045. CHAPTER 20 - THE ATONEMENT - ITS EXTENT - MORE MODERN PHASES OF CALVINISM EXAMINED.

CHAPTER 20 - THE ATONEMENT - ITS EXTENT - MORE MODERN PHASES OF CALVINISM EXAMINED. IN the controversy which, for a century past, has been conducted with so much zeal between Calvinism and Arminianism, it cannot be denied that the advocates of Calvinism have greatly changed their form of presenting, and their method of defending, that system. The phase of Calvinism, as generally set forth in this country at the present day, is materially modified from what it was half a century ago. An exemplification of this fact is, perhaps, nowhere more clearly witnessed than in connection with the New School Presbyterians. Indeed, it was the introduction of a new method of setting forth the Calvinistic doctrines which mainly contributed to the division of the Presbyterian Church in the United States into the New and the Old School branches. In our preceding chapter, we think we have clearly shown that Calvinism, in all its different phases, and in all its various costumes, in the same Churches at different times, and in different Churches at all times, has ever been, and still continues to be, essentially the same: the changes having been merely modal, its identity essential. We have, however, deemed it proper to devote a brief chapter to the consideration of that system, as presented generally in the present day, and especially by the New School Presbyterians, and the New England Congregationalists.

I.We will first explain this “new divinity,” as it pertains to the essential feature in question.

We choose to do this by a few citations from some reputable authors. The Rev. Albert Barnes, an accredited exponent of the doctrine in question, in his sermon entitled “The Way of Salvation,” expresses himself thus: “This atonement was for all men. It was an offering made for the race. It had not respect so much to individuals, as to the law and perfections of God. It was an opening of the way for pardon - a making forgiveness consistent - a preserving of truth - a magnifying of the law; and had no particular reference to any class of men. We judge that he died for all. He tasted death for every man. He is the propitiation for the sins of the world. He came, that whosoever would believe on him should not perish, but have eternal life. The full benefit of this atonement is offered to all men. In perfect sincerity God makes the offer. He has commissioned his servants to go and preach the gospel - that is, the good news that salvation is provided for them - to every creature. He that does not this - that goes to offer the gospel to a part only, to elect persons only, or that supposes that God offers the gospel only to a portion of mankind - violates his commission, practically charges God with insincerity, makes himself ‘wise above what is written,’ and brings great reproach on the holy cause of redemption. The offer of salvation is not made by man, but by God. It is his commission; and it is his solemn charge that the sincere offer of heaven should be made to every creature. I stand as the messenger of God, with the assurance that all that will may be saved; that the atonement was full and free; and that, if any perish, it will be because they choose to die, and not because they are straitened in God. I have no fellow-feeling for any other gospel: I have no right-hand of fellowship to extend to any scheme that does not say that God sincerely offers all the bliss of heaven to every guilty, wandering child of Adam.” From this extract, who would suppose that its author was not an Arminian of the boldest type? Here is exhibited a general, a universal, atonement for every child of Adam - a provision, rich, full, and free, to be sincerely tendered to all mankind. Is not this real Wesleyan Arminianism? Such, truly, it seems! But, strange to think! the author is still a Calvinist. Subscribing to the “Westminster Confession of Faith,” he still holds to predestination, the eternal decrees, foreordination, effectual calling, in the strict, unconditional sense. When he exclaimed, “I stand as the messenger of God, with the assurance that all that will may be saved,” he inserted the little emphatic word “will,” which still enables him to moor his bark in the Calvinistic harbor.

It is the theory of Mr. Barnes, and of the New School Calvinists generally, that Christ died for all; that the atonement is ample for all; that God invites all; that God wills that all should come to Christ and be saved.

They proclaim these Bible truths with impassioned earnestness, so that one could hardly suppose it possible that they did not believe that God had provided a possible salvation alike for all men. But yet, their theory admits no such thing. They hold that while the atonement is ample to save all, if they would but accept it, that yet, such is the native depravity of the human heart, that no man will, or can, accept of the salvation offered, unless God first, by invincible sovereign grace, imparts the will to repent, believe, and obey the gospel; and they farther hold, as strictly as do Calvinists of the Old School, that God has determined from all eternity to impart this sovereign converting grace only to the elect of God embraced in the covenant of redemption. They farther admit that these elect of God, until God visits them with his invincible converting grace, are quite as wicked, and as averse to the exercise of true repentance and faith, as the rest of mankind whom God sees fit to “pass by,” and leave to perish for their sins.

Yet they still contend strenuously, that if men perish, it is altogether their own fault; and that God in perfect sincerity makes the offer of salvation to all men alike. But how do they reconcile all this with the doctrine of the “Confession of Faith” to which they all subscribe? This is the point now to be examined.

Calvinists of this class play upon the word will, telling us that all the inability of the reprobate sinner to come to Christ results from his own perverse will; that he might be saved if he would, but as he freely wills to reject Christ, he is justly accountable for his unbelief and sin, though they can show us no way, according to their theory, by which this unbelief and sin, for which they are held responsible, may be removed, or overcome. When they speak of the ability of all men to believe and be saved, they understand by the term ability something far short of the full import of that word as commonly used. They resort to the subtlety of philosophy, and make a distinction between natural and moral ability. By the former, they mean the physical powers necessary to the performance of any specific act; by the latter, they mean the mental state, or condition of the will or heart, necessary to the performance of the act in question. Hence, when they say that all men may believe and be saved, they only mean that they have the natural powers necessary to saving faith; but that those natural powers must necessarily be unavailing in all except the elect, because they cannot be exerted without the moral ability, which none can possess unless God see proper, by his invincible sovereign grace, to confer it. But as he has decreed from all eternity to withhold this grace from all except the elect, it is certain, according to this theory, that none others will, or can, be saved. To show that we do not misstate their views in reference to natural and moral ability, we make a few quotations from their own writers.

Dr. John Smalley says: “Moral inability consists only in the want of heart, or disposition, or will, to do a thing. Natural inability, on the other hand, consists in, or arises from, want of understanding, bodily strength, opportunity, or whatever may prevent our doing a thing when we are willing, and strongly enough disposed or inclined, to do it.”

Andrew Fuller says: “We suppose that the propensities of mankind to evil are so strong as to become invincible to every thing but omnipotent grace… It is natural power, and that only, that is properly so called, and which is necessary to render men accountable beings.” In the Princeton Review, (April, 1854, page 246,) moral inability is defined as “a rooted propensity to evil, and aversion to good; a moral bias, which man has not the requisite power to remove.”

Mr. Barnes, in the sermon from which we have quoted, in speaking of natural ability, says: “It is not to any want of physical strength that this rejection is owing, for men have power enough in themselves to hate both God and their fellow-men: it requires less physical power to love God than to hate him.” Here the position assumed by Mr. Barnes is, that because men have the requisite “physical power” to” love God,” therefore they are responsible for rejecting Christ; although, according to his own theory they are by nature involved in a moral inability which must forever neutralize that “physical power.” We might multiply quotations from Calvinistic writers, both Old and New School, on this point, but we have said enough to evince clearly what they mean by their distinction between natural and moral ability, and that they ground human responsibility solely on natural ability.

We, however, with special reference to New School divinity, present a few additional remarks. The following propositions, Which we quote from the Bibliotheca Sacra, were subscribed to by a number of the New School divines, for the express purpose of demonstrating that their theory of Calvinism was consistent with the “Confession of Faith.”

1. “While sinners have all the faculties necessary to a perfect moral agency and a just accountability, such is their love of sin and opposition to God and his law, that, independently of the renewing influence or almighty energy of the Holy Spirit, they never will comply with the commands of God.” (April No., 1863, page 585.)

2. “While repentance for sin and faith in Christ are indispensable to salvation, all who are saved are indebted from first to last to the grace and Spirit of God. And the reason that God does not save all, is not that he lacks the power to do it, but that in his wisdom he does not see fit to exert that power farther than he actually does.” (July No., 1863, page 585.)

3. “While the liberty of the will is not impaired, nor the established connection between means and end broken by any action of God on the mind, he can influence it according to his pleasure, and does effectually determine it to good in all cases of true confession.” (July No., 1863, page 586.)

4. “While all such as reject the gospel of Christ, do it not by coercion, but freely, and all who embrace it, do it not by coercion, but freely, the reason why some differ from others is, that God has made them to differ.” (July No., 1863, page 586.)

It is not to our purpose to inquire into all the shades of difference in opinion between New and Old School Calvinists. We have numbered the foregoing propositions, and have italicized parts of them, for our own convenience in commenting upon them. In general terms, we remark that they are so ingeniously framed, that while the superficial examiner might construe them as favoring Arminianism, yet, upon closer scrutiny, it may be clearly seen that they are so worded as to admit of being dove-tailed into old-fashioned Calvinism, as homogeneous to the same system. In No. 1, the “almighty energy of the Holy Spirit” is referred to, without which the sinner “never will comply with the commands of God.” This means, in Old School dialect, the “effectual call” - the “secret, invincible, regenerating grace” - without which none can will to come to Christ. None without this grace can be saved; consequently the salvation of those from whom this grace is withheld, is beyond the range of possibility. In No. 2, the Calvinistic dogma that the sinner can do nothing toward his salvation, but that he is as passive and helpless in the case as the clay in the hand of the potter, is fully implied in the terms, “are indebted from first to last to the grace and Spirit of God” - that is, repentance and faith on the part of the sinner have nothing to do with his salvation, whether as conditions or otherwise. And more plainly still, we are here taught that the reason why all are not saved is this: God “in his wisdom does not see fit to exert that (his saving) power any farther in that way” - that is, the reason of their not being saved is altogether with God; it results solely from his sovereign will. In No. 3, the “invincible sovereign grace which God sees fit to bestow upon the elect, but to withhold from all others,” is clearly secured. God can “influence” the will “according to his pleasure, and does effectually determine it to good:” this is only the “invincible grace” of “effectual calling,” with the phraseology slightly modified. The language is changed - the sense is identical with Old Calvinism. In No. 4, the entire question of salvation or damnation is removed from the door of the sinner, and devolved solely upon God. If men “differ” in moral or religious character, it is because “God has made them to differ.” The sinner is not the custodian of his own moral character. If one is good, and another bad - if one is a believer, and the other an infidel - we are taught that “the reason why is, that God has made them to differ.”

It is plain, from the quotations given, that the New School as well as the Old hold that none ever will, or, in the proper sense of the word, can, be saved, except God, by the exertion of his power, in a manner in which he does not see fit to exert it upon others, makes them willing to repent and believe, thus making them to differ from others. Hence, according to this theory, as God has determined not to exert this power on any but the “elect,” and as none can be saved without it, it follows that salvation is not made possible for all men.

II.We now proceed to show that their whole theory, with their distinctions about natural and moral ability and inability, is erroneous - inconsistent with the philosophy of language, and the nature of things. The terms, natural and moral ability, have evidently been coined and pressed into this discussion by Calvinists to answer a purpose. They are used in a variety of acceptations - some proper, and some improper.

Often they are ambiguous - convenient handmaids of sophistry, serving to obscure the truth, or to make error pass for truth. They are, as used in theology, an outbirth of Augustinian predestination - a material out of which has been woven a fabric to cover up some of the most rugged and distasteful features of Calvinism.

Allowed to occupy their proper place, natural and moral are adjectives of very plain import. Natural, says Webster, means “pertaining to nature; produced or effected by nature, or by the laws of growth, formation, or motion, impressed on bodies or beings by divine power.” Moral, says Webster, “denotes something which respects the conduct of men - something which respects the intellectual powers of man, as distinct from his physical powers.” Webster defines ability to mean “power,” whether physical, intellectual, or of whatever kind.

Hence it is easy to understand these terms in their proper literal import. To have ability for any thing, is to possess all the power requisite for it. Ability to do any thing, implies all the power necessary to the performance of the act. If several powers are necessary to the performance of a specific act - if it can only be performed by the possession of all those powers - we cannot have ability for it while we lack any one of those powers. The distinction made by Calvinistic divines between natural and moral ability, is not only at war with the philosophy of language, but with the nature of things. Agreeably to Webster, or any good lexicographer, the moral powers (so called) are as natural as the physical. Is not the intellect, the will, or the moral sense, as natural - as much an element of our constitution - as our physical powers? Are not the moral powers really only one phase or species of the natural? In a word, is not the moral ability of these divines as much natural as their natural ability? And if so, is not the dividing of ability into natural and moral, manifestly inaccurate?

“The will,” says Dr. Whedon, (see Whedon on the “Freedom of the Will,”) “is as natural a power as the intellect or the corporeal strength. The volitions are as truly natural as any bodily act. The will is a natural part of the human soul. The ability or inability of the will is a natural ability or inability. There is no faculty more natural than the will, or that stands above it, or antithetical to it, as more eminently natural. On the other hand, to make moral volitional is absurd; for many acts of the will belong not to the sphere of morals. They are not moral or ethical acts, and therefore they exert no moral ability; and so, again, the power to will is not a moral, but a natural, ability.” The same author continues: “This misuse of terms infringes upon and tends to supplant their legitimate application to their proper significates. There is a proper natural ability, moral ability, and gracious ability, to which these terms should be exclusively applied.

“Natural ability, or abilities, include all the abilities or powers with which a man is born, or into which he grows. Natural is hereby often antithetical to acquired. The term ability includes capabilities of body or mind; of mind, including intellect, will, or moral sense.

“Moral ability, being a species under natural ability, is every power of the body or mind viewed as capable of being exerted for a moral or immoral purpose.

“Gracious ability is an ability, whether of body or soul, conferred by divine goodness over and above the abilities possessed by man by nature - that is, as a born and growing creature.” The purpose for which the Calvinistic thesis respecting natural and moral ability was invented, was to find a plausible ground of human responsibility, consistently with the tenets of Calvinism. In addition to the abuse of terms which, as we have shown, the scheme involves, we now proceed to show that -

III.The scheme itself is not only absurd and self-contradictory, but that it fails to furnish any rational ground of human responsibility; and, consequently, does not essentially differ from the doctrine of the Old School, on the main question between them and Arminians.

1. The gist of the whole thesis about natural and moral ability with these divines, whether they rank as New or Old School, is, that they assume that man has natural ability to embrace salvation, and that this alone furnishes ample ground of responsibility. The fallacy lies in this: they assume that because a man possesses a kind of ability, therefore he is responsible for not performing a certain duty, which can only be performed by the exercise of another kind of ability which he does not possess - that is, because we have a natural ability, we are responsible for not doing what it is impossible for us to do without a moral ability.

Now, we demand, is it not clear that if responsibility connects with power to do what is required at all, it must be an adequate power? Mr. Barnes endeavors to show that, because a man has “physical strength,” he is responsible for not receiving Christ into his heart. The power to perform any given act amounts to nothing, unless it can avail in reference to that act. Unless it can do this, it is no power at all in the case. Because a child has power to read a verse in his English Testament, will you chastise him for not reading it in the Greek, of which he is perfectly ignorant? No man can receive salvation by the exercise of mere natural ability, any more than he can create a world. How, then, can he be justly responsible for not accepting salvation, merely because of his natural ability? Must the sinner be “punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord” for not obeying the gospel, merely because he had natural ability, though he had not moral ability, without which he could no more obey the gospel than he could stop the course of nature?

2. But again, this scheme is as self-contradictory as it is absurd. Ability to do any particular thing, means all the power essential to the performance of that thing. Hence, if I have a natural ability to accept salvation, I must also have moral ability. If natural ability does not include all the ability essential to the act in question, it is no ability; for ability for any thing includes all the power essential to its performance. In the nature of things, I can have no natural ability to do any thing, unless I first have the moral ability. Moral ability implies the will - the state or disposition of the heart. Now, how can I get up and walk, unless I am willing to do so? I must first have the will before I can perform any act of duty whatever - that is, I must first have the moral before I can have the natural ability for it. If I lack the moral ability to come to Christ for salvation, I can have no ability whatever for that duty. Natural ability in the case is an absurdity. I can have no natural ability in opposition to, or in the absence of, moral ability. Hence, to found human responsibility upon natural, in the absence of moral, ability, is to found it upon a nullity - upon no ability - upon an impossibility.

Dr. Whedon pertinently remarks: “Where there is no moral ability, there can be no natural ability. Where there is no power to will, there is no power to execute the behest of the will. That behest cannot be obeyed if it cannot exist. If there be no adequate power for the given volition, there is no volition to obey, and so no power to obey. An impossible volition cannot be fulfilled. If a man through counter motive force has no power to will otherwise than sin, he has no sequent power to do otherwise than sin. If a man has not the power to will right, he has not the power to act right. An agent can perform a bodily act only through his will. And as it is a universal law that no agent can do what he cannot will, so it is a universal truth, that where there is no power of will, there is no bodily power to fulfill the volition which cannot exist. What a man cannot will, that he cannot do - that is, where there is no moral ability, there can be no natural ability. Hence it is helplessly absurd to propose ‘natural ability,’ in the absence of ‘moral ability,’ as a ground of responsibility.”

3. But again, there is another kind of ability of vastly more consequence than either natural or moral ability. We mean gracious ability. To speak of responsibility in reference to salvation being founded on natural or moral ability, or both of them together, is to ignore the express teachings of the Saviour, who says: “This is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men love darkness rather than light.” Responsibility, it is true, depends to some extent on all these powers - physical, intellectual, and volitional - so far as they can aid us in the service of God; but all these powers together cannot make up that ability, out of the use or abuse of which our responsibility mainly arises. The salvation or destruction of the soul turns solely upon the use or abuse of that gracious ability which God, through the atonement of Christ and the influence of the Holy Spirit, imparts to every sinner. Here is the ground of that responsibility which all must meet in the final judgment. If there condemned, it will be because we rejected offered mercy, refusing to use the gracious ability furnished us by the gospel. If saved, it will be because we accepted that gracious ability so freely provided. In connection with the eternal destiny of the soul, all other ability, if it includes not this, is light as a feather. No other ability - call it natural, moral, or by what name we please - can enable us to believe and be saved, or to reject Christ and perish.

4. But we now inquire, Does this New School theory harmonize with that of the Old School, in reference to the great essential question between Calvinists and Arminians? Or does it poise itself upon the Arminian platform, and teach a possible salvation for all men? We think it only necessary to scrutinize this theory closely, to perceive that it escapes none of those serious objections which have been urged against rigid Calvinism. It is liable to all those absurd and revolting consequences.

(1)In reference to the eternal destiny of the soul, it devolves the responsibility, not upon the sinner, but upon God. The doctrine set forth by the theory teaches, that while the atonement is ample for all, intended for all, and the gospel should be preached alike to all, and the invitation to repent, believe, and be saved, should be sincerely addressed to all, that yet, such is the native depravity and moral inability of all sinners, that no one of the race will ever repent and believe, if left to himself, and to the common influences of the gospel and the Spirit. It farther teaches that God, looking upon all men as alike utterly sinful and helpless, sees proper to extend to a part (the elect) a secret invincible influence, making them willing and able (imparting the indispensable moral ability) to accept of salvation; and that the impartation of this influence absolutely secures the salvation of all to whom it is given; and that if this influence were in the same way extended to all, all would be saved.

Now, we demand, of what avail can it be to the sinner to be told that Christ died to save him; that atoning mercy, ample, rich, and free, is provided for him, and that he may come to Christ and be saved, if he will, when he is assured that he is possessed of an inherited nature so corrupt and obdurate that none possessed of that nature ever did, or ever will, come to Christ, till God sees proper to impart the secret invincible influence of his Spirit, and thereby regenerate that nature? If the nature of all men is alike depraved, and if God imparts to a portion, who are no better than the rest, this influence, which, if imparted alike to all, would save all, but withholds it from others, then are not “the ways of God” unequal? Is not God a “respecter of persons”?

If it is certain that the sinner never will, nor can, be saved without this secret influence, which God of his own sovereign pleasure withholds, then where rests the responsibility? Whose fault, whose doing, is it that the sinner is not saved? He inherits this moral inability, which is certain, while it remains, to keep him from Christ. Can he be responsible for the nature with which he was born? Or how can he change this nature? He has natural ability, it is allowed. But is this adequate to the work? Can the native powers of this fallen body and depraved soul overcome this moral inability - this perverseness of will - which cleaves to the native moral constitution, like “the skin to the Ethiopian, or the spots to the leopard”? And while this moral inability remains, the sinner can no more come to Christ than he can dethrone Omnipotence. If this moral inability can only be overcome in the heart of the sinner by a secret invincible influence (the effectual call) which God has determined to withhold, then may the preacher as well waste his sermons and his exhortations upon the insensate rocks as upon him! It affords no palliation to tell him he may come to Christ if he will. The question is, How can he get the will? Can he change that corrupt nature, one of whose essential attributes excludes that will?

If we admit that God imparts to the sinner a gracious ability by which this corrupt nature may be restrained, and this moral inability so counteracted as to enable the sinner to come to Christ - if we take this position, then the difficulty all vanishes. But by so doing, we step fairly upon the Arminian ground, and the last plank of the Calvinistic platform has been deserted. Here is the dividing line between these two renowned systems of theology. If God has provided a gracious ability for every sinner, by which this soul-destroying moral inability may be counteracted, and the sinner saved, then is Arminianism true: the responsibility is thrown upon the sinner, and “the ways of God are justified to men.” But if we reject this position, then do we hitch on to the system of Calvinism; and we must embrace it in all its essential features, however rugged and revolting they may appear, or involve ourselves at every step in palpable inconsistency and self-contradiction.

(2) Again: if, as the theory teaches, God gives to a part the moral ability to come to Christ, and withholds it from the rest, when all are alike depraved and helpless, does not this prove that God primarily wills the destruction of those that are lost - preferring their destruction to their salvation? All must admit that God could, were he so disposed, just as easily impart this secret invincible grace to all as to a part. It will be admitted also, that if God would but impart this grace alike to all, then all would infallibly be saved. Now we ask, according to this theory, Why is not the sinner saved? The answer must be, because God primarily wills that he should be lost. He wills to withhold that grace, without which he cannot be saved, and with which he infallibly would be saved; consequently he wills that the sinner should be lost. And thus it is clear that this theory destroys the proper ground of human responsibility, taking it from the sinner, and throwing it back on the primary will of God. Hence, by clear logical sequence, this theory is liable to all the objectionable features of rigid Calvinism. It denies that the atonement provides a possible salvation for all men.

(3) If the ground be taken, as has been done by some claiming to be Calvinists, that the sinner may, by the exercise of his mere native powers, change his “purpose,” or his “preference,” and thus, on the principle of self-conversion, come to Christ, repent, believe, and be saved, independent of this secret invincible grace - (the effectual call) - if any choose to occupy this position, then they are neither Calvinists nor Arminians, but have rushed to the extreme of Pelagianism. For the refutation of their theory, we refer to the appropriate department in this work.

We think it must now be clearly apparent that, however much Calvinists may vary on points of little or no importance, yet, when they come to the main question involved in their controversy with Arminians, they perfectly harmonize.

It is only necessary for us particularly to inquire for the sense in which they use scholastic and technical terms, and we may readily see that, however diversified the course of illustration and reasoning which they pursue, they arrive at the same ultimate conclusion. Whether they speak of a universal or limited atonement; whether they present the offer of gospel grace in terms the most general and unlimited, or with marked restriction and reservation; whether they be supralapsarian or sublapsarian in their peculiar views of the covenant of redemption; whether they be ranked with Antinomians or moderate Calvinists; whether they be designated as Baxterians or Hopkinsians, as New or Old School; whether they dwell mostly on free agency and sufficient grace, or on divine sovereignty and philosophic necessity; or in whatever else they may differ, they arrive at the same ultimate conclusion on the great question we have proposed, as containing the gist of the controversy between Calvinists and Arminians. They do not believe that the atonement of Christ so extends to all men as to make salvation possible for them.