Appendix - CHAPTER 2 SECTION II OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE AND EVIDENCE
CHAPTER 2 SECTION II OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE AND EVIDENCE
It being a matter of the utmost consequence to the right procedure of the intellect, to state the several kinds of knowledge, as well as the degrees of it in each kind, which can admit of any, I shall observe that there are three kinds of knowledge, and as many kinds of evidence, on which they are built. The first is that we have from our senses, which consists in an intellectual view of the ideas transmitted through them to the memory. This is a knowledge direct, immediate, and intuitive, and carries in it the highest certainty. Consequently, it admits of no proof from reason: for all such proof has less of perspicuity and certainty, than that which it already contains in its own nature This is a knowledge which admits of no degrees of evidence : for all sensation is in itself equally certain, and the evidence of all the senses is equally clear, with respect to their proper objects. When the sensation is regular, and perfect, the assent of the intellect necessarily follows all at once; though in a manner quite different from demonstration, which extorts it by immediate proof. Not that it yields to the clearest demonstration, when the organ is rightly disposed, and exercised upon its proper object, at a just distance, and in a due medium. Against sensitive knowledge, reason can never interpose, unless there is a suspicion of failure in the act of sensation. Nor does it inquire then, whether the evidence of sense be true ; but whether it be truly the evidence of sense. So that to argue against the evidence of sense, is to oppose the evidence of reason, to what in its nature admits of no reasoning at all. And highly necessary it was, that this evidence of sense should be so immediate, clear and undoubted, because it is the foundation of all knowledge, human and divine. If then the truth of this admitted of’ any doubt or were capable of any proof, we should wander about is endless skepticism, without the least certainty an any thing. For no proof for it could be more evident, than that which it was brought to prove, and would therefore itself require another proof; and on. with endless confusion. A second kind of knowledge is that we have from self-consciousness We come to the knowledge of things without us, by the meditation of of their ideas ; but we are immediately conscious of what passes in our own minds, without the intervention of any idea. Thus we have a’ knowledge of all the faculties of our soul, very different from sensitive knowledge; though we have no degree of it antecedent to the exercise of those faculties upon the ideas of sensation : as we should have had no knowledge of our bodily motions, if the parts had not actually moved.
Though this kind of knowledge be more complex, it is equally tertam with that we have from sensation. The assent as necessarily’ follows upon consciousness : indeed it falls in with it. The conscious ness itself is the very assent ; nor can they be distinguished even in thought. When this internal sensation is truly natural, we are never deceived in this article of knowledge. And this also is so clear and distinct that it admits of no proof from reason.- So that neither can this, any more than the former, be called demonstration : since, like that, it is so immediate and intimate to us, that nothing can increase its evidence, And for a man to argue away any instances of this knowledge,’ or to deny their certainty, is no less absurd, than to contradict the clear perceptions of external sense. Only it is to be observed, that all here said of this knowledge, is said of the first, immediate, internal perceptions; not of any farther observations, made upon them by the intellect, or of any deductions afterward drawn concerning them.
These two kinds of knowledge are immediate, and consequently a sort of intuition : entirely different from which is, —The third kind of knowledge, REASONING, which is mediate, and wholly acquired by deduction, by the exercise of that one operation of the mind, illation or consequence. This we may subdivide into different species, according to the different manner of the intellect’s’ procedure, in making its deductions. The first species is science or demonstration, which appears clearest in the syllogistic form; by applying a common measure to two extremes, which have an infallible connexion with it. So that the conclusion follows by an absolute certainty, and compels the assent And the knowledge is as infallible, as the direct, clear perception bf sensation, or consciousness. The second species of it is moral certainty, the utmost degree of which is nearest to demonstration. This knowledge is acquired by proofs that have only an undoubted connexion with the two extremes. The force of this every plain understanding perceives; and it rarely requires the syllogistic form, unless for the confuting perverse opposers. The arguments for it are deduced from all kinds of knowledge; but still the assent is free; and the will has a great share in promoting or hindering it. And hence it comes, that there is room for passion and prejudice of all sorts, to interpose and bias the intellect.
We ought not therefore to call the evidence of moral truths, by the name of demonstration. It is true, both mathematical and moral truths are founded on the strongest proof. Yet they admit not of the same sort of proof nor indeed are they capable of it.
Because it is so great a disadvantage both to natural and revealed religion, to have a moral certainty confounded with mathematical, I shall distinguish the different natures of them more fully, under two different propositions.
Mathematical Certainty As in this proposition, the three angles of a right-lined triangle are equal to two right ones. | Moral Certainty As in this proposition, there isa God. |
1. Here there is the utmost degree of mathematical certainty: the evidence is infallible, and the consequence follows by a natural necessity. | 1. Here there is the utmost degree of moral certainty : the evidence is indubitable, and the consequence follows by a moral necessity. |
2. The demonstrative evidence of this, when understood, compels and extorts assent. | 2. The moral evidence of this, when understood, demands and requires assent |
3. In this point of knowledge, no concurrence of the will is re-quisite. The intellect assentswithout it, and no prejudice or passion can so interpose, as to in-fluence its judgment. | 3. In this point of knowledge, the concurrence of the will is requisite. The intellect cannot assent without it. Any prejudice or passion may so interpose, as entirely to alter its judgment. |
4. This sort of knowledge admits of no degrees of certainty, and there can be no proof of it, but of one kind, | 4. This sort of knowledge admits of many degrees of certainty, and draws its proofs from all kinds of knowledge. |
5. One demonstrative argument makes the utmost mathematical ‘certainty, which excludes all possibility of falsehood. | 5. Many arguments concur to make the utmost moral certainty, which excludes all probability, though not possibility of falsehood. |
6. This takes place in things natural and material, such as quantity, figure and extension; ideas of which we have from direct and immediate sensation. | 6. This takes place in things supernatural and spiritual, such as God and his attributes ; of we have no idea from direct and immediate sensation, but only from analogy. |
7. Our reasonings on this side are about simple ideas, concerning which there is general consent | 7. Our reasonings on this side are about complex notions anticonceptions, concerning which, men extremely disagree |
From the very different, and even opposite nature of moral certainty, and that which is strictly mathematical, it must appear
1. That there is as little room for the latter in natural religions, as in revealed. To show this clearly, I have instanced in the’ fundamental truth of both ; which, though founded upon the utmost moral evidence, so as to render a dissent from it inexcusable yet appears not to be strictly demonstrable. Indeed, were there one demonstrative argument for it, all others would be entirely needless.
2. That natural religion includes faith, founded on moral evidence. When, upon full proof to our understanding, we assent to this, There is a God, then the hearty concurrence of the will completes that assent into faith. Faith therefore, is altogether as necessary in natural religion, as in revealed. For though we have a moral certainty for the existence of a Deity, which so far is knowledge only ; yet still because the intrinsic nature of God is utterly incomprehensible, and can be no immediate object of human understanding, men must give the assent of the intellect here, together with the consent of the will, to the truth of things, as mysterious as any in all revealed religion; anti which they are obliged to conceive by the same analogy, by which we conceive all the mysteries of christianity.
3. That evangelical faith is no precarious or implicit assent, but founded on the utmost evidence we are capable of receiving, for, a. truth of that nature. To see this clearly, we must well distinguish two things:
First, The assent of the understanding to a proposition upon moral, evidence, which is thus far merely knowledge. Here we are, to fix our foot, and join issue with all ranks’ of unbelievers; the ground of whose condemnation will be, that they wilfully withheld their assent from the truths of revelation, when they had the same evidence, which would have fully convinced them in matters merely human.
Secondly, A consent of the will, following the assent of the intellect. The whole process of the mind in obtaining such a faith, as performed in this manner:
1. A proposition being offered us, the will consents to weigh the evidence for it.
2. The intellect weighs it, and if the moral evidence be full, assents to it.
Thus it commences a point of knowledge, and on a second consent of the will, a point of faith. But it is worth observing, that there can be no immediate assent to any thing inconceivable or incomprehensible. To explain this by a few instances. “ There is a God.” When, upon full evidence, we assent to this, what is intelligible in that proposition, is the immediate object of our knowledge. The incomprehensible nature and attributes of God, are only the remote and mediate objects of it,
Again. “ This is my beloved Son.” We assent to this, as a perfectly intelligible proposition, on full evidence that it was spoke from heaven; being assured, that Christ, not in any unintelligible manner, but according to the plain sense of the words, is as really and truly the Son of God, as one man is the son of another.
He who believes thus far. without any respect to what is incomprehensible in that proposition, namely, the supernatural generation, and the ineffable manner of it, has an evangelical faith. But what then, you will say, becomes of the mysteries of the gospel They are all laid up safe, out of our reach, to be the immediate objects of our knowledge, when we come to see face to face. From hence it appears, that Christian faith is not an implicit assent to things unintelligible and inconceivable : since nothing, that is incomprehensible, can come into any question between us and unbelievers. We can have no controversy, but about what is perfectly understood, as far as it is so; and concerning the moral evidence, upon which propositions, as clear as any in ‘human language, are founded. Our controversies turn wholly upon what is clear. As to what is incomprehensible, in any proposition, it can be no immediate, direct object, either of knowledge or of faith. The third species of knowledge, which we have from reason, is OPINION. This Plato well defines a medium between knowledge and ignorance. it is a sort of knowledge, loosely speaking, inferior to any of the foregoing, but approaching nearest to that founded on moral evidence. Only whereas moral certainty, in its highest degree, leaves but a bare POSSIBILITY of the thing’s being otherwise ; all opinion leaves room, more or less, for DOUBT, yea, for some fear of its being otherwise. But as for all the degrees between the highest moral certainty on one hand, and the lowest probability on the other, these two sorts of knowledge run into each other, and are not easily to ‘be distinguished. This may be illustrated by a parallel, drawn from common mechanism. While you are offering the reasons, for and against any morally certain or probable proposition, imagine yourself throwing them into the scales, and weighing them in a balance. If the balance inclines not at all to either side, there is no sort of knowledge, but downright ignorance : the reasons on each side destroy each other, SO that the intellect cannot assent to either. And if there be any decision, it is the arbitrary imposition and precarious act of the will. If either from its natural weakness, or for want of improvement, the intellect cannot find out reasons, so that each scale preponderates in its turn, then it in a state of doubt. If one scale preponderates but a little, and continues at a stay, so that the difference is barely discernible, it is then’ only a conjecture. But if this preponderancy is very plain, though there is weight enough on the other side, to keep the scale still pru dent, then it is probability or opinion. When, lastly, the arguments are so strong that one of the scales weighs to the ground, then it is moral certainty, and there is no reasonable cause for any farther scrutiny. The proposition then concludes as surely, though ‘not so necessarily, as demonstration ; which admits of no weight whatever to be thrown into the opposite scale. Of probability in general it may be observed,
1. That, while we are weighing a probable proposition, there are two latent causes of deceit; the one in the intellect itself, which holds the balance; for if a man is ignorant or weak, so as not to discern the proper reasons, he may be imposed upon by false weights: the other in the will, when, instead of plain reason, a man throws his pride, or passion, or prejudice, into the scales. And these will, by the invisible’ turn of a false balance, outweigh the strongest arguments.
2. That the higher degrees of probability, in matters of religion, demand our assent. So they do in all other things. here the. difference is not great, between the opposite sides of a question, men ever close with the greatest appearance of truth, and that in all things’ of the greatest moment. Nay, the main conduct of human life is governed by the highest probability: so that, in many instances, it would be downright madness, not to be determined by it. Yet,
3. Mere probability is not a sufficient ground for religious faith. This must be built on certain knowledge, which opinion, properly speaking, is not. Indeed the word is vulgarly taken for any assent, whether formed on probability, or moral certainty. And so, it is commonly said, “a man is of such an opinion,” with regard to the very fundamentals of christianity. But-this loose way of speaking ought never to be used, seeing it has a tendency to betray unwary men, into a favourable judgment of such principles, as are destructive of all religion. The fourth species of knowledge, which we have from reasoning, (if it be not rather a particular species of moral certainty) is an assent upon testimony: to make which truly knowledge, there must be a concurrence of our own reason in the following particulars:
1. Our own reason must judge ,of the subject matter of the information, whether it be made in intelligible words. For no man can be informed, of what he cannot understand : there can be no revelation to us, concerning the intrinsic nature of things, that are incomprehensible to us. And accordingly, no part of the christian revelation, concerning God and things supernatural, reaches farther than their existence, and that lively analogy, under which they are represented; which is as plain and obvious, and intelligible, as any thing in common life.
2. Our reason must convince us, that the matter of the information is possible. that it implies no contradiction. And if the information relates to things supernatural, this is a fundamental rule to induce no contradiction, but from what is plain and intelligible in every proposition. Whence it follows, that such absurdities and contradictions, as arise from a comparison of what is plain and intelligible, with what is incomprehensible, in respect of their intrinsic nature are all groundless and imaginary.
3. Our reason must judge concerning the ability and integrity of the informer. information or testimony may he divided into human, and ‘divine. To human testimony we assent only so far, as it appears agreeable to truth. Yet this assent is very extensive, and makes up the greatest part of human knowledge. It takes in all we have of the history of mankind, all the accounts of whatever we have not seen ourselves. And we acquiesce in all this, not as probable only, but as so much real knowledge; being an assent, which is founded on such evidence, as often amounts to a moral certainty. As to Divine information or revelation, reason, knowing it to be Divine, is already convinced that it exceeds all human certainty. The only thing, therefore, which is to be convinced of here, is, 4. That the revelation is divine, or that the scripture is of Divine authority, in order to this, we may observe,
First, that, as God has made men the immediate instruments of all those revelations, so evangelical faith must be partly founded on human testimony. By men were both the Old and New Testament wrote; and if we consider them abstracted from their Divine authority, they must be allowed to be of equal credibility, at least, with all other ancient writings. Though we should suppose them to,be upon the foot of mere human testimony, yet would our knowledge of them be, at least, of equal certainty, with that founded on any profane history. Now, if to this human, we add such Divine testimony, as cannot be pretended for any other writings in the world, as the miracles of Christ and his apostles: the concurrent completion of all the prophecies, from the beginning of the world, in him alone; the scriptures being the only book in the world, that gives us any account the whole series of God’s dispensation towards wan, from the creation for four thousand years; the great exaltation of natural religion, visible in every part of it; and, lastly, the providential care so fest in every age, for transmitting down several books, writing at such great distances of time one from another, and all of them from us ; their being at this day so void of any material error, that in the infinite various readings, which have been carefully Collected, there cannot be found one contrariety in any’ fundamental point of faith -or practice : if these things, I say, are thoroughly considered, they: give the scriptures such a certainly, as no writing merely human can have, and are the greatest evidence for the truth of them which they are capable of receiving, with a continued, daily repetition of miracles. We may observe,
Secondly, that, as God has made men the immediate instrument of all his revelations, so he hath condescended to make use of human language, as well as of our natural ideas and conceptions, for the’ clear and easy representation of things supernatural, and otherwise incomprehensible. indeed the intrinsic nature of heavenly things could not otherwise have been revealed to us; seeing we had neither capacity to apprehend, nor language to express it. Or had ‘it been miraculously revealed to a particular man, yet it would’ ‘-not have been possible for him to utter it. This made it necessary to adapt all the divine revelations to our natural way of thinking and speaking. And accordingly we are not obliged to believe any doctrine, which is not plain and intelligible. All in scripture, beyond this, is no immediate object of our faith, but belongs to another world: and we are at present to believe no more of it,. than’ that it is incomprehensible.
Nothing therefore is more absurd, than ,the objections of unbelievers against the Christian mysteries, as unintelligible; since Christianity requires our assent to nothing, but what is plain and intelligible in every proposition. Let every man first have a full conviction, of the truth of each proposition in the gospel, as far only as it is plain and intelligible, and let him believe as far as he understands. Let him firmly believe, there is but one God, the object’ of any Divine worship whatever; and think and speak of him under that plain,, scriptural distinction, of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; leaving the incomprehensible nature of that union and distinction, to, the great Author of our faith himself. Let him believe Christ to be the only begotten Son of God, in the obvious import of these words, and leave the manner of that inconceivable generation to the veracity of God. Let him believe, that Christ did as truly make an atonement to God for us, as one man atones for another to a third person; ‘and leave, the unintelligible part of that Divine operation, for the subject of future praise and contemplation. Let men, I say, believe as far as they thus clearly understand, without perplexing themselves or others with what is incomprehensible; and them they fulfil the whole purpose of God in all his revelations. By thus carefully distinguishing the several kinds of knowledge and evidence, what endless confusion may be prevented, in religious controversies! Most of these have arisen from supposing these heads of knowledge to differ in degree only, not in kind; and from confounding the different kinds of evidence, peculiar to each of them; from men’s insisting upon the evidence proper to one kind of knowledge, for that of another, which will not admit of it; from opposing to each other the different kinds of knowledge, which can never interfere or clash with each other; and lastly, from not distinguishing between a blind, implicit assent to the testimony of another, and that faith, which implies a full, rational conviction of the truth of what is believed.