02.05. Postscript
POSTSCRIPT.
SINCE my Writing what precedes, the learned Author has published a second Edition of his Book, with a Postcript; wherein, he farther treats of the Infliction of Punishment, without a Charge of Guilt, and endeavours to clear it of some Objections, He represents it as the Opinion of those, who are skill’d in the civil Law, that an innocent Man may suffer Punishment, If he had read their Writings with due Care, he could not, I think, have fallen into such a gross Mistake: This he doubtless ought to have done, since he appeals to their Judgment in the Affair, his Neglect thereof, I cannot but apprehend will be thought inexcusable. My Design here is to propose and give Answers to four Queries They are these.
Query 1. What is Punishment, and may it be inflicted on an innocent Person?
Query 2. May not God punish an innocent Creature as so considered: Or without any Imputation of Sin or Guilt?
Query 3. May God impute the Fault of an offending Creature to one who is innocent, in order to his Suffering Punishment: Or was it agreeable to his Righteousness and Justice, to charge Sin on Christ, and punish him for it?
Query 4. If it will render the Doctrine of Christ’s Atonement, less exceptionable, to state it in such a Manner and Light, as corresponds with the Conduct of Men in some Cases of Penalty, why may it not be done, in order to compose Differences subsisting among Christians? Why should we delight in Obscurity, and contend for Principles, which will not admit of an easy Explication and Defence, either from the common Notions, or Conduct of Men, when this Doctrine may be so stated, as to agree with the common Sentiments of Mankind, and may by that Means be more generally approved?
Query 1. What is Punishment, and may it be inflicted on an innocent Person?
Answ. It is the Infliction of Suffering or Pain, with relation to or on Account of Offence, I suppose it will be allowed, that Cicero was no incompetent Judge in this Matter, and he defines it thus: Pain or Torment is the Punishment of Sinf66, i.e. when judicially inflicted, as he must be understood to mean. And Grotius it will certainly be granted, was well acquainted with the Nature of Penalty. His Definition of it is this: Punishment in the general Signification of it, is the Evil of Suffering, which is inflicted for the Evil of Actionf67; and observes, That he who punishes, that he may justly punish, must have a Right to punish, which Right, says he, arises from the Fault of the Person guiltyf68. Now if to punish without Right is unjust, and if a Right to punish arises from Offence, then to punish an innocent Man, is the Infliction of Penalty without Right to do it, and is a manifest Violation of Justice. Farther his Opinion is, That no Man ought to be punished beyond Desertf69. This is also observed by Cicerof70. If a Man is not to be punish’d beyond Desert, then surely not without Desert: If it is unjust to inflict greater Pain for an Offence, than that Offence deserves, it can never be consistent with Justice to punish without Offence. Now an innocent Person, as so considered, or without the Imputation of another’s Crime, cannot be attended with any Desert of Punishment, and therefore it is not lawful to punish him. He may not, as Cicero very rightly observes, be brought into any Danger of Punishmentf71. far the Guilty only, as Cicero farther observes, are to be punished. His Opinion was, That it is cruel to punish the Crimes of Parents in Childrenf72. Philo condemns the Practicef73. And Vinius in his Commentary on the Institutions of Justinian the Emperor says, It is not just, that the Heir should suffer Punishment for the Fault of the Deceasedf74. And Selden, whose Judgment in this Point is of considerable Weight, observes, That by the Reason and Essence of Punishment, properly so called, it should be impendent on a Person for sin or Guiltf75. The formal Cause of Punishment, says he, certainly consists in this, that it is timwria, or vindictive, or purgative, or expiatory, or some other Way bears Respect to Wickedness or Sin committed. And adds, Punishment, properly speaking, as it hath Place in any Right whatever, is taken for this, that it is the Evil of suffering for the Evil of Action; or that it is rendered, as an Evil of Punishment, for that which is the past Evil of Guilt, viz. Punishment is Avenging a Crime, or as the Greek Lawyers speak Amartimatov Ekdikhsiv, i.e. the Avenging of Sinf76. To this Purpose, says Hierocles, The Law taketh Vengeance on a Man, not simply, or as a Man; but as evil or guiltyf77.
Object. The Children of a Traytor suffer for their Father’s Crime, although they are not guilty of Rebellion with him, nor is his Sin imputed to them.
Answ. 1. The King, or sovereign Prince, is the Fountain of Honour: In such a Stile Kings speak of themselves in the Creation of Peers: as Selden observes in his Titles of Honourf78. The King or supreme Magistrate confers Peerage or Dignity on a Subject, in a conditional Manner, He requires an Oath of Loyalty, and Subjection, which supposes a due Regard to the Laws of the Land; this is also observed by Selden, in his Titles of Honourf79. Hence in case of Treason, the Person on whom Nobility or Honour is conferr’d, violates his solemn Oath, and forfeits his Dignity, nor may be supposed to have any longer, a legal Title to that Dignity or Honour.
3. It is a Rule with Lawyers, that Parents cannot convey greater Right than they have themselves: Now, as a Traytor, by his Rebellion against his lawful Sovereign, forfeits his Title to Nobility and Honour, his Son cannot be intitled to that Dignity.
4. If a Subject holds his Estate by a Right from the Crown, which is many Times the Case, by treasonable Acts, he forfeits his Title to it, his Right to that Estate ceases, and therefore no Right to it. from him, can devolve upon his Son.
5. Some have thought Confiscation of Goods cruel and unjyst, as Cicerof80, Vinniusf81, and Chrysotomf82.
6. But allowing it just, it is not a Punishment to Children, tho’ it is to their guilty Parent: This, as Grotius observes, some call Damage or Suffering indirect, and allow it not to be Punishment, and assign this obvious Reason for it: Children have a Right to Nothing, but what their Parents posess to their latest Breathf83. A Traytor forfeiting his Dignity, Estate and Goods, as well as his Life, he is degraded before his Condemnation, as Selden observes, in his Titles of Honourf84, or is reduced to a base Condition, to Disgrace and Poverty, and therefore he has neither Dignity, Estate, nor Goods to leave to his Descendants. Hence it is evident that the Punishment wholly terminates on him, tho’ his Posterity in an indirect Manner, suffer, or in Consequence of that his Punishment; the Law supposes a Traytor to have no Right to Honour, Estate, or Goods, and therefore no Right to either, can descend from him to his Children: For according to the Rule before-mentioned, he cannot convey farther Right, than he himself possesses: He is inverted with no Right to either of there Things, as the Law supposes; hence it manifestly follows, no Right to them he can convey. These Things evidently prove, that the Children of a Traytor, are not punished for their Father’s Crime, tho’ they suffer in Consequence of it. Vinnius, as was before observed, denies that penal Actions against Heirs may be allowed, for this Reason, lest there should be Punishment, where there is no Guilt. Pecuniary Punishments may indeed pass to Heirs, yet not as Punishments; but as Debts due upon the Estate of the deceased, which they take possession of, the Reason of which is, the Deceased and the Heir, are accounted as one Person, with Respect to the Estate or Goods convey’d and enjoyed. Farther, something afflictive may be enjoyn’d on a Person, or Benefit taken from him, by Reason of another’s Crime: But not so as that the Offence is the proximate Cause of the Action, as it relates to the Right itself of acting: He who becomes a Surety for another’s Debt suffers Damage; but the proximate Cause of his Obligation, is his Engagement itself. And hence it is, that the Evil inflicted on him takes its Measure or Degree, not from the others Fault; but from the Power he had in promising.
1. No Man may promise to die for another, because he hath not Power over his Life.
2. Nor to lose a Member, for Power is not given to a Man over the Members of his Body, but to preserve it. He may not injure himself, nor has a Power of inverting others, with a Right of doing it.
3. Banishment, and Loss of Money, for another, is not properly Punishment.
4. Obligation to Punishment arises from Desert, Desert is personal, for this Reason, no Man free from Fault may be punished for the Fault of anotherf85.
5. Achan’s Children, Saul’s, etc. God exercised a Right of Dominion over, but not of Punishment, Grotiusf86. Upon the Whole, it appears, that Penalty may not be inflicted, without Relation to Fault or Sin imputed. Grotius, in his Defence of the Satisfaction of Christ, urging that it might, and Arguing on that Principle, rendered the Answer, on this Part of the Subject, very east to Crellius, who pretty well understood the Law, and made a satisfactory Reply impossible to Grotius, without an Acknowledgment of a Mistake in this Point. Let the Reader compare the fourth Chapter of his Book, with the Answer of Crellius to it, and with what he delivers here concerning Punishment, and he will be convinced of the Truth of this Observation.
It is in vain to think of establishing the Doctrine of Christ’s Satisfaction against the Socinians, who are not unskilful in the Law, by referring to the Conduct, of Men in the Infliction of Penalty: For this Case is really singular, and has no Parallel, and it is utterly impossible that any thing of the like Nature, consistent with Justice, should ever be acted by Men. It will be always easy to prove, that Punishment properly so called, may not be inflicted on an innocent Person by Men: Since the Guilty and the Innocent cannot possibly become one in the Eye of human Laws, and Men have not Right to inflict Penalty; but upon a legal Charge of Guilt on the Person, who is the Subject of Punishment, and no Man is invested with Power over his Life, or over the Members of his Body, except to preserve the one and the others; and therefore may not engage to submit to Death, or Mutilation for the Fault and Crime of another. For tho’ an innocent Person may suffer, in Consequence of the Infliction of Punishment on a Person guilty, in some Instances, yet he is not, he may not be punished without a Concern in the Guilt, from whence alone arises Obligation to suffer Punishment. Thus much in Answer to the first Query.
Query 2. May God punish an innocent Creature, as so considered, or without the Imputation of another’s Sin or Guilt to him.
Answ. I humbly apprehend he cannot, for the Reasons following:
1. God cannot but approve and justify an innocent Creature as so consider’d, or as free from all Charge and Imputation of Offence, the Reason is evident: The innocent Creature is what God wills him to be according to his Law, and therefore it is impossible he should, under this Consideration, be the Object of his Disapprobation.
2. An innocent Creature, as such, cannot be the Subject of the Condemnation and Curse of the Law of God: Because the Law pronounces a Sentence of Condemnation, only, upon a Charge or Imputation of Fault or Sin.
3. Hence it necessarily follows, that an innocent Creature, as so consider’d, cannot be impressed with a piercing Sense of divine Vengeance against Sin. A Perception the guiltless Creature may have, of the Evil of Sin, and of the Wrath of God, which Sin demerits: Such a Perception the holy Angels, and glorify’d Saints doubtless have, and ever will have; but this is not attended with any Anguish or Pain of Mind: For it is only a Sense of Sin, as charg’d or imputed, and of an Obnoxiousness to divine Displeasure that Account, which can give the Soul Uneasiness and Torture. This seems to me so evident and demonstrable, that nothing, I apprehend can be more so. The Saints I am persuaded, will retain forever a Consciousness of their sinful Actions, and will never lose the Idea of that Wrath, Curse, and Vengeance, to which their Offences render’d them obnoxious: But this Consciousness, and this Perception of the proper Demerit of their Guilt, occasion no Uneasiness, Sorrow, or Pain; the Reason is, they are discharg’d of their Guilt, and are not the Objects of God’s Displeasure, to which it exposed them; this must be allow’d, if their Happiness in Heaven is granted to be complete.
4. Each of there Things enter into the very Nature of, and are essential to divine Punishment. Surely it is not to be thought, that God approves of any whom he punishes, that is to say, as they are the Subjects of his Act of punishing: And it is impossible, that a Creature under the same Consideration should be the Object of divine Condemnation and Justification; for these are certainly inconsistent Ideas, if any such there be. Nor can God impress the Mind of a Creature, with a painful Sense of his Wrath, who is not, under any Consideration, the Object of his Displeasure. Either therefore an innocent Creature cannot be the Subject of Penalty, or these Things do not enter into the Nature of divine Punishment: Or else Guilt is imputed to that innocent Creature, and in his suffering Punishment, he is consider’d, not as he is in himself; but as guilty, by a Charge of another’s Guilt on him, for whom he sustains that Punishment.
5. God in punishing, acts as a Lawgiver and Judge: The Act of punishing therefore, is not an Act of Sovereignty, but of Righteousness and Justice; and is agreeable to the Nature of his Law by which penal Suffering is threatened. Now if no divine Law is extant, which threatens Penalty without Relation to a Charge of Fault or Sin, it should seem to follow, that Punishment cannot be inflicted on an innocent Creature, as such, or without the Imputation of another’s Guilt to him. I am firmly of Opinion, that no Law of God is to be produc’d, wherein penal Suffering is denounced, without Respect to Sin imputed, as the procuring Cause of that Denunciation of penal Evil, and if not, then no innocent Creature as such, can be the Subject of divine Punishment. 6. What God hates in Men he cannot do himself. Nothing is the Object of God’s Displeasure; but what is contrary to the divine Nature: To punish the Innocent is disapproved of God, because it is a dreadful Violation of Right and Justice; and is therefore contrary to the essential Righteousness and Justice of God. It being so, he cannot condemn and punish, without a righteous Charge and Imputation of Offence.
Query 3. May God impute the Fault of a Criminal to one who is impotent, in order to his suffering Punishment, or was it agreeable to the Righteousness and Justice of God, to Charge Sin on Christ, in order to his sustaining the Penalty due to it?
Answ. In this Question we may observe, that those, who plead for Christ’s suffering Penalty, with. out a Charge of Guilt, in order to Satisfaction, can have nothing to object to the Righteousness and Justice of God, in punishing his Son. The only Difficulty with them, is to reconcile the Act of the Imputation of Sin to Christ, with divine Justice, to which End, I would propose several Things to Consideration.
1. Christ and his People are to be reckoned as one: He as Head and they as Members constitute one mystical Person. Such a Relation subsists between him and them, as cannot subsist among Men, and therefore, as the Conjunction and Union of Christ and his People is singular and without a Parallel, such Acts may follow upon it, both towards Christ himself as Head, and towards them, as Members, which cannot take place with Respect to any others, viz. The Charge of their Sins on Christ, and the manipulation of his Righteousness or Obedience to them.
2. According to a special divine Constitution, he took their Place, Standing and Relation to the Law: Christ’s being made of a Woman, was peculiar to himself; so also was his being made under the Law (Galatians 4:4). In Consequence of which, what the Law charg’d on them and demanded of them, is in Right and Justice chargeable on him, and he becomes responsible for them, in order to their Redemption from it, as a Law or Covenant of Works. This supposes the Imputation of their Sins to him, and the Imputation of his Righteousness to them.
3. He voluntarily agreed to take their Debts upon himself, or to come under that Charge, which the Law exhibited against them: And therefore no injurious Part was acted towards our Saviour, in the Imputation of Guilt to him, any more than Injustice is done to a Surety for a Debtor, in charging a Debt to him, which he undertook to pay.
4. Christ bore our Sin, or was under a Charge of Guilt, but for a Time, and in order to make Satisfaction for it, and upon his making Satisfaction for Sin, he was acquitted and discharg’d of Guilt, which I apprehend is design’d, when it is said: He was justified in the Spirit (1 Timothy 3:16.). if the Imputation of Sin to him had been perpetual, as it as to the Persons of Sinners, the highest Injury had attended that Act, because his Sufferings had then been endless in Duration, and he must have been rendered incapable of receiving any Reward, for his singular Submission to the Will of God in bearing Sin; but this was not the Case: For,
5. Signal Honour is conferred upon Christ on Account of his submitting to the Will of God, in this wonderful Affair: And therefore no Prejudice arose to our Saviour, from the Imputation of Sin to him (Php 2:9-11).
6. No false or mistaken Idea, attends the Doctrine of the Imputation of Sin to Christ: For he was not esteemed the actual Transgressor, in that Act; but the Transgressions of others, with his full and free Consent, were placed to his Account: The Debt charged on him, as he did not contract: it, he was not reputed to have so done; but in Vertue of his own Engagement, it became his, and no otherwise. So that in this singular Case, there is nothing contrary to Truth, Justice and Righteousness.
7. It is Fact, that the Minds of Men may be troubled about a sinful Act, which was the personal Act of another, as that criminal Action is imputed to them, and subjects them to Punishment. Adam’s first Offence, was his personal Act: His Posterity cannot have a Consciousness. of committing it; but a painful Sensation may attend the Apprehension of a righteous Charge, and Imputation of that sinful Action to them, by which they are made or constituted Sinners. And thus tho’ it was impossible, that Christ should have a Consciousness of our criminal Actions, as his personal Acts: Yet he might have, and actually had, a painful Sensation of the Charge of those Actions to him, and of his Obnoxiousness to Penalty on that Account. To deny this entirely destroys the Reality of his suffering Penalty, and of Consequence the Truth of his Satisfaction. In Words Men may deny Socinianism; but unless this is granted, all that the Socinians contend for, may and must be allow’d because without it, the Death of Christ cannot justly be considered as a Punishment inflicted on him, and therefore can’t be satisfactory; at most, it was only a Condition of Pardon and Salvation, which the Socinians themselves readily assent to.
Query 4. If it will render the Doctrine of Christ’s Atonement, less exceptionable, to state it. in such a Manner and Light, as corresponds with the Conduct of Men in some Cases of Penalty, why may it not be done, in order to compose Differences subsisting among Christians? Why should we delight in Obscurity, and contend for Principles, which will not admit of an easy Explication and Defence, either from the common Notions, or Actions of Men: When it may be so stated, as to agree with the common Sentiments of Mankind, and may by that Means be more generally approved?
Answ. 1. The Imputation of a Fault, and the Infliction of Punishment, are as distinct Ideas as can be; the Ideas of Colour and Sound are not more so. They be as different, as the Idea of a Cause and its Effect are.
2. Among Men Punishment cannot be inflicted, without a Charge of Offence. This I think is very clearly proved above: And also that Men have no Power to impute the criminal Action of an Offender, to an innocent erson; or to punish him for another’s Offence.
3. This Doctrine ought to be esteemed among the deep things of God: It is his Wisdom, yea his hidden Wisdom In a Mystery. With as much Reason therefore, It may be affirmed, that more Depth of Wisdom, Is not discovered in Nature than in Art, as that the Affair of punishing the innocent Jesus to save Sinners, is to be explained by the common Notion and Actions of Men, in civil Life. A higher Affront, in my Opinion, can’t soon be offered to God: Or a greater Reproach be cast on the Gospel, than such a Way of stating this Doctrine carries in it. I am fully persuaded it is acting a very bad Part, by what Motives or Views soever, a Person may be influenced to do it, and that it will appear so to be, when the Time of Disputing shall have an End with Men.
FINIS.