008. I. The Sense of Theism.

I. The Sense of Theism.

1. Doctrinal Content of the Term.—Theism means the existence of a personal God, Creator, Preserver, and Euler of all things. Deism equally means the personality of God and also his creative work, but denies his providence in the sense of theism. These terms were formerly used in much the same sense, but since early in the last century deism has mostly been used in a sense opposed to the Scriptures as a divine revelation, and to a divine providence. Such is now its distinction from theism. Pantheism differs from theism in the denial of the divine personality. With this denial, pantheism can mean no proper work of creation or providence. The philosophic agnosticism which posits the Infinite as the ground of finite existences, but denies its personality, is in this denial quite at one with pantheism. The distinction of theism from these several opposing terms sets its own meaning in the clearer light. Creation and providence are here presented simply in their relation to the doctrinal content of theism. The methods of the divine agency therein require separate treatment. Nor could this treatment proceed with advantage simply in the light of reason; it requires the fuller light of revelation.

2. Historic View of the Idea of God.—Religion is as wide-spread as the human family and pervades the history of the race. But religion carries with it some form of the idea of God or of some order of supernatural existence. There is no place for religion without this idea. This is so thoroughly true that the attempts to found a religion without the notion of some being above us have no claim to recognition in a history of religion. But while religion so widely prevails it presents great varieties of form, especially in the idea of God, or of what takes the supreme place in the religious consciousness. Such differences appear in what are called the ethnic, religions, the religions of different races. Of these James Freeman Clarke enumerates ten.^[71] Some make the number greater, others less. However, the exact number does not concern our present point. In the instances of Confucianism, Brahmanism, and Buddhism there are wide variations in the conception of God, and equally so in the other ethnic religions. As we look into details these variations are still more manifest. In view of the objects worshiped, the rites and ceremonies of the worship, the sentiments uttered in prayer and praise, we must recognize very wide differences of theistic conception. The case is not really other, because so many of these ideas are void of any adequate truth of theism. They are still ideas of what is divine to the worshiper and have their place in the religious consciousness. We can hardly think that in the low forms of idolatry there is nothing more present to religious thought and feeling than the idol. “Even the stock or stone, the rudest fetich before which the savage bows, is, at least to him, something more than a stock or stone; and the feeling of fear or awe or abject dependence with which he regards it is the reflex of a dim, confused conception of an invisible and spiritual power, of which the material object has become representative.”^{[72] [71]} Ten Great Religions.

^[72]Caird:The Philosophy of Religion, p. 177. See also, Flint:Antitheistic Theories, p. 521; Miller:Origin of Religion, p. 101.

3. Account of Perverted Forms of the Idea.—These perverted forms arise, in part, from speculations which disregard the imperative laws of rational thinking, and, in part—mostly, indeed—from vicious repugnances to the true idea. When God is conceived under the form of pantheism, or as the Absolute in a sense which precludes all predication and specially denies to him all personal attributes, the idea is the result of such speculation as we have just now characterized, or a creation of the imagination. In either form the idea is just as impotent for any rationale of the cosmos as the baldest materialism. Neither has any warrant in rational thought. When God is conceived under the forms of idolatry the conception is from a reaction of the soul against the original idea. The reaction is from a repugnance of the sensibilities to the true idea, not from any discernment of rational thought. This is the account which Paul gives of the source and prevalence of idolatry (Romans 1:21-25; Romans 1:28). His account applies broadly to the heathen world. “When they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened.” Thus closing their eyes to the light of nature in which God was manifest, they “changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things.” It was because “they did not like to retain God in their knowledge.”

4. Definitive Idea of God.—A definition of God that shall be true to the truth of his being and character is a difficult attainment. This must be apparent whether we study definitions as given, or the subject of definition. God is for human thought an incomprehensible Being, existing in absolute soleness, apart from all the categories of genus and species. Hence the difficulty of definition. The true idea cannot be generalized in any abstract or single principle. As the Absolute or Unconditioned, God is simply differentiated from the dependent or related; as the Infinite, from the finite. The essential truths of a definition are not given in any of these terms. As the Unknowable, the agnostic formula is purely negative and without definitive content. Absolute will cannot give the content of a true idea of God. In order to the true idea, will must be joined with intellect and sensibility in the constitution of personality. Some of the divine titles have the form of a definition, but are not such in fact. God is often named the Almighty^[73] but this expresses simply his omnipotence, which is only one of his perfections. Another title is Jehovah (Exodus 6:3),which signifies the eternal, immutable being of God; but while the meaning is profound the plenitude of his being is not expressed. “God is love” (1 John 4:16). There is profound truth here also; but the words express only what is viewed as supreme in God.

^[73]Particularly in the book of Job. The citation of a few definitions may be useful. “The first ground of all being; the divine spirit which, unmoved itself, moves all; absolute, efficient principle; absolute notion; absolute end.” -Aristotle. This definition conforms somewhat to the author’s four forms of cause. It contains more truth of a definition than some given by professedly Christian philosophers. “The moral order of the universe, actually operative in life.” —Fichte. Lotze clearly points out the deficiencies of this definition.^[74] It gives us an abstract world-order without the divine Orderer. “The absolute Spirit; the pure, essential Being that makes himself object to himself; absolute holiness; absolute power, wisdom, goodness, justice.”—Hegel. “A Being who, by his understanding and will, is the Cause (and by consequence the Author) of nature; a Being who has all rights and no duties; the supreme perfection in substance; the all-obligating Being; Author of a universe under moral law; the moral Author of the world; an Intelligence infinite in every respect.”—Kant. “God is derived incontestably from good and means the Good itself in the perfect sense, the absolute Good, the primal Good, on which all other good depends—as it were, the Fountain of good. Hence God has been styled the Being of beings (ens entium), the supreme Being (ens summnm), the most perfect Being (ens perfectissimum s. realissimum).”—Krug. “The absolute, universal Substance; the real Cause of all and every existence; the alone, actual, and unconditioned Being, not only Cause of all being, but itself all being, of which every special existence is only a modification.”—Spinoza. This is a pantheistic definition. “The ens a se, Spirit independent, in which is embraced the sufficient reason of the existence of things contingent—that is, the universe.”—Wolf. These citations are found in the useful work of Krauth-Fleming.^[75] Some of them contain much truth, particularly Hegel’s and Kant’s. The serious deficiency is in the omission of any formal assertion of the divine personality as the central reality of a true definition. On the other hand, too much account is made of the divine agency in creation and providence. This agency is very properly included in a definition of theism, particularly in its distinction from deism and pantheism, but is not necessary to a definition of God himself.

^[74]Microcosmus, vol. ii, pp. 673, 674.

^[75]Vocabulary of the Philosophical Sciences, pp. 683, 684.

We may add a few other definitions. “God is the infinite and personal Being of the good, by and for whom the finite hath existence and consciousness ; and it is precisely this threefold definition—God is spirit, is love, is Lord—this infinite personal Good, which answers to the most simple truths of Christianity.”^[76] Martensen gives the elements of a definition substantially the same.^[77] “God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.”^[78] Dr. Hodge thinks this probably the best definition ever penned by man.

^[76]Nitzsch:Christian Doctrine, p. 141.

^[77]Christian Dogmatics, p. 73.

^[78]Westminster Confession, Shorter Catechism.

Personality is the deepest truth in the conception of God and should not be omitted from the definition. With this should be combined the perfection of his personal attributes. All the necessary truths of a definition would thus be secured. Hence we define thus: God is an eternal personal Being, of absolute knowledge, power, and goodness.^[79]

^[79] We give a few references, in some of which, however, we find elaborate characterizations of God, rather than compact definitions. Watson:Theological Institutes, vol. i, pp. 263-269; Knapp:Christian Theology, pp. 85, 86; Cocker:Theistic Conception of the World, pp. 27-37; Martineau:Essays, Philosophical and Theological, vol. ii, pp. 187-189; Christlieb:Modern Doubt and Christian Belief, pp. 219-225; Shedd:Dogmatic Theology, vol. i, pp. 151-194; Lotze;Microcosmus, vol. ii, pp. 659-688.