature, constitution and evolution of his faculties and feelings as a psychical being; and ethics, which treats of him as a volitional being, possessing will or determining activity.
(1) Ethics and Metaphysics
Ethics, though distinct from, is closely connected with metaphysics on the one hand, and psychology on the other. If we take metaphysics in its widest sense as including natural theology and as positing some ultimate end to the realization of which the whole process of the world is somehow a means, we may easily see how it is a necessary presupposition or basis of ethical inquiry. The world as made and governed by and for an intelligent purpose, and man as a part of it, having his place and function in a great teleological cosmos, are postulates of the moral life and must be accepted as a basis of all ethical study. The distinction between ethics and metaphysics did not arise at once. In early Greek philosophy they were closely united. Even now the two subjects cannot be completely dissociated. Ethics invariably runs back into metaphysics, or at least into theology, and in every philosophical system in which the universe is regarded as having an ultimate end or good, the good of human beings is conceived as identical with or included in the universal good (see Ziegler, Gesch. der christlichen Ethik; also Sidgwick, History of Ethics).
(2) Ethics and Psychology
On the other hand ethics is closely associated with, though distinguishable from, psychology. Questions of conduct inevitably lead to inquiries as to certain states of the agent’s mind, for we cannot pronounce an action morally good or bad until we have investigated the qualities of intention, purpose, motive and disposition which lie at the root of the action. Hence, all students of ethics are agreed that the main object of their investigation must belong to the psychical side of human life, whether they hold that man’s ultimate end is to be found in the sphere of pleasure or they maintain that his well-being lies in the realization of virtue. Questions as to existence, evolution and adequacy of a moral faculty (see CONSCIENCE); as to the relation of pleasure and desire; as to the meaning of validity of voluntary action; as to the historical evolution of moral customs and ideals, and man’s relation at each stage of his being to the social, political and religious institutions, belong indeed to a science of ethics, but they have their roots in psychology as a study of the human soul.
The very existence of a science of ethics depends upon the answers which psychology gives to such questions. If, for example, we decide that there is no such faculty in man as conscience and that the moral sense is but a natural manifestation which has gradually evolved with the physical and social evolution of man (Darwin, Spencer); or if we deny the self-determining power of human beings and assume that the freedom of the will is a delusion, or in the last resort a negligible element, and treat man as one of the many phenomena of a physical universe, then indeed we may continue to speak of a science of the moral life as some naturalistic writers do, but such a science would not be a science of ethics as we understand it. Whatever be our explanation of conscience and freedom, no theory as to these powers must depersonalize man, and we may be justly suspicious of any system of psychology which undermines the authority of the moral sense or paves the way for a complete irresponsibility.
The “Ought”
Ethics is based on the assumption that man is a person possessing rights and having duties - responsible therefore for his intentions as well as his actions. The idea of personality involves not only a sense of accountability but carries with it also the conception of a law to which man is to conform, an ideal at which he is to aim. The end of life with all its implications forms the subject of ethics. It is concerned not simply with what a man is or does, but more particularly with what he should be and do. Hence, the word “ought” is the most distinctive term of ethics. The “ought” of life constitutes at once the end or ideal and the law of man. It comprises end, rule and motive of action. Thus the problem of ethics comes to be regarded as the highest good of man, the
5. Relation of Christian Ethics to Moral Philosophy
If ethics generally is based upon the postulates of philosophy and psychology, and at each stage of human consciousness grounds its principles of life upon the view of the world and of man to which it has attained, Christian ethics presupposes the Christian view of life as revealed by Christ, and its definition must be in harmony with the Christian ideal. Christian ethics is the science of morals conditioned by Christianity, and the problems which it discusses are the nature, laws and duties of the moral life as dominated by the Supreme Good which Christians believe to have been revealed in and through the life and teaching of Jesus Christ. Christian ethics is thus a branch or particular application of general ethics. So far from being opposed to moral philosophy it is the inevitable outcome of the evolution of thought. For if the revelation of God through Christ is true, then it is a factor, and the greatest in life and destiny, which must condition man’s entire outlook and give a new value to his aims and duties.
(1) Not an Opposition
In Christianity we are confronted with the motive power of a great Personality entering into the current of human history, and by His preëminent spiritual force giving a direction to the moral life of man. This means that the moral life can only be understood by reference to the creative power of this Personality. If there is any place at all for a distinct science of Christian ethics, that place can be indicated only by starting from the ethical ideal embodied in Christ, and working out from that point a code of morality for the practical guidance of the Christian life. But while this truth gives to Christian ethics its distinctive character and preëminent worth, it neither throws discredit upon philosophical ethics nor separates the two sciences by any hard-and-fast lines. They have much in common. A large domain of conduct is covered by both. The so-called pagan virtues have their worth for Christian character and are in the line of Christian virtues. Man even in his natural state is constituted for the moral life and is not without some knowledge of right and wrong (Rom 1:20). The moral attainments of the ancients are not simply “splendid vices.” Duty may differ in content, but it is of the same kind under every system. Purity is purity, and benevolence benevolence, and both are excellences, whether manifested in a heathen or a Christian. While therefore Christian ethics takes its point of departure from the revelation of God and the manifestation of man’s possibilities in Christ, it accepts and uses the results of moral philosophy in so far as they throw light upon the fundamental facts of human nature. As a system of morals Christianity claims to be inclusive. It takes cognizance of all the data of consciousness, and assumes all ascertained truth as its own. It completes what is lacking in other systems in so far as their conclusions are based on an incomplete survey of facts. Christian morals, in short, deal with personality in its highest ranges of moral power and spiritual consciousness, and seek to interpret life by its greatest possibilities and loftiest attainments as they have been revealed in Christ.
(2) Philosophical Postulates
As illustrating what has just been said two distinctive features of Christian morals may be noted, of which philosophical ethics takes little or no account:
(a) Christian ethics assumes a latent spirituality in man awaiting the Spirit of God to call it forth. “Human nature,” says Newman Smyth, “has its existence in an ethical sphere and for moral ends of being.” There is a natural capacity for ethical life to which man’s whole constitution points. Matter itself may be said to exist ultimately for spirit, and the spirit of man for the Holy Spirit (compare Rothe, Theologische Ethik, I, 459). No theory of man’s physical beginning can interfere with the assumption that man stands upon a moral plane and is capable of a life which shapes itself to spiritual ends. Whatever be man’s history and evolution, he has from the beginning been made in God’s image, and he bears the Divine impress in all the lineaments of his body and soul. His degradation cannot wholly obliterate his nobility, and his actual corruption bears witness to his possible holiness. Christian morality is therefore nothing else than the morality prepared from all eternity, and is but the highest realization of that which heathen virtue was striving after. This is the Pauline view of human nature. Jesus Christ, according to the apostle, is the end and consummation of the whole creation. Everywhere there is a capacity for Christ. Man is not simply what he now is, but all that he is yet to be (1Co 15:47-49).
(b) Connected with this peculiarity is another which further differentiates Christian ethics from philosophical - the problem of the re-creation of character. Speculative systems do not advance beyond the formation of moral requirements; they prescribe what ought ideally to be done or avoided. Christianity, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the question, By what power can I achieve the right and the good? (compare Ottley, Christian Ideas and Ideals, 22). It regards human nature as in need of renewal and recovery. It points to a process by which character can be restored and transformed. It claims to be the power of God unto salvation to everyone that believeth (Rom 1:16). Christian ethics thus makes the twofold assumption, and in this its contrast to philosophical ethics is disclosed, that the ideal of humanity has been revealed in Jesus Christ and that in Him also there is supplied a power by which man may become his true self, all that his natural life gives promise of and potentially is.
(3) Method
Passing from a consideration of the data of Christian ethics to its method, we find that here again there is much that is common to philosophy and Christian morals. The method in both is the rational method. The Christian ideal, though given in Christ, has to be examined, analyzed and applied by the very same faculties as man employs in regard to speculative problems. All science must be furnished with facts, and its task is to give a consistent explanation of them. While the speculative thinker finds his facts in the constitution of the moral world at large, the Christian discovers his in Scripture, and more particularly in the teachings of Christ. But it is sufficient to point out that while the New Testament is largely occupied with ethical matters, there is no attempt at a scientific formulation of them. The materials of systematic treatment are there, but the task of coordinating and classifying principles is the work of the expositor. The data are supplied but these data require to be interpreted, unified and applied so as to form a system of ethics. Consequently in dealing with his facts, the same method must be employed by the Christian expositor as by the student of science. That is the method of rational inquiry and inductive procedure - the method imposed upon all mental problems by the essential nature of the mind itself. The authority to which Christian ethics appeals is not an external oracle which imposes its dictates in a mechanical way. It is an authority embodied in intelligible forms and appealing to the reasoning faculties of man. Christian ethics is not a cut-and-dried, ready-made code. It has to be thought out by man and brought to bear, through the instrumentality of his thinking powers, upon all the relationships of life. According to the Protestant view, at least, ethics is no stereotyped compendium of rules which the Bible or the church supplies to save a man from the trouble of thinking. It is a complete misapprehension of the nature of Scripture and of the purpose of Christ’s example and teaching to assume that they afford a mechanical standard which must be copied or obeyed in a slavish way. Christ appeals to the rational nature of man, and His words are life and spirit only as they are apprehended in an intelligent way and become by inner conviction and personal appropriation the principles of thought and action:
6. Relation of Christian Ethics to Dogmatics
Within the domain of theology the two main constituents of Christian of teaching are dogmatics and ethics, or doctrine and morals. Though it is convenient to treat these separately, they really form a whole, and are but two sides of one subject. It is difficult to define their limits, and to say where dogmatics ends and ethics begins.
The distinction has sometimes been expressed by saying that dogmatics is a theoretic, while ethics is a practical science. It is true that ethics stands nearer to everyday life and deals with methods of practical conduct, while dogmatics is concerned with beliefs and treats of their origin and elucidation. But on the other hand ethics discusses thoughts as well as actions, and is interested in inner judgments not less than outward achievements. There is a practical side to all doctrine; and there is a theoretic side of all morals. In proportion as dogmatic theology becomes divorced from practical interest there is a danger that it may become mere pedantry. Even the most theoretic of sciences, metaphysics, while, as Novalis said, it bakes no bread, has its justification in its bearing upon life. On the other hand, ethics would lose all scientific value and would sink into a mere enumeration of duties if it had no dogmatic basis and did not draw its motives from beliefs. The common statement that dogmatics shows what we should believe and ethics what we should do is only approximately true and is inadequate. For moral laws and precepts are also objects of faith, and what we should believe involves a moral requirement and has a moral character.
(1) The Connection
Schleiermacher has been frequently charged with ignoring the differences between the two disciplines, but with scant justice; for while he regards the two studies as but different branches of Christian doctrine and while emphasizing their intimate connection, he by no means neglects their differences (compare Schleiermacher, Christliche Lehre, 1-24). Recent Christian moralists (Dorner, Martensen, Wuttke, Haering, Lemme) tend to accentuate the distinction and claim for them a separate discussion. The ultimate connection cannot indeed be overlooked without loss to both. It leads only to confusion to talk of a creedless morality, and the attempt to deal with moral questions without reference to their dogmatic implication will not only rob Christian ethics of its distinctive character and justification, but will reduce the exposition to a mere system of emotionalism. Dogmatics and ethics may be regarded as interdependent and mutually serviceable. On the one hand, ethics saves dogmatics from evaporating into unsubstantial speculation, and, by affording the test of life and workableness, keeps it upon the solid foundation of fact. On the other hand, dogmatics supplies ethics with its formative principles and normative standards, and preserves the moral life from degenerating into the vagaries of fanaticism or the apathy of fatalism.
(2) The Distinction
While both sciences form the complementary sides of theology, and stand in the relation of mutual service, ethics presupposes dogmatics and is based upon its postulates. Dogmatics presents the essence, contents and object of the religious consciousness; ethics presents this consciousness as a power determining the human will (Wuttke). In the one, the Christian life is regarded from the standpoint of dependence on God; in the other, from the standpoint of human freedom. Dogmatics deals with faith in relation to God, and as the receptive organ of Divine grace; ethics considers it rather in its relation to man as a human activity, and as the organ of conduct (compare Lemme, Christliche Ethik, I, 15). Doctrine shows us how our adoption into the kingdom of God is the work of Divine love; ethics shows us how this knowledge of salvation manifests itself in love to God and our neighbor and must be worked out through all the relationships of life (compare Haering).
(3) Theological Postulates
From this point of view we may see how dogmatics supplies to ethics certain postulates which may briefly be enumerated.
(A) The Christian Idea of God
God is not merely a force or even a creator as He is presented in philosophy. Divine power must be qualified by what we term the moral attributes of God. We do not deny His omnipotence, but we look beyond it to “the love that tops the power, the Christ in God.” Moreover we recognize a gradation in God’s moral qualities: (a) benevolence or kindness; (b) more deeply ethical and in seeming contrast to His benevolence, Divine justice - not mere blind benevolence but a kindness which is wise and discriminating (compare Butler); (c) highest in the scale of Divine attributes, uniting in one comprehensive quality kindness and justice, stands Divine love or grace. The God whom dogmatics postulates to ethics is God in Christ.
(B) The Christian Doctrine of Sin
It is not the province of ethics to discuss the origin of evil or propound a theory of sin. But it must see to it that the view it takes is consistent with the truths of revelation and in harmony with the facts of life. A false or inadequate conception of sin is as detrimental for ethics as it is for dogmatics, and upon our doctrine of evil depends very largely our view of life as to its difficulties and purposes, its trials and triumphs. Three views of sin have been held. According to some (e.g. the ancient Greeks) sin is simply a defect or shortcoming, a missing of the mark (
While there is truth in both of these views, by themselves, each separately, or both in combination, is defective. They do not sufficiently take account of the personal self-determinative element in all sin. It is a misfortune, a fate from which the notion of guilt is absent. The Christian view implies these conceptions, but it adds its own distinctive note which gives to them their value. Sin is not merely a negative thing, it is something positive, an inward dominating force. It is not merely an imperfection, or want; it is an excess, a trespass. It is not simply an inherited and inherent malady; it is a self-chosen perversion. It is not inherent in the flesh or animal impulses and physical passions: it belongs rather to the mind and will. Its essence lies in selfishness. It is the deliberate choice of self in preference to God. It is personal and willful rebellion. It is to be overcome, therefore, not by the suppression of the body or the excision of the passions, but by the acceptance of a new principle of life and a transformation of the whole man. There are of course degrees and stages of wrongdoing, and there are compensating circumstances which must be taken into account in estimating the significance of evil; but in its last resort Christian ethics postulates the fact of sin and regards it as personal rebellion against the holiness of God, as the deliberate choice of self and the willful perversion of all the powers of man into instruments of unrighteousness.
(C) The Responsibility of Man
A third postulate arises as a consequence from the Christian view of God and the Christian view of sin, namely, the responsibility of man. Christian ethics treats every man as accountable for his thoughts and actions, and therefore capable of choosing the good as revealed in Christ. While not denying the sovereignty of God or minimizing the mystery of evil and clearly recognizing the universality of sin, Christianity firmly maintains the doctrine of human freedom and accountability. An ethic would be impossible if, on the one side, grace were absolutely irresistible, and if, on the other, sin were necessitated, if at any single point wrongdoing were inevitable. Whatever be our doctrine on these subjects, ethics demands that freedom of the will be safeguarded.
At this point an interesting question emerges as to the possibility, apart from a knowledge of Christ, of choosing the good. Difficult as this question is, and though it was answered by Augustine and many of the early Fathers in the negative, the modern, and probably the more just, view is that we cannot hold mankind responsible unless we accord to all men the larger freedom. If non-Christians are fated to do evil, then no guilt can be imputed. History shows that a love for goodness has sometimes existed, and that many isolated acts of purity and kindness have been done, among people who have known nothing of the historical Christ. The New Testament recognizes degrees of depravity in nations and individuals and a measure of noble aspiration and earnest effort in ordinary human nature. Paul plainly assumes some knowledge and performance on the part of the heathen, and though he denounces their immorality in unsparing terms he does not affirm that pagan society was so utterly corrupt that it had lost all knowledge of moral good.
II. Historical Sketch of Ethics
A comprehensive treatment of our subject would naturally include a history of ethics from the earliest times to the present. For ethics as a branch of philosophical inquiry partakes of the historical development of all thought, and the problems which it presents to our day can be rightly appreciated only in the light of certain categories and concepts - such as end, good, virtue, duty, pleasure, egoism and altruism - which have been evolved through the successive stages of the movement of ethical thoughts. All we can attempt here, however, is the baldest outline of the different epochs of ethical inquiry as indicating the preparatory stages which lead up to and find their solution in the ethics of Christianity.
1. Greek Philosophy
(1) Sophists
All the great religions of the world - of India, Persia and Egypt - have had their ethical implicates, but these have consisted for the most part of loosely connected moral precepts or adages. Before the golden age of Greek philosophy there were no ethics in the strict sense. The moral consciousness of the Greeks takes its rise with the Sophists, and particularly with Socrates, who were the first to protest against the long-established customs and traditions of their land. The so-called “wise men” were in part moralists, but their sayings are but isolated maxims presenting no unity or connection. Philosophy proper occupied itself primarily with purely metaphysical or ontological questions as to the nature of being, the form and origin and primal elements of the world. It was only when Greek religion and poetry had lost their hold upon the cultured and the beliefs of the past had come to be doubted, that questions as to the meaning of life and conduct arose.
(2) Socrates
Already the Sophists had drawn attention to the vagueness and inconsistency of common opinion, and had begun to teach the art of conduct, but it was Socrates who, as it was said, first brought philosophy down from heaven to the sphere of the earth and directed men’s minds from merely natural things to human life. He was indeed the first moral philosopher, inasmuch as, while the Sophists talked about justice and law and temperance, they could not tell, when pressed, what these things were. The first task of Socrates, therefore, was to expose human ignorance. All our confusion and disputes about good arise, says. Socrates, from want of clear knowledge. He aimed, therefore, at producing knowledge, not merely for its own sake, but because he believed it to be the ground of all right conduct. Nobody does wrong willingly. Let a man know what is good, that is, what is truly beneficial, and he will do it. Hence, the famous Socratic dictum, “Virtue is knowledge and vice is ignorance.” With all his intellectualism Socrates was really a hedonist, believing that pleasure was the ultimate end of life. For it must not be imagined that he conceived of knowledge of virtue as distinct from interest. Everyone naturally seeks the good because the good is really identified with his happiness. The wise man is necessarily the happy man, and hence, “to know one’s self” is to learn the secret of well-being.
(3) Plato
While Socrates was the first to direct attention to the nature of virtue, his one-sided and fragmentary conception of it received a more systematic treatment from Plato, who attempted to define the nature and end of man by his place in the cosmos. Plato thus brought ethics into intimate connection with metaphysics. He conceived an ideal world in which everything earthly and human had its prototype. The human soul is derived from the world-soul and, like it, is a mixture of two elements. On the one side, in virtue of reason, it participates in the world of ideas, or the life of God; and on the other, by virtue of its animal impulses, it partakes of the world of decay, the corporeal world. These two dissimilar parts are connected by an intermediate element, which Plato calls
(4) Aristotle
The ethics of Aristotle, while it completes, does not essentially differ from that of Plato. He is the first to treat of the subject formally as a science, which assumes in his hands a division of politics. For, as he says, man is really “a social animal”; and, even more decisively than Plato, he treats of man as a part of society. Aristotle begins his great work on ethics with the discussion of the chief good, which he declares to be happiness or well-being. Happiness does not consist, however, in sensual pleasure, or even in the pursuit of honor, but in a life of well-ordered contemplation, “an activity of the soul in accordance with reason” (Nic. Eth., I, chapter v). But to reach the goal of right thinking and right doing, both favorable surroundings and proper instruction are required. Virtue is not virtue until it is a habit, and the only way to become virtuous is to practice virtue. It will thus be seen that Aristotle balances the one-sided emphasis of Socrates and Plato upon knowledge by the insistence upon habit. Activity must be combined with reason. The past and the present, environment and knowledge, must both be acknowledged as elements in the making of life. The virtues are thus habits, but habits of deliberate choice. Virtue is therefore an activity which at every point seeks to strike the mean between two opposite excesses. Plato’s list of virtues had the merit of simplicity, but Aristotle’s, though fuller, lacks system and consists generally of right actions which are determined in reference to two extremes. One defect which strikes a modern is that among the virtues benevolence is not recognized except obscurely as a form of liberality; and in general the gentler self-sacrificing virtues so prominent in Christianity have no place. The virtues. are chiefly aristocratic and are impossible for a slave. Again while Aristotle did well, in opposition to previous philosophy, to recognize the function of habit, it must be pointed out that habit of itself cannot make a man virtuous. Mere habit may be a hindrance and not a help to higher attainment. You cannot reduce morality to a succession of customary acts. But the main defect of Aristotle’s treatment of virtue is that he regards the passions as wholly irrational and immoral. He does not see that passion in this sense can have no mean. If you may have too much of a good thing, you cannot have even a little of a bad thing. In man the desires and impulses are never purely irrational. Reason enters into all his appetites and gives to the body and all the physical powers an ethical value and a moral use. We do not become virtuous by curbing the passions but by transfiguring them into the vehicle of good. Aristotle, not less than Plato, is affected by the Greek duality which makes an antithesis between reason and impulse, and imparts to the former an external supremacy.
(5) Stoics and Epicureans
The two conflicting elements of reason and impulse which neither Plato nor Aristotle succeeded in harmonizing ultimately gave rise to two opposite interpretations of the moral life. The Stoics selected the rational nature as the true guide to an ethical system, but they gave to it a supremacy so rigid as to threaten the extinction of the affections. The Epicureans, on the other hand, seizing the doctrine that happiness is the chief good, so accentuated the emotional side of nature as to open the door for all manner of sensual enjoyment. Both agree in determining the happiness of the individual as the final goal of moral conduct. It, is not necessary to dwell upon the particular tenets of Epicurus and his followers. For though both Epicureanism and Stoicism, as representing the chief tendencies of ethical inquiry, have exercised incalculable influence upon speculation and practical morals of later ages, it is the doctrines of Stoicism which have more specially come into contact with Christianity.
(6) Stoicism
Without dwelling upon the stoic conception of the world, according to which the universe was a whole, interpenetrated and controlled by an inherent spirit, and the consequent view of life as proceeding from God and being in all its parts equally Divine, we may note that the Stoics, like Plato and Aristotle, regarded the realization of man’s natural purpose as the true well-being or highest good. This idea they formulated into a principle: “Life according to Nature.” The wise man is he who strives to live in agreement with his rational nature in all the circumstances of life. The law of Nature is to avoid what is hurtful and strive for what is appropriate; and pleasure arises as an accompaniment when a being obtains that which is fitting. Pleasure and pain are, however, to be regarded as mere accidents or incidents of life and to be met by the wise man with indifference. He alone is free, the master of himself and the world, who acknowledges the absolute supremacy of reason and makes himself independent of earthly desires. This life of freedom is open to all, for all men are equal, members of one great body. The slave may be as free as the consul and each can make the world his servant by living in harmony with it.
There is a certain sublimity in the ethics of Stoicism. It was a philosophy which appealed to noble minds and “it inspired nearly all the great characters of the early Roman empire and nerved every attempt to maintain the dignity and freedom of the human soul” (Lecky, History of European Morals, I, chapter ii). We cannot, however, be blind to its defects. With all their talk of Divine immanence and providence, it was nothing but an impersonal destiny which the Stoics recognized as governing the universe. “Harmony with Nature” was simply a sense of proud self-sufficiency. Stoicism is the glorification of reason, even to the extent of suppressing all emotion. It has no real sense of sin. Sin is un-reason, and salvation lies in the external control of the passions, in indifference and apathy begotten of the atrophy of desire. The great merit of the Stoics is that they emphasized inner moral integrity as the one condition of all right action and true happiness, and in an age of degeneracy insisted on the necessity of virtue. In its preference for the joys of the inner life and its scorn of the delights of sense; in its emphasis upon duty and its advocacy of a common humanity, together with its belief in the direct relation of each human soul to God, Stoicism, as revealed in the writings of a Seneca, a Marcus Aurelius and an Epictetus, not only showed how high paganism at its best could reach, but proved in a measure a preparation for Christianity with whose practical tenets, in spite of its imperfections, it had much in common.
(7) Stoicism and Paul
That there are remarkable affinities between Stoicism and Pauline ethics has frequently been pointed out. The similarity both in language and sentiment can scarcely be accounted for by mere coincidence. There were elements in Stoic philosophy which Paul would not have dreamed of assimilating, and features with which he could have no sympathy. The pantheistic view of God and the material conception of the world, the self-conscious pride, the absence of all sense of sin and need of pardon, the temper of apathy and the unnatural suppression of feelings - these were features which could not but rouse in the apostle’s mind strong antagonism. But on the other hand there were certain well-known characteristics of a nobler order in Stoic morality which we may believe Paul found ready to his hand, ideas which he did not hesitate to incorporate in his teaching and employ in the service of the gospel. Without enlarging upon this line of thought (compare Alexander, Ethics of St. Paul), of these we may mention the immanence of God as the pervading cause of all life and activity; the idea of wisdom or knowledge as the ideal of man; the conception of freedom as the prerogative of the individual; and the notion of brotherhood as the goal of humanity.
2. Scholasticism
It will be possible only to sketch in a few rapid strokes the subsequent development of ethical thought. After the varied life of the early centuries had passed, Christian ethic (so prominent in the Gospels and Epistles), like Christian theology, fell under the blight of Gnostieism (Alexandrian philosophy; compare Hatch, Hibbert Lectures) and latterly, of Scholasticism. Christian truth stiffened into a cumbrous catalogue of ecclesiastical observances. In the early Fathers (Barnabas, Clement, Origen, Gregory), dogmatic and ethical teaching were hardly distinguished. Cyprian discussed moral questions from the standpoint of church discipline.
The first real attempt at a Christian ethic was made by Ambrose, whose treatise on the Duties is an imitation of Cicero’s work of the same title. Even Augustine, notwithstanding his profound insight into the nature of sin, treats of moral questions incidentally. Perhaps the only writers among the schoolmen, except Alcuin (Virtues and Vices), who afford anything like elaborate moral treatises, are Abelard (Ethica, or Scito te Ipsum), Peter Lombard (Sentences), and, above all, Thomas Aquinas (Summa, II).
3. Reformation
Emancipation from a legal dogmatism first came with the Reformation which was in essence a moral revival. The relation of God and man came to be re-stated under the inspiration of Biblical truth, and the value and rights of man as man, so long obscured, were disclosed. The conscience was liberated and Luther became the champion of individual liberty.
Descartes and Spinoza
The philosophical writers who most fully express in the domain of pure thought the protestant spirit are Descartes and Spinoza, with whom speculation with regard to man’s distinctive nature and obligations took a new departure. Without following the fortunes of philosophy on the continent of Europe, which took a pantheistic form in Germany and a materialistic tone in France (though Rousseau directed the thought of Europe to the constitution of man), we may remark that in England thought assumed a practical complexion, and on the basis of the inquiries of Locke, Berkeley and Hume into the nature and limits of the human understanding, the quest. ions as to the source of moral obligation and the faculty of moral judgment came to the front.
4. English Moralists
British moralists may be classified mainly cording to their views on this subject. Beginning with Hobbes, who maintained that man was naturally selfish and that all his actions were self-regarding, Cudworth, More, Wallaston, Shaftesbury, Hutchison, Adam Smith and others discussed the problem, with varying success, of the relation of individual and social virtues, agreeing generally that the right balance between the two is due to a moral sense which, like taste or perception of beauty, guides us in things moral. All these intuitional writers fall back upon a native selfish instinct. Selfishness, disguise it as we may, or, as it came to be called, utility, is really the spring and standard of action. Butler in his contention for the supremacy and uniqueness of conscience took an independent but scarcely more logical attitude. Both he and all the later British moralists, Paley, Bentham, Mill, suffer from a narrow, artificial psychology which conceives of the various faculties as separate and independent elements lying in man.
5. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is a scheme of consequences which finds the moral quality of conduct in the effects and feelings created in the subject. With all their differences of detail the representatives of theory are at one in regarding the chief end of man as happiness. Bentham and Mill made the attempt to deduce benevolence from the egoistic startingpoint. “No reason can be given,” says Mill (Utilitarianism, chapter iv), “why the general happiness is desirable except that each person ... desires his own happiness ... and the general happiness therefore is a good to the aggregate of all persons.” Late utilitarians, dissatisfied with this non-sequitur and renouncing the dogma of personal pleasure, maintain that we ought to derive universal happiness because reason bids us (compare Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, III, xiii). But what, we may ask, is this reason, and why should I listen to her voice?
6. Evolutionary Ethics
The intuitional theory has more recently allied itself with the hypothesis of organic evolution. “These feelings of self-love and benevolence are really,” says Spencer, “the products of development. The natural instincts and impulses to social good, though existent in a rudimentary animal form, have been evolved through environment, heredity and social institutions to which man through his long history has been subject.” But this theory only carries the problem farther back, for, as Green well says (Proleg. to Ethics), “that countless generations should have passed during which a transmitted organism was progressively modified by reaction on its surroundings till an eternal consciousness could realize itself ... might add to the wonder, but it could not alter the results.”
7. Kant
The great rival of the pleasure-philosophy is that which has been styled “duty for duty’s sake.” This position was first taken by Kant whose principle of the “Categorical Imperative” utterly broke down theory of “pleasure for pleasure’s sake.” For Kant, conscience is simply practical reason; and its laws by him are reduced to unity. Reason, though limited in its knowledge of objects to phenomena of the senses, in the region of practice transcends the phenomenal and attains the real. The autonomy of the will carries us beyond the phenomenal into the supersensible world. Here the “Categorical Imperative” or moral law utters its “thou shalt” and prescribes’ a principle of conduct irrespective of desire or ulterior end. In accordance with the nature of the Categorical Imperative, the formula of all morality is, “Act from a maxim at all times fit for law universal” (Kritik d. praktischen Vernunft and Grundlage zur Metaphysik der Sitten).
This principle is, however, defective. For while it determines the subjective or formal side of duty, it tells us nothing of the objective side, of the content of duty. We may learn from Kant the grandeur of duty in the abstract and the need of obedience to it, but we do not learn what duty is. Kant’s law remains formal, abstract and contentless, without relation to the matter of practical life.
8. German Idealists
To overcome this abstraction, to give content to the law of reason and find its realization in the institutions and relationships of life and society, has been the aim of the later idealistic philosophy which starts from Kant.
(1) Hegel
Following Fichte, for whom morality is action according to the ideas of reason - selfconsciousness finding itself in and through a world of deeds - Hegel starts with the Idea as the source of all reality, and develops the conception of Conscious Personality which, by overcoming the antithesis of impulse and thought, gradually attains to the full unity and realization of self in the consciousness of the world and of God. The law of Right or of all ethical ideal is, “Be a person and respect others as persons” (Hegel, Philosophie des Rechtes, section 31). These views have been worked out in recent British and American works of speculative ethics by Green, Bradley, Caird, McTaggart, Harris, Royce, Dewey, Watson.
Man as a self is rooted in an infinite self or personality. Our individual self-consciousness is derived from and maintained by an infinite eternal and universal self-consciousness. Knowledge is, therefore, but the gradual discovery of mind in things, the progressive realization of the world as the self-manifestation of an infinite Personality with whom the finite intelligence of man is one. Hence, morality is the gradual unfolding of an eternal purpose whose whole is the perfection of man.
(2) Watchwords: Pleasure and Duty
We have thus seen that in the history of ethics two great rival watchwords have been sounded - pleasure and duty, or, to put it another way, egoism and altruism. Both have their justification, yet each taken separately is abstract and one-sided. The problem of ethics is how to harmonize without suppressing these two extremes, how to unite social duty and individual right in a higher unity. We have seen that philosophical ethics has sought a synthesis of these conflicting moments in the higher and more adequate conception of human personality - a personality whose ideals and activities are identified with the eternal and universal personality of God. Christianity also recognizes the truth contained in the several types of ethical philosophy which we have passed under review, but it adds something which is distinctively its own, and thereby gives a new meaning to happiness and to duty, to self and to others.
Christian synthesis: Christianity also emphasizes the realization of personality with all that it implies as the true goal of man; but while Christ bids man “be perfect as God is perfect,” He shows us that we only find ourselves as we find ourselves in others; only by dying do we live; and only through profound self-surrender and sacrifice do we become ourselves and achieve the highest good.
III. Principles and Characteristics of Biblical Ethics
The sketch of the history of ethics just offered, brief as it necessarily is, may serve to indicate the ideas which have shaped modern thought and helped toward the interpretation of the Christian view of life which claims to be the fulfillment of all human attempts to explain the highest good. We now enter upon the third division of our subject which embraces a discussion generally of Biblical ethics, dealing first with the ethics of the Old Testament and next with the leading ideas of the New Testament.
1. Ethics of the Old Testament
The gospel of Christ stands in the closest relation with Hebrew religion, and revelation in the New Testament fulfils and completes the promise given in the Old Testament. We have seen that the thinkers of Greece and Rome have contributed much to Christendom, and have helped to interpret Bible teaching with regard to truth and duty; but there is no such inward relation between them as that which connects Christian ethics with Old Testament morality. Christ himself, and still more the apostle Paul, assumed as a substratum of his teaching the revelation which had been granted to the Jews. The moral and religious doctrines which were comprehended under the designation of “the Law” formed for them, as Paul said (Gal 3:24, Gal 3:25), a
(1) Religious Characteristics of Hebrew Ethics
At the outset we are impressed by the fact that the moral ideal of Judaism was distinctly religious. The moral obligations were conceived as Divine commands and the moral law as a revelation of the Divine will. The religion was monotheistic. At first Yahweh may have been regarded merely as a tribal Deity, but gradually this restricted view gave place to a wider conception of God as the God of all men; and as such He was presented by the later prophets. God was for the Jew the supreme source and author of the moral law, and throughout his history duty was embodied in the Divine will. Early in the Pentateuch the note of law is struck, and the fundamental elements of Jewish morality are embedded in the story of Eden and the Fall. God’s commandment is the criterion and measure of man’s obedience. Evil which has its source and head in a hostile though subsidiary power consists in violation of Yahweh’s will.
(A) The Decalogue
First among the various stages of Old Testament ethic must be mentioned the Mosaic legislation centering in the Decalogue (Ex 20; Dt 5). Whether the Ten Commandments issue from the time of Moses, or are a later summary of duty, they hold a supreme and formative place in the moral teaching of the Old Testament. All, including even the 4th, are purely moral enactments. But they are largely negative, only the 5th rising to positive duty. They are also chiefly external, regulative of outward conduct, forbidding acts but not taking note of intent and desire. The 6th and 7th commandments protect the rights of persons, while the 8th guards outward property. Though these laws may be shown to have their roots and sanctions in the moral consciousness of mankind and as such are applicable to all times and all men, it is clear that they were at first conceived by the Israelites to be restricted in their scope and practice to their own tribes.
(B) Civil Laws
A further factor in the ethical education of Israel arose from the civil laws of the land. The Book of the Covenant (Ex 20 through 23), as revealing a certain advance in political legislation and jurisprudence, may be regarded as of this kind. Still the hard legal law of retaliation - “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth” - discloses a barbarous conception of right. But along with the more primitive enactments of revenge and stern justice there are not wanting provisions of a kindlier nature, such as the law of release, the protection of the fugitive, the arrangements for the gleaner and the institution of the Year of Jubilee.
(C) Ceremonial Laws
Closely connected with the civil laws must be mentioned the ceremonial laws as an element in the moral life of Israel. If the civil laws had reference to the relation of man to his fellows, the ceremonial laws referred rather to the relation of man to God. The prevailing idea with regard to God, next to that of sovereign might, was holiness or separateness. The so-called Priestly Code, consisting of a number of ceremonial enactments, gradually took its place alongside of the Mosaic law, and was established to guard the being of God and the persons of the worshippers from profanation. These had to do (a) with sacrifices and offerings and forms of ritual which, while they typified and preshadowed the ideas of spiritual sanctity, often degenerated into superstitious practices (compare Amo 5:25, Amo 5:26; Hos 6:6; Isa 1:11-13); (b) commands and prohibitions with regard to personal deportment - “meats and drinks and divers washings.” Some of these had a sanitary significance; others guarded the habits of daily life from heathen defilement.
(D) Prophecy
The dominant factor of Old Testament ethics lay in the influence of the prophets. They and not the priests were the great moralists of Israel. They are the champions of righteousness and integrity in political life, not less than of purity in the individual. They are the witnesses for God and the ruthless denouncers of all idolatry and defection from Him. They comment upon the social vices to which a more developed people is liable. They preach a social gospel and condemn wrongs done by man to man. Government and people are summoned to instant amendment and before the nation is held up a lofty ideal. The prophets are not only the, preachers, but also the philosophers of the people, and they direct men’s minds to the spiritual and ideal side of things, inveighing against worldliness and materialism.
Under their reflection, theories as to the origin and nature of evil begin to emerge, and the solemnity and worth of life are emphasized. While on the one hand the sense of individual responsibility is dwelt upon, on the other the idea of a hereditary taint of soul is developed, and it is shown that the consequences of sin may affect even the innocent. A man may inherit suffering and incur penalties, not apparently through any fault of his own, but simply by reason of his place in the solidarity of the race. Problems like these awaken deep perplexity which finds a voice not only in the Prophets but also in the Book of Job and in many of the Psalms. The solution is sought in the thought that God works through evil, and by its effects evolves man’s highest good. These conceptions reach their climax in the Second Isa, and particularly in Psa 53:1-6. God is constantly represented as longing to pardon and reinstate man in His favor; and the inadequacy of mere ceremonial as well as the failure of all material means of intercourse with Yahweh are repeatedly dwelt upon as preparing the way for the doctrine of salvation. In the Book of Pss - the devotional manual of the people reflecting the moral and religious life of the nation at various stages of its development - the same exalted character of God as a God of righteousness and holiness, hating evil and jealous for devotion, the same profound scorn of sin and the same high vocation of man are prevalent.
(E) Books of Wisdom
Without dwelling at length on the ethical ideas of the other writings of the Old Testament - the Books of Wisdom, Proverbs, Job, Ecclesiastes - we may remark that the teaching is addressed more to individuals than prophecy is; while not being particularly lofty it is healthy and practical, shrewd, homely common sense. While the motives appealed to are not always the highest and have regard frequently to earthly prosperity and worldly policy, it must not be overlooked that moral practice is also frequently allied with the fear of God, and the fight choice of wisdom is represented as the dictate of piety not less than of prudence.
It is to the sapiential books (canonical and apocryphal) that we owe the most significant ethical figures of the Old Testament - the wise man and the fool. The wise man is he who orders his life in accordance with the laws of God. The fool is the self-willed man, whose life, lacking principle, fails of success. The nature of wisdom lies not in intellectual knowledge so much as in the control of passion and the prudent regulation of desire. The idea of human wisdom is connected in these books with the sublime conception of Divine wisdom which colors both them and the Psalms. In some of the finest passages, Wisdom is personified as the counselor of God in the creation of the world (Prov 8; The Wisdom of Solomon 10; Job 28), or the guide which guards the destinies of man (The Wisdom of Solomon 10:15ff).
If the sapiential books are utilitarian in tone the Book of Ecclesiastes is pessimistic. The writer is impressed with the futility of life. Neither pursuit of knowledge nor indulgence in pleasure affords satisfaction. All is vanity. Yet there is an element of submission in this book which only escapes despair by a grim and stolid inculcation of obedience to Divine command.
(F) Apocryphal Books
In an article on the Ethics of the Bible some allusion ought to be made to the spirit of the apocryphal books, reflecting as they do the ideas of a considerable period of Jewish history immediately before and contemporaneous with the advent of Christ. While in general there is a distinct recognition of true moral life and a high regard for the moral law, there is no system of ethics nor even a prevailing ethical principle in these books. The collection presents the ideas of no one man or party, or even of one period or locality. The moral ideas of each book require to be considered separately (see special articles), and they ought to be studied in connection with the philosophy of Philo and generally with the speculation of Alexandria, upon which they exercised considerable influence. The Wisdom of Solomon is supposed by Pfieiderer and others to have affected the Hellenic complexion of Paul’s thought and also to have colored the stoic philosophy.
The apocryphal books as a whole do not give prominence to the idea of an ancient covenant and are not dominated by the notion of a redemptive climax to which the other Old Testament books bear witness. As a consequence their moral teaching lacks the spirituality of the Old Testament; and there is an insistence upon outward works rather than inward disposition as essential to righteousness. While wisdom and justice are commended, there is a certain self-satisfaction and pride in one’s own virtue, together with, on the part of the few select spirits which attain to virtue, a corresponding disparagement of and even contempt for the folly of the many. In Sirach especially this tone of self-righteous complacency is observable. There is a manifest lack of humility and sense of sin, while the attainment of happiness is represented as the direct result of personal virtue (Sirach 14:14ff).
The Book of The Wisdom of Solomon shows traces of neo-Platonic influences and recognizes the four Platonic virtues (8:7) and while admitting the corruption of all men (9:12ff) attributes the causes of evil to other sources than the will, maintaining the Greek dualism of body and soul and the inherent evil of the physical nature of man. The Book of Judith presents in narrative form a highly questionable morality. On the whole it must be recognized that the moral teaching of the Apocrypha is much below the best teaching of the Old Testament. While Sirach gives expression to a true piety, it manifests its want of depth in its treatment of sin and in the inculcation of merely prudential motives to goodness. In general the essence of love is unknown, and the moral temper is far inferior to the ethics of Jesus. It is a mundane morality that is preached. Hope is absent and righteousness is rewarded by long life and prosperity (Tobit). Legalism is the chief characteristic (Baruch), and Pharisaic ceremonialism on the one hand, and Sadducaic rationalism on the other are the natural and historical consequences of apocryphal teachings.
(2) Limitations of Old Testament Ethics
In estimating the ethics of the Old Testament as a whole the fact must not be forgotten that it was preparatory, a stage in the progressive revelation of God’s will. We are not surprised, therefore, that, judged by the absolute standard of the New Testament, the morality of the Old Testament comes short in some particulars. Both in intent and extent, in spirit and in scope, it is lacking.
(A) As to Intent
The tendency to dwell upon the sufficiency of external acts rather than the necessity of inward disposition, may be remarked; though as time went on, particularly in the later Prophets and some of the Psalms, the need of inward purity is insisted upon. While the ideal both for the nation and the individual is an exalted one - “Be ye holy for I am holy” - the aspect in which the character of God is represented is sometimes stern if not repellent (Ex 24; Num 14:18; Gen 18; 2Sa 24:17). But at the same time there are not wanting more tender features (Isa 1:17; Mic 6:8), and the Divine Fatherhood finds frequent expression. Even though the penal code is severe and the ceremonial law stern, a gentler spirit shines through many of its provisions, and protection is afforded to the wage-earner, the poor and the dependent, while the regulations regarding slaves and foreigners and even lower animals are merciful (Deu 24:14, Deu 24:15; Jer 22:13, Jer 22:17; Mal 3:5; Deu 25:4).
Material Motives
Again we have already remarked that the motives to which the Old Testament appeals are often mercenary and material. Material prosperity plays an important part as an inducement to moral conduct, and the good which the pious patriarch contemplates is earthly plenty, something which will enrich himself and his family. At the same time we must not forget that the revelation of God’s purpose is progressive, and His dealing with men educative. There is naturally therefore a certain accommodation of the Divine law to the various stages of moral apprehension of the Jewish people, and on the human side a growing sense of the meaning of life as well as an advancing appreciation of the nature of righteousness. Gradually the nation is being carried forward by the promise of material benefits to the spiritual blessings which they enshrine. If even in the messages of the prophets there is not wanting some measure of threats and penalties, we must remember the character of the people they were dealing with - a people wayward and stubborn, whose imaginations could scarcely rise above the material and the temporal. We must judge prophecy by its best, and we shall see that these penalties and rewards which undoubtedly occupy a prominent place in Old Testament ethics were but goads to spur the apathetic. They were not ends in themselves, nor mere arbitrary promises or threats, but instruments subservient to higher ideals.
(B) As to Extent
With regard to the extent or application of the Hebrew ideal it must be acknowledged that here also Old Testament ethics is imperfect as compared with the universality of Christianity. God is represented as the God of Israel and not as the God of all men. It is true that a prominent commandment given to Israel is that which our Lord endorsed: “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself” (Lev 19:18). The extent of the obligation, however, would seem to be restricted in the language immediately preceding it: “Thou shalt not take vengeance, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people.” It has been pointed out that the term
2. Outline of New Testament Ethics
We are now prepared to indicate briefly the distinctive features of the ethics of Christianity. As this article is, however, professedly introductory, and as the ethics of Jesus forms the subject of a separate treatment (see ETHICS OF JESUS), it will not be necessary to offer an elaborate statement of the subject. It will be sufficient to suggest the formative principles and main characteristics. What we have to say may conveniently be divided under three heads: (1) The Christian ideal; (2) The dynamic power; (3) The virtues, duties and spheres of Christian activity.
(1) Ethics of Jesus and Paul
Before, however, entering upon these details, a few words may fittingly be said upon the relation of the ethics of Jesus to those of Paul. It has been recently alleged that a marked contrast is perceptible between the teaching of Jesus and that of Paul, and that there is a great gulf fixed between the Gospels and the Epistles. Jesus is a moralist, Paul a theologian. The Master is concerned with the conditions of life and conduct; the disciple is occupied with the elaboration of dogma. This view seems to us to be greatly exaggerated. No one can read the Epistles without perceiving the ethical character of a large portion of their teaching and noticing how even the great theological principles which Paul enunciates have a profound moral import. Nor does it seem to us that there is any radical difference in the ethical teaching of Christ and that of the Apostle.
(2) Character
Both lay emphasis on character, and the great words of Christ are the great words of Paul. The inmost spring of the new life of love is the same for both. The great object of the Pauline dialectic is to place man emptied of self in a condition of receptiveness before God. But this idea, fundamental in Paul, is fundamental also in the teaching of Jesus. It is the very first law of the kingdom. With it the Sermon on the Mount begins: “Blessed are the poor in spirit.” If we analyze this great saying it surely yields the whole principle of the Pauline argument and the living heart of the Pauline religion. In perfect agreement with this is the fundamental importance assigned both by Jesus and Paul to faith. With both it is something more than mental assent or even implicit confidence in providence. It is the spiritual vision in man of the ideal, the inspiration of life, the principle of conduct.
(3) Inwardness of Motive
Again the distinctive note of Christ’s ethic is the inwardness of the moral law as distinguished from the externality of the ceremonial law. Almost in identical terms Paul insists upon the need of inward purity, the purity of the inner man of the heart. Once more both lay emphasis upon the fulfillment of our duties to our fellow-men, and both are at one in declaring that man owes to others an even greater debt than duty. Christ’s principle is, “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself”; Paul’s injunction is “Owe no man anything but to love one another.” Christ transforms morality from a routine into a life; and with Paul also goodness ceases to be a thing of outward rule and becomes the spontaneous energy of the soul. For both all virtues are but the various expressions of a single vital principle. “Love is the fulfilling of the law.” The dynamic of devotion according to Christ is, “God’s love toward us”; according to Paul, “The love of Christ constraineth us.”
Ideal of Life: And if we turn from the motive and spring of service to the purpose of life, again we find substantial agreement: “Be ye perfect as your Father in heaven is perfect” is the standard of Christ; to attain to the perfect life - “the prize of the high calling of God in Christ” - is the aim of Paul.
(4) Ultimate End
Nor do they differ in their conception of the ultimate good of the world. Christ’s ethical ideal, which He worked for as the realization of the object of His mission, was a redeemed humanity, a re-establishment of human society, which He designated “the kingdom of God.” Paul with his splendid conception of humanity sees that kingdom typified and realized in the Risen Life of his Lord. It is by growing up in all things unto Him who is the Head that the whole body will be perfected in the perfection of its members. And this is what Paul means when he sums up the goal and ideal of all human faith and endeavor - “till we all attain ... unto a fullgrown man, unto ... the fullness of Christ” (Eph 4:13). Paul everywhere acknowledges himself to be a pupil of the Master and a teacher of His ways (1Co 4:17). Without pursuing this subject there can be no doubt that in their hidden depths and in their practical life the precepts of the apostle are in essential agreement with those of the Sermon on the Mount, and have a dommon purpose - the presenting of every man perfect before God (compare Alexander, Ethics of St. Paul).
3. The Ethical Ideal
The ethical ideal of the New Testament is thus indicated. The chief business of ethics is to answer the question, What is man’s supreme good? For what should a man live? What, in short, is the ideal of life? A careful study of the New Testament discloses three main statements implied in what Christ designates “the kingdom of God”: man’s highest good consists generally in doing God’s will and more particularly in the attainment of likeness to Christ and in the realization of human brotherhood - a relation to God, to Christ and to man. The first is the pure white light of the ideal; the second is the ideal realized in the one perfect life which is viewed as standard or norm; the third is the progressive realization of the ideal in the life of humanity which is the sphere of the new life.
(1) Holiness
Holiness as the fulfillment of the Divine will is, as we have seen, Christ’s own ideal - Be ye perfect as your Father; and it is Paul’s - This also we wish, even your perfection (2Co 13:11). The ideas of righteousness and holiness as the attributes of God are the features of the kingdom of God or of heaven, the realization of which Jesus continually set forth as the highest aim of man; and running through all the epistles of Paul the constant refrain is that ye might walk worthy of God who hath called you unto His kingdom and glory. To walk worthy of God, to fulfill His will in all sincerity and purity, is for the Christian as for the Jew the end of all morality. Life has a supreme worth and sacredness because God is its end. To be a man is to fulfill in his own person God’s idea of humanity. Before every man, just because he is man with the touch of the Divine hand upon him and his Maker’s end to serve, lies this ultimate goal of existence - the realization of the perfect life-according to the idea of God.
(2) Christlikeness
If Godlikeness or holiness is the end, Christlikeness is the norm or standard in which that end is presented in the Gospel. In Christianity God is revealed to us through Jesus Christ, and the abstract impersonal ideas of holiness and righteousness are transmuted into the features of a living personality whose spirit is to be reproduced in the lives of men. In two different ways Christ is presented in the New Testament as ideal. He is at once the Pattern and the Principle or Power of the new life.
(a) He is the Pattern of goodness which is to be reproduced in human lives. It would lead us to trench on the succeeding article if we were to attempt here a portrayal of the character of Jesus as it is revealed in the Gospels. We only note that it is characteristic of the New Testament writers that they do not content themselves with imaginative descriptions of goodness, but present a living ideal in the historical person of Jesus Christ.
(b) He is also Principle of the new life - not example only, but power - the inspiration and cause of life to all who believe (Eph 1:19, Eph 1:20). Paul says not, “Be like Christ,” but “Have the mind in you which was also in Christ.” The literal imitation of an example has but a limited reign. To be a Christian is not the mechanical work of a copyist. Kant goes the length of saying that “imitation finds no place in all morality” (Metaphysics of Ethics, section ii). Certainly the imitation of Christ as a test of conduct covers a quite inadequate conception of the intimate and vital relation Christ bears to humanity. “It is not to copy after Him,” says Schultz (Grundriss d. evangelischen Ethik, 5), “but to let His life take form in us, to receive His spirit and make it effective, which is the moral task of the Christian.” It is as its motive and creative power that Paul presents Him. “Let Christ be born in you.” We could not even imitate Christ if He were not already within us. He is our example only because He is something more, the principle of the new life, the higher and diviner self of every man. “He is our life”; “Christ in us the hope of glory.”
(3) Brotherhood and Unity of Man
The emphasis hitherto has been laid on the perfection of the individual. But both Christ and His apostles imply that the individual is not to be perfected alone. No man finds himself till he finds his duties. The single soul is completed only in the brotherhood of the race. The social element is implied in Christ’s idea of the Kingdom, and many of the apostolic precepts refer not to individuals but to humanity as an organic whole. The church is Christ’s body of which individuals are the members, necessary to one another and deriving their life from the head. The gospel is social as well as individual, and the goal is the kingdom of God, the brotherhood of man. Paul proclaims the unity and equality before God of Greek and Roman, bond and free.
4. The Dynamic Power of the New Life
In the dynamic power of the new life we reach the central and distinguishing feature of Christian ethics. Imposing as was the ethic of Greece, it simply hangs in the air. Plato’s ideal state remains a theory only. Aristotle’s “virtuous man” exists only in the mind of his creator. Nor was the Stoic more successful in making his philosophy a thing of actuality. Beautiful as these old-time ideals were, they lacked impelling force, the power to change dreams into realities. The problems which baffled Greek philosophy it is the glory of Christianity to have solved. Christian ethics is not a theory. The good has been manifested in a life. The Word was made flesh. It was a new creative force - a spirit given and received, to be worked out and realized in the actual life of common men.
(1) The Dynamic on Its Divine Side
The problem with Paul was, How can man achieve that good which has been embodied in the life and example of Jesus Christ? Without entering into the details of this question it may be said at once that the originality of the gospel lies in this, that it not only reveals the good but discloses the power which makes the good possible in the hitherto unattempted derivation of the new life from a new birth under the influence of the Spirit of God. Following his Master, when Paul speaks of the new ethical state of believers he represents it as a renewal or rebirth of the Holy Spirit. It is an act of Divine creative power.
Without following out the Pauline argument we may say he connects the working of the Holy Spirit with two facts in the life of Christ, for him the most important in history - the death and resurrection of our Lord. Here we are in the region of dogmatics, and it does not concern us to present a theory of the atonement. All we have to do with is the fact that between man and the new life lies sin, which must be overcome and removed, both in the form of guilt and power, before reconciliation with God can be effected. The deed which alone meets the case is the sacrifice of Christ. In virtue of what Christ has achieved by His death a fundamentally new relationship exists. God and man are now in full moral accord and vital union.
But not less important as a factor in creating the new life is the resurrection. It is the seal and crown of the sacrifice. It was the certainty that He had risen that gave to Christ’s death its sacrificial value. “If Christ be not risen ye are yet in your sins.” The new creature is the work of Christ. But His creative power is not an external influence. It is an inner spirit of life. All that makes life life indeed - an exalted, harmonious and completed existence - is derived from the Holy Spirit through the working of the crucified risen Christ.
(2) The Dynamic on Its Human Side
Possession of power implies obligation to use it. The force is given; it has to be appropriated. The spirit of Christ is not offered to free a man from the duties and endeavors of the moral life. Man is not simply the passive recipient of the Divine energy. He has to make it his own and work it out by an act of free resolution. When we inquire what constitutes the subjective or human element, we find in the New Testament two actions which belong to the soul entering upon the new world in Christ - repentance and faith. These are complementary and constitute what is commonly called conversion. Repentance in the New Testament is a turning away in sorrow and contrition from a life of sin and a breaking with evil under the influence of Christ. If repentance looks back and forsakes, faith looks forward and accepts. In general it is the outgoing of the whole man toward his Lord, the human power or energy by which the individual receives and makes his own the life in Christ. It is not merely intellectual acceptance or moral trust; it is above all appropriating energy. It is the power of a new obedience. As the principle of moral appropriation it has its root in personal trust and its fruit in Christian service. Faith, in short, is the characteristic attitude and action of the whole Christian personality in its relation to the spiritual good offered to it in Christ.
5. Virtues, Duties and Spheres of the New Life
It but remains to indicate how this new power manifests itself in character and in practical conduct. Character is expressed in virtue, and duty is conditioned by station and relationships.
(1) The Virtues
The systematic enumeration of the virtues is one of the most difficult tasks of ethics. Neither in ancient nor in modern times has complete success attended attempts at classification. Plato’s list is too meager. Aristotle’s lacks system and is marred by omission. Nowhere in Scripture is there offered a complete description of all the virtues that flow from faith. But by bringing Christ’s words and the apostolic precepts together we have a rich and suggestive cluster (Mt 5; 6; Gal 5:22, Gal 5:23; Col 3:12, Col 3:13; Php 4:8; 1Pe 2:18, 1Pe 2:19; 1Pe 4:7, 1Pe 4:8; 2 Pet 15-8; 1 Jn 3; Jude). We may make a threefold classification:
(A) The Heroic Virtues
The heroic virtues, sometimes called the cardinal, handed down from antiquity - wisdom, fortitude, temperance, justice. While these were accepted and dwelt upon, Christianity profoundly modified their character so that they became largely new creations. “The old moral currency was still kept in circulation, but it was gradually minted anew” (Strong).
(B) The Amiable Virtues
The amiable virtues, which are not merely added on to the pagan, but being incorporated with them, give an entirely new meaning to those already in vogue. While Plato lays stress on the intellectual or heroic features of character, Christianity brings to the foreground the gentler virtues. Two reasons may have induced the Christian writers to dwell more on the self-effacing side of character: partly as a protest against the spirit of militarism and the worship of material power prevalent in the ancient world; and chiefly because the gentler self-sacrificing virtues more truly expressed the spirit of Christ. The one element in character which makes it beautiful and effective and Christlike is love - the element of sacrifice. Love evinces itself in humility which lays low all vaunting ambition and proud selfsufficiency. Closely allied to humility are meekness and its sister, long-suffering - the attitude of the Christian in the presence of trial and wrong. With these again are connected contentment and patience and forbearance, gentle and kindly consideration for others. Lastly there is the virtue of forgiveness. For it is not enough to be humble and meek; we have a duty toward wrongdoers. We must be ready to forget and forgive (Rom 12:20). “Be ye kind one to another, tenderhearted, forgiving each other, even as God also in Christ forgave you” (Eph 4:32).
(C) The Theological Virtues
The theological virtues or Christian graces - faith, hope, charity. Some have been content to see in these three graces the summary of Christian excellence. They are fundamental in Christ’s teaching and the apostolic combination of them may have had its basis in some lost word of the Master (Harnack). These graces cannot be separated. They are all of a piece. He who has faith has also love, and he who has faith and love cannot be devoid of hope. Love is the first and last word of apostolic Christianity. No term is more expressive of the spirit of Christ. Love was practically unknown in the ancient world. Pre-Christian philosophy exalted the intellect but left the heart cold. Love in the highest sense is the discovery and creation of the gospel, and it was reserved for the followers of Jesus to teach men the meaning of charity and to find in it the law of freedom. It is indispensable to true Christian character. Without it no profession of faith or practice of good deeds has any value (1Co 13:1-13). It is the fruitful source of all else that is beautiful in conduct. Faith itself works through love and finds in its activity its outlet and exercise. If character is formed by faith it lives in love. And the same may be said of hope. It is a particular form of faith which looks forward to a life that is to be perfectly developed and completed in the future. Hope is faith turned to the future - a vision inspired and sustained by love.
(2) The Duties
Of the duties of the Christian life it is enough to say that they find their activity in the threefold relationship of the Christian to self, to his fellow-men and to God. This distinction is not of course quite logical. The one involves the other. Self-love implies love of others, and all duty may be regarded as duty to God. The individual and society are so inextricably bound together in the kingdom of love that neither can reach its goal without the other.
(A) Duties Toward Self
Duties toward self are, however, plainly recognized in the New Testament. our Lord’s commandment, “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,” makes a rightly conceived self-love the measure of love to one’s neighbor. But the duties of self-regard are only lightly touched upon, and while the truth that the soul has an inalienable worth is insisted upon, to be constantly occupied with the thought of oneself is a symptom of morbid egoism and not a sign of healthy personality. But the chief reason why the New Testament does not enlarge upon the duty of self-culture is that according to the spirit of the gospel the true realization of self is identical with self-sacrifice. Only as a man loses his life does he find it. Not by anxiously standing guard over one’s soul but by dedicating it freely to the good of others does one realize one’s true self.
At the same time several self-respecting duties are recognized, of which mention may be made: (i) stability of purpose or singleness of aim; (ii) independence of other’s opinion; (iii) supremacy of conscience and a proper self-estimate. In this connection may be noticed also the Christian’s proper regard for the body which, as the temple of God, is not to be despised but presented as a living sacrifice; his attitude to worldly goods; his obligation to work; his right to recreation; and his contentment with his station - all of which duties are to be interpreted by the apostolic principle, “Use the world as not abusing it.” The Christian ideal is not asceticism or denial for its own sake. Each must make the best of himself and the most of life’s trust. All the faculties, possessions, pursuits and joys of life are to be used as vehicles of spiritual service, instruments which make a man a fit subject of the kingdom of God to which he belongs.
(B) Duties in Relation to Others
Duties in relation to others, or brotherly love, are defined as to their extent and limit by the Christian’s relation to Christ. Their chief manifestations are: (i) justice, involving respect for others, negatively refraining from injury and positively yielding deference and honor, truthfulness, in word and deed, “speaking the truth in love,” just judgment, avoiding censoriousness and intolerance; (ii) kindness or goodness, embracing sympathy, service and practical beneficence which provides for physical need, administers comfort and gives, by example and direct instruction, edification; (iii) patience, comprising forbearance, peaceableness.
(C) Duties in Relation to God
Here morality runs up into religion and duty passes into love. Love rests on knowledge of God as revealed in Christ, and expresses itself in devotion. Love to God is expressed generally in (i) thankfulness, (ii) humility, (iii) trustfulness; and particularly in worship (sacraments and prayers), and in witness-bearing - adorning the doctrine by beauty of life.
(3) Spheres and Relationships
Of the various spheres and relationships in which the Christian finds opportunity for the exercise and cultivation of his spiritual life we can only name, without enlarging upon them, the family, the state and the church. Each of these spheres demands its own special duties and involves its own peculiar discipline. While parents owe to their children care and godly nurture, children owe their parents obedience. The attitude of the individual to the state and of the state to the individual are inferences which may be legitimately drawn from New Testament teaching. It is the function of the state not merely to administer iustice but to create and foster those agencies and institutions which work for the amelioration of the lot and the development of the weal of its citizens, securing for each full liberty to make the best of his life. On the other hand it is the duty of the individual to realize his civic obligations as a member of the social organism. The state makes its will dominant through the voice of the people, and as the individuals are so the commonwealth will be.
6. Conclusion
Absoluteness, Inwardness and Universality
In closing we may say that the three dominant notes of Christian ethics are, its absoluteness, its inwardness and its universality. The gospel claims to be supreme in life and morals. For the Christian no incident of experience is secular and no duty insignificant, because all things belong to God and all life is dominated by the Spirit of Christ. The uniqueness and originality of the ethics of Christianity are to be sought, however, not so much in the range of its practical application as in the unfolding of an ideal which is at once the power and pattern of the new life. That ideal is Christ in whom the perfect life is disclosed and through whom the power for its realization is communicated. Life is a force, and character is a growth which takes its rise in and expands from a hidden seed. Hence, in Christian ethics all apathy, passivity and inaction, which occupy an important place in the moral systems of Buddhism, Stoicism, and even medieval Catholicism, play no part. On the contrary all is life, energy and unceasing endeavor.
There are many details of modern social life with which the New Testament does not deal: problems of presentday ethics and economics which cannot be decided by a direct reference to chapter and verse, either of the Gospels or Epistles. But Paul’s great principles of human solidarity; of equality in Christ; of freedom of service and love; his teachings concerning the church and the kingdom of God, the family and the state; his precepts with regard to personal purity, the use of wealth and the duty of work, contained the germs of the subsequent renewal of Europe and still contain the potency of social and political transformation.
Literature
General Works on Ethics
Lotze, Paulsen, Wundt, Green, Sidgwick, Stephen, Dewey and Tufts, Palmer, Bowne, Mezer; Harris, Moral Evolution; Dubois; Randall, Theory of Good and Evil; Calderwood, Handbook of Moral Philosophy; Muirhead, Elementary Ethics; Sutherland, Origin and Growth of Moral Instinct; Simmel, Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft; Givycky, Moralphilosophic; Guyot, La morale; Janet, Theory of Morals (translation); Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics; Eucken, works generally; Hensel, Hauptproblem der Ethik; Lipps, Die ethischen Grundfragen; Natorp, Socialpädagogik; Schuppe, Grundzüge der Ethik u. Rextsphilosophie; Schwarz, Das sittliche Leben; Wentscher, Ethik.
General History
See Histories of Philosophy; Zeller, Erdmann, Windelband, Maurice, Turner, Weber, Rogers, Alexander; Jodl, Geschichte der Ethik in der neueren Philosophic.
Works on Theological or Christian Ethics
Old Testament: Dillmann, Baudissin, Bertmann, Geschichte der christlichen Sitte; König, Hauptprobleme der Altes Testament Religions-Geschichte; Delitzsch, Riehm, Kuënen; Mozley, Ruling Ideas in Early Ages; Hessey, Moral Difficulties in the Bible; Moore, in Lux mundi; Ladd, Doctrine of Sacred Scripture; Robertson, Early Religion of Israel; Caillard, Progressive Revelation; Schultz, Old Testament Theology (English translation); Bruce, Ethics of the Old Testament; N. Smyth, Christian Ethics; Startton; Strong.
New Testament and Christianity
Martinsen, Wuttke, Schletermacher, Rothe, Dorner, H. Weiss, Harlen, Hofmann, Frank, Luthardt, Beck, Kübel, Kähler, Pfieiderer, Schultz, Köstlin; Herrmann, Faith and Morals; Communion of the Christian with God; Thomas, Jacoby, Lemme, Strong, Knight, N. Smyth; Ottley in Lux mundi and Christian Ideas and Ideals; W. L. Davidson, Christian Ethics, Guild Series; W. T. Davidson, Christian Interpretation of Life and Christian Conscience; Mackintosh; Murray, Handbook of Christian Ethics; Maurice, Social Morality; Nash, Ethics and Revelation; Dobschütz, Christian Life in the Primitive Church; Clark, Christian Method of Ethics; Mathews, The Church and the Changing Order; Freemantle, The World as the Subject of Redemption; The Gospel in Secular Life; Sladden, Applied Christianity; Leckie, Life and Religion; Rauschenbusch, Christianity and the Social Order; Peile, The Reproach of the Gospel; Coe, Education in Religion and Morals; Haering, The Ethics of the Christian Life (English translation); Tymms, Ancient Faith in Modern Light; Harris, God, the Creator; Bovon, Morale chrétienne; Wace, Christianity and Morality; Kidd, Morality and Religion; Drummond, Via, Veritas, Vita; Hatch, Greek Ideas and the Christian Church; Matheson, Landmarks of New Testament Morality.
Works on New Testament Theology
Also contain section on Ethics; Weiss, Holtzmann, Beyschlag; Harnack, Das Wesen, or What Is Christianity?; Stevens; Wernle, The Beginnings of Christianity; Adeney, Gould, Gardner, Bosworth, Briggs; Caird, Evolution of Religion.
Works on the Teaching of Jesus
Especially Wendt, Bruce, Stevens, Horton, Jackson, Swete, Latham, Pastor Pastorum; Tolstoy; Jülicher. See next article for the works on the Ethics of Jesus.
Special Works on Apostolic Ethics
Ernesti, Ethik des Apostels Paulus; A. Alexander, The Ethics of St. Paul; Weinel, Paul; Baur, Paulinismus; Joh. Weiss, Paul and Jesus.
History of Christian Ethics
Wuttke, Sidgwick, Ziegler, Luthardt, Thomas; Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory; Gass; Scharling, Christliche Sittenlehre; Lecky, History of European Morals; Pfleiderer.
It is proposed in the present article not to discuss the vast subject of ethics in general, but to attempt to ascertain what were the most striking points in which the ethical ideas of the Christiana of the Apostolic Age differed from those of earlier speculators on the subject.
1. Sources of information.-All our first-hand information is contained in the writings of the NT and of the Apostolic Fathers. Indirectly the works of later Christian authors, who treated the subject more systematically, may throw some light by way of inference on the conceptions of the Apostolic Age: for instance, if the treatment of the cardinal virtues by St. Augustine and others shows a marked difference from the treatment found in pre-Christian writers, it may perhaps be rightly inferred that the difference is due to ideas which already prevailed in the first generation of Christians. But inferences of this sort are precarious, for it is hardly possible to ascertain accurately how far the other influences which contributed to the thought of the later writers were operative in the earliest age; and in any case it is probable that later writings would not add anything of great importance to the general outline, which is all that is being attempted here. Attention will therefore be confined to the contemporary documents. And with respect to these, critical questions may be ignored. The accuracy of the historical narrative is not in question, and whatever may be the authorship or the precise date of the documents reviewed, they are all sufficiently early to reflect ethical ideas which belong to the Apostolic Age, and not those which belong to a later period.
2. General characteristics of ethical thought
(1) Absence of systematic treatment.-Ethical questions are constantly touched upon in the NT, but always more or less in connexion with particular cases as they arise, and never in connexion with a complete and thought-out system. Here there is a striking contrast with Greek philosophy. The philosophers tried to find a rational basis for human life in all its relations. In ethics they discussed the question of the supreme good-whether it was knowledge, or pleasure, or virtue; they classified the virtues, and discussed in the fullest manner their various manifestations. There is nothing of this sort in the NT. The morality of the Jews, again, was very different from that of the Greeks, fur the Jews took little interest in purely philosophical problems; but they also had a system, and a very elaborate one, of law and of ceremonial observance, with which their morality was closely bound up. Although the Christians inherited so much from the Jews, this system, after being, as it were, raised to its highest power in the Sermon on the Mount, was definitely set aside in the Apostolic Age. And in the place of a system we find an overpowering interest in certain historical facts. The Synoptic Gospels are occupied with a fragmentary narrative of the life of Christ, in which a good deal of moral teaching is contained. But it is such as arises incidentally from the facts recorded in the narrative, and it is not presented as part of a scheme of ethics. In the Fourth Gospel there is something more nearly resembling systematic moral discussion, but even here the discourses arise out of a historical framework, and the prevailing interest is not ethical but spiritual and mystical. The Acts contains little but narrative, and the teaching recorded in it centres almost monotonously around facts. In the Epistles ethical questions are constantly dealt with, but the problems are practical, and arise out of the circumstances of the time. This is not to say that in these writings there is no new point of view, but that ethics is nowhere treated in a complete and systematic way, and that there appears to be no consciousness on the part of the writers that they are in possession of a new ethical theory or philosophy. The difference, therefore, between pre-Christian and Christian ethics does not consist in a new theory or system. The subject was treated in the Apostolic Age from the practical point of view.
(2) The moral ideal.-A new element is, however, introduced into ethics by that very concentration upon a single historical life which has been noted above. The ideal man had figured largely in earlier ethical systems, but the ideal man of philosophy had been entirely a creation of the imagination, and his actual existence never seems to have been thought of as a practical possibility. Now, however, an actual human life is put forward as a model of perfection, and it is assumed without discussion that all ethical questions, as they may happen to arise, may be, and must be, tested by this.
(3) The new life.-There is, moreover, in the consciousness of the Apostolic Age something more potent than belief in a historical example. There is a sense which pervades every writing of this time that a new force has come into existence. It is not necessary to insist upon the prominence in early Christian teaching of the belief in the Resurrection, The continued life and activity of the Person who is the centre of all their thought were the greatest of all realities to the early Christians. With it was combined the belief in the continual indwelling and inspiration of the Holy Spirit. And this seems to explain the apparent indifference to ethical theory which has been noted. For to the early Christians ‘outward morality is the necessary expression of a life already infused into the soul’ (Strong, Christian Ethics, p. 69). It is in this respect that the Christian conception presents the most marked contrast to pre-Christian thought, There was a note of hopelessness in the moral speculation of the Greeks, Even a high ideal was a thing regarded as practically out of reach for the mass of mankind. Plato looked upon the ideal State as a necessary condition for the exercise of the highest virtue, and its conception was a wonderful effort of the philosophical imagination; but it was not considered possible. Even the apparently practical conceptions of Aristotle require a complete reconstruction of society. The Stoic philosophers abandoned this dream, and could suggest nothing better than the withdrawal of the wise man from all ordinary human interests. The Neo-Platonist went further, and sought complete severance from the world of sense, Jewish thought was on different lines, but there was an even keener sense of sin and failure, although this was redeemed from despair by the hope of a Messianic Age which would redress all the evils of the existing order. Above all there was no sufficient solution, and among the Greeks little attempt at a solution, of the problem of how the human will was to be sufficiently strengthened to do its part in the realization of any ideal. In the writings of the Apostolic Age, on the other hand, there is found not only a belief in a perfect ideal historically realized, but also a belief in an indwelling power sufficient to restore all that is weak and depraved in the human will.
(4) The evangelical virtues.-In the NT there is no regular discussion of the nature of virtue, and no formal classification of virtues. The Greek philosophers, while they differed in their views of that constituted the chief good, were agreed in accepting what are known as the four cardinal virtues-prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice-as the basis of their classification. This division, from the time of Plato onwards (and he appears to assume it as familiar), is generally accepted as exhaustive, and other virtues are made to fall under these heads. But although this classification must have been familiar to a large number of the early Christians, and although it had been adopted in the Book of Wisdom (8:7), it is not mentioned in the NT. The cardinal virtues reappeared in Christian literature from Origen onwards, and were exhaustively treated by Ambrose, Augustine, Gregory, and mediaeval writers, but this kind of discussion does not make its appearance in the Apostolic Age. Such lists of virtues us that which occurs in Gal_5:22 f. are clearly not intended to be exhaustive or scientific, and the nearest approach to a system of virtues is made by St. Paul in 1 Cor., where he expounds what became known as the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. These three are also closely associated in Rom_5:1-5, 1Th_1:2 f., and Col_1:3-5; and two other NT writers (Heb_10:22-24 and 1Pe_1:21 f.) mention them in conjunction in a suggestive manner. It seems that they were generally recognized as moral or spiritual states characteristic of the Christian life. And the reason for this appears to be that they are regarded as the means by which the Christian is brought into personal relation with the historical facts, and with the new life brought by them into the world, which have been spoken of above as the point on which the Christians of the first age centred their attention. The insistence on these spiritual virtues brings out two distinct characteristics of the ethical thought of the Apostolic Age, which are nowhere defined or discussed in the NT, but which nevertheless appear to be consistently implied. These characteristics are a new doctrine of the end of man, and consequently a new criterion of good and evil, and a new view of human nature.
(a) These three virtues all take a man outside himself, and make it impossible for him to be merely self-regarding. They bring him into close relation not only with his fellow-men but with God. So union with God becomes the highest end of man. This union, moreover, is not absorption: whatever may have been the case of some later Christian mystics, the most mystical of the early writers, St. Paul and St. John, never contemplate anything but a conscious union with God, in which the whole individuality of man is preserved. ‘From first to last the Christian idea is social, and involves the conscious communion between man and man, between man and God. And no state of things in which the individual consciousness disappears will satisfy this demand ‘(Strong, op. cit. p. 88). Faith, hope, and love all relate to a spiritual region above and beyond this present life, but the existing world is not excluded from it. The Kingdom of God, which occupies as large a place in the thought of the Apostolic Age, is regarded as future and as transcendental, but it is also regarded as having come already, so far as the rule of Christ has been made effective in this life. Thus a new standard for moral judgments is set up those actions and events are good which advance the coming of the Kingdom, and those are evil which impede it.
(b) Further, the evangelical virtues assume a unity in human nature which pre-Christian systems of thought failed to recognize. Greek thought either regarded human nature as unfallen, or it adopted more or less an Oriental view of evil as immanent in matter. When evil could not be ignored it might be ascribed either to ignorance or to the imprisonment of the soul in an alien environment. In neither ease could human nature be regarded as a whole which in its own proper being is harmonious. The body and the emotions which are closely connected with it were looked upon as things which must either be kept in strict subjection to the intellect, or, as far as possible, be got rid of altogether. In early Christian thought, on the other hand, hope and love are mainly emotional, and faith is by no means exclusively intellectual. In St. Paul’s use of the term it includes a strong element of emotion-it ‘worketh through love’ (Gal_5:6); and it is almost more an act of the will than of the intellect. And although asceticism played a great part in some departments of later Christian thought, in the Apostolic Age there can be no doubt of the importance assigned to the body. The conspicuous Christian belief in the resurrection of the body assumes a very different point of view from that of Oriental or oven of Greek philosophy. It is clear that the first generation of Christians regarded human nature as fallen indeed, but as capable in all its parts of restoration, and they believed that none of its parts could be left out from the salvation of the whole.
(5) The conception of sin.-Speaking generally, it may be said that the non-Christian view of sin regards it as natural, and that the Christian view regards it as unnatural. This is, however, a broad generalization, and requires further definition. No system of ethical thought can altogether ignore the fact of sin, though it is sometimes minimized. But there are wide differences in the way in which it is regarded. In pre-Christian thought it was often almost Identified with ignorance. It was assumed that a man cannot sin willingly, because no man desires evil for himself. Virtue is therefore knowledge, and the possibility of knowing what is right and doing what is wrong need not be considered. This was the teaching of a large section of Greek philosophy. Again, wherever Oriental ideas had influence, the seat of evil was thought to be in matter. Sometimes the strife between good and evil was explained as a contest between two rival and evenly-balanced powers. Sometimes a good deity was conceived as acting upon an intractable material. The practical conclusion was usually some form of asceticism-an attempt to be quit of the body and all that it implied; and this asceticism, by a process easy to be understood, not infrequently led to licence. These tendencies often make their appearance in Church history, and traces of them are to be found in the writings of the NT, but during the Apostolic Age the dangers of Gnosticism and Antinomianism were but rudimentary. In modern times the view of evil which regards it as undeveloped good, or as the survival of instincts that are no longer necessary or beneficial, has some points in common with the old dualisms. The common feature of all these views is that they regard evil as more or less inevitable and according to nature. It would not be true to say that they altogether disregard the human will, or deny human responsibility, but they treat the body rather than the will as the seat of evil, and they tend to look upon evil as, upon the whole, natural and necessary. The Christian view of sin, as it appears in the writings of the Apostolic Age, is in the sharpest contrast to this. It is the Jewish view, carried to its natural conclusion, and its chief characteristics may be set down under three heads.
(a) First, the freedom of the will is not considered from the philosophical point of view at all. The metaphysical difficulties are not even touched upon, nor is any consciousness shown of their existence. But the responsibility of man is always assumed, Nor is it for his actions alone that he is responsible. The Sermon on the Mount brings home to him responsibility for every thought, and for his whole attitude towards God. And in doing so it brings to its natural conclusion the course of ethical thought among the Jews. If, however, the root of sin is in the will, it follows that it is not in matter, or in the body, or in anything distinct from the will of man. The whole universe is good, because it is created by God, and sin consists in the wilful misuse of things naturally good. Asceticism therefore, except in the sense of such training as may help to restore the will to a healthy condition, is excluded.
(b) Secondly, the idea of the holiness of God, as forming a test of human action and a condemnation of human shortcomings, is another conception inherited from Judaism. Early Jewish ideas about God are anthropomorphic, but the anthropomorphism is of a very different kind from that of the Greeks, The deities of Greek mythology who aroused the contemptuous disgust of Plato were constructed out of human experience with all the evil and good qualities of actual men emphasized and heightened. To the Jew God is an ideal, the source of the Moral Law, rebellion against which is sin. So in the Sermon on the Mount the perfection of God is held up as the ideal for human perfection, and St. Paul makes the unity of God the ground for belief in the unity of the Church.
(c) Thirdly, sin was regarded as a thing which affects the race, and not only individuals. The beliefs of the Apostolic Age with regard to Christ’s redemptive work imply that there is a taint in the race, and that human nature itself, and not only individual men, has to be restored to communion with God, and requires such a release from sin as will make communion with God possible. Some practical results of this belief in the solidarity of mankind are conspicuous in early Christian writings. One is the exercise of discipline. It was left that the actions and character of individuals compromised and affected the whole body, and that they could not therefore be left to themselves. The injury done by the rebellion of one injured and imperilled the whole community. Both, for his own sake and for the sake of the Church a corporate censure was required, extending if necessary to the cutting off of the offending member (1 Corinthians 5, 2 Corinthians 2, Mat_18:15-20, etc.). Another result of the belief in solidarity is the emphasis laid upon social virtues in connexion with the corporate character of the Church (e.g. Romans 12, 1 Corinthians 12-14, Galatians 5, etc.). It partly accounts for that special prominence of humility in Christian ethics which has been so often commented on from different points of view, for humility is regarded not only as a duty enforced by the example of Christ, but also as the practical means for preserving the unity and harmonious working of the body (Php_2:3-5, etc.).
3. Conclusion.-Ethics in the Apostolic Age did not consist in a re-statement of old experience or in a system of purely ethical theory, but in the recognition and acceptance in the sphere of conduct of the practical consequences of what was believed to be an entirely new experience of spiritual facts.
Literature.-A. Neander, ‘Verhältniss der hellen. Ethik zur christlichen,’ in Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen, 1851, also Geschichte der christl. Ethik (═ Theolog. Vorlesungen, v. [1864]); W. Gass, Geschichte der christl. Ethik, 1881; C. E. Luthardt, Geschichte der christl. Ethik, 1888: H. Martensen, Christian Ethics, Eng. translation , (General) 1885, (Individual) 1881, (social) 1882; J. R. Illingworth, Christian Character, 1904; T. B. Strong, Christian Ethics, 1896 (to which this article is especially indebted); H. H. Scullard, Early Christian Ethics, 1907; T. v. Haering, The Ethics of Christian Life, Eng. translation 2, 1909.
J. H. Maude.
Laws are at the heart of Judaism, but a large part of Jewish law is about ethical behavior. See Love and Brotherhood, Speech and Lashon Ha-Ra, Tzedakah: Charity, and Treatment of Animals.
Ethics is a broad subject whose particular concern is with right conduct in human behaviour. This includes every aspect of people’s conduct, whether it involves others or not. People are answerable to God for all that they do (Heb 4:13; Rev 20:12).
God’s standards
From the beginning people had within them some knowledge of right and wrong. God gave them a revelation of the standards of conduct he required in human relationships, and each individual’s conscience judged that person according to those standards. This was so even when the person had rejected the knowledge of God (Rom 1:21-23; Rom 2:14-15; cf. Mat 7:11; see CONSCIENCE; REVELATION).
When God took the people of Israel into a covenant relationship with himself, he gave them a law-code to regulate their national life. This written code was an application of the unwritten principles which God had placed within the human heart from the beginning but which people had neglected. These principles were based on the truth that the moral conduct of people should be a reflection of the moral character of God, in whose image they were made (Exo 19:6; Lev 11:44-45; Lev 19:2; Mat 19:17; cf. Eph 4:24; see LAW).
The ethics of this Israelite law-code concerned a person’s relationships with people and with God. In both cases the motive for right conduct was to be genuine love (Lev 19:17-18; Deu 6:3-7). Right conduct concerned all personal behaviour (e.g. Exo 20:12; Exo 22:21-27; Exo 23:1-8; Lev 18:6; Lev 18:19; Lev 18:22), yet it was more than merely a personal matter. People lived not in isolation but as part of a community, and God wanted the community as a whole to follow his standards (Exo 23:10-12; Exo 23:17; Exo 32:7-10; Lev 19:9-10; Deu 20:10-20).
In giving his law to Israel at Mt Sinai, God’s purpose was not that as Israelites kept it they could earn the right to become his people. Rather he gave the law to a nation that he had already made his people (Exo 4:22; Exo 6:6-8; Exo 24:3-4). Each person was a guilty sinner and received salvation only through coming in faith and repentance to God (Exo 32:33; Exo 34:6-7; Psa 51:1-4; Isa 1:16-20). Salvation was a gift of God’s grace, not a reward for keeping moral laws; though the person who received that salvation loved God’s law all the more and had an increased desire to keep it (Psa 119:14-16; Psa 119:44-48; Rom 9:31-32; Gal 3:10; Gal 3:18).
Likewise in the new era introduced through Jesus Christ, no one is saved through keeping moral instructions, whether those instructions come from the law of Moses, the teachings of Jesus or the writings of the early Christian leaders. Salvation is by God’s grace, and repentant sinners receive it by faith. But again, having received it they should be diligent to produce good works (Eph 2:8-10; Tit 2:11-12; Jas 2:18; Jas 2:26; 1Pe 2:9-12; see GOOD WORKS).
Genuine love is once again the source of right behaviour. As new people indwelt by the Spirit of God, Christians can now produce the standard of righteousness that the law aimed at but could not itself produce (Rom 8:1-4; Rom 13:8-10; 2Co 5:17; 1Jn 2:3-6; see SANCTIFICATION).
Ethical teachings of Jesus
The foundation of Christian ethics is not what men and women themselves might choose to do, but what God through Christ has already done. Jesus was not primarily a teacher of ethics who showed people how to live a better life, but a Saviour who died and rose again to give repentant sinners an entirely new life (Rom 6:1-11; 2Co 5:15; 2Co 5:17; 1Pe 1:18-23; 1Pe 4:1). God has made believers his children, and they must now show this to be true in practice. Because God has acted in a certain way, Christians must act in a certain way (1Co 6:20; Eph 4:1; Eph 5:1; 1Jn 3:9-10; 1Jn 4:7).
Jesus’ teaching must therefore be understood in relation to his mission. He was not a social reformer, but the Saviour-Messiah who brought the kingdom of God into the world. He did not draw up a code of ethics, but urged people to humble themselves and enter the kingdom of God. He knew that people would have worthwhile change in their behaviour only when they were truly changed within (Mat 4:23; Mat 5:3; Mat 5:21-22; Mat 12:28; Mat 15:19-20; Mat 18:4; Mat 19:23; see KINGDOM OF GOD).
In dealing with standards of human behaviour, Jesus did not introduce any new set of values. He referred people back to the values which were already clearly set out in the Old Testament but which people had either ignored or distorted (Mat 5:17; Mat 5:43-44; Mat 19:8-9; Mat 22:37-40; see SERMON ON THE MOUNT).
Neither did Jesus present his teaching in the form of regulations applicable to all people in all circumstances, as if it were the law-code of a civil government. His requirement, for example, that people sell their houses or leave their families applied not in all cases, but only in those where people had put their interests before God’s (Mat 19:16-22; Luk 9:57-62). But the principle on which that particular instruction was based (namely, that discipleship involves sacrifice) applies to everyone (Mat 10:34-39; Mat 16:24-26).
If Jesus had set out a law-code, its regulations would have been suited to the way of life in first century Palestine, but unsuited to other cultures and eras. Instead, as each occasion arose, Jesus emphasized whatever aspect of God’s truth was related to the circumstances (e.g. Mat 22:15-22; Mar 12:38-40; Luk 14:8-11). He also left behind with his followers the gift of the Holy Spirit who, generation after generation, helps Christians to interpret his words and apply their meaning. The teaching of Jesus never goes out of date (Joh 14:15-17; Joh 16:13-15).
Motives and behaviour
Because God’s work of redemption through Christ is the basis of Christian ethics, the relationship that believers have with Christ will largely determine their behaviour. Their understanding of Christian doctrine will enlighten them concerning Christian conduct. Their appreciation of what Christ has done will deepen their love for him and give them the desire to please him. They will want to obey his teachings (Joh 14:15; Joh 15:4; Joh 15:10; 2Co 8:9; 1Th 2:4; 1Ti 1:5; 1Ti 6:3; Heb 13:21).
This obedience is not the fearful keeping of stern demands, but the joyful response to Christ’s love (1Jn 2:1-5; 1Jn 4:10-12; 1Jn 5:3; cf. Mat 11:29-30; see OBEDIENCE). It is not bondage to a new set of laws, but a freedom to produce the character that no set of laws can ever produce (Rom 8:2; Gal 5:1; Gal 5:13; Col 2:20-23; see FREEDOM).
The fact that Christian obedience is free from legalism is no excuse for moral laziness. Christians have a duty to be obedient (Rom 6:16; 1Co 9:21; 2Co 10:5; 1Pe 1:14-16). They need to exercise constant self-discipline (1Co 9:24-27), and they will be able to do this through the work of Christ’s Spirit within them (Gal 5:22-23; see SELF-DISCIPLINE). The work of the Holy Spirit helps believers produce that Christian character which is the goal of Christian ethics. The motivating force behind the conduct of Christians is their desire to be like Christ and so bring glory to God (Rom 13:14; 1Co 10:31; 2Co 3:18; Col 3:9-10; Col 3:17; cf. Mat 5:48).
Being like Christ does not mean that Christians in different cultures and eras must try to copy the actions of the Messiah who lived in first century Palestine. It means rather that they have to produce the sort of character Jesus displayed and be as faithful in their callings as Jesus was in his (Joh 13:15; Joh 15:12; Eph 4:24; Eph 5:1-2; 1Pe 2:21; 1Jn 2:6). Christians know that in some bodily way they are to become like Christ at his return, and this should encourage them to become more like him in moral character now (Php 3:17-21; 1Th 3:13; Tit 2:11-14; 1Jn 3:2-3).
Christians live with the sure expectation that a better life awaits them in the heavenly kingdom. This, however, is no reason to try to escape the problems of the present life (1Co 15:54; 1Co 15:58; Php 1:23-24; 2Ti 2:10-15). On the contrary, the affairs of the present life help develop personal character and communion with God, which give meaning to life now and will last through death into the age to come (1Co 13:8-13; 1Pe 1:3-9).
The awareness of future judgment creates for Christians both expectancy and caution. This is not because they want rewards or fear punishment, but because the day of judgment is the climax of the present life and the beginning of the new (Mat 25:14-30; 1Co 3:12-15; 2Co 5:10; 2Ti 4:6-8; see JUDGMENT; PUNISHMENT; REWARD).
Applying Christian ethics to society
Christian ethical teaching is aimed, first of all, not at making society Christian, but at making Christians more Christlike. Their character and behaviour must reflect their new life in Christ (Rom 6:4; Eph 4:22-24; Col 2:6-7). But Christian ethics are not a purely private affair. Christians are part of a society where Christ has placed them as his representatives, and they must apply their Christian values to the affairs of that society (Mat 5:13-16; Joh 17:15-18; see WITNESS; WORLD).
The immediate community in which Christians must give expression to their standards is the family (Eph 5:22-33; Eph 6:1-4; see FAMILY; MARRIAGE). Beyond the family is the larger community where they live and work, and where they inevitably meet conduct that is contrary to their Christian understanding of righteousness, truth and justice (Eph 6:5-9; see JUSTICE; WORK). Over all is the civil government. Although Christian faith does not in itself make people experts on economics, politics or sociology, it does teach them moral values by which they can assess a government’s actions (Rom 13:1-7; see GOVERNMENT).
Since the Creator knows what is best for his creatures, Christian ethics are the best for people everywhere. Christians should therefore do all they can to promote God’s standards. A society will benefit if its laws are based on God’s standards (Exo 20:13-17; Deu 5:29; Rom 13:8-10), though Christians should realize that it is not possible to enforce all those standards by law. Civil laws can deal with actions that have social consequences, but they cannot deal with the attitudes that cause those actions (cf. Mat 5:21-22; Eph 4:25-32).
In addition, the ethical standards of a society may be so poor that laws have to be less than ideal in order to control and regulate an unsatisfactory state of affairs (e.g. Exo 21:1-11; Deu 24:1-4; see DIVORCE; SLAVERY). This does not mean that Christians may lower their moral standards to the level of the civil law; for something that is legal according to government-made laws may still be morally wrong (cf. Mat 19:7-9). Nor does it mean (as the system known as Situation Ethics claims) that nothing is absolutely right or wrong, and that in certain situations Christians are free to disobey God’s moral instructions, provided they feel they are acting out of love to others. The more knowledge Christians have of God’s law, the more he holds them responsible to obey it (Luk 12:48; Joh 9:41; Jas 2:10-12; cf. Amo 3:2).
The study of right and wrong, good and bad, moral judgment, etc.