031. I. Classification Of The Attributes.

I. Classification Of The Attributes.

1. Method of Classification.—There are peculiarities in the classification of the attributes, as compared with the classifications in the sciences of nature, which should not be overlooked. In these sciences the classifications are made under terms which express general conceptions, not realities of existence. Such are the terms mollusca, vertebrata, mammalia, ruminantia. The attributes have no such a conceptual ground. God as their subject is the deepest reality of existence. It was an egregious error of Mill to assert the contrary: “God is as much a general term to the Christian or Jew as to the polytheist.”^[217] With the polytheist to whom there are many gods the term might express a general conception, but with the Christian or Jew, to whom there is only one God, it cannot have such a sense. If this term expressed a mere conception or general notion, no ground would remain for the attributes as concrete realities in the divine personality. But God is a personal term, with the definite and concrete sense of a proper term. As the subject of the attributes he is the infinite reality of being. In this fact lies one peculiarity in the classification of the attributes as compared with the classifications in the sciences of nature.

^[217]Logic, p. 94.

There is another peculiarity of this classification. Under the common terms or general conceptions, as above stated, the things classed are essential, individual existences; whereas the attributes are neither essential nor individual existences, but are concrete realities of the divine personality. With these profound differences, we may still observe a scientific method in the treatment of the divine attributes. Such a method requires their classification on the ground of what is the deepest in God as their subject. This law must exclude all predicables which, however true of God, are not distinctively attributes. It follows that a catalogue of divine predicables, however complete and true, is not a classification of the divine attributes. Nor is any division on grounds which do not thoroughly differentiate the several groups a proper classification. A neglect of these principles results in artificial distinctions—of which there are many instances.

2. Artificial Classifications.—It will help us to a clearer view of the question if we notice a few instances of such artificial distinctions and groupings.

Such is the division of the attributes into the natural and the moral. Instances of the kind are so common that it is needless to give any special reference. It might be proper to distinguish the spheres of the divine agency into the natural and the moral, but such a distinction of the attributes is groundless. God acts in the physical and moral spheres, but not by two distinct sets of powers. Such a distinction in the spheres of his operation cannot be carried back into the powers of his agency. A grouping of the attributes as positive and negative is equally artificial. It is artificial because this distinction in the terms marks no real distinction in the attributes. The negative terms have just as positive a sense as the class of positive terms. Infinity and immutability express the reality of the limitless and changeless in God just as omniscience and omnipotence express the absolute plenitude of his knowledge and power. It thus appears that there is no ground for this classification of the attributes. It is a grouping without any real distinction. It will further appear that the divine predicables which we express negatively are not distinctively attributes.

There is no scientific advance on the ground of a distinction between what God is in himself and in his manifestations: “the Majesty which he has in himself, and the glory which he outwardly manifests; the inner brightness, consequently, and the outward radiance of the light; the attributes which relate to his mode of existence, and those which become known to us in his mode of Operation.”^[218] There is no ground for such a distinction. In any proper sense in which some attributes are related to the mode of the divine existence all must be so related. Hence they cannot be thus divided into distinct classes. Further, all are eternally complete in God; hence no manifestation of a part in the mode of his operation can constitute a ground of classification.

^[218]Van Oosterzee:Christian Dogmatics, vol. i, p. 254.

Dr. Hodge accepts the classification of the Westminster Catechism. He thinks that, while open to speculative objection, it has the advantage of simplicity and familiarity.^[219] He does not commend it, as certainly he could not, for any exact analysis or scientific construction. However complete as a catalogue, it is not in any strict sense a classification.

^[219]Systematic Theology, vol. i, p. 376.

We may present together two instances of analysis and classification which, with verbal differences, are substantially the Dr. Pope gives, as the result of his analysis, “First, the attributes pertaining to God as absolute or unrelated being; then, those arising out of the relation between the Supreme and the creature, which indeed require the creature for their manifestation; and, finally, those which belong to the relation between God and moral beings under his government, with special reference to man.”^[220] Dr. Cocker gives the result of his analysis and the grounds of his classification thus: “1. As related to our intuition of real being; by abstraction from all other being or personality—the immanent attributes of God. 2. As causally related to finite, dependent existence; by elimination of all necessary limitation—the relative or transitive attributes of God. 3. As ethically related to finite personality; by elimination of all imperfection—the moral attributes of God.”^[221] It will readily appear, on a comparison of these two instances, that the three divisions of the one are the same in principle and method as the three divisions of the other. They are both specially formal endeavors toward a scientific attainment. We must think the method a mistake and the aim a failure. In the grouping of the attributes according to the three divisions, certain divine predicables are placed in the first which are not distinctively attributes. We may instance spirituality, which is of the very essence of God and not an attribute of his being; eternity, which is in no proper sense an attribute of the absolute being of God, and no truer of his absolute being than of his personal attributes which are grouped in the second and third divisions; immutability, which is not distinctively a truth of the essential being of God, as it is equally true of all his attributes; self-sufficiency, which, instead of being a distinct truth of the very essence of God, can be a reality only with his omniscience and omnipotence. In the second and third groupings, on a distinction of relations to the creature and to moral beings, with a resulting distinction of attributes as the transitive and the moral, it was impossible to complete the second division without placing in it some attributes which are necessary to the third—impossible, because that distinction is scientifically insufficient for the separate groupings. Omniscience, omnipotence, wisdom, goodness, which could not be omitted from the relation of God to the creature, are equally necessary in his relation to moral government. The insufficiency of these distinctions may be further noted, particularly in the analysis of Cocker. The transitive attributes of his second division are as immanent in God as the attributes of the first, and no more transitive than those of the third. In both instances, the distinction between the second and third divisions is really the same as that, previously noticed, between the natural and moral attributes, and is open to the same insuperable objections.

^[220]Christian Theology, vol. i, p. 291.

^[221]Theistic Conception of the World, p. 50.

It was not our purpose to review comprehensively the many methods in the classification of the attributes, but to notice a few instances as illustrative of an artificial method. What we have given may suffice for this purpose.

3. Classification on the Ground of Personality.—In the true method of science classification is on the ground of what is most determinate in the subject. This is the natural method in distinction from the artificial. The same method should be observed in the classification of the divine attributes. Personality is the most determinate conception of God, and the truest, deepest sense in which he can be viewed as the subject of his own attributes. Personality is the only conception of God which immediately gives his attributes. Any other ground of classification must result either in a mere catalogue in which subject and attribute are confusedly jumbled, or in groupings without any sufficient ground of distinction. Personality gives all attributes which are properly such in distinction from what God is as their subject. This will appear on their direct treatment, while the attributes themselves will thus open into a clearness of view not otherwise attainable.

4. Category of the Attributes.—Our method omits from this category certain divine predicables usually classed as attributes. Of these there are several classes. Some belong to God as subject, not as attributes. Some, however true of God, are in no proper sense his attributes. Others result from the perfection of attributes, but are not distinctively attributes themselves. We have previously noted spirituality as belonging to the first class. Eternity and unity belong to the second. Immutability and omnipresence belong to the third. For the present it may suffice thus to name the several classes, as all must be treated in the proper place. It may be further stated that one attribute, as we shall find the category, includes what are usually treated as several attributes. As God in personality is the subject of his own attributes, so therein we must find their true category. This category must be determined by the constitutive and essential facts of the divine personality. These essential facts are the divine attributes. There are no single terms for their complete expression, and the best will require explication. The requirement is specially from the perfection of the powers which constitute the divine attributes. The terms which express these powers in the human personality require explication; and the requirement must be far deeper in their use for the divine attributes. A proper analysis gives us the essential powers of the human personality as intellect, sensibility, and will. For the present we shall use the same terms for the designation of the constitutive powers of the divine personality. We said for the present, because these terms must be left open for such modification or substitution as may be required by the plenitude and perfection of these powers in the divine personality.

Intellect is in both common and philosophic use for the power or capacity of rational intelligence in the human mind. It includes all the cognitive faculties, but signifies simply the capacity for knowledge, while knowledge itself must be an acquisition through their proper use. There is the reality of intellect in God; and, so far, there is a likeness of powers in the human and the divine personalities. Knowledge in God, however, is not an acquisition, but an eternal possession. This profound distinction requires the use of another term for the expression of the whole truth in God. Intellect well expresses the power of knowledge in the human mind, but cannot express the plenitude of the reality in the divine mind. No term is more appropriate than omniscience—the one long in theological use. Omniscience implies the profoundest sense of intellect as a power of knowledge, but omits all implication of a process of acquisition, while it expresses the infinite plenitude of the divine knowledge.

Sensibility is the term in philosophic use for all forms of mental feeling. It is also used without any qualification for all forms of divine feeling. It seems more appropriate for a philosophy grounded in sensationalism than for a philosophy which gives a proper place to the higher rational powers and to original truths. The profoundest motives of life arise with the activities of the philosophic and moral reason. Sensibility seems but a poor term for the expression of these higher motivities. Yet it is the term in philosophic use; nor have we another with which to replace it. It seems still more inappropriate and insufficient for the expression of the forms of feeling in the mind of God, and necessary to his personality. But the difficulty of replacing it with a better still remains. The term feeling is deficient in definiteness, and includes much of human sensibility which can have nothing analogous in the divine consciousness. Affection and emotion are in philosophic use for distinct forms of sensibility, and hence are respectively too specific and narrow for the present requirement. Even love, while the deepest truth of the divine nature, does not include all the forms of divine feeling. It seems necessary still to use the term sensibility. But we here use it only in the sense of the higher forms of feeling, particularly the rational and moral, which render man the image of God. These feelings are the response of his motivities to the objects of his conception, and constitute the motives of his providence. Without such motives he could have no reason for any action. Neither teleology, nor justice, nor love could have any place in the operations of his providence. There could be no divine providence. Neither could there be a divine personality. Will is the third and completing attribute of personality. It is the necessary power of personal agency, of rational self-determination, of rational action with respect to motives and ends. The will is not sufficient for personality simply as a power of self-energizing for the attainment of the ends of one’s impulses and appetences. Such a power is no higher than the self-energizing of an animal. It must be central to the personality, that it may be the working-power of the rational personal agency. It is thus the power of election with respect to ends, and the executive power whereby one may give effect to his choices. The will is thus a necessary attribute of personality. It is such an attribute in God. The truth of such a divine attribute is in the Scriptures, and in the reality of the divine personality. The power of personal agency in God, whether in creation, providence, or grace, is the power of his will. It has the plenitude of omnipotence. Hence will and omnipotence in God are the same attribute. For this reason “we may properly use the term omnipotence.