037. CHAPTER 16 - THE ATONEMENT - ITS NECESSITY.

CHAPTER 16 - THE ATONEMENT - ITS NECESSITY. THE word atonement occurs but once in the New Testament, (Romans 5:11.) In that passage the Greek is katallaghn, from the verb katallassw, which means to reconcile.

It is, however, a word of frequent occurrence in the Old Testament. In the Hebrew, the word is copher, signifying, primarily, to cover, or overspread; but is constantly used to denote the expiation or satisfaction made for sin, by the various sacrifices and offerings presented under the law. By lexicographers, generally, the word is defined to mean an expiation or satisfaction for an injury or offense. In a theological sense, by the atonement, we understand the expiation or satisfaction made for sin, by the sufferings and death of Christ, whereby salvation is made possible to man. To subject belonging to Christianity has been thought to involve more intricacy, and certainly none possesses more importance, than the one now presenting itself to our consideration; therefore it merits at our hands the closest thought and the most devout supplication, that in reference to this deeply interesting theme we may be led to a clear perception of the “truth as it is in Jesus.”

It will readily be perceived that the great subject of redemption through the atonement of Christ is founded upon, and intimately connected with, the state of man as a sinner, which has been the subject of discussion in several of the preceding chapters. Indeed, it is clear that if man be not a sinner, to provide a Saviour for his redemption would be perfectly useless. Redemption through Christ is obviously a scheme of recovery from the evils of the Fall. It is a gracious remedy for the moral disease with which as we have already seen, the nature of man is infected. To deny the existence of the disease, is to discard the necessity of the remedy. Hence it would appear reasonable to suppose that our views of the nature of the remedy will be influenced by the light in which we view the disease for which it is provided. If we are heterodox on the one point, to preserve consistency throughout our system we cannot be sound in the faith upon the other. Thus it will be seen that, in proportion as the scriptural doctrine of depravity has been depreciated or discarded, so has the doctrine of atonement been explained away or denied.

Before we enter properly into the investigation of this subject, as presented in the Scriptures, it may be proper briefly to present the leading views which have been entertained upon it by different classes of theologians. That Jesus Christ is the Saviour of sinners, and that his mission into our world, and his death and sufferings are, in some way, connected with this great work, is freely admitted by all. But when we come to speak of the nature of the connection between the death of Christ and the salvation of man, a great diversity of sentiment, on points of vast importance, is at once seen. The first theory which we shall notice upon this subject is generally denominated Socinianism, though it has been adopted by most of the modern Unitarians. The substance of this system we shall present in the language of Dr. Priestley, in his “History of the Doctrine of the Atonement.” The quotations have been collected and thrown together by Dr. Hill, in his “Lectures,” as follows:

“The great object of the mission and death of Christ was to give the fullest proof of a state of retribution, in order to supply the strongest motives to virtue; and the making an express regard to the doctrine of a resurrection to immortal life the principal sanction of the laws of virtue, is an advantage peculiar to Christianity. By this peculiar advantage the gospel reforms the world, and remission of sin is consequent on reformation. For although there are some texts in which the pardon of sin seems to be represented as dispensed in consideration of the sufferings, the merit, the resurrection, the life, or the obedience of Christ, we cannot but conclude, upon a careful examination, that all these views of it are partial representations, and that, according to the plain general tenor of Scripture, the pardon of sin is, in reality, always dispensed by the free mercy of God upon account of man’s personal virtue, a penitent, upright heart, and a reformed, exemplary life, without regard to the sufferings or merit of any being whatever.” From these extracts it appears that the Socinians deny that Christ suffered in the room of sinners, to expiate their sins, and satisfy the demands of a broken law. According to their view, he only saves us by leading us to the practice of virtue, through the influence of his example and instructions. The second theory we shall notice is the Arian hypothesis. This, while it attaches more importance than the Socinians do to the death of Christ, denies that it was either vicarious or expiatory; and so falls very far short of the proper Scripture view. This system represents Christ as more than a mere man - as a superangelic being, the first and most exalted of creation: and that his mission into our world was a wonderful display of benevolence, inasmuch as he left the high honors of glory, and condescended to lead a life of toil and ignominy in the propagation of his religion; and then to seal the truth of his doctrine with his own blood. Sufferings so great, say the Arians, by so exalted a character, although they are in no sense vicarious or expiatory, yet are not without their influence, but constitute a powerful argument in favor of the salvation of sinners since they form a sufficient ground for the Redeemer to claim the deliverance of all who repent and believe, as a reward for what he has done and suffered in their behalf. Thus, according to this view, the Saviour gains a power and dignity as a Mediator by his sufferings, though there is seen no special necessity for them, inasmuch as God, had he seen fit, could have extended salvation to man as consistently without as with those sufferings. The theory which we have here presented has not only been advocated by the Arians, but, with little variation, has found favor with some divines having higher claims to orthodoxy - such as Dr. Balguy of the Established Church of England, and Dr. Price among the Dissenters. We will not now enter into the discussion of the peculiar character of the two schemes just presented, but in the regular course of the investigation of the Scripture doctrine of the atonement, we trust their refutation will be sufficiently obvious. In pleading for their peculiar views on the subject of the atonement, the different parties have not only appealed to the Scriptures, but have instituted a course of reasoning founded upon the analogy of faith and the general tenor of revelation. Such a course of investigation, in reference to this subject, is by no means improper, provided both reason and revelation be allowed to occupy their proper position. But let it be remembered that while we may exercise our reason in reference to the correct understanding of what is plainly revealed, we are not at liberty, as professed Christians, to reason in opposition to the explicit declarations of the inspired oracles. That this obviously important principle has always been. observed, especially by those who have opposed the expiatory character of the atonement, can by no means be affirmed. Indeed, there is perhaps no subject in the investigation of which men have ventured farther in bold and impudent assertion, in the very face of plain Scripture. Such has been the spirit of many who have written in opposition to what we conceive to be the true doctrine of the atonement, that they have been utterly incapable of making a fair statement of the doctrine they opposed. They have poured their vituperation and abuse upon a caricature of their own invention - a creature of their own imagination - bearing scarcely a feature of resemblance to the acknowledged sentiments of those whom they opposed. But this will more fully appear as we proceed in the investigation of the doctrine.

I. The first point to which we invite attention is, the difficulties in the way of man’s salvation, which rendered the atonement necessary. Why was it, it is asked, that there was a necessity for the sufferings of the Son of God? To this we reply, that the great necessity for the atonement is founded upon the pure and unchangeable principles of the divine government. But these must be considered in connection with the true character and condition of man, as well as the grand design of the Almighty in his creation. Let these important points be carefully examined, and the necessity for the great work of atonement will be clearly seen.

1. Then, we say, that in proposing to himself the creation of human beings, the Infinite Mind must have been swayed and determined by a design worthy the character of the Supreme Creator. This grand design, or reason, for the creation of man could not have been based upon the nature or character of man while as yet he had no actual existence, but must have been the result of the divine perfections, in their independent operations.

“I do not here introduce any external impulsive cause as moving God unto the creation of the world; for I have presupposed all things distinct from him to have been produced out of nothing by him, and consequently to be posterior, not only to the motion, but the actuation, of his will. Since, then, nothing can be antecedent to the creature besides God himself, neither can any thing be a cause of any of his actions but what is in him, we must not look for any thing extrinsical unto him, but wholly acquiesce in his infinite goodness, as the only moving and impelling cause.” (Pearson on the Creed.) From all that we can learn of the nature of God himself, and the character of his administration toward his creatures, we are led to infer that, in the creation of man, the great object was the development of the divine perfections, and the happiness of intelligent creatures. Any thing repugnant to, or falling short of, this pure and exalted object, would be so derogatory to the divine character, and so palpably inconsistent with what we see of the divine administration, as to be utterly incapable of commanding the assent of an intelligent mind.

2. If the correctness of this statement, in reference to the design of God in creation, be admitted, we inquire, in the next place, whether the noble and exalted powers with which man was originally endued were, in their nature, calculated to promote this design. Now, it must be admitted that the Almighty was not only perfectly free to create or not to create, but also to create man as he was created, or a being of vastly superior or inferior powers. This being the case, it must follow that Infinite Wisdom saw that the grand design of creation would be best promoted by producing beings of precisely the character with which man was primarily constituted. If we deny this conclusion, we arraign the divine perfections, and charge the Creator with folly! As we dare not do this, we inquire, What was the primitive character of man? We learn from St. Paul that “he was made a little lower than the angels;” that “he was crowned with glory and honor;” that he was “set over the works” of the divine hand; and that “all things” were put in “subjection under his feet.” Now, it appears from this that man was originally formed, not only superior to inanimate creation - to stocks and stones that cannot feel - but also superior to irrational, sentient existences - to “birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things.” In a word, he was made a free and morally accountable agent. Endued with rational powers, capable of discerning between right and wrong, he was a being calculated to reflect the glories of the great Creator by a proper exercise of the exalted powers conferred upon him. He was capable of enjoying God, from which alone solid happiness can spring. And this capacity resulted from his nature, as a free moral agent. Hence it will appear that the endowment of free agency, originally conferred upon man, was calculated to promote his own happiness, and to exhibit the glorious perfections of the Creator, which, as we have seen, accords with the grand design in creation.

3. From the character of man as a free moral agent, it necessarily follows that he must be placed under a law adapted to his nature. There is apparent a fitness and harmony throughout the system of the universe, which necessarily results from the perfections of Him who made all things. The various parts of the works of God are placed in situations suitable to their nature: thus the fish are assigned to the aqueous element, while the birds are allowed to fly in the air. The entire material universe is placed under a system of government correspondent to its nature, known by the appellation of physical laws, or laws of nature. To have placed mere matter under a system of moral government, would have been a blunder too glaring to be possible for Infinite Wisdom.

Equally absurd would it be for irrational, sentient beings to be placed under a law suited only either to unorganized, lifeless matter, or intellectual moral agents. How then could we suppose that the infinitely wise Creator would produce a race of rational, intelligent beings, endued with free moral agency, as we have seen men to be, and leave them either without a law for the government of their actions, or place them under a system of government not suited to their nature? The idea is most preposterous, and disgraceful to the divine character. To have placed man under the regulation of laws only suited to lifeless matter, would have been to reduce him to the character of a clod or a pebble; to have placed him under laws suited to irrational, sentient beings, would have been to reduce his character to the level of “the beasts which perish;” but to have left him entirely destitute of law, would have been to strike him from existence at a blow; for all creation, whether material or immaterial, whether rational or irrational, is, by the wise arrangement of the great Ruler of the universe, placed under a system of government completely adapted to the diversified character of the things to be governed. This beautiful and harmonious adaptation of law to the character of the creatures of God, necessarily results from the infinite perfections of the Creator; so that it cannot possibly be otherwise, unless we would destroy the divine government, and annihilate the perfections of Jehovah. From the principles here laid down, the truth of which we think cannot be denied, it will necessarily follow that either to have left man without a rule for the government of his conduct, or to have given him a law not suited to his character as a moral agent, would have been either to have made him something entirely different from what he was, to have destroyed his very existence, or, what is far worse, to have deranged or annihilated the perfections of the great Creator himself.

4. In the next place, we notice that this law, adapted to the character of man, under which we have seen that he must have been placed, must necessarily be of such a character that man may either obey or disobey it. Whatever theory we may adopt in reference to the freedom of the human will, if it would deprive an accountable moral agent of the power to do either good or evil, we may rest assured that it is false. A moral, accountable agent must, of necessity, possess this power; otherwise you might as well speak of rewarding the sparks for “flying upward,” or of punishing the rivers for discharging their waters into the ocean. Hence it will follow that the law under which man was placed was such that he might have kept it, although he was free to disobey it.

There is no possible way of avoiding this conclusion, but by denying the character in which man was created, which, as already shown, would arraign the attributes of his Creator.

Again, as the grand design of the Almighty in the creation of man was that his own glory might be displayed in the happiness of his creatures, it was therefore necessary, for the attainment of this end, to promote the obedience and virtue of man. That happiness is necessarily connected with obedience and virtue, is one of the plainest principles of philosophy, as well as religion. “To be good is to be happy,” has become a maxim of acknowledged truth. Vice produces misery, as a necessary and invariable consequence. Hence the Almighty, in order to secure the happiness of man, endeavored, by all appropriate means, to secure his obedience and virtue. But this could only be accomplished by placing him under appropriate law; for where there is no law or rule of action, there can be no obedience, no transgression, no virtue, no vice; in a word, without law, there can be neither moral good nor evil; there can be no distinction in the qualities of actions; nor can we see how an intelligent, accountable agent could exist.

5. In the next place, it would follow that, in order to carry out the original design of the happiness of man, this suitable law must be plainly prescribed. A law unrevealed can be of no avail. How can man be expected or required to perform his duty, unless he be informed of its nature? Hence, at the first creation, the Almighty made a plain revelation of his will to man. None can know the mind of God but by revelation from him; hence to deny revelation, would be to deny that the will of God is the law under which man is placed; or otherwise we must deny the accountability of man, and discard the entire system of rewards and punishments.

6. But, again, it must be obvious that the revelation to man of a suitable law for the government of his conduct, can be of no avail unless there be affixed an adequate penalty. In fact, a law without a penalty is a contradiction in terms - a manifest absurdity. The moment you abstract the penalty, the quality of law ceases, and the command can be nothing more than mere advice. Therefore we see clearly the propriety, and even the absolute necessity, of annexing to the law an adequate penalty. With divine authority and consistent propriety it was said, “In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die.”

It has been contended by some, who admit the propriety of what they would be pleased to call an adequate penalty, that the penalty of death here specified was unnecessarily severe; therefore, although this point has been touched in the discussion of the fall of man, some farther observations may, in this place, be necessary.

It must, then, be admitted, in the first place, that the prime object of penalty is to prevent crime, so far as this can be accomplished without destroying the moral agency and accountability of man. Had it been possible so to frame the penalty of the law as either to prevent the possibility of obedience on the one hand, or of disobedience on the other, the necessary consequence would have been that man could no longer be rewardable or punishable, but must sink to the station of inanimate or irrational creation. Hence it is plain that, in the selection of the penalty for the Adamic law, the Almighty not only had respect to the prevention of crime, and the promotion of the happiness of his creatures, but also to the preservation of the great principles of his moral government, as well as the security to man of his high dignity of free moral agency and accountability to God. When these great essential objects, for the accomplishment of which the penalty was designed, are taken into the account, it is utterly impossible for man, with his limited powers, to say, without the most daring presumption, that the penalty was not the most appropriate that could possibly have been selected.

It is certain that if the penalty has any influence at all, in proportion as it is increased in severity will the probability of obedience be increased.

Therefore, to say that the threatened penalty was too severe, is in effect to say that the probability for disobedience, and consequent misery, should have been rendered greater than it was. With how little semblance of reason this can be contended for, will be manifest, when we reflect that, great as the penalty was, it did not absolutely secure obedience; the event shows that man did transgress. Surely, then, there could have been no necessity for adding to the probability of that event. We think it must be admitted that it is impossible for man, a priori, to determine how great the penalty must have been to have destroyed his accountability, by giving too great security to obedience; or how small it must have been, to have destroyed his accountability by giving too great security to disobedience. For any thing that we can certainly know, the smallest increase or diminution of the penalty, might have wrested from man his character as a free moral agent, and rendered him utterly unfit for either reward or punishment.

Once more: that it is obviously inconsistent for a believer in the truth of revelation to cavil about the nature of the penalty of the original law, must be admitted, when we reflect that it amounts virtually to an impeachment of the divine attributes. To say that the Divine Being did not so comprehend the entire character and relations of his own creatures, as to know certainly what description of penalty was the best calculated to promote his grand design in creation, is directly to assail his wisdom. To say that he chose to affix one penalty to the law, when he knew that another was better suited to the grand end in view, is an impudent attack upon his goodness. Hence it will follow that, unless we venture to assail the divine perfections, if we admit the truth of revelation, which declares explicitly, “In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die,” we are compelled to admit that the annexed penalty was the most appropriate, and the best calculated to promote the grand design in man’s creation, of any that could have been selected. He whose wisdom and goodness are so gloriously exhibited throughout his works, in the perfect adaptation of the means to the end, cannot be supposed, in reference to the moral government of man - the most important being belonging to sublunary creation - to have blundered so egregiously as to have selected inappropriate means for the accomplishment of his excellent and glorious purpose.

7. The only remaining consideration, in order that we may arrive at the ground of necessity for the atonement, is for us to ascertain whether there was a necessity for the execution of the penalty, after the law had been violated; or whether it might have been remitted, independently of satisfaction or expiation. To this inquiry we reply, that every consideration which urged the propriety of the threatening, or even of the establishment of the law itself, with equal propriety and force demanded the execution of the penalty. To affix a penalty to a law, and then permit disobedience to pass with impunity, and the threatened penalty to be entirely forgotten or disregarded, would be perfect mockery.

Therefore, when man transgressed, the truth, justice, mercy, and all the attributes of God, as well as the stability and honor of the eternal throne itself, cried aloud for the execution of the penalty of the violated law.

1. Those who have denied the necessity, and consequently the reality, of the atonement, have contended that the Almighty might consistently, by the exercise of his mere prerogative as Governor of the universe, have extended pardon to the sinner, without any satisfaction or condition whatever. To this we reply, that perhaps such might be the case, provided the Almighty were destitute of moral character, and regardless of moral principle. But a little reflection will show that such a course of procedure would be at war with the holy and immutable perfections of God.

(1) God had positively denounced the penalty - “In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die.” This was the unequivocal language of God himself. Had no regard been paid to this after man had transgressed, where would have been the truth of God? And what kind of a lesson on the subject of veracity would herein have been inculcated upon the intelligent universe?

(2) Upon this principle, where would have been the justice of God? Had not the affixing of the penalty been in accordance with the eternal rectitude of the divine character, it never could have been threatened, and if so, it will necessarily follow that the same immutable principles of rectitude which first authorized the penalty will require its execution. Indeed, to say that God has a right to remit a threatened penalty, independently of satisfaction or atonement, is to deny that he has the right to execute it; for a right to inflict a penalty; or punishment, can only be founded upon the supposition that it is just. And if it be in accordance with justice to inflict the penalty, it must follow that if it be not inflicted, the claims of justice are infringed.

Again, upon the supposition that God has a right to remit any penalty, by the mere exercise of his prerogative, it would follow that, upon the same principle, he may remit every penalty, and that not only in reference to its severity, but to its whole extent and influence. And if it be right, according to the principles of justice, to remit all penalty and punishment, it cannot be consistent with goodness to inflict any punishment whatever; for it is most clear that the goodness of God must always seek the happiness of his creatures, so far as it can be done consistently with his rectitude. Thus it appears that pardon without an atonement, on the principle of prerogative, would deprive the Almighty of all right to punish offenders, nullify the principles of justice, and overturn the government of God altogether.

(3) But, in the next place, it may easily be seen that the above plan of pardon by prerogative, independent of atonement, is also repugnant to the goodness of God. The grand object of law is the happiness and well-being of the intelligent universe. The great Governor of all can not act upon the principle of clearing the guilty without inflicting a positive injury on the innocent; for it is to the interest of all intelligent beings that the divine government be sustained. Upon its stability depends, not only their happiness, but their very existence itself. Let it be known that crime is not to be punished, that law is merely a form, and threatened penalty but a mockery, and who can tell the consequence that would immediately result throughout the vast extent of God’s moral dominions? A license for universal rebellion would be proclaimed, and soon the intelligent universe would become a ruinous wreck. With such an example of disregard for principle in the divine administration before them, what hope could there have been that man, or any of the subjects of God’s moral government, could afterward have paid any regard to the divine command? Therefore the divine goodness itself, which would prevent the universal prevalence of anarchy and rebellion, and the consequent misery and eternal ruin of millions of worlds, joins her voice with the pleadings of justice, for the honor and security of the divine throne, for the preservation of the principles of immutable rectitude in the divine administration, and for the promotion of the happiness of God’s intelligent creatures, in opposition to the ruinous scheme of pardon by prerogative, independent of atonement.

2. In the next place, we will notice that some have contended that, even if there were a doubt with regard to the propriety of extending pardon by prerogative to all classes of transgressors indiscriminately, there can be no doubt of its propriety and fitness on the condition of repentance. This is the ground taken by Socinus, and it has been strenuously insisted upon by Dr. Priestley, and the modern Socinians and Unitarians generally. But that it is alike repugnant to reason, fact, and Scripture, we think may be easily shown.

(1) Let it be remembered, that to plead for the propriety of pardon on the ground of repentance, is, in effect, to acknowledge that it cannot consistently be conferred by the mere prerogative of God, by which it has been contended that he may relax his law at pleasure, and relinquish his right to punish the sinner. To say that repentance is required as the condition, is to admit that there is something in the principles of unbending rectitude by which the divine government is swayed, that would render it improper to pardon offenders indiscriminately, merely on the principle of mercy. This scheme, then, evidently acknowledges the necessity of a satisfaction of some kind, in order to pardon; but the question is, whether that satisfaction is bare repentance.

Here we may observe, in the second place, that the word repentance, in the Scriptures, is taken in two different senses; but in neither acceptation can it furnish a just and independent ground for pardon.

First, it means sorrow for sin, induced solely by the apprehension or realization of the dreadful punishment and misery necessarily resulting therefrom, without being founded upon any pure principle of hatred to sin on account of its intrinsic moral evil, or leading to any genuine reformation of heart and life. The dispensing of pardon upon a repentance of this kind, is not only destitute of the least countenance from fact and Scripture, but it would be as completely subversive of all moral government as if no condition were required whatever. Were this principle admitted, it would follow that God is bound to extend pardon to every repentant criminal, and that, too, as soon as he begins to repent. This is contradicted by the fact that all men, even after they repent of their sins, are left in this world to suffer more or less the evil consequences thereof. Now, if repentance is the only and sufficient ground for pardon, every repentant sinner should immediately be released from all punishment whatever. But again, is it not evident that any sinner, so soon as all hope of advantage from crime were gone, and he began to feel the just punishment of his sins, would immediately begin to repent; and thus, no sooner would the punishment begin to be felt, than it would be removed? This would in effect overturn all government, and proclaim complete and immediate indemnity for all transgression. In the next place, repentance, in the Scriptures, is taken for that sincere and heart-felt sorrow for sin, on account of its intrinsic evil and offensiveness in the sight of a holy God, which leads to a reformation of heart and life, from pure and evangelical principle. In reference to a repentance of this kind, we remark, in the first place, that, independent of grace received through the atonement of Christ, it is utterly out of the power of any man thus to repent. This necessarily follows from the totally depraved character of man as a fallen sinner, which has already been discussed. Now, to make this repentance, which can only result from the atonement of Christ, a consideration by which the necessity of that atonement shall be superseded, is manifestly absurd. But even if we admit the possibility of repentance, in the full sense of the word, independent of the atonement, this repentance could nevertheless be no just ground for pardon. It could not change the relation of the sinner to the violated law. He would still be charged with the guilt of transgression, however penitent he might be. This guilt nothing but pardon can remove. Were it the case that repentance could remove the guilt of the sinner, independent of pardon, then pardon itself would be entirely superseded.

(2) Again, it is clear that repentance, however sincere it may be, and however great the immediate benefits resulting from it, can have no retrospective bearing, so as to cancel past offense. Were it true that full and immediate pardon flows directly consequent upon repentance then it would follow that the broken constitution of the intemperate, the wasted fortune of the profligate, and the blasted character of the criminal, would, upon reformation of heart and life, immediately be restored; but such is evidently not the fact. As in reference to the things of this life, repentance, while it may deliver us from falling again into such crimes and misfortunes as we have forsaken and endeavored to escape, cannot immediately deliver us from the bitter consequences of past misdoings and folly; so, upon the same principle, in reference to spiritual things, while it may prevent a farther accumulation of guilt, and an exposure to increased punishment, it cannot affect the past, so as to remove the guilt, and release from the punishment already contracted and incurred.

(3) Again, to suppose that repentance can purchase exemption from punishment incurred by past offense, is to suppose that we are not continually indebted to God the full tribute of all the service we are capable of rendering. If the service of to-day may not only meet the demands of God upon us for the time being, but also enable us to satisfy the unliquidated claims of yesterday, then it follows that it is possible for us to perform works of supererogation - to do more than God requires of us, and thus procure a surplus of merit, which we may transfer to the benefit of our more destitute neighbor, or by which we may accumulate an account in our own favor, so as to bring the Almighty, according to strict principles of law, actually in our debt. How absurd the hypothesis!

(4) Once more: a close examination of the subject will show that pardon, upon the principle of repentance alone, is self-contradictory and absurd. To say that pardon is based upon repentance, is to admit that it cannot take place otherwise; and if so, then it would follow that there must be a hindering cause; but no hindering cause can exist, except the obligations of the Almighty to maintain the principles of his moral government. But if the Almighty is under obligations to maintain the principles of his moral government, then it will follow that he is not at liberty to pardon, even the penitent offender, without an atonement, or expiation for past guilt; for the law denounces “death as the wages of sin,” irrespective of penitence or impenitence. Thus it appears that pardon for sin without atonement, whether the sinner be penitent or impenitent, would be repugnant to the principles of law: and this plan of pardon would abrogate the divine government, as really as it could be done by the system of pardon on the principle of mere prerogative.

(5) Finally, the Scriptures give no countenance to either of these modes of pardon. It is therein declared that God “will by no means clear the guilty.” “The soul that sinneth, it shall die.” “The wages of sin is death;” and, “Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them.” These are the statutes of the divine government; and they stand with equal force against the penitent and the impenitent; nor can they, in the least, mitigate their rigor, or release their hold upon the criminal, however penitent he may be, till their claims are met, and their full demands satisfied, by an adequate atonement.

It is true that the Scriptures present the promise of mercy to the sincere penitent; but it is not upon the ground or merit of repentance, but through the atoning sacrifice of Him who is “exalted a Prince and a Saviour, for to give repentance to Israel and forgiveness of sins.” Thus have we seen that the necessity for the great work of the atonement of Christ is founded upon the principles of the divine government, taken in connection with the grand design of the Almighty in the creation of man, as well as the true character of man as a free moral agent, who, by the abuse of that liberty, has fallen under the penalty of a violated law, and consequently lies in a state of guilt and misery.