The Preparation of the Gospel (part 2 of 2)

Eusebius of Caesarea (c. AD 260–339)

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p. 614 a XLV. Further concerning the same p. 615 a XLVI. Further concerning the same p. 615 b XLVII. That Plato also enacts that the citizens should be divided into twelve tribes in imitation of the Hebrew nation p. 616 d XLVIII. In what kind of place Plato enacts that the city should be founded : he describes certain features like the site of Jerusalem p. 617 a XLIX. How Plato deprecates the preparatory teaching of the Greeks as being injurious p. 618 c L. On the opinion of the Atheists, from the tenth Book of The Laws p. 621 a LI. How Plato arranges the argument concerning God p. 623 c LII. How he discourses on God's universal providence. In the tenth Book of The Laws p. 630 c CHAPTER I OUR twelfth Book of the Preparation for the Gospel will now from this point supply what was lacking in the preceding Book in proof of Plato's accordance with the Hebrew Oracles, like the harmony of a well-tuned lyre. We shall begin with a defence of our Faith, that is reviled among the multitude.

[PLATO] 'It would be another question therefore whether one is right or wrong in finding fault with the constitutions of Lacedaemon and Crete: perhaps, however, I should be better able than either of you to tell what most people say of them. For if your laws are even moderately well framed, one of the best of them must

be a law allowing none of the young to inquire what is right or wrong in them, but bidding all with one Yoice and one mouth to agree that everything is well settled by the appointment of the gods; and if any one says otherwise, they must not endure to listen to him at all. But if an old man observes any fault in your laws, he may discuss such subjects with a ruler and one of his own age, no young man being present.' 'What you enjoin, Stranger, is perfectly right.'

With good reason then the Hebrew Scriptures at an earlier time require faith before either the understanding or examination of the sacred writings, where it says, 'If ye will not believe, surely ye shall not understand,' and again, 'I believed, and therefore have I spoken.' For which cause also among us those who are newly admitted and in an immature condition, as if infants in soul, have the reading of the sacred Scriptures imparted to them in a very simple way, with the injunction that they must believe what is brought forward as words of God. But those who are in a more advanced condition, and as it were grown grey in mind, are permitted to dive into the deeps, and test the meaning of the words: and these the Hebrews were wont to name 'Deuterotists,' as being interpreters and expounders of the meaning of the Scriptures. CHAPTER II [PLATO] 'IN the next place therefore we should say: It seems, Tyrtaeus, that you praise most highly those who distinguish themselves in foreign and external war. He would admit this, I suppose, and agree?

'Of course. 'But we say that, though these are brave, those are far braver who show their valour conspicuously in the greatest of all wars. And we too have a poet as witness on our side, Theognis, a citizen of Megara in Sicily, who says: "Cyrnus, when factions rage, a faithful man Is worth his weight in silver and in gold." 'Such a man then, we say, is very much braver than the other in a harder warfare, almost as much as justice and temperance and wisdom combined with valour are better than valour by itself alone. For a man would never be found faithful and true in civil wars without possessing all virtue. But there are very many mercenaries who are willing to die in war, standing firm and fighting, as Tyrtaeus says, the greater part of whom, with very few exceptions, are violent and unjust and insolent and the most senseless of mankind.

'To what conclusion then does our present argument lead? And what does it wish to make clear by these statements? Evidently this, that before all things both the heaven-sent lawgiver in this country, and every other of the least usefulness, will always enact his laws with a view chiefly to the greatest virtue: and this is, as Theognis says, faithfulness in dangers, which one might call perfect justice.' Among us also the Word of salvation, joining wisdom with faith, commends the man who is adorned with both, saying, in His own words: 'Who then is the faithful and wise steward?' and again, 'Well done, good and faithful servant, thou hast been faithful over a few things, I will set thee over many things.' Certainly in these passages He

clearly shows that He approves not unreasoning faith, but that which is combined with the greatest virtues, such certainly being wisdom and goodness.

CHAPTER III [PLATO] 'FOR indeed it seems to me that in our former arguments we stated opportunely that the souls of the dead have a certain power after death, and take an interest in human affairs. There are tales treating of these matters, which are tedious though true: but on such subjects besides the other reports which we ought to believe, as being so many and so ancient, we must also believe the lawgivers who say that these things are true, unless they are shown to be utter fools.' In the Book of the Maccabees also it is said that Jeremiah the Prophet after his departure from life was seen praying for the people, as one who took thought for men upon earth. And Plato also says that we ought to believe these stories. CHAPTER IV [PLATO] 'THERE are two kinds of stories, the one true, and the other false?

'Yes. 'And we must instruct children in both, and in the false first? 'I do not understand, said he, what you mean. 'Do you not understand, said I, that what we first tell children is a fable? And this, I suppose, is, generally speaking, fiction, though there is also some truth in it. And we use fables with children earlier than gymnastics. 'That is true.' So Plato writes. And among the Hebrews also it is the custom to teach the histories of the inspired Scriptures to those of infantine souls in a very simple way just like any fables, but to teach those of a trained mental habit the more profound and doctrinal views of the histories by means of the so-called Deuterosis and explanation of the thoughts that are unknown to the multitude. CHAPTER V [PLATO] 'Do you not know then that the beginning is the chief part of every work, especially for any young and tender mind? For at that age any character that one wishes to impress on each is most easily formed and imparted.

'Quite so. 'Shall we then just carelessly permit our children to listen to casual fables (composed by casual persons), and to receive into their souls opinions for the most part opposite to those which, when they are grown up, we shall think they ought to hold? 'We must by no means permit it. 'In the first place then, it seems, we must supervise the writers of fables, and approve any good fable they may compose, and reject any that are not good. And we must persuade nurses and mothers to tell their children those which are approved, and to form their souls by the fables much more carefully than their bodies with their hands. But the greater number of the tales which they tell them now must be rejected.' These precautions also had been taken by the Hebrews before Plato's time. For those who had a divine spirit fit for discerning of spirits approved what was rightly said or written with help from the Holy Spirit, and the contrary they rejected, just as they rejected the words of the false prophets. Moreover it was the custom of parents and nurses to soothe their infant children by singing the most edifying narratives from the

divine Scriptures, just like any fables, for the sake of preparing beforehand for the religion which they were to learn when approaching to manhood.

CHAPTER VI [PLATO] 'LISTEN then, as they say, to a very pretty story, which you, I suppose, will regard as a myth, but I as a true story, for what I am going to say I shall tell you as being true.' And after a little more: '(There was a law) that he who had lived a just and holy life should depart after death to the Islands of the Blessed, and dwell in perfect happiness beyond the reach of all evils. But the man who had lived an unjust and ungodly life must go away to the prison-house of vengeance and punishment, which they call Tartarus.' And again a little farther on: 'Next they must be stripped of all these wrappings and so tried, for their judgement must be after death. The judge also must be naked, that is to say, dead, examining by his very soul the very soul of each immediately after death, when it is bereft of all its kindred, and has left all that apparel behind on earth, in order that the judgement may be just.'

And afterwards he adds: 'This, Callicles, is what I have heard and believe to be true, and from these stories I gather the following conclusion: death, as it seems to me, is nothing else than the separation from each other of two things, the soul and the body. 'And after they are separated, each of them retains its own condition almost the same as it had when the man was alive, the body having its own nature and the results of its treatment and sufferings all plainly visible. For instance, if a man's body was large either by nature or by training or both while he was alive, his corpse also after death will be large; and if it was fat, it will be fat also after death, and so on. 'And again, if it was his custom to wear long hair, his corpse also will have long hair; or if a man was often whipped, and bore traces of the stripes in scars on his body either from scourges or from wounds of other kinds, when alive, his body after death may be seen to have these marks. Or if a man's limbs were broken or distorted during life, the same will be visible also after death. 'And in a word, whatever was a man's condition of body during life, the same conditions are also plainly visible after death, either all or most of them for a certain time.

This same then seems to me to be the case, Callicles, with reference to the soul also. When it is stript of the body, all things are visible in the soul, both its natural qualities, and the effects due to the habits of every kind which the man had contracted in his soul. 'When therefore they have come before the judge, those from Asia before Rhadamanthus, he stops them, and examines the soul of each, without knowing whose it is; but often when he has laid hands on the Great King or some other king or potentate, he discerns that his soul has no sound part in it, but is scored with scourges, and full of scars from perjuries and injustice, of which each man's deeds have left the print upon his soul, and all crooked from falsehood and imposture, with nothing straight, because it has been reared with no sense of truth: and from power, and luxury, and insolence, and intemperance of

conduct he sees the soul full of deformity and ugliness; at sight of which he sends it off straight to prison in disgrace, where on its arrival it will have to endure its befitting punishments,

'Now every man who is under punishment, if punished rightly by another, ought either to become better and profit by it, or to be made an example to the rest, that others, seeing the sufferings which he endures, may be brought by terror to amendment. 'Those who receive benefit when they are punished by gods and men are they whose sins are remediable; but nevertheless it is by pain and suffering that they receive the benefit both here and in Hades, for in no other way is it possible to be delivered from iniquity. 'But if any have been guilty of the worst crimes, and have become incurable by reason of such iniquities, of these the examples are made; and inasmuch as they are incurable, they can no longer receive any benefit themselves, but others are benefited, who see them enduring for ever the greatest and most painful and terrible sufferings for their sins, hung up there in the prison-house in Hades as signal examples, a spectacle and a warning to the wicked who from time to time arrive there. And if what Polus says is true, I foretell that Archelaus will be one of these, and every other tyrant who is like him.

'I suppose that the majority of these examples have been taken from among tyrants and kings and potentates, and those who have managed the affairs of states; for these because of their power commit the greatest and most impious crimes. 'Homer too bears witness to this. For he has represented those who are suffering eternal punishment in Hades as kings and potentates, a Tantalus, and Sisyphus, and Tityus. But Thersites, or any other common villain, no poet has represented as involved in extreme punishments as being incurable: for, I suppose, he had not the power, and therefore was happier than those who had it. In fact, however, Callicles, the men who become excessively wicked are of the class who have power. Yet there is nothing to prevent good men from being found even among these; and those who are so found are very worthy of admiration. For it is a difficult thing, Callicles, and very praiseworthy for a man who has great power of doing wrong to live always a just life, and few there be of this kind. Some there have been both here and elsewhere, and I doubt not there will be others, endowed with this virtue of administering justly whatever may be entrusted to them; and one there has been very celebrated over all Greece, Aristides son of Lysimachus: yet for the most part, my good friend, men in power turn out bad.

As I was saying therefore, when Rhadamanthus gets hold of such a man, he knows nothing else about him, neither who he is, nor of what family, but only that he is a villain: and on seeing this, he sends him off to Tartarus, with a badge upon him to show whether he seems to be curable or incurable; and on arrival there he undergoes the treatment proper to his case. 'But sometimes after looking upon another soul that has lived a holy life in company with truth, a private man's or any

other's (most likely, I venture to say, Callicles, the soul of a philosopher who minded his own work and did not busy himself in affairs during his life), he is delighted and sends it off to the Islands of the Blessed. 'Aeacus also does just the same, and each of these two sits in judgement with a rod in his hand. But Minos as superintending sits alone, and holds a golden sceptre, as Ulysses in Homer says that he saw him,

"Holding a sceptre of gold, as he utters the doom of the dead." 'For my part therefore, Callicles, I am convinced by these stories, and consider how I shall present my soul before the judge in the healthiest condition possible. So renouncing what most men deem honours, I shall try by really practising truth both to live the best life in my power, and so, when death comes, to die. 'All other men also I exhort to the best of my ability. And you especially I in my turn invite to enter upon this mode of life and this conflict, which I declare to be worth all other conflicts here on earth. 'And I make it a reproach to you that you will not be able to help yourself, when the trial and the judgement of which I was just now speaking come upon you. But on coming before that judge, the son of Aegina, when he lays hold of you and leads you forward, you will stand agape and turn dizzy there, just as much as I should here. And perhaps some one will smite you even to your shame upon the cheek, and will insult you in every way.

'Perhaps, however, this appears to you a fable, like an old wife's tale, and so you despise it. And there would be nothing strange in despising it, if by any searching we could find something better and truer. 'But as it is you see that though there are three of you, who are the wisest of the Greeks of the present time, yourself and Polus and Gorgias, you are not able to show that we ought to live any other life than this, which appears to be of advantage in the other world as well. But amid so many arguments, while all the rest were refuted, this alone remains unshaken, that to do wrong is to be more carefully avoided than to suffer wrong, and above all a man must study not to seem but to be good, both in private and in public life.' So then Plato supposed that Aeacus and Minos and Rhadamanthus would be judges of the dead: but the word of God protests that 'all must appear before the judgement-seat of God; that each one may receive the things done in the body, according to what he hath done, whether it be good or bad.'

And again it says, 'In the day when God shall judge the secrets of men, . . . who will render to every man according to his works: to them who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory and honour and immortality, eternal life: but unto them that are contentious, and obey not the truth, but obey unrighteousness, there shall be wrath and indignation, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that worketh evil, of the Jew first, and also of the Greek; . . . for there is no difference.' CHAPTER VII [PLATO] 'TAKE care, however, that these things come not to the knowledge of uneducated men: for there are, I think, hardly any tales more ridiculous than these to the multitude, nor on the other hand any more admirable

and inspiring to the well disposed. But though often repeated and constantly heard even for many years, they, like gold, hardly become thoroughly purified with much careful treatment.'

Among us also the Word of salvation says: 'Give not that which is holy to the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine.' And again, 'For the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him.' CHAPTER VIII [PLATO] 'AND indeed (I call it folly) also in the individual, when good reasons that are present in his soul produce no good effect, but what is quite contrary to them. All these I should class as the worst kinds of ignorance both in a state and in each individual citizen, and not the ignorance of the craftsmen, if you understand, Strangers, what I mean. 'Yes, we understand, friend, and admit what you say. 'Let this then be thus laid down as agreed on and stated, that nothing connected with government must be entrusted to those citizens who are ignorant of these things, and they must be reproached for ignorance, even though they may be very clever in argument and thoroughly trained in all accomplishments, and all that naturally tends to quickness of understanding: while those who are of the opposite character to them must be called wise, even though, according to the proverb, they know neither how to read nor how to swim; and offices of authority must be given to them as sensible men.

'For, my friends, how can there be even the smallest kind of wisdom without harmony? It is not possible. But the finest and greatest of harmonies may most justly be called the greatest wisdom; and of this that man partakes who lives according to reason, whereas he who lacks wisdom is the ruin of his family, and by no means a saviour to the state, but on the contrary he will on every occasion be found ignorant in such affairs.' Let this suffice for my quotation from the Laws, But in the Statesman also the same author speaks as follows on the subject of not being at all anxious about names and phrases: 'Very good, Socrates; and if you continue to guard against being anxious on account of names, you will turn out to be richer in wisdom in your old age.' CHAPTER IX THE Hebrew Scripture introduces Moses at first as deprecating the leadership of the people by what he said to Him who conversed with him, 'I beseech Thee, O Lord, appoint some other that is able, whom Thou shalt send' : and afterwards it represents Saul as hiding himself to avoid assuming the kingdom, and the prophet Jeremiah as humbly deprecating his mission. Now hear how Plato also confirms the reasonableness of declining office, speaking as follows:

[PLATO] 'This then, O Thrasymachus, is now clear, that no art nor government provides for its own benefit, but as I said before, both provides and enjoins what is profitable to the governed, having regard to his advantage though he is the weaker, and not to that of the stronger. 'It was for these reasons then, my dear Thrasymachus, that I said just now that no one is ready to accept office of his own

free will, and take in hand other people's troubles to set right, but all demand a recompense, because he who intends to do j ustice to his art never practises nor enjoins what is best for himself, if he follows the rules of art, but what is best for the governed. For which reasons, as it seems, there must be a payment for those who are expected to be willing to take office, either money, or honour, or a penalty if he refuse.'

CHAPTER X WHEREAS the oracles of the Hebrews teach that their prophets and righteous men bravely endured the most extreme insults and outrages and every kind of danger, you may learn the agreement of Plato's opinion on this point also from these words of his, which he has set down in the second Book of the Republic: [PLATO] 'Such then being our representation of the unjust man, let us now in our argument set the just man beside him "in his nobleness and simplicity," a man, as Aeschylus says: "Whose will is not to seem good, but to be." 'We must take away the seeming. For if he is to seem just, he will have honours and rewards for seeming to be so: and then it will be uncertain whether he is just for the sake of justice, or for the sake of the rewards and honours. 'We must strip him then of everything except justice, and make his condition the reverse of the former. Though never doing wrong, he must have the reputation of the worst wrongdoing, that his justice may be strictly tested by his being proof against infamy, and its consequences: and he must be immovably steadfast even unto death, being in reality just but "with a life-long reputation for injustice." '

And soon after he adds: 'Let me therefore describe it; and so, Socrates, if my speech be somewhat coarse, imagine the speaker to be not me, but those who praise injustice above justice. And they will tell you as follows, that in these circumstances the just man will be scourged, racked, fettered, will have both eyes torn out, and at last after suffering every kind of torture he will be crucified, and will learn that a man should wish not to be, but to seem, just.' Such is Plato's description in words, but the righteous men and prophets among the Hebrews are recorded long before to have suffered in deed all that he describes. For though most just, yet as if the most unjust, 'they were stoned, they were sawn asunder, they were slain with the sword, they wandered about in sheep-skins and goat-skins, being destitute, afflicted, tormented,... wandering in deserts, and mountains, and caves, and the holes of the earth, of whom the world was not worthy.'

The Apostles also of our Saviour, though following the highest path of justice and piety, were by the multitude involved in the reputation of injustice, and what they suffered we may learn from themselves when they say, 'We are made a spectacle unto the world, both to angels and to men . . . And even unto this present hour we both hunger, and thirst, and are naked, and are buffeted, and have no certain dwelling-place: . . . being reviled, we bless; being persecuted, we endure; being defamed, we intreat: we are made as the filth of the world.' Nay, even unto this

present time the noble witnesses of our Saviour throughout all man's habitable world, while exercising themselves 'not to seem but to be' both just and pious, have endured all the sufferings which Plato enumerated: for they were both scourged, and endured bonds and racks, and even had their eyes torn out, and at last after suffering all terrible tortures they were crucified. None like them will you find by any searching among the Greeks, so that one may naturally say that the philosopher did no less than prophesy in these words concerning those who among us were distinguished in piety and true righteousness.

CHAPTER XI As Moses in some mystic words says that in the beginning of the constitution of the world there had been a certain Paradise of God, and that therein man had been deceived by the serpent through the woman, hear now what Plato, all but directly translating the words, and on his part also speaking allegorically, has set down in the Symposium. Instead of the Paradise of God he called it the garden of Zeus, and instead of the serpent and the deception wrought by it he supposed Penia (Poverty) to lay the plot, and instead of the first man, whom the counsel and providence of God had set forth as it were for His new-born son, he spake of a son ot Metis (Counsel) called Poros (Plenty), and instead of saying 'when this world was being constituted,' he said 'when Aphrodite was born,' speaking in this allegorical way of the world, because of the beauty with which it is clothed. He speaks, however, word for word as follows:

[PLATO] 'When Aphrodite was born, the gods were holding a feast, and among the rest was Poros the son of Metis. And after dinner, Penia, as there was a feast, came to beg and stood about the doors. So Poros being drunk with nectar, for there was no wine as yet, went into the garden of Zeus, where he was weighed down with sleep. So then Penia, to relieve her destitution, plotted to get a child by Poros, and lay down beside him, and conceived Eros.' Such then were the thoughts which in this passage also Plato obscurely hinted in imitation of Moses. CHAPTER XII AGAIN Moses had said, 'But for Adam there was not found an help meet for him. And God caused a trance to fall upon Adam, and cast him into a sleep, and He took one of his ribs, and filled up the flesh instead thereof. And the Lord God builded the rib, which He had taken from Adam, into a woman.'

Plato, though he did not understand in what sense the story is told, was evidently not ignorant of it. But he assigns it to Aristophanes, as a comedian accustomed to scoff even at holy things, introducing him in the Symposium as speaking thus: 'Now you must first become acquainted with human nature and its affections. For our original nature of old was not the same as now, but of a different kind. In the first place the sexes of mankind were three, not two as now, male and female, but there was also a third combining them both, of which the name remains now, but the thing itself has disappeared. For Hermaphrodite was then both a real form and a name combined of both, the male and the female.' Then after his usual sarcasms,

he adds: ’After this speech his Zeus proceeded to cut the men in two, like those who cut sorb-apples for pickling, or eggs with hairs. And of each whom he cut he bade Apollo turn round the face and half of the neck towards the cutting, that by contemplating the section of himself the man might be more obedient to order: he also bade him heal the other parts.’

CHAPTER XIII MOSES described the original life of the earth-born as having been spent in the Paradise of God, and God as guiding them in a course of life without money or possessions, and all things as growing up for them without sowing or ploughing, and themselves as bare of the clothing afterwards adopted: and now listen to the philosopher all but translating these very statements into the Greek language. He says then: [PLATO] ’God Himself was their shepherd and guardian, just as now man being another animal of more divine nature tends other kinds inferior to himself. And while God was their ruler, there were no states, nor any possessions of wives and children; for they all sprang up out of the earth into a new life with no remembrance of their former state: and there were no things of this present kind, but they had fruits in abundance both from trees and many various plants, not growing from cultivation, but sent up spontaneously by the earth. They dwelt for the most part in the open air, without clothes and without bedding; for their seasons were so tempered as to cause them no trouble, and they had soft couches, where grass sprang up in abundance out of the earth. The life of which I speak, Socrates, was that of the age of Kronos: but the present life, which is said to be in the reign of Zeus, you know by your own experience.’

CHAPTER XIV AGAIN as Moses has recorded that ’the serpent was more subtle than all the beasts,’ and how the serpent talked to the woman and the woman to the serpent, and has set forth the persuasions used by the serpent, now listen to what Plato writes: [PLATO] ’If therefore the children of Kronos, with so much leisure and ability to hold intercourse by words not only with men but with beasts also, used all these advantages with a yiew to philosophy, conversing with the beasts as well as with one another, and inquiring from every nature which by the possession of any special faculty discerned anything different from the rest to add to the store of wisdom, it is easy to decide that the men of that age were ten thousand times better than the present in respect of happiness. ’But if filling themselves to the full with meat and drink they discoursed to one another and to the beasts of fables such as now are told of themselves, this also, just simply to declare my own opinion, is very easy to decide. Nevertheless let us leave these questions, until there appear some informer competent to tell us in which way the men of that age were inclined in regard to knowledge and the use of language.’

CHAPTER XV WHEN Moses had laid down a plan of legislating for men, he thought that he must have in his preface an account of ancient times: and he makes mention of the Flood, and of the subsequent life of mankind, and then he describes the social

life of the men of old among the Hebrews who were friends of God, and also of those who were proved otherwise in offences, because he considered that the narration of these things would be a parallel to his legislation. And in like manner Plato also, when he proceeds to write down laws, affects the same method with Moses. In the preface, for instance, of the Laws, he has made use of his account of ancient times, making mention of a flood, and of the mode of life after the flood. Listen at least to what he says at the beginning of the third Book of the Laws:

'Do you think then that there is any truth in the ancient traditions? 'What traditions? 'That mankind has often been destroyed by floods and diseases and many other calamities, in which only some small portion of the human race was left. 'Certainly every one thinks all this very probable. 'Come then, let us consider one of the many destructions, namely this which was caused by the flood. 'What point are we to observe in regard to it? 'That those who escaped the destruction at that time would be chiefly mountain-shepherds, small sparks of the human race preserved on the hill-tops. 'Evidently. 'Moreover such men must necessarily be unacquainted both with other arts and especially with the devices of men in towns against each other with regard to selfish advantage and rivalry, and all other evil deeds which they contrive one against another. 'Certainly it is probable. 'Let us suppose then that the cities settled on the plains and by the sea were utterly destroyed at that time.

'Suppose so. 'Must we not say then that all implements were lost, and every excellent invention connected with art, whether of political or any other kind of wisdom, must all have perished at that time? ' And further on he says: 'Let us say then that, at the time when the destruction had just taken place, the condition of mankind was this, a boundless and fearful desolation, and a very great expanse of fertile land.' After these and other such statements, he goes on to describe the lives of mankind after the flood, and then, just as Moses appends to the history after the flood the civil state of the godly Hebrews of old, in like manner Plato also, next to the lives of those who followed the flood, tries to describe the ancient times of Greek history, as Moses does of the Hebrews, mentioning the Trojan war, and the first constitution of Lacedaemon, and the Persians, and those who had lived among these events whether well or ill: and then after the narration of these things he begins his arrangement of the laws, following Moses in this also.

CHAPTER XVI MOSES made all his legislation and the constitution of his state dependent on piety towards the God of the universe, and inaugurated his legislation with the Creator of all, and then taught that from the good that is divine proceeds all good for man, and referred the divine to the ruling mind of the world, that is the very God of all. Now see how our philosopher also, treading in the same steps, finds fault with the lawgivers of the Cretans and Lacedaemonians, and teaches throughout the law approved by Moses, speaking as follows: [PLATO] 'May I then

explain how I should have liked to hear you define the matter further? 'By all means, Stranger. 'You ought to have spoken thus: It is not without reason that the laws of the Cretans are especially celebrated among all the Greeks: for they are rightly framed in that they render those who use them happy; for they provide all good things for them.

'Now goods are of two kinds: some human, and some divine; and the former are dependent on the divine; and if a city accept the greater, it gains the less also; but otherwise, it is deprived of both. Now there are first the lesser goods, of which the chief is health, and beauty second, and the third strength of body for running and all other movements, and wealth fourth, not blind but keen-sighted wealth, if it accompany wisdom. 'For this indeed is the first and chief of divine goods, wisdom I mean, and next a temperate habit of soul joined with intelligence, and from these combined with courage a third good would be justice, and a fourth courage. Now all these are by nature set in higher rank than those bodily goods, and the lawgiver too must give them this rank. 'And next he must direct that all the other ordinances for his citizens are to be regarded by them as looking towards these goods, and among these the human to look to the divine, and all the divine to the ruling mind.

'With regard also to mutual contracts of marriage, and then in the procreation and nurture of children, both male and female, he must take care of his citizens in youth and maturer years even till old age, duly awarding honour or disgrace, and after having observed and watched over their pains and pleasures and desires in all these kinds of intercourse, and their pursuit of love of all kinds, he must rightly distribute praise or blame by means of the laws themselves.' Also a little afterwards he says: 'After careful observation the legislator will appoint guardians over all these matters, some guiding their course by wisdom, and some by true opinion, so. that intelligence may bind all these ordinances together and render them, subservient to temperance and justice, not to wealth or ambition. 'It is in this way that I, O Strangers, should have wished, and still do wish you to describe how in the so-called laws of Zeus, and those of the Pythian Apollo, which Minos and Lycurgus enacted, all these provisions are contained, and what orderly arrangement in them is discernible to one who by skill and habits has experience about laws, although to the rest of us this is by no means clear.'

Among us also it is said, 'Seek ye first the kingdom (of God) and (His) righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you.' But long before this Moses also having commenced with the doctrine concerning God, and having next adapted to it his constitution of the state, and the rules about contracts, and the customs of social life, appoints as rulers and guardians over them all those who are consecrated to God, as the scriptures also teach, just men, haters of arrogance, 'some guiding their course by wisdom and some by true opinion.' CHAPTER XVII [PLATO] 'I TELL you then; and I affirm that the man who is to excel in anything must practise that

very thing from his earliest youth, both in sport and in earnest, in every particular pertaining to the subject. Take for instance, the man who is to be a good husbandman or a builder of some kind; the one must play at building children's houses, and the other at tilling the ground, and be who brings up either of them must provide small copies of the real tools for him; and whatever branches of knowledge must be learnt beforehand they must begin to learn; the carpenter for instance must learn to measure by rule or line, and the soldier to play at riding or some other such exercise; and by their sports the teacher must try to turn the children's pleasures and desires to the point which they must reach to attain their end in life.

'The chief point then in education, we say, is the right "training in the nursery," which will best lead the soul of the child in his play to the love of that, in which, when he has become a man, he will need to be perfect in the excellence of his work.' This also Moses had previously enacted, saying, 'And these words, which I command thee this, day, shall be in thy heart and in thy soul, and thou shalt enforce them upon thy sons.' This the Hebrews are accustomed to do, training up all their young children from a tender age in the precepts of religion: and this is zealously practised to the present time in accordance with an ancestral custom in the Jewish nation. CHAPTER XVIII [PLATO] 'LET not therefore that which we call education be indefinite. For at present when we blame, or praise the mode in which each has been brought up we speak of one of us as educated, and another as uneducated, although sometimes they are men extremely well educated for retail trade or a shipmaster's life or any other such calling. For in our present discourse, as it seems, we do not regard this as education, but that training to virtue from childhood, which makes a man desire and long to become a perfect citizen, knowing how to rule and to obey with justice.

'This is the training which, as it seems to me, our present mode of speaking designates, and which alone it would allow us to call education; but that which aims at wealth or at strength or even at any kind of cleverness apart from intelligence and justice (it deems) mechanic and illiberal and not worthy to be called education at all. 'Let us then have no difference with them about a name, but let the present mode of speaking continue as agreed on between us, namely that those who have been rightly educated generally become good men. And so we must never disparage education, as it is of all noblest things the first that comes to the best of men: and if ever it transgresses, but may possibly be reformed, that is what every man should do to the utmost of his power throughout life.' Also in the second Book of the Laws he adds: 'By education then I mean the virtue that comes first to children, that is, if pleasure and friendship and pain and hatred are rightly engendered in their souls when as yet they are incapable of reason, and, when they have attained to reason, agree with their reason that they have been rightly trained by suitable habits. This harmonious agreement is virtue as a whole, but the part of it due to right training in regard to pleasures and pains, so as to hate what one ought to

hate, from the very beginning unto the end, and to love what one ought to love, if you cut off just this part by your argument and call it education, according to my judgement you would use the name rightly.'

So speaks Plato. But he is anticipated by David in the Psalms, when in teaching us 'to hate what we ought to hate, and love what we ought to love' he speaks as follows: 'Come, ye children, hearken unto me: I will teach you the fear of the Lord. What man is he that desireth life, and would fain see good days? Keep thy tongue from evil, and thy lips that they speak no guile. Depart from evil, and do good; seek peace, and pursue it.' Solomon too says in like manner: 'Hear, ye children, the instruction of a father. For I give you a good gift: forget not my laws.' And again: 'Get wisdom, get understanding; forget it not.' And: 'Say that wisdom is thy sister; and gain understanding for thy familiar friend.' Again: 'Enter not upon the paths of the ungodly, and envy not the ways of transgressors.' And numberless other such, passages you will find in the Hebrew Scriptures, fitted for teaching the acquisition of piety and virtue, and suited alike to the young and to those of full age.

CHAPTER XIX THE answer of God said to Moses: 'See, thou make all things after the pattern which was shown to thee in the mount.' And the sacred word stated more plainly, 'Who served a copy and shadow of the heavenly things;' and taught that the symbols in the writings of Moses plainly contain an image of the more divine realities in the intelligible world. Now then listen how Plato also gives similar interpretations in the sixth Book of the Republic, writing as follows; [PLATO] 'The philosopher then by communing with God and with the order of the world becomes both orderly and divine, as far as is possible to man: slander however is rife in all things. 'In all indeed. 'If therefore, said I, it ever becomes necessary for him to study how to introduce what he sees in yonder world into the habits of mankind both in private and in public life, and so to mould others as well as himself, do you think that he will be found a bad artificer of temperance and justice and civic virtue in general?

'Certainly not, said he. 'But then if the multitude understand that what we say about him is true, will they be angry with the philosophers? And will they disbelieve us when we say that a State can never be prosperous, unless it be planned by artists who follow the divine pattern? 'They will not be angry, said he, if they understand it. But now what kind of plan do you mean? 'They would take, said I, a State and the moral nature of man for a tablet, and first of all would make a clean board, which is not at all an easy matter. You know, however, that the philosophers would differ at once from other men on this point, that they would be unwilling to touch either individual or State, or to frame laws, before they had either received a clean board, or themselves had made it so, 'Yes, and rightly, said he.

’Next then do you not think they would sketch out the plan of the constitution? ’Of course. ’Then, I suppose, in working it out, they would frequently look to this side and to that, both to what is essentially just and beautiful and temperate and everything of that kind, and then to. the other side, to what is found in men, and would put upon their tablet the likeness of a man by making a combination and mixture of the various ways of life, and taking their design from that which, when embodied in man, Homer called the form and likeness of God. ’Rightly, said he. ’And one feature, I suppose, they would wipe out, and paint in another, until they made the human characters as pleasing as possible to God.’ CHAPTER XX [PLATO] ’IT seems to me that for the third or fourth time our argument has been brought round to the same point, namely that education is the drawing and leading of children to that which has been declared by the law to be right reason, and which has been approved by the best and eldest men from experience to be truly right.

’In order therefore that the soul of the child may not be accustomed in its joys and sorrows to go contrary to the law and to the rules laid down by the law, but may comply with it by rejoicing and sorrowing at the same things as the old man,----for this purpose, let these, which we call songs, be now in reality charms for the soul, seriously designed with a view to harmony such as we speak of; but because the souls of the young are unable to bear seriousness, let them be called and treated as plays and songs, just as those who are in charge try to offer to the sick and enfeebled in body the nutriment that is good for them in some kinds of pleasant food and drink, but that which is unwholesome in unpleasant things, in order that they may like the one, and be rightly trained to dislike the other.

’And in the same way the good lawgiver will persuade, and, failing to persuade, will compel the poet rightly to represent by noble and praiseworthy language both the gestures in his rhythms and the music in his harmonies of the temperate and brave and thoroughly good men.’ With good reason then among us also the children are trained to practise the songs made by divine prophets and hymns addressed to God. CHAPTER XXI [PLATO] ’You compel your poets to say that the good man, as being temperate and just, is happy and blessed, whether he be tall and strong, or small and weak, and whether he be rich or poor: but if he should perchance ”Midas and Cinyras in wealth surpass,” and be unjust, he would be miserable and live a wretched life. ’Also your poet, if he speaks rightly, says, ”Ne’er would I praise, nor count for aught, a man”

who did not combine justice with the practice and attainment of all things accounted honourable; and, being a just man, ”Close should he stand and strive to reach the foe:” but if unjust he should ”Not dare to look on battle’s bloody death, Nor outstrip Thracian Boreas in the race,” nor ever have any other of the so-called good things, for the things called good by the many have no right to the name. ’For health is called the best, and beauty the second, and wealth the third; and

numberless other things are called good, such as quick sight and hearing, and the sensitive and sound condition of all organs connected with the senses, and again to be a tyrant and do whatever one likes, and then it is said the consummation of all blessedness is to have acquired all these things and then come to be immortal as soon as possible.

'But you and I say this, I suppose, that to just and holy men these are all excellent possessions, but to the unjust great evils all of them, beginning with health. For indeed to have sight and hearing and sensation and to live at all are the greatest of evils for a man who possesses all the so-called goods without justice and virtue in general if he is to be immortal for ever, but a less evil if such a one survive as short a time as possible. 'These then are the things which I suppose you will persuade and compel your poets to say, as I do, and also by making their rhythms and harmonies correspond thereto, so to train your youths. Do you not see? For I say plainly that evil things so-called are to the unjust good, but evil to the just: and good things to the good are really good, but evil to the evil. As I was asking then before, do you and I agree, or how say you?'

These thoughts are not much unlike David's Psalms, which he had previously composed by divine inspiration, teaching by songs and hymns who is the truly blessed man, and who the contrary. This, at least, is the thought with which his Book begins, where he says: 'Blessed is the man that walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly,' and so on. This is what Plato has altered when he declares that the poets ought to say, 'that the good man being temperate and just is happy and blessed, and if a man be rich but unjust, he is miserable.' And the very same thought David again expressed thus in the Psalms, saying: 'If riches abound, set not your heart upon them.' And again: 'Be not thou afraid when a man is made rich, and when the glory of his house is increased.' And at your leisure you may find each of the philosopher's sayings stated word for word throughout the whole sacred writing of the Psalms.

CHAPTER XXII [PLATO] 'NAY rather, how surpassingly worthy of a lawgiver and a statesman. But other things there you would find to be less worthy: this point, however, about music is both true and worthy of consideration, that it was possible, as it seems, on such subjects for a man of firm courage to get songs established by law which naturally produce right conduct. But this will be work for a god or some godlike man.' With good reason therefore it had been enacted among the Hebrews also that they should admit no other hymns and songs in religious instructions than those which had been made under the influence of the Divine Spirit by men of God and prophets, and the music corresponding to these sung in the manner customary among them. CHAPTER XXIII [PLATO] 'So far I myself agree with the multitude, that music must be judged by pleasure, not however by the pleasure of chance persons, but that the best music generally is that which gives delight to the best

persons who are well educated, and especially that which delights the one man pre-eminent both in virtue and education.

'And the reason why I say that the judges of this matter must be virtuous is this, that they ought to be endowed with wisdom in general, and especially with courage. 'For the true judge ought not to judge by what he learns from the theatre, when driven out of his senses by the tumult of the multitude and his own ignorance; nor if, on the other hand, he knows right, ought he through unmaniiness and cowardice carelessly to deliver a false judgement out of the same mouth with which he invoked the gods before proceeding to give judgement. For the judge sits there not as the learner but rather, according to right, as the teacher of the spectators, and to oppose those who neither properly nor rightly give pleasure to the spectators.' Among the Hebrews also in old times it was not the part of the multitude to judge the discourses pronounced from divine inspiration, and the inspired songs, but they were few and rare persons, themselves partakers of a divine spirit, fit to judge of what was said, who alone were permitted to approve and consecrate the books of the prophets, and to reject those of men unlike them in character.

CHAPTER XXIV [PLATO] 'Now the original purpose of my argument, to exhibit in becoming language the aid that should be given to the Chorus of Dionysus, has been stated to the best of my power. Let us then consider whether this has been rightly done. I suppose that an assembly of this kind necessarily ends by becoming ever more tumultuous as the drinking goes on, just what we supposed at the outset must necessarily occur in the circumstances now under discussion. 'Necessarily. 'Yes, and every man is lifted with lighter heart above himself, and is gladdened, and grows full of loud confidence, and of unwillingness in such a state to listen to his neighbours, and claims to be competent to govern both himself and every one else. 'Certainly. 'Did we not say then that in these circumstances the souls of the drinkers, becoming like iron heated in the fire, grow softer and younger, so as to be found tractable by one who has both the knowledge and the power to train and mould them just as when they were young? And that this modeller is the same as in their youth, namely the good legislator, who must make laws for the banquet, able to give an entirely opposite turn to the will of the man who is growing confident and bold and impudent beyond bounds, and refuses to submit to order and to his turn of silence, and speech, and drinking, and singing; laws able also justly to inspire that noblest fear, which stoutly resists the entrance of unbecoming boldness, that divine fear to which we have given the names of reverence and shame?

'That is true. 'We said too that the quiet and sober must be guardians of these laws and aid their operation.' With good reason therefore it has been made a traditional custom for us also in our feasts to sing songs and hymns composed in honour of God, the proper order being under the charge of those who are guardians among us. CHAPTER XXV

[PLATO] 'IF, as a serious matter, any city means to practise the custom now mentioned in a lawful and orderly fashion, as taking anxious care for the sake of temperance, and in like manner and for the same reason will not hold aloof from other pleasures, but form plans for the sake of controlling them, in this way they may all be used: but if it is to be for sport, and with permission for any one to drink who will, and whenever he will, and with whomsoever he will, with the accompaniment of whatever other customs he will, I should never join in the vote, that this city or this man ought ever to indulge in drinking; but going even farther than the usage of the Cretans and Lacedaemonians I should vote for the law of the Carthaginians, that no one when in camp should ever taste wine, but accustom himself to water-drinking the whole time; and that in any city neither male nor female slave should ever taste wine, nor magistrates during the year in which they may be in office, nor again should pilots or judges while on duty taste wine at all, nor any one who is coming to deliberate in any important council, nor any one at all in the daytime, unless on account of bodily training or sickness; nor again at night, when any one whether man or woman thinks of getting children. One might also mention many other reasons, why those who hold to reason and law should not drink wine, so that on this principle no city whatever would have need of many vineyards, but the other forms of husbandry and the whole mode of life would be duly regulated.'

Moses also anticipates this by enacting that the priests must not taste wine at the time of their religious service, saying: 'And the Lord spake to Aaron, saying, Ye shall drink no wine nor strong drink, thou and thy sons with thee, whenever ye go into the tent of the testimony, or when ye approach to the altar, so shall ye not die: a statute for ever throughout your generations.' The same author also gives a law to those who make a vow, saying: 'Whosoever, whether man or woman, shall make a special vow of self-dedication to purity unto the Lord, he shall separate himself from wine and strong drink, and vinegar of wine and vinegar of strong drink shall he not drink.' Solomon too forbids the use of wine to rulers and judges, saying: 'Do all things with deliberation; drink wine with deliberation: princes are passionate, let them not drink wine, lest they drink and forget wisdom... and troubles.' The apostle also gives permission to Timothy on account of sicknesses, saying: 'Use a little wine for thy stomach's sake and thine often infirmities.'

CHAPTER XXVI [PLATO] 'IF therefore there has either been in the boundless ages of the past, or is even now in some barbarous region lying far away out of our sight, or shall hereafter be a necessity for men eminent in philosophy to take charge of a State, I am ready to argue to the death in defence of this assertion, that the constitution which I have described has existed, and still exists, and will exist, whenever the Muse herself becomes mistress of the State: for it is not impossible that she should become mistress, nor are my descriptions impossible.' CHAPTER XXVII [PLATO] 'But how for a man in relation to himself? Must he be disposed as an enemy towards an enemy, or what do we say in this case? 'O Athenian stranger,

Attic I should not like to call you, since you seem to me worthy rather to be called after the name of the goddess, because you have made the argument clearer by rightly bringing it back to its first principle, so that you will more easily recognize that we were quite right just now in saying that all men are enemies to all, both in public and in private, and every one an enemy to himself.

'What do you mean, my good sir? 'In this last case also, my friend, a man's conquest over himself is the first and noblest of all victories, but to be defeated by himself is at once the basest and worst defeat of all. For this is a sign that there is a war against ourselves going on in every one of us.' And after other passages he adds to this and says: 'Must we not then reckon each of ourselves as one? 'Yes. 'But as possessing in himself two counsellors, antagonistic and foolish, which we call pleasure and pain? 'That is true. 'And in addition to both these certain opinions of things future, which in common are called expectation, but severally the expectation of pain is called fear, and the expectation of the contrary is confidence. And further with all these there is a calculation, which of them is better or worse, and when this calculation has become a common decree of a State it is called law.'

And presently he says: 'But this we know, that these affections in us are like cords and strings which pull us inwardly, and being opposite to each other draw us different ways towards opposite actions; and herein lies the distinction between virtue and vice. For reason affirms that there is one of these drawings to which every man ought always to yield, and never let it go, but pull against the other cords; and that this one is the golden and sacred guidance of reason, called the public law of the State; and that others are hard and of iron, but this one soft, as being of gold (and of one form), while the others are like all kinds of forms. We ought therefore always to take part with the best guidance, that of the law. For inasmuch as reason is beautiful and gentle and not violent, its guidance needs assistants, in order that in us the golden kind of motive may prevail over the other kinds.

'And so in this way the fable about virtue, speaking of us as being puppets, would be maintained, and the meaning of the expression about a man being "better or worse than himself" would in a certain way be made clearer; and that in regard to a State or an individual, the latter having found in his own case a true principle with regard to this drawing by cords should live in obedience to it, and a State, having learned the principle either from some god or from this very individual thus informed, should establish it as a law for dealing both with herself and with all other states. Thus vice and virtue would be more clearly distinguished for us.' Among us also the word of God teaches the like doctrines, saying: 'I delight in the law of God after the inward man, but I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind.' And again: 'Their thoughts one with another accusing or else excusing them.' And other passages which are similar to these.

CHAPTER XXVIII [PLATO] 'We remember, however, that in the former part of our discussion we agreed that, if the soul should be found to be older than the body, the properties also of the soul would be older than those of the body. 'Yes, certainly. 'Then tempers, and dispositions, and wishes, and reasonings, and true opinions, and meditations, and remembrances must hare been prior to length and breadth and thickness and strength of bodies, if soul is prior to body. 'Necessarily. 'Must we not then necessarily grant what follows immediately from this, that the soul is the cause of all that is good and evil, and noble and base, and just and unjust, and of all opposites, if we suppose her to be the cause of all things?' Let these quotations suffice from the tenth Book of the Laws. Now with these Moses frequently agrees in his laws, saying: 'And if a soul sin and commit a transgression,' and all other passages expressed by him in like manner to this.

CHAPTER XXIX THE Hebrew Scripture says of the earnest philosopher: 'It is good for a man to bear the yoke in his youth: he will sit alone, and keep silence, because he hath taken it upon him:' and of the prophets beloved by God, that they passed their lives in deserts, and mountains, and caves,for the sake of attaining the height of philosophy, fixing their thought upon God alone; and now hear Plato, how he too makes this mode of life divine, giving the following description of one who aspires to the height of philosophy: [PLATO] 'We are to speak then, it seems, since this is your pleasure, of the leaders: for why should one talk about those who spend their time to bad purpose in philosophy? But these leaders, I suppose, in the first place from their youth up have never known the way to the Agora, nor where the court of justice is, or the council-chamber, or any other public assembly of the State: and laws and decrees, whether read or written, they neither see nor hear. The strivings of political clubs to gain offices, and meetings and banquets and revellings with flute-girls, are practices which do not occur to them even in dreams.

'And what has happened well or ill in the city, or what evil has come to any one from his ancestors male or female, is less known to him than, as the proverb says, the number of gallons in the sea. And as to all these things he knows not even that he does not know them, for he does not abstain from them for the sake of gaining reputation; but in fact it is only his body that has its place and home in the city, but his mind esteeming all these things as little or nothing, disdains them and is "flying all abroad," as Pindar says, measuring both the things beneath the earth and on its surface, and studying the stars above the sky, and scrutinizing in all ways the whole nature of existing things each as a universal, but not condescending to anything close at hand. 'How do you mean this, Socrates?

'Just as, when Thales was star-gazing, Theodorus, and looking upward fell into a well, a clever and witty Thracian handmaid is said to have made a jest upon him, that he was eager to know about things in heaven, but took no notice of what was before his face and at his feet. 'And the same jest holds good against all who pass

their lives in philosophy. For in fact a man of this kind knows nothing of his nearest neighbour, not merely as to what he is doing, but hardly even knows whether he is a man or some other kind of animal. But what man is as man, and what is becoming to such a nature to do or to suffer different from all others, this he is investigating, and takes much trouble in searching it out. You understand, I suppose, Theodorus, do you not? 'Yes, I do, and what you say is true.

'Therefore, my friend, the man of this character both in his private intercourse with every one, and in public life, as I said at first, whenever he is compelled either in a law-court or anywhere else to talk about the things at his feet and before his eyes, becomes a laughing-stock not only to Thracian girls but also to the rest of the rabble, by falling into wells and every kind of trouble from want of experience: and his awkwardness is shocking and makes him seem no better than a fool. 'For when scandal is going on he has nothing personal wherewith to reproach anybody, inasmuch as he knows no harm of any one from having paid no attention to it: so he appears ridiculous in his perplexity. And amidst the praises and loud boastings of others it is evident that he is laughing not in pretence but in reality, and so he is thought to be silly.

'For when either a tyrant or a king is eulogized, he fancies that it is some kind of herdsman, as a swineherd, or a shepherd, or cowherd that he hears congratulated for drawing much milk; but he supposes that they have a more ill-tempered and more treacherous animal than those to tend and to milk. 'He supposes also that a man in this position must become from want of leisure no less boorish and uneducated than the herdsmen, being shut in by his citywall as by a fold on the mountain. And when he hears how some one or other, possessing ten thousand plethra of land or yet more, possesses a wonderful amount, he thinks that what he hears of is very little, being accustomed to look at the earth as a whole. 'And when men sing the praises of family, saying that some man of birth can show seven wealthy ancestors, he regards the commendation as that of very dull and short-sighted persons, who from want of education cannot look always to the whole, nor calculate that every man has had countless myriads of ancestors and forefathers, among whom any man whatever has had many times over thousands and thousands of rich and poor, and kings and slaves, barbarians and Greeks: but when men pride themselves upon a pedigree of five and twenty ancestors, or trace back to Hercules son of Amphitryon, their narrow-mindedness seems to him extraordinary, and he laughs at their being unable to calculate that the twenty-fifth upwards from Amphitryon, and the fiftieth from him, was such as fortune made him, and so to shake off the vanity of an unintelligent soul.

'In all these matters then such a philosopher is derided by the multitude, on the one hand as seeming to be arrogant, and on the other as ignorant of what is before his feet, and at a loss on every occasion. 'You state exactly what takes place, Socrates.

’But when the philosopher himself, O my friend, draws a man upwards, and the other is willing to escape with him from the question, ”In what do I wrong you, or, you me,” into the contemplation of abstract justice and injustice, and what is the essence of each of them, and in what they differ from other things or from each other; or from the question, whether a king possessing much wealth is happy, to the contemplation of abstract monarchy and human happiness and misery in general, of what nature ”they are, and in what way it is befitting to human nature to acquire the one of them, and avoid the other,----when in turn that narrow-minded, shrewd and pettifogging creature is required to explain all these subjects, he gives the philosopher his revenge. Turning giddy where he hangs on high, and looking down, unaccustomed as he is, from the upper air, dismayed and perplexed and stammering a barbarous jargon, he makes himself a laughing-stock not to Thracian girls, nor to any other uneducated person, for they do not understand it, but to all who have been brought up otherwise than as slaves.

’This then, O Theodorus, is the character of each. The one is the character of the man who has been really brought up in freedom and leisure, whom you call a philosopher, with whom we need not be indignant at his seeming to be a simpleton and a nobody, when he is thrown into any servile offices, as for instance if he does not understand how to tie up a bundle of bed-clothes, nor to sweeten a sauce or a flattering speech. But the other is the character of the man who is able to render all such services as these smartly and quickly, but does not understand how to throw his cloak over his right shoulder like a gentleman, nor in just harmony of language to hymn the praises of the true life of gods and of divinely favoured men. ’If, Socrates, you could persuade all men, as you do me, of the truth of what you say, there would be more peace and fewer evils among men.

’But it is not possible, O Theodorus, either that evils should disappear (for there must always be something antagonistic to good), or that they should be settled among the gods, but they necessarily haunt our mortal nature and this our place of abode. ’Wherefore also we should try to escape from this world to the other as speedily as possible. And escape means assimilation to God as far as is possible, and assimilation means to become just and holy and wise withal. But in fact, my good friend, it is not at all an easy thing to persuade men that the reasons for which the multitude say that we ought to shun wickedness and pursue virtue are not the right reasons for practising the one and avoiding the other, I mean the wish not to seem to be bad, but to seem to be good. ’For this, as it seems to me, is the proverbial old wives’ gossip: but the truth we may state as follows: God is never in any way unrighteous, but most perfectly righteous: and nothing is more like Him than any one of us who may likewise become most righteous. On this depends a man’s true ability, or his nothingness and cowardice.

'For to know this is wisdom and genuine virtue, but not to know it is manifest ignorance and vice: and all other kinds of seeming cleverness and wisdom, when they display themselves in political power, are vulgar, and in arts mechanical. With the man then who does wrong, and says or does unholy things, it is far best not to admit that villany makes him a clever man. 'For such men glory in their shame, and suppose that they are spoken of as no fools, nor mere cumberers of the ground, but men of the right sort to prosper in a State. We ought therefore to tell them the truth, that they are all the more what they think they are not, because they think they are not. For they are ignorant of the penalty of injustice, the last thing of which they ought to be ignorant. For it is not the penalty which they fancy, stripes and death, which wrong-doers sometimes escape altogether, but a penalty which it is not possible to escape.

'What penalty then do you mean? 'Though there are two examples set forth in the world of reality, the divinity being the example of the greatest happiness, and the godless of the greatest misery, they do not see that this is true, but from silliness and the extreme of folly they are not conscious of growing like to the one and unlike the other because of their evil deeds: and they pay the penalty for this by living the life fitted for the pattern to which they are growing like. 'And if we tell them that unless they get rid of their cleverness, the place that is free from all evil will not receive them after death, but that they will always have a life here on earth corresponding to their own character by a continual association with evil, being evil themselves, they will listen to this, as men of the utmost cleverness and cunning listening to fools.

'Quite so, Socrates. 'I know it indeed, my friend. There is, however, just one circumstance in their case, whenever they are obliged to give and to receive an explanation in private about the studies which they condemn, and are willing to stand their ground manfully for a long time, and not run away like cowards, then at last, my good sir, they are strangely dissatisfied with themselves and their arguments, and their fine rhetoric somehow fades away, so that they seem to be no better than children.' CHAPTER XXX AMONG us also there is this saying concerning all sophistry practised among men: 'For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will set at nought the prudence of the prudent. Where is the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the disputer of this world?' Moreover that those who study a divine philosophy ought to have no narrow-minded thoughts, we are taught in the saying: 'While we look not at the things which are seen, but at those which are not seen: for the things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal.'

And of the fact that wickedness gathers close around the earth and this mortal life, the word of God says somewhere: 'Redeeming the time, because the days are evil.' And: 'Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof.' The prophet also says: 'Cursing,

and stealing, and adultery, and murder, are poured out upon the earth, and they mingle blood with blood.' And with regard to escaping from this world to God, Moses says: 'Thou shalt walk after the Lord thy God, and to Him shalt thou cleave.' And the same Moses teaches us to imitate God, saying: 'Ye shall be holy, for the Lord your God is holy.' David also knowing that God is righteous, and urging us to become imitators of Him ourselves, says: 'Righteous is the Lord, and loveth righteousness.' The same David taught us to despise wealth, saying: 'If riches increase, set not your heart upon them'; and, 'Be not thou afraid, when a man is made rich, and when the glory of his house is increased: for when he dieth, he shall carry nothing away, nor shall his glory descend with him.'

Also in the following words he taught us not to admire the ruling powers among mankind: 'Put not your trust in princes, nor in any sons of men, in whom there is no safety. His breath will go forth, and he will return to his earth: in that day shall all his thoughts perish.' CHAPTER XXXI [PLATO] 'But even if the case were not such as our argument has now proved it to be, if a lawgiver, who is to be of ever so little use, could have ventured to tell any falsehood at all to the young for their good, is there any falsehood that he could have told more beneficial than this, and better able to make them all do everything that is just, not by compulsion but willingly? 'Truth, O Stranger, is a noble and an enduring thing; it seems, however, not easy to persuade men of it.'

Now you may find in the Hebrew Scriptures also thousands of such passages concerning God as though He were jealous, or sleeping, or angry, or subject to any other human passions, which passages are adopted for the benefit of those who need this mode of instruction. CHAPTER XXXII [PLATO] 'ARE we then agreed as to our former statements? 'About what? 'That every one, man and boy, free and slave, male and female, and the whole city, should never cease from reciting to themselves these charms which we have just described, changed from time to time in some way or other, and presenting every kind of variation, so that the singers may have an insatiable desire for the hymns, and pleasure in them. 'How could there be any doubt that this practice ought to be adopted?' In the fifth Book also of the Republic he writes to the like effect, saying as follows:

[PLATO] 'Do you then know any human occupation, in which the male sex is not superior in all these respects to the female? Or need we waste time by mentioning the art of weaving, and the making of pancakes and preserves, in which the female sex is thought forsooth to be great, and in which their utter inferiority is most ridiculous? 'You say with truth, said he, that the one sex is far surpassed by the other, I might almost say, in everything. Many women, no doubt, are better than many men in many points, but the general truth is as you say. 'No occupation then, my friend, of those who manage the affairs of the state belongs to a woman as woman nor to a man as man; but the natural qualities are found here and there in

both sexes alike, and while woman has by nature a share in all pursuits, and man in all, yet woman is in all weaker than man.

'Yes, certainly. 'Are we then to assign all employments to men, and none to women? 'How can we? 'In fact, we shall say, I suppose, that among women also one has a natural gift of healing and another has not, and one is musical and another unmusical? 'Certainly. 'Also one fit for gymnastics and for war, and another unwarlike and with no taste for gymnastics? 'So I suppose. 'Again, one woman is a philosopher, another hates philosophy? And one is high-spirited, another spiritless? 'This too is true. 'So there is one woman fit for a guardian, and another unfit. Or was not such the nature which we selected as that of men who were fit for guardians? 'Yes, it was such. 'Both woman and man therefore have the same natural fitness for guardianship of the state, except in so far as one is weaker and another stronger. 'So it appears.

'We must then select women also who are of this character to live with men of the same character, and to share in their guardianship, since they are competent, and akin to them in nature.' With good reason then our Word also admits to its divine instruction and philosophy every class not only of men but also of women, and not only of free men and slaves, but also of Barbarians and Greeks. CHAPTER XXXIII [PLATO] 'LET us look at it then in this way. Now suppose some one were to praise the breeding of goats, and the animal itself as a fine property; and some one else, having seen goats feeding without a goatherd in cultivated ground and doing mischief, should find fault with them, and on seeing any kind of cattle without a keeper or with bad keepers, should in this case blame them, do we think that such a man's censure would convey any just blame whatever?

'How should it? ' Also after a few sentences: 'And what would you say of one who praises or blames any kind of community, which ought naturally to have a ruler, and which with his aid is useful, whereas the critic had never seen it in its rightful association with a ruler, but always without rule, or with bad rulers? Do we suppose that observers such as these could pronounce any useful censure or praise on communities of this kind? 'How could they?' If then among us also it should appear that some without any president and ruler, or with evil rulers, were doing evil, one ought not to find fault with our whole school, but rather to admire our religious constitution from the conduct of those who follow it rightly. CHAPTER XXXIV IN the Proverbs of Solomon it is briefly stated: 'The memory of the just is associated with praises, but the name of the ungodly is extinguished'; and again it is said: 'Call no man blessed before his death': so now hear how Plato interprets the thought in the seventh Book of the Laws, saying:

[PLATO] 'Whosoever of the citizens should reach the end of their life after having wrought good and laborious works either in body or soul, and been obedient to the laws, it would be fitting that they should receive eulogies. 'By all means. 'It

is not safe, however, to honour those who are still alive with eulogies and hymns, before a man has finished his whole course of life, and crowned it with a noble end. And let us have all these honours common to men and to women who have been conspicuously good.' CHAPTER XXXV As Solomon had said in Proverbs: 'Give me neither poverty nor riches,' so Plato says in the fourth Book of the Republic: [PLATO] 'But we have found, it seems, some other things for the guardians, against which they must watch in every way, that they may not creep in unobserved into the state. 'What kind of things?

'Riches, said I, and poverty; as the one engenders luxury, and idleness, and revolution, and the other meanness and mischievousness, as well as revolution.' By mischievousness is meant every disgraceful action. CHAPTER XXXVI AGAIN Moses says in his laws: 'Let every man fear his father and his mother,' and 'Honour thy father and thy mother, that it may be well with thee'; and Plato, like Moses, bids us both honour and fear them, speaking thus in the Laws: [PLATO] 'Every man of sense fears and honours the prayers of his parents, knowing that many times and for many persons they have been accomplished.' And again in another place he says: [PLATO] 'We would have every one reverence his elder both in word and deed. And any one who is twenty years older than himself, whether male or female, let him regard as father or mother, and treat with reverence.' CHAPTER XXXVII

MOSES in his laws forbade Hebrews to have Hebrews as slaves, and said: 'If thou buy an Hebrew servant, six years shall he serve thee: and in the seventh year thou shalt send him away free.' And in like manner Plato says in the Republic: [PLATO] 'They should therefore themselves own no Greek as a slave, and advise the other Greeks to the same effect. 'Certainly, said he. 'Thus then they would be more ready to turn their arms against Barbarians, and abstain from war against each other.' CHAPTER XXXVIII [PLATO] 'LET no man move landmarks, either of his own fellow citizen who is a neighbour, or of one whose property marches with his on the borders, if he be neighbour to a foreigner, considering that this is really to move what should be immoveable.' And presently he says: [PLATO] 'Whosoever ploughs over his neighbour's lands, encroaching upon the boundaries, let him repay the damage, and as a cure for both his impudence and his meanness let him pay besides double of the damage to the person injured.'

CHAPTER XXXIX [PLATO] 'And in a word, let not the disgrace and punishment of a father follow upon any of the children, except when any one's father and grandfather and great-grandfather in succession have paid the penalty of death.' CHAPTER XL A LAW of Moses says: 'If a man steal a calf, or a sheep, and slay it, or sell it, he shall repay five calves for the calf, and four sheep for the sheep. . . . But if he be caught, and the theft be found in his hand alive, from a calf or an ass to a sheep, he shall repay double.' Now hear how Plato follows this, saying: [PLATO] 'But whether a thief steal much or little, let there be one law and one punishment

imposed for all alike. For in the first place he must pay double the amount stolen, if he be convicted in a suit of this kind, and if the rest of his substance suffice to pay it, beyond his lot of land; and if not, he must be kept in prison until he has paid it, or persuaded the man who gained sentence against him to release him.'

CHAPTER XLI AGAIN when Moses says: 'But if the thief be found breaking in, and be smitten that he die, it is not murder,' Plato agrees in this also, saying: [PLATO] 'If a man catch a thief coming into his house by night to steal his goods, and slay him, let him be guiltless: also if he kill a footpad in self-defence, let him be guiltless.' CHAPTER XLII [PLATO] 'AND so if a beast of burden or any other animal kill a man, except any animals which, when struggling in any contest of the public games, do such a thing, let the relatives prosecute the slayer for murder, and let the suit be decided by the country guardians, such and so many as the relative shall appoint, and let the beast which is condemned by them be slain and cast outside the borders of the country.' So says Plato. And Moses in anticipation says: 'But if a bull gore a man or a woman and they die, the bull shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten, but the owner of the bull shall be quit.'

CHAPTER XLIII THE prophetic scripture says: 'Son of man, behold, the house of Israel are all of them become unto Me a mixture of copper, and tin, and iron, and lead, in the midst of the furnace are they made a mixture of silver. Therefore say, Thus saith the Lord; because ye are all become one mixture, therefore, behold, I will gather you into the midst of Jerusalem, even as silver is gathered, and copper, and iron, and lead, and tin, into the midst of the furnace, to blow fire upon them, that they may be melted' : and now hear what Plato says in like manner: [PLATO] 'Listen then to the rest of the fable. For we in the city are of course all brothers, as we shall say to them in telling the fable, but the god, in forming as many of you as are fit to rule, mixed gold in their composition; wherefore they are the most to be honoured; and for all the auxiliaries, silver; but iron and copper for the husbandmen and other operatives.

'Inasmuch then as you are all of one family, you will generally beget children like yourselves, but sometimes from a golden parent a silver child will be born, and a golden child from a silver parent, and all the rest in this way, one from another. 'And this is the first and chief command that God lays upon the rulers, that they be above all good guardians of their children and watch over them with strictest care, to see what metal is mingled in their souls; and if one of their own children be found to be partly of copper or iron, they must by no means have pity on him, but assign to him the rank befitting his nature, and thrust him down either among the operatives or the husbandmen; and if, on the other hand, from these classes there be born a child with a mixture of gold or silver, they will value them and promote them, some to the rank of guardian, others to that of auxiliary: for there is an oracle that the state will be destroyed, whenever the man of iron or of copper

has become its guardian. Do you know any device then by which they might be brought to believe this fable?'

CHAPTER XLIV THE Hebrew prophecy says to the princes of the people: 'O ye shepherds of Israel, do shepherds feed themselves? Do not the shepherds feed the sheep? Behold, ye devour the milk, and the fat ye slay, and clothe you with the wool, and ye feed not My sheep.... And ye sought not the lost, and the broken ye bound not up, and brought not back that which was going astray.' Moreover the Word of our salvation says: 'The good shepherd giveth his life for the sheep: but he that is an hireling and not the shepherd, whose own the sheep are not, forsaketh them.' Now listen also to Plato, in the first Book of the Republic, how he translates these sayings:

[PLATO] 'But as it is, Thrasymachus (for we must still look back upon our former statements), you see that though at first you defined the true physician, you did not afterwards think it necessary to keep strict watch over the definition of the true shepherd; but you suppose that, in so far as he is a shepherd, he fattens the sheep not with a view to what is best for the sheep, but with a view to the good cheer, just as a banqueter who is going to have a feast, or on the other hand with a view to selling them, as a money-maker and not a shepherd. But surely the art of the shepherd is concerned with nothing else than how to provide what is best for the flock over which he is set: for surely it has sufficiently provided all that is required for its own perfection, as long as it lacks nothing of the shepherd's art. Thus then I was supposing just now, that we must necessarily admit that every government, in so far as it is a government, looks solely to what is best for that which is governed and tended by it, in the case both of public and private government. But is it your opinion that the rulers in states, I mean the true rulers, hold office willingly?'

CHAPTER XLV THE Hebrew prophecy says: 'From fear of thee, O Lord, we have been with child, and we have been in pain, and have brought forth wind [of deliverance]': and Plato in the Theaetetus represents Socrates as speaking thus: [PLATO] 'Those who associate with me are in fact affected in the same way as women in childbirth: for they travail in pain and are full of perplexity night and day far more than the women. And this pain my art is able both to arouse and to allay.' CHAPTER XLVI THE prophet Ezekiel said: 'And the hand of the Lord came upon me, and I saw, and, behold, an uplifting wind came from the north.' And presently he said: 'And in the midst was the likeness as of four living creatures. And the appearance of them was as the likeness of a man upon them, and each one had four faces. And the likeness of their faces was as the face of a man: and they four had the face of a lion on the right side; and they four had the face of a calf on the left side; they four had also the face of an eagle.' Hear now what Plato also says in like manner:

[PLATO] 'Now then, said I, let us discuss it with him, since we have come to an agreement as to the effect of a course of injustice and a course of justice respec-

tively. ’How discuss it? said he. ’By forming in words an image of the soul, that the author of those remarks may know how he described it. ’What sort of image? said he. ’One of such a kind, said I, as the creatures which, according to the legend, were naturally produced in old times, the Chimaera and Scylla and Cerberus, and many others in which several forms are said to have grown together into one. ’So they say, said he. ’Mould then, first, a single form of a motley many-headed beast, having a ring of heads of tame and wild beasts, and able to change all these and to produce them out of itself. ’The task, said he, needs a cunning artist: but nevertheless, since language is more easily moulded than wax and substances of that kind, suppose the model made.

’Now then model a second form of a lion, and a third of a man: but let the first be far the greatest, and the second next to it. ’These, said he, are easier, and are already done. ’Well, then, join the three in one, so that they may in a manner be grown together. ’They are so joined, said he. ’Now mould around them on the outside a likeness of ’one of them, that of the man, so that to one who cannot see the inside, but only the outer cover, there may appear to be one single animal, a man. ’The cover is moulded, said he. ’To the man, then, who says that it is profitable for this human creature to do wrong and not for his interest to do right, let us reply, that his assertion can only mean, that it is profitable for him by feeding the multiform beast well to strengthen both the lion and the lion’s members, but to starve and weaken the man, so that he may be dragged whichever way either of the others draws him. and not to familiarize them at all or make them friendly one to another, but leave them to bite and struggle among themselves and devour one another.

’Certainly, said he, this is what the eulogist of injustice must say. ’On the other hand, then, would not he who says that justice is profitable assert that the creature ought so to act and speak, that his inner man shall have the chief control over the whole man, and take charge of the many-headed beast like a husbandman, nourishing and taming the gentle parts and hindering the growth of the wild, having taken the lion’s nature for his ally, and by his common care for all make them friendly to each other and to himself, and so train them? ’Yes, this again is quite what the advocate of justice has to say.’ CHAPTER XLVII THE whole nation of the Hebrews having been divided into twelve tribes, Plato also in like manner enjoins by law the necessity of maintaining the propriety of this in the case of his own citizens, speaking as follows:

[PLATO] ’Let our whole country be divided into twelve parts as equal as possible, and for each part let one tribe assigned by lot furnish annually five men as guardians of the public lands and commanders of cavalry.’ And again he says: ’Let the generals elected propose for themselves twelve commanders of infantry, one for each tribe.’ CHAPTER XLVIII As the royal metropolis established long before among the Hebrews was far from the sea, and situated among the mountains, and

possessed of very fruitful land; so Plato says that the metropolis to be founded by him in his Laws ought to be something of this kind. His words are as follows: [PLATO] 'But what I am more desirous of asking concerning it is this, whether it will be a city on the sea-coast or inland. 'The city of which we spake just now, Stranger, is about eighty stadia distant from the sea.

'How then? Are there harbours on this side of it, or is it altogether without harbours? 'Nay, on this side, O Stranger, it is as well provided with harbours as possible. 'Wonderful! You don't say so! Further, then, does the country about it produce everything, or does it need anything besides? 'It hardly needs anything more. 'And will it have any neighbouring city close to it? 'None at all, and that is why it is to be founded there: for some emigration that occurred in the place in old times has left this region uninhabited for an immense time. 'Well, again? As to hills, and plains, and forest, what proportion has it of each? 'It is like the general character of the rest of Crete. 'Should you call it rocky rather than level? 'Yes, certainly.

'It cannot then be hopelessly bad for the attainment of virtue. For if it was to have been on the coast, and with good harbours, and in need of many things more than it could produce, it would have needed some mighty saviour and lawgivers more than mortal, if, under such natural conditions, its moral tendencies were not to be very promiscuous and evil; but as it is there is some consolation in the eighty stadia. It lies indeed nearer to the sea than it should, considering how very well you say it is provided with harbours; nevertheless we may be content even with this. For when the sea is close to a country, its daily neighbourhood is pleasant, but in reality it is very brackish and bitter: for by filling the city with commerce and retail trade, it engenders shifty and faithless habits in men's souls, and makes the city unfaithful and unfriendly both to herself, and likewise to all other nations. Against this, however, it possesses a consolation in producing all things; yet being rocky it evidently cannot be at the same time productive in abundance and in variety. For if it had both, it would provide large exports, and in return be filled with gold and silver coin; than which, I may say, there could be no greater evil, taken singly, for a city in regard to the attainment of just and noble sentiments.'

But now after so many proofs as we have hitherto given, let us observe how, after approving the mode of education among the Hebrews in the passages which we have mentioned, he deprecates the Greek method, writing as follows in the tenth Book of the Republic: CHAPTER XLIX [PLATO] 'LET me say to you in confidence (for you will not tell of me to the tragic poets and all the rest of the imitative tribe), all such poetry seems to be hurtful to the understanding of those hearers who do not possess an antidote in the knowledge of its real nature. 'Pray what is the purport of your remarks? said he. 'I must speak, said I, although a certain fondness and reverence which I have felt from boyhood for Homer restrains my speech. For

of all those charming tragic poets he seems to have been the first teacher and leader: nevertheless we must not respect a person in preference to the truth, but, as I said, I must speak out.

'Quite so, said he.' Then afterwards he adds: [PLATO] 'As to other matters, then, let us demand no explanation from Homer, or any other of the poets, by asking why, if any of them was skilful in healing, and not a mere imitator of medical language, none of the poets ancient or modern is said to have made cures, as Asclepius did, or to have left any school of medical art behind him, as Asclepius left his descendants: and let us not ask him about other arts, but let them pass. 'With regard, however, to those grandest and noblest subjects of which Homer undertakes to speak, such as war, and strategy, and administration of states, and the education of mankind, it is fair, I suppose, to ask him this question: "My dear Homer, if in the representation of virtue you were not a mere image-maker twice removed from the truth, as we defined an imitator to be, but only once removed, and capable of knowing what pursuits make men better or worse both in private and in public, tell us which of our states owed a better government to you, as Lacedaemon to Lycurgus, and many both small and great states to many other legislators? What state alleges that you have been a good lawgiver to them and have conferred a benefit upon them? For Italy and Sicily so speak of Charondas, and we of Solon: but who says this of you?" Will he be able to mention any?

'I think not, said Glaucon. At least no one says so, not even the Homeridae themselves. 'Well, but what war in the time of Homer is recorded to have been waged successfully under his command or advice? 'Not one. 'But are there said to have been many ingenious inventions applicable to arts or any other pursuits, as in the case of a man who is wise in practical work, such as Thales the Milesian, and Anacharsis the Scythian? 'Nothing of the kind whatever. 'Well, then, if not publicly, yet in private, is Homer said during his lifetime to have guided the education of any persons, who loved him for his society, and handed down a certain Homeric way of living to those who came after; just as Pythagoras was wonderfully beloved himself for this kind of association, and his successors, who to this day call their mode of life Pythagorean, seem to be in a manner distinguished among other men?

'Nothing of this kind either is reported of him. For surely, Socrates, the education of Creophylus, the companion of Homer, would appear even more ridiculous than his name, if the stories told about Homer are true: for it is said that in his lifetime he was much neglected by this very man. 'Yes, so indeed it is said, I replied. 'But do you suppose, O Glaucon, that if Homer had been really able to educate men and make them better, as being himself capable not merely of imitating but of knowing such subjects, he would have failed to gain many companions, by whom he would have been honoured and beloved? So then Protagoras of Abdera, and Prodicus of Ceos, and very many others are able in private intercourse to persuade the men

of their day, that they will not be able to manage either their own house or their state, unless they preside over their education, and are so much beloved for this their wisdom as to be almost carried about on the heads of their companions. Can we then suppose that, if Homer or Hesiod was really capable of improving men in virtue, their contemporaries would have allowed them to wander about as rhapsodists, and would not rather have hugged them closer than gold, and constrained them to stay with them at home, or, if they could not persuade them, would themselves have escorted them wherever they went, until they had received sufficient education?

'It seems to me, Socrates, said he, that what you say is entirely true. 'Then must we not assume that all the poets, from Homer downwards, only copy images of virtue and of the other subjects of their poetry, and do not touch the truth? But, as we were saying just now, the painter, though he knows nothing himself about shoemaking, will make what seems to be a shoemaker to those who likewise know nothing about it, but judge by the colours and forms? 'Yes, certainly. 'In the same way, then, I suppose, we may say that the poet also by his names and phrases lays on certain colours proper to the several arts, of which he knows nothing himself except how to imitate them, so that to others like him, judging only from the words, whether he speaks about shoemaking, or generalship, or any other subject whatever, in metre and rhythm and harmony, it seems to be extremely well spoken.

'So powerful a charm these musical forms have naturally in themselves: but when stripped of their musical colouring, you know, I imagine, how poor the poets' works appear when read in bare simplicity as prose. Have you observed it, or not? 'I have, said he.' Now these things being so, it seems good to me to go through some short passages of Plato, wherein he maintains the doctrine of God and of providence in a more logical manner, adhering in this also to the Hebrew dogmas. And first let us observe how he sets forth the opinions of the atheists. CHAPTER L [PLATO] 'THERE are some who say that all things come, and have come, and will come into existence some by nature, some by art, and some by chance. 'Do they not say well then? 'Yes, it is probable, I suppose, that wise men are right in what they say. Nevertheless let us follow them up, and inquire what they on that side mean.

'By all means. 'It seems, they say, that the greatest and fairest things are wrought by nature and chance, and the less important by art, which receiving from nature the great original works of creation moulds and frames all the smaller, which we all call artificial. 'What do you mean? 'I will state it still more plainly thus. Fire and water and earth and air, they say, all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art. And the bodies which come next to these, the earth, and sun, and moon, and stars, have been created by help of these elements, which are absolutely inanimate. And being severally carried by the chance with which they meet from their several forces, they combine in some intimate way, hot with cold, or dry with moist, and soft

with hard, and all other principles which by chance were yet necessarily combined with a mixture of their opposites, and in this way and according to these conditions they have thus created both the whole heaven and all things in the heaven, and all animals too and plants, all seasons being produced, they say, from these elements, not by virtue of intelligence, nor any god, nor art, but, as we say, by nature and chance.

'And afterwards from these mortal elements art sprang up later, mortal like them, and has since produced certain playthings, not partaking much of truth, but certain images akin, one to another, such as are produced by painting and music and all their assistant arts. And the arts which do produce anything good, are those which combine their own power with that of nature, as for example medicine, and husbandry, and gymnastics. Moreover it is said that political science also cooperates in some small measure with nature, but for the most part with art: and thus that all legislation allies itself not with nature but with art, the assumptions of which are not true. 'How do you mean? 'In the first place, my excellent friend, these people say that gods exist not by nature but by art and by certain laws, and that these laws differ in various ways, according as the several states agreed among themselves in establishing their legislation: and moreover that what is honourable by nature is one thing, but by law another; and that principles of justice have no existence at all by nature, but that men go on disputing with one another, and are always changing them; and whatever alterations they make are severally valid at the time when they make them, being made by art and laws, and not by any natural principle.

'All these, my friends, are doctrines of men whom the young think wise, both poets and prose writers, who say that conquest by force is the best right. And from this cause young men are assailed by impious thoughts, as that there are no gods such as the law commands them to believe in, and therefore dissensions arise, from their drawing men towards what they call the right life of nature, which is in reality to live in mastery over all others, and not as serving others according to law. 'What a description you have given, O Stranger, and what injury by young men both publicly to states and to private families!' Also after other passages he says: 'But now, Cleinias, answer me again, since you too must take part in the discussion. For the man who talks thus probably believes fire, and water, and earth, and air to be the first elements of all things, and these are what he calls nature, and believes the soul to be made out of them afterwards: and this not only seems to be probable, but he really tries to prove it to us by his argument.

'Yes, certainly. 'Is it possible then that we have discovered a source, as it were, of the senseless opinion of all men who ever meddled with physical inquiries? Consider and examine every argument: for indeed it is a matter of no small importance, if those who take up impious arguments, and lead others, should be found to be

using their arguments not at all rightly, but in a mistaken manner. This seems indeed to me to be the case. 'You say well; but try now to explain how it is. 'It is likely then that we shall have to deal with rather unusual arguments.' Also soon after he adds this: 'Nearly all of them, my friend, seem to have been ignorant both of the nature and of the power of the soul, and especially of its origin, that it is the first of all things, created before all bodies, and the chief ruling principle of all their change and rearrangement. Now if this is so, must not the things which are akin to the soul have of necessity been created before those which belong to the body, if the soul itself is older than the body?

'Necessarily. 'Then thought, and attention, and mind, and art, and law must be prior to hard and soft, and heavy and light: and moreover the great primal works and actions must be works of art, as being first of all; and natural products and nature, which they are wrong in calling by this name, must come afterwards and take their beginning from art and mind. 'How wrong? 'By "nature" they mean the generation of the first principles. But if the soul shall be found to be first, not fire nor air, then the soul having been the very first generated would most rightly be said to exist pre-eminently by nature. This is true, if one has proved soul to be older than body, but not otherwise. 'What you say is most true.' CHAPTER LI 'COME then, if we ought ever to invoke divine aid, let us do so now: let the gods be invoked with all earnestness to come to the demonstration of their own existence; and let us hold fast to this as a sure cable in embarking upon our present argument.

When I am questioned upon matters of this kind, it seems to be the safest course to answer such questions in the following manner. 'When any one says to me, Stranger, are all things at rest, and nothing in motion, or the very contrary? Or are some of them in motion, and some at rest? Some I suppose are in motion, I shall say, and some at rest. Is there not then some place in which the fixed are at rest, and the moving move? 'Of course. 'And some, I suppose, would move in one single place, and others in more than one. 'Do you mean, I shall say, that the things which are in the condition of rest at the centre move in one single place, just as the circumference of circles revolves, though the circles are said to be at rest? 'Yes.' And afterwards he adds: 'Let us further state it in the following way, and answer ourselves again. If all things were somehow combined in one mass at rest, as most of such philosophers are bold enough to say, which of the above-mentioned kinds of motion must first arise among them?

'Of course the self-moving: for unless there were previously some change in themselves, they could never begin to change from any external cause. 'As the beginning then of all motions, and the first which arises in things at rest and continues in things in motion, the self-moving, we must say, is necessarily the eldest and mightiest of all changes; and that which is changed by another, and itself moves others, is the second. 'Most true. 'Since therefore we have reached this stage of

the argument, let us make the following answer. 'What answer? 'If we see this self-motion take place anywhere in the element of earth, or water, or fire, whether separate or combined, what condition shall we say exists in such element? 'Do you ask me whether we shall say that it is alive, when it moves itself? 'Yes. 'It is alive, of course. 'And again, when we see soul in any thing, must we admit that this has a different or the same life as the former?

'The same, and no other. 'Stay then, in heaven's name. Should you not wish to understand three points about every thing? 'What do you mean? 'One, the essence; and one, the definition of the essence; and one, the name: and further, that there are two questions concerning everything that exists. 'How two? 'Sometimes one puts forward the name alone and asks for the definition, and at another time one puts forward the definition alone and asks the name. Are we then willing now again to make a statement of the following kind? 'Of what kind? 'There is, I suppose, something divisible into two equal parts in other things as well as in number. And the name of this that is divisible in number is "even," and its definition is "number divisible into two equal parts." 'Yes. 'It is something of this kind that I am trying to explain. 'Is it not the same thing of which we speak in either way, whether on being asked for the definition we give the name, or being asked for the name we give the definition, since it is the same thing that we speak of by name as "even," and by definition as "number divisible into two equal parts "?

'Yes, certainly. 'What then is the definition of that which has the name "soul"? Have we any other except that which was stated just now, "the motion which has the power of moving itself "? 'Do you mean to say that the definition "self-moving " implies the same essence as the name, which we all call "soul "? 'That is what I say. And if this is so, do we any longer feel the want of a sufficient proof that soul is the same as the first creative and moving principle of all things that are, and have been, and shall be, and again of all their contraries, since it has been shown to be the cause of all change and motion? 'We want no more: but it has been most satisfactorily proved that soul is the oldest of all things, as having been the beginning of motion. 'Is not then the motion which is produced in one thing because of another, but never presents any self-motion, being in reality a change of a soul-less body, of secondary rank or of a rank as far removed as any number by which one may choose to reckon it?

'Rightly so. 'Should we then have said rightly and properly and with the most perfect truth that soul has existed before body, or not, and that body is secondary and comes after soul, as according to nature the governed comes after the governing principle? 'Yes, with the most perfect truth. 'Do we however remember that we admitted in the former part, that, if soul should be found to be older than body, the things of the soul would also be older than those of the body? 'Yes, certainly. 'Then characters, and moral habits, and wishes, and reasonings, and true opinions, and

acts of attention and memory must have existed earlier than length, and breadth, and depth, and strength of bodies, if soul was prior to body. 'Necessarily. 'Must we then necessarily admit what follows immediately on this, that soul is the cause of good and evil, and honourable and base, and just and unjust, and of all opposites, if at least we are to assume it to be the cause of all things?

'Of course. 'Must we not say then that, as soul governs and inhabits all things that move in any way, it governs the heaven also? 'Certainly. 'One soul, or more? More than one, I will answer for you both. Not less than two at least we must suppose, the beneficent, and that which has power to work evil. You have spoken very rightly. 'Well, to proceed. Soul then conducts all things in heaven, and earth, and sea by her own movements, the names of which are will, consideration, attention, deliberation, opinion right or wrong, joy, sorrow, confidence, fear, hatred, affection, and all movements either akin to these or primary, which again taking with them the secondary movements of bodies lead all things to growth and decay, and separation and combination, and their attendant conditions of heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, hard and soft, white and black, bitter and sweet, and all things by use of which the soul, which is divine, taking ever with her the divine mind, conducts all things rightly and happily, but, if she allies herself with folly, works all the contrary effects to these. Are we to assume that these things are so, or have we still a doubt whether they may not be otherwise?

'By no means. 'Which kind then of soul, are we to say, rules over heaven and earth and their whole circuit? That which is full of wisdom and virtue, or that which possesses neither? Are you willing that we should answer this as follows? 'How? 'If on the one hand, my excellent friend, we are to say, the whole path of heaven and the course of all things therein has a nature similar to the movement and revolution and reasonings of mind, and proceeds in a manner akin thereto, we must evidently say, that the best kind of soul takes care of the whole world, and guides it on that best path. 'True. 'But if it proceeds in an insane and disorderly manner, we must say that the evil soul is guiding it. 'This too is most true. 'What then is the nature of the movement of mind? Now in answering this question, my friends, it is difficult to speak wisely. And for this reason it is fair that I too should help you now in the answer.

'You say well. 'Let us then not frame our answer as if looking straight at the sun and bringing on ourselves darkness at noonday, by supposing that we shall ever see mind with mortal eyes, and know it thoroughly. It is safer to observe the subject of our inquiry by looking upon an image of it. 'How do you mean? 'Of those ten kinds of motion let us take as its image that which mind resembles; and when I have helped you to remember this, I will frame our common answer. 'You could not speak better. 'Well then of our former discourse we remember thus much at least, that of all things we supposed some to be in motion, and some at rest. 'Yes.

’And again of those that were in motion we supposed some to more in one place only, and others in more than one, as they were carried along.

’That is so. ’Of these two motions then that whose course is always in one place must necessarily move round some centre, like the wheels on a lathe, and must be in every way as much as possible akin and similar to the revolving motion of the mind. ’How do you mean? ’Surely if we say that mind and the motion which goes on in one place both move according to the same conditions, and in the same manner, and in the same course, and round the same centres, and towards the same direction, and according to one law and one order, like the motions of a top, we should never be shown to be bad word-painters of beautiful images. ’What you say is very right. ’Well then this other motion which never proceeds in the same manner, nor according to the same conditions, nor in the same course, nor round the same centres, nor towards the same direction, nor in one place, nor in proportion, nor order, nor any law, must be akin to every kind of folly.

’Most truly it must. ’Now then there is no longer any difficulty in saying expressly, that since soul is that which carries all things round for us, we must of necessity affirm that the revolution of the heaven is carried on by the care and arrangement either of the best soul or of the worse. ’But according to what has now been said, O Stranger, it would be impious to say otherwise than that soul or souls endowed with every virtue carry them round. ’You have paid admirable attention to my arguments, Cleinias. But listen further to the following. ’What? ’If soul carries all things round, sun and moon and the stars too, does she not also carry round each one of them? ’Of course. ’Then concerning one of them let us argue in a manner which we shall find applicable to all the heavenly bodies. ’Which one? ’Every man sees the sun’s body, but no one sees his soul, nor yet the soul of any animal’s body, either in life or after death. There is, however, much reason to suppose that this nature of soul invests all our bodily senses though utterly imperceptible thereby to us, but is apprehended by mind alone. By mind therefore and by thought let us grasp the following notion of it.

’What kind of notion? ’If soul carries the sun round, we shall not be far wrong in saying that it does one of three things. ’What three? ’That either dwelling within this circular body that we see the soul carries it such as it is safely through in every direction, as our soul carries us about every way; or having from some external source provided herself with a body of fire or a kind of air, as some say, she forcibly drives body by body; or thirdly, being herself without a body, but endowed with certain other exceedingly wonderful powers, she so guides his course. ’Yes. ’This so far must be true, that soul directs all things by one or other of these operations.’ These then are the statements of our philosopher in the tenth Book of the Laws. But hear how he arranges the same thought in the Philebus also:

[PLATO] ’All the wise men say with one voice, in reality magnifying themselves, that mind is our king of heaven and earth. And perhaps they are right. But, if you please, let us conduct our examination of the general nature of mind more at length. ’Speak in whatever way you please, Socrates, thinking nothing of length on our account, as you will not be wearisome, to us. ’You say well. Let us then begin our further inquiries in the following manner. ’How? ’Whether ought we to assert, Protarchus, that all things and this so-called universe are under the guardianship of the irrational and purposeless force, and mere hap-hazard; or that, on the contrary, as those before us used to say, mind and wisdom of some marvellous kind arrange and govern them? ’They are utterly different assertions, O noble Socrates. For the opinion which you mention seems to me to be impious. But the assertion that mind arranges them all is worthy of the aspect of the world, and of sun and moon and stars and the whole circuit of heaven, and for my part I would never speak nor even think of them otherwise.

’Are you willing then that we also should assent to what was agreed on by those before us, that these things are so? And not merely think that we must state the opinions of others without risk to ourselves, but also share the danger and bear part of the blame, when some clever man asserts that these things are not as we say but all in disorder? ’Of course I should be willing. ’Come then, scan carefully the argument on this subject which now encounters us. ’Only state it. ’Do we discern in the constitution of the world the elements belonging to the nature of the bodies of all living things, fire and water and air and ”land,” as the storm-tossed sailors say? ’Certainly. For we are verily tossed by storms of perplexity in our present discussions. ’Well then, concerning each of the elements existing in us, take a statement of this kind.

’What? ’That each of these as existing in us is small, and weak, and in no respect at all pure, and without a power worthy of its nature: and having admitted this in one, conceive the same of all. As for instance there is fire, I suppose, in us, and fire in the universe. ’Of course. ’Is not then the part that is in us small and weak, and mean, but that which is in the universe wonderful both in quantity and beauty, and in every kind of power that belongs to fire? ’What you say is very true. ’Again, is the fire of the universe generated and fed and ruled by this fire that is in us, or on the contrary is it from that fire that mine and yours and that of all other animals receives all these services? ’This question does not even require an answer. ’Quite right. You will say the same then, I suppose, concerning the earth that is here in the animals and that which is in the universe; and so of all the other elements about which I asked just now you will give this same answer.

’Yes, for who would ever be thought to be in his right mind, if he answered otherwise? ’No one probably. But now follow the next point. For when we saw all these elements now mentioned combined in one, did we not call it a body? ’Of course.

’Assume the same then in regard also to this which we call the world: for because of the same process it must be a body, being composed out of the same elements. ’What you say is very right. ’Is then our body nourished wholly from this body, or does this receive from ours its nourishment and all the further services which we just now mentioned in reference to them? ’This is another question, Socrates, not worth asking. ’But what of the following? Is it worth asking? Or what will you say? ’Say what it is. ’Shall we not say that this body of ours has a soul?

’Of course we shall say so. ’Whence, my dear Protarchus, did it get a soul, unless indeed the body of the universe had a soul, inasmuch as it has all things the same as our body, and in every way more beautiful? ’Evidently from no other source, Socrates. ’For surely we do not think, O Protarchus, that those four classes, the finite, the infinite, their compound, and cause which exists as a fourth class in all things,----that this, which in our bodies supplies a soul, and endows it with the art of exercising the body and healing it when it has fallen ill, and makes various arrangements and remedies in various parts, is to be called entire and complete wisdom; but that, though these same elements exist in the heaven as a whole, and in its great divisions, in more beauty and purity, it has not contrived to create in these the nature of all that is most beautiful and noble.

’Nay, this would be in every way unreasonable. ’If then this is denied, would it not be better for us, with that other argument as our guide, to say, that, as we have often said, there is in the world a vast infinity and an efficient limit, and over them a cause of no little power, ordering and arranging years, and seasons, and months, which cause is most justly called wisdom and mind? ’Most justly indeed. ’Wisdom however and mind could never exist without soul. ’No indeed. ’Will you not say then that through the power of the cause there is implanted in the nature of Zeus a kingly soul and a kingly mind: and in other gods other noble qualities, according to the names by which they like each to be called?’ CHAPTER LII [PLATO] ’To the man who believes that there are gods, but that they take no heed of human affairs, we must speak words of encouragement. O best of men, let us say, your believing in gods is perhaps due to some divine affinity that draws you towards your kindred, to honour and believe in them. But the fortunes of evil and unjust men both in private and in public life, though not really happy, yet being in the opinions of men vehemently but unduly commended as happy, and wrongfully celebrated both in poetry and in literature of every kind, tend to draw you towards impiety.

’Or perhaps from seeing unrighteous men at last reach old age, and leave behind them children’s children in the greatest dignities, you are now disturbed, when, after seeing them in all these conditions or after hearing or having been yourself an actual eye-witness of some of them, when many terrible impieties were committed, you see them in consequence of these very deeds attain from small beginnings to despotic powers and highest dignities: then it is evident that because of all such

things, though you would riot like to blame the gods as the causes of them, because they are your kindred, yet being at the same time led astray by false reasoning and unable to be angry with the gods, you have come to this your present condition of thinking that, though they exist, they despise and disregard the affairs of men. 'In order therefore that your present doctrine may not grow into a stronger tendency towards impiety, but that, if it be at all possible, we may be enabled to avert its progress by arguments, let us add the sequel to the argument by which at the outset we reached our conclusion against the man who did not believe in gods at all, and try now to make further use of it. And do you, O Cleinias, and you, Megillus, take turns in answering for the young man, as before. And if any difficult point arise in the arguments, I will take it from you, and carry you across the river, as I did just now.

'You speak well: and if you do this, we to the best of our ability will do as you say. 'But probably it will not be difficult to prove at least this, that the gods are not less careful over small matters than over those of great importance. For he was present, I suppose, and heard what we were saying just now, that being endowed with every virtue they hold the care of all things as their own peculiar right. 'Yes, and he listened attentively. 'Let us then examine the next point together, namely what virtue we ascribe to them, when we agree that they are good. Do we say, pray, that prudence and the possession of mind is proper to virtue, and the contrary to vice? 'We do say so. 'Again? That manliness is part of virtue, and cowardice of vice? 'Yes, certainly. 'Shall we also say that of these qualities one class is disgraceful, and the other honourable?

'We must. 'And of these shall we say that all the bad belong, if so be, to us, but the gods have no part either great or small in such qualities? 'This also every one must admit. 'Again? Shall we class carelessness, and idleness, and luxury as a virtue of the soul? How say you? 'How could we? 'Well then on the opposite side? 'Yes. 'The contraries to these therefore we must set on the other side? 'Yes, on the other side. 'What then? Luxurious, and careless, and idle, every one of this character would be in our opinion a man whom the poet declared to be most like to stingless drones? 'Most truly the poet spake. 'We must not say then that god is of a character such as this, which he himself hates: nor if any one attempts to utter anything of this kind must it be allowed.

'Surely not. How could it be allowed? 'If then it is a man's especial duty to manage and attend to some work, but he attends to the great and neglects the small parts of this kind of work, on what principle can we praise such a man without going altogether wrong? Let us, however, look at it thus. Does not he who acts in this way, whether god or man, act on one of two principles? 'What two principles? 'Either as thinking that it is of no consequence to the whole, if the small matters are neglected, or from slothfulness and luxury, if it is of consequence and he neglects

them. Is there any other way in which negligence occurs? For of course, when it is impossible to attend to all, there will then be no negligence on the part of one who fails to attend to any matters either small or great, to which a god or any inferior person deficient in power may be unable to attend.

'Of course not. 'Now then to answer us three there are two, who both admit that gods exist, though one says that they may be appeased by prayer, and the other that they are careless of small matters. In the first place you both say that gods know and see and hear all things, and that of all the objects of sensation or knowledge nothing can possibly escape their notice. Do you say this is so, or how? 'It is so. 'Well, again? Can they do all things which are possible for mortals and immortals? 'How can they refuse to admit that this also is true? 'Moreover we have agreed, all five of us, that they are not only good but as good as possible. 'Yes, certainly. 'Is it not impossible then to admit that they do anything whatever from indolence and luxury, if they are such as we say? For in us idleness is the offspring of cowardice, and carelessness of idleness and luxury.

'You speak most truly. 'No god then is ever negligent from idleness and carelessness, for of course there is no cowardice in him. 'Most true. 'If then they neglect the small and trifling concerns of the universe, the alternative is that they must do this, either from knowing that there is no need to attend to any such things at all; or----what is the remaining alternative except that they know the contrary? 'There is none. 'Are we then to suppose, O excellent and best of men, that you mean to say that they are ignorant and, though they ought to attend, are negligent from ignorance, or that they know they ought, just as the worst of men are said to do, when they know that it would be better to do differently from what they really do, and do it not, because of some yielding to pleasures or pain? 'How is it possible?

'Do not then human affairs partake of the nature endowed with soul, and is not man himself of all animals the most religious? 'It seems so indeed. 'We say, however, that all mortal animals are the "possessions of the gods," to whom also the whole heaven belongs. 'Of course. 'Now therefore any one may say that these things are either small or great to the gods; for in neither case can it become our owners to neglect us, being, as they are, most careful and benevolent. Besides this let us consider the following point also. 'What point? 'About sensation and power. Are they not naturally opposed to each other in regard to ease and difficulty? 'How do you mean? 'It is surely more difficult to see and to hear the small than the great; but on the other hand it is easier for any one to carry, and hold, and take care of the small and light, than the opposites.

'Very much more. 'If then a physician who is willing and able to cure a whole body committed to his charge, attend to the great but neglect the small parts, will the whole do well with him? 'By no means. 'No, nor yet with pilots, nor generals, nor stewards, nor statesmen, nor any such officials, would the many or the great things

do well apart from the few or small. For as the stonemasons say, the large stones do not lie well without the small. ’How could they? ’Let us therefore never think that God is inferior to mortal workmen, who, the better they are themselves, finish their proper works the more exactly and perfectly, both small and great with the same skill; but that God, most wise as He is, and both willing and able to care for all, takes no care at all for those which it is easier to care for, as being small, but only of the great, just like some idle or cowardly workman giving up work because of the labour.

’By no means, O Stranger, let us admit such a thought as this concerning gods: for our thought in that case would be by no means either pious or true. ’It seems to me that we have now at last had quite sufficient discussion with the censorious young man about the negligence of gods. ’Yes. ’In forcing him at least by our arguments to confess that he was wrong in what he said. I think, however, that he is still in need of some consoling words. ’Of what nature, my good friend? ’Let us persuade the young man by our arguments, that all things have been arranged by the guardian of the universe with a view to the safety and excellence of the whole, and that each part thereof does and suffers its proper share according to its power. And for each of these parts there are rulers appointed over the very smallest portion of action and suffering, by whom perfection is wrought out even to the minutest subdivision.

’And as one of these thy own portion, O bold man, small indeed though it is, ever looks and tends towards the whole. But of this very fact thou art ignorant, that all creation takes place for the sake of that whole, in order that the life of the universe may have a constant supply of happy being, created not for thy sake, but thou for the sake of that whole. For every physician and every skilful workman makes every thing for the sake of all, aiming at that which is most for the common good: each part he makes for the sake of a whole, and not a whole for the sake of a part. ’But thou art discontented, because thou knowest not in what way that which is best for thee is expedient both for the whole and for thyself, as far as the law of your common origin admits. But since a soul combined now with one body, and now with another, is always undergoing changes of all kinds, either of itself or through some other soul, nothing is left for the player to do but to shift the pieces, moving the disposition that is growing better into a more favourable place, and that which is growing worse into the worse place, in order that each may obtain the lot appropriate to its destiny.

’How do you mean? ’I think I am explaining it in the way in which it would naturally be easy for the gods to take care of all. For if one were to form and to refashion all things without constantly looking to the whole, as for instance to make living water out of fire, instead of so forming many things out of one, or one out of many, that they partook of a first, or second, or third birth, the contents of the ever-changing arrangement would be infinite in multitude. But now there is wonderful facility for

the guardian of the universe. ’How do you mean again? ’In this way. Our King saw that all actions were full of life, and that there was much virtue in them and much vice, and that soul and body had become indestructible, but not eternal, like those who are gods according to law; for if either of these two, soul and body, had perished, there would never have been any generation of living beings; he also discerned that it was the constant nature, of one part, the good in the soul, to be beneficial, and of the evil part to do harm; and when He considered all this, He contrived the place of each part so that it would render virtue victorious in the whole being, and vice overpowered, in the fullest and easiest and best manner.

’With a view then to all this, He has arranged what quality each must be constantly acquiring, and what seat and what regions it must inhabit in its transmutations: but the causes of the production of a certain quality He left to the will of each of us. For every one of us becomes for the most part such at each time as is the tendency of his desires and the quality of his soul. ’Naturally so. ’All things therefore which are endowed with a soul are liable to change, as possessing the cause of change in themselves; and in changing they follow the order and law of destiny. If they make only slight changes of moral character, their changes of place are less and on the level surface of their country; but those which make more and worse changes of character are cast down into the abyss, and the so-called infernal regions, all which under the name of Hades and other similar names men greatly dread and dream about, both in life and after they are separated from their bodies. Whenever therefore a soul undergoes great changes of vice or virtue, through her own will and the strong influence of association, if in the one case from communion with divine virtue she becomes eminently virtuous, she passes into an excellent and all-holy place, being carried away to some other and better region than this; but in the contrary case, she transfers her life to places of the opposite kind.

’ ”Such the just doom the Olympian gods decree,” for you, O boy, or youth, who think the gods care nothing for you; namely, that if you are growing worse you must pass on to the worse souls, and if better to the better, and both in life and in every successive death must do and suffer what it is fitting for like to do to like. ’Neither shall you nor any other ever boast of having got the better of the gods by escaping this doom, which is the most strictly ordained of all dooms by those who ordained it, and of which you must most carefully beware: for it will never lose sight of you. Neither will you be so little as to sink into the depth of the earth, nor so high as to fly tip into heaven; but you shall pay the fitting penalty, whether while abiding here, or after you have passed into Hades, or been carried away into some yet more savage place than these.

’You must also take the same account of those others, those, I mean, whom you saw grown from small to great by unholy deeds or any such practices, and supposed that they had passed from misery to happiness, and thought that in their deeds, as

in. a mirror, you had seen the universal carelessness of the gods, not knowing in what way their share contributes to the whole. But think you, O boldest of men, that it is of no importance to know this, without knowing which a man can never have an idea of life nor be able to join in a discussion thereon, in regard to a happy or unhappy lot. 'If you can be persuaded of this by Cleinias here, and by all this our company of reverend seniors, that you know not what you say about the gods, God Himself will give you good help: but if you should be in need of any further argument, listen to what we say to the third opponent, if you have any sense at all.'

The meaning of this, if not the actual words, has been previously set down very briefly in the oracles of the Hebrews, the thought being comprised in few words. For the sentence, 'You will neither be so little as to sink into the depth of the earth, nor so high as to fly up into heaven,' must be similar to the passage in David, which runs thus: 'Whither shall I go from Thy spirit, and whither shall I flee from Thy presence? If I go up into heaven, Thou art there. If I go down into Hades, Thou art there. 'If I should take wings, and abide in the utmost parts of the sea; there also shall Thy hand lead me.' Also this: 'The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth His handy-work.' And again, this in Isaiah: 'Lift up your eyes on high, and behold who shewed all these things.' Also this: 'From the greatness and beauty of created things in like proportion is their first maker beheld.' And this: 'For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and godhead.' Also this, 'I was envious at the wicked, when I saw the prosperity of sinners,' seems to me to have been paraphrased by Plato in the passage, 'You must also take the same account of those others, those, I mean, whom you saw grown from small to great by unholy deeds, or any such practices, and supposed that they had passed from misery to happiness.'

Also all the other passages expressed like these in the words of the Hebrews anticipated the interpretation put forth at length by Plato. And so you will find, by carefully examining each of them point by point, that it agrees with the Hebrew writings. And by doctrines of the Hebrews I mean not only the oracles of Moses, but also those of all the other godly men after Moses, whether prophets or apostles of our Saviour, whose consent in doctrines must fairly render them worthy of one and the same title. [Footnotes moved to end and numbered]

Book 13

BOOK XIII

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heaven and the luminaries therein p. 702 b XIX. What kind of laws concerning women were not rightly ordained by Plato p. 706 a XX. Plato's directions in the Phaedrus concerning unlawful love opposed to the Laws of Moses

p. 709 c XXI. Concerning the laws of murder in Plato, which were not worthy of his great intellect: with these the laws of Moses should be contrasted p. 711 b PREFACE SINCE it has been seen in the preceding Books that the philosophy of Plato in very many points contains a translation, as it were, of Moses and the sacred writings of the Hebrews into the Greek language, I now proceed to add what is still wanting to the argument, and to go through the opinions expressed upon the several topics by those who were before me, and at the same time to free myself from a plausible charge of reproach, in case any one should accuse me. Why then, he might say, if Moses and Plato have agreed so well in their philosophy, are we to follow the doctrines not of Plato but of Moses, when we ought to do the reverse, because, in addition to the equivalence of the doctrines, the Greek author would be more congenial to us as Greeks than the Barbarian?

Being loth to make a retort to this charge from respect to the philosopher, I defer this question to a later period, and will first examine those points which I mentioned first. Take then and read what sort of opinion Plato used to put forward concerning the Greek poets and writers on religion, and how he used to reject all the traditional notions concerning the gods, and thoroughly expose their absurdity. CHAPTER I [PLATO] 'To tell of the other divinities, and to learn their origin, is beyond our power; but we must give credence to those who have spoken in former times, who being, as they said, the offspring of gods, had certain knowledge, I suppose, of their own ancestors. It is impossible therefore to disbelieve children of the gods, even though they speak without certain or probable proofs: but as they declare that they are reporting family histories, we must in obedience to the law believe them.

'On their authority then let the origin of these gods be admitted and stated thus. The children of Ge and Uranus (Earth and Heaven) were Oceanus and Tethys, and their children Phorcys and Kronos and Rhea and the rest of them; and of Kronos and Rhea sprang Zeus and Hera, and all whom we know as their reputed brethren, and still others who were their offspring.' In exhorting us hereby to believe the fables concerning gods, and the authors also of the fables as being forsooth the children of gods, in the first place by saying that 'the poets are the offspring of the gods,' it seems to me that he scoffingly implies that the gods also had been men, and of the same nature as their children. And next he brings a direct charge against the theologians, whom he had declared to be the offspring of gods, in the assertion which he adds, 'even though they speak without probable or certain proofs,' and by the addition of the words 'as they said.' He seems too to be jesting when he says, they 'had certain knowledge, I suppose, of their own ancestors'; and again,

'It is impossible to disbelieve children of the gods.' Also he expressly shows that he speaks thus against his own judgement on account of the laws, by confessing that it was necessary 'to believe them in obedience to the law.'

And in proof that this was his meaning, hear how in open and undisguised language he reproaches all the would-be theologians, smiting them in the Epinomis with the following words: CHAPTER II [PLATO] 'WITH regard therefore to the origin of gods and of living beings, as it has been misrepresented by those of former times, it seems necessary for me in the first place to give a better representation in the subsequent discourse, taking up again the argument which I have undertaken against the impious.' That he has good reason for repudiating the theology of the earliest writers, he shows in the second Book of the Republic, where it is worth while to fix the attention upon the number and nature of the statements which he makes concerning the same poets and theologians, from the traditions handed down from old times concerning the Hellenic gods, speaking in the very words that follow:

CHAPTER III [PLATO] 'IN the greater fables, said I, we shall discern the lesser also: for the general character and the effect of both the greater and the less must be the same. Do you not think so? Yes, I do, said he: but I do not even understand which you call the greater. Those, said I, which Hesiod and Homer and the other poets used to tell us. For they, I suppose, used to compose and tell, and do still tell, false stories to mankind. 'What kind of stories do you mean, said he, and what fault do you find with them? 'The fault, said I, which before and above all we ought to reprove, especially if the falsehood is unseemly. 'What is this fault? 'When a man in his discourse concerning gods and heroes misrepresents their nature, as when an artist paints what is not at all like the things which he may wish to imitate.

'Yes indeed, said he, it is right to condemn such things: but how. and what kind of faults do we mean? 'In the first place then, said I, it was an unseemly lie that was told by the author of that greatest fiction about the greatest gods, how Uranus wrought what Hesiod says he did, and how Kronos took revenge upon him. Again, the doings of Kronos and his treatment by his son, even if they were true, ought not, I should have thought, to have been thus lightly mentioned before young and silly persons, but, best of all, to have been buried in silence; or, if there were any necessity to tell them, then as few as possible should have heard them in secret, after sacrificing no mere pig, but some great and scarce victim, so that very few might have had a chance of hearing them. 'Yes indeed, said he, these stories are mischievous. Aye, said I, and they must not be told in our city, Adeimantus; nor must a young hearer be told, that he would be doing nothing extraordinary in committing the worst crimes, nor on the other hand in inflicting every kind of punishment upon his father if he did wrong, but would be doing what the first and greatest of the gods did.

’Certainly not, nor in my own opinion are such stories fit to be told. ’Nor yet, said I, about gods going to war with gods, and plotting against each other and fighting (untrue as such things are), ought anything to be said, if the future guardians of our city are to think it most disgraceful to be quarrelling lightly one with another. Far less ought we to tell them in fables and on tapestry about wars of the giants and many other quarrels of all kinds between gods and heroes and their own kinsmen and relations: but if we could in any way persuade them, that no citizen was ever at enmity with a fellow citizen, and that such a thing was unholy, these are the kind of tales that ought rather to be told to children from the first by old men and old women and by those who are growing elderly, and the poets should be compelled to make their tales like these.

’The chaining too of Hera by her son, and the hurling of Hephaestus out of heaven by his father, when he was going to defend his mother from a beating, and all the battles of the gods that Homer has invented, must not be admitted into the city, whether they are composed with or without allegorical meanings. ’For the youth is not able to judge what is allegory and what is not: but whatever opinions he accepts at such an age are wont to become indelible and unalterable: and on this account perhaps we ought to regard it of the highest importance, that the tales which they first hear ”should be adapted in the most perfect manner to the promotion of virtue.” ’Yes, that is reasonable, said he: but if any one were to ask us again which these fictions are, and what fables we mean, which should we mention? Then said I: My dear Adeimantus, you and I are not speaking at present as poets, but as founders of a state: and founders of a state ought to know the moulds in which poets should cast their fictions, and from which they must not be permitted to deviate, nor must they invent the fables themselves.

’Quite right, said he: but that is the very point, what would be the proper models in the case of theology? ’Some such as the following, said I; God must of course always be represented as He really is, whether a poet describes Him in epic verse, or in lyrics, or in tragedy. ’Yes, that must be so. ’Is not God then really good, and to be so described? ’Of course. ’But surely nothing good is hurtful? Is it? ’I think not. ’Does then that which is not hurtful do hurt? ’Of course not. ’And does that which hurts not, do any evil? ’No, again. ’Neither can that which does no evil be the cause of any evil? ’How could it? ’Well then, is the good beneficial? ’Yes. ’It is the cause then of well-being? ’Yes. ’The good then is not the cause of all things, but only of what is right, and not the cause of evils.

’Quite so, said he. ’Neither then, said I, can God, since He is good, be the cause of all things, as the many say, but of few things that happen to men He is the cause, and of many things He is not the cause: for our good things are far fewer than the evil. And of the good we must assign no other cause than God, but of the evil we must seek the causes in other things, but not in God. ’I think, said he, you speak

most truly. ’We must not then, said I, allow either Homer or any other poet foolishly to commit such an offence as this against the gods, and to say that ” Two coffers lie beside the door of Zeus, With gifts for man; one good, the other ill.” ’And to whom Zeus give a mixture of the two, ”Him sometimes evil, sometimes good befalls”;

’And to whom he gives no mixture, but the ill alone, ”Him ravenous hunger o’er God’s earth pursues.” ’Nor must we admit that Zeus is to us ”The sole dispenser both of weal and woe.” ’And if any one say that the violation of oaths and treaties wrought by Pandarus was brought about by Athene and Zeus, we shall not approve: nor that the strife and contest of the gods was caused by Themis and Zeus: nor again must we permit our young men to hear how Aeschylus says that ” God plants in mortal breasts the cause of sin, When He would utterly destroy a house.” ’But if any one writes a poem, in which these iambics are found, about the sorrows of Niobe, or the calamities of ”Pelops’ line,” or the ”tale of Troy,” or any other such events, either we must forbid him to call them the work of a god, or, if of a god, then he must invent some such explanation for them as we are now seeking, and must say that God did what was just and good, and the others were the better for being chastised. But we must not permit the poet to say that those who suffered punishment were miserable, and that this was God’s doing.

’If, however, they would say that the wicked were miserable because they needed punishment, but were benefited by being punished by God, that we must approve. ’But as to saying that God, who is good, becomes the author of evil to any, we must by all possible means contend that no one shall make such statements in his own city, if it is to be governed by good laws, nor any one either young or old listen to his tales whether in verse or prose, as such statements if tittered would be impious, and neither profitable to us, nor consistent with themselves. ’I vote with you, said he, for this law, and am pleased with it. ’This then, said I, will be one of the laws and moulds in which our speakers must speak concerning God, and our poets write, That God is not the cause of all things, but only of the good.

’That is quite satisfactory, said he. ’And what then of this second? Do you suppose God to be a sorcerer, and of a nature to show Himself craftily now in one form and now in another, at one time actually becoming what He seems, and changing His own proper form into various shapes, and at another deceiving us, and making us imagine such transformations in Him; or do you think that He is a simple essence, and most unlikely to go out of His own proper form? ’I am not able, said he, to answer now off-hand. ’Well, what do you say to this? If anything were to change from its own proper form, must it not be changed either by itself or by some other? ’It must. ’Are not then the things which are in the best condition least liable to be altered or moved by another? As for example when a body is affected by meats and drinks and labours, and every plant by sunshine and winds and other such influences, is it not the healthiest and the most perfect that is altered least?

'Of course it is. 'And would not the bravest and wisest soul be least disturbed and altered by any influence from without? 'Yes. 'Moreover I suppose that, on the same principle, among all manufactured things, furniture, buildings, and clothes, those that are well made and in good condition suffer the least alteration from time and other influences? 'It is so. 'Everything then which is well constituted either by nature or art, or both, admits the least alteration by any other? 'So it seems. 'But surely God, and the things of God, are in every way most excellent? 'Of course. 'In this way then God is most unlikely to take many shapes. 'Most unlikely indeed. 'But would He change and alter Himself? 'Evidently, said he, if He is changed at all. 'Does He then change Himself into what is better and more beautiful, or into what is worse and less beautiful than Himself?

'It must be into what is worse than Himself, if He is changed at all: for surely we shall not say that God is imperfect in beauty or goodness. 'You are quite right, said I. And this being so, do you think, Adeimantus, that any one, whether god or man, would willingly make himself worse in any way? 'Impossible, said he. 'It is also impossible then, said I, that a god should be willing to change himself, but each one of them, as it seems, being as perfect as possible in beauty and goodness, remains ever absolutely in his own form. 'It seems to me quite certain, said he. 'Then, my good friend, said I, let none of the poets tell us that " Gods, in the guise of strangers from afar, Wander in various forms from state to state." 'Nor let any one slander Proteus and Thetis, nor introduce Hera in tragedies nor in any other poems transformed as a priestess begging alms

"For Inachus the Argive river-god's Life-giving daughters." 'These and many other such falsehoods let them cease to invent. Neither let our mothers be persuaded by these poets to terrify their children by the tales which they wickedly tell them, that certain gods forsooth wander about by night in the likeness of many animals of different kinds, lest they be both guilty of blasphemy against the gods, and at the same time make their children more cowardly. 'Let them beware, said he. 'But then, said I, do the gods, though they are not capable of actual change, make us imagine, by their deception and magic, that they appear in various forms? 'Perhaps, said he. 'Well then, said I, would a god be willing to lie either by word or by deed, in putting phantoms before us? 'I do not know, said he. 'Do you not know, said I, that the true lie, if one may so speak, is hated by all both gods and men?

'How do you mean? said he. 'You know, of course, said I, that no one willingly consents to lie to the highest and chiefest part of himself, and concerning matters of the highest importance, but every one fears above all to harbour a lie there. 'No, I do not even now understand you, said he. 'Because, said I, you think I have some grand meaning: but I only mean that to lie to the soul about realities, and to be deceived and ignorant, and to have and to hold the falsehood there, is what all men would most dislike, and what in that part of them they utterly detest. 'Yes, utterly,

said he. 'But surely, as I was saying just now, this is what might most rightly be called "a true lie," this ignorance in the soul of the deceived: since the lie in words is a sort of imitation of the affection in the soul, and an image produced afterwards, not at all a pure unmixed lie. Is it not so?

'Yes, certainly. 'The real lie then is hated not only by gods, but also by men? 'I think so. 'Well then? When and in what case is the lie in words useful, and so not deserving to be hated? Is it not in dealing with enemies, and when any of those who are called our friends from madness or any kind of folly attempt to do some mischief, it then becomes useful as a remedy to turn them from their purpose? 'Also in those mythical tales of which we were speaking just now, because we know not how the truth stands about ancient events, do we not make the falsehood as much like truth as possible, and so make it useful? 'It certainly is so, said he. 'For which of these reasons then is falsehood useful to God? Would He lie from ignorance of ancient events by trying to make them like the truth?

'Nay, that would be ridiculous. 'There is nothing of the lying poet then in God? 'I think not. 'But would He lie through fear of His enemies? 'Far from it. 'Or because His friends are foolish or mad? 'Nay, said he, no fool or madman is a friend of God. 'There is no motive then for a god to lie? 'There is none. 'The nature then of gods and demi-gods is quite incapable of falsehood? 'Yes, utterly so. 'God then is perfectly simple and true both in deed and word, and neither changes in Himself, nor deceives others, either in apparitions, or by words, or by sending signs, either in dream or waking vision. 'I too think it is just as you say. 'You agree then, said I, that this is a second mould in which speech or poetry about the gods must be cast, that they neither are wizards who transform themselves nor mislead us by falsehoods either in word or in deed?

'I do agree. 'While therefore we commend many other things in Homer, we shall not commend this, the sending of the dream by Zeus to Agamemnon; nor the passage of Aeschylus, in which Thetis says that Apollo, singing at her marriage, "Dwelt on my happy motherhood, The life from sickness free and lengthened years; Then all-inclusively he blest my lot, Favoured of heaven, in strains that cheered my soul. And I too fondly deemed those lips divine Sacred to truth, fraught with prophetic skill; But he himself who sang, the marriage-guest Himself, who spake all this, 'twas even he That slew my son." 'When a poet says such things as these about gods, we shall be angry, and refuse him a chorus; neither shall we allow our teachers to use them for the education of the young, if our guardians are to grow up devout and godlike, as far as it is possible for man to be.

'I entirely assent, said he, to these principles, and would adopt them as laws.' Thus speaks Plato: and you would find that the Hebrew Scripture does not contain disgraceful tales about the God of the universe, nor yet about the heavenly angels around Him, nor even about the men who are beloved of God, in any like manner

to the Greek theologies; but it contains the model put forth by Plato, that God is good, and all things done by Him are of the same character. Therefore after each of the works of creation that admirable man Moses adds, And God saw that it was good: and at the end of all he sums up his account of the whole and says, And God saw all things that He had made, and, behold, they were very good. It is also a doctrine of the Hebrews that God is not the author of evils, inasmuch as God made not death, neither hath He pleasure in the destruction of the living: for He created all things that they might have being, and the generative powers of the world are healthful; but by the envy of the devil death entered into the world.

Wherefore by the prophet also God is introduced as saying to the man who from his own choice had become evil, Yet I had planted thee a fruitful vine: how wast thou turned back into the strange vine? And if it should anywhere be said that evils happen to the wicked from God, it must be understood as an accidental coincidence of name, this name being given to the chastisements which God in His goodness is said to send not for the hurt of those who are chastised, but for their benefit and profit: just as a physician to save the sick might be thought to apply bad things in his painful and bitter remedies. Wherefore in the sacred Scripture also, where it is said that evils are brought upon men by God, we must apply the saying of Plato, 'that God did what was just and good,' even when He was inflicting stern treatment and what men think evils upon those who so deserved, and that 'they were the better for being chastised,' not only according to the philosopher but also according to the Hebrew Scripture which says, For whom the Lord loveth He chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom He receiveth.

'But we must not permit the poet to say that they who were punished were miserable, and that this was God's doing; if, however, they would say that the wicked were miserable because they needed chastisement, but were benefited by being punished by God, that we must approve. But as to saying that God, who is good, becomes the author of evil to any, we must by all possible means contend against it.' Moreover on the point that God is not subject to change, the Hebrew prophecy teaches as follows, speaking in the person of God: For I am the Lord your God, and I change not. David also, in his description of God, cries aloud saying: They all shall wax old as doth a garment, and as a vesture shalt Thou roll them up, and they shall be changed: but Thou art the same, and Thy years shall not fail.

Wherever the Hebrew writings introduce the Word of God as appearing in form and fashion of man, we must remark that they do not represent Him as appearing to men in the same manner as Proteus and Thetis and Hera, according to the Greek legends, nor as the gods who wander about at night in the likeness of animals of many various kinds; but He came, as Plato himself says is sometimes necessary, for the benefit of friends: 'when through madness or some kind of folly they attempt to do mischief, then as a remedy to turn them from their purpose' the advent of

God among men is useful. Now no species of living creatures on earth is dearer to God than man, a species which is of the kindred and family of the Word of God, by whom also man was made rational in the nature of his soul; with good reason therefore they say that the heavenly Word, in His care for a living creature whom He loved, came for the healing of the whole race, which had become subject to disease and a strange kind of madness, so that they knew neither God their Father, nor the proper essence of their own spiritual nature, nor yet God's providence which preserves the universe, but had almost come into the degenerate state of an irrational animal.

And on this account, they say, the Saviour and Physician at His advent departed not from His own proper nature, nor yet deceived those who saw Him, but preserved the truth of both natures, the invisible and the visible. For in one way He was seen as true man, and in another way He was the true Word of God, not by witchcraft nor by deluding the spectators; for even Plato thought that the divine nature was rightly free from falsehood. 'Therefore God the Word, being perfectly simple and true both in deed and in word, neither changed Himself, nor deceived others, either by apparitions or by words, or by sending signs, either in dream or waking vision.' For all such actions He performed, as became a Physician of reasonable souls, for the salvation of the whole human race, in reality and not in mere seeming, by means of the human nature which He assumed; and thus He bestowed on all of us reconciliation and friendship with His Father through that knowledge of God and true religion which was announced by Him.

Such then are our doctrines: and with those who say otherwise 'we shall be angry, and refuse them a chorus, neither shall we allow our teachers to use their sayings for the education of the young, if our guardians are to grow up devout and godlike,' as our philosopher also thought to be best. CHAPTER IV [PLATO] 'FOR though these men themselves consider Zeus the best and most righteous of the gods, yet they acknowledge that even he bound his own father Kronos, because he used wickedly to devour his sons, and that Kronos too had mutilated his own father for similar reasons; but they are angry with me because I proceed against my father for doing wrong, and so they contradict themselves in regard both to the gods and to me. 'Is this then the reason, Euthyphron, why I am prosecuted, because when any one says such things about the gods, I am vexed at hearing them? And for this, it seems, some one will say that I commit a great sin. Now therefore if you, who know so well about such matters, agree with them, it seems that I too must of necessity agree. For what else can I say, since I myself admit that I know nothing about them? But tell me, for friendship's sake, do you really believe that these things are so?

'Yes, Socrates, and more wonderful things than these, of which the multitude know nothing. 'Do you then also believe that there has really been war among the gods,

and dire quarrels and battles, and many other such things, as are told by the poets, and seen in the decorations of our temples by good painters? Especially at the Great Panathenaea the robe that is carried up to the Acropolis is full of such embroideries. Are we to say that these tales are true, Euthyphron? 'Not these alone, O Socrates; but, as I said just now, I will, if you like, relate to you many other tales concerning the gods, which, I am sure, you will be astonished to hear.' Thus writes Plato in the Euthyphron. And Numenius explains his meaning in his book concerning The Secrets in Plato, speaking in the way following: CHAPTER V [NUMENIUS] 'IF Plato, after proposing to write about the theology of the Athenians, had then been displeased with it, and accused it of containing tales of the quarrels of the gods among themselves, and of singing how some had intercourse with their children, and others devoured them, and how for these things children took vengeance upon their fathers, and brothers upon brothers, and other things of this kind,----if, I say, Plato had taken these stories and openly censured them, I think he would have afforded to the Athenians an occasion for showing their wickedness again by killing him, just as they killed Socrates.

'But since he would not have preferred life to truthfulness, and saw that he should be able to preserve both life and truth, he gave the part of the Athenians to Euthyphron, a boastful and stupid person, and especially bad in theology, but represented Socrates in his own person, and in his peculiar style, in which he was accustomed to converse with and confute every one.' CHAPTER VI [PLATO] 'MY dear Crito, your zeal would be most valuable, if it were consistent at all with right; but if not, the greater the zeal, the more dangerous. We must consider therefore whether we ought to do this or not; for I not only am now but always have been so disposed as to yield to no other persuasion from my friends except the reason which on consideration may appear to me the best. 'The arguments then which I used to urge aforetime, I cannot reject now, because this mischance has come upon me; but they appear to me of no less force, and I prefer and honour the same reasons as I did before: and unless we have any better to urge in my present position, be assured that I shall never agree with you, not even if the power of the multitude should try to scare us like children with more bugbears than at present, threatening bonds, and all kinds of death, and confiscations of goods.

'What then will be the fairest way of examining the question? Should we in the first place take up again this argument which you urge, I mean that concerning men's opinions, whether it was in every case a right statement or not, that we ought to pay attention to some opinions, and not to others? Or whether the statement was right before I was condemned to die, but now has been manifestly proved to have been urged just for the sake of arguing, while it was in reality mere jesting and trifling? 'My own desire then is to consider with your help, Crito, whether the argument will appear to me to be in anyway altered, now that I am. in this position, or still the same; and whether we shall renounce it or act according to it. Now I think that by

those who thought they were talking seriously, it was generally stated in the same manner as I stated it just now, that of the opinions which men entertain we ought to prize some highly, and not others.

'Pray tell me, Crito, do you not think this a right statement? For you, in all human probability, are in no danger of dying to-morrow, and your judgement will not be perverted by the present mischance. Consider then: do you not think it a satisfactory statement, that we ought not to respect all the opinions that men hold, but to respect some and not others? Nor yet the opinions of all men, but those of some, and not of others? What say you? Is not this a right statement? 'Quite right. 'Must we not then respect the good opinions, and not the bad? 'Yes. 'And are not the opinions of the wise good, and those of the foolish bad? 'Of course. 'Come then, what again was said about such matters as these? Does a man who is learning gymnastics with serious attention give heed to the praise and blame and opinion of every man, or only of that one who may happen to be a physician or a trainer?

'Only of that one. 'He ought then to fear the censures and welcome the praises of that one, and not those of the many? 'That is evident. 'He must act then, and practise, and eat and drink in such way as may seem good to the one who is his master and understands the matter, rather than to all the others together. 'It is so. 'Well; and if he disobey that one, and disregard his opinion and praises, and respect those of the many who understand nothing about it, will he suffer no harm? 'Of course he will. 'But what is this harm? And whither does it tend, and to what part of the disobedient person? 'Evidently to the body, for it does harm to this. 'You are right. And, Crito, is not the case the same with the rest, not to go through them all? Moreover, in regard to what things are just and unjust, and disgraceful and honourable, and good and evil, which are the subjects of our present consultation, must we follow the opinion of the many and fear it, or that of the one, if there is a man of understanding, whom we ought to reverence and fear more than all the rest together? And if we fail to follow him we shall corrupt and ruin that part of us which, as we said, is improved by justice and degraded by injustice. Or is that part of no importance?

'I think it is important, Socrates. 'Well then, if we ruin that part of us, which is improved by what is healthful and damaged by what is unwholesome, by not yielding to the opinion of those who have understanding, is our life worth living when that is ruined? Now this part, I suppose, is the body, is it not? 'Yes. 'Is our life then worth living with a wretched and diseased body? 'By no means. 'But is then life tolerable for us with that part of us diseased which is damaged by injustice and improved by justice? Or do we believe that part of us, whatever it is, which is concerned with injustice and justice to be more worthless than the body? 'By no means. 'More precious then? 'By far. 'Then, my good friend, we must not care thus at all what the many will say of us, but what the man who understands about

justice and injustice will say, the one man, and the very truth. So in the first place this proposal of yours is not right, when you advise that we ought to care for the opinion of the many in reference to what is just and honourable and good, and the contrary.'

The word of salvation also says: 'Ye seek the glory which cometh from men, and the glory which cometh from the Only One ye seek not.' Wherefore we also in our conflicts for religion do rightly in not considering what the many will say of us, but what is the will of One, even the Word of God, whom having in our judgement chosen once for all, it behoves us still to honour even as we did before, and not to change, no, 'not even if the power of the multitude should scare us like children with bugbears.' Now such were the men who bore illustrious testimony of old among the Hebrews. CHAPTER VII [PLATO] 'Do we say that we must not intentionally do wrong in any way, or that we ought to do wrong in one way, and not in another? Or is it neither honourable nor good to do wrong in any way, as we have often agreed in former times, and as I was saying just now? Or have all those our former admissions been scattered to the winds in these last few days, and have we at our age, dear Crito, while holding earnest discourse with one another, been unaware so long that we are no better than children? Or is it most surely true, as we used then to say, that whether the many affirm or deny it, and whether we are to receive still harder treatment or more gentle than now, nevertheless to do wrong is in every way both evil and disgraceful to the wrong-doer? Is this what we assert or not?

'It is. 'We must not then do wrong in any way. 'Surely not. 'Not even return wrong for wrong then, as is the opinion of the many, since we must never do wrong in any way? 'Evidently not. 'Well, again? Ought we, Crito, to do evil or not? 'Of course we ought not, Socrates. 'Well then? To render evil for evil, as the many say, is that just or not just? 'Not just. 'For, I suppose, there is no difference between doing evil to men, and doing them wrong. 'You say well. 'Then we must neither do wrong in return, nor do evil to any man, whatever we may suffer from him. But take care, dear Crito, lest you may be making this admission against your real opinion. For I know that this is what very few people think or ever will think. Between those then who have adopted this opinion and those who have not there is no common purpose, but they must necessarily despise each other when they look each at the others' intentions. Therefore do you also consider very carefully whether you share and agree with my opinion, and let us begin our deliberations from this point, that it is never right either to do wrong, or to return wrong, or when evil-entreated to retaliate by rendering evil. Or do you draw back, and not agree with my first principle? For I have long been of this opinion, and am so still. But if you have formed any other opinion, speak and explain. If, however, you abide by what you held before, listen to the next step.

'I do abide by it, and agree with you. But say on. 'I go on then to state the next point, or rather I ask whether a man ought to do whatever he has admitted to any one to he just, or falsely to abandon it? 'He ought to do it.' Compare with this the saying: 'Render to no man evil for evil'; and this: 'Bless them that curse you: pray for them that despitefully use and persecute you, that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven, who maketh His sun to rise upon the evil and upon the good, and sendeth rain upon the just and on the unjust.' Also this: 'Being reviled, we bless; being persecuted, we endure; being defamed, we intreat': a passage which occurs in our sacred Scriptures. The Hebrew prophet also says: 'If I rendered evil to them that rendered evil to me.' And again: 'With them that hate peace I am for peace.'

CHAPTER VIII [PLATO] 'BUT you used to boast then that you were not grieved if you must die, but preferred death, as you said, to banishment; now, however, you are neither ashamed of those fine sayings, nor pay any respect to us, the laws, but are attempting to destroy us; and you cire doing just what the vilest slave would do, in trying to run away contrary to the conditions and agreements on which you consented to be our citizen. 'In the first place, therefore, answer us this very question, whether we state the truth in asserting that you have agreed to be governed according to us in deed, and not only in word; or is it untrue? What are we to say in answer to this, Crito? Must we not admit it? 'Yes, Socrates, we must. 'Are you not then, they would say, transgressing the covenants and agreements which you made with us, and to which you agreed under no compulsion, nor deception? Nor were you forced to decide too hastily, but for a period of seventy years you were at liberty to go away, if you were not satisfied with us, and if our agreements appeared to you unjust?

'You did not, however, prefer either Lacedaemon or Crete, which you are always saying are well governed, nor any other state, Hellenic nor Barbarian, but you travelled away from Athens less than the lame and the blind and the cripples. So much more than other Athenians were you in love with the state, and of course with us the laws; for who would like a state without laws? And will you not now abide by your agreements? You will, if you take our advice, Socrates.' CHAPTER IX 'FOR whoever is a corrupter of laws, would be surely thought a corrupter of young and foolish persons. Will you then flee from the well-governed states, and the best-behaved of men? And if you do this, will your life be worth living? Or will you associate with them, and feel no shame in discoursing with them,----and what arguments will you use, dear Socrates? The same as here, that virtue and justice and institutions and laws are the most precious things for mankind? And do you not think that this conduct of Socrates would be unseemly? You certainly ought to think so.

'But you will depart from these regions, and go to Crito's friends in Thessaly: for there forsooth is the greatest disorder and licence. And perhaps it will please them to hear from you, in what a ridiculous fashion you made your escape from the prison, having wrapped yourself in some disguise, or taken a goatskin, or something else such as runaways usually dress themselves up in, and so transformed your appearance. 'But will there be no one to remark that, being an old man, with probably but a short time left to live, you dared to show so greedy a love of life in defiance of the highest laws? Perhaps not, if you do not annoy any one: but otherwise, you will have to listen to many things unworthy, dear Socrates, of you. So you will live by cringing to all men, and serving them; and what will you be doing but feasting in Thessaly, as if you had gone abroad to Thessaly for a dinner? And those fine discourses about justice and the other virtues, where will they be?

'But forsooth you wish to live for the sake of your children, that you may bring them up and educate them? 'What then? Will you take them to Thessaly and bring them up and educate them there, making aliens of them, that they may receive this further benefit from you? Or if instead of that they are brought up here, will they be better brought up and educated because you are alive though not with them? For your friends will take care of them? They will take care of them then if you are gone away to Thessaly; but if you are gone to the other world, will they not take care of them, if indeed there is any good in those who say that they are your friends? You must surely suppose they will. 'Nay, dear Socrates, listen to us who have reared you, and value neither children, nor life, nor any thing else as of more account than justice, that when you come to the unseen world you may have all these pleas to offer in your defence to the rulers there. For it is evident that to act in this manner is neither in this life better or more just or more holy for you or any of yours, nor will it be better for you when you have arrived in the other world.

'But now, if you go hence, you will go as one who has suffered injustice not from us, the laws, but from men. But if you go abroad in this disgraceful manner, returning injury for injury and evil for evil, transgressing your own agreements and covenants which you made with us, and wronging those whom you ought least to wrong, yourself and your friends and country and us, we shall be angry with you while you live, and in the other world our brethren, the laws in Hades, will give you no friendly reception, knowing that you have tried your best to destroy us.' CHAPTER X 'PERHAPS therefore some one will say, Are you not ashamed then, Socrates, of having pursued such a course of life, that you are now in danger of being put to death for it? But I should return a just answer to him, You are wrong in what you say, Sir, if you suppose that any man who is of the least good ought to take into account the risk of life or death, instead of looking at this point alone in his actions, whether he is doing what is just or unjust, the works of a good or a bad man.

’For according to your argument the demi-gods who died at Troy would be good for nothing, especially the son of Thetis, who so despised danger in comparison with incurring disgrace, that though his mother, being a goddess, had spoken to him, I suppose, in this way, when he was so eager to kill Hector, O my Son, if you avenge the murder of your friend Patroclus and kill Hector, you will be killed yourself, for, said she, ”On Hector’s fate thine own will follow close.” And after hearing this he cared little for death and danger, but fearing much more to live as a coward and not avenge his friends, he exclaims: ”Would I might die this hour” after inflicting vengeance on the injurious foe, that I remain not here a laughing-stock, ”Cumbering the ground, beside the sharp-beaked ships.” ’Think you that he cared for death and danger? Thus, O men of Athens, the case stands in very truth: wherever a man has chosen his own post because he thought it best, or has been placed by a commander, there, in my judgement, he is bound to await the danger, taking no account either of death or of anything else than disgrace.

’If therefore, O men of Athens, when the leaders whom you chose to be my commanders set me in my post at Potidaea, and Amphipolis, and at Delium, or anywhere else, I remained just like any other where they placed me and ran the risk of being killed,----how strangely should I have acted, when the god, as I thought and supposed, ordered me to live the life of a philosopher, examining myself and others, if in this case, through fear either of death or anything else whatever, I should desert my post. ’Strange it would be indeed, and then in truth any one might justly bring me before the court, on the ground that I do not believe in the existence of gods, since I disobey the oracle, and am afraid of death, and think myself wise when I am not. For to be afraid to die, Sirs, is nothing else than to think oneself to be wise, when one is not: for it is to think that one knows, what one does not know. For no one knows about death even whether it may not be the greatest of all blessings to man; but they fear it as if they certainly knew that it is the greatest of evils. And what is this but that same disgraceful ignorance, for a man to think that he knows what he does not know?

’But I, Sirs, perhaps on this subject also differ from most men in this; and were I to say that I am wiser than another in any respect, it would be in this, that, as I do not know enough about the state of things in Hades, so I also think that I do not know. But I do know that to do wrong and to disobey one’s superior, whether god or man, is evil and disgraceful. Those evils therefore which I know to be evil I shall always fear and shun, rather than things which, for aught I know, may really be good. ’Therefore not even if you acquit me now, and refuse to believe Anytus, who said that either I ought not to have come into this court at all, or that, since I had come, it was impossible to avoid putting me to death, and told you that, if I should be acquitted, at once your sons would all be utterly corrupted by practising what Socrates teaches----if in answer to this you should say to me,

Socrates, we are not going to be persuaded by Anytus this time, but we acquit you, on this condition however, that you cease to spend your time in this speculation, and in philosophy; and if you be convicted of doing so any more, you will be put to death;----if then, as I said, you were to acquit me on these conditions, I should say to you, O men of Athens, I honour and I love you, but I shall obey the god rather than you, and as long as I have breath and power, I shall never cease from studying philosophy, and exhorting and instructing any of you whom I may meet from time to time, in my usual style of discourse.' And a little further on he adds: 'Let us then consider it also in this way, that there is much reason to hope that death is a good. For the state of the dead is one of two things: either it is like non-existence and absence of all sensation in the dead, or, as is commonly said, it is a sort of transference and migration of the soul from this region to another. And if there is no sensation, but as it were a sleep in which the sleeper sees nothing even in a dream, death must be a wonderful gain.

'For I suppose, that if a man were obliged to select the night in which he slept so soundly as to see nothing even in a dream, and to compare all the other nights and days of his life with this night,----if, I say, he were obliged to consider and tell us how many days and nights in the course of his life he had passed more happily and more pleasantly than this night, I think that not merely any ordinary person but even the great King himself would find these better nights very few in comparison with all the rest of his days and nights. If therefore death is something of this kind, I call it a gain: for thus all time appears nothing more than a single night. 'But if on the other hand death is like a departure hence to another place, and if what is said is true, that all the dead exist there, what greater good could there be than this, O my judges? For if on arriving in Hades, after having been delivered from the self-styled judges here, a man shall find the true judges, who are said to give judgement there, Minos, and Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus, and Triptolemus, and all the other demi-gods who were just in their own lives, will the change of abode be worth nothing?

'Or on the contrary, what would any of you pay to associate with Orpheus, and Musaeus, and Hesiod, and Homer? For my part I am willing to die many a death, if indeed these things are true, since I too should find it a delightful occupation there, whenever I met with Palamedes, and Ajax the son of Telamon, and any other of the ancients who has died through an unjust judgement, to compare my own sufferings with theirs,----no unpleasant thing, methinks it would he. And moreover the chief delight would be to spend my life in examining and scrutinizing the dwellers in that world, as I do those here, to learn which of them is wise, and which, though he thinks so, is not.' We also have the saying: 'We ought to obey God rather than men.' And: 'Be not afraid of them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul.' And we know, 'that if the earthly house of our bodily frame be dissolved, we have a building from God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens': ... and

that 'whilst we are absent from the body we are at home with the Lord,' who also hath promised to all who have hoped in Him, that they shall rest in the bosoms of Abraham and Isaac and Jacob, and, in company with all the other Hebrew prophets and righteous men beloved of God, shall pass the long eternity in a blessed life.

CHAPTER XI 'OF those then who have been killed in war, shall we not say in the first place that any one who died an honourable death was of the golden race? 'Most certainly. 'But when any of such a race as this have died, shall we not believe Hesiod, that: "These still on earth as holy daemons dwell, Brave guardians of mankind from every ill"? 'Yes, we shall believe him. 'Shall we then inquire of the god how we ought to class daemons and deities, and with what difference, and place them thus in whatever way he may direct? 'Of course we shall. 'And for all time to come, believing them to have become daemons, we shall so serve and worship their tombs; and these same customs we shall observe, when from old age or any other cause any one dies of those who have been judged pre-eminently good in life? '

These customs also may fitly be adopted on the death of those beloved of God, whom you would not do wrong in calling soldiers of the true religion. Hence comes also our custom of visiting their tombs, and offering our prayers beside them, and honouring their blessed souls, believing that we do this with good reason. But in truth though I have made these selections out of the writings of Plato, any other student might find still more points of agreement with our doctrines in the same author, and perhaps in others also. Since, however, others before us have touched upon the same subject, I think it would be right for me to look at the results of their work also. And I will quote first the words of the Hebrew philosopher Aristobulus, which are as follows: CHAPTER XII [ARISTOBULUS] 'IT is evident that Plato closely followed our legislation, and has carefully studied the several precepts contained in it. For others before Demetrius Phalereus, and prior to the supremacy of Alexander and the Persians, have translated both the narrative of the exodus of the Hebrews our fellow countrymen from Egypt, and the fame of all that had happened to them, and the conquest of the land, and the exposition of the whole Law; so that it is manifest that many things have been borrowed by the aforesaid philosopher, for he is very learned: as also Pythagoras transferred many of our precepts and inserted them in his own system of doctrines.

'But the entire translation of all the contents of our law was made in the time of the king surnamed Philadelphus, thy ancestor, who brought greater zeal to the work, which was managed by Demetrius Phalereus.' Then, after interposing some remarks, he further says: 'For we must understand the voice of God not as words spoken, but as construction of works, just as Moses in the Law has spoken of the whole creation of the world as words of God. For he constantly says of each work, "And God said, and it was so." 'Now it seems to me that he has been very carefully

followed in all by Pythagoras, and Socrates, and Plato, who said that they heard the voice of God, when they were contemplating the arrangement of the universe so accurately made and indissolubly combined by God. Moreover, Orpheus, in verses taken from his writings in the Sacred Legend, thus sets forth the doctrine that all things are governed by divine power, and that they have had a beginning, and that God is over all. And this is what he says:

"I speak to those who lawfully may hear: Depart, and close the doors, all ye profane, Who hate the ordinances of the just, The law divine announced to all mankind. But thou, Musaeus, child of the bright Moon, Lend me thine ear; for I have truths to tell. Let not the former fancies of thy mind Amerce thee of the dear and blessed life. Look to the word divine, keep close to that, And guide thereby the deep thoughts of thine heart. Walk wisely in the way, and look to none, Save to the immortal Framer of the world: For thus of Him an ancient story speaks: One, perfect in Himself, all else by Him Made perfect: ever present in His works, By mortal eyes unseen, by mind alone Discerned. It is not He that out of good Makes evil to spring up for mortal men. Both love and hatred wait upon His steps, And war and pestilence, and sorrow and tears: For there is none but He. All other things 'Twere easy to behold, could'st thou but first Behold Himself here present upon earth. The footsteps and the mighty hand of God Whene'er I see, I'll show them thee, my son: But Him I cannot see, so dense a cloud In tenfold darkness wraps our feeble sight. Him in His power no mortal could behold, Save one, a scion of Chaldaean race:

For he was skilled to mark the sun's bright path, And how in even circle round the earth The starry sphere on its own axis turns, And winds their chariot guide o'er sea and sky; And showed where fire's bright flame its strength displayed. But God Himself, high above heaven unmoved, Sits on His golden throne, and plants His feet On the broad earth; His right hand He extends O'er Ocean's farthest bound; the eternal hills Tremble in their deep heart, nor can endure His mighty power. And still above the heavens Alone He sits, and governs all on earth, Himself first cause, and means, and end of all. So men of old, so tells the Nile-born sage, Taught by the twofold tablet of God's law; Nor otherwise dare I of Him to speak: In heart and limbs I tremble at the thought, How He from heaven all things in order rules. Draw near in thought, my son; but guard thy tongue With care, and store this doctrine in thine heart."

Aratus also speaks of the same subject thus: "From Zeus begin the song, nor ever leave His name unsung, whose godhead fills all streets, All thronging marts of men, the boundless sea And all its ports: whose aid all mortals need; For we his offspring are; and kindly he Reveals to man good omens of success, Stirs him to labour by the hope of food, Tells when the land best suits the grazing ox, Or when the plough; when favouring seasons bid Plant the young tree, and sow the various seed." 'It is clearly shown, I think, that all things are pervaded by the power of God: and this

I have properly represented by taking away the name of Zeus which runs through the poems; for it is to God that their thought is sent up, and for that reason I have so expressed it. These quotations, therefore, which I have brought forward are not inappropriate to the questions before us.

'For all the philosophers agree, that we ought to hold pious opinions concerning God, and to this especially our system gives excellent exhortation; and the whole constitution of our law is arranged with reference to piety, and justice, and temperance, and all things else that are truly good.' To this, after an interval, he adds what follows: 'With this it is closely connected, that God the Creator of the whole world, has also given us the seventh day as a rest, because for all men life is full of troubles: which day indeed might naturally be called the first birth of light, whereby all things are beheld. 'The same thought might also be metaphorically applied in the case of wisdom, for from it all light proceeds. And it has been said by some who were of the Peripatetic School that wisdom is in place of a beacon-light, for by following it constantly men will be rendered free from trouble through their whole life.

'But more clearly and more beautifully one of our forefathers, Solomon, said that it has existed before heaven and earth; which indeed agrees with what has been said above. But what is clearly stated by the Law, that God rested on the seventh day, means not, as some suppose, that God henceforth ceases to do anything, but it refers to the fact that, after He has brought the arrangement of His works to completion, He has arranged them thus for all time. 'For it points out that in six days He made the heaven and the earth and all things that are therein, to distinguish the times, and predict the order in which one thing comes before another: for after arranging their order, He keeps them so, and makes no change. He has also plainly declared that the seventh day is ordained for us by the Law, to be a sign of that which is our seventh faculty, namely reason, whereby we have knowledge of things human and divine.

'Also the whole world of living creatures, and of all plants that grow, revolves in sevens. And its name "Sabbath" is interpreted as meaning "rest." 'Homer also and Hesiod declare, what they have borrowed from our books, that it is a holy day; Hesiod in the following words: "The first, the fourth, the seventh a holy day." 'And again he says: "And on the seventh again the sun shines bright." 'Homer too speaks as follows: " And soon the seventh returned, a holy day." 'And again: " It was the seventh day, and all was done." 'Again: " And on the seventh dawn the baleful stream Of Acheron we left." 'By which he means, that after the soul's forgetfulness and vice have been left, the things it chose before are abandoned on the true seventh which is reason, and we receive the knowledge of truth, as we have said before.

'Linus too speaks thus: "All things are finished on the seventh dawn." 'And again: "Good is the seventh day, and seventh birth." 'And: "Among the prime, and perfect is the seventh." 'And: "Seven orbs created in the starlit sky Shine in their courses through revolving years."' Such then are the statements of Aristobulus. And what Clement has said on the same subject, you may learn from the following: CHAPTER XIII [CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA] 'BUT we must add the further evidence, and show now more clearly the plagiarism of the Greeks from the Barbarian philosophy. For the Stoics say that God, as also the soul of course, is in essence body and spirit. All this you will find directly stated in their writings. For I do not wish you now to consider whether their allegorical interpretations, as the Gnostic verity delivers them, show one thing and mean another, like clever wrestlers. But what they say is that God extends through all being, while we call Him simply the Creator, and Creator by a word.

Now they were misled by what is said in Wisdom: "Yea, she pervadeth and penetrateth all things by virtue of her purity": since they did not understand that this is said of that wisdom which was the first-created of God. Yes, say they; but the philosophers, Stoics as well as Plato and Pythagoras and even Aristotle the Peripatetic, suppose matter to be one of the first principles, and do not assume one only principle. 'Let them know, then, that the so-called matter, which is said by them to be without quality or shape, has been previously described more boldly by Plato as "Not-being"; and is it perchance from knowing that the real and true first cause is one, that he speaks so mysteriously in the Timaeus in these very words? 'Now therefore let my position be stated as follows: "Of the first principle or principles of all things, or in whatever way it is thought right to describe them, I must not speak at present, for no other reason than this, that it is difficult to explain my opinions according to our present form of discourse."

'And, besides, that prophetic expression, "The earth was invisible and without order," has given them suggestions of a material essence. In fact, the interposition of "chance" occurred to Epicurus from having misunderstood the language of the following passage: "Vanity of vanities, all is vanity." To Aristotle it occurred to bring Providence down only so far as to the moon, from this Psalm: " Thy mercy, O LORD, is in the heaven, and Thy truth reacheth unto the clouds." For before the coming of the Lord the meaning of the prophetic mysteries was not as yet revealed. 'Again the chastisements after death and the punishment by fire were stolen from our Barbarian philosophy both by every Muse of poetry and even by the Greek philosophy. Plato, for instance, in the last Book of the Republic says in. express terms: "Hereupon certain fierce men of fiery aspect, who were standing by and understood the sound, seized and led away some of them separately; But Aridaeus and the rest they bound hand and foot and head together, and threw them down, and flayed them, and dragged them along the road outside, carding them like wool on thorns." For his "fiery men" are meant to indicate angels, who seize the unrigh-

teous and punish them. ” Who maketh,” says the Scripture, ” His angels spirits, and His ministers a flaming fire.”

’Now it follows upon this that the soul is immortal. For that which is undergoing punishment or correction being in a state of sensation, must be living, though it be said to suffer. Again, does not Plato know also rivers of fire, and the deep of the earth, called by the Barbarians Gehenna, which he calls poetically Tartarus, and introduces Cocytus, and Acheron, and Phlegethon, and names of this kind, as places of punishment for correctional training? And representing, according to the Scripture, the angels of the least of the little ones which behold the face of God, and also His supervision extended to us through the angels set over us, he does not hesitate to write: ’”After all the souls have chosen their lives, according to their lot, they went forward in order to Lachesis, and she sent with each the genius of his choice, to be the guardian of his life, and the fulfiller of his chosen destiny.”

’Perhaps also something of this kind was intimated to Socrates by his daemon. ’Nay more, the philosophers borrowed, from Moses their doctrine that the world was created, and Plato has said expressly: ’ ” Was it that the world had no beginning of creation, or has it been created at first from some beginning? For it is visible, and tangible, and has a body.” ’And again, when he says: ”To find therefore the Maker and Father of this universe is a hard task,” he not only shows that the world has been generated, but also indicates that it was generated from Him, as from one alone, and sprang up out of non-existence. The Stoics also suppose that the world has been created. ’The devil too, so often mentioned by the Barbarian philosophy, the prince of the daemons, is described by Plato, in the tenth Book of the Laws, as being a malignant soul, in the following words: ”As then a soul directs and inhabits all things that move in every direction, must we not say that it also directs the heaven?

’ ” Of course. ’ ”One soul or more? More, I will answer for both of you. Less than two surely we must not suppose, one that does good, and the other that has power to work evil.” ’In like manner also he writes in the Phaedrus thus: ”There are indeed other evils, but with most of them some daemon has mingled an immediate pleasure.” And further in the tenth Book of the Laws be directly expresses that thought of the Apostle: ”Our wrestling is not against blood and flesh, . . . but against the spiritual powers of the hosts in heaven,” when he writes thus: ’ ” For since we agreed among ourselves that the heaven is full of many goods, and full also of evils, and of more evils than goods, such a conflict as this, we say, is immortal, and requires wonderful caution.” ’Again, the Barbarian philosophy knows one intelligible world, and another sensible, the one an archetype, and the other an image of that fair model; and the former it ascribes to unity, as being perceptible to thought only, but the sensible to the number six: for among the Pythagoreans six is called marriage, as being a generative number. And in the unity it sets an in-

visible heaven, and a holy earth, and intelligible light. For ”In the beginning,” says the Scripture, ”God created the heaven and the earth: and the earth was invisible.” Then it adds, ”And God said, Let there be light, and there was light.” But in the creation of the sensible world He framed a solid heaven (and what is solid is sensible), and a visible earth, and a light that is seen. Do you not think that from this passage Plato was led to leave the ”ideas” of living things in the intelligible world, and to create the sensible forms according to the various kinds of that intelligible world?

’With good reason, therefore, Moses says that the body was formed of earth, what Plato calls ”an earthly tabernacle,” but that the reasonable soul was breathed by God from, on high into man’s face: for they say that the ruling faculty is seated in this part, and interpret thus the accessory entrance of the soul through the organs of sense in the first-formed man; for which reason also man, they say, is made ”after the image and likeness of God.” ’For the image of God is the divine and royal Word, the impassible man; and an image of that image is the human mind. But if you will admit another name for the growing likeness, you will find it called in Moses a following of God: for he says, ”Walk after the LORD your God, . . . and keep His commandments.” And all the virtuous are, I suppose, followers and servants of God.

’Hence the Stoics have said that the end of philosophy is to live according to the guidance of nature, while Plato says it is to become like God, as we showed in the second Miscellany; and Zeno the Stoic having received it from Plato, and he from the Barbarian philosophy, says that all good men are friends one of another. For in the Phaedrus Socrates says that ”Fate has not ordained that the wicked should be a friend to the wicked; nor the good fail to be a friend to the good.” ’This he also fully showed in the Lysis, that friendship can never be preserved amid injustice and wickedness. The Athenian Stranger too says in like manner, ”That it is conduct pleasing to God and like Him, and has one ancient saying in its favour, when ’like loves like’ if it be in measure, but things beyond measure agree neither with things beyond nor with things within measure. And God must be to us the measure of all things.”

’Then lower down Plato adds again: ’ ” For indeed every good man is like every other good man, and consequently being also like God, he is beloved both by every good man and by God.” Arrived at this point, I am reminded of the following passage, for at the end of the Timaeus he says that ”one should assimilate that which perceives to that which is perceived, according to its original nature, and by thus assimilating them attain the end of that life which is proposed by the gods to men as the best both for the present time and for that which is to follow.” And after a few sentences he adds: ’That we are brethren as belonging to one God and one teacher, Plato evidently declares in the following terms: ” For ye in the city are all

brothers, as we shall say to them in telling the fable; but God, in forming as many of you as are fit to rule, mixed gold in their composition, wherefore they are the most to be honoured: and for all the auxiliaries silver, but iron and copper for the husbandmen and other operatives."

'Whence, he says, it has necessarily come to pass that some embrace and love those things which are objects of knowledge, and others those which are matters of opinion. For perhaps he is prophesying of that elect nature which desires knowledge; unless in assuming three natures he, as some supposed, is describing three forms of polity, that of the Jews silver, that of the Greeks the third, and that of the Christians in whom there has been infused the royal gold, the Holy Spirit. 'Also he exhibits the Christian life when writing word for word in the Theaetetus: "Let us speak then of the leaders; for why should one talk about those who spend their time to no good purpose in philosophy? But these leaders, I suppose, neither know the way to the Agora, nor where the court of justice is, or the council-chamber, or any other public assembly of the State; and laws, and decrees whether read or written, they neither see nor hear. The strivings of political clubs, and meetings, to obtain offices, and revellings with flute-girls are practices which do not occur to them even in dreams. And what has happened well or ill in the city, or what evil has come to any one from his ancestors, is less known to them than, as the proverb says, the number of gallons in the sea. As to all these things he knows not even that he does not know them: for in fact it is his body only that has its place and home in the city, but the man himself 'is flying,' as Pindar says,'underneath the earth' and above the heaven, studying the stars, and scrutinizing every nature on all sides."

'Again, with the Lord's saying, "Let your yea be yea, and your nay, nay," we must compare this: "But it is by no means right for me to admit a falsehood, and to suppress a truth." Also with the prohibition of swearing agrees this saying in the tenth Book of the Laws: "Let there be no praising nor swearing about anything." And to speak generally, Pythagoras and Socrates and Plato, when they say that they hear God's voice, while carefully contemplating the constitution of the universe as made by God and held together without interruption, must have heard Moses say, in describing the word of God as a deed, "He spake, and it was done." 'Also taking their stand upon the formation of the man out of dust, the philosophers on every occasion proclaim that the body is of earth, and Homer does not shrink from putting it in the light of a curse:

" But may all ye to earth and water turn." Just as Esaias says: " And tread them down as clay." 'Callimachus too writes expressly: " It was that year in which the winged tribe And they that swim the sea or tread the earth Spake like the clay Prometheus called to life." 'And again the same poet said: " If thou wast fashioned by Prometheus' hand, And not of other clay." 'Hesiod also says of Pandora:

” Renowned Hephaestus bade he with all speed Mix earth with water, and therein infuse The voice and mind of man.” ’Now as the Stoics define nature as an artistic fire which proceeds systematically to generation; so by the Scripture God and His Word are represented figuratively by fire and light. Again, is not Homer also alluding to the separation of the water from the land, and the clear discovery of the dry land, when he says of Tethys and Oceanus:

” For now have they long time From love and from the marriage-bed abstained ”? ’Again, the most learned among the Greeks ascribe to God power in all things: thus Epicharmus, who was a Pythagorean, says: ” Nothing e’er from God escapeth; this behoves thee well to know; He o’erlooks us closely; nothing is to God impossible.” ’The lyric poet too: ” From thickest darkness of the night God can call forth the purest light, Or with dark clouds at will o’erlay The brightness of the orient day.” ’He who alone can turn the present day into night, the poet says, is God. ’Aratus also, in the book entitled Phaenomena, after saying: ” From Zeus begin the song, nor ever leave His name unsung, whose godhead fills all streets, All thronging marts of men, the boundless sea, And all its ports; whose aid all mortals need,” ’adds: ”For we his offspring are,”

as it were by creation, . . . ”and kindly he Reveals to man good omens of success. In heaven he set those guiding lights, and marked Their several course; and for the year he wove The circlet of the stars, to show to man What best the seasons suit, that all things set In order due may grow. Him ever first, Him last our prayers invoke. Hail, Father, hail! Wonder and joy and blessing of mankind.” ’Also before him Homer, in the account of the shield made by Hephaestus, describes the creation of the world in accordance with Moses, saying: ”Thereon were figured earth, and sky, and sea, And all the signs that crown the vault of heaven.” ’For the Zeus who is celebrated in all poems and prose compositions, carries up our thought to God. ’Then, further, Democritus writes that some few of mankind are in the light, so to say, ”who lift up their hands to that place which we Greeks now call the air, and mythically speak of all as Zeus; and he knows all things, and gives and takes away, and he is king of all.” With deeper mystery the Boeotian Pindar, as being a Pythagorean, teaches:

” One race of men and one of gods, Both from one mother draw our breath,” that is, from matter: he teaches also that the Creator of this world is one, whom he calls, ” Father, of all artificers the best,” who has also provided the means of advancement to divinity according to merit. ’For I say nothing as to Plato, how he plainly appears in the Epistle to Erastus and Coriscus to set forth Father and Son somehow from the Hebrew Scriptures, when he exhorts them in these words ”to invoke both with a graceful earnestness, and with the culture which is akin to such earnestness, the God who is the cause of all, and also to invoke the Father and Lord of Him who is

ruler and cause, whom (says he) ye shall know, if ye study philosophy aright." 'Also Zeus in his harangue in the Timaeus calls the Creator Father, in these words:

"Ye gods and sons of gods, whose Father I am, and Creator of the works." So that also when he says, "Around the King of all are all things, and for His sake they all are, and that is the cause of all things beautiful; and around a Second are the secondary things, and around a Third the tertiary," I understand it in no other way than that the Holy Trinity is signified. For I think that the Holy Spirit is the third, and the Son the second, "by whom all things were made" according to the will of the Father. 'The same author, in the tenth Book of the Republic, mentions Er, the son of Armenius, a Pamphylian by birth, who is Zoroaster. At least Zoroaster himself writes, "Zoroaster the son of Armenius, a Pamphylian by birth, having been slain in war, writes down here all things which when in Hades I learned from the gods." Now Plato says that this Zoroaster when laid upon the funeral pile on the twelfth day after death came to life again. Perhaps he alludes not to the resurrection, but to the circumstance that the way for souls to their reception above is through the twelve signs of the Zodiac, and Plato himself says that their way of return to birth is the same. In this way we must understand also that the labours of Hercules were said to be twelve, after which the soul obtains its release from this world entirely. Empedocles also I do not pass over, who mentions the restitution of all things in merely physical language, saying that there will at some time be a change into the essence of fire.

'And most plainly is Heracleitus of Ephesus of this opinion, who maintained that there is one world eternal, and another that perishes, namely, the world in its orderly arrangement, which he knew to be no other than a certain condition of the former. But that he knew the world, which consisting of all being is eternally of a certain quality, to be eternal, he makes evident in speaking thus: " The world which is the same for all was made neither by any god nor man, but always was, and is, and shall be, an everliving fire, kindled in measure, and in measure extinguished." 'His doctrine was that the world was created and perishable, as is shown by what he adds: "The transmutations of fire are first sea, and of sea one half becomes earth and the other half lightning." For virtually he says, that by God the Word, who administers the universe, fire is changed through air into moisture, the seed as it were of the cosmical arrangement; and this moisture he calls sea. And out of this again heaven and earth arise, and all things therein contained.

'How the world is again taken back into the primitive essence, and destroyed by fire, he clearly shows in these words: " The sea is spread abroad, and is measured to the same proportion as it was before it became earth." In like manner concerning the other elements the same is to be understood. 'Doctrines similar to this are taught also by the most celebrated of the Stoics in their discussions concerning a conflagration and re-arrangement of the world's order, and concerning both the

world and man in their proper quality, and the continuance of our souls. Again, Plato in the seventh Book of the Republic has called our day here a ” darkness visible,” because, I suppose, of the world-rulers of this darkness; and the soul’s entrance into the body he has called ”sleep” and ”death,” in the same manner as Heracleitus. And is this, perhaps, what the Holy Spirit, speaking by David, foretold concerning our Saviour: ” I laid me down and slept: I awaked, for the LORD will sustain me.” For he figuratively calls not only the Resurrection of Christ an awaking from sleep, but also the Lord’s coming down into flesh a sleep.

’For instance, the same Saviour gives the exhortation ”Watch,” as much as to say, study to live, and try to keep the soul independent of the body. Also in the tenth Book of the Republic, Plato speaks prophetically of the Lord’s day in these words: ”But when those in the meadow had each been there seven days, they were obliged on the eighth to arise thence and proceed on their journey, and arrive on the fourth day.” ’By the meadow, therefore, we must understand the fixed sphere, as a quiet and pleasant place, and an abode of the saints; and by the seven days, each motion of the seven planets, and the whole effective device which speeds them to their final rest. The journey after passing the planets leads to heaven, that is to the eighth motion and eighth day; and when he says that the souls are four days on the journey, he indicates their passage through the four elements.

’Moreover, the Greeks as well as the Hebrews recognize the holiness of the seventh day, by which the cycle of the whole world of animals and plants is regulated. Hesiod, for instance, speaks of it thus: ”The first, the fourth, the seventh a holy day.” ’And again: ”And on the seventh again the sun shines bright.” ’Homer too: ” And soon the seventh returned, a holy day.” ’And again: ”The seventh day was holy.” ’And again: ” It was the seventh day, and all was done.” ’And again: ”And on the seventh day the baleful stream Of Acheron we left.” ’Moreover, the poet Callimachus writes: ”All things were finished on the seventh dawn.” ’And again: ” Good is the seventh day, and seventh birth.” ’And: ” Among the prime, and perfect is the seventh.” ’Also: ” Seven orbs created in the starlit sky Shine in their courses through revolving years.”

’The Elegies of Solon also make the seventh day very divine. ’And again: Is it not like the Scripture, which says, ”Let us take away from us the righteous man, because he is of disservice to us,” when Plato, all but foretelling the dispensation of salvation, speaks thus in the second Book of the Republic: ”In these circumstances the just man will be scourged, fettered, both eyes torn out; and at last, after suffering every kind of torture, he will be crucified ”? Antisthenes too, the Socratic, paraphrases that prophetic Scripture, ”To whom did ye liken Me? saith the LORD,” when he says that ”God is like to none, wherefore no man can come to know Him from an image.” The like thoughts Xenophon the Athenian expresses in these words: ” That He who moves all things, and is Himself at rest, is a great and

mighty Being, is manifest: but what He is in form, is unknown. Neither, indeed, does the sun, which appears to shine on all, seem to allow himself to be seen: but if any one gazes impudently upon him, he is deprived of sight." The Sibyl had said before:

"What flesh can e'er behold with mortal eyes The immortal God, who dwells above the skies? Or who of mortal birth can stand and gaze With eyes unshrinking on the sun's fierce rays?" 'Rightly, therefore, does also Xenophanes of Colophon, when teaching that God is one and incorporeal, add this: " One God there is, supreme o'er gods and men, Not like in form to mortals, nor in mind." 'And again: " But mortals fondly deem that gods are born, Have voice, and form, and raiment like their own." 'And again: "If then the ox and lion had but hands To paint and model works of art, like man, The ox would give his god an oxlike shape, The horse a figure like his own would frame, And each would deify his kindred form." 'Again, then, let us listen to Bacchylides, the lyric poet, when he says concerning the divine nature:

" No taint of foul disease can them assail, No bane annoy, unlike in all to man." 'Hear also Cleanthes, the Stoic, who has written as follows in a certain poem concerning the Deity: "Askest thou what good is? List then to me. Good is well ordered, holy, just, devout, Self-mastering, useful, honourable, right, Grave, self-dependent, ever full of help, Unmoved by fear, by sorrow, and by pain, Beneficent, well pleasing, friendly, safe, Of good report, acknowledged, and esteemed, Free from vainglory, careful, gentle, strong, Deliberate, blameless, during to the end." 'The same author, tacitly accusing the idolatry of the multitude, adds this: "Poor slave is he who to opinion looks, In hope, forsooth, some honour thence to gain." 'We must not, therefore, any longer think of the divine nature according to the opinion of the multitude: for, as Amphion says in the Antiope: " Never can I believe that secretly, Disguised in fashion of some wicked knave, Zeus visited thy bed in human form."

'But Sophocles writes in straightforward language: " For this man's mother was by Zeus espoused, Not in a shower of gold, nor in disguise Of feathered swan, as when he pregnant made Fair Leda, but complete in manly form." 'Then farther down he added: "Swiftly then the adulterer Upon the bridal chamber's threshold stood." 'After which he still more openly describes the incontinence of Zeus as represented in the fable, in the following manner: "Then he nor feast, nor lustral water touched, But hastened to the couch, with heart deep stung By lust, and wantoned there that whole night through." 'Let these things, however, he left to the follies of the theatres. Heracleitus expressly says: "Men are found incapable of understanding the reason of what is right on each occasion, both before they have heard it, and on hearing it for the first time." 'And Melanippides, the lyric poet, sings thus:

" Hear me, O Father, man's delight, Thou ruler of the undying soul." 'Parmenides too, "the Great," as Plato calls him in the Sophist, writes in the following manner

concerning the Deity: ” Many the proofs that show The Deity knows neither birth nor death, Sole of His kind, complete, immovable.” ’Moreover, Hesiod says that He is ”Sole king and lord of all the immortal gods, With whom no other may in power contend.” ’Nay, further, Tragedy also draws us away from the idols, and teaches us to look up to heaven. For as Hecataeus, who composed the Histories, says in the passage concerning Abraham and the Egyptians, Sophocles openly cries out upon the stage: ”There is in truth One God, and One alone, Who made the lofty heavens, and wide-spread earth, The sea’s blue wave, and might of warring winds. But we poor mortals with deceived heart, Seeking some solace for our many woes, Raised images of gods in stone or bronze, Or figures Wrought of gold or ivory; And when we crowned their sacrifice, and held High festival, we thought this piety.”

’Euripides, too, says in his tragedy upon the same stage: ”Seest thou this boundless ether spread on high, With watery arms embracing all the earth? Call this thy Zeus, deem this thine only god.” ’In the drama of Pirithous also the same tragic poet speaks as follows: ” Thee we sing, the Self-begotten, Who all nature dost embrace, And mid yon bright ether guidest In her everlasting race. Day and dusky night returning Deck for Thee heaven’s wide expanse: Myriad stars for ever burning Weave round Thee their mystic dance.” ’For here he speaks of the Creative mind as ” the Self-begotten,” and all things that follow are ranked with the cosmos, in which also are the alternations of light and darkness. Aeschylus also, the son of Euphorion, speaks very solemnly of God: ” Zeus is the bright pure ether, Zeus the earth, The heaven, the universe, and all above.”

’I know that Plato adds his testimony to Heracleitus when he writes: ” One, the only wise, wills not to be described, and wills to be named Zeus.” And again, ”law is obedience to the will of one.” Also if you should wish to trace back the meaning of the saying, ” He that hath ears to hear, let him hear,” you would find it explained by the Ephesian thus: ” Those who hear without understanding are like deaf persons: the proverb witnesses of them that though present they are absent.” ’But you wish perhaps to hear from the Greeks an express statement of one first cause? Timaeus the Locrian, in his treatise on Nature, will testify for me word for word: ”There is one beginning of all things, which is unoriginate: for if it had an origin, it would be no longer a beginning, but that from which it originated would be the beginning.” For this opinion, which is true, flowed from the passage, ” Hear, O Israel, the LORD thy God is One, and Him only shalt thou serve.”

”Lo! He is clear to all, from error free,” as says the Sibyl. ’Also Xenocrates, the Chalcedonian, by naming ” the High and Nether” Zeus, admits an indication of Father and Son. And the strangest thing of all is, that the Deity seems to be known to Homer, who represents the gods as subject to human passions, yet even so does not gain the respect of Epicurus. Homer says at least: ”Achilles, why with active feet pursue, Thou mortal, me Immortal? Knowest thou not My Godhead? ” ’For he

has made it clear that the deity cannot be apprehended by a mortal, nor perceived by feet, or hands, or eyes, or by the body at all. ”To whom have ye likened the Lord? Or to what likeness have ye compared Him?” says the Scripture. ” Is He an image that a workman made, or did a goldsmith melt gold and spread it over Him? ” and the rest.

’The Comic poet Epicharmus also, in his Republic, speaks evidently of the Word (Reason) in this manner: ” Greatest need hath man of Reason and of number in life’s ways; For in them is our salvation, and by them we mortals live.” Then he adds expressly: ”Reason is man’s guide, to govern and preserve him in the way.” Then: ” Mortal men have use of Reason; Reason also is divine: Reason is the gift of nature for man’s life and sustenance. Reason man’s divine attendant guideth him in all his arts: Reason is his sole instructor, teaching what is best to do. Art is not of man’s invention, but a gift that comes from God, Man’s own reason is the offspring of that Reason all-divine.” ’Moreover, the Spirit had cried by the mouth of Esaias, ” What is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? saith the LORD: I am full of the burnt-offerings [of rams], and in the fat of lambs and blood of bulls [and of he-goats] I have no delight”; and added soon after, ” Wash you, make you clean, put away your iniquities from your souls.” So Menander, the Comic poet, writes what answers to this in these very words:

”For whosoever brings a sacrifice Of countless bulls or kids, O Pamphilus, Or aught like these, who works of art designs, Vestments of gold or purple, life-like forms Graven in emerald or ivory, And hopes thereby God’s favour may be Won He strangely errs, and hath a dullard’s mind. Man’s duty is to help his brother man, Nor simple maid nor wedded wife betray. Nor steal nor murder for foul lucre’s sake. Then covet not, dear friend, a needle’s thread, For God is ever near to watch thy deeds.” ’” I am a God at hand, and not a God far off. Shall man do aught in secret places, and I not see him?” So God speaks by Jeremiah. And again Menander, paraphrasing that Scripture, ”Offer the sacrifice of righteousness, and put your trust in the LORD,” writes in this way: ”Then, dearest friend, Ne’er covet even a pin that is not thine; For God in works of righteousness delights, And thine own life permits thee to enrich, Ploughing the land and toiling night and day. Then be thou ever just, and worship God With heart as pure as is thy festal robe. And if the thunder roll, flee not, my lord, For conscious of no guilt thou need’st not fear: Since God is watching o’er thee nigh at hand.”

”Whilst thou art yet speaking, I will say, Behold, here I am,” saith the Scripture. ’Diphilus again, the Comic poet, discourses of the Judgement somewhat as follows: ”Thinkest thou then, Niceratus, the dead, Who in this life all luxury enjoyed, Escaped from God lie hidden from His sight? There is an eye of Justice that sees all, And even in Hades we believe there are Two paths of destiny, one for the just, The other for the ungodly. If men say The earth shall hide them both alike for ever, Go

rob, and steal, all right and wrong confound: Be not deceived; in Hades judgement waits, Which God will execute, the Lord of all, Whose Name so terrible I dare not speak. He to the sinners length of days accords; But if a mortal thinks, that day by day He can do evil, and escape the gods, In this his wicked thought, though Justice lag With tardy foot, he shall be caught at last. All ye who think there is no God, beware! There is, there is: let then the wicked man Cease to do ill, and so redeem the time: Else his just doom he shall at last receive."

'With this the tragedy also agrees in these words: "There comes in after days, there comes a time, When you bright golden ether shall pour forth Her store of fire, until the well-fed flame All things in heaven and earth shall fiercely burn." And again soon after it adds: "And then when all creation is dissolved, The sea's last wave shall die upon the shore, The bald earth stript of trees, the burning air No winged thing shall bear upon its breast; When all is lost then all shall be restored." The like thoughts we shall find also expressed in the Orphic poems, as follows: "He hides them all, then from his heart again With anxious care brings all to gladsome light." And if we live a just and holy life throughout, happy are we here, and happier after our departure hence, enjoying blessedness not merely for a time, but enabled to find rest in eternity.

"Sharing with all the gods one hearth, one feast, And free from human sorrows, toil, and death." So says the philosophic poetry of Empedocles. There is none so great, even in the opinion of the Greeks, as to be above the judgement, nor so small as to be hidden from it. 'The same Orpheus says also this: " Look to the word divine, keep close to that, And guide thereby the deep thoughts of thine heart. Walk wisely in the way; and look to none Save to the immortal Framer of the world." And again concerning God, calling Him invisible, he says that He was made known only to one certain person, a Chaldaean by birth, whether he so speaks of Abraham, or of his son, in the following words: "Save one, a scion of Chaldaean race: For he was skilled to mark the sun's bright path, And how in even circle round the earth The starry sphere on its own axis turns, And winds their chariot guide o'er sea and sky."

'Then, as it were paraphrasing the Scripture, " Heaven is my throne, and earth the footstool of my feet," he adds: "But God Himself high above heav'n, unmoved, Sits on His golden throne; and plants His feet On the broad earth; His right hand He extends O'er Ocean's farthest bound; the eternal hills Tremble in their deep heart, nor can endure His mighty power. And still above the heavens Alone He sits, and governs all on earth. Himself first cause, and means, and end of all. Not otherwise dare I to speak of Him: In heart and limbs I tremble at the thought, How He from heav'n all things in order rules," and the lines that follow these. For herein he has plainly set forth all those prophetic sayings: "Whosoever shall rend the heaven, trembling shall seize him: and from Thee the. mountains shall melt away, as wax

melteth from the presence of fire." Also what is said by the mouth of Esaias: "Who measured the heaven with a span, and all the earth with his fist?"

'Again, when he says: "Lord of the heavens, of Hades, land, and sea, Whose thunders shake Olympus' strong-built dome, Whom daemons shuddering flee, and all the gods Do fear, and Fates implacable obey. Eternal Mother and eternal Sire, Whose anger shakes the universal frame, Awakes the stormy wind, veils all with clouds, And rends with sudden flash the expanse of heav'n. At Thy command the stars their changeless course In order run. Before Thy fiery throne Angels unwearied stand; whose only care Is to perform Thy gracious will for man. Thine is the Spring new-decked with purple buds, The winter Thine, with chilling clouds o'ercast, And autumn with its merry vintage Thine." 'Then, expressly calling God the Almighty, he adds: " Come, then, thou deathless and Immortal Power, Whose name none but Immortals can express. Mightiest of Gods, whose will is strong as Fate, Dreadful art Thou, resistless in Thy might, Deathless, and with etherial glory crowned."

So then by the word μητροπάτωρ he not only indicated the creation out of nothing, but gave occasion perhaps to those who introduce the doctrine of emissions to imagine also a consort of God. And he paraphrases the prophetic Scriptures, both that which was spoken by Hosea (Amos): " Lo! I am he that formeth the thunder and createth the wind, whose hands founded the host of heaven": and that which was spoken by Moses: " See, see, that it is I, and there is no other god but me. I will kill, and I will make to live: I will wound, and I will heal: and there is none that shall deliver out of my hand." " 'Tis He that out of good for mortals brings Evil and cruel war," according to Orpheus. 'Such also is the saying of Archilochus of Pares: "Zeus, Father Zeus, the realm of heav'n is thine, But knavish and unholy deeds of men Scape not thine eye."

'Let Thracian Orpheus again sing for us thus: "His right hand He extends O'er Ocean's farthest bound; and plants His feet On the broad earth." These thoughts are manifestly taken from that passage, "The Lord shall shake inhabited cities, and take the whole world in His hand, as a nest"; "The LORD who made the earth by His power," as Jeremiah says, " and established the world by His wisdom." 'Moreover in addition to this Phocylides, calling the angels daemons, shows in the following words that some of them are good and some bad, as we also have been taught that some are apostate: " But daemons different in kind o'er men At various times preside; some to protect Mankind from coming evils." 'Well therefore does Philemon also, the Comic poet, exterminate idolatry by these words: " Fortune is no divinity for us, No goddess; only that which of itself Happens by chance to each is fortune called."

'Sophocles too, the Tragedian, says: "Not even the gods have all things at their will, Save Zeus, the final and first cause of all." 'Orpheus also says: " One power, one

god, one vast and flaming heav'n, One universal frame, wherein revolve All things which here we see, fire, water, earth," and the lines that follow. 'Pindar too, the Lyric poet, breaks out as it were in transport, saying expressly: " What then is God? The All." 'And again: " God, who for mortals all things makes, (Gives also grace to song)." 'Also when he says: "Why hope in wisdom to excel Thy brother man? It is not well For mortals here on earth With minds of human birth The counsels of the gods to scan." He has drawn his thought from the passage: " Who hath known the mind of the LORD? Or who hath been His counsellor?" 'Moreover Hesiod agrees with what has been said above in writing thus:

"Of men on earth no prophet so inspired Can know the mind of aegis-bearing Zeus." With good reason, therefore, does the Athenian Solon himself follow Hesiod, when he writes: "The Immortals' mind is all unknown to men." 'Again, as Moses had foretold that the woman because of the transgression should bring forth children to pain and sorrow, a certain poet of no little distinction writes: " Never by day from labour and distress By night from groaning shall they cease; so hard The cares and troubles which the gods shall give." 'Moreover Homer shows that God is just, when he says: "The Eternal Father hung His golden scales aloft." And Menander, the Comic poet, interprets God's, goodness, when he says: " By every man from moment of his birth A friendly genius stands, life's mystic guide. No evil daemon he (forbid the thought!), With power malign to mar thy happy lot."

And then he adds: " Ἅπαντα δ' ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸν Θεόν," meaning either "that every god is good," or, what is the truer meaning, " that in all things God is good." 'Again, Aeschylus, the Tragic poet, in setting forth the power of God does not hesitate to call Him the Most High in the following passage: "Set God apart from mortals in thy thought, Nor deem that, like thyself, He too is flesh. Thou know'st. Him not: as fire He now appears. A mighty force, now water, now dark storm. Again in likeness of the beasts He comes, Of wind, or lightning, thunder, cloud, or rain. The seas, and sea-girt rocks, the springing wells, The gathering floods, obey His sovereign will. The pillars of the earth, the vast abyss Of Ocean, and the mountain-tops do shake, If the dread Master's eye but look on them: So glorious is the power of God Most High."

Does it not seem to you that he is paraphrasing that passage: " At the presence of the LORD the earth trembles." 'Besides this, the chief prophet Apollo is compelled, in testimony to the glory of God, to say of Athena, when the Medes were marching against Greece, that she entreated and supplicated Zeus for Attica. And the oracle is as follows: "Pallas with many words and counsel wise May pray, but ne'er appease Olympian Zeus. For he to the consuming fire will give The shrines of many gods, who now perchance Stand bathed in chilling sweat, and shake with fear," and so forth. [CLEMENT] 'Thearidas, in his book On Nature, writes, "The first cause of things that exist, the real and true cause, is one. For that is in the

beginning one and alone." "There is none other save the mighty King," as Orpheus says. And with him the Comic poet Diphilus agrees in a very sententious manner, when he says:

"Him never cease to honour and adore, Father of all, sole source of every good." 'With good reason, therefore, Plato trains "the noblest natures to attain that learning which in the former part of our discussion we declared to be the highest, both to discern the good and to make the great ascent." "This then, as it seems, would be no mere turning of an oyster-shell, but the conversion of a soul passing from a kind 'of darkness visible' to the true upward path of being, which we shall call true philosophy"; and those who have partaken thereof he judges to belong to the golden race, when he says, "Ye are doubtless all brethren"; but those who are of the golden race can judge most accurately, and in every way. . . . 'Instinctively, therefore, and without teaching, all things derive from all a conception of the Father and Maker of all, things inanimate by suffering with the animal creation, and of living beings those which are already immortal by working in the light of day, and of those still mortal some (perceive Him) in fear while carried by their mother in the womb, but others by independent reasoning. And of mankind both Greeks and Barbarians all have this conception; and nowhere is there any race either of husbandmen or of shepherds, nay not even of the dwellers in cities, who can live without being prepossessed by the belief in that higher power. Wherefore every nation of the east, and every one that touches the western shores, the northern also, and all upon the south, have one and the same presentiment of Him who established the government of the world, inasmuch as the most universal of His operations have pervaded all things alike.

'Much more did the inquisitive philosophers among the Greeks, by an impulse from the Barbarian philosophy, ascribe the pre-eminence to the One invisible most mighty and most skilful chief cause of all things most beautiful, without understanding the consequences of this, unless they were instructed by us, nay, not even understanding how God Himself is naturally to be conceived, but only, as we have said many times already, in a true but indirect way.' So far Clement. But since the Philosophy of Plato was shown by us at some length to be in very many things in agreement with the doctrines of the Hebrews (for which we admire the man's wisdom and his candour also in regard to the truth), it is time to consider what the points are in which, as we say, we are no longer so favourably disposed towards him, but prefer that which is accounted the Barbarian philosophy to his.

CHAPTER XIV THE oracles of the Hebrews containing prophecies and responses of a divine power beyond that of man, and claiming God as their author, and confirming their promise by the prediction of things to come, and by the results corresponding to the prophecies, are said to be free from all erroneous thought. For instance, 'the words of God are declared to be pure words, and silver tried in the

fire, tested by earth, purified seven times.' But not such are the words of Plato, nor yet of any other of the wise among men, who with the eyes of mortal thought and with feeble guesses and comparisons, as in a dream, and not awake, attained to a notion of the nature of all things, but superadded to the truth of nature a large admixture of falsehood, so that one can find in them no learning free from error.

Now, for example, if you would suppress a little of this self-admiration, and contemplate the true light itself by the faculty of reason, you would perceive that even that wonderful philosopher, who alone of all the Greeks touched the threshold of truth, dishonours the name of the gods by applying it to perishable matter and carved images fashioned by mechanic hands into a human shape; and after the lofty height of his magniloquence, wherein he contended that he knew the Father and Maker of this universe, is thrust down from his place on high among the supramundane circles, and sinks with the common people of Athens into the lowest depth of their God-detested idolatry; so that he does not shrink from saying that Socrates had gone down to the Peiraeus to pray to the goddess, and to see his fellow citizens then for the first time celebrating their barbarous festival; acknowledging also that he had enjoined the offering of a cock to Aesculapius, and regarded as a god the ancestral prophet of the Greeks, the daemon who sits enshrined at Delphi.

Wherefore also the blame of the superstitious delusion of the unphilosophical multitude might with good reason be ascribed to him. Take up again for instance his discourse a little farther back, and after his incorporeal and imperishable 'ideas,' and after a first god and a second cause, and after intelligent and immortal essences, observe what kind of laws the all-wise philosopher would enact concerning the belief of the common people, speaking thus: [PLATO] 'To tell of the other divinities and to learn their origin is beyond us; but we must give credence to those who have spoken in former times, who being, as they said, the offspring of gods, had, I suppose, a clear knowledge of their own ancestors. It is impossible therefore to disbelieve children of the gods, even though they speak without certain or probable proofs: but as they assert that they are reporting family histories, we must in obedience to the law believe them.

'On their authority then let the origin of these gods be as follows and so stated. The children of Earth and Heaven were Oceanus and Tethys; and their children Phorcys and Kronos and Rhea, and all the others with them: and of Kronos and Rhea came Zeus and Hera, and all whom we know as their reputed brethren, and still others who were their offspring.' For these reasons then we must give up the great philosopher, as having misrepresented the fabulous theogonies of the poets, not like a philosopher, nor in a self-consistent manner. For you had the opportunity of hearing himself speak in the Republic as follows: 'In the greater fables, said I, we shall also discern the less: for there must be the same type, and the same

tendency in both the greater and the less: do you not think so? 'Yes, I do, said he: but I do not even understand which you call the greater.

'Those, said I, which Hesiod and Homer and the other poets told us: for they, I suppose, were the composers of fictitious tales, which they told and still tell to mankind'; meaning the stories which we have quoted a little above. Again there was that passage of his in which he said, 'We shall begin then, said I, with the following verse, and strike out it and all that are like it: " Fain would I serve some master in the field," and the rest; also the passage wherein he adds: 'Once more then we shall entreat Homer and the other poets not to represent Achilles, the son of a goddess, " Now turning on his side, and now again Upon his back," and the rest that follows. To this he adds: 'Or to say that Zeus, while all the other gods and men were asleep, and he alone awake, lightly forgot all the plans he had devised, through the eagerness of desire, and was so smitten at sight of Hera that he would not even wait to go into his chamber, but wished to lie with her there on the ground like a lark, and said that he was possessed by a stronger passion than even when they first used to meet "without the knowledge of their dear parents." Nor shall we admit the tale of Ares and Aphrodite being bound by Hephaestus for acts of the same kind!'

And then after having told these tales in such a manner, what does he mean in the saying which comes after, by calling the poets 'children of the gods,' and asserting that 'to disbelieve them is impossible,' although he protested that they had invented the fictitious stories about the gods 'without necessary or probable proofs'? And what is the meaning of this unreasonable belief, put forward in fear of punishment from the laws? And how can Uranus and Ge be first of the gods, then their offspring Oceanus and Tethys, and after all these Kronos, and Rhea, and Zeus, and Hera, and all their sons and brothers and descendants mentioned in fables by Homer and Hesiod, when he was refuting these very stories by speaking thus: 'The fault, said I, which we ought to reprove before all and above all, especially if a man lies in unseemly fashion. 'What fault is that?

'When a man in his discourse concerning gods and heroes misrepresents their nature, just as when an artist paints what is not at all like the things which he may wish to imitate.' And again: 'In the first place, said I, it was no seemly lie that was told by the author of that greatest lie about the greatest gods, how Uranus wrought what Hesiod says he did, and how Kronos took revenge upon him,' and what follows this. But how could the same poets who are here called false and untruthful be spoken of on the other hand as offspring of the gods? However, for these reasons we must abandon this philosopher, as having through fear of death played false with the Athenian democracy: but must honour Moses, and the Hebrew oracles, as everywhere shining out from the one true religion that is free from error. Look then at another point.

CHAPTER XV THE Hebrews say that the intermediate nature of rational beings is generated and not without beginning. And in their account they distinguish this nature into intelligent beings whom they call spirits, and powers, and God's ministering angels and archangels: and from their fall and transgression they derive the race of daemons, and the whole species of the adverse and wicked agency. For which reason they forbid us to regard as gods those who are not possessed of virtue and goodness as inseparable from their nature, but have received their very existence not from themselves but from the Cause of all, and also acquire their well-being, and their virtue, and their immortality itself not in the same manner as either He who is God over all, or He by whom all things were made. But Plato although, like the Hebrews, he supposes the rational natures to be incorporeal and intelligible essences, yet falls away from consistency, by first asserting that they, as well as every soul, are unoriginated, and then saying that they were formed out of an effluence of the First Cause. For he does not mean to admit that they have arisen out of nothing.

Wherefore also he supposes that there is a numerous race of gods, assuming in his argument certain effluences and emissions of the First and Second Causes: and that they are in nature good and in no way capable of departing from their proper virtue, whence also he supposes them to be gods. But the tribe of daemons he believes to be different from these, as being capable of baseness and wickedness, and change for the worse: and some of these are called, and are, good and some evil. But while he thus makes these suppositions contrary to the Hebrew doctrines, he does not explain from what source it may reasonably be said that the daemons arose. For that they arose from the matter of the corporeal elements no one in his senses would assert: for this matter is irrational, but rational things can never be born of an irrational, and the daemons are rational. If, however, these come from an effluence of the greater gods, how then are they not themselves gods as much as those who have begotten them? And how if the source is good are the things which flow from it not like it? And whence in these latter did a shoot of wickedness grow up, if the root comes originally from good and passes through good? Of how can bitter come from the sweet?

If then the race of the wicked daemons is worse than any darkness and any bitterness, how can it be said to come from an effluence of the nature of the better powers? If it was from this, it would not have turned aside from its proper lot: and if it has been changed, then it was not at first impassible in its nature: and if it was not such, how then could they be gods who are capable of participating in an evil destiny? If, however, they were neither from the effluence of the better powers, nor yet from the matter of the corporeal elements, we must now either say that they were unoriginated, and must set over against God in addition to the unoriginated matter of the corporeal elements a third group of unoriginated rational beings, thus no longer representing God as being the Maker of all, and Framer of the Universe,

or, if we admit this, we must also admit that He made the non-existent, according to the statements of the Hebrews,

For what do these teach on this subject? They say that the intermediate nature of rational beings arose neither from the matter of the corporeal elements, nor from an effluence of the essence which is unbegotten and ever remains in the same mode and relations; but that having no previous existence it has come into being by the effective power of the Cause of all. And thus they are no gods, nor have been properly dignified with the title, because they are not equalized in nature with their Maker, nor have goodness inseparably attached to them, like God, but sometimes would even admit the contrary to that which is good through disregard of that study of the higher power, which everyone has wrought out for himself, who is by nature master of his own movement and purpose. So much then for this subject; and now let us pass to another.

CHAPTER, XVI PLATO, although he agreed with the Hebrews in supposing the soul immortal, and saying that it was like unto God, no longer follows them when he sometimes says that its essence is composite, as if involving a certain part of the indivisible and immutable Cause, and a part of the divisible nature belonging to bodies. He speaks, for instance, in the Timaeus in these very words: [PLATO] 'But to the soul, as a mistress to rule over a subject, He gave priority and precedence over the body both in origin and excellence, and made her out of the following constituents and in the following manner. Of the indivisible and ever immutable essence, and of the other divisible essence belonging to bodies, He compounded a third intermediate species of essence out of both the nature of 'the same' and the nature of 'the other,' and in this way set it midway between the indivisible part and the divisible part which belongs to bodies. And he took the three, as they now were, and mingled them all together into one "idea," and as the nature of "the other" was hard to combine, he fitted it by force into "the same."'

Hence also he has naturally connected the passible part with the rational part of the essence. But though at one time he has given this decision concerning the essence of soul, at another he involves it in a different and worse absurdity, by declaring that the divine and heavenly essence, which is incorporeal and rational and like unto God, and which by virtue of its great excellence soars above the celestial circles, comes down from above out of the supramundane regions upon asses, and wolves, and ants, and bees, and calls upon us to believe this account without any proof. He speaks accordingly in the discourse Concerning the Soul as follows: 'So they continue to wander until, by the craving of that corporeal nature which still accompanies them, they are again imprisoned in a body: and probably they are imprisoned in animals of such moral nature as the habits which they may themselves happen to have followed in life.

'What kind of natures do you mean, Socrates? 'For example, those who have practised gluttony, and wantonness, and drunkenness, and have taken no good heed, probably sink into the class of asses and other beasts of that kind: do you not think so? 'Yes, what you say is quite probable. 'And those who have preferred a course of injustice and tyranny and plunder go into the classes of wolves, and hawks, and kites: or whither else should we say that such souls go? 'Certainly into such as these, said Cebes. 'Well then, said he, as to the other cases it is evident what way each soul will go, according to the affinities of their habits. 'Quite evident, said he, for how could it be otherwise? 'Well then, said he, are not the happiest among them and those who pass into the best place the men who have practised the civil and political virtue which is called temperance and justice, produced by habit and attention, without the aid of philosophy and intellect?

'How now are these the happiest? 'Because it is probable that these pass again into some social and gentle race, of bees perhaps or wasps or ants, or even back again into the human race itself.' In the Phaedrus also hear how he discourses: 'For to the same state from which each soul has come she does not attain within ten thousand years; for before this time none grows wings except the soul of the guileless philosopher, or of the philosophic lover. These in the third period of a thousand years, if they have chosen this life thrice successively, so get their wings and fly away in the three-thousandth year. But the others receive judgement when they have finished their first life: and after judgement some go to the houses of correction beneath the earth and suffer punishment, and others, lifted by the judgement to some place in heaven, live in a manner worthy of the life which they lived in human form. But in the thousandth year both good and evil souls come to an allotment and choice of their second life, and choose whichever each may wish. And there both a human soul may pass into the life of a beast, and from a beast he who was once a man may pass back into a man again.'

This is what he says in the Phaedrus; but now listen to him writing in the Republic in the following style: 'For he said that he saw the soul which was once that of Orpheus choosing the life of a swan, out of hatred of the female sex, because he had been killed by them, and would not be conceived and born of woman. Then he saw the soul of Thamyras choose the life of a nightingale: he saw also a swan changing and making choice of a man's life, and other musical animals in like manner, as was natural. And the soul that gained the twentieth lot chose a lion's life; and it was the soul of Ajax, son of Telamon, which shrank from becoming a man because he remembered the judgement concerning the arms. 'And the soul of Agamemnon which came next, and also hated the human race because of his sufferings, changed for the life of an eagle. The soul of Atalanta, whose lot was about the middle, having observed the great honours of an athlete, could not pass by without choosing that life. Next after her he saw the soul of Epeius, the son of

Panopeus, passing into the nature of a female artist. Far off among the hindmost he saw the soul of Thersites, the buffoon, entering into an ape.

'The soul of Odysseus, having by chance obtained the last lot of all, came forward to choose; and having been cured of ambition by remembrance of his former troubles, went about for a long time seeking for the life of a private person free from business, and with difficulty found one lying somewhere neglected by all the rest, and when he saw it he said that he would have done the same even if he had gained the first lot, and so chose it gladly. Of the other animals also some in like manner passed into men and into one another, the unjust changing into the savage, and the just into the gentle, and formed all kinds of mixtures.' In these discourses concerning the soul it is evident that Plato is following the Egyptian doctrines: for his statement is not that of the Hebrews, since it is not in accordance with truth. There is, however, no occasion to refute this, because he did not himself attempt the problem in the way of demonstration. But thus much one may reasonably remark, that it was not consistent for the same person to say that at the moment of decease the souls of the ungodly departing hence suffer in Hades the just penalties of their deeds, and there undergo eternal punishment, and then to assert that they choose again their modes of life here according to their own will.

For he says that they become imprisoned in a body through desire of what is bodily; and that some of them who have been reared in wantonness and gluttony become asses, and enter into the bodies of other beasts, choosing them at will and not according to just desert; and the unjust and rapacious become wolves, and kites, having entered into this nature of their own accord. Then he says that the soul of Orpheus wished to be a swan; and the soul of Thamyras chose the life of a nightingale, and Thersites that of an ape. But where then would be that judgement after their departure hence, which he describes in the dialogue On the Soul, saying: 'When the deceased have arrived at the place to which each is brought by his daemon, . . . then those who may be thought to have lived an ordinary life proceed to Acheron, and having embarked in such vessels as there are for them, they arrive in these at the lake; and there they dwell, and are purged and punished for their crimes, and so absolved from any offence which each has committed: and for their good deeds they receive rewards each according to his desert. But any who may be thought to be incurable because of the greatness of their sins, having perpetrated either many great acts of sacrilege or many wicked and lawless murders, or any other crimes of this kind, these, I say, are cast by their suitable destiny into Tartarus, whence they never come out.

Thus he described the fate of the ungodly; and now hear how he speaks of the pious: 'And of this class those who have thoroughly purified themselves by philosophy live for the time to come altogether free from troubles, and attain to abodes still more beautiful than the former, to describe which is neither easy, nor is the time at

present sufficient.' In the Gorgias also observe what he says: 'The man who has lived a just and holy life departs after death to the Islands of the Blessed, and there dwells in perfect happiness beyond the reach of ills. But he who has lived an unjust and godless life goes to the prison-house of vengeance and punishment, which they call Tartarus, . . . and whoever may have committed the worst misdeeds, and because of such crimes have become incurable, of these the examples are made. And, being incurable, they receive no more benefit themselves; but others receive benefit, who see them for their great sins enduring the most painful and terrible sufferings for all time, hung up simply as examples there in the prison-house in Hades, a spectacle and warning to the wicked who are continually arriving.'

How can this agree with the statements concerning an exchange of bodies, which the soul, they say, seeks after and chooses? For how can the same soul after its departure hence endure tortures, and prisons, and all this punishment for ever, and on the other hand as one released and free from bonds choose whatever modes of life it will? And if it were likely to choose again the life of pleasure, where then is the prison-house of vengeance and punishment? At leisure one might attack the argument at a thousand other points, on the thought of which there is no time to enlarge. So the first error in Plato's opinion on this subject has been thus detected; but the second slip in the exposition of his doctrine, wherein he laid down that one part of the soul is divine and rational and another part of it irrational and passible, has been condemned even by his own friends, as one may learn from statements of the following kind:

CHAPTER XVII [SEVERUS] 'WITH regard to the soul as described by Plato, which he says was composed by God of an impassible and a passible essence, as some intermediate colour from white and black, this is what we have to say, that when in time a separation of them takes place the soul must necessarily disappear, like the composition of the intermediate colour, when each of its constituents is naturally separated in time into its proper colour. But if this is so we shall show the soul to be perishable and not immortal. 'For if this is admitted, that nothing in nature is without its opposite, and that all things in the world have been arranged by God out of the nature of these opposites, He having impressed upon them a friendship and communion, as of dry with moist, and hot with cold, heavy with light, white with black, sweet with bitter, hard with soft, and on all qualities of this kind one other combination including them all, and then upon the impassible essence a combination with the passible, and if the combined and mingled elements naturally in time undergo a separation from each other, and if it is to be assumed that the soul has been produced out of an impassible and a passible essence, then, in the same way as the intermediate colour, so also this must naturally disappear in time, when the opposite elements in its composition press towards their proper nature.

'For do we not see that what is naturally heavy, even though it be lifted up by us, or by any natural lightness being added to it from without, presses down as before in its own natural direction? How in like manner also that which is by nature light, if borne downward by similar external causes, presses upward itself as before? For things which have been combined into one out of two mutual opposites cannot possibly remain always in the same state, unless there is always in them some third kind of natural substance. 'But soul in fact is not any third thing compounded of two mutual opposites, but simple and in its sameness of nature impassible and incorporeal: whence Plato and his School said that it was immortal. 'Since, however, it is a doctrine common to all that man is made of soul and body, and the motions which take place within us apart from the body, whether voluntary or involuntary, are said to be affections of the soul, most of the philosophers, guessing hereby that its substance is passible, say that it is mortal and of a corporeal nature, not incorporeal. But Plato was driven to interweave the passible element with its naturally impassible essence. That neither, however, is the case we shall endeavour to demonstrate by arguing from what Plato and the others have severally said, and explaining the powers which operate within us.'

Let this suffice for my quotation from Severus the Platonist On the Soul. But in addition to what has been already said consider also the following point in regard to the origin of heaven and the luminaries therein. CHAPTER XVIII PLATO agrees with the Hebrews in the account which he gives of the heaven and its phenomena, according to which it was settled that they have had a beginning, as having been made by the Author of the universe, and that they partake of the corporeal and perishable substance; but he no longer agrees with the Hebrews when he enacts a law that men should worship them and believe them to be gods, speaking thus in the Epinomis: [PS.-PLATO] 'Whom then, O Megillus and Cleinias, do I ever with reverence speak of as god? Heaven, I suppose, which it is most right for us, like all others, daemons as well as gods, to honour, and to pray especially to it: and that it has also been the author of all other blessings to us all men would agree.'

Then lower down in the same work he adds this: 'But of the visible gods, who are the greatest and most honourable, and have the keenest sight in all directions, the first we must declare to be the nature of the stars, and all things that we perceive to have been created with them; and next to these and under them the daemons in order, and, as occupying a third and intermediate abode, an aerial race acting as our interpreters, whom we ought to honour much with prayers for the sake of their favourable intervention.' Having hereby declared that the aforesaid beings are gods, he gives in the Timaeus a physical explanation of their original constitution, in the following description: [PLATO] '(Having arranged that) as fire is to air, so is air to water, and as air to water, so is water to earth, of these He combined and constituted a visible and tangible heaven. And for these reasons and out of these elements, such as I have described, being four in number, the body of the world was

formed in harmony by due proportion, and from them gained a friendliness such that after having coalesced in itself it became indissoluble by any other except the author of its combination.'

Then he adds: 'And in the centre of it He set a soul, which He not only spread throughout, but also wrapped it round the body on the outside, and so formed one single and solitary heaven as a circle revolving in a circle.' And again lower down he says in addition: 'In accordance then with reason and this purpose of God for the birth of time, that time might begin, sun, and moon, and five other luminaries, which are surnamed planets, have been created in order to define and preserve the reckonings of time: and, after having made their several bodies, God set them in the orbits traversed by the revolution of "the other." ' Also he adds: 'And the bodies bound together by animated bonds became living beings, and learned the law appointed for them.' In the tenth Book also of the Laws he gives a general explanation concerning every kind of soul, speaking as follows:

'All things, however, that partake of soul are subject to change, as possessing in themselves the cause of change. And when they have changed they move on in the order and law of their destiny: if they have made only small change in their moral characters, they make small changes of place on the surface of the ground; but if they have fallen away more frequently and culpably, they pass into the abyss.' So then if 'all things which partake of soul are liable to change, as possessing the cause of change in themselves,' and if heaven, and sun, and moon are, according to Plato himself, partakers of soul, then these also must change, 'as possessing the cause of change in themselves,' according to his statement. How then does he say on the other hand that they are eternal and therefore gods, although existing in a mortal body, and liable to be dissolved? At least he says again in the Timaeus:

'When therefore all gods, both those which are visible in their revolutions and those which appear only as far as they choose, had been created, the author of this universe spake to them as follows: 'Ye gods and sons of gods, the works whereof I am the creator and father, are indissoluble save by My will. Therefore though all that is bound may be dissolved, yet only an evil being would wish to dissolve that which is well composed and in right condition. Wherefore also since ye have come into existence, though ye are not altogether immortal nor indissoluble, nevertheless ye shall not be dissolved nor incur the fate of death, since in My will ye have found a still stronger and more valid bond than those by which ye were bound together at the time of your creation.' So speaks Plato. With good reason therefore do Moses and the Hebrew oracles forbid to worship these and to regard them as gods; but leading us upward to the God who is King of all, the very creator of sun and moon and stars and the whole heaven and world, who by a divine word combined and fitted all things together, he bids us by his law to believe in Him alone as God, and to ascribe the honour of worship to Him only, saying, 'Lest, when thou see the sun

and moon and all the stars and all the host of heaven, thou be deceived and worship them.'

This command is interpreted and explained at large by Philo, the man so learned in the affairs of the Hebrews, speaking thus word for word: [PHILO] 'Some supposed that sun and moon and the other luminaries are gods of absolute power, to whom they attributed the causes of all things that are made. But Moses thought that the world was both created, and was the greatest of all States, having rulers and subjects, the rulers being all in heaven, such as are planets and fixed stars, and the subjects being the natures beneath the moon, in the air, and near the earth. 'But the so-called rulers, he thought, were not independent, but deputies of one universal Father, by imitating whose superintendence they succeed in ruling every thing in creation in accordance with justice and law. But they who did not discern Him who sits as charioteer ascribed the causes of all things which are done in the world to those who are yoked under Him, as if they worked independently. But the most sacred Lawgiver changes their ignorance into knowledge, when He speaks thus: "Lest, when thou beholdest the sun and the moon and the stars and all the host of heaven, thou be deceived and worship them."

'With well-directed aim and nobly did he call the acceptance of the above-mentioned as gods a deception. For they saw that the seasons of the year, in which the generations of animals and plants and fruits are brought to completion in definite periods, of time are settled by the advance and retreat of the Sun; they saw also that the Moon as handmaid and successor of the Sun had taken up by night the care and superintendence of the same as the Sun by day, and that the other luminaries in accordance with their sympathy towards things terrestrial were working and doing countless services for the permanence of the whole; and so they fell into an endless delusion in supposing that these were the only gods. 'Whereas if they had been attentive to walk by the unerring path they would have learned at once that in the same way as sense is the servant of mind, so also were all who can be perceived by sense made ministers of Him whom mind alone can perceive.'

Also he further says: 'So having transcended by reason all visible being, let us go on to the dignity of Him who is without bodily form and invisible, and can be apprehended by thought alone, who is not only the God of the worlds both of thought and sense, but also the Creator of all things. But if any one assign the worship of the Eternal Maker to another younger and begotten being, let him be written down as a madman and guilty of the greatest impiety.' These are the truly genuine and divine teachings of the Hebrew religion which we have preferred to their vain philosophy. Why need I enlarge further, and bring to light the other errors of Plato, when it is easy from what has been already said to guess also what points I have now passed over in silence? It was not, however, for the sake of accusing him that

I was led to speak of these things, since for my part I very greatly admire the man, and esteem him as a friend above all the Greeks, and honour him as one whose sentiments are dear and congenial to myself, although not the same throughout; but I wished to show in what his intelligence falls short in comparison with Moses and the Hebrew prophets.

And yet to one prepared to find fault it were easy to pass censure on countless points, such as his solemn and sapient regulations with regard to women in the Republic, or such as his fine phrases about unnatural love in the Phaedrus. If, however, you desire to listen to these subjects also, take and read his utterances which follow: CHAPTER XIX [PLATO] 'PERHAPS now, said I, many points connected with our present subject will appear more than usually ridiculous, if they are to be carried out as described. 'Certainly, said he. 'What then, said I, is the most ridiculous thing that you see in them? Is it not, of course, that the women are to practise gymnastics naked in the palaestra with the men, and not only the young women but even the elder also; just as the old men in the gymnasia, when though wrinkled and not pleasing in appearance, they nevertheless love to practise gymnastics.'

And next he adds: 'But the man who laughs at the women taking exercise naked for the best of purposes, as though forsooth he were "reaping fruit of wisdom" in his laughter, seems not even to know at what he is laughing.' He says also in the seventh Book of the Laws: 'It will therefore evidently be necessary for the boys and girls to learn dancing and gymnastics; and there will be dancing-masters for the boys and mistresses for the girls, that they may go through the exercise with the greater advantage.' He also writes therein as follows: 'Again, I suppose, our virgin Queen, who delighted in the practice of the dance, did not think fit to play with empty hands, but to be arrayed in full armour and so perform the dance: an example which most surely it would become both youths and maidens alike to imitate.' He also enacts a law that women should even go to war, in the following words:

'And in all these schools teachers of the several subjects, being resident foreigners, should be induced by payments to give fill instructions relating to war to those who come as pupils, and all relating to music, not merely to one who may come at his father's wish, while another, without such wish, neglects his education; but, as the saying is, every man and boy, as far as possible, must receive compulsory education, as belonging more to the State than to their parents. All the same rules my law would enjoin for women as much as for men, that the females also should practise the same exercises. And neither as to horsemanship nor gymnastics should I have any fear in making this statement, that, though becoming to men, it would not be becoming to women.' And again a little lower down he says: 'Let us consider as gymnastics all bodily exercises relating to war, in archery, and in throwing all kinds of missiles, and the use of the target, and all fighting in heavy armour, and

tactical evolutions, and all kinds of marching, camps and encamping, and all instructions pertaining to horsemanship. For there must be public teachers of all these arts, earning pay from the State, and their pupils, all the boys and men in the city and girls and women, must be skilled in all these matters; having while still girls practised every kind of dancing and fighting in heavy armour, and as women having applied themselves to evolutions, and tactics, and grounding and taking up arms.'

But neither to these rules would the Hebrew doctrine assent, but would assert the very opposite, ascribing success in war not even to the strength of men, much less to that of women, but attributing all to God and to His aid in battle. And so it says: 'Except the Lord build the house, their labour is but lost that build it. Except the Lord keep the city, the watchman waketh but in vain.' But observe how the wonderful philosopher also brings the women into the gymnastic contests, speaking thus: 'But as to women, let girls who are still young contend naked in the foot-race, and double course, and horse-race, and long race on the race-course itself: but those of thirteen years are to go on until their union in marriage, but not beyond twenty years nor less than eighteen; and they must come down to contend in these races clothed in befitting dress.

'So let these be our rules of racing for both men and women. But as to trials of strength, instead of wrestling and all such contests which now are severe, let there be fighting in armour, both single combats, and two against two.' And next, after saying, 'So also we must call to our aid those who excel in fighting in armour, and bid them help us to frame the like laws,' he adds these words: 'Let also the same laws be in force in regard to the females until the time of marriage.' Then after having appended immediately to these laws those concerning the training of peltasts and the pancratium, and archery, and throwing stones from the hand and with a sling, and concerning the horserace, here again he adds these words concerning the females: 'But it is not right to force females by laws and ordinances to participate in these contests; if, however, just from their former training passing into a habit their natural, constitution without inconvenience allows children or maidens to take part, we must permit it and not blame them.'

So far the laws of Plato concerning women. But the following extraordinary law is also his: 'If any have left female children, let the judge go back through brothers and brothers' sons, first on the male side, and afterwards on the female, in one and the same family: and let him judge by examination the fitness or unfitness of the time for marriage, inspecting the males naked, and the females naked as far as the navel.' Moreover at the festivals he says that they must dance naked, speaking in the sixth Book of the Laws as follows: 'For this so serious purpose therefore they ought to perform their sports and dance together youths and maidens, both seeing and being seen within bounds of reason and of a certain age implying suit-

able causes, both sexes being naked so far as sober modesty in each permits.' In addition to all this hear also the following passages in the Republic on the law that the women should be in common:

'This law, said I, and the others which went before have, I suppose, the following law as their consequence. 'What is that? 'These women must all be common to all these men, and none live with any man as his own: and the children too must be common, and neither any parent know his own offspring, nor any child his father.' Next he adds: 'It is probable, said he. You therefore, said I, as their lawgiver will select the women as well as the men, and, as far as possible assign those who are of like nature: and they, as having houses and meals in common, and none possessing anything of this kind privately, will of course be together, and being mixed up together both in the gymnasia and in their general mode of life will be led, I suppose, by the necessity of nature to intercourse with each other. Or do you think that what I say will not necessarily occur?

'Not by any mathematical necessity, said he, but by constraints of love, which are likely to be keener than the other kind in persuading and drawing the mass of mankind.' But some one perhaps will explain the meaning of these passages in a different way, and will say that they do not suggest what is commonly supposed; since he does not say that all the women without distinction are to be in common, so that wantonness may be allowed to every chance-comer, but that the assignment of them among the men is to lie in the power of the magistrates. For they are to be common in the same way as one may say that the public money is common, being distributed to the proper persons by those who are entrusted with it. Suppose then that this is so. But what would you say on learning that he also bids them not to bring forth into light what they conceive, speaking as follows?

'For a woman, said I, let the law be that beginning from the twentieth year she should bear children for the State until the fortieth year: and for a man, after he has passed the most vigorous prime of his course, henceforward to beget children for the State until his fifty-fifth year.' After which he says: 'But when both the women and the men, I suppose, have passed the age for begetting children, we shall let them go free perhaps to have intercourse with whomsoever they please.' And he adds: 'Having strictly charged them, if possible, to bring forth no embryo to light, if such there should be; but should any force its way, to deal with it on the understanding that there is no maintenance for such a child.' Such are his directions concerning the conduct of women: and concerning unnatural love [for which he makes a long apology----ED.], how unlike are his sentiments to those of Moses, who in laws expressly contrary pronounces with loud voice the fit sentence against sodomites.

Why need we still urge the charge that this most wise philosopher after acquitting such sinners, against whom he did not think it fit to prescribe sentence of death,

directs in his Laws that the slave who failed to give information of a treasure discovered by another should be punished with death. But that you may not suspect me of bearing false witness, listen also to what follows: CHAPTER XXI 'WHATEVER answer the god may give in regard to the property and the man who removed it, that let the city execute in obedience to the oracles of the god. And if the informer be a free man, let him have the reputation of goodness; but if he fail to inform, of baseness. But if he be a slave, the informer may rightly be made free by the city, on payment of his value to his master; but if he fail to give information, let him be punished by death.'

Here again the punishment of death is enacted not against the man who has purloined some forbidden property, but against him who failed to inform against another who had done wrong: and in another case too he declares a master free from guilt if he kill his own slave in anger. He says in fact: 'If he have killed a slave of his own, let him undergo purification; but if he have killed another man's slave in anger, let him pay the owner twofold for the loss.' Listen also to this passage of the laws which he enacted in regard to murderers: 'If therefore any one with his own hand slay a free man, and the deed have been done in a passion without premeditation, let him suffer all other penalties that were deemed right for one who slew another without anger to suffer, but let him undergo compulsory exile for two years to correct his passion.'

And then he appends to this another law of the following kind: 'But let the man who has slain another in anger, yet with premeditation, suffer all other the same penalties as the former offender; but just as the other was banished for two years, let him be banished for three, being punished for a longer term because of the violence of his passion.' Then next he enacts such laws as the following in regard to one who has committed homicide a second time: 'But if ever after returning from exile either of them be overcome by anger and commit this same offence again, let him be banished and never return.' And again afterwards he says: 'But if, as occurs sometimes, though not often, a father or mother from anger kill a son or a daughter by blows or any manner of violence, let them undergo the same purifications as the others, and spend three years in exile. But when the homicides have returned from exile, let the wife be separated from her husband and the husband from the wife, and not beget children together any more.'

To this also he adds: 'But if any man in anger slay his wedded wife, or a wife do the same in like manner to her own husband, let them undergo the same purifications, but continue three years in banishment. And when the author of such a deed has returned, let him have no communion in sacred rites with his children, nor ever sit at the same table with them. 'And if a brother or sister slay brother or sister in anger, be it enacted that the same purifications and banishments as have been appointed for parents and children be undergone by them; and let them never have

the same home with those whom they have deprived of brothers, or of children, nor share in their sacred rites. 'But if brother slay brother in a faction fight, or in other like manner, while defending himself against an assault, let him be guiltless, as if he had slain an enemy in war. And in like manner if a citizen slay a fellow citizen, or a foreigner a foreigner. But if a foreigner slay a citizen, or a citizen a foreigner in self-defence, let him be in the same position as to being guiltless: and in like manner if a slave kill a slave. But if on the other hand a slave kill a free man in self-defence, let him be subject to the same laws as the slayer of a father.

'Whosoever designedly and wrongfully slays with his own hand any one of his kinsmen, in the first place let him be excluded from legal rights, polluting neither agora, nor temples, nor harbours, nor any other public assembly, whether any one interdict the doer of these deeds or not: for the law interdicts him. . . . And let the man who fails to prosecute him, when he ought, or fails to proclaim him be excluded from kinship: . . . and in the second place let him be liable to prosecution by any one who wishes to exact retribution for the deceased. And if a woman has wounded her husband, or a man his wife, with design to kill, let either suffer perpetual banishment.'

Such are the laws of the philosopher: and if we are to bring those of Moses into comparison with them, hear what sort of ordinances he makes concerning cases of homicide. 'If one smite a man and he die, let him surely be put to death. And if he did it not purposely, but God delivered him 'into his hands, I will give thee a place whither the slayer shall flee. But if a man set upon his neighbour to slay him with guile, and flee for refuge, thou shalt take him from Mine altar to put him to death. He that smiteth his father, or his mother, shall surely be put to death. . . . And if two men revile one another, and one smite his neighbour with a stone or with his fist, and he die not, but be laid upon his bed, if the man rise again, and walk abroad upon his staff, then shall he that smote him be quit: only he shall pay for his loss of time, and the fees of his physician. And if a man smite his servant, or his maid, with a staff, and he die under his hands, he shall surely be punished. But if he live a day or two he shall not be punished; for he is his money. . . . And if a man smite the eye of his servant, or the eye of his handmaiden, and blind him utterly, he shall send them forth free for their eyes' sake.'

Such then are the laws of Moses. Now hear again in what way, and for what kind of offences, Plato orders that the slave shall be punished with scourging without hope of pardon: '"When a man wishes to gather the vintage of what are now called fine grapes, or the so-called fine figs, if he be taking them from his own property, let him gather the fruit however and whenever he will: but if from the property of others without having gained permission, let that man always be punished, in accordance with the principle of not taking up what one laid not down. But if a slave touch any of such things without having gained permission of the owner of

the farms, for every berry of the grapes and every fig of the fig-tree let him be scourged with an equal number of stripes.'

Such are the enactments against these offences, unworthy of the magnanimity of Plato. But how noble and humane those of Moses are you may learn by listening to him while he speaks as follows: 'When thou art come into thy neighbour's vineyard, thou shalt eat grapes until thy soul be satisfied, but shalt not put any into thy vessel.' And again: 'If thou come into thy neighbour's standing corn, and pluck the ears with thy hands, then thou shalt not put a sickle to thy neighbour's standing corn.' And again: 'If thou reapest thy harvest in thy field, and hast forgotten a sheaf in thy field, thou shalt not turn back again to take it: it shall be for the poor, for the stranger, for the fatherless, and for the widow, that the LORD thy God may bless thee in every work of thine hands. And if thou gather thine olives, thou shalt not turn back to glean what is left behind thee: it shall be for the stranger, and the fatherless, and the widow. And if thou gather the grapes of thy vineyard, thou shalt not glean over again what is left behind thee: this shall be for the stranger, for the fatherless and for the widow.'

These then are the enactments found in Moses. And Plato's are well known, in which you may find thousands irreproachable, whereof we most gladly welcome all that is noble and excellent in him, and bid a long leave to what is not of such a character. But since we have travelled so far through these matters, and have shown cause why we have not chosen to follow Plato in philosophy, it is time to bring the rest of our promise to completion, and to review the other sects of Greek philosophy. [Footnotes moved to the end and numbered]

Book 14

BOOK XIV

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p. 766 b XXI. Against the Epicureans, who define the good as pleasure. From the same p. 768 d XXII. Further against those who define the good as pleasure. From the Philebus of Plato p. 770 b XXIII. Against the Epicureans, who deny a Providence, and refer the universe to corporeal atoms. From Dionysius, Bishop of Alexandria, On Nature p. 772 d XXIV. From human examples. From the same p.

773 d XXV. From the constitution of the universe. From the same p. 774 d XXVI. From the nature of man. From the same p. 778 c XXVII. That to God there is no toil in working. From the same p. 781 a CHAPTER I PREFACE CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THE BOOK. HAVING described in the preceding Book all that there was to say and to hear about the philosophy of Plato and his agreement with the Hebrew oracles, for which we are struck with admiration of him, and on the other hand concerning his dissent from them, for which no man of good sense could approve him, I will now pass on to the remaining sects of those who have been famed for philosophy among the Greeks.

And in their case again I shall set their lapse from the truth before the eyes of my readers, not in. my own person nor of my own authority, but as before by the testimony of the very words of Greek authors: not indeed from dislike to any of them personally, since I confess that I have a great admiration for them, when I compare the persons with the rest of mankind as men. But when I compare them with the sacred writers and prophets of the Hebrews, and with God who through them has both uttered predictions of things to come and exhibited marvellous works, nay more, has laid the foundations of instruction in religious learning and true doctrines, I no longer think that any one ought with reason to blame us, if we prefer God before men, and truth itself before human reasonings and conjectures. All this I have striven to prove in the argument of this present Preparation, as at once an answer and a defence against those who shall inquire, what beauty or majesty we have seen in the writings of the Barbarians, that we have decided to prefer them to our ancestral and noble philosophy, that, I mean, of the Greeks. However, it is time now to let our proof proceed by way of facts.

CHAPTER II Now, I think, we ought before all things to begin from the first foundation of philosophy among the Greeks, and to learn concerning the so-called physical philosophers before the time of Plato, who they were, and what sort of men their philosophy found as champions of its system; then we must pass on to the successors of Plato, and learn who they also were, and survey their mutual disputations, and review also the dissensions of the other sects, and the oppositions of their opinions, wherein I shall exhibit the noble combatants like boxers eagerly exchanging blows as on a stage before the spectators. Let us, for instance, at once observe how, on the one hand, Plato used to scoff at the earliest philosophers who preceded him, and how others scoffed at Plato’s friends and successors: and again in turn how Plato’s disciples used to criticize the wise doctrines of Aristotle’s fertile thought: and how those who boasted of Aristotle and the Peripatetic School used to prove that the views of those who preferred the opposite sect were nonsense.

You will also see the clever and precise doctrines of the subtlety of the Stoics ridiculed in turn by others, and all the philosophers on all sides struggling against their: neighbours, and most bravely joining in battle and wrestling, so that even

with hands and tongue, or rather with pen and ink, they raise strongholds of war against each other, striking, as it were, and being struck by the spears and various weapons of their wordy war. And in this strife of athletes our arena will include, in addition to those already mentioned, men stripped of all truth, who have taken up arms in opposition to all the dogmatic philosophers alike; I mean the Pyrrhonists, who declared that in man's world there is nothing comprehensible; and those who said with Aristippus that the feelings were the sole objects of perception, and then again those who with Metrodorus and Protagoras said that we ought to believe only the sensations of the body.

Over against these we shall at the same time strip for the combat the schools of Xenophanes and Parmenides, who arrayed themselves on the opposite side and annihilated the senses. Neither shall we omit the champions of pleasure, but shall enroll their leader Epicurus also with those already mentioned. But against all alike we shall use their own weapons to set forth their confutation. Also of all the so-called physicists alike I shall drag out to light both the discrepancies of their doctrines and the futility of their eager studies; not at all as a hater of the Greeks or of reason, far from it, but to remove all cause of slanderous accusation, that we have preferred the Hebrew oracles from having forsooth been very little acquainted with Hellenic culture. CHAPTER III THE Hebrews on their part from long time of old and, so to say, from the very first origin of man, having found the true and religious philosophy have carefully preserved this undefiled to succeeding generations, son from sire having received and guarded a treasure of true doctrines, so that no one dared to take away from or add to what had been once for all determined.

So neither has Moses the all-wise, who has been shown by our former discourse to have been older than all the Greeks, but last in time of all the ancient Hebrews, ever thought of disturbing and changing any of the doctrines held by his forefathers concerning dogmatic theology, except so far as to found for the people under his charge a certain conduct of life towards each other, and a code of laws for a kind of moderate republic. Nor have the prophets after him, who flourished for countless periods of years, ever ventured to utter a word of discord either against each other, or against the opinions held by Moses and the elders beloved of God. Nay not even has our Christian School, which derives its origin from them, and by a divinely inspired power has filled alike all Greece and Barbarian lands, introduced anything at variance with the earlier doctrines; or perhaps one should rather say that not only in the doctrines of theology but also in the mode of life Christianity prescribes the same course as the godly Hebrews before Moses.

Our doctrines then thus described, and testified to by all authors, first middle and last, with one mind and one voice, confirm with unanimous vote the certainty of that which is both the true religion and philosophy, and are filling the whole world, and growing afresh and flourishing every day, as if they had but just established their

first prime: and neither legal ordinances, nor hostile plots, nor the oft-sharpened weapons of enemies have exhibited a power superior to the excellence of the reasons which we followed. But now let us observe what strength has ever been exhibited by the doctrines of the philosophy of the Greeks, tossed as they were in shallow waters; and first of them all let us send down into the battle those who are called physicists. As then these are said to have flourished before Plato, we may learn, from Plato himself how they were at variance one with another; for he exposes the feud of Protagoras, Heracleitus, and Empedocles against Parmenides and his school.

For Protagoras, who had been a disciple of Democritus, incurred the reputation of atheism: he is said, at least, to have used an introduction of the following kind in his book Concerning the gods: 'As to gods I neither know that they exist, nor that they do not exist, nor of what nature they are.' And Democritus said that 'the first elements of the universe were vacuum and plenum,' and the plenum he called 'being' and 'solid,' but the vacuum 'not-being.' Wherefore he also says that 'being' no more exists than 'not-being'; and that 'the things which partake of "being" have from eternity a continuous and swift motion in the vacuum.' But Heracleitus said that fire was the first principle of all things, out of which they all come, and into which they are resolved. For all things are change, and there is a time determined for the resolution of them all into fire, and for their production out of it.

These philosophers then said that all things are in motion; but Parmenides, who was by birth an Eleatic, held the doctrine that 'the all is one,' and that it subsists without beginning and without motion, and is spherical in shape. And Melissus, who was a disciple of Parmenides, held the same opinions with Parmenides. So now listen to what Plato relates with regard to these men in the Theaetetus: CHAPTER IV [PLATO] 'AND so from drift and motion and mixture of one with another, all things are "becoming," though we forsooth speak of them as "being," not using a right term. For nothing ever "is," but is always "becoming." And on this point grant that, except Parmenides, all the wise men in succession were agreed, Protagoras, and Heracleitus, and Empedocles, and the chief poets in either kind of poetry, Epicharmus in Comedy, and Homer in Tragedy, who, when he calls

"Oceanus sire and Tethys mother of gods," says that all things are the offspring of flux and motion. Do you not think that this is what he means? 'I think so. 'Who then could any longer escape derision, if he disputed against so great an army with Homer for their leader? ' Then afterwards proceeding in his argument he further says: 'One must come then to closer quarters, as the argument in defence of Protagoras enjoined, and by sounding this floating essence observe whether it gives a true or a false note. At all events there has been no small conflict about it with no few disputants. Far indeed from being small, it is making great advance in Ionia. For the disciples of Heracleitus take a very vigorous lead in this argument.

’So much the more then, my dear Theodorus, are we bound to examine it, and that from its first principle, as they themselves suggest.

’Yes, by all means: for in fact, Socrates, about these Heracleitean doctrines, or, as you call them, Homeric and still older, it is no more possible to argue with the men themselves at Ephesus who pretend to be experts than with men in a frenzy. For in absolute accordance with his writings they are always adrift, and as to dwelling upon an argument and a question, and quietly answering and asking in turn, they have less than no power at all; or rather the expression ”not even nothing” is preferable in view of the absence of even the least quietness in the men. But if you ask any of them a question, they pull out as from a quiver dark little phrases which they shoot off at you, and if you try to get an explanation of what this means, you will presently be struck with another new-fangled phrase, and will never come to any conclusion at all with any of them, no, nor yet they themselves with one another; but they watch most carefully not to allow anything to be settled either in argument, or in their own souls, thinking, I suppose, that it would be something stationary; and with that they are altogether at war, and drive it out everywhere to the utmost of their power.

’Perhaps, Theodorus, you have seen the men fighting, but have never been in their company when at peace; for they are no friends of yours. But, I suppose, they explain doctrines of this peaceful kind at leisure to their disciples, whomsoever they wish to make like themselves. ’Disciples, my good Sir! Such people do not become disciples one of another, but they grow up of themselves, inspired each of them from any chance source, and the one thinking that the other knows nothing. From these men therefore, as I was going to say, you can never get a reason, either willingly or unwillingly; but we must take the matter over ourselves and examine it like a mathematical proposition. ’Yes, you speak with discretion. As to the proposition then, have we not received it from the ancients, who concealed it from the multitude in poetry, that Oceanus and Tethys, the origin of all things, are flowing streams, and that nothing is at rest; and now from their successors, who in their superior wisdom openly declare it, in order that even their cobblers may hear and learn their wisdom, and may cease from foolishly supposing that some things are at rest and others in motion, and when they have learned that all are in motion, may honour them?

’But I nearly forgot, Theodorus, that others set forth the opposite doctrine to this, namely, ”That only is unmoved, whose name is All,” and all other assertions which men like Melissus and Parmenides, in opposition to all these doctrines, stoutly maintain, that all is one and stands self-contained, having no place in which to move. ’How then, my friend, are we to deal with all these? For going on little by little we have unconsciously fallen between both armies, and unless we can in some way defend ourselves and retreat, we shall pay the penalty, just like those

who play across a line in the palaestra, when they are caught hold of by both sides and dragged in opposite directions.' This is what Plato says in the Theaetetus. Passing next to the Sophist, he speaks again concerning the physical philosophers his predecessors as follows:

'It seems to me that Parmenides, and every one who has ever yet adventured upon a trial of determining the number and nature of things existent, have discoursed to us in an easy strain. How? Each seems to me to be relating a sort of fable to us, as if we were children. One says that existences are three, and some of them are sometimes warring in a manner with one another, and then becoming friends again they exhibit marriages, and births, and rearing of offspring: another says that they are two, moist and dry, or hot and cold, and he makes them dwell together and marries them. But all the Eleatic tribe in our part, beginning with Xenophanes and still earlier, assume that all things so-called are one, and so proceed with their fables. But certain Ionian and Sicilian Muses afterwards conceived that it is safer to combine both principles, and say that "being" is both many and one, and is held together by enmity and friendship. For it is ever separating and being united, as the more strong-minded Muses assert; but the weaker relax the perpetual continuance of these conditions, and say that in turn the universe is now one and friendly under the influence of Aphrodite, and then many and at war with itself through some discordance. But whether in all this any of them has spoken truly or not, it would be hard and offensive to find fault in such important matters with famous men of antiquity.'

Then after a few sentences he adds: 'Well then, though we have not discussed all those who give precise definitions about "being" and "not-being," nevertheless let it suffice: and on the other hand let us look at those who speak otherwise, in order that we may see from them all that it is by no means easier to say what "being" is than what "not-being" is. 'We must proceed then to consider these also. 'Moreover it seems that among them there is, as it were, a kind of war of the Giants, through their disputing with one another about the nature of "being." 'How? 'One side are for dragging all things down from heaven and from the invisible to earth, actually grasping rocks and oaks in their hands. For they lay hold of everything of this kind, and stoutly maintain, that "being" belongs only to that which admits some kind of contact and handling, defining body and "being" as the same, and should any one else say that a thing without body has "being," they utterly despise him, and will not listen to anything else.

'Truly they are terrible men that you speak of: for I too ere now have met with many of them. 'For this reason those who dispute against them defend themselves very cautiously from some high place in an unseen world, contending that certain intelligible and incorporeal "forms" are the true "being." But the corporeal atoms of the other side, and that which they call the truth, these shatter in pieces by their

arguments, and call them a floating kind of ”becoming,” instead of ”being.” And between the two armies, O Theaetetus, there is always a mighty battle joined on these subjects. ’True.’ So far, then, has Plato censured the physical philosophers who preceded him. And the kind of opinion which he himself was for introducing on the matters in question we have declared in the preceding Books, when we were showing his agreement with the Hebrew doctrines and with the teaching of Moses in regard to ’Being.’

But come, let us examine in our argument Plato’s own successors also. It is said that Plato, haying established his School in the Academy, was the first called an Academic, and was the founder of the so-called Academic philosophy. And after Plato Speusippus, the son of Plato’s sister Potone, succeeded to the School, then Xenocrates, and afterwards Polemon. And these, it is said, began from his own hearth at once to undo the teaching of Plato, distorting what had been clear to the master by introducing foreign doctrines, so that you might expect the power of those marvellous dialogues to be extinguished at no distant time, and the transmission of the doctrines to come to an end at once on the founder’s death: for a conflict and schism having hereupon begun from them, and never ceasing up to the present time, there are none who delight to emulate the doctrines which the Master loved, except perchance one or two in all our lifetime, or some others very few in number, and themselves not altogether free from false sophistry; since even the earlier successors of Plato have been blamed for such tendencies.

Polemon’s successor, it is said, was Arcesilaus, and report says that he forsook the doctrines of Plato, and established a sort of alien and, as it is called, second Academy. For he declared that we ought to suspend judgement about all things, for all are incomprehensible, and the arguments on either side equal each other in force, also that the senses and reason in general are untrustworthy. He used, for instance, to praise this saying of Hesiod, ’The gods have spread a veil o’er human thought.’ He used also to try to make some paradoxical novelties. After Arcesilaus, Carneades and Cleitomachus are said to have abandoned the opinion of their predecessors, and become the authors of a third Academy. ’And some add also a fourth, that of the followers of Philo and Charmides: while some reckon even a fifth, that of the disciples of Antiochus.’ Such were the successors of Plato himself: and as to their character take and read the statements of Numenius the Pythagorean, which he has set down in the first Book of his work entitled Of the revolt of the Academics against Plato, to the following effect.

CHAPTER V [NUMENIUS] ’FOR the time then of Speusippus, sister’s son to Plato, and Xenocrates the successor of Speusippus, and Polemon who succeeded Xenocrates in the School, the character of the doctrine always continued nearly the same, so far as concerned this much belauded suspension of judgement which was not yet introduced, and some other things perchance of this kind. For in

other respects they did not abide by the original tradition, but partly weakened it in many ways, and partly distorted it: and beginning from his time, sooner or later they diverged purposely or unconsciously, and partly from some other cause perhaps other than rivalry. 'And though for the sake of Xenocrates I do not wish to say anything disparaging, nevertheless I am more anxious to defend Plato. For in fact it grieves me that they did not do and suffer everything to maintain in "every way an entire agreement with Plato on all points. Yet Plato deserved this at their hands, for though not superior to Pythagoras the Great, yet neither perhaps was he inferior to him; and it was by closely following and reverencing him that the friends of Pythagoras became the chief causes of his great reputation.

'And the Epicureans, having observed this, though they were wrong, were never seen on any point to have opposed the doctrines of Epicurus in any way; but by acknowledging that they held the same opinions with a learned sage they naturally for this reason gained the title themselves: and with the later Epicureans it was for the most part a fixed rule never to express any opposition either to one another or to Epicurus on any point worth mentioning: but innovation is with them a transgression or rather an impiety, and is condemned. And for this reason no one even dares to differ, but from their constant agreement among themselves their doctrines are quietly held in perfect peace. Thus the School of Epicurus is like some true republic, perfectly free from sedition, with one mind in common and one consent; from which cause they were, and are, and seemingly will be zealous disciples.

'But the Stoic sect is torn by factions, which began with their founders, and have not ceased even yet. They delight in refuting one another with angry arguments, one party among them having still remained steadfast, and others having changed. So their founders are like extreme oligarchs, who by quarrelling among themselves have caused those who came after to censure freely both their predecessors and each other, as still being more Stoical one party than the other, and especially those who showed themselves more captious in technicalities; for these were the very men who, surpassing the others in meddlesomeness and petty quibbles, were the more quick to find fault. 'Long before these, however, there was the same feeling in those who drew their doctrines from Socrates in different directions, Aristippus in his own way, and Antisthenes in his, and elsewhere the Megarians and Eretrians in ways of their own, and others with them.

'And the cause was, that as Socrates assumed three gods, and philosophized before them in the strains appropriate to each, his hearers did not understand this, but thought that he spoke all at random, and according to the breath of fortune which at any moment prevailed, sometimes one, sometimes another, as it chanced to blow. 'But Plato had been a Pythagorean, and knew that Socrates for the same reason took such sayings from no other source than that, and had known what he

was saying; and so he too wrapped up his subjects in a manner that was neither usual nor plain to understand; and after conducting them each in the way that he thought fit, and disguising them so as to be half seen and half unseen, he wrote in safety, but himself gave occasion to the subsequent dissension, and distraction of his doctrines, not indeed from jealousy nor yet from ill will----but I am unwilling to speak unfavourable words of men of earlier times.

'But now that we have learned this, we ought rather to apply our judgement to a different point, and as we proposed at the commencement to distinguish Plato from Aristotle and Zeno, so now again separating him from the Academy, if God help us, we will allow him to be in and of himself a Pythagorean. Since now being torn in pieces more furiously than any Pentheus deserved, he suffers limb by limb, but is by no means transformed from his whole self and retransformed. 'As a man therefore who stood midway between Pythagoras and Socrates he reduced the sternness of the former to benevolence, and the wit and playfulness of the latter he raised from irony to dignity and gravity, and by making just this mixture of Socrates and Pythagoras he showed himself more affable than the one and more grave than the other. 'This, however, is not at all what I was going to discuss, my present inquiry having no concern herewith: but I will pass on to what I had intended, lest I should be thrown out of the way that leads thither, or else I seem likely to run away altogether.

'Arcesilaus and Zeno became disciples of Polemon, for I am going to mention them again at last. Of Zeno I remember to have said that he attended Xenocrates and then Polemon, and afterwards became a Cynic in the School of Crates: but now let him be accounted to have also derived something from Stilpo and those Heracleitean discourses. 'For since as fellow disciples of Polemon Arcesilaus and Zeno were emulous of each other, the one of them took as his allies in their mutual contest Heracleitus, and Stilpo, and also Crates, among whom he was made by Stilpo a disputant, by Heracleitus austere, and by Crates cynical: but the other, Arcesilaus, has Theophrastus, and Crantor the Piatonist, and Diodorus, and then Pyrrho, and of these Crantor made him persuasive, Diodorus sophistical, and Pyrrho versatile, and reckless, and nothing at all. 'And this was the meaning of a certain hexameter verse often applied to him in an insulting parody:

"Plato before, and Pyrrho behind, in the midst Diodorus." But Timon says that he was also taught and equipped by Menedemus in the art of disputation, if at least it is of him that he says: "With Menedemus' lead beneath his breast He runs apace to Pyrrho's mass of flesh, Or Diodorus' dialectic craft." 'So by interweaving the reasonings and scepticism of Pyrrho with the subtleties of Diodorus, who was skilled in dialectics, he arrayed a kind of mouthy chatter in Plato's forcible language, and would say and unsay, and roll over from this side and from that, and from either side, whichever it might chance, retracting his own words, obscure, and contradic-

tory withal, and venturesome, and knowing nothing, as he said himself, so candid as he was: and then somehow he would turn out like those who did know, after having exhibited himself in all kinds of characters by the sketchiness of his discourses.'

CHAPTER VI 'THERE was no less uncertainty about Arcesilaus than about Tydides in Homer, when you could not know on which side he was, whether associated with Trojans or with Achaeans. For to keep to one argument and ever say the same thing, was not possible for him, nor indeed did he ever think such a course by any means worthy of a clever man. So he went by the name of a "Keen sophist, slayer of men unskilled in fence." 'For by preparation and study in the delusive show of his arguments he used to stupefy and juggle like the Empusae, and could neither know anything himself nor let others know: he spread terror and confusion, and in carrying off the prize for sophistries and deceitful arguments, he rejoiced over his disgrace, and prided himself wonderfully on not knowing either what is base or noble, or what is good or bad, but after saying whichever came into his thoughts, he would change again and upset his argument in many more ways than he had constructed it.

'So he would cut himself and be cut in pieces like a hydra, neither side being distinguished from the other, and without regard to decency; nevertheless he pleased his hearers, who while they listened saw also that he was good-looking: he was most pleasing therefore both to hear and to see, after they grew accustomed to accept from him arguments proceeding from a beautiful face and mouth, besides the kindliness which shone in his eyes. 'Now this description must not be taken loosely, but from the beginning such was his character. For having associated in boyhood with Theophrastus, a man of gentle and amorous disposition, Arcesilaus being beautiful and still in the bloom of youth gained the love of Crantor the Academic, and attached himself to him; and being not without natural ability, he let it run its swift and easy course, and fired by love of disputation he gained help from Diodorus in those elegant and artfully studied plausibilities, and also attended the School of Pyrrho (now Pyrrho had begun somewhere or other from the School of Democritus),----so Arcesilaus, equipped from this source, adhered, except in name, to Pyrrho, as one who overthrew all things.

'Mnaseas at least, and Philomelus, and Timon, the Sceptics, call him a Sceptic, as they were themselves, because he also overthrew truth and falsehood and probability. 'Therefore, although on account of his Pyrrhonistic doctrines he might have been called a Pyrrhonist, yet from respect for his lover he submitted to be still called an Academic. He was therefore a Pyrrhonist, except in name: but an Academic he was not, except in being so called. For I do not believe what Diocles of Cnidos asserts in his Diatribae so-entitled, that through fear of the followers of Theodorus, and of the Sophist Bion, who used to assail the philosophers, and

shrank from no means of refuting them, Arcesilaus took precautions, in order to avoid trouble, by never appearing to suggest any dogma, but used to put forward the ”suspense of judgement” as a protection, like the black juice which the cuttle-fishes throw out. This then I do not believe.

’Those, however, who started from this School, Arcesilaus and Zeno, with such auxiliary forces of arguments helping both sides in the war, forgot the origin from, which they had started in the School of Polemon: ”And parting, formed in order of attack.” ”Together rushed Bucklers and lances, and the furious might Of mail-clad warriors; bossy shield on shield Clattered in conflict; loud the clamour rose.” ”Buckler to buckler pressed, and helm to helm, And man to man.” ”Man struggling hand to hand with man.” ”Then rose too mingled shouts and groans of man, Slaying and slain ”; the Stoics being the slain; for they could not strike the Academics, because they could not discover in what part they were most liable to be beaten. But beaten they would be, and their foundation shaken, if they were to have neither principle nor starting-point for the battle. Now the principle was to prove that they did not express the thoughts of Plato; and their starting-point was lost, if they altered the definition concerning the conceptual presentation by the removal of a single word.

’It is not now the proper time for me to show this, but I will mention it again, when I arrive exactly at this point. When, however, they had come to open variance, it was not that the two struck at each other, but only Arcesilaus at Zeno. For Zeno in his fighting had a certain solemnity and heaviness, not more effective than the oratory of Cephisodorus: for he, Cephisodorus, when he saw his own teacher Isocrates attacked by Aristotle, though he was ignorant and unacquainted with Aristotle, yet from perceiving that the works of Plato were highly esteemed, supposed that Aristotle’s philosophy agreed with Plato’s, and in trying to make war upon Aristotle struck at Plato, and having drawn his first accusation from the ”Ideas,” ended by attacking his other doctrines, of which he knew nothing himself, but guessed the received opinions concerning them by the way in which they are usually described.

’However, this Cephisodorus instead of fighting the man with whom he was at war, fought with the one against whom he wished not to make war. But if Zeno himself after getting rid of Arcesilaus, had abstained also from making war upon Plato, he would have shown himself, in my judgement, an excellent philosopher, in so keeping the peace. But if he acted with a knowledge perhaps of the doctrines of Arcesilaus, though in ignorance of Plato, to judge from what he wrote against him, he is convicted of taking an inconsistent course, in not striking the one whom he knew, and insulting most foully and disgracefully the man whom he had no right to assail, and treating him far worse than he should have treated a dog. ’However, he certainly showed a high spirit in his disregard of Arcesilaus: for either through ignorance of his doctrines, or through fear of the Stoics, he turned aside ”the mighty

jaws of bitter war" against Plato. But of Zeno's vile and utterly shameless revolts against Plato I shall speak again, if I can spare time from philosophy. I hope, however, never to have so much time to spare, at least for this purpose, unless it be in sport.

'So, when Arcesilaus saw that Zeno was a professional rival, and worth conquering, he shrank from nothing in trying to overthrow the arguments set forth by him. 'Now of the other points on which he was at war with him, I perhaps am not able to speak, or even if I were able, there would be no need to mention them now: but as Zeno was the first inventor of the following doctrine, and as he, Arcesilaus, saw that both itself and its name were famous at Athens, I mean, the conceptual presentation, he employed every device against it. But the other being in the weaker position could suffer no injury by keeping quiet, and so disregarded Arcesilaus, against whom he would have had much to say, but was unwilling, or rather perhaps there was some other cause; but Plato being no longer among the living he proceeded to fight with his shadow, and tried to cry him down by uttering all kinds of vulgar buffoonery, thinking that neither could Plato defend himself, nor would any one else care to avenge him: or if Arcesilaus should care to do so, he thought that at all events he should be a gainer by diverting the attack of Arcesilaus from himself. He knew also that Agathocles of Syracuse had practised this artifice upon the Carthaginians.

'The Stoics listened in amazement. For their Muse was not even then learned nor productive of such graces as those by which Arcesilaus talked them down, knocking off this argument, cutting away that, and tripping up others, and so succeeded in persuading them. When therefore those against whom he argued were worsted, and those in whose midst he was speaking were astounded, the men of that day were somehow convinced that neither speech was anything, nor feeling, nor any single work however small, nor on the contrary would anything ever have seemed useless, except what so seemed in the opinion of Arcesilaus of Pitane. But he, as we said, held no opinion, nor made any more definite statement than that all these were little phrases and bugbears.' CHAPTER VII 'Now there is a pleasant story about Lacydes which I wish to tell you. Lacydes was rather stingy, and in a manner the proverbial Economist; for this man, who was in such general good repute, used to open his storeroom himself and shut it himself. And he would take out what things he wanted, and do all other such, work with his own hands, not at all as approving self-dependence, nor as being in any poverty, nor in want of servants, for he certainly had servants such as they were: but the reason you are at liberty to guess.

'However, I will go on to tell the pretty story which I promised. For while acting as his own steward he thought that he ought not to carry the key about on his own person, but he used after locking up to hide the key in a certain hollow writing-case: and after sealing this with a ring, he used to roll the ring down through the

keyhole and leave it inside the house, so that afterwards when he came back, and opened with the key, he would be able to pick up the ring, and lock up again, and then to seal, and then to throw the ring back again inside through the keyhole. So the servants having discovered this clever trick, whenever Lacydes went out for a walk or anywhere else, they too would open the storeroom, and then, after eating this and drinking up that according to their desire, and carrying other things away, they went through this same round, they shut up, and sealed, and the ring they let down through the keyhole into the house, laughing heartily at their master.

'So Lacydes, when he had left his vessels full and found them empty, was puzzled by what occurred; and when he heard that the doctrine of incomprehensibility was taught in the philosophy of Arcesilaus, he thought that this was the very thing that was occurring in regard to his storeroom. And from this beginning he took to studying with Arcesilaus the philosophy that we can neither see nor hear anything clear or sound; and having once drawn one of his companions into the house, he began to argue with him on "the suspense of judgement" with extraordinary Tehemence, as it seemed, and said, This indeed I can state to you as an indisputable fact, haying learned it from my own case, not from questioning any other. 'And then he began and described the whole misfortune which had happened to him about the storeroom. What then, said he, could Zeno now say against "incomprehensibility" thus in all points proved manifest to me in such circumstances as these? For as I locked it up with my own hands, sealed it myself, and myself threw the ring inside, and when I came again and opened it, saw the ring inside but not my other property, how can I fail to be justly incredulous of all things? For I shall not dare for my part to say that any one came and stole the things, as there was the ring inside.

'Then his hearer, who was an insolent fellow, having heard out the whole story as well as he could listen, being scarce able hitherto to contain himself, burst out into a very broad laugh, and still laughing and chuckling tried between whiles to refute his silly notion. So beginning from that time Lacydes no longer used to throw the ring inside, and ceased to use in argument the "incomprehensibility" of his storeroom, but began to comprehend his losses, and found that he had been philosophizing over them in vain. 'Nevertheless his servants were impudent knaves, and not to be caught with one band, but just such as the slaves you see in comedy, a Geta or a Dacus, loud-tongued in Dacian chatter; and after they had listened to the Stoics' sophisms, or had learned them in some other way, went straight at the venture, and used to take off his seal, and sometimes they would substitute another instead of it, but sometimes they did not even this, because they thought it would be all incomprehensible to him, whether this way or any other.

'So when he came in, he used to examine, and when he saw the writing-case unsealed, or, though sealed, yet with a different seal, he was very angry: but when they said that it was sealed, for they could themselves see his own seal, he would

begin a subtle argument and demonstration. And when they were beaten by his demonstration, and said that, if the seal was not there, perhaps he had himself forgotten and not sealed it up, Yes, certainly, he said, he remembered that he had himself sealed it up, and began to prove it, and argue all round, and thinking that they were making sport of him, he would make violent complaints against them with many oaths. 'But they suspected his attacks, and began to think that he was making sport of them; since Lacydes, who was a philosopher, had decided that he could have no opinion, and therefore no memory, for memory is a kind of opinion; a short time ago at least they had heard him, they said, speak thus to his friends.

'But when he overthrew their attempts and used language not at all Academic, they would go themselves to the school of some Stoic, and learn anew what they ought to say, and with that preparation would meet sophistry with sophistry, and show themselves rivals of the Academic school in the art of thievery; Then he would find fault with the Stoics; but his servants would put aside his accusations by alleging "incomprehensibility" with no little jeering. 'So discussions went on there on all points, and arguments and counter-arguments; and in the meanwhile there was not a single thing left, no vessel, nor anything that was put in the vess.el, nor any other things that make up the furnishing of a house. 'And Lacydes for a while was at a loss, seeing that the support of his own doctrines was of no help to him; and thinking that, if he could not convict them, everything he had would be upset, he fell into perplexity, and began to cry out upon his neighbours and upon the gods, Oh! Oh! and Alas! Alas! and By all the gods, and By the goddesses, and all the other artless affirmations of men who in cases of distrust take to strong language---all these were uttered with loud shouting and asseveration.

'But at last, since he had a battle of contradiction in the house, the master, doubtless, took to playing the Stoic with his servants, and when the servants insisted, on the Academic doctrines, in order that they might have no more trouble, he became a constant stay-at-home, sitting before his storeroom. And when he could do no good, he began to suspect what his philosophy was coming to, and opened his mind. Of these things, my boys, said he, we talk in our discussions one way, but we live in another.' This is what he tells about Lacydes. But the man found many hearers, one of whom, Aristippus of Cyrene, was distinguished. But of all his disciples his successor in the School was Evander, and those who came after him. After these Carneades took up the teaching and established a third Academy. In argument he employed the same method as Arcesilaus, for, like him, he too practised the mode of attacking both sides, and used to upset all the arguments used by the others: but in the principle of 'suspension of judgement' alone he differed from him, saying that it was impossible for a mortal man to suspend judgement upon all matters, and there was a difference between 'uncertain' and 'incomprehensible,' and though all things were incomprehensible, not all were uncertain. But this Carneades was also acquainted with the Stoic doctrines, and by his contentious op-

position to them grew more famous, by aiming not at the truth but at what seemed plausible to the multitude: whence he also gave the Stoics much displeasure. So Numenius writes about him as follows:

CHAPTER VIII 'CARNEADES having succeeded to the leadership disregarded the teacher whose doctrines he ought to have defended, both those which were unassailable and those which had been assailed, and referring everything back to Arcesilaus, whether good or bad, renewed the battle after a long interval.' And afterwards he adds: 'So this man also would bring forward and take back, and gather to the battle contradictions and subtle twists in various ways, and be full both of denials and affirmations, and contradictions on both sides: and if ever there was need of marvellous statements, he would rise up as violent as a river in, flood, overflowing with rapid stream everything on this side and on that, and would fall upon his hearers and drag them along with him in a tumult. 'While therefore he swept off all others he himself remained infallible, an advantage not enjoyed by Arcesilaus: for while he used with his quackery to come round his frenzied companions, he was unconscious of having first deluded himself in this, that he had not been guided by sensation, but convinced of the truth of his reasoning in the overthrow of all things at once.

'But Carneades after Arcesilaus must have been evil upon evil, as he made not even the smallest concession, unless his opponents were likely to be disconcerted by it, in accordance with what he called his positive and negative presentations from probability, that this individual thing was an animal or was not an animal. 'So after such a concession, just as wild beasts who recoil throw themselves all the more violently upon the spear-points, he too after giving in would make a more powerful assault. And when he had stood his ground and was successful, then at once he would voluntarily disregard his previous opinion, and make no mention of it. 'For while granting that there are both truth and falsehood in all things, as if he were co-operating in the method of inquiry, he would give a hold like a clever wrestler and thereby get the advantage. For after granting each side according to the turn of the scale in probability, he said that neither was comprehended with certainty.

'He was in fact a more clever freebooter and conjurer than Arcesilaus. For together with something true he would take a falsehood like it, and with a conceptual presentation a concept similar to it, and after weighing them till the scales were even, he would admit the existence neither of the truth nor of the falsehood, or no more of the one than of the other, or more only from probability. 'So dreams followed dreams, because the false presentations were like the true, as in passing from an egg of wax to the real egg. 'The evil results therefore were the more numerous. And nevertheless Carneades fascinated and enslaved men's souls; as an undetected cozener, and an open freebooter, he could conquer whether by craft or by force even those who were very thoroughly equipped. 'In fact every opinion of Carneades

was victorious, and never any other, since those with whom he was at war were less powerful as speakers.

'Antipater, for instance, who was his contemporary, was intending to write something in rivalry; in face, however, of the arguments which Carneades kept pouring forth day by day, he never made it public, neither in the Schools, nor in the public walks, nor even spoke nor uttered a sound, nor, it is said, did any one ever hear from him a single syllable: but he kept threatening written replies, and hiding in a corner wrote books which he bequeathed to posterity, that are powerless now, and were more powerless then against a man like Carneades, who showed himself eminently great, and was so considered by the men of that time. 'But nevertheless, although from his jealousy of the Stoics he stirred up confusion in public, he would himself in secret with his own friends agree, and speak candidly, and affirm, as much as any other ordinary person.' Then next he adds:

'Mentor was a disciple of Carneades at first, yet not his successor: for while still living Carneades found him familiar with his mistress, and not merely from a probable presentation, nor as failing to comprehend, but most fully believing his own eyes, and with a clear comprehension, rejected him from his School. So he departed and became his opponent in sophistry, and his rival in art, refuting the "incomprehensibility" which he taught in his discourses.' Again he adds: 'But Carneades, as teaching a self-contradictory philosophy, used to pride himself upon his falsehoods, and hide the truths beneath them. So he used his falsehoods as curtains, and hiding within spoke the truth in a somewhat knavish way. Thus he suffered from the same fault as beans, of which the empty ones float on the water and rise highest, while the good ones lie below and are unseen,' This is what is said about Carneades. In the School Cleitomachus is appointed his successor, and after him Philon, of whom Numenius makes mention as follows:

CHAPTER IX 'So then this Philon on first succeeding to the School was beside himself with joy, and by way of making a grateful return used to worship and extol the doctrines of Cleitomachus, and "arm himself in gleaming brass" against the Stoics. 'But as time went on, and their doctrine of "suspense" was going out of fashion from familiarity, he was not at all consistent in thought with himself, but began to be converted by the clear evidence and acknowledgement of his misfortunes. Having therefore already much clearness of perception, he was very desirous, you may be sure, to find some who would refute him, that he might not appear to be turning his back and running away of his own accord. 'A disciple of Philon was Antiochus, who founded a different Academy: at least he attended the School of Mnesarchus the Stoic, and adopted the contrary opinions to his teacher Philon, and fastened countless strange doctrines upon the Academy.'

These anecdotes and thousands like these are recorded of the successors of Plato. It is time, however, to take up our subject anew, and examine the opinions, alike

false and contradictory, of the physical philosophers, men who wandered over the wide earth, and had set the highest value on the discovery of truth, and been familiar with the opinions of all the ancients, and carefully studied the exact nature of the theology which existed among all, Phoenicians and Egyptians and the Greeks themselves, in much earlier times. It is worth while then to hear from themselves what was the fruit they found from their labours, that so we may learn whether any worthy notion of God had come down to them from the men of an older time. For the superstition of polytheism was formerly prevalent from ancient times among the nations, and shrines, and temples, and mysteries of the gods were everywhere customarily maintained, both in city and country districts. So then there was no need even of human philosophy, if indeed the knowledge of things divine had preoccupied the ground: nor was there any necessity for the wise to invent novelties, if forsooth the doctrines of their forefathers were right, nor any cause for factions and dissensions among the noble philosophers, if the ancestral opinion about their gods had been tested and proved to be harmonious and true.

Or what need was there to war and fight with one another, or run about and wander up and down the long course, and filch the learning of the Barbarians, when they ought to have been staying at home, and learning all from the gods, if forsooth there were any gods, or to learn from the writers on religion the true and infallible statements of the matters investigated in philosophy, about which they spent infinite toil and contention, yet fell far short of discovering the truth? Why too need they have ventured to make novel inquiries about gods or to quarrel and pummel one another, if forsooth a safe and sure discovery of gods and a true knowledge of religion was contained in sacred rites and mysteries and the rest of the theology of the most ancient races, when they might have cultivated that very religion undisturbed and in harmonious agreement?

But then if it should be found that these men had learned no truth about God from their predecessors, but had set themselves to the examination of nature by their own devices, and used conjectures rather than clear conception, why should they any longer refuse to acknowledge that the ancient theology of the nations offered nothing beyond the account which has been rendered in the books preceding this? Now that the philosophy of the Greeks was a product of human conjectures and much disputation and error, but not of any exact conception, you may learn from Porphyry’s Epistle to Anebo the Egyptian, when you hear him acknowledge this very fact in these words: CHAPTER X [PORPHYRY] ’I WILL begin my friendship with you by an inquiry concerning the gods and good demons and the philosophical doctrines relating to them, subjects upon which very much has been said by Greek philosophers also, the greater part, however, of their statements having only conjecture for the foundation of their credibility.’

And lower down he adds again: 'For among us there is much verbal controversy, as we derive the notion of "the good" by conjecture from human reasonings: and those who have formed plans of communication with the higher nature, have exercised their wisdom in vain, if this branch of the subject has been disregarded in the investigation.' Moreover in what he wrote Against Boethus, On the Soul, the same author makes the following confession in writing, word for word:---- 'The evidence of our thoughts and that of history unquestionably establish the immortality of the soul: but the arguments brought forward by philosophers in demonstration of it seem easy to be overthrown through the ingenious arguments of the Eristics on every subject. For what argument in philosophy could not be disputed by men of a different opinion, when some of them thought fit to suspend judgement even about matters that seemed to be manifest?'

Also in the work which he entitled Of the Philosophy derived from Oracles he expressly acknowledges that the Greeks have been in error, and calls his own god as a witness, saying that even Apollo had proclaimed this by oracles, and had testified to the discovery of the truth by the Barbarians rather than by the Greeks, and moreover had even mentioned the Hebrews in the testimony which he bore. In fact, after quoting the oracle he has immediately made use of these concluding words: 'Have you heard how much pains have been taken that a man may offer the sacrifices of purification for the body, to say nothing of finding the salvation of the soul? For the road to the gods is bound with brass, and steep, and rough, and in it Barbarians found many paths, but Greeks went astray, while those who already held it even ruined it; but the discovery was ascribed by the testimony of the god to Egyptians, Phoenicians, and Chaldeans (for these are Assyrians), to Lydians, and to Hebrews.'

This is the statement of the philosopher, or rather of his god. Is it right then after this to blame us, because forsooth we forsook the Greeks who had gone astray and chose the doctrines of the Hebrews, who had received such testimony for comprehension of the truth? And what are we to expect to learn from philosophers? Or what hope is there of assistance from them, if indeed their statements for the most part derive the first principles of their proof from conjectures and probabilities? And what is the benefit of disputation, if forsooth all the arguments of the philosophers are easily overthrown, because of the sophistical use of language on all subjects? For these are the statements heard just now not from us, but from themselves. Wherefore it seems to me that not unreasonably but rightly and with well-proved judgement, we have despised teaching of such a character, and have welcomed the doctrines of the Hebrews, not because they have received testimony from the demon, but because they are shown to partake of the excellence and power of divine inspiration.

In order, however, that you may learn by actual facts the disputations of the wonderful philosophers, and their dissensions about first principles, and about gods, and the constitution of the universe, I will set out their own words before you a little later. But first we must notice another point; for they go about boasting everywhere of their mathematical sciences and saying that it is altogether necessary for those who are going to attempt the comprehension of truth to pursue the study of astronomy, arithmetic, geometry, music,----the very things which were proved to have come to them from Barbarians,----for that without these a man cannot be accomplished in learning and philosophy, nay, cannot even touch the truth of things, unless the knowledge of these sciences has been previously impressed upon his soul. And then, priding themselves upon their learning in the subjects which I have mentioned, they think that they are lifted up on high and almost walking upon the very ether, as though forsooth they carried God Himself about with them in their arithmetic; and because we do not pursue the like studies, they think us no better than cattle, and say that we cannot in this way know God, nor anything grand. Come then, let us first set straight what is wrong in this, by holding out true reason as a light before them.

And that will show thousands of Greeks and thousands of Barbarian races also, of whom the former with the help of the aforesaid sciences recognized neither God, nor virtuous life, nor anything at all that is excellent and profitable, while the latter without all these sciences have been eminent in religion and philosophy. For instance, you may learn what sort of opinions were held on these subjects by one so celebrated among them all as Socrates, if you give credit to what Xenophon narrates in the Memorabilia as follows: CHAPTER XI [XENOPHON] 'HE also used to teach how far it was necessary for a well-educated man to be acquainted with each subject. For example, he said that he ought to learn geometry so far as to be able, if ever it should be necessary, rightly to measure land either in taking or giving possession, or in allotting it, or marking out work. And this, he said, was so easy to learn that one who gave his mind to the measuring could know at once how much land there was, and go away acquainted with the mode of measuring it.

'But of learning geometry so far as to reach those unintelligible diagrams he disapproved, for he said he did not see of what use these were, although he was not unacquainted with them. But they were enough, he said, to exhaust a man's lifetime, and hindered him from many other useful branches of learning. 'He bade them also become acquainted with astronomy, but this also only so far as to be able to know the time of night, or of the month, or of the year, for the sake of travelling, or voyaging, or keeping watch, and to be able to make use of the indications relating to all other things that are to be done either in the night, or in the month, or year, by knowing the different seasons for the works before mentioned. These also, he said, were easy to learn from nocturnal hunters, and pilots, and many others, whose business it is to know these things.

'But he strongly dissuaded from learning astronomy to such an extent as to know the bodies which are not in the same orbit, and the planets and comets, and to waste time in investigating their distances from the earth, and their periods, and the causes of them. For he said that in these matters he did not see any benefit, and yet even in these he was not uninstructed. But he said of these also that they were enough to wear out a man's lifetime, and to hinder him from many useful pursuits. 'And he wholly dissuaded one from anxiously inquiring in what way the heavenly bodies are each contrived by God; for he neither thought that these things could be discovered by mankind, nor did he believe that the gods would be pleased with the man who sought to know what they had not been willing to make clear. But he said that the man who troubled himself about these things would be in danger even of going as mad as Anaxagoras was, who prided himself very highly upon explaining the contrivances of the gods.

'For when he used to say that fire and the sun were the same, he ignored the fact that though men easily discern, the fire, yet they cannot look upon the sun; and by being exposed to the sunshine they have their complexions darkened, but not so by fire. Also he was ignorant that of plants which spring out of the earth none can make good growth without the light of the sun, while all perish when heated by fire. And in saying that the sun was a fiery stone he was ignorant also of this fact, that while a stone set in the fire neither shines nor lasts long, the sun continues all the time to be the brightest of all things. 'He also used to bid us learn to count; but here also as in everything else he bade us guard against useless trouble: yet as far as it was useful he would himself help his companions in examining and discussing all things.'

So writes Xenophon in the Memorabilia. And in the Epistle to Aeschines the same author writes as follows concerning Plato, and those who boast of their physiology of the universe: CHAPTER XII

'THAT the things of the gods are beyond us is manifest to every one; but it is sufficient to worship them to the best of our power. What their nature is it is neither easy to discover nor lawful to inquire. For it pertains not to slaves to know the nature or conduct of their masters, beyond what their service requires. And what is of most importance, in proportion as we ought to admire one who spends labour upon the interests of mankind, so to those who strive to get fame from many inopportune and vain attempts it brings the more trouble. For when, 0 Aeschines, has any one ever heard Socrates talking about the heaven, or encouraging any one to learn about geometrical lines for correction of morals? As to music we know that he understood it only by ear; but he was constantly telling them on every occasion what was noble, and what manliness was, and justice, and other virtues: he used in fact to call the interests of mankind absolute good; and all things else, he used to say, were either impossible to be achieved by men, or were akin to fables,

playthings of Sophists in their supercilious discussions. And he did not merely say these things without practising them. But to write of his doings to you who know them, although not likely to be unpleasing, takes time, and I have recorded them elsewhere. When refuted therefore let them cease, or betake themselves to what is reasonable, these men who were not pleased with Socrates, to whose wisdom the god bare witness while he was yet alive, and they who put him to death found no expiation in repentance. And so-----what a noble thing----they fell in love with Egypt, and the prodigious wisdom of Pythagoras, men whose excess and inconstancy towards Socrates was proved by their love of tyranny, and exchange of frugal living for a table of Sicilian luxury to serve their boundless appetite.'

So speaks Xenophon, with a hint at Plato. But Plato in the Republic relates that concerning gymnastics and music Socrates spake as follows: CHAPTER XIII [PLATO] 'WHAT then, O Glaucon, would be a learning likely to draw the soul from the transient to the real? But while I am speaking there comes into my mind this point: did we not say surely that these guardians while yet young must be athletes in war? Yes, we said so. The learning then which we are seeking must have this quality in addition to the former. What quality? It must be of some use to men of war. It certainly must, if possible. They were to be educated, we said before, in gymnastic and music. It was so, said he. And gymnastic, I suppose, since it presides over growth and decay of the body, is concerned with generation and corruption. That is evident. This then cannot be the study for which we are seeking. It cannot. Can then music, so far as we previously discussed it? Nay, said he, that, if you remember, was the counterpart of gymnastic, as training our guardians by the influences of habit, by harmony imparting not science but a kind of harmoniousness, and by rhythm a rhythmical movement, and as having in its words certain other moral tendencies akin to these, whether the subjects of its discourse were fabulous or partly true; but it contained no instruction tending to such an end as you are now seeking.

'You remind me very correctly, said I; for music certainly contained nothing of the kind. But what can there be of this character, my excellent Glaucon? For, I think, we regarded all the arts as mechanical. Of course.' Then further on he adds: 'We must never let those whom we are to educate attempt any imperfect form of science that has not reached the point that all ought to attain, as we were saying just now about astronomy. Or do you not know that they treat harmony also in this way? For while they measure and compare with each other the notes and concords that are merely heard, they labour, like the astronomers, on a useless task. 'Yes, by heaven! said he, and it is ludicrous to see how they name certain condensed intervals, and lay their ears on one side, as if trying to catch a note from their neighbours; and some of them say that they can still hear an intermediate sound, and that this is the very smallest interval which should be used in measuring, while others doubt this and say that they now sound alike, and both set their ears before their mind.

'You mean, said I, those good men who are always teasing and torturing the strings, and screwing them up on the pegs. But that the metaphor may not be extended too far about the beats given by the plectrum, and the assent, and dissent, and petulance of the strings, I drop the metaphor, and say that I do not mean these men, but those others whom we said just now that we would consult about harmony. For they do the same as the astronomers; they investigate the numerical relations in the harmonies which fall upon the ears, but they do not rise to problems, to examine what numbers are harmonious, and what not, and the reason in either case.' But now let this suffice in the way of preface to our defence that we have not without right judgement neglected the useless learning of such subjects as these. Let us then make at once a new beginning and examine the mutual contradictions in doctrine of the aforesaid physical philosophers. Now Plutarch has collected together the opinions of all the Platonists and Pythagoreans alike, and of the still earlier physical philosophers as they were called, and again of the more recent Peripatetics, and Stoics, and Epicureans, and written them in a work which he entitled Of the Physical Doctrines approved by Philosophers, from which I shall make the following quotations:

CHAPTER XIV [PLUTARCH] 'THALES of Miletus, one of the seven sages, declared water to be the first principle of all things. This man is thought to have been the founder of philosophy, and from him the Ionic sect derived its name; for it had many successions. After studying philosophy in Egypt he came as an elderly man to Miletus. He says that all things come from water, and are all resolved into water. And he forms his conjecture first from the fact that seed, which is watery, is the first principle of all animal life; thus it is probable that all things have their origin from moisture. His second argument is that all plants derive nourishment and fruitfulness from moisture, and when deprived of it wither away. And the third, that the very fire of the sun, and of the stars, and the world itself are nourished by the evaporations of the waters. For this reason Homer also suggests this notion concerning water,

"Ocean, which is the origin of all." This is what Thales says. 'But Anaximander of Miletus says that the first principle of all things is the infinite, for from this all are produced, and into this all pass away; for which reason also infinite worlds are generated, and pass away again into that from which they spring. So he says the reason why the infinite exists is that the subsisting creation may not be deficient in any point. But he also is at fault in not saying what the infinite is, whether it is air, or water, or earth, or any other corporeal elements; he is wrong therefore in declaring the matter while excluding the efficient cause. For the infinite is nothing else than matter, and matter cannot have an actual existence, unless the efficient cause underlie it. 'Anaximenes of Miletus declared that the air is the first principle of all things, for from this all are produced, and into it they are resolved again. For example, our soul, he says, is air, for it holds us together; and the whole world too

is encompassed by air and breath, and air and breath are used as synonyms. But he too is wrong in thinking that living beings consist of simple homogeneous air and breath; for it is impossible that the matter can exist as sole principle of things, but we must assume the efficient cause also. As for instance silver suffices not for the production of the drinking-cup, unless there be the efficient cause, that is the silversmith; the case is similar with copper and various kinds of wood, and all other matter.

'Heracleitus and Hippasus of Metapontum say that fire is the principle of all things: for from fire, they say, all things are produced and all end in fire: and all things in the world are created as it gradually cools down. For first the coarsest part of it is pressed together and becomes earth; then the earth being resolved by the natural force of the fire is turned into water, and being vaporised becomes air. And again the world and all the bodies in it are consumed in a conflagration by fire. Fire therefore is the first principle, because all things come from it, and the end, inasmuch as they are all resolved into it.

'Democritus, who was followed long after by Epicurus, said that the first principles of all things are bodies indivisible, but conceivable by reason, with no admixture of vacuum, uncreated, imperishable, not capable of being broken, nor of receiving shape from their parts, nor of being altered in quality, but perceptible by reason only; that they move, however, in the vacuum, and through the vacuum, and that both the vacuum itself is infinite and the bodies infinite. And the bodies possess these three properties, shape, magnitude, and weight. Democritus, however, said two, magnitude and shape; but Epicurus added to them a third, namely weight. For he said the bodies must be moved by the impulse of the weight, since otherwise they will not be moved at all. The shapes of the atoms are limitable, not infinite: for there are none either hook-shaped, nor trident-shaped, nor ring-shaped. For these shapes are easily broken, whereas the atoms are impassive and cannot be broken; but they have their proper shapes, which are conceivable by reason. And the "atom" is so called, not because it is extremely small, but because it cannot be divided, being impassive, and free from admixture of vacuum: so that if a man says "atom" he means unbreakable, impassive, unmixed with vacuum. And that the atom exists is manifest: for there are also elements (στοιχεῖα), and living beings that are empty, and there is the Monad.

'Empedocles, son of Meton, of Agrigentum, says that there are four elements, fire, air, water, earth, and, two original forces, love and hate, of which the one tends to unite, and the other to separate. And this is how he speaks: "Learn first four roots of all things that exist: Bright Zeus, life-giving Hera, and the god Of realms unseen, and Nestis, who with tears Bedews the fountain-head of mortal life." For by "Zeus" he means the seething heat and the ether; and by "life-giving Hera," the air; the earth by Aidoneus, and by Nestis and "the fountain-head of mortal life," the seed, as

it were, and the water.' So great is the dissonance of the first physical philosophers: such too is their opinion concerning first principles, assuming, as they did, no god, no maker, no artificer, nor any cause of the universe, nor yet gods, nor incorporeal powers, no intelligent natures, no rational essences, nor anything at all beyond the reach of the senses, in their first principles.

In fact Anaxagoras alone is mentioned as the first of the Greeks who declared in his discourses about first principles that mind is the cause of all things. They say at least that this philosopher had a great admiration for natural science beyond all who were before him: for the sake of it certainly he left his own district a mere sheepwalk, and was the first of the Greeks who stated clearly the doctrine of first principles. For he not only pronounced, like those before him, on the essence of all things, but also on the cause which set it in motion. '"For in the beginning," he said, "all things were mingled together in confusion: but mind came in, and brought them out of confusion into order.'" One cannot but wonder how this man, having been the first among Greeks who taught concerning God in this fashion, was thought by the Athenians to be an atheist, because he regarded not the sun but the Maker of the sun as God, and barely escaped being stoned to death.

But it is said that even he did not keep the doctrine safe and sound: for though he made mind preside over all things, he did not go on to render his physical system concerning the existing world accordant with mind and reason. Hear in fact how in Plato's dialogue Of the Soul Socrates blames him in the following passage: CHAPTER XV [PLATO] 'BUT once when I heard a man reading out of a book, as he said, of Anaxagoras, and saying that it is mind that sets all in order, and is the cause of all, I was delighted with this cause, and it seemed to me in a certain manner right that mind should be the cause of all things, and I thought, if this is so, mind in its ordering all things must arrange each in such a way that all may be best. 'If therefore any one should wish to find the cause of each thing, how it comes into being or perishes or exists, what he must find out about it is this, how it is best for it either to be, or to do or suffer anything else. According to this theory then a man ought to consider nothing else, whether in regard to himself or others, except what is best and most perfect: then the same man must necessarily know also the worse; for the knowledge concerning them is the same.

'Reasoning thus then I rejoiced to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the cause of existing things after my own mind, and that he would tell me in the first place whether the earth is flat or round, and, after he had told me, would further explain the cause and the necessity, stating which is the better, and that it is better for it to be of such shape: and if he should say that it is in the centre, I thought that he would go on to explain that it is better for it to be in the centre: and if he should prove all this to me, I was prepared to desire no other kind of cause beyond that. 'Moreover I was prepared to make the like inquiries concerning sun

and moon and the other heavenly bodies as to their relative swiftness, and turning-points and other conditions, how it is better for each of them thus to act and be acted upon as they are. For I could never have thought that when he asserted that they were ordered by mind he would ascribe any other cause to them, except that it was best for them to be just as they are.

'I thought therefore that in assigning its cause to each of them severally, and to all in common, he would further explain what was best for each and what was the common good of all. And I would not have sold my expectations for a great deal, but I seized the books very eagerly, and began to read as fast as I could, in order that I might know as soon as possible what was best and what worse. How glorious then the hope, my friend, from which I was driven away, when, as I went on reading, I saw a man making no use of mind, nor alleging any (real) causes for the ordering of things, but treating as causes a parcel of airs and ethers and waters, and many other absurdities. 'And he seemed to me to be very much in the same case as if one were to say that whatever Socrates does he does by mind, and then, on attempting to state the causes of each of my actions, should say first of all that the reasons of my sitting here now are these, that my body is composed of bones and muscles, and the bones are hard and have joints separate one from another, while the muscles are capable of contraction and relaxation, surrounding the bones as do also the flesh and skin which hold them together. When therefore the bones are lifted in their sockets, the muscles by their relaxation and contraction make me able, I suppose, now to bend my limbs, and this is the cause why I am sitting here with my knees bent.

Again, with regard to my conversing with you, it is as if he were to state other causes, such as these, a set of sounds, and airs, and hearings, and ten thousand other things of this kind, but should neglect to mention the true causes, namely, that since the Athenians thought it better to condemn me, for that reason I too in my turn have thought it better to sit here, and more just to remain and undergo my sentence, whatever they may have ordered. 'For, by the Dog! I think these muscles and these bones would long ago have been near Megara or Boeotia, carried thither by their opinion of what is best, did I not think it more just and more noble to undergo any sentence which the state may appoint, instead of taking to flight like a runaway. 'But to call such things as these causes is extremely absurd: if however any one were to say that without having such things, bones and muscles and all else that I have, I should not be able to do what I thought right, he would speak truly; but to say that these are the causes of my doing what I do, and that I do so by mind, but not by choice of what is best, would be a great and extreme carelessness of speech.'

Then he adds: 'And for this reason one man by surrounding the earth with a vortex makes it to be kept steady forsooth by the heaven, while another sets the air as a

support to the earth as if it were a broad kneading-trough. But the power by which things are now set in the best possible way for them to have been placed, this they neither investigate, nor think that there is any superhuman force in it, but imagine that they might at some time discover an Atlas stronger and more immortal than this, and more capable of holding all things together, and suppose that ”the good and binding” does in reality bind and hold together nothing at all.’ So much says Socrates of the opinion of Anaxagoras. Now Anaxagoras was succeeded by Archelaus both in the school and in opinion, and Socrates is said to have been a disciple of Archelaus. Other physical philosophers, however, as Xenophanes and Pythagoras, who nourished at the same time with Anaxagoras, discussed the imperishable nature of God and the immortality of the soul. And from these afterwards arose the sects of Greek philosophy, some of whom followed these, and some followed others, and certain of them also invented opinions of their own. Again then Plutarch writes of their suppositions concerning gods in this same manner:

CHAPTER XVI [PLUTARCH] ’SOME of the philosophers, as Diagoras of Melos, and Theodoras of Cyrene, and Euemerus of Tegea, altogether deny that there are any gods’. There is an allusion also to Euemerus in the Iambic poems of Callimachus of Cyrene. Euripides also, the tragic poet, though he was loth to withdraw the veil through fear of the Areopagus, yet gave a glimpse of this. For he brought Sisyphus forward as the patron of this opinion, and advocated his judgement.’ After these he brings in Anaxagoras again, stating that he was the first who formed right thoughts about God. And this is how he speaks: ’But Anaxagoras says that in the beginning the bodies were motionless, but the mind of God distributed them in order, and produced the generations of the universe. Plato, however, supposed that the primordial bodies were not motionless, but were moving in a disorderly way: wherefore, says he, God having ordained that order is better than disorder, made an orderly distribution of them.’

To which he adds: ’They therefore are both in error, because they represented God as having regard to human affairs, and arranging the world for this purpose: for the living Being which is blessed and immortal, supplied with all good things, and incapable of any misfortune, being wholly occupied with the maintenance of its own happiness and immortality, has no regard for human affairs. But he would be a miserable being if he carried burdens like a labourer or artisan, and was full of cares about the constitution of the world. ’And again the god of whom they speak either was not existing throughout that former age when the primary bodies were motionless, or when they were moving in disorderly fashion, or else he was either asleep, or awake, or neither of these. We can neither admit the first, for every god is eternal; nor the second, for if God was sleeping from eternity He was dead; for an eternal sleep is death. But surely God is incapable of sleep; for the immortality of God and that which is akin to death are far apart.

'If then God was awake, either He was in want of something to complete His happiness, or He was complete in blessedness. And neither according to the first case is God blessed, for that which is wanting in happiness is not blessed: nor according to the second case; for being deficient in nothing, any actions He might attempt must be void of purpose. And if God exists, and if human affairs are administered by His care, how conies it that the counterfeit is prosperous, and the worthy suffers adversity? 'For Agamemnon, who was both "A valiant warrior and a virtuous king," was overpowered and treacherously murdered by an adulterer and adulteress. Also his kinsman Hercules, after purging away many of the plagues by which human life is infested, was treacherously murdered with a poisoned robe by Deianira. 'Thales held that god is the mind of the world; Anaximander that the stars are celestial gods; Democritus that god is like a sphere amid fire, which is the soul of the world.

'Pythagoras held that of first principles the monad is god: and the good, which is the nature of the One, is the mind itself. But the unlimited duad is a daemon and the evil, and it is surrounded by the multitude of matter and the visible world.' Now after these, hear what were the opinions held by those of more recent time: 'Socrates and Plato held that (God is) the One, the single self-existent nature, the monadic, the real Being, the good: and all this variety of names points immediately to mind. God therefore is mind, a separate species, that is to say what is purely immaterial and unconnected with anything passible. 'Aristotle held that the Most High God is a separate species, and rides upon the sphere of the universe, which is an etherial body, the fifth essence so-called by him. And when this had been divided into spheres, which though connected in their nature are separated by reason, he thinks that each of the spheres is a living being compounded of body and soul, of which the body is etherial, and moves in a circular orbit, while the soul, being itself motionless reason, is actually the cause of the motion.

'The Stoics set forth an intelligent god, an artistic fire, proceeding methodically to generate a world, which comprises all the seminal laws, in accordance with which things are severally produced according to fate: also a spirit, which pervades the whole world, but receives different names according to the changes of the matter through which it has passed. 'They regard as a god the world, and the stars, and the earth, but mind which is highest of all they place in the ether. 'Epicurus held that the gods are of human shape, but all to be discerned by reason because of the fineness of the particles in the nature of their forms. The same philosopher added four other natures generically imperishable, namely the atoms, the vacuum, the infinite, the similarities, which are called homoeomeriae and elements.' Such are the dissensions and blasphemies concerning God of the physical philosophers, among whom, as is proved by this narrative, Pythagoras, and Anaxa-goras, and Plato, and Socrates were the first who made mind and God preside over the world. These then are shown to have been in their times very children, as compared with the times at which the remotest events in Hebrew antiquity are fixed by history.

Accordingly among all the Greeks, and those who long ago introduced the polytheistic superstition among both the Phoenicians and Egyptians, the knowledge of the God of the universe was not very ancient, but the first of the Greeks to publish it were Anaxagoras and his school. Moreover the doctrines of the polytheistic superstition prevailed over all nations; but they contained, as it seems, not the true theology, but that which the Egyptians and Phoenicians, as was testified, were the very first to establish. And this was a theology which by no means treated of gods, nor of any divine powers, but of men who had already been long lying among the dead, as was shown long since by our word of truth. Come then, let us take up our argument again. Since among the physical philosophers some were for bringing all things down to the senses, while others drew all in the contrary direction, as Xenophanes of Colophon, and Parmenides the Eleatic, who made nought of the senses, asserting that there could be no comprehension of things sensible, and that we must therefore trust to reason alone, let us examine the objections which have been urged against them.

CHAPTER XVII [ARISTOCLES] 'BUT there came others uttering language opposed to these. For they think we ought to put down the senses and their presentations, and trust only to reason. For such were formerly the statements of Xenophanes and Parmenides and Zenon and Melissus, and afterwards of Stilpo and the Megarics. Whence these maintain that "being" is one, and that the "other" does not exist, and that nothing is generated, and nothing perishes, nor is moved at all. 'The fuller argument then against these we shall learn in our course of philosophy; at present, however, we must say as much as this. We should argue, that though reason is the most divine of our faculties, yet nevertheless we have need also of sense, just as we have of the body. And it is evidently the nature of sense also to be true: for it is not possible that the sentient subject should not be in some way affected, and being affected he must know the affection: therefore sensation also is a kind of knowledge.

'Moreover if sensation is a kind of affection, and everything that is affected is affected by something, that which acts must certainly be other than that which is acted on. So that first there would be the so-called "other," as for instance, the colour and the sound; and then the existing thing will not be one: nor moreover will it be motionless, for sensation is a motion. 'And in this way every one wishes to have his senses in a natural state, inasmuch as he trusts, I suppose, to sound senses rather than to diseased. With good reason therefore a strong love of our senses is infused in us. No one certainly, unless mad, would choose ever to lose a single sense, that so he might gain all other good things. 'Those then who found fault with the senses, if at least they were persualded that it was useless to have them, ought to have said just what Pandarus says in Homer about his own bow,

”Then may a stranger’s sword cut off my head, If with these hands I shatter not and burn The bow that thus hath failed me at my need,” and immediately after to have destroyed all their senses: for thus one would have believed them as teaching by deed that they had no need of them. ’But now this is the very greatest absurdity; for though in their words they declare their senses to be useless, in their deeds they continue to make the fullest use of them. ’Melissus in fact wishing to show why none of these things which are apparent and visible really exists, demonstrates it by the phenomena themselves. He says in fact: ”For if earth exists, and water, and air, and fire, and iron, and gold, and the living and the dead, and black and white, and all the other things which men say are real, and if we see and hear rightly, then ’being’ also ought to be such as it at first seemed to us to be, and not to change, nor become other, but each, thing ought always to be just such as it is. But now we say that we see, and hear, and understand aright: yet it seems to us that the hot becomes cold, and the cold hot, and the hard soft, and the soft hard.”

’But when he used to say these and many other such things one might very reasonably have asked him, Well then, was it not by sensation you learned that what is hot now becomes cold afterwards? And in like manner concerning the other instances. For just as I said, it would be found that he abolishes and convicts the senses because he most fully believes them. ’But in fact the arguments of this kind have already been subjected to nearly sufficient correction: they have certainly become obsolete, as if they had never been uttered at all. Now indeed we may say boldly that those philosophers take the right course who adopt both the senses and the reason for acquiring the knowledge of things.’ Such then were the followers of Xenophanes, who is said to have flourished at the same time with Pythagoras and Anaxagoras. Now a hearer of Xenophanes was Parmenides, and of Parmenides Melissus, of him Zeno, of him Leucippus, of him Democritus, of him Protagoras and Nessas, and of Nessas Metrodorus, of him Diogenes, of him Anaxarchus, and a disciple of Anaxarchus was Pyrrho, from whom arose the school of those who were surnamed Sceptics. And as these also laid it down that no conception of anything was possible either by sense or by reason, but suspended their judgement in all cases, we may learn how they were refuted by those who held an opposite opinion, from the book before mentioned, speaking word for word as follows:

CHAPTER XVIII ”BEFORE all things it is necessary to make a thorough examination of our own knowledge; for if it is our nature to know nothing there is no further need to inquire about other things. ’Some then there were even of the ancients who spoke this language, and who have been opposed by Aristotle. Pyrrho indeed, of Elis, spoke strongly in this sense, but has not himself left anything in writing. But his disciple Timon says that the man who means to be happy must look to these three things: first, what are the natural qualities of things; secondly, in what way we should be disposed towards them; and lastly, what advantage there will be to those who are so disposed. ’The things themselves then, he professes to show,

are equally indifferent, and unstable, and indeterminate, and therefore neither our senses nor our opinions are either true or false. For this reason then we must not trust them, but be without opinions, and without bias, and without wavering, saying of every single thing that it no more is than is not, or both is and is not, or neither is nor is not.

'To those indeed who are thus disposed the result, Timon says, will be first speechlessness, and then imperturbability, but Aene-sidemus says pleasure. 'These then are the chief points of their arguments: and now let us consider whether they are right in what they say. Since therefore they say that all things are equally indifferent, and bid us for this reason attach ourselves to none, nor hold any opinion, I think one may reasonably ask them, whether those who think things differ are in error or not. For if they are in error, surely they cannot be right in their supposition. So they will be compelled to say that there are some who have false opinions about things, and they themselves therefore must be those who speak the truth: and so there must be truth and falsehood. But if we the many are not in error in thinking that things differ, what do they mean by rebuking us? For they must be in error themselves in maintaining that they do not differ.

'Moreover if we should even grant to them that all things are equally indifferent, it is evident that even they themselves would not differ from the multitude. What then would their wisdom, be? And why does Timon abuse all other persons, and sing the praises of Pyrrho only? 'Yet, further, if all things are equally indifferent and we ought therefore to have no opinion, there would be no difference even in these cases, I mean in the differing or not differing, and the having or not having an opinion. For why should things of this kind be rather than not be? Or, as Timon says, why "yes," and why "no," and why the very "Why?" itself? It is manifest therefore that inquiry is done away: so let them cease from troubling. For at present there is no method in their madness, while, in the very act of admonishing us to have no opinion, they at the same time bid us to form an opinion, and in saying that men ought to make no statement they make a statement themselves: and though they require you to agree with no one, they command you to believe themselves: and then though they say they know nothing, they reprove us all, as if they knew very well.

'And those who assert that all things are uncertain must do one of two things, either be silent, or speak and state something. If then they should hold their peace, it is evident that against such there would be no argument. But if they should make a statement, anyhow and by all means they must say that something either is or is not, just as they certainly now say that all things are to all men matters not of knowledge but of customary opinion, and that nothing can be known. 'The man therefore who maintains this either makes the matter clear, and it is possible to understand it as spoken, or it is impossible. But if he does not make it clear, there

can be absolutely no arguing in this case either with such a man. But if he should make his meaning clear, he must certainly either state what is indefinite or what is definite: and if indefinite, neither in this case would there be any arguing with him, for of the indefinite there can be no knowledge. But if the statements, or any one of them whatever, be definite, the man who states this defines something and decides. How then can all things be unknowable and indeterminate? But should he say that the same thing both is and is not, in the first place the same thing will be both true and false, and next he will both say a thing and not say it, and by use of speech will destroy speech, and moreover, while acknowledging that he speaks falsely, says that we ought to believe him.

'Now it is worth inquiring whence they learned what they say, that all things are uncertain. For they ought to know beforehand what certainty is: thus at all events they would be able to say that things have not this quality of certainty. First they ought to know affirmation, and then negation. But if they are ignorant of the nature of certainty, neither can they know what uncertainty is. 'When indeed Aenesidemus in his Outline goes through the nine moods (in all of which he has attempted to prove the uncertainty of things), which are we to say, that he speaks with knowledge of them or without knowledge? For he says that there is a difference in animals, and in ourselves, and in states, and in the modes of life, and customs, and laws: he says also that our senses are feeble, and that the external hindrances to knwoledge are many, such as distances, magnitudes, and motions: and further, the difference of condition in men young and old, and waking and sleeping, and healthy and sick: and nothing that we perceive is simple and unmixed; for all things are confused, and spoken in a relative sense.

'But when he was making these and other such fine speeches, one would have liked, I say, to ask hirn whether he was stating with full knowledge that this is the condition of things, or without knowledge. For if he did not know, how could we believe him? But if he knew, he was vastly silly for declaring at the same time that all things are uncertain, and yet saying that he knew so much. 'Moreover whenever they go through such details, they are only making a sort of induction, showing what is the nature of the phenomena and of the particulars: and a process of this kind both is, and is called, a proof. If therefore they assent to it, it is evident that they form an opinion: and if they disbelieve it, neither should we choose to give heed to them. 'Timon moreover in the Python relates a story at great length, how he met Pyrrho walking towards Delphi past the temple of Amphiaraus, and what they talked about to each other. Might not then any one who stood beside him while writing this reasonably say, Why trouble yourself, poor fellow, in writing this, and relating what you do not know? For why rather did you meet him than not meet him, and talk with him rather than not talk?

'And this same wonderful Pyrrho, did he know the reason why he was walking to see the Pythian games? Or was he wandering, like a madman, along the road? And when he began to find fault with mankind and their ignorance, are we to say that he spoke truth or not, and that Timon was affected in a certain way and agreed with his sayings, or did not heed them? For if he was not persuaded, how did he pass from a choral dancer to a philosopher, and continue to be an admirer of Pyrrho? But if he agreed with what was said, he must be an absurd person for taking to philosophy himself but forbidding us to do so. 'And one must simply wonder what is the meaning to them of Timon's lampoons and railings against all men, and the tedious Rudiments of Aenesidemus and all the like multitude of words. For if they have written these with an idea that they would render us better, and therefore think it right to confute us all, that so we may cease to talk nonsense, it is evidently their wish that we should know the truth, and assume that things are such as Pyrrho maintains. So if we were to be persuaded by them we should change from worse to better, by forming the more advantageous judgements, and approving those who gave the better advice.

'How then could things possibly be equally indifferent and indeterminate? And how could we avoid giving assent and forming opinions? And if there is no use in arguments, why do they trouble us? Or why does Timon say, "No other mortal could with Pyrrho vie"? For one would not admire Pyrrho any more than the notorious Coroebus or Meletides, who are thought to excel in stupidity. 'We ought, however, to take also the following matters into consideration. For what sort of citizen, or judge, or counsellor, or friend, or, in a word, what sort of man would such an one be? Or what evil deeds would not he dare, who held that nothing is really evil, or disgraceful, or just or unjust? For one could not say even this, that such men are afraid of the laws and their penalties; for how should they, seeing that, as they themselves say, they are incapable of feeling or of trouble?

'Timon indeed even says this of Pyrrho: "O what a man I knew, void of conceit, Daunted by none, who whether known to fame Or nameless o'er the fickle nations rule, This way and that weighed down by passion's force, Opinion false, and legislation vain." 'When, however, they utter this wise saw, that one ought to live in accordance with nature and with customs, and yet not to assent to anything, they are too silly. For they require one to assent to this at least, if to nothing else, and to assume that it is so. But why ought one, rather than ought not, to follow nature and customs, if forsooth we know nothing, and have no means whereby to judge? 'It is altogether a silly thing, when they say, that just as cathartic drugs purge out themselves together with the excrements, in like manner the argument which maintains that all things are uncertain together with everything else destroys itself also. For supposing it to refute itself, they who use it must talk nonsense. It were better therefore for them to hold their peace, and not open their mouth at all,

'But in truth there is no similarity between the cathartic drug and their argument. For the drug is secreted and does not remain in the body: the argument, however, must be there in men's souls, as being always the same and gaining their belief, for it can be only this that makes them incapable of assent. 'But that it is not possible for a man to have no opinions, one may learn in the following manner. For it is impossible that he who perceives by sense does not perceive: now perception by sense is a kind of knowledge. And that he also believes his sensation is evident to all: for when he wishes to see more exactly, he wipes his eyes, and comes nearer, and shades them. 'Moreover we know that we feel pleasure and pain: for it is not possible for one who is being burned or cut to be ignorant of it. And who would not say that acts of memory surely and of recollection are accompanied by an assumption? But what need one say about common concepts, that such a thing is a man, and again concerning sciences and arts? For there would be none of these, were it not our nature to make assumptions. But for my part I pass over all other arguments. Whether, however, we believe, or whether we disbelieve the arguments used by them, in every way it is an absolute necessity to form an opinion.

'It is manifest then that it is impossible to study philosophy in this fashion; and that it is also unnatural and contrary to the laws, we may perceive as follows. For if on the other hand things were in reality of this kind, what would remain but that we must live as if asleep, in a random and senseless fashion? So that our lawgivers, and generals, and educators must all be talking nonsense. To me, however, it seems that all the rest of mankind are living in a natural way, but only those who talk this nonsense are puffed up with conceit, or rather are gone stark mad. 'Not least, however, one may learn this from the following case. Antigonus, for instance, of Carystus, who lived about the same times and wrote their biography, says that Pyrrho being pursued by a dog escaped up a tree, and, when laughed at by those who stood by, said that it was difficult to put off the man. And when his sister Philiste was to offer a sacrifice, and then one of her friends promised what was necessary for the sacrifice and did not provide it, but Pyrrho bought it, and was angry, upon his friend saying that his acts were not in accord with his words nor worthy of his impassivity, he replied, In the case of a woman certainly we ought not to make proof of it. Nevertheless his friend might fairly have answered, If there is any good in these arguments of yours, your impassivity is useless in the case even of a woman, or a dog, and in all cases.

'But it is right to ascertain both who they were that admired him, and whom he himself admired. Pyrrho then was a disciple of one Anaxarchus, and was at first a painter, and not very successful at that; next, after reading the books of Democritus, he neither found anything useful there nor wrote anything good himself, but spake evil of all, both gods and men. But afterwards wrapping himself up in this conceit, and calling himself free from conceit, he left nothing in writing. 'A disciple of his was Timon of Phlius, who at first was a dancer in the chorus at the theatres, but

having afterwards fallen in with Pyrrho he composed offensive and vulgar parodies, in which he has reviled all who ever studied philosophy. For this was the man who wrote the Silli, and said: ”Mankind how poor and base, born but to eat, Your life made up of shame, and strife, and woe.”

And again: ”Men are but bags with vain opinions filled.” ’When nobody took notice of them any more than if they had never been born, a certain Aenesidemus began just yesterday to stir up this nonsense again at Alexandria in Egypt. And these are just the men who were thought to be the mightiest of those who had trodden this path. ’It is evident then that no one in his right mind would approve such a sect, or course of argument, or whatever and however any one likes to call it. For I think for my part that we ought not to call it philosophy at all, since it destroys the very first principles of philosophy.’ These then are the arguments against those who are supposed to follow Pyrrho in philosophy. And near akin to them would be the answers to be urged against those who follow Aristippus of Cyrene, in saying that only the feelings are conceptional. Now Aristippus was a companion of Socrates, and was the founder of the so-called Cyrenaic sect, from which Epicurus has taken occasion for his exposition of man’s proper end. Aristippus was extremely luxurious in his mode of life, and fond of pleasure; he did not, however, openly discourse on the end, but virtually used to say that the substance of happiness lay in pleasures. For by always making pleasure the subject of his discourses he led those who attended him to suspect him of meaning that to live pleasantly was the end of man.

Among his other hearers was his own daughter Arete, who having borne a son named him Aristippus, and he from having been introduced by her to philosophical studies was called his mother’s pupil (mhtrodi/daktoj). He quite plainly defined the end to be the life of pleasure, ranking as pleasure that which lies in motion. For he said that there are three states affecting our temperament: one, in which we feel pain, like a storm at sea; another, in which we feel pleasure, that may be likened to a gentle undulation, for pleasure is a gentle movement, comparable to a favourable breeze; and the third is an intermediate state, in which we feel neither pain nor pleasure, which is similar to a calm. So of these feelings only, he said, we have the sensation. Now against this sect the following objections have been urged (by Aristocles). CHAPTER XIX ’NEXT in order will be those who say that the feelings alone are conceptional, and this was asserted by some of the Cyrenaics. For they, as if oppressed by a kind of torpor, maintained that they knew nothing at all unless some one standing by struck and pricked them; for when burned or cut, they said, they knew that they felt something, but whether what burned them was fire, or what cut them iron, they could not tell.

’Men then who talk thus one might immediately ask, whether they at all events know this that they suffer and feel something. For if they do not know, neither

could they say that they know only the feeling: if on the other hand they know, the feelings cannot be the only things conceptional. For ”I am being burned” was a statement, and not a feeling. ’Moreover these three things must necessarily subsist together, the suffering itself, and that which causes it, and that which suffers. The man therefore who perceives the suffering must certainly by sensation feel the sufferer. For surely he will not know that some one is being warmed, it may be, without knowing whether it is himself or his neighbour; and whether now or last year, and whether at Athens or in Egypt, whether alive or dead, and moreover whether a man or a stone. ’Therefore he will also know by what he suffers: for men know one another, and roads, and cities, and their food. Artisans again know their own tools, and physicians and sailors prognosticate what is going to happen, and dogs discover the tracks of wild beasts.

’Moreover the man who suffers anything certainly perceives it either as something affecting himself or as another’s suffering. Whence therefore will he be able to say that this is pleasure, and that pain? Or that he felt something by taste, or sight, or hearing? And by tasting with his tongue, and seeing with his eyes, and hearing with his ears? Or how do they know that it is right to choose this, and avoid that? But supposing them to know none of these things, they will have no impulse nor desire; and so would not be living beings. For they are ridiculous, whenever they say that these things have happened to them, but that they do not know how or in what manner. For such as these could not even say whether they are human beings, nor whether they are alive, nor, therefore, whether they say and declare anything. ’What discussion then can there be with such men as these? One may wonder, however, if they know not whether they are upon earth or in heaven; and wonder still more, if they do not know, though they profess to study this kind of philosophy, whether four are more than three, and how many one and two make. For being what they are they cannot even say how many fingers they have on their hands, nor whether each of them is one or more.

’So they would not even know their own name, nor their country, nor Aristippus: neither therefore whom they love or hate, nor what things they desire. Nor, if they were to laugh or cry, would they be able to say, that is laughable, and that painful. It is evident therefore that we do not even know what we are now saying. Such men therefore as these would be no better than gnats or flies, though even those animals know what is natural and unnatural.’ Although there are endless arguments that one might use against men in this state of mind, yet these are sufficient. The next thing is to join them in examining those who have taken the opposite road, and decided that we ought to believe the bodily senses in everything, among whom are Metrodorus of Chios, and Protagoras of Abdera. Metrodorus then was said to have been a hearer of Democritus, and to have declared ’plenum’ and ’vacuum’ to be first principles, of which the former was ’being,’ and the latter ’not-being.’ So in writing about nature he employed an introduction of this kind, ’None of us knows

anything, not even this, whether we know or do not know': an introduction which gave a mischievous impulse to Pyrrho who came afterwards. Then he went on to say that 'all things are just what any one may think them.'

And as to Protagoras it is reported that he was called an atheist. In fact he, too, in writing about the gods used this sort of introduction: 'So as to gods I know not either that they exist, nor what their nature is: for there are many things that hinder me from knowing each of these points.' This man the Athenians punished by banishment, and burned his books publicly in the middle of the marketplace. Since then these men asserted that we must believe our senses only, let us look at the arguments urged against them (by Aristocles). CHAPTER XX 'Now there have been men who maintained that we must believe only sense and its presentations. Some indeed say that even Homer intimates this kind of doctrine by declaring that Ocean is the first principle, as though all things were in flux. But of those known to us, Metrodorus of Chios seems to make the same statement; Protagoras of Abdera not only seems, but expressly states this.

'For he said that "the Man is the measure of all things, of existing things, that they exist, of non-existent things, that they do not exist: for as things appear to each person, such they also are; and of the rest we can affirm nothing positively." 'Now in answer to them one may say what Plato says in the Theaetetus: in the first place, why in the world, if such forsooth is the nature of things, did he assert that "the Man" is the measure of truth and not a pig or a dog-headed ape? But next, how did they mean that themselves were wise, if forsooth every one is the measure of truth to himself? Or how do they refute other men, if that which appears to each is true? And how is it that we are ignorant of some things, though we often perceive them by sensation, just as when we hear barbarians speaking?

'Moreover the man who has seen anything, and then remembers it, knows it, though he is no longer sensible of it. And if he should shut one eye and see with the other, he will evidently be both knowing and not knowing the same thing. 'And in addition to this, if that which appears to each is also true, but what they say does not appear true to us, it must also be true that the Man is not the measure of all things. 'Moreover artists are superior to the unskilled, and experts to the inexperienced, and for this reason a pilot, or a physician, or a general foresees better what is about to happen. 'These men too absolutely destroy the degrees of the more or less, and the necessary and contingent, and the natural and unnatural. And thus the same thing would both be and not be; for nothing hinders the same thing from appearing to some to be, and to others not to be. And the same thing would be both a man and a block: for sometimes the same thing appears to one a man and to another a block.

'Every speech too would be true, but also for this reason false: and counsellors and judges would not have anything to do. And what is most terrible, the same

persons will be both good and bad, and vice and virtue the same thing. Many other instances also of this kind one might mention; but in fact there is no need of more arguments against those who think that they have no mind nor reason.' Then next he adds: 'But since there are even now some who say that every sensation and every presentation is true, let us say a few words about them also. For these seem to be afraid lest, if they should say that some sensations are false, they should not have their criterion and their canon sure and trustworthy: but they fail to see that, if this be so, they should lose no time in declaring that all opinions also are true; for it is natural to us to judge by them also of many things: and nevertheless they maintain that some opinions are true and some false.

'And then if one were to examine he would see that none even of the other criteria are always and thoroughly free from error; as for instance I mean a balance, or a turning-lathe, or anything of this kind: but each of them in one condition is sound and in another bad; and when men use it in this way, it tells true, but in that way tells false. Moreover if every sensation were true, they ought not to differ so much. For they are different when near and far off, and in the sick and the strong, and in the skilled and unskilled, and prudent and senseless. And of course it would be altogether absurd to say that the sensations of the mad are true, and of those who see amiss, and hear amiss. For the statement that he who sees amiss either sees or does not see would be silly: for one would answer, that he sees indeed, but not aright.

'When, however, they say that sensation being devoid of reason neither adds anything nor takes away, it is evident that they fail to see the obstacles: for in the case of the oar in the water, and in pictures, and numberless other things, it is the sense that deceives. Wherefore in such cases we all lay the blame not on our mind, but on the presentation: for the argument refutes itself when it maintains that every presentation is true. For at all events it declares the falsity of ours, which causes us to think that not every presentation is true. The result then for them is to say that every presentation is both true and false. 'And they are altogether wrong in maintaining that things really are just such as they may seem to us: for on the contrary they appear such as they are by nature, and we do not make them to be so, but are ourselves affected in a certain way by them. Since if we were to imagine puppies or young kids, as painters and sculptors do, it would be ridiculous to assert straightway that they existed, and therefore to represent them to ourselves as standing ready at hand.'

From what has been said then it is evident that they do not speak rightly who assert that every sensation and every presentation is true. But in fact, though this is so, Epicurus again, starting from the School of Aristippus, made all things depend on pleasure and sense, defining the feelings alone to be conceptional, and pleasure the end of all good. Now some say that Epicurus had no teacher, but read the writings

of the ancients; others say that he was a hearer of Xenocrates, and afterwards of Nausiphanes also, who had been a disciple of Pyrrho. Let us see then what are the arguments which have been urged against him also. CHAPTER XXI [ARISTOCLES] 'SINCE knowledge is of two kinds, the one of things external, and the other of what we can choose or avoid, some say that as the principle and criterion of choosing and avoiding we have pleasure and pain: at least the Epicureans now still say something of this kind: it is necessary therefore to consider these points also.

'For my part then I am so far from saying that feeling is the principle and canon of things good and evil, that I think a criterion is needed for feeling itself. For though it proves its own existence, something else is wanted to judge of its nature. For though the sensation tells whether the feeling is our own or another's, it is reason that tells whether it is to be chosen or avoided. 'They say indeed that they do not themselves welcome every pleasure, and shun every pain. And this is a very natural result. For the criteria prove both themselves and the things which they judge: feeling, however, proves itself only. And that this is so, they bear witness themselves. For although they maintain that every pleasure is a good and every pain an evil, nevertheless they do not say that we ought always to choose the former and avoid the latter, for they are measured by quantity and not by quality.

'It is evident therefore that nothing else than reason, judges the quantity: for it is reason that gives the judgement, "It is better to endure this or that pain that so we may enjoy greater pleasures," and this, "It is expedient to abstain from this or that pleasure, in order that we may not suffer more grievous pains," and all cases of this kind. 'On the whole, sensations and presentations seem to be, as it were, mirrors and images of things: but feelings and pleasures and pains to be changes and alterations in ourselves. And thus in sensation and in forming presentations we look to the external objects, but in experiencing pleasure and pain we turn our attention to ourselves only. For our sensations are caused by the external objects, and as their character may be, such also are the presentations which they produce: but our feelings take this or that character because of ourselves, and according to our state.

'Wherefore these appear sometimes pleasant and sometimes unpleasant, and sometimes more and sometimes less. And this being so, we shall find, if we should choose to examine, that the best assumptions of the principles of knowledge are made by those who take into consideration both the senses and the mind. 'While the senses are like the toils and nets and other hunting implements of this kind, the mind and the reason are like the hounds that track and pursue the prey. Better philosophers, however, than even these we must consider those to be who neither make use of their senses at random, nor associate their feelings in the discernment of truth. Else it would be a monstrous thing for beings endowed with man's nature to forsake the most divine judgement of the mind and entrust themselves

to irrational pleasures and pains.' CHAPTER XXII So much, from the writings of Aristocles.

[PLATO] 'Let us then judge each of the three separately in relation to Pleasure and to Mind: for we must see to which of these two we are to assign each of them as more akin. 'You are speaking of Beauty, and Truth, and Moderation? 'Yes: but take Truth first, Protarchus, and then look at three things, Mind, and Truth, and Pleasure, and after taking long time for deliberation make answer to yourself whether Pleasure or Mind is more akin to Truth. 'But what need of time? For I think they differ widely. Pleasure is of all things most full of false pretensions; and in the pleasures of love, the greatest as they are thought, even perjury, as they say, is forgiven by the gods, its votaries being regarded, like children, as possessing not even the smallest share of Reason; while Reason is either the same thing as Truth, or of all things most like it and most true.

'Will you not then next consider Moderation in the same way, whether Pleasure possesses more of it than Wisdom, or Wisdom more than Pleasure? 'An easy question this again that you propose. For I think one would find nothing in the world of a more immoderate nature than Pleasure and delight, nor any single thing more full of moderation than Reason and Science. 'You say well; yet go on to speak of the third point. Has Reason a larger share of Beauty than Pleasure has, so that Reason is more beautiful than Pleasure, or the contrary? 'Is it not the fact, Socrates, that no one ever yet whether waking or dreaming either saw or imagined Wisdom and Reason to be unseemly in any way or in any case, either past, present, or to come? 'Right. 'But surely when we see any one indulging in Pleasures, and those too the greatest, the sight either of the ridicule or of the extreme disgrace that follows upon them makes us ashamed ourselves, and we put them out of sight and conceal them as much as possible, consigning all such things to night, as unfit for the light to look upon.

'In every way then, Protarchus, you will assert, both by messengers to the absent and by word of mouth to those present, that Pleasure is not the first of possessions nor yet the second, but the first is concerned with Measure, and Moderation, and opportuneness, and whatever qualities of this kind must be regarded as having acquired the eternal nature. 'So it appears from what you now say. 'The second is concerned with Symmetry and Beauty and Perfection and Sufficiency, and all qualities which are of this family. 'It seems so, certainly. 'If then, as I foretell, you assume as the third class mind and wisdom, you will not go far astray from the truth. 'Perhaps so. 'Shall we not say then that the fourth class, in addition to these three, are what we assumed to belong to the soul itself, sciences, and arts, and right opinions as they were called, inasmuch as they are more akin to the good than to Pleasure?

'Very likely. 'In the fifth place then pleasures which we assumed in our definition to be unmixed with pain, and called them pure cognitions of the soul itself, but consequent on the sensations. 'Perhaps. 'And, as Orpheus says, "In the sixth age still the sweet voice of song." But our discourse also seems to have been brought to an end at the sixth trial. And nothing is left for us after this except to put the crown as it were upon what we have said. 'Yes, that is proper. 'Come then, as the third libation to Zeus Soter, let us with solemn asseveration go over the same argument. 'What argument? 'Philebus proposed to us that the good is pleasure universally and absolutely. 'By the third libation, Socrates, it seems that you meant just now that we must take up again the argument from the beginning. 'Yes. But let us listen to what follows. On my part when I perceived what I have now been stating, and was indignant at the argument employed by Philebus, and not by him only but often by thousands of others, I said that Mind was far nobler than Pleasure, and better for human life.

'It was so. 'Yes, but, suspecting that there were many other good things, I said that if any of these should be found better than both the former, I would fight it out for the second prize on the side of Mind against Pleasure, and Pleasure would be deprived even of the second prize. 'You did indeed say so. 'And presently it was most satisfactorily shown that neither of these was sufficient. 'Most true. 'So in this argument both Reason and Pleasure had been entirely set aside, as being neither of them the absolute good, since they lacked sufficiency, and the power of adequacy and perfection. 'Quite right. 'But something else having been found better than either of them, Mind has now again been shown to be ten thousand times closer and more akin than Pleasure to the nature of the conqueror. 'Of course. 'So then the power of Pleasure will be fifth in the award, as our argument has now declared.

'It seems so. 'But not first, no, not even if all oxen and horses and other beasts together should assert it by their pursuit of enjoyment, though the multitude believing them, as soothsayers believe birds, judge pleasures to be most powerful to give us a happy life, and think that the lusts of animals are more valid witnesses than the words of those who from time to time have prophesied by inspiration of the philosophic Muse. 'Now at last, Socrates, we all say that you have spoken most truly.' So writes Plato. But I am also going to set before you a few passages of Dionysius, a bishop who professed the Christian philosophy, from his work On Nature, in answer to Epicurus. And do thou take and read his own words, which are as follows: CHAPTER XXIII [DIONYSIUS OF ALEXANDRIA] 'Is the universe one connected whole, as it seems to us and to the wisest of the Greeks, such as Plato and Pythagoras and the Stoics and Heracleitus? Or two, as some one may have supposed, or even many and infinite in number, as it seemed to some others, who by many aberrations of thought and various applications of terms have attempted minutely to divide the substance of the universe, and suppose it to be infinite, and uncreated, and undesigned.

'For some who gave the name "atoms" to certain imperishable and most minute bodies infinite in number, and assumed a void space of boundless extent, say that these atoms being borne on at random in the void, and accidentally colliding with each other through an irregular drift, become entangled, because they are of many shapes and catch hold of each other, and thus produce the world and all things in it, or rather worlds infinite in number. 'Epicurus and Democritus were of this opinion: but they disagreed in so far as the former supposed all atoms to be extremely small and therefore imperceptible, while Democritus supposed that there were also some very large atoms. Both, however, affirm that there are atoms, and that they are so called because of their impenetrable hardness. 'But others change the name of the atoms, and say that they are bodies which have no parts, but are themselves parts of the universe, out of which in their indivisible state all things are composed, and into which they are resolved. And they say that it was Diodorus who invented the name (τὰ ἀμερῆ) of these bodies without parts. But Heracleides, it is said, gave them a different Dame, and called them "weights," and from him Asclepiades the physician inherited the name.'

After these statements he proceeds to overthrow the doctrine by many arguments, but especially by those which follow: CHAPTER XXIV 'How are we to bear with them when they assert that the wise and therefore beautiful works of creation are accidental coincidences? Works, of which each as it came into being by itself, and likewise all of them taken together, were seen to be good by Him who commanded them to be made. For the Scripture says, "And God saw all things that He had made, and behold, they were very good." 'Nay, they will not even be taught by the small and familiar examples lying at their feet, from which they might learn that no useful and beneficial work is made without a special purpose, or by mere accident, but is perfected by handiwork for its proper service: but when it begins to fall off and become useless and unserviceable, then it is dissolved and dispersed in an indefinite and casual way, inasmuch as the wisdom by whose care it was constructed no longer manages nor directs it.

'For a cloak is not woven by the warp being arranged without a weaver, or the woof intertwined of its own accord; but if it be worn out, the tattered rags are cast away. A house too or a city is built up not by receiving some stones self-deposited at the foundations, and others jumping up to the higher courses, but the builder brings the well-fitted stones and lays them in their place: but when the building is overthrown, however it may occur, each stone falls down and is lost. 'Also while a ship is being built, the keel does not lay itself, and the mast set itself up amidships, and each of the other timbers of itself take any chance position; nor do the so-called hundred pieces of the wagon fit themselves together each in any vacant place it finds: but the carpenter in either case brings them together fitly.

'But should the ship go to pieces at sea, or the wagon in its course on land, the timbers are scattered wherever it may chance, in the one case by the waves, and in the other by the violent driving. Thus it would befit them to say that their atoms, as remaining idle, and not made by hands, and of no use, are driven at random. Be it for them to see the invisible atoms, and understand the unintelligible, unlike him who confesses that this had been manifested to him by God saying to God Himself, "Mine eyes did see Thy unperfected work." 'But when they say that even what they assert to be finely-woven textures made out of atoms are wrought by them spontaneously without wisdom and without perception, who can endure to hear of the atoms as workmen, though they are inferior in wisdom even to the spider which spins its web out of itself?'

CHAPTER XXV 'OR who can endure to hear that this great house, which consists of heaven and earth, and, because of the great and manifold wisdom displayed upon it, is called the Cosmos, has been set in order by atoms drifting with no order at all, and that disorder has thus become order? 'Or how believe that movements and courses well regulated are produced from an irregular drift? Or that the all-harmonious quiring of the heavenly bodies derives its concord from tuneless and inharmonious instruments? 'Also if there be but one and the same substance of all atoms, and the same imperishable nature, excepting, as they say, their magnitudes and shapes, how is it that some bodies are divine, and incorruptible, and eternal, or at least, as they would say, secular according to him who so named them, both visible and invisible, visible as the sun, and moon, and stars, and earth and water, and invisible as gods, and daemons, and souls? For that these exist, they cannot, even if they would, deny.

'And the most long-lived are animals and plants; animals, in the class of birds, as they say, eagles, and ravens, and the phoenix; and among land animals, stags, and elephants, and serpents; but among aquatic animals, whales: and among trees, palms, and oaks, and perseae; and of trees some are evergreen, of which some one who had counted them said there were fourteen, and some flower for a season, and shed their leaves: but the greatest part both of plants and animals die early and are short-lived, and man among them, as a certain holy Scripture said of him, "Man that is born of a woman hath but a short time to live." 'But they will say that variations in the bonds which connect the atoms are the causes of the difference in duration. For some things are said to be packed close and fastened tightly together by them, so that they have become close textures extremely difficult to unloose, while in others the combination of the atoms has been weak and loose in a greater or less degree, so that either quickly or after a long time they separate from their orderly arrangement: and some things are made up of atoms of a certain nature shaped in a certain way, and others of different kinds of atoms differently arranged.

'Who is it then that distinguishes the classes, and collects them, and spreads them abroad, and arranges some in this way for a sun, and others in that way to produce the moon, and brings together the several kinds according to their fitness for the light of each separate star? For neither would the solar atoms, of such a number and kind as they are, and in such wise united, ever have condescended to the formation of a moon, nor would the combinations of the lunar atoms ever have become a sun. Nay, nor would Arcturus, bright though he is, ever boast of possessing the atoms of the morning star, nor the Pleiades those of Orion. For it was a fine distinction drawn by Paul when he said, "There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars: for one star differeth from another star in glory."

'And if their combination, as of things without life, took place unconsciously, they required a skilful artificer: and if their conjunction was involuntary and of necessity, as in things without reason, then some wise leader of the flock presided over their gathering. But if they have been willingly confined to the performance of a voluntary work, some marvellous architect took the lead in apportioning their work; or acted as a general who, loving order, does not leave his army in confusion and all mixed up together, but arranges the cavalry in one place, and the heavy-armed infantry separately, and the javelin-men by themselves, and the archers apart, and the slingers in the proper place, that those of like arms might fight side by side. 'But if they think this example a jest because I make a comparison between large bodies and very small, we will turn to the very smallest.'

Then he adds next to this: 'But if there were neither word, nor choice, nor order of a ruler laid upon them, but they by themselves directing themselves through the great throng of the stream, and passing out through the great tumult of their collisions, were brought together like to like not by the guidance of God, as the poet says, but ran together and gathered in groups recognizing their own kin, then wonderful surely would be this democracy of the atoms, friends welcoming and embracing one another, and hastening to settle in one common home; while some of them rounded themselves off of their own accord into that mighty luminary the sun, in order to make day, and others flamed up into many pyramids perhaps of stars, in order to crown the whole heaven; while others are ranged around, perchance to make it firm, and throw an arch over the ether for the luminaries to ascend, and that the confederacies of the common atoms may choose their own abodes, and portion out the heaven into habitations and stations for themselves.'

Then after some other passages he says: 'But these improvident men, so far from discerning what is invisible, do not see even what is plainly visible. For they seem not even to observe the regular risings and settings either of the other bodies, or the most conspicuous, those of the sun, nor to make use of the aids bestowed through them upon mankind, the day lighted up for work, and the night overshad-

owing for rest. For ”man,” says the Scripture, ”will go forth to his work and to his labour until the evening.” ’Nay, they do not even observe that other revolution of the sun, in which he completes determinate times and convenient seasons and solstices recurring in undeviating order, being guided by the atoms of which he consists. But though these miserable men, the righteous, however, as they believe, be unwilling to admit it, yet ”Great is the Lord that made him, and at His word he hasteneth his course.”

’For do atoms, O ye blind, bring you winter and rains, that the earth may send up food for you and all the living creatures thereon? And do they lead on the summer, that ye may also receive the fruits of the trees for enjoyment? And why then do ye not worship the atoms, and offer sacrifice to the guardians of your fruits? Ungrateful surely, for not consecrating to them even small first-fruits of the abundant gifts which ye receive from them.’ And after a short interval he says: ’But the stars, that mixed democracy of many tribes, constituted by the wandering atoms ever scattering themselves abroad, marked off regions for themselves by agreement, just as if they had instituted a colony or a community, without any founder or master presiding over them; and the border-laws towards neighbouring nations they faithfully and peacefully observe, not encroaching beyond the boundaries which they have occupied from the beginning, just as if they had laws established by these royal atoms.

’Yet these do not rule over them: for how could they, that are non-existent? But listen to the oracles of God: ”In the judgement of the Lord are His works from the beginning; and from the making of them He disposed the parts thereof. He garnished His works for ever, and the beginnings of them unto their generations.”’ And after a few sentences he says: ’Or what phalanx ever marched across the level ground in such good order, none running on ahead, none falling out of rank, none blocking the way, nor lagging behind his company, as in even ranks and shield to shield the stars move ever onward, that continuous, undivided, unconfused, unhindered host? ’Nevertheless, by inclinations and sidelong deviations, certain obscure changes of their course occur. And yet those who have given attention to these matters always watch for the right times and foresee the places from which they each rise. Let then the anatomists of the atoms, and dividers of the indivisible, and compounders of the uncompounded, and definers of the infinite, tell us whence comes the simultaneous circular revolution and periodical return of the heavenly bodies, wherein it is not merely one single conglomeration of atoms that has been thus casually hurled out as from a sling, but all this great circular choir moving evenly in rhythm, and whirling round together. And whence comes it, that this vast multitude of fellow travellers without arrangement, without purpose, and without knowledge of each other, have returned together? Rightly did the prophet class it among things impossible and unexampled that even two strangers should

run together: ”Shall two,” he says, ”walk together at all, except they have known each other?’”

After speaking thus, and adding numberless other remarks to these, he next discusses the question at length by arguments drawn from the particular elements of the universe, and from the living beings of all kinds included in them, and moreover from the nature of man. And by adding yet a few of these arguments to those which have been mentioned, I shall bring the present subject to an end. CHAPTER XXVI ’ALSO, they neither understand themselves nor their own circumstances. For if any of the founders of this impious doctrine reconsidered who and whence he is, he would come to his senses as feeling conscious of himself, and would say, not to the atoms, but to his Father and Maker, ”Thy hands fashioned me, and made me,” and like that writer he would have described still further the wonderful manner of his formation: ”Hast Thou not poured me out as milk, and curdled me like cheese? Clothed me with skin and flesh, and knit me together with bones and sinews? Thou hast granted me life and favour, and Thy guardianship hath preserved my spirit.”

’For how many and of what sort were the atoms which the father of Epicurus poured forth from himself, when he was begetting Epicurus? And when deposited in his mother’s womb, how did they coalesce, and take shape, and form, and motion, and growth? And how did that small drop, after calling together the atoms of Epicurus in abundance, make some of them into skin and flesh for a covering, and how was it raised erect by others turned into bone, and by others bound together with a contexture of sinews? ’And how did it adapt the many other limbs, and organs, and entrails, and instruments of sense, some within and some without, by which the body was quickened into life? For among these no idle nor useless part was added, no, not even the meanest, neither hair, nor nails, but all contribute, some to the benefit of the constitution, and others to the beauty of the appearance.

’For Providence is careful not only of usefulness, but also of beauty. For while the hair of the head is a protection and a covering for all, the beard is a comely ornament for the philosopher. The nature also of the whole human body Providence composed of parts, all of which were necessary, and invested all the members with their mutual connexion, and measured out from the whole their due supply. ’As to the most important of these members, it is evident even to the simple from their experience what force they have: there is the supreme power of the head, and around the brain, as enthroned in the citadel, is the attendant guard of the senses: the eyes going on in advance, the ears bringing back reports, the taste, as it were, collecting provisions, the smell tracing out and examining, and the touch arranging everything that is subject to it. (For at present we shall only run over in a summary manner a few of the works of the all-wise Providence, intending soon, if God permit, to complete the task more carefully, when we are directing our efforts against him who is thought more learned.)

'Then there is the ministry of the hands, by which all kinds of workmanship and inventive arts are perfected, separately endowed with their particular facilities for co-operation in one and the same work, the strength of the shoulders in . bearing burdens, the grasp of the fingers, the joints of the elbows both turning inward towards the body and bending outwards, that they may be able both to draw things in and thrust them off. The service of the feet, by which the whole terrestrial creation comes under our power, the land to tread on, the sea to sail, the rivers to cross, and communication of all things with all. The belly, a store-room of food, meting out from itself in due measure the provisions for all the members associated with it, and ejecting what is superfluous: and all the other parts whereby the administration of the human constitution has been manifestly contrived, and of which the wise and foolish alike possess the use but not the knowledge.

'For the wise refer the administration to whatever deity they suppose to be most perfect in all knowledge and most beneficent towards themselves, being convinced that it is the work of superior wisdom and power truly divine; while the others inconsiderately refer the most marvellous work of beauty to a chance meeting and coincidence of the atoms. 'Now though the still more effectual consideration of these subjects, and the arrangement of the internal parts of the body, have been accurately investigated by physicians, who in their astonishment made a god of nature, yet let us hereafter make a re-examination as well as we may be able, even though it be superficial. 'Now in a general and summary way I ask who made this whole tabernacle such as it is, lofty, erect, of fine proportion, keenly sensitive, graceful in motion, strong in action, fit for every kind of work? The irrational multitude of atoms, say they. Why, they could not come together and mould an image of clay, nor polish a statue of marble, nor produce by casting an idol of silver or gold; but men have been the inventors of arts and manufactures of these materials for representing the body.

'And if representations and pictures could not be made without intelligence, how can the real originals of the same have been spontaneous accidents? 'Whence too have soul, and mind, and reason been implanted in the philosopher? Did he beg them from the atoms which have no soul, nor mind, nor reason, and did each of them inspire him with some thought and doctrine? 'And was the wisdom of man brought to perfection by the atoms, in the same way as Hesiod's fable says that Pandora was by the gods? Will the Greeks also cease to say that all poetry, and all music, and astronomy, and geometry, and the other sciences are inventions and instructions of the gods, and have the Atomic Muses alone been skilful and wise in all things? For the race of gods constructed by Epicurus out of atoms is banished from their infinite worlds of order, and driven out into the infinite chaos.'

CHAPTER XXVII 'BUT to work, and to administer, to do good and to show forethought, and all such actions are burdensome perhaps to the idle and foolish, and

to the feeble and wicked, among whom Epicurus enrolled himself by entertaining such thoughts of the gods; but to the earnest, and able, and wise, and prudent, such as philosophers ought to be (how much more the gods?), not only are these things not unpleasant and arduous, but even most delightful, and above all else most welcome; for to them carelessness and delay in performing any good action is judged to be a disgrace, as a poet admonishes them with his advice: ”Nor aught until the morrow to delay,” and with the threat in addition: ”He who puts off his work Must ever wrestle with malignant fates.” ’We too are more solemnly instructed by a prophet, who says that virtuous actions are truly worthy of God, and that he who cares little for them is accursed: for he says, ”Cursed be he that doeth the works of the Lord carelessly.”

’Then too those who have not learned an art, and can only pursue it imperfectly because the effort is unusual and the work unpractised, find a weariness in their attempts: but those who are making progress, and still more those who are perfect, delight in the easy accomplishment of their pursuits, and would rather choose to complete what they usually practise, and to finish their work, than to possess all the things which men reckon good. ’For instance, Democritus himself, as the story goes, used to say that he would rather discover one single law of causation than receive the kingdom of Persia, and this, although he was vainly seeking causes where no cause was, as one who started from a false principle and an erroneous hypothesis, and did not discern the root and the necessity common to the nature of all things, but regarded the contemplation of senseless and random contingencies as the highest wisdom, and set up chance as the mistress and queen of things universal and things divine, and declared that all things took place in accordance therewith, but banished it from the life of man, and convicted those who worshipped it as senseless. For example, in the beginning of his Suggestions he says: ”Men formed an image of chance as an excuse for their own folly: for chance is by nature antagonistic to judgement: and this worst enemy of wisdom they said ruled over it; or rather they utterly overthrow and annihilate this latter, and set up the other in its place: for they praise not wisdom as fortunate, but fortune as most wise.”

’Whereas therefore the masters of those works which are beneficial to life take pride in the help which they render to their fellow men, and desire praise and fame for the works in which they labour for their good, some in providing food, others as pilots, some as physicians, and some as statesmen, philosophers proudly boast of their efforts to instruct mankind. ’Or will Epicurus or Democritus dare to say that they distress themselves by their pursuit of philosophy? Nay, there is no other gladness of heart that they would prefer to this. For even though they think that good consists in pleasure, yet they will be ashamed to say that philosophy is not more pleasant to them. ’But as to the gods of whom their poets sing as ”Givers of good things,” these philosophers with mocking reverence say, The gods are neither givers nor partakers of any good things. In what way then do they

show evidence of the existence of gods, if they neither see them present and doing something, as those who in admiration of the sun and moon and stars said that they were called gods (θεούς) because of their running (θεειν), nor assign to them any work of creation or arrangement, that they might call them gods from setting (θεῖναι), that is making (for in this respect in truth the Creator and Artificer of the universe alone is God), nor exhibit any administration, or judgement, or favour of theirs towards mankind, that we should owe them fear or honour, and therefore worship them?

'Or did Epicurus peep out from the world, and pass beyond the compass of the heavens, or go out through some secret gates known only to himself, and behold the gods dwelling in the void, and deem them and their abundant luxury blessed? And did he thence become a devotee of pleasure, and an admirer of their life in the void, and so exhort all who are to be made like unto those gods to participate in this blessing, commending as a happy banqueting hall for them, not heaven or Olympus, as the poets did, but the void, and setting before them their ambrosia made out of the atoms, and pledging them in nectar from the same? 'And moreover he inserts in his own books countless oaths and adjurations addressed to those who are nothing to us, swearing continually "No, by Zeus," and "Yes, by Zeus," and adjuring his readers and opponents in argument "in the name of the gods," having, I suppose, no fear himself of perjury nor trying to frighten them, but uttering this as an empty, and false, and idle, and unmeaning appendage to his speeches, just as he might hawk and spit, and turn his face, and wave his hand. Such an unintelligible and empty piece of acting on his part was his mentioning the name of the gods.

'This however was evident, that after the death of Socrates he was afraid of the Athenians, and that he might not seem to be what he really was, an atheist, he played the charlatan and painted for them some empty shadows of unsubstantial gods. For he neither looked up to heaven with eyes of intelligence, that he might hear the clear voice from above, which the attentive observer did hear, and testified that "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth the work of His hands," nor did he with his understanding look upon the ground, for he would have learned that "The earth is full of the mercy of the Lord," and that "The earth is the Lord's, and the fullness thereof." For the Scripture says, "After this also the Lord looked upon the earth, and filled it with His blessings. With the soul of every living thing He covered the face thereof."'

'And if they are not utterly blind, let them survey the vast and varied multitude of living beings, land and water animals, and birds, and let them take note how true has been the testimony of the Lord in the judgement which He passed on all His works, "And all appeared good according to His command." ' These arguments I have culled from a large number framed against Epicurus by Dionysius, the bishop, our contemporary. But now it is time to pass on to Aristotle, and to the sect of the

Stoic philosophers, and to review the remaining opinions of the wonderful sect of physicists, that so we may present to the censorious our defence for having withdrawn from them also. [Footnotes placed at the end and numbered]

Book 15

BOOK XV

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I THOUGHT it important in the beginning of the Preparation for the Gospel to refute the polytheistic error of all the nations, in order to commend and excuse our separation from them, which we have made with good reason and judgement.

Therefore before all else in the first three Books, I thoroughly examined not only the fables concerning their gods which have been turned into ridicule by their own theologians and poets, but also the solemn and secret physical theories of these latter, which have been transported by their grand philosophy high up to heaven and to the various parts of the world; although their theologians themselves declared that there was no need at all to talk gravely on these matters. We must therefore carefully observe that the oldest of their theologians were proved on the

highest testimony to have no special knowledge of the history, but to rely solely on the fables. Hence naturally in all cities and villages, according to the narratives of these ancient authors, initiatory rites and mysteries of the gods corresponding to the earlier mythical tales have been handed down by tradition; so that even to the present time the marriages of their gods and their procreation of children, their lamentations and their drunkenness, the wanderings of some, the amours of others, their anger, and their different disasters and adventures of all kinds, are traditionally received in accordance with the notices recorded by the most ancient authors, in their initiatory rites, and in their hymns, and in the songs composed in honour of their gods.

But nevertheless, as a work of supererogation, I also brought out to light the refinements of these later authors themselves which they had pompously exhibited in physical explanations, and the subtleties of the sophists and philosophers. Moreover, as to the account of the renowned oracles, and the false opinion concerning fate so celebrated among the multitude, these I laid bare by evidence as clear as day in other three books following next after the first three; and for the proof against them I made use not only of my own dialectic efforts, but also especially of the sayings of the Greek philosophers themselves. Passing on thence to the oracles of the Hebrews, I showed, in the same number of books again, by what reasonings we accepted the dogmatic theology contained in them, and the universal history taught by them and confirmed by the testimony of the Greeks themselves. Next in order I refuted the method of the Greeks, and clearly showed how they had been helped in all things by Barbarians, and that they bring forward no serious learning of their own, making also a comparative table of the times in which the celebrated Greeks and the Hebrew prophets lived. Again in the next three books I showed the agreement of the best-esteemed philosophers of the Greeks with the opinions of the Hebrews, and again made their own utterances my witnesses.

Moreover in the book preceding this I clearly detected those Greek philosophers who differ from our opinions as being at variance not with us only but also with their own countrymen, and as having been overthrown by their own disciples. Throughout all these discussions I show to my readers that the judgement of my own mind is impartial, and by the very facts and deeds, so to say, I have brought forward my proofs, that with no want of consideration, but with well-judged and sound reasoning, we have chosen the philosophy and religion of the Hebrews, which is both ancient and true, in preference to that of the Greeks, which result was also confirmed by the comparison of the statements of the Greeks. As we have been deferring up to the present time our final discourse hereon, which is the fifteenth Book of the treatise in hand, we will now make up what is lacking to the discussions which we have travelled through, by still further dragging into light the solemn doctrines of the fine philosophy of the Greeks, and laying bare before the eyes of all the useless learning therein. And before all things we shall show that not from ignorance of

the things which they admire, but from contempt of the unprofitable study therein we have cared very little for them, and devoted our own souls to the practice of things far better.

When therefore by God's help this book shall have received the seal of truth, my work on the Preparation shall here be brought to a close; and passing on to the more complete argument of the Demonstration of the Gospel, I shall connect the commencement of my second treatise with the consideration of the remaining charge brought against us. Now the fault alleged against us was this, that though we honoured the oracles of the Hebrews above those of our own country, we did not emulate and choose a life like that of the Jews. Against that charge I shall, with the help of God, endeavour to make answer after the completion of my present discourse. For in this way I think that the second part being connected in one bond, as it were, with the first, will unite and complete the general purpose of the whole discussion. As to our present task, however, in the preceding Books we have seen the philosophy of Plato sometimes agreeing with the doctrines of the Hebrews, and sometimes at variance with them, wherein it has been proved to disagree even with its own favourite dogmas: while as to the doctrines of the other philosophers, the physicists, as they are called, and those of the Platonic succession, and of Xenophanes and Parmenides, moreover of Pyrrho, and those who introduce the 'suspension of judgement,' and all the rest, whose opinions have been refuted in the preceding discourse, we have seen that they stand in opposition alike to the doctrines of the Hebrews and of Plato and to the truth itself, and moreover have received their refutation by means of their own weapons.

It is time then to look down, as it were, from a raised stage upon the other vain conceit of the Aristotelian and Stoic philosophers, and also to survey all the remaining physical systems of the supercilious tribe, that we may learn the grand doctrines taught among them, and on the other hand the objections urged against them by those of their own side. For in this way our decision to withdraw from these also will be freed from all reasonable blame, for that we have preferred the truth and piety found among those who have been regarded as Barbarians to all the wisdom of the Greeks, not in ignorance of their fine doctrines, but by a well examined and thoroughly tested judgement. . To begin with Aristotle. Other authors, and among them philosophers not otherwise undistinguished, have defamed his personal life. But for my part I cannot willingly endure even to hear the man evil spoken of by his own friends. Wherefore I shall the rather set forth the defence urged on his behalf in the works of Aristocles the Peripatetic, who in his seventh book On Philosophy writes of him as follows:

CHAPTER II [ARISTOCLES] 'FOR how is it possible that, as Epicurus says in his Epistle concerning moral habits, when a young man he squandered his patrimony, and afterwards, was forced into military service, and being unsuccessful in this

had recourse to selling drugs, then, after Plato's walk had been thrown open to all, joined himself to him? 'Or how could any one accept what Timaeus of Tauromenium says in his Histories, that when advanced in years he kept the doors of an obscure surgery, or any others? 'Or who would believe what Aristoxenus the musician says in his Life of Plato? For he states that during his wandering and long absence from home certain strangers rose up against him and built a Peripatos in opposition to him. Some therefore think that he says this in reference to Aristotle, whereas Aristoxenus always speaks of Aristotle with reverence. 'One may also say with reason that the memoirs by Alexinus the Eristic are ridiculous. For he makes Alexander when a boy converse with his father Philip, and pour contempt upon Aristotle's doctrines, while approving Nicagoras, who was surnamed Hermes.

'Eubulides, also, in his book against Aristotle manifestly lies, first in bringing forward some frigid poems as written by others concerning his marriage and his intimacy with Hermias, and secondly in asserting that he offended Philip, and did not come to visit Plato when dying, and that he had corrupted his writings. 'As to the accusation of Democharesagainst the philosophers, why need we mention it? For he has reviled not Aristotle only, but all the rest as well. Moreover, any one glancing at the calumnies themselves would say that the man talks nonsense. For he says that there have been discovered letters of Aristotle against the Athenian state, and that he betrayed Stageira, his native city, to the Macedonians; and further, that, when Olynthus was destroyed, at the place where the booty was sold he pointed out to Philip the most wealthy of the Olynthians. 'Foolish also are the calumnies which have been brought against him by Cephisodorus, the disciple of Isocrates, saying that he was luxurious and a gourmand, and other things of this kind.

'But all are surpassed in folly .by the statements of Lycon, who says that he is himself a Pythagorean. For he affirms that Aristotle offered to his wife after death a sacrifice such as the Athenians offer to Demeter, and that he used to bathe in warm oil, and then sell it: and that when he was starting for Chalcis, the customhouse officers found in the vessel seventy-five brass plates. 'These are nearly all the chief detractors of Aristotle: of whom some lived at the same time with him, and others a little later, but all were Sophists, and Eristics, and Rhetoricians, whose very names and books are more dead than their bodies. As to those who came after them, and then repeated their statements, we may put them aside altogether, and especially those who have not even read their books, but invent for themselves, of which kind are those who say that he had three hundred dishes: for nobody could be found among his contemporaries, except Lycon, who has said any such thing about him. He, however, has said, as I mentioned before, that there were seventy-five plates found.

'But not only from the dates and from the persons who have reviled him might one infer that all the things that have been stated are false, but also from the fact that they do not all bring the same charges, but each says some things of his own: in which if there was any one word of truth, he deserved surely to have been put to death by his contemporaries not once only but ten thousand times. 'It is manifest therefore that it has happened to Aristotle, as to many others, to be envied by the Sophists of his time, both for his friendships with kings, and for his superiority in argument. But those who are right-minded must look not only to the detractors, but also to those who praise and emulate him: for these will be found much more in number and in worth. 'Now all the other stories are manifestly invented: but credit seems to be given to these two things for which some blame him; one, that he married Pythias, who was by birth the sister, and by adoption the daughter, of Hermias, to flatter him. For instance Theocritus of Chios wrote an epigram of this kind:

"To Hermias, eunuch and Eubulus' slave, This empty tomb by empty sage was rais'd, Who left the groves of Academe, and dwelt By Borborus' streams, his ravenous maw to fill." 'The other charge was that Aristotle was ungrateful to Plato. 'Now among many authors who have written of Hermias and Aristotle's friendship with him, the chief is Apellicon, and any one after reading his books will soon cease to speak evil of them. 'But with regard to his marriage to Pythias he has himself made sufficient defence in his Epistles to Antipater. For after the death of Hermias he married her because of his affection for him, she being also a modest and good woman, but in misfortune by reason of the calamities which had overtaken her brother.' Then afterwards he says: 'But after the death of Pythias, the daughter of Hermias, Aristotle married Herpyllis of Stageira, by whom a son Nicomachus was born to him. And he, it is said, was brought up as an orphan by Theophrastus, and when a very young man was killed in war.'

But enough of these extracts from the aforesaid book of Aristocles: for it is time now to consider the dogmatic philosophy of Aristotle. CHAPTER III WHEREAS Moses and the Hebrew prophets laid it down that the perfection of a happy life is the knowledge of the God of all the world and friendship with Him accomplished by piety, and taught that true piety is the pleasing God by every virtue (because this is the source of blessings, for all things depend on God only, and all are procured from Him for the friends of God), and whereas Plato gives definitions agreeing with these, and declares virtue to be the perfection of happiness, Aristotle took the other path, and says that no one can be happy otherwise than through bodily pleasure and abundance of outward means, without which even virtue cannot profit. How the friends of Plato opposed him and refuted the falseness of his opinion, we may learn from what follows:

CHAPTER IV [ATTICUS] ’FOR whereas by the common judgement of philosophers Philosophy as a whole makes promise of human happiness, and is divided into three parts according to the distribution which makes up the universe, the Peripatetic will be seen to be so far from teaching herein any of the doctrines of Plato, that, though there are many who differ from Plato, he will himself be shown to be his strongest opponent. ’And in the first place he departed from Plato on the point of universal and chief importance by failing to keep the measure of happiness, and not admitting that for this virtue is sufficient; but having missed the power that is in virtue, he thought that it needed the goods of fortune, in order to gain happiness with their help; but if it were to be left by itself, he complained that it was a powerless thing incapable of attaining to happiness.

’Now this is not the time for showing how ignoble and mistaken was his opinion both on this and on the other points: but I think it is manifest, that whereas the object aimed at and the happiness are not equal nor identical according to Plato and according to Aristotle, but the one is ever crying aloud and proclaiming that the most righteous is the most happy man, while the other does not admit that happiness is a consequence of virtue, unless it be fortunate also in birth and beauty and other things, and so ”To war he came, decked, like a girl, with gold,” according to the difference of the end the philosophy leading thereto must also be different. ’For a man who walks only on one way which naturally leads to something that is petty and low, cannot reach to greater things that are set on high. ”See’st thou where yonder hill stands up aloft Rugged with overhanging cliffs? There sits The bird that lightly mocks thy feeble threat.”

’Up to this lofty hill that shrewd and crafty beast is not able to ascend: but in order that the fox may come close to the eagle’s brood, either they must meet with some ill luck and fall to the ground through the destruction of their own nest, or the fox herself must grow what it is not her nature to grow, ”and circle on light wings,” and so soaring from the earth fly up to the lofty hill. But as long as each remains on his own level, there can be no communion between things of earth and the offspring of heaven.’ After other statements he adds: ’Since then this is the case, and since Plato’s endeavour is to draw the souls of the youths upward to the divine, and in this manner he makes them the friends of virtue and of honour, and persuades them to despise all else, tell us, O Peripatetic, how wilt thou teach these things? How wilt thou guide the lovers of Plato to them? Where in thy sect is so lofty a height of argument as to acquire the spirit of the Aloadae and seek the path to heaven, which they thought might be made by piling up mountains, a thing which, as Plato says, is to be done by removing ”the objects of human ambition.”

’What help then canst thou give the young men towards this end? And whence find any argument as an active ally of virtue? From what letters of Aristotle? From whom of his followers? Out of what writings? I give thee leave even to forge, if

thou wilt, only let it be something spirited. But in fact thou hast neither anything to say, nor would any of the leaders of thy sect permit thee. 'At all events the treatises of Aristotle on these subjects, entitled Eudemian and Nicomachian and the Great Ethics, have a petty, and low, and vulgar idea of virtue, and no better than an ordinary and uneducated man might have, or a lad, or a woman. For the diadem, so to speak, and the kingly sceptre, which virtue received from Zeus, and holds inalienable, "For ne'er his promise shall deceive, or fail, Or be recalled, if with a nod confirmed,"

this they dare to take away from her. 'For they do not allow her to make men happy, but set her on a level with wealth, and glory, and birth, and health, and beauty, and all the other possessions which are common to vice. For as the presence of any whatsoever of these without virtue suffices not to render the possessor happy, so without these virtue, according to the same system, is not able to give happiness to its possessor. 'Is not then the dignity of virtue dethroned and cast down? Certainly: yet they say virtue is far superior to all the other good things. Of what avail is this? For they say also that health is better than wealth: but it is a fault common to all, that apart each from other they suffice not for happiness. 'If ever therefore any one, starting from these doctrines and this sect, should teach that he who seeks all that is good for man in the soul alone is happy, they say that he never mounts the wheel, nor could he who is oppressed by "misfortunes such as Priam's" possibly be happy and blessed.

'But it is not unlikely that the possessor of virtue may fall into some such misfortunes. Hereupon it follows, that happiness neither results from every condition to the possessors of virtue, nor remains always with them if it does come. "Of leaves one generation by the wind Is scattered on the earth; but others soon The teeming forest clothe. ... So with our race, these nourish, those decay." Thy similitude, O poet, is still narrow and timid: "The Spring-tide comes again." It is a long time that intervenes, and in which nothing grows. If thou would'st give an exact similitude of the mortality and decay of the human race, compare it with Aristotle's happiness. This springs up and passes away more lightly than the leaves, not continuing through the circling year, nor within the year, nor within a month, but in the very day, the very hour, it both springs up and perishes.

'And many are the causes which destroy it, and all of them results of chance: for there are the body's "various dooms," and these are myriads, and there is poverty, and disgrace, and all things of this kind; and against none of these are dear virtue's resources sufficient of themselves to give help; for she is without strength to ward off misery or to preserve happiness. 'In what way then can any one who has been reared in these doctrines and delighted with them either himself assent to the teaching of Plato, or ever confirm others in it? For it is not possible that any one starting from these principles should accept those other Herculean and divine dog-

mas, that virtue is a strong and noble thing, and never fails to give happiness, nor is ever deprived of it: but though poverty and disease and infamy and tortures and pitch and the cross, yea, though all the disasters of tragedy come in together like a flood, still the righteous man is happy and blessed.

'In fact, as with the tongue of the most loud-voiced herald, he proclaims the most righteous man, just as some victorious athlete, saying that he is the happiest of all men, who reaps the fruit of happiness from righteousness itself. Distinguish then, if you will, and variously distribute good things in threefold, fourfold, or manifold order; for this is nothing to the point before us; you will never by them bring us near to Plato. 'For what, if among good things, some, as you say, are worthy of honour, as the gods; and some worthy to be praised, as the virtues; and some are powers, as riches and strength; and others are beneficial, as the healing arts? Or what, if you distribute them with less division, and say that of good things some are ends, and some are not ends, and call those ends, for the sake of which the others are taken, and not ends those which are taken for the sake of others?

'Or what, if one were taught, that some are absolutely good, and others not good for all? Or that some are goods of the soul, and others of the body, and others external? Or again, that of goods, some are powers, and others dispositions and habits, and others actions; and some ends, and some matter, and some instruments? And if one learn from thee to divide the good according to the ten categories, what are these lessons to the judgement of Plato? 'For as long as you on the one hand, either equivocally or as you please, speak of the good things of virtue, and combine with it certain other things as essential to happiness, thus robbing virtue of its sufficiency, while Plato on the other hand gets from virtue itself what is complete for happiness and seeks for the other things only as a superfluity, there can be on this point nothing common between you. You want one set of arguments, Plato's friends want others. 'For as

"Lions and men no safe alliance form, Nor wolves and lambs in friendly mind agree," so between Plato and Aristotle there is no friendship in regard to the very chief and paramount doctrine of happiness. For if they have no evil thoughts one towards the other, yet it is evident that their statements concerning what is important on this point are diametrically opposite.' CHAPTER V AGAIN, whereas Moses and the Hebrew prophets, and Plato moreover in agreement with them on this point, have very clearly treated the doctrine of the universal providence, Aristotle stays the divine power at the moon, and marks off the remaining portions of the world from God's government: and on this ground also he is refuted by the aforesaid author, who discusses the matter as follows: 'Whereas, further, the most important and essential of the things that contribute to happiness is the belief in providence, which more than aught else guides human life aright, unless at least we are to remain ignorant

”Whether by justice or by crooked wiles Mankind from earth may scale the lofty height,” Plato makes all things connected with God, and dependent on God, for he says that ”He, holding the beginning and the middle and the end of all things, passes onward in a straight course to the accomplishment of His purpose.” And again he says, that ”He is good, and goodness can never have any jealousy of anything. And being free from jealousy, He makes all things as good as possible, bringing them out of disorder into order.” And while He cares for all things, and orders all as well as possible, He has taken thought for mankind also.’ And after a few words: ’Thus speaks Plato. But he who puts aside this divine nature, and cuts off the soul’s hope of hereafter, and destroys reverence before superior Beings in the present life, what communion has he with Plato? Or how could he exhort men to what Plato desires, and confirm his sayings? For on the contrary he surely would appear as the helper and ally of those who wish to do injustice. For every one who is human and constrained by human desires, if he despise the gods and think they are nothing to him, inasmuch as in life he dwells far away from them, and after death exists no more, will come prepared to gratify his lusts.

’For it is not impossible to feel assurance of being undetected in wrong-doing, if indeed it be necessary to avoid detection by men: it is not necessary, however, on every occasion even to seek to avoid detection, where a man has power to overmaster those who have discovered him. So the disbelief in providence is a ready way to wrong-doing. ’For a very worthy person indeed is he, who after holding out pleasure to us as a good, and granting us security from the gods, still thinks to provide a plan to prevent wrong-doing. He acts like a physician who, having neglected to give help while the sick man was yet alive, attempts after death to devise certain contrivances for curing the dead man. ’In a similar manner to him the Peripatetic acts. For it is not so much the eagerness for the pleasure, as the disbelief that the deity cares, that encourages wrong-doing. What then, some one may say, do you put Aristotle in the same class with Epicurus?

’Why certainly, at least in relation to the point before us. For what difference does it make to us, whether you banish deity from the world and leave us no communion therewith, or shut up the gods in the world and remove them from all share in the affairs of earth? For in both cases the indifference of the gods towards men is equal, and equal also the security of wrong-doers from fear of the gods. And as to our deriving any benefit from them while they remain in heaven, in the first place this is common also to things without reason or life, and further, in this way, even according to Epicurus, men get help from the gods, ’They say, for instance, that the better emanations from them become the causes of great blessings to those who partake of them. But neither Epicurus nor Aristotle can rightly be reckoned on the side of providence. For if according to Epicurus providence disappears, although the gods according to him employ the utmost solicitude for the preservation of

their own goods, so must providence disappear according to Aristotle also, even if the heavenly motions are arranged in a certain order and array.

'For we seek a providence that has an interest for us, and in such that man has no share who has admitted that neither daemons, nor heroes, nor any souls at all can live on hereafter. 'But therein Epicurus, in my judgement, seems to have acted more modestly: for as if he despaired of the gods being able to abstain from the care of mankind if they came in contact with them, he transferred them, as it were, to a foreign country, and settled them somewhere outside the world, excusing them from the charge of inhumanity by the removal, and by their separation from all things. 'But this our super-excellent discoverer of nature, and accurate judge of things divine, after putting human affairs under the very eyes of the gods yet left them uncared for and unregarded, being administered by some force of nature, and not by divine reason. Wherefore he himself cannot fairly escape that other charge which some imagine against Epicurus, that it was not according to his judgement, but through fear of men, that he allotted room in the universe to the gods, just like a spectator's place in a theatre.

'And they regard it as a proof of. the man's opinion, that he deprived the gods of their activity towards us, from which alone a just confidence in their existence was likely to be derived. For this same thing is done by Aristotle also; for by his both putting them far off and giving over the proof to sight only, an operation too feeble to judge of things at so great a distance, it may readily be thought that from shame he admits the existence of gods there. 'For as he neither left anything outside the world, nor gave his gods access to things on earth, he was compelled either to confess himself altogether an atheist, or to preserve the appearance of allowing gods to remain, by banishing his gods to some such place as that. But Epicurus, by excusing the higher powers from diligent care because of the want of communication, seems to throw a decent veil over his disbelief in the gods.'

Such are the remarks of Atticus against Aristotle's repudiation of the doctrine of providence. The same author further adds to what has been quoted the following remarks, aiming at the same philosopher's unwillingness to admit that the world was created. CHAPTER VI WHEREAS again Moses decided that the world was created, and set up God as Maker and Creator over the universe, and whereas Plato's philosophy taught the same doctrines as Moses, Aristotle, having travelled the contrary course on this point also, is refuted by the aforesaid author writing as follows word for word: 'In the first place then Plato speculating upon the origin of the world, and considering that every one must necessarily seek after this great and very beneficial doctrine of Providence, and having reasoned out the conclusion that the uncreated has no need either of a maker or of a guardian for its well-being, in order that he might not deprive the world of providence, denied that it was uncreated.

'And we pray that we may not at this point he opposed by those of our own household, who choose to think that according to Plato also the world is uncreated. For they are bound in justice to pardon us, if in reference to Plato's opinions we believe what he himself, being a Greek, has discoursed to us Greeks in clear and distinct language. "For God," says he, "having found the whole visible world not at rest, but moving in an irregular and disorderly manner, brought it out of disorder into order, because He thought that this was altogether better than the other." And still more plainly he shows that he did not adopt creation in an enigmatic way, nor yet for need of clearness, in the discourse which he has made the Father of all hold upon this point after the creation of the universe. "For," says he, "since ye have come into being, (and he is speaking to the gods) though ye are not altogether immortal nor indissoluble, nevertheless ye shall certainly not be dissolved, since ye have gained my will."

'But, as I was saying, with those who talk to us at home, as being our friends, we will discuss the matter in a friendly way and quietly with gentle arguments. For Aristotle seems to have brought them also over, as haying been unable to resist his attack upon the doctrine, and unwilling to impute to Plato what seemed to have been detected as a fallacy. 'But according to our hearing, whereas Plato claims for the world that it is the noblest work made by the noblest of Creators, and invests the Maker of all with a power by which He made the world which did not previously exist, and haying made it, will if He please preserve it ever in safety, and whereas according to him the world is in this way supposed to be created and imperishable, who among the Peripatetics gives us any confirmation of these doctrines?

'We must gently admonish their ally, that it is not absolutely necessary that whatever has been created must also perish, nor conversely that what will never perish must necessarily be uncreated. For we must neither admit that the sole cause of the imperishable is derived from its being uncreated, nor must we leave the passing of the created to destruction as admitting no remedy. 'Whence then are we to get any help on these points from the doctrines of Aristotle, a man who pursues the argument on these subjects, not indirectly, nor merely as stating his own opinion, but sets himself in direct opposition to Plato, and both brings the created under a necessity of perishing, and says that what is imperishable maintains its imperishable condition only from the fact of not having been created, nor even leaves any power in God, which He can use to do any good. For what has never existed before now, this, he says, never can come into existence.

'And so far is he from supporting Plato's doctrine by these statements, that he has ere now frightened some even of Plato's zealous disciples by what he said, and led them to reject his doctrine, because they were not able to perceive, that although, according to the nature of things alone without the will and power of God, neither the created is imperishable nor the imperishable created. 'Yet when

one has established as the chief cause that which proceeds from God, one must take this as guide in all things, and show it to be a cause on no point inferior to any others. For it is ridiculous that, because a thing has come into existence, it must therefore perish, and yet not perish, if God so wills; ridiculous also that, because a thing is uncreated, it has strength to escape from perishing, and yet that the will of God is insufficient to keep any created thing from perishing.

'The builder is able to set up a house not yet existent, and a man can make a statue not previously existent, and another frames a ship out of unwrought timber and gives it over to those who want it, and all the other artificers, who pursue the constructive arts, have this power to bring some non-existent thing into existence; and shall the universal King and Chief Artificer not so much as share the power of a human artificer, but be left by us without any share in creation? Not so, if at least we be able in any small degree to form an estimate of a divine cause. 'But though competent to create and to will what is excellent, (for He is good, and the good feels no envy about anything), is He yet unable to preserve and guard what He has made? Yet surely even the other artificers are competent to do both. The builder, for instance, and the shipwright not only build new ships and houses, but are able also to repair those which are wearing away from time, substituting in them other parts in place of those which have been damaged.

'So that surely so much as this must be conceded to God also. For how can He who is able to make a whole thing be unable to make it in part? So then why need it be made new, if one who is a maker in general is also to preserve his beautiful work against every accident? For to be willing to undo what was well made is the part of an evil one. 'But there is no stronger bond for the preservation of things created than the will of God. Or, while many things which shared in the zeal and will of man, as nations and cities and works, after existing an enormous time still remain when he who willed them is no more, shall the things which have had a share in God's purpose, and have been made for Him and by Him,----shall these then pass away and no longer remain while their Maker is still present?

'What cause can have done violence to the purpose of God? Can it be the necessity proceeding from the things created themselves? But this by accepting the orderly arrangement confessed itself overcome by God. But can it be some cause from without acting in antagonism to God? Yet neither does any such cause exist, nor is it right to make God inferior to any in matters in which He has before prevailed and made order, unless indeed we altogether forget that we are discoursing about the greatest and most divine power. 'But enough, for perhaps we are carried away by zeal into this argument concerning the truth. One thing is plain which we set forth, that they can be no teachers concerning the creation of the world who do not allow it any creation at all.' Further, concerning the fifth essence in bodies introduced by Aristotle we must quote the following statements:

CHAPTER VII ’For instance, with regard to the so-called elements, which are the primary constituents of bodies, Plato, like those before him, following the clear evidence concerning them, said that they were these four which are generally acknowledged, namely, fire, earth, air, and water, and that all other things are produced from their combinations and changes. But Aristotle, as it seems, hoped to appear extraordinarily wise, if he could add another body, and counted in with the four visible bodies the fifth essence: and he thus made a very brilliant and bountiful use of nature, but failed to observe that in physical inquiry one must not lay down laws, but search out nature’s own facts.

’To the proof then that the primary natures of bodies are four, which is what the Platonists want, the Peripatetic would not only give no help, but would even be almost its only opponent. For instance, when we say that every body is either hot or cold, or moist or dry, or soft or hard, or light or heavy, or rare or dense, and when we find that there can be nothing else to partake of any of these conditions besides the four elements,----for if anything is hot, it is either fire or air; and if cold, either water or earth; and if dry, fire or earth; and if moist, water or air; and if soft, air or fire; and if hard, water or earth; and light and rare, as for instance, fire and air; and heavy and dense, as water and earth; ----and when from all the other simple forces we perceive that there cannot be any other body besides these, this man alone opposes us, asserting that there can be a body which partakes not of these, a body, that is, neither heavy nor light, neither soft nor hard, neither moist nor dry, almost calling it a body that is not a body. For though he has left it the name, he has taken away all the forces by means of which it naturally becomes a body.

’Either, therefore, he will withdraw us from Plato’s opinion by persuading us of his own statements, or by confirming those of Plato he will himself withdraw from his own opinions. So that in no way is he of any use in regard to Plato’s doctrines. ’Further, Plato will have it that all bodies, inasmuch as they are regarded as formed upon one similar kind of matter, turn and change one into another. But Aristotle claims absolutely an essence in all other things which is impassible, and imperishable, and unchangeable, lest forsooth he should seem to be the inventor of something contemptible: yet he says nothing at all extraordinary and original, but transfers Plato’s fine intuitions in other matters to such as are unsuitable, just like some of the more modern sculptors. ’For they too, when they have copied the head of one statue, and the breast of another, and the waist of another, sometimes put together things which do not suit each other, and persuade themselves that they have made something original: and indeed the whole, which any one would blame as being unsymmetrical, is their own; but the contributions which are brought together in it, and have some beauty, are not theirs.

'In like manner also Aristotle hearing from Plato that there is a certain essence intelligible in itself abstractedly, and incorporeal colourless and intangible, neither coming into being, nor perishing, nor turning, nor changing, but always existing in the same conditions and manner, and hearing again at another time of the things in heaven that being divine and imperishable and impassible they are yet bodies, he combined out of both and stuck together things not at all congruous: for from the one he took the property of body, and from the others the property of impassibility, and so framed an impassible body. 'In the case then of the statues, even if the combination of the different parts was not beautiful, it was at least not impossible to be made. For instance, even Homer shows us such combinations, for he says, "In eyes and head Like Zeus the Lord of thunder, with the girth Of Ares, and Poseidon's brawny chest."

But the body could never be impassible: for being combined with a passible and changeable nature, it must necessarily suffer with its yokefellow. And if there were anything impassible, it must be separated and free from that which suffers; so that it would be without the matter, and when separated from that it must necessarily be acknowledged to be incorporeal.' Further, let us give our attention to these other points in which he proves that Aristotle is at variance with Plato. CHAPTER VIII 'THEN these are followed by many points in which they are at variance. For the one says that the things in heaven have most of their character from fire, while the other says that the heavenly bodies have nothing to do with fire. And Plato says that God kindled light in the second circle from the earth in order that it might as much as possible illumine the whole heaven, such being his declaration concerning the sun. But the other, not willing that the sun should be fire, and knowing that light is pure fire, or something of fire, does not allow that light is kindled round the sun.

'Further, the one, attributing formal immortality to all the heavenly bodies, says that there take place certain secretions from them and equivalent accessions; and he is compelled to say this, in regard to the secretions, by the rays of the sun and the heat produced in the efflux from him; and, in regard to the accessions, by the equality in his apparent magnitude: for the bodies would not appear equal if they received nothing in place of what they emit: 'but Aristotle maintains that they continue altogether the same in substance, without either any secretion from them or any accretion. 'Further, the one, in addition to the common motion of the heavenly bodies, in which all move in the spheres to which they are confined, both the fixed stars and the planets, gives them another motion also, which indeed happens to be otherwise most admirable, and congenial to the nature of their body; for as they are spherical, naturally each would have a spherical motion of rotation: but the other deprives them of this motion also, which they perform as liviag beings, and leaves them only the motion which results from other bodies surrounding them, as if they were without life.

'Moreover he says that the appearance presented to us by the stars as if they were in motion is an affection of the feebleness and quivering, as it were, of our sight, and is not a reality: as if Plato derived his belief in their motion from this appearance, and not from the reason which teaches that as each of these is a living being, and has both soul and body, it must necessarily have its own proper motion (for every body whose motion is from without is lifeless, but that which is moved from within and of itself is animated); and when moved, as being divine, it must move with the most beautiful motion, and since motion in a circle is the most beautiful, it must move in this way. 'And the truth of the sensation would be in part confirmed by the testimony of reason; it was not, however, this sensation that caused the belief in the motion. With regard to the motion of the whole, he could not contradict Plato's assertion that it takes place in a circle, for he was overpowered by the clear evidence: yet here also this fine invention of the new body gave him room for dissent.

'For whereas Plato attributed the circular motion to the soul, inasmuch as there were four bodies and all naturally moved in a simple and straight course, fire towards the outside, and earth towards the centre, and the others towards the intervening space, Aristotle, as assigning a different motion to each different body, so also assigned the circular as a sort of bodily motion to his fifth body, easily deceiving himself in all. 'For to bodies which move in a straight line their heaviness or lightness supplied a source of motion; but the fifth body, partaking neither of heaviness nor lightness, was rather a cause of immobility, and not of motion in a circle. 'For if to bodies that move in a straight line the cause of their motion is not their shape, but the inclination of their weight, a body, not only when placed in the centre of any like body, will have no inclination in any direction, but, also, when set in a circle round any kind of body whatever, will have no cause of inclination towards anything,

"Move they to right towards the rising sun, Or move to left," whether forward or backward. 'Further, when other bodies have been thrust out of their proper places, the rebound towards these gives them a motion again of themselves; but as that fifth body never departs from its own localities, it ought to remain at rest. 'And with regard to the other bodies, when this fifth is put out of the question, it is evident that Aristotle out of contentiousness does not agree with Plato. For Plato had inquired whether body, is heavy by nature or light by nature, and, since it was evident that these terms are used according to the relation towards up and down, he had considered whether there is by nature any up and down or not, and had exactly shown that according to the affinities of the bodies to their places, the direction towards which they severally tended would be called "down," and the other direction from which each would draw back be called "up." And "heavy" and "light" he disposed according to the same relation, and further proved that neither their centre nor their circumference is rightly called "up" or "down." But Aristotle

makes objection, thinking that he must overthrow the other's doctrines on every side, and urges us to call that which tends to the centre "heavy," and that which tends to the circumference "light," and the place in the centre he calls "down," and the circumference "up." '

Thus widely do they differ from each other in regard to the world, and its constituents, and the heavenly bodies. Such are the opinions of these two. But Moses and the oracles of the Hebrews trouble themselves about none of these things; and with good reason, because it was thought that those who busied themselves about these matters gained no benefit in regard to the right conduct of life. CHAPTER IX 'Now concerning the soul what need we say? For this is evident not only to philosophers but also to nearly all ordinary persons, that Plato allows the soul to be immortal, and has written many discourses concerning this, showing in many various ways that the soul is immortal. 'Great also has been the emulation of the zealous followers of Plato's teaching in defence both of Plato and of his doctrine; for this is almost the one thing that holds his whole school together.

'For the hypothesis of his ethical doctrines was a consequence of the immortality of the soul, since it was through the divine nature of the soul that virtue was enabled to maintain its grandeur and lustre and high spirit; in nature also it was in consequence of the soul's direction that all things gained the possibility of being well ordered. '"For soul," he says, "as a whole has the care of all soulless being, and traverses all heaven, appearing at different times in different forms." Moreover, science also and wisdom have been made by Plato dependent on the immortality of the soul. For all kinds of learning are recollections, and he thinks that in no other way can inquiry and learning, out of which science springs, be maintained. 'Now if the soul is not immortal, neither is recollection, and if not this, then neither learning. Whereas therefore all the doctrines of Plato are absolutely attached to and dependent on the divine nature of the soul and its immortality, he who does not admit this overthrows Plato's whole philosophy.

'Who then first attempted to oppose the proofs, and rob the soul of immortality and all its other power? Who else, I say, before Aristotle? For of the rest some allowed that it has a continued existence, and others, if not granting so much as this, yet assigned to the soul a certain power and movement and works and actions in the body. 'But the more Plato tried to magnify the importance of the soul, declaring it to be the beginning of creation, and the pupil of God, and the power presiding over all things, so much the more contentiously did Aristotle seek to destroy and to dishonour it, and prove the soul to be almost nothing. 'For he said that it was neither spirit, nor fire, nor body at all, nay, nor yet an incorporeal thing such as to be self-governed and to have motion, nor even so much as to be in the body without motion, and, so to say, soulless. For see how he ventured, or even was forced, so

far as to rob the soul of its primary motions, deliberation, thought, expectation, remembrance, reasoning!

'For this secretary, as they say, of nature says that these are not movements of the soul. Surely this man may be quite trusted to have understood anything about the things outside him, who has made so great a mistake about his own soul, as not even to understand that it thinks! For it is not the soul, he says, but the man that performs each of these acts, while the soul is motionless. 'Dicaearchus therefore following him, and being able to discern the consequence, took away the whole substance of the soul. It is manifest indeed that the soul is a thing invisible and concealed, so that, through the clear evidence at least of our senses, we could not grant its existence: but though concealed, its motions seem to compel us to acknowledge that the soul is an existent thing. 'For almost every one seems to understand that the following are acts of the soul: to deliberate, to consider, and to think in any way whatever. For when we behold the body and its powers, and reflect that actions of this kind are not proper to the body, we grant the existence within us of something else which deliberates, and that this is the soul. Since from what other source came our belief concerning soul?

'If therefore any one take away these acts which are the chief evidences of the soul, and assign them to something else, he has neither left us any evidence of its existence, nor any purpose for which it would seem to be of use. What help therefore can he who would have the soul to be immortal derive from him that deals death to the soul? And what is the explanation of the manner of its motion, according to which we call it self-moved, to be obtained from those who attribute to it no motion at all?

'True; but in regard to the immortality of the mind some one may say that Aristotle agrees with Plato. For though he will not admit the whole soul to be immortal, yet he acknowledges the mind at least to be divine and imperishable. What therefore the mind is in its essence and its nature, whence it comes, and from what source it separates itself and enters into man's nature, and whither it departs again, himself alone may know; if at least he understands anything that he says about the mind, and is not avoiding the proof by wrapping up the difficulty of the matter in the obscurity of his language, and, just like the cuttle-fish, making it difficult to catch him by means of the darkness he creates. 'But even in these matters he is altogether at variance with Plato. For the one says that mind cannot subsist without a soul, while the other separates the mind from the soul. And immortality the one gives to it in partnership with the soul, as being otherwise impossible; but the other says that this survives in the mind alone when separated from the soul. And that the soul goes forth from the body he would not allow, because this thought pleased Plato: but he insisted that the mind is severed from the soul, because Plato judged such a thing as this impossible.'

These are the statements of Atticus: and I will add to them the views of Plotinus also, expressed in the following manner: CHAPTER X [PLOTINUS] 'THE manner in which "entelecheia" is used in speaking of the soul may be considered in the following way. The soul, they say, holds in the combination the place of form, in relation to the body when alive as matter: but it is the form not of every body, nor of body as such, but as physical, organic, and potentially alive. 'If therefore it is like that with which it has been compared, it is as the form of a statue to the bronze: and if the body is divided, the soul must be divided into parts with it, and if any part is cut off from the body, a portion of the soul is with the part cut off; and the supposed withdrawal of the soul in sleep does not take place, since the entelechy must be inseparable from that to which it belongs; but in reality there is no such thing as sleep.

'Moreover if there is an entelechy, there can be no opposition between reason and desires, but the whole must be affected throughout in one and the same way, without any self-discord. But sensations may possibly exist only contingently, while perceptions cannot: wherefore they themselves also introduce the mind as another soul, and suppose it immortal. 'The reasoning soul therefore must be an entelechy, if we must use this term, in some other way than this. Nor will the sensitive soul, since this also retains the impressions of the sensible objects when absent, retain them without the body's aid: otherwise, they will be in it just like forms and images: but if they were therein in this manner, it would be impossible to receive them otherwise (than with the body's aid). Therefore, it is not an entelechy as being inseparable. 'Moreover that which desires not meats or drinks, but other than bodily things, is not itself an inseparable entelechy.

'Then there would remain the vegetative principle, which would seem to admit a doubt, whether it be in this way an inseparable entelechy. Yet even this seems not to be so. For if the beginning of every plant is at the root, and the rest of the body grows round the root and the lower parts in many plants, it is evident that the soul forsakes the other parts and is collected in some one: it is not then in the whole as an inseparable entelechy. For again, before the plant grows the soul is in a little germ: if therefore it both comes from a larger plant into a small germ, and from a small germ into a whole plant, what is to hinder its being also wholly separated? And how, being also indivisible can it become a divisible entelechy of a divisible body? 'Also the same soul from one animal becomes another: how then could the soul of the former become the soul of the next, if it were the entelechy of one? And this is evident from the animals which change into other animals. The soul then has not its existence from being the "form" of anything, but is an essence, not receiving its existence in consequence of its abode in a body, but existing before it belonged to this, so that in an animal the body will not generate the soul.

'What then is its essence? And if it is neither body, nor an affection of body, but action and production and many such things are both in it and from it, being an essence in addition to its bodies, what is its nature? Must it not manifestly be what we call real essence? For all that is bodily may be said to be generation but not substance, becoming and perishing, and never really being, but preserved by participation with being, so far as it may partake thereof.' Now since we have related the opinions of Plotinus, it will not be out of place to observe what Porphyry also has said in his books against Boëthus On the Soul. CHAPTER XI [PORPHYRY] 'IN answer to him who called the soul an entelechy, and supposed it, though utterly motionless, to be a cause of motion, we must ask what is the source of the strong excitements of the animal who understands nothing of what he sees and utters, though his soul discerns what is future and not yet present, and moves according to the same? Whence also in the constitution of the animal come the acts of the soul as of a living thing, acts of deliberation, inquiry, and will, which are movements of the soul and not of the body?'

Then presently he adds: 'To liken the soul to weight or bodily properties uniform and immovable, by which either the motion or the quality of the subject-matter is determined, was the part of a man who either willingly or unwillingly had utterly lost sight of the dignity of the soul, and had in no way discerned that by the presence of the soul the animal's body is made alive, as by the presence of fire the water placed close to it, though cold in itself, is made hot; and by the rising of the sun the air, which is dark without his shining, is made full of light. 'Yet neither was the heat of the water previously the fire nor the fire's heat; nor was the light of the atmosphere that light which is inherent in the sun: and in the same way the animation of the body, which seems like the weight or the quality in the body, is not that soul which was located in the body and through which also the body partook of a certain breath of life.'

Then afterwards he adds: 'So then all the other statements which others have made concerning the soul bring disgrace upon us. For must it not be a disgraceful doctrine which makes the soul the entelechy of the physical organic body? And is not that a shameful doctrine, which represents it as having somehow a breath or intelligent fire, kindled or quenched by the cooling, and, as it were, dipping in the air around it, and which makes it a collection of atoms, or represents it as wholly engendered of the body? ' This is what in The Laws the author represented as the impious doctrine of impious men. All such statements then are full of shame: but, says he, no one would be ashamed for him who calls it a self-moved substance. CHAPTER XII [ATTICUS] 'FURTHER, when Plato says that the soul pervading all parts arranges all in order, and is that whereby the other philosophers would admit that all things are so arranged, and that nature is nothing else than soul, and evidently not an irrational soul, and when from this Plato gathers that all things

take place according to providence, since they take place according to nature, in none of these opinions does Aristotle agree with us.

'For he does not admit that nature is soul, and earthly things ordered by one nature: for he says that for each several thing there are also different causes. For of the things in heaven which 'always remain in the same relations and conditions he supposes fate to be the cause: and of sublunary things, nature; and of human affairs, prudence, and forethought, and soul, showing indeed nicety in such distinctions, but not discerning the necessary truth. 'For if there were not some one animate power pervading the whole, and binding and holding all things together, the whole could not be either reasonably or beautifully arranged. It was a proof then of the same blindness, to hope that a city could ever continue in well-being without unity, and to believe that one could in argument preserve this universe in perfect beauty, such it appears, without having bound and compacted it together by participation in some one common principle.

'And something of this kind, he says, it is that arranges the several parts, such as to be a principle of motion, but he will not admit that this is soul; though Plato nevertheless shows that in all things that are moved the source and fountain of their motion is the soul. And that which would be the work of a rational and wise soul, to make nothing without a purpose, this he attributes to nature, but gives nature no share in the name of soul; as if things were derived not from powers but from names.' CHAPTER XIII 'BUT the chief point and power of Plato's system, his theory of ideas, has been discredited, and abused, and insulted in every way, as far as it was in Aristotle's power. For as he was unable to conceive that things of a grand, divine, and transcendent nature require a certain kindred power for their recognition, and trusted to his own meagre and petty shrewdness, which was able to make its way through things terrestrial, and discern the truth in them, but was not capable of beholding the plain of absolute truth, he made himself the rule and judge of things above him, and denied the existence of any peculiar natures such as Plato affirmed, but dared to call the highest of all realities triflings and chatterings and nonsense.

'Rather is the supreme and final speculation of Plato's philosophy that which treats of this intelligible and eternal being of the ideas, wherein verily the utmost toil and stress is set before the soul. For a most happy man is he, who has shared in the effort and attained the end, while he who has failed from want of power to obtain an insight is left without any share at all of happiness. 'And for this reason Plato too strives earnestly in every way to show the strength of these ideal natures. For he says that it is not possible either rightly to assign a cause of anything whatsoever, except by participation in the ideas, or to have knowledge of any truth except by reference to these: nay not even a particle of reason would any have, unless they should acknowledge the existence of these ideas. 'They again who have decided

to maintain the doctrines of Plato lay the chief stress of their arguments on this point, and quite necessarily. For nothing is left of the Platonic system, if one will not grant them on Plato's behalf these primary and i principal natures. For it is in these that he is especially superior to all other men.

'For as he conceived God in relation to these ideas as Father of all, and Creator, and Lord, and Guardian; and as from men's works he recognized that the artist formed a previous conception of that which he was about to make, and then afterwards adapted the likeness to the conception thus formed in the case of the things made; in the same way therefore Plato comprehended at a glance that God's conceptions, the patterns of the things made, are earlier than the things themselves, being incorporeal and intelligible, ever existing in the same conditions and modes, themselves the highest and first beings, and in part the causes to all the rest of their being just such as they severally are, according to their likeness to them; and seeing that they are not easy to be discerned, nor yet able to be clearly expressed in speech, Plato himself treated of these subjects as far as it was possible to represent them in speech or thought, and to prepare those who were to follow after him; and having arranged his whole philosophy to this end, he asserts that with these ideas and the perception of them are concerned the wisdom and the science, whereby the proper end of man and the life of blessedness are attained.'

So far speaks Atticus. I might have quoted yet more than this from his book which I have mentioned: let us be satisfied, however, with what has been set forth, and pass on next to the sect of the Stoics. Among the hearers then of Socrates was one Antisthenes, a man like Heracleitus in spirit, who said that madness was better than pleasure, and therefore used to advise his friends never to stretch out a finger for the sake of pleasure. And a disciple of his was Diogenes the 'dog,' who seemed to entertain most brutelike ideas, and attracted many followers. He was succeeded by Crates, and a disciple of Crates was Zeno of Cittium, who was established as founder of the sect of the Stoic philosophers. Zeno was succeeded by Cleanthes, and Cleanthes by Chrysippus, and he by the second Zeno, and the rest in order. All these are said to have been especially devoted both to hard living and to dialectic. The doctrines then of their philosophy are somewhat as follows.

CHAPTER XIV [ARISTOCLES] 'THEY say, like Heracleitus, that the element of the existing world is fire, and that the original principles of fire are matter and god, as Plato says. But the former says that both principles, the active and the passive, are corporeal, while the latter says that the first active cause is incorporeal. 'Then, moreover, they say that at certain predestined and definite times the whole world is consumed by fire, and afterwards reorganized again. The primordial fire, however, is as it were just a seed, containing the reasons and the causes of all things past, present, and future: and that the combination and sequence of these constitute fate, and knowledge, and truth, and law of all being, from which there is no escape

or avoidance. And in this way all things in the world are admirably arranged, just as in any well-ordered state.' CHAPTER XV [ARIUS DIDYMUS] 'THE whole ordered world (κόσμος) with all its parts they call god, and say that he is one alone, and finite, and living, and eternal, and god: for all bodies are contained in him, and in him there is no vacuum. For the name order (κόσμος) is applied to the quality of all substance as well as to that which has an arrangement of like kind consequent on the ordering (διακόσμηνσιν).

'Wherefore according to the former rendering they say that the world is eternal, but as to its orderly arrangement created and subject to change at infinite periods past and future. 'And the quality of all being is an eternal world and god; the name world (κόσμος) also means the system compounded of heaven, and the air, and earth, and sea, and the natures contained in them; and again the name world means the dwelling-place of gods and men, and of all things made for their sake. 'For in the same way as the name city has two meanings, the dwelling-place, and the system resulting from the combination of residents and citizens, so also the world is, as it were, a city composed of gods and men, in which the gods hold the rule, and the men are subject. 'There is, however, a community between them, because they partake of reason, which is nature's law: and for their sakes all other things have been made. From which things it follows that we must suppose that the god who administers the whole takes thought for mankind, being beneficent, and kind, and friendly to; man, and just, and possessed of all virtues.

'For this reason indeed the world is also called Zeus, since he is the cause of our life (ζῆν): and inasmuch as from eternity he administers all things unchangeably by connected (εἰρομένῳ) reason, he is also called Fate (εἰμαρμένην): and Adrasteia, because nothing can escape him (ἀποδιδράσκειν) and Providence, because, he arranges things severally for good. 'Cleanthes would have the sun to be the ruling power of the world, because it is the greatest of the heavenly bodies, and contributes most to the administration of the whole by making the day and the year and the other seasons. 'Some, however, of the sect thought that the earth was the ruling power of the world. But Chrysippus thought it was the ether, the clearest and purest as being most mobile of all things, and carrying round the whole course of the world.' Let this extract then suffice from the Epitome of Arius Didymus. But with reference to the opinion of the Stoics concerning God it is sufficient to quote the words of Porphyry in the answer which he wrote to Boëthus On the Soul, in the form following:

CHAPTER XVI [PORPHYRY] 'THEY do not hesitate to call God an intelligent fire and allow Him to be eternal, and to say that He destroys and devours all things, being such a fire as that which is known to us, and to contradict Aristotle who deprecates saying that the ether consists of fire of this kind. 'But if they are asked how such a fire lasts so long, though they do not say that it is fire of another kind, yet after

describing it as of such a nature, and claiming credence for their own assertion, they add on to this unreasonable belief that it is also an eternal fire, though they assume that even this etherial fire is partially quenched and rekindled. But why should one spend time in pursuing any further their blindness in regard to their own doctrines, and their indolence and contempt for the doctrines of the ancients?'

CHAPTER XVII [NUMENIUS] 'BUT what then is "being "? Is it these four elements, earth and fire and the other two intermediate natures? Are then these the real beings, either collectively, or any one of them singly? But how can they be, since they are both created and destroyed again, for we may see them proceeding one out of another, and interchanging, and subsisting neither as elements nor as compounds? These cannot thus be a body with true being. 'But though not these, yet it is possible that matter may have true being? But for matter also this is utterly impossible, through want of power to continue. For matter is a running and swiftly changing stream, in depth, and breadth, and length undefined and endless.' And presently he adds: 'So it is well stated in the argument that, if matter is infinite, it is undefined; and, if undefined, irrational; and, if irrational, it cannot be known. But as it cannot be known it must necessarily be without order, as things arranged in order must certainly be easy to be known: and what is without order, is not stable: and whatever is not stable cannot have true being.

'Now this was the very point on which we agreed among ourselves before, that it is not permissible for all these things to be associated with true being. I should wish this to be the opinion of all men, be it at all events mine. I deny, therefore, that either matter in itself, or material bodies are true being. 'What then? Have we any thing else besides these elements in the nature of the universe? Yes, certainly. And this is not at all a subtle thing to express, if we would together try to discuss the following point first in the case of ourselves. 'For since bodies are in their own nature inanimate and dead, carried hither and thither, and not abiding in one stay, have they not need of something to hold them together? Most certainly. And if they should fail to find this, would they continue? Certainly not. What is there then to hold them? If on the one hand this also were a body, I think that being liable to be dissolved and dispersed it would need a Zeus Soter to sustain it. If, however, it must be freed from what bodies suffer, in order that after they have been generated it may be able to avert their destruction, and hold them together, to me it seems that there is nothing else left, except only the incorporeal. For of all natures this alone is stable, and compact, and not at all corporeal. At all events it is neither created, nor increased, nor subject to any other kind of motion, and for these reasons the incorporeal was rightly judged worthy to take precedence.'

CHAPTER XVIII [ARIUS DIDYMUS] 'But the oldest of this sect are of opinion that all things are changed into ether, when at certain very long periods all are resolved into an ethereal fire.' And afterwards he adds: 'But from this it is manifest that

Chrysippus has not accepted this confusion in reference to substance (for that was impossible), but only that which was meant as equivalent to change. For the term destruction is not properly understood of the great destruction of the world which takes place in long periods by those who hold the doctrine of the dissolution of the universe into fire, which they call conflagration, but they use the term destruction (fqora&n) as equivalent to change in the course of nature. 'For it is held by the Stoic philosophers that the universal substance changes into fire, as into a seed, and coming back again, from this completes its organization, such as it was before. And this is the doctrine which was accepted by the first and oldest leaders of the sect, Zeno, and Cleanthes, and Chrysippus. For the Zeno who was the disciple and successor of Chrysippus in the School is said to have doubted about the conflagration of the universe.'

CHAPTER XIX 'THE common reason having advanced so far, and a common nature having become greater and fuller, and having at last dried up all things and absorbed them into itself, finds itself in the universal substance, having gone back to the condition first mentioned, and to that resurrection which makes the Great Year, in which takes place the restitution from itself alone to itself again. 'And when it has returned, because of an arrangement such as that from which it began to make a similar organization, it according to reason follows the same course again, so that such periods go on from eternity and never cease. For it is not possible for all things to have a cause of their beginning, nor of that which administers them. For under things created there must lie a substance of a nature to receive all the changes, and the power that out of it created them. For as there is in our case a certain kind of creative nature, there must of necessity be something of the same kind in the world also, something uncreated, for there cannot be a beginning of creation in the case of this nature: and in the same way as it is uncreated, it is also impossible for it to be destroyed, either by itself, or by anything external that would destroy it.

CHAPTER XX 'THE seed, says Zeno, which man emits is breath combined with moisture, a portion and fragment of soul, and a blending of the parents' seed, and a concrete mixture of the various parts of the soul. For this, having the same laws as the universe, when emitted into the womb is caught up by another breath, and made a portion of the female's soul and grows into one with it, and being there stirred and kindled by it grows in secret, continually receiving additions to the moisture and increasing of itself.' And a little further on he adds: 'With regard to the soul, Cleanthes, in setting forth the doctrines of Zeno for comparison with the other physicists, says that Zeno calls the soul an exhalation endowed with sensation, just as Heracleitus does. For wishing to make it clear that there is a perpetual production of intelligent souls by exhalation, he compared them to rivers, speaking as follows: "Though men step into the same rivers, the waters that from time to time flow over them are different": and souls likewise are exhaled from moisture.

'So then Zeno, like Heracleitus, represents the soul as an exhalation. And he says that it is sensitive for the reason that the ruling part is capable of being impressed through the senses from real and substantial objects, and receiving their impressions. For these are special properties of soul.' After other remarks he adds: 'And they say that there is a soul in the universe, which they call ether, and air surrounding the laud and sea, and exhalations from them; and that to this soul are attached all the other souls, both those in animals, and those in the surrounding air; for the souls of the dead still continue. 'Some say that the soul of the universe is eternal, but that the others at death are absorbed into union with it: and that every soul has in it a certain ruling faculty, which is life, and sensation, and appetite.' And a little further on he proceeds:

'They say that the soul is created and perishable, but does not perish immediately when freed from the body, but abides for some time by itself; the soul of the good until the resolution of all things into fire, but the soul of the foolish for certain periods of time. 'But the continued existence of souls they thus describe, that we ourselves on becoming souls continue to exist, having been separated from the body and changed into the smaller substance of the soul. But the souls of the foolish and of irrational animals perish together with their bodies.' Such are the doctrines of the Stoic philosophy collected out of the Epitomae of Arius Didymus. But in answer to their absurd opinion about the soul, it is sufficient to quote the refutations briefly stated in the following words in Longinus, one of our own age: CHAPTER XXI [LONGINUS] 'To speak briefly, it seems to me that all who represented the soul as a body have strayed, one after another, far away from right reasoning. For how is it at all admissible to assume that what is proper to the soul is similar to any of the elements? Or how refer it to the compounds and mixtures, which occurring in many ways are of a nature to generate forms of countless other bodies, in which, if not continuously, at all events at intervals one may see the cause of the elements, and the advance of the primary elements towards the secondary and tertiary compounds? But of properties pertaining to the soul not a trace nor a sign is found in bodies, not even if one should strive, like Epicurus and Chrysippus, to turn every stone, and examine every power of body for an origin of the functions of the soul.

'For what help would the subtilty of the breath give us for sensible presentations and reasonings? Or why has the shape of the atoms so great power above all else and such facility of change, as to beget wisdom, whenever it is mixed up in the moulding of another body? I think indeed that not even if one chanced to be one of Hephaestus' tripods and handmaidens, of whom the former, Homer says, went self-moved to the assembly, and the latter helped their master in his work, and lacked none of the advantages which living beings possess, much less those of the fortuitous motes, . . . and on the other hand it is like the stones upon the sea-shore, in regard to being able to do anything remarkable towards producing sensation. For one might justly be indignant with Zeno and Cleanthes for arguing so very

contemptuously about the soul, and saying both alike that the soul is an exhalation of the solid body. For what, in heaven's name, is there at all in common between an exhalation and a soul? And how is it possible for them, if they think that both our nature and that of other animals is like this, to be able to preserve either sensible presentations and remembrances permanently, or, on the other hand, instincts and desires of things conducive to understanding? Shall we then indeed degrade the gods also, and Him who pervades all things alike in earth and heaven, into an exhalation, and smoke, and such nonsense as this? And shall we not feel ashamed even towards the poets, who although they have not an exact understanding of the gods, nevertheless partly from the common conception of mankind, and partly from inspiration of the Muses, which is of a nature to stir them hereto, have spoken more honourably concerning them, and not called them exhalations, or airs, or breaths, and such nonsense?'

This is what Longinus tells you. But listen to Plotinus also, aiming against the same sect such remarks as follow: CHAPTER XXII [PLOTINUS] 'Now whether each of us is immortal, or wholly perishes, or whether parts of him will pass into dissolution and destruction, while parts remain for ever, which are the man himself, this one may learn as follows, by examining it in the natural way. 'In the first place, man cannot be a simple thing, but he has in him a soul, and has also a body whether as our instrument, or as attached to us in any other way; at all events let them be thus distinguished, and let us examine closely the nature and essence of each. 'The body then, being itself compound, cannot, from the reason of the thing, be permanent; and our senses perceive it dissolving, and wasting, and suffering all kinds of decay, while each of the parts in it follows its own course, and one wastes another away, and changes into another, and destroys it; and this especially when the soul, which harmonizes them, is not present with the atoms.

'And even if each be isolated in coming into existence, it is not one, since it admits of separation into form and matter, of which even simple bodies must be constituted; moreover having also magnitude, inasmuch as they are bodies, and can be divided and broken into small fragments, in this way also they would be liable to destruction. 'So if this is part of ourselves, we are not altogether immortal: but if it is an instrument, it must be of the nature described, as having been given only for a certain time. But the dominant part, even the man himself, would be either like the form in relation to the body as matter, or like the agent in relation to an instrument. And in either way the soul is the self. 'Of what nature then is this? Either it is body, and must certainly be soluble, for every body is compound. Or if it were not body, but of some other nature, this also we must examine either in the same way or some other. And first we must consider into what this body, which they say is soul, must be resolved.

'For since life is an inseparable property of soul, this body which is the soul, if it consisted of two or more bodies, must either in each of the two or in every one have life innate, or one must have it and the other not, or neither have it. If then the life were attached to one of them only, this itself would be soul. 'What then would a body be, which derived life from itself? For fire, and air, and water, and earth, are without life from. themselves: and to whichever of these soul is attached, the life which this one enjoys is adventitious. But besides these there are no other bodies. And by those who think that there are elements different from these, they were not said to be souls but bodies, and not to have life. But if, though none of them has life, the assemblage of them is said to have produced life, this is absurd.

'If, however, each has life, even one is sufficient: but rather it is impossible that a collection of bodies should produce life, and things unintelligent beget intelligence. Moreover they will not assert that these are produced by any and every mode of combination. There must then be the power that is to arrange, and the cause of the combination: so that this would hold the place of a soul. 'For there would not be even a simple body, to say nothing of a composite body, in the world of being, if there were not a soul in the universe; since it is the accession of reason to matter that makes body, and reason can come from no other source than soul.; 'If any one should deny this, and say that a soul is made by a concurrence of atoms or indivisibles, he would be refuted by its oneness and community of feeling, and by analogy, since there can be no unity that does not extend throughout the whole, nor can a common feeling come from bodies which are without feeling and incapable of union; but the soul is conscious of feeling; also from things which have no parts there can come neither body nor magnitude.

'Moreover supposing the body to be simple, if they say that all that is material has no life of itself (for matter has no qualities), but that what is classed as the form (εἶδος) adds the life----then, if they say that this form is the essence, only the one of these and not the union of both will be the soul; and on the other hand, there is no body, for even this is not produced from mere matter, or else we must resolve it again in the same manner. 'But if they say that the form is an affection of the matter, but not the essence, they will have to state the source from which this affection and the life have come into the matter. For certainly the matter does not give itself form, nor infuse into itself a soul. There must, then, be something which provides life, whether it be provided for the matter or for any of the bodies, and this must be outside and beyond any bodily nature. Since otherwise there would not even be any body, as there would be no animal force.

'For its own nature is in flux and motion, and if all were bodies they would perish very speedily, even though the name soul should be given to one of them: for it would be affected in the same way as the other bodies, they all having the same matter. Or rather nothing would ever come into being, but all things would remain

as matter, if there were nothing to give it form. 'But perhaps even matter would not exist at all, but this universe would be dissolved, if any one should entrust it to a combination of body, giving it in mere name the rank of soul, though it is only air and breath that is most easily dispersed, and has no unity of itself. For since all bodies are capable of division, how can any one who makes this universe depend on any of them, fail to make it unintelligent and moved at random?

'For what order, or reason, or mind can there be in breath which needs a soul to give it order? But granted the existence of a soul, all these are subservient to it for the constitution of a world and of every living thing, a different power from each contributing to the whole: whereas if there be no soul present in the universals, they will not merely be without order, but will be nothing at all. 'These men are also themselves led by the truth to testify that there must be something prior to bodies and superior to them, a species of soul, since they suppose that breath is endowed with mind and that fire is intelligent, as without fire and breath the better part cannot exist in the actual world, but seeks a place where it may be settled; whereas they ought to be seeking where to settle the bodies, as it seems these must be settled in powers of the soul.

'But if they assume that life and soul are nothing besides breath, what becomes of their much boasted phrase "in a certain state," in which they take refuge when compelled to assume some active nature besides bodies? If then they say that not every breath is soul, because countless breaths are inanimate, but the breath that is "in a certain state," they must say that this "certain state," and this condition, is either something real or nothing. 'But if they say it is nothing, there will be breath only, and the "certain state" a mere name: and so it will result in their saying that nothing else exists but matter, and that soul, and god, and all things are a mere name, and that matter alone exists. But if the "state" is something real and additional to the substratum and the matter, existing in matter but itself immaterial because it is not compounded again out of matter, it must be not body, but a kind of reason, and a different nature.

'Moreover from the following considerations it is not less evidently impossible that the soul should be a body of any kind whatever. For then it must be either hot or cold, either hard or soft, and liquid or solid, and black or white, with all other bodily qualities differing in different bodies. And if it is hot, it will only give heat, if cold it will only chill, and the additional presence of lightness will make things light, and of heaviness heavy, and blackness will make black, and whiteness white. 'For it is no property of fire to chill, nor of cold to make hot. But the soul both produces different effects in different animals, and also contrary effects in the same animal; making some parts solid and others liquid, and some thick and others thin, black and white, light and heavy. Yet it ought to have produced only one effect according to the quality of the body in colour and other respects: but in fact it produces many.

'And how then will they explain the fact that the motions are diverse instead of one, since every body has one motion only? If they allege choice as cause of some motions, natural laws of others, so far they are right: but choice is not a property of body, nor laws, at least if they are different, while the body is one and simple, and has no participation in any such law, except what has been given to it by that which caused it to be hot or cold. 'Also the power of causing growth in periods of time and up to this or that measurer----whence can the body itself get this? For it is natural to it to be increased, but to have no power in itself of causing increase, except in as far as it may be taken into service as a mass of matter by the power which by means of it effects the increase. Even if the soul were a body and caused increase, it must also be itself increased by an addition evidently of similar body, if it is to advance equally with that which receives increase from it. And the addition will either be soul, or soulless body.

'And if soul, how and whence does it come in, and how is it added? But if the addition is soulless, how is it to become animated, and to agree with what was there before, and be one with it, and share the same opinions with the first soul? Will not rather this soul, as a stranger, be in ignorance of what the other knows; and just as with the other mass of our body, one part will pass away from it, and another be added, and nothing will be the same? 'How then are our remembrances formed? And how our knowledge of our own selves, if we have never the same soul? Moreover if it is body, and the nature of body is that, when divided into several parts, each of the parts is not the same as the whole, and if a soul is of a certain size, then whatever is less than that will not be soul, just as everything of a certain size by any subtraction changes from being what it was.

'But if anything possessing magnitude should remain the same in quality when diminished in bulk, it is altered as body and as quantity, but may retain its sameness in quality as being different from quantity. 'What then will they say, who assert that the soul is body? 'First as to each part of the soul that is in the same body, is each a soul such as the whole is? 'And so again the part of each part? Magnitude then contributed nothing to its essence; yet it ought to have done so, as there was, a certain fixed quantity; and it was whole in many different places, which cannot be the case with body, that the same should be whole in many places, and the part be the same as the whole. 'But if they say that each of the parts is not a soul, they will have a soul consisting of soulless parts. And further still, if the magnitude of each soul be limited in each direction, then if it become either less or greater it will not be a soul.

'Whenever therefore from one connexion and the same seed twin children are begotten, or even many, as in the case of the other animals, the seed being parted into several places, where each is a whole, does not this teach those who are willing to learn, that where the part is the same as the whole, this whole in its own

essence transcends the quantitative existence, and must itself be without quantity? For thus it will remain the same when quantity is withdrawn, inasmuch as it is independent of quantity and bulk, as its essence is something different therefrom. The soul therefore and its laws are independent of quantity. 'But that, if the soul were body, there would be neither sensation nor thought, nor knowledge, nor virtues, nor anything noble, is evident from the following reasons. Whatever is to perceive anything by sensation must itself be one, and must apprehend everything by the same sentient power; even if there should be many impressions that enter through many organs of sensation, or many qualities of one thing, and even if through one sense there should enter a complex object, such as a face.

'For there are not different powers that perceive the nostril and the eye, but the same perceives all at once. And if one impression comes through the eyes, and another through hearing, there must be some one power which both reach: or how could one say that these are different, if the sensations did not reach the same sentient power at the same time? This, therefore, must be as it were a centre, and lines converging from the circumference of the circle must convey the sensations from all sides to it, and the percipient power of this kind must be really and truly one. 'For if this were to be extended, and the sensations were to strike upon both extremities, as it were, of a line, either they must run together again to one and the same point, as the centre, or to some other: and each different point will have a sensation of one of the two objects, just as if I were to perceive one object and you another.

'And if the sensible object be one, as a face, it will be contracted into one, as is evidently the case; for contraction takes place in the very pupils of the eyes (otherwise how could very large objects be seen through them?): so that there is a still further contraction in passing on to the ruling faculty, in such a way that indivisible notions are produced. And this faculty will be indivisible, or, if it were a magnitude, the perceptions would share its divisibility, so that one part (of the soul) would perceive one part (of the object), and another another, and nothing in us would perceive the sensible object as a whole. 'But in fact the whole sentient is one: for how could it be divided? For there can be no correspondence of equal to equal, because the ruling faculty cannot be equal to each and every sensible object. Into how many parts then shall the division be made? Or shall it be divided into as many parts as the number of varieties in the object of sense that enters? And so then each of those parts of the soul will also perceive by its subdivisions, or the parts of the subdivisions will have no perception; but that is impossible. And if any part perceive all the object, since magnitude by its nature is infinitely divisible, the result will be that each man will also have infinite sensations for each sensible object, infinite images, as it were, of the same thing in our ruling faculty.

’Moreover if the sentient be body, the sensation cannot take place otherwise than as seals impressed on wax from signet-rings, whether the sensations be impressed upon the blood or upon the breath. If then the impressions are made as in liquid bodies, which is probable, they will become confused, just as if made on water, and there will be no remembrance of them. ’But if the impressions remain, either it is impossible for others to be imprinted while the former occupy the place, so that there will be no other sensations: or if others are made, the former will be obliterated, so that the remembrance will come to nothing. But if it is possible to remember, and to receive sensations one upon another, without hindrance from the earlier, it is impossible for the soul to be body. ’And the same may also be seen from the sensation of pain. When a man is said to have a pain in his finger, the pain of course is about the finger, but the sensation of the pain, they must evidently admit, arises in the ruling faculty. While the suffering part therefore is different, the ruling faculty perceives the (animal) spirit, and the whole soul shares the same feeling.

’How then does this result? By transmission, they will say, the animal spirit about the finger having first suffered, and imparted the suffering to the next, and this to another, until it arrived at the ruling faculty. ’Necessarily, therefore, if the first had a sensation of pain, there must be another sensation for the second, if the sensation came by way of transmission, and another also for the third, and the sensation of one single pain must become many and infinite, and afterwards the ruling faculty must perceive all these sensations and its own in addition to them. ’But the truth is, that each of them is not a sensation of the pain in the finger, but that which is next to the finger is a feeling that the wrist is in pain, and the third is a feeling that another part farther up is in pain, and so there are many pains: and the ruling faculty does not perceive the pain in the finger, but the pain close to itself, and knows only this, and dismisses the others, not understanding that it is the finger which is in pain.

’If, therefore, it is not possible for the sensation of such a pain to be produced by transmission, nor possible that in the body as being a mass, when one part suffers, another part should be noticed (for in every magnitude one part and another part are different), we must suppose the sentient power to be of such a nature as to be everywhere identical with itself. But to effect this is the property of a different kind of being from body. ’That it would not be possible even to think, if the soul were any kind of body, is to be shown from the following reasons. For if the meaning of sensation is, that the soul apprehends the objects of sense by making use of body, it cannot be that thought also means perception by means of body, or else it will be the same as sensation. ’If, therefore, thought is apprehension without the aid of body, much rather must the thinking faculty not be body, since sensation is of sensibles, but thought of intelligibles. But if they will not admit this, at all events

there must be both thoughts of some intelligibles, and apprehensions of things without magnitude.

'How, then, if it be magnitude will it conceive in thought that which is not magnitude, or by that which is divisible conceive that which is not divisible? Will it be by some indivisible part of itself? But if so, the thinking faculty will not be body. For there is certainly no need of the whole in order to touch; for any one part is sufficient. 'If, therefore, they should admit, as is true, that the first notions are those of the things which are most entirely free from body, that is of absolutes, the intelligent faculty can form notions only as being or becoming free from body. But if they should say that the notions are of forms embodied in matter, yet they are only formed by abstraction from the bodies, the mind making the abstraction. 'For certainly the abstraction of circle, and triangle, and line, and point has nothing to do with flesh, or matter at all. In such an operation, therefore, we must separate the soul itself also from body: it must not therefore itself be body. I suppose too that beauty and justice are things without magnitude, and therefore the conception of them also. So that as they occur the soul will receive them with its indivisible faculty, and they will abide in it as indivisibles.

'Also if the soul be corporeal how can prudence, justice, fortitude, and other virtues belong to it? For then temperance, or justice, or fortitude must be some kind of breath, or of blood; unless perhaps fortitude were the uneasiness of the breath, and temperance its right temperature, and beauty a certain elegance in forms, because of which, when we see them, we call men goodly and beautiful in body. 'To be strong and beautiful in form might indeed be suitable to breath; but what does breath want of prudence? Nay; but, on the contrary, it wants to find enjoyment in embraces and caresses, wherein it will either be warmed, or will desire a moderate coolness, or attach itself to things soft, and tender, and smooth. But for assigning to each thing its due worth, what would it care? 'And is it because they are eternal that the soul fastens upon the conceptions of virtue, and the other objects of the intellect, or does virtue begin to exist in one, and must it perish again? But then who creates it, and whence? For thus there would again remain that former question. It must be, then, because they are eternal and abiding, such as are the conceptions of geometry: and, if eternal and abiding, not corporeal. Therefore also the soul in which they are to exist must be of this same nature; it must not then be corporeal; for everything of the nature of body is non-abiding and transient.

'If, from seeing the operations of bodies, in imparting heat and cold, and thrusting, and weighing down, they put the soul in this class, as if seating it in a place of activity,----then in the first place they are ignorant that even these bodies work these effects by means of the incorporeal powers contained in them, and then that these are not the powers which we claim as belonging to the soul; but the powers of thought, sensation, reasoning, desiring, managing wisely and well, all require

another kind of essence. ’So by transferring the powers of the incorporeal to the corporeal, they leave none for the former. And that bodies can only produce their effects by means of incorporeal powers is evident from the following reasons. For it will be admitted that quality is one thing and quantity another, and that every body has quantity, and yet not every body has quality, as for example mere matter. But if they admit this, they must admit that quality, being different from quantity, is different from body.

’For if it have not quantity, how can it be body, since every body has quantity? Moreover, as was said somewhere above, if every body on being divided, and every mass, ceases to be what it was, but when the body is cut small the same quality remains entire in every part,----if for example, the sweetness of honey is none the less sweetness in every drop,----sweetness cannot be a body. The same is true of all the other qualities. ’Then further, if the powers were bodies, the strong powers must necessarily be great masses, and those which can effect but little, small masses. But if when the masses are great the powers are small, and a few very small masses have the greatest powers, their efficacy must be attributed to something else than magnitude, therefore to something without magnitude. ’The fact too that matter, being as they say body, is itself the same, but produces different effects when it has qualities added to it,----does not this make it evident that the things added are actually rational powers and incorporeal? And let them not reply that, when breath or blood has departed, the animals die. For it is impossible to exist without many other things besides these, and yet the soul can be none of them. Moreover neither breath nor blood extends through all parts, but soul does.

’Further, if the soul being body had pervaded every part, it would also have been mixed, in the same way as the mixture takes place in all other bodies. But if the mixture of the bodies leaves none of the components in actual existence, neither will the soul retain an actual existence in the bodies, but only potential, having lost its existence as soul. Just as if sweet and bitter be mingled, the sweet no longer exists. And so we have no soul. ’And the fact that, being body, it is mingled with body, the whole throughout the whole, so that wherever either may be there the other is also, both having a mass equal to the whole, and that no increase has taken place by the addition of the other,----this will leave nothing that it does not divide. For the mixture is not made in large portions alternately (for so they say it would be a juxta-position), but having passed through the whole, the addition being superimposed upon the less (a thing impossible, that the less should be found equal to the greater)----but nevertheless having so passed through, it divides the whole in every part.

’Therefore if this occurs at any point whatever, and there be no body between, which has not been cut, the body must have been divided into points, which is impossible; and if the division be carried on to infinity (for whatever particle of

body you take, it may be divided), the infinities will have not only a potential but an actual existence. Therefore it is not possible that body should wholly pervade the whole: but the soul does pervade the whole: therefore it is incorporeal. 'As to their saying that the same breath is an earlier nature, and when it has come into a cool place (ψυχρῷ) and been sharpened, it becomes soul (ψυχή), being made finer in the cool, ----this certainly is absurd; for many animals are born in warm places, and have a soul that has not been cooled. But at all events they say that there is an earlier nature of the soul produced by external contingencies. The result, therefore, is that they make the inferior first, and before this another still less, which they call habit (ἕξις). And the mind comes last, as produced of course from the soul; or if mind is before all things, they ought to make soul next, then vegetative nature; and the later always the worse, if it is a merely natural product.

'If, therefore, even God in respect of His mind is regarded by them as later, and as generated, His intelligence also being adscititious, it would be possible that neither soul, nor mind, nor God should exist. For if the potential could exist without the previous existence of the actual, and of mind, it would never attain to actuality. For what would there be to bring it on, if there exist not besides itself something prior? But if it is to bring itself into actuality (which is absurd), yet at least in so bringing itself forward it must have something to look to, which must exist not potentially but actually. 'And yet if the potential is to have the power of always remaining the same, it will of itself have attained to actuality, and this latter will be better than that which has only potentiality, as being a state desired by it. The better therefore will be the prior, both as having a different nature from body, and as always actually existent: mind, therefore, and soul are prior to mere nature; soul, therefore, does not exist as breath, nor yet as body. However, though other arguments might be stated, and have been stated by others, showing that it is not body, yet even what I have now said is sufficient.

'But since it is of a different nature, we must inquire what this nature is. Is it then, though different from body, yet something belonging to body, as it were a harmony? For although the Pythagoreans used this word "harmony" in a different way, they supposed that it was something of the same kind as the harmony on the strings of the lyre. 'For as when the strings of the lyre have been stretched tight there conies a certain kind of effect upon them, which is called harmony, in the same way also in our body, when a mixture is made of unlike elements, they thought that a mixture of a certain quality produces both life and soul, which is the effect upon the mixture. But many arguments have ere now been urged against this opinion to show that it is impossible. 'For it has been argued that the soul is the prior element, but the harmony subsequent: and that the former rules and presides over the body, and in many ways contends with it, but could not do so if it were a harmony: and that the one is an essence, but the harmony is not an essence: and that the mixture of the bodily elements, of which we consist, if it be in due proportion, would mean

health: also that in each part differently compounded there would be a different soul, so that there would be many souls: and, as the chief argument, that prior to this present soul there must be another soul to produce this harmony, as in the case of musical instruments there is the musician, who puts the harmony into the strings, having in himself the reasoning faculty in accordance with which he will modulate it.

'For neither in that case will the strings of themselves, nor in this case the bodily particles be able to bring themselves into harmony. And speaking generally, these philosophers also make animated things out of inanimate, and things casually brought out of disorder into order, and instead of order from the soul they make the soul itself to have received its subsistence from the self-made order. But this cannot possibly take place either in the single parts or in the wholes. The soul, therefore, is not a harmony.' These extracts are taken from the work of Plotinus against the opinion of the Stoics concerning the soul, who say that it is corporeal. But since I have set forth sufficiently for a summary statement the arguments against Aristotle and the Peripatetics, and those against the sect of the Stoics, it is time to go back again and survey the wonderful physical theories of all their noble philosophers together, seeing especially that all the Greeks in common believed in and worshipped as visible gods the Sun, and Moon, and the rest of the luminaries, and the other elements of the world, and have transferred the fabulous and nonsensical tales about their polytheistic error by more seemly physical explanations to the primary elements and the divisions of the whole world.

Wherefore I think it necessary for me also to collect their opinions on these subjects, and to review their disputes and their vain conceit. These matters also I will quote from the work of Plutarch, in which he collected the opinions thereon of all the philosophers both ancient and modern, writing in the following manner: CHAPTER XXIII ---- OF THE SUN. [PLUTARCH] 'ANAXIMANDER: that there is a circle twenty-eight times as large as the Earth, having its circumference like a chariot-wheel, hollow, and full of fire, and partly showing the fire through an opening, as through a bellows-pipe: and this is the Sun. 'Xenophanes: it is formed from the sparks which are seen to be collected from watery vapour, and which compose the Sun out of burning clouds. 'The Stoics: a flame out of the sea, endowed with intelligence. 'Plato: out of an immense fire. 'Anaxagoras, Democritus, Metrodorus: a fiery mass of metal or stone.

'Aristotle: a globe of the fifth corporeal element. 'Philolaus the Pythagorean: a disk as of glass, which receives the reflected radiance of the fire in the cosmos, and transmits the light to us; so that the Sun's fiery appearance in the heaven is like the light which comes to us dispersed by reflexion from the mirror: for this light also we call the Sun, being as it were an image of an image. 'Empedocles: there are two Suns; the one archetypal, a fire in the other hemisphere of the cosmos,

which, has filled that hemisphere, being always opposite to its own reflected light; and the other which we see is the reflected light in this other hemisphere which is filled with air mixed with heat, formed by reflexion from the spherical surface of the Earth and failing upon the crystalline Sun, and carried round with the motion of the fiery Sun: but to express it more shortly, the Sun is the reflexion of the fire that surrounds the Earth.

'Epicurus: a compact mass of earth, resembling pumice or sponge in its pores, and kindled by the fire.' CHAPTER XXIV ---- OF THE SUN'S MAGNITUDE. 'ANAXIMANDER: the Sun itself is equal to the Earth, but the orbit from which it breathes out its fire, and by which it is carried round, is twenty-seven times as large as the Earth. 'Anaxagoras: many times as large as Peloponnesus. 'Heracleitus: the breadth of a man's foot. 'Epicurus again says that the aforesaid descriptions are all possible: or else that it is of the same size as it appears, or a little greater or less.' CHAPTER XXV ---- OF THE SHAPE OF THE SUN. 'ANAXIMENES: the Sun is flat like a plate. 'Heracleitus: like a boat, concave. 'The Stoics: spherical, like the universe and the stars. 'Epicurus: the aforesaid descriptions are all possible.' Such is their Sun, the mighty god of all things visible in heaven. But Moses and the Hebrew oracles waste no labour on any of these matters.

CHAPTER XXVI ---- OF THE MOON. 'ANAXIMANDER: it is a circle nineteen times as large as the Earth, full of fire, as in the case of the Sun, and is eclipsed in consequence of the rotation of its disk. And it is like a chariot wheel, having its circumference hollow, and full of fire, with only one vent. 'Xenophanes: a cloud condensed. 'The Stoics: a mixture of fire and air. 'Plato: of earth for the more part. 'Anaxagoras, Democritus: a fiery solid, having in itself plains, and mountains, and ravines. 'Heracleitus: earth surrounded with mist. 'Pythagoras: a mirror-like body.' CHAPTER XXVII ---- OF THE MOON'S MAGNITUDE. 'THE Stoics represent it as larger than the Earth, as they also say of the Sun. 'Parmenides: equal to the Sun, for it is illumined from it.' CHAPTER XXVIII ---- OF THE MOON'S SHAPE. 'THE Stoics: it is spherical, as the Sun. 'Heracleitus: like a boat.

'Empedocles: like a disk (or quoit). 'Others like a cylinder.' CHAPTER XXIX ---- OF THE MOON'S ILLUMINATION. 'ANAXIMANDER: it has light of its own, but somewhat scanty. 'Antiphon: the Moon shines by its own light; but the portion of it which is partially hidden is obscured by the Sun's light falling upon it, as it is the nature of the stronger fire to obscure the weaker: which happens also with the other heavenly bodies. 'Thales and his followers: the Moon is illumined from the Sun. 'Heracleitus: the Sun and Moon are affected in the same way: for the heavenly bodies being boat-like in shape, and receiving the products of the watery evaporation, become luminous in appearance; the Sun more brilliantly, because it moves in a purer atmosphere, but the Moon moving in a turbid atmosphere there-

fore also appears more dim.’ CHAPTER XXX ---- WHAT IS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PLANETS AND FIXED STARS?

’THALES: the heavenly bodies are of earth, but on fire. ’Empedocles: of fire, from the fiery element, which the air contained in itself and thrust out at the first separation of the elements. ’Anaxagoras: the surrounding atmosphere is in its substance fire, but by the energy of its revolution catches up stones from the earth, and having set them on fire has made stars of them.; ’Diogenes: the heavenly bodies are porous like pumice, and are the breathing-holes of the universe. But again the same author thinks that they are stones, which, though at first invisible, often fall upon the Earth and are extinguished, just as the stony meteor which fell in a fiery form at Aegospotamoi. ’Empedocles: the fixed stars are fastened to the crystalline sphere, but the planets are free. ’Plato: for the most part they are of fire, but partake also of the other elements as a cement.

’Xenophanes: they consist of clouds on fire, but are extinguished every day, and re-kindled in the night, just like live coals: for their risings and settings are their kindlings and quenchings. ’Heracleides and the Pythagoreans think that each of the stars is a world, including an Earth, and an atmosphere and an ether in the infinite space. These doctrines are introduced in the Orphic Hymns, for they make each star a world. ’Epicurus rejects none of these opinions, but adheres to his ”possible.”’ CHAPTER XXXI ---- OF THE SHAPE OF THE STARS. ’THE Stoics: the stars are spherical, like the universe, Sun; and Moon. ’Cleanthes: conical. ’Anaximenes: like studs fastened in the crystalline sphere. ’But some say that they are plates of fire, as it were pictures.’ Such are the discoveries of the wonderful philosophers concerning what they call visible gods. But learn also from the same Plutarch’s voice, what decisions they have pronounced concerning the universe:

CHAPTER XXXII ---- HOW THE WORLD WAS CONSTRUCTED. ’THE world, therefore, has been fashioned in a rounded form, in the following manner. As the corporeal atoms have an undesigned and fortuitous motion, and move continuously and very swiftly, many of them were collected together, and from this cause had great variety of shapes and sizes. ’And when these were all gathered in the same place, all the larger and heaviest settled down: but as many as were small, and round, and smooth, and easily moved, were thrust out in the collision of the bodies, and carried up on high. ’When, therefore, the propelling force ceased to carry them upward, and the propulsion no longer tended towards the height, while on the other hand they were prevented from sinking downward, they were compressed into the places which were able to admit them; and these were the places around them. ’So the multitude of the bodies were turned round towards these places, and becoming intermingled one with another in the turning they generated the heaven. But the atoms retaining the same natural tendency, and being of various kinds, as I have

said, were thrust out towards the upper region, and produced the nature of the stars.

'But the multitude of the bodies which were exhaled kept striking upon the air and thrusting it away; and the air in its motion being turned into wind and encompassing the stars carried them round with it, and maintained the revolution which they now have on high. Afterwards out of the particles which settled down the Earth was produced, and out of those which were carried upward the heaven, and fire, and air. 'And as there was still much matter included in the Earth, which became condensed in consequence of the blows from the winds and the currents from the stars, all of its shape that was formed by minute particles was further compressed, and generated the watery element. 'And this having a fluid tendency was carried down into the hollow places which were able to receive and hold it; or the water settled down of itself and gradually hollowed out the places below it.'

Such is their wonderful cosmogony! And with, this is connected much other disputation, as they started questions about problems of all kinds; whether we ought to regard the universe as one or many; and the cosmos as one or more; and whether it has a soul, and is administered by a divine providence, or the contrary: also whether it is imperishable or perishable; and from what source it is sustained; and from what kind of material God began to make the world: also concerning the order of the world; and what is the cause of its inclination; also concerning what is outside the circumference of the world; and which is the right and which the left side of the world; also concerning the heaven, and, besides all this, concerning daemons and heroes; and about matter, and about ideas: about the arrangement of the universe: yet more, about the course and motion of the stars: and besides this, from what source the stars derive their light: also about the so-called Dioscuri, and the eclipses of the Sun and Moon, and her aspect, and why she has an earthlike appearance; also concerning her distances; and moreover concerning the years.

Now all these questions have been treated in numberless ways by the philosophers of whom we speak, but since Plutarch collected them in a few concise words, by bringing together the opinions of them all and their contradictions, I think it will not be unprofitable to us if they are presented with a view to their rejection on reasonable grounds. For since they stood in diametrical opposition one to another, and stirred up battles and wars against each other, and nothing better, each with jealous strife of words confuting their neighbours' opinions, must not every one admit that our hesitation on these subjects has been reasonable and safe? Next in order to the aforesaid subjects I will add all their disquisitions upon matters nearer to the Earth; concerning the figure of the Earth, and its position and inclination: also concerning the sea; that so you may know that the noble sages differed not only about things high and lofty, but that they have disagreed also in matters terrestrial. And to increase yet more your admiration of this wisdom of the wise, I will add

also all the controversies they waged about the soul and the ruling faculty therein, unable as they were to discover what their own nature was. But now let us go back to the first of the aforesaid subjects.

CHAPTER XXXIII ---- WHETHER THE ALL IS ONE. 'THE Stoics then represented the world as one, which they also affirmed to be the All, including the corporeal elements. 'But Empedocles said that, though the world was one, yet it was not the All, but only a small part of the All, and the rest useless matter. 'Plato derives his opinion that the world is one, and the All one, by inference from three arguments: from the notion that it will not be perfect, unless it comprehends all things; that it will not be like its pattern, unless it be unique; that it will not be indestructible, if there be anything outside it. But in answer to Plato it must be said, that the world is not perfect, for it does not include all things; for man also is perfect, but does not include all things: and there are many examples, as in the case of statues, and houses, and pictures: and how can it be perfect, if it is possible for anything to revolve outside it? And indestructible it is not, and cannot be, since it is created.

'But Metrodorus says it is as absurd that there should be but one world generated in infinite space, as that there should be but one head of corn in a great plain: and that the world is one of an infinite multitude is manifest from the infinity of causes. For if the world is finite, while the causes from which the world has come are all infinite, the number of worlds must be infinite. For where they all have been causes, there must also be effects: and causes they are, whether the atoms or the elements.' CHAPTER XXXIV ---- WHETHER THE WORLD HAS A SOUL, AND IS ADMINISTERED BY PROVIDENCE. 'THE others all say that it has a soul, and is administered by providence. 'But Democritus and Epicurus, and all who are for bringing in the atoms and vacuum, say that it neither has a soul, nor is administered by providence, but by some irrational kind of nature.

'Aristotle says that, as a whole and throughout, it has neither a soul, nor reason, nor intelligence, nor is it administered by providence. For while the heavenly regions partake of all these properties, because they include spheres which are endowed with a soul and life, the terrestrial regions have none of them, but share in the orderly arrangement by accident and not directly.' CHAPTER XXXV ---- WHETHER THE WORLD IS IMPERISHABLE. 'PYTHAGORAS, and Plato, and the Stoics say that the world was created by God; and that, so far as it depends on its nature, it is perishable, because it is perceptible by sense through being corporeal; nevertheless it will not be destroyed, through the providence and support of God. 'Epicurus says that it is perishable, because created, like an animal or a plant. 'Xenophanes: the world is uncreated, and eternal, and imperishable. 'Aristotle: the part of the world beneath the Moon may be affected by change, and the things terrestrial therein are doomed to perish.'

CHAPTER XXXVI ---- FROM WHAT SOURCE THE WORLD IS SUSTAINED. 'ARISTOTLE: if the world receives sustenance, it will also perish; but in fact it needs no sustenance, and therefore is also eternal. 'Plato: the world supplies its own sustenance out of its waste, by a change. 'Philolaus: the decay is twofold, sometimes by fire fallen from heaven, and sometimes from the water of the Moon being thrown off by the revolution of its atmosphere: and the exhalations from these are the sustenance of the world.' CHAPTER XXXVII ---- FROM WHAT MATERIAL FIRST GOD BEGAN TO FORM THE WORLD. 'THE physicists say that the creation of the world began from Earth, as from a centre; and the centre is the beginning of a sphere. 'Pythagoras: from fire, and the fifth element. 'Empedocles: the ether was first separated, and next the fire, and after it the Earth, out of which, when very closely compressed by the rush of the sphere, the water gushed up, and the air was formed from it by evaporation. Then the heaven was produced from the ether, and the Sun from the fire: and the terrestrial parts were formed by condensation out of the other elements.

'Plato: the world was made visible according to the pattern of the intelligible world: and of the visible world first the soul, and after this the corporeal element, first the part produced from fire and earth, and secondly that from water and air. 'Pythagoras says that, whereas there are five solid figures which are also called mathematical, out of the cube the earth was produced; out of the pyramid the fire; out of the octahedron the air; out of the eicosahedron the water; and out of the dodecahedron the sphere of the universe. 'And herein again Plato follows Pythagoras.' CHAPTER XXXVIII ---- OF THE ARRANGEMENT OF THE WORLD. 'PARMENIDES: there are wreaths twisted round one upon the other, one of the rare matter, and the other of the dense; and between them others of light and darkness mixed; and that which surrounds them all like a wall is solid. 'Leucippus and Democritus extend a tunic and a membrane in a circle round the world.

'Epicurus: the boundary of some worlds is thin, and of others dense: and of these part are in motion, and part immovable. 'Plato: fire first, then ether, after that air, next water, and earth last: but sometimes he combines the ether with the fire. 'Aristotle: first impassible ether, that is a fifth body; after that passibles, fire, air, water, and earth last. Of these the celestial portions have the circular motion assigned to them: and of the portions ranged beneath them the light have the upward, and the heavy the downward motion. 'Empedocles: the places of the elements are not entirely fixed and limited, but they all in a certain way partake one of another.' CHAPTER XXXIX ---- WHAT IS THE CAUSE OF THE INCLINATION OF THE WORLD. 'DIOGENES, Anaxagoras: after the world was established, and had brought forth the living beings out of the earth, the world was somehow spontaneously inclined towards its southern side, perhaps from design, in order that some parts of the world might be uninhabitable and some habitable, in consequence of cold, and torrid heat, and a temperate climate.

'Empedocles: when the air yielded to the impulse of the Sun, the polar Bears became inclined, and the northern regions were elevated, and the southern depressed, and the whole world accordingly.' CHAPTER XL ---- OF THE OUTSIDE OF THE WORLD, WHETHER IT IS A VACUUM. 'THE Pythagoreans: outside the world there is a vacuum, into and out of which the world breathes. 'The Stoics: infinite (vacuum), into which the world is also dissolved by the conflagration. 'Poseidonius: not infinite, but sufficiently large for the dissolution. 'Plato, Aristotle: no vacuum either outside the world or inside.' CHAPTER XLI ---- WHICH ARE THE RIGHT AND WHICH THE LEFT SIDES OF THE WORLD. 'PYTHAGORAS, Plato, Aristotle: the right parts of the world are the eastern, from which the motion begins, and the left are the western. 'Empedocles: the right is the region of the summer solstice, and the left the region of the winter solstice.'

CHAPTER XLII ---- OF THE HEAVEN; WHAT IS ITS SUBSTANCE. 'ANAXIMENES: it is the circumference of the outer zone. 'Empedocles: the heaven is solid, formed from air compressed by fire into a crystallized form, and encompassing the whole elements of fire and air in each of the hemispheres. CHAPTER XLIII ---- OF DAEMONS AND HEROES. 'IN connexion with the discourse concerning gods we must inquire into that which concerns daemons and heroes. 'Thales, Pythagoras, Plato, the Stoics: daemons are beings of the nature of souls: heroes also are souls which have been separated from their bodies; and the good souls are good daemons, and the bad souls evil daemons. 'But Epicurus admits none of these opinions.' CHAPTER XLIV ---- OF MATTER. 'Matter is the substratum to generation and decay and the other changes. 'The Schools of Thales and Pythagoras, and the Stoics: matter is wholly and thoroughly subject to change and alteration and flux.

'The School of Democritus: the primary elements are impassible, namely, the atom, the vacuum, and the incorporeal. 'Aristotle and Plato say that matter is corporeal, without form, specific character, shape, or quality, so far as it depends on its own nature, but receptive of the specific forms, as it were a nurse, and a mould, and a matrix. But those who say that matter is water, or fire, or air, or earth, no longer speak of it as without form, but as body: while those who say that it is the indivisible bodies and atoms, do regard it as without form.' CHAPTER XLV ---- OF THE IDEA. 'AN "idea" is an incorporeal entity (οὐσία), subsisting itself, and by itself, but giving its image to portions of formless matter, and becoming the cause of their manifestation. 'Socrates and Plato suppose the ideas to be separable from the matter, subsisting in the thoughts and in the presentations of god, that is, of the mind.

'Aristotle allowed the specific forms and ideas to remain, not however as separate from the matter, having freed himself from the notion of its being done by god. 'The Stoic followers of Zeno said that the ideas are thoughts of our own.' CHAPTER XLVI ---- OF THE ORDER OF THE STARS. 'XENOCRATES thinks that the stars move on

one superficies. ’The other Stoics that some are before others in height and depth. ’Democritus puts the fixed stars first, and next to these the planets, after which the Sun, the Day-star, the Moon. ’Plato next to the position of the fixed stars sets first the planet called Phaenon, that is Saturn: second Phaethon, that is Jupiter; third the Fiery, Mars; fourth the Day-star, Venus; fifth Stilbon, Mercury; sixth the Sun; seventh the Moon. ’Of the Mathematicians some agree with Plato, but some put the Sun in the centre of all. ’Anaximander, and Metrodorus of Chios, and Crates think that the Sun is placed highest of all, next to him the Moon, and beneath them the fixed stars and planets.’

CHAPTER XLVII ---- OF THE COURSE AND MOTION OF THE STARS. ’ANAXAGORAS, Democritus, Cleanthes: all the fixed stars pass from east to west. ’Alcmaeon and the Mathematicians: the planets move in an opposite direction to the fixed stars; for theirs is the contrary course from west to east. ’Anaximander: they are borne along by the circles and spheres on which they are each set. ’Anaximenes: the stars do not revolve beneath the Earth, but around it. ’Plato and the Mathematicians: the Sun, the Day-star, and Stilbon (Venus and Mercury) have equal orbits.’ CHAPTER XLVIII ---- WHENCE THE STARS RECEIVE THEIR LIGHT. ’METEODORUS: the fixed stars are all illumined by the Sun. ’Heracleitus and the Stoics: the stars are fed from the exhalation of the Earth. ’Aristotle: the heavenly bodies have no need of nourishment; for they are not perishable but eternal. ’Plato: there is a common nourishment of the whole world and of the stars from themselves.’

CHAPTER XLIX ---- OF THE SO-CALLED DIOSCURI. ’XENOPHANES: what appear like stars upon the ships are little clouds which shine in consequence of a certain kind of motion. ’Metrodorus: they are flashes from the eyes which look at them with fear and amazement.’ CHAPTER L ---- OF AN ECLIPSE OF THE SUN. ’THALES was the first who said that the Sun is eclipsed from the Moon (which is of an earthy nature) coming perpendicularly under it; and that by reflexion in a mirror she is seen situated beneath the Sun’s disk. ’Anaximander: from the closing of the orifice of the breathing-hole of the Sun’s fire. ’Heracleitus: in consequence of the turning of the boat-like figure, so that the concavity is above, and the convexity below facing our eyes. ’Xenophanes: by extinction, and then again there rises another Sun in the east. But he has incidentally mentioned an eclipse of the Sun lasting over the whole month, and again a total eclipse, so that the day seemed like night.

’Some say that it is a condensation of the invisible clouds coming over the Sun’s disk. ’Aristarchus sets the Sun among the fixed stars, and makes the Moon move round the Sun’s orbit, and the Sun’s disk to be overshadowed in consequence of these inclinations. ’Xenophanes: there are many suns and moons, corresponding to the climes, and sections, and zones of the Earth: and at a certain season the Sun’s disk falls into some section of the Earth which is not inhabited by us, and thus, as

if stepping into a hole, suffers eclipse. But the same author says that the Sun goes forward into infinity, but seems to revolve because of its distance.' CHAPTER LI ---- OF AN ECLIPSE OF THE MOON. 'ANAXIMANDER: from the closing of the orifice of its circumference. 'Berossus: because of the turning of the dark side towards us. 'Heracleitus: because of the turning of the boat-like figure.

'Of the Pythagoreans some say that it is an outshining and obstruction by our Earth or the counter-earth: but the more recent say that it is in consequence of the spreading of a flame which is gradually kindled in an orderly manner, until it produces the complete full moon, and decreases again in like manner until the conjunction, at which it is entirely extinguished. 'Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Mathematicians agree that it effects its monthly obscurations by travelling round with the Sun and sharing its illumination; but the eclipses by falling into the shadow of the Earth when that comes between the two luminaries, or rather when it obstructs the light from the Moon.' CHAPTER LII ---- OF THE MOON'S ASPECT, AND WHY IT HAS AN EARTHLIKE APPEARANCE. 'THE Pythagoreans say that the Moon has an earthlike appearance, because it is inhabited like our Earth, but by larger animals and more beautiful plants. For the animals upon it are fifteen times as large, and emit no bodily secretion; and that the day is longer in the same proportion.

'Anaxagoras: on account of an unevenness in the mixture, because of its being both cold and earthy: for the misty part is mingled with the fiery, whence the Moon is also said to shine with false light. 'The Stoics: because of the admixture of air in its substance its composition is not pure.' CHAPTER LIII ---- OF THE MOON'S DISTANCES. 'EMPEDOCLES: the Moon is distant from the Sun twice as far as from the Earth. 'The Mathematical School: eighteen times as far. 'Eratosthenes: the Sun's distance from the Earth is four millions and eighty thousand stades: but the Moon's distance from the Earth seven hundred and eighty thousand stades.' CHAPTER LIV ---- OF YEARS. 'A YEAR of Saturn is a period of thirty years: of Jupiter twelve; of Mars two; of the Sun twelve months; and the same for Mercury and Venus, for they run an equal course. But the Moon's is thirty days: for this is the complete month from first appearance to conjunction.

'The Great Year some suppose to consist in a period of eight years, but others in nineteen years, and others in fifty-nine. Heracleitus makes it consist of eighteen thousand solar years: Diogenes of three hundred and sixty-five years, as many as the year has days according to Heracleitus: but others of seven thousand, seven hundred, and seventy-seven years.' So widely do the aforesaid persons differ from each other in regard to things in the heavens above. But now look also at their opinions about the Earth. CHAPTER LV ---- OF THE EARTH. 'THALES and his followers say that the Earth is one. 'Hicetas the Pythagorean says that there are two, this and the antipodal earth. 'The Stoics: the Earth is one, and finite. 'Xenophanes:

from the lower part its roots reach into infinity, and it is composed of air and fire. 'Metrodorus: the Earth is the deposit and sediment of the water, and the Sun of the air.'

CHAPTER LVI ---- OF THE FIGURE OF THE EARTH. 'THALES and the Stoics: the Earth is spherical. 'Anaximander: it is like a stone pillar supporting the surfaces. 'Anaximenes: like a table. 'Leucippus: like a kettle-drum. 'Democritus: like a disk in its extension, but hollow in the middle.' CHAPTER LVII ---- OF THE POSITION OF THE EARTH. 'THE followers of Thales say the Earth is the centre. 'Xenophanes: the Earth first, for its roots reach into infinity. 'Philolaus the Pythagorean: first, fire in the centre; for this is the hearth of the universe: second, the antipodal Earth, and third, the Earth which we inhabit, opposite to the antipodal both in situation and revolution; in consequence of which the inhabitants of the antipodal Earth are not seen by those in this Earth. 'Parmenides was the first to mark off the inhabited parts of the Earth under the two tropical zones.' CHAPTER LVIII ---- OF THE EARTH'S MOTION.

'ALL the others say that the Earth is at rest. 'But Philolaus the Pythagorean says that it revolves round the fire in an oblique circle, in like manner as the Sun and Moon. 'Heracleides of Pontus, and Ecphantus the Pythagorean make the Earth move, not however by change of place, but by rotation, turning like a wheel on an axle, from west to east, about its own centre. 'Democritus: at first the Earth used to change its place, owing to its smallness and lightness; but as in the course of time it grew dense and heavy, it became stationary.' After the utterance of these different opinions by the noble philosophers concerning the Earth, hear now what they say of the Sea. CHAPTER LIX ---- OF THE SEA, HOW IT WAS COMPOSED, AND WHY IT IS SALT. 'ANAXIMANDER says that the Sea is the remnant of the original moisture, the greater part of which was dried up by the fire, and the remainder changed through its burning heat.

'Anaxagoras: when the water, which in the beginning was a stagnant lake, was burnt up by the Sun's revolution, and the greasy part evaporated, the remainder subsided into saltness and bitterness. 'Empedocles: the Sea is the sweat of the Earth when scorched by the Sun, because of the increased condensation. 'Antiphon: the sweat of the hot part, from which the included moisture was separated, turned salt by being boiled down, which happens always in the case of sweat. 'Metrodorus: from being drained through the earth it has partaken of its density, just as liquids which are strained through ashes. 'Plato and his followers: of the elementary water the part formed out of air, being condensed by cooling, became sweet; but the part formed from earth, being evaporated by heat and burning, became salt.' So much, then, concerning the Sea. But as to those who professed to give physiological explanations about the whole world, and things celestial and ethereal, and the conception of the universe, how little they knew even of their

own nature, you may learn from their discordant utterances on these points also, as follows.

CHAPTER LX ---- OF THE PARTS OF THE SOUL. 'PYTHAGORAS, Plato: in the first analysis the Soul has two parts; for it has one part rational and another irrational. But in close and exact consideration, its parts are three: for they distinguish the irrational into the irascible and the appetitive. 'The Stoics: it is composed of eight parts; five senses, sight, smell, hearing, taste, touch; and a sixth, speech; a seventh, generation; and an eighth, the actual ruling principle, from which proceeds the extension of all these through their proper organs, in a similar manner to the tentacles of the polypus. 'Democritus, Epicurus: the Soul consists of two parts, its rational faculty being settled in the breast, and the irrational diffused over the whole complexity of the body. 'But Democritus thought that all things, even dead bodies, naturally partake of a certain kind of soul, because in an obscure way they have some warmth and sensation, though the greater part is dissipated.'

CHAPTER LXI ---- OF THE EXILING FACULTY. 'PLATO, Democritus: it is in the head as a whole. 'Straton: between the eyebrows. 'Erasistratus: about the membrane of the brain, which he calls the epicranis. 'Herophilus: in the cavity of the brain, which is also its base. 'Parmenides: in the breast as a whole. 'Epicurus, and all the Stoics: in the heart as a whole. 'Diogenes: in the arterial cavity of the heart, which is full of breath. 'Empedocles in the composition of the blood. 'Others in the membrane of the pericardium: and others in the diaphragm. Some of the more recent philosophers say that it reaches through from the head to the diaphragm. 'Pythagoras: the vital power is around the heart; but the rational , and intelligent faculty in the region of the head.' So far, then, as to their opinions on these matters. Do you not think therefore that with judgement and reason we have justly kept aloof from the unprofitable and erroneous and vain labour of them all, and do not busy ourselves at all about the said subjects (for we do not see the utility of them, nor any tendency to benefit and gain good for mankind), but cling solely to piety towards God the creator of all things, and by a life of temperance, and all godly behaviour according to virtue, strive to live in a manner pleasing to Him who is God over all?

But if even you from malice and envy hesitate to admit our true testimony, you shall be again anticipated by Socrates, the wisest of all Greeks, who has truthfully declared his votes in our favour. Those meteorological babblers, for instance, he used to expose in their folly, and say that they were no better than madmen, expressly convicting them not merely of striving after things unattainable, but also of wasting time about things useless and unprofitable to man's life. And this shall be testified to you by our former witness Xenophon, one of the best-known of the companions of Socrates, who writes as follows in his Memorabilia: CHAPTER LXII [XENOPHON] 'No one ever yet saw Socrates do or heard him say anything impi-

ous or unholy. For he did not discourse about the nature of the universe or the other subjects, like most of them, speculating upon the condition of the cosmos, as the Sophists call it, and by what forces of necessity the celestial phenomena severally are produced: rather he used to expose the foolishness of those who troubled themselves about such things.

'And the first point he used to consider in regard to them was, whether they go on to study such matters, because they think that they have already an adequate knowledge of human affairs, or deem that they are doing their proper work in neglecting human interests and speculating on the divine. 'And he used to wonder that they did not clearly see that it is impossible for men to discover these things, since even those who pride themselves most highly on the discussion of these matters do not agree in opinion with each other, but are just like madmen in their mutual feelings. 'For as among madmen some have no fear even of things fearful, while others are afraid where no fear is; so some of these think it. no shame to say or do anything and everything even in a crowd, while others think it not right even to go out among men: and some honour neither temple, nor altar, nor anything else belonging to the gods, while others worship any casual stocks and stones and wild beasts. Also of those who study anxiously the nature of the universe some think that "being" is only one, others that it is infinite in multitude: some too think that all things are in perpetual motion, and others that nothing can ever be moved: and some that all things are being generated and perishing, but others that nothing could ever be generated or perish.

'He also used to ask the following questions about them: whereas those who study human affairs think that whatever they have learned they will be able to practise both for themselves and for whomsoever they may wish, do those who search after things divine think in like manner that when they know by what forces of necessity phenomena are severally produced, they will be able whenever they please to make winds and rains and seasons, and whatever else of this kind they may need? Or, without even hoping for anything of this sort, are they satisfied merely to know how such phenomena are severally produced? 'Such, then, was the nature of his remarks about those who busied themselves with these matters: but he himself was always discoursing of human interests, inquiring what was, pious, what impious; what noble, what base; what just, what unjust; what sanity, what madness.' These, then, were the opinions of Socrates. And next after him Aristippus of Cyrene, and then later Ariston of Chios, undertook to maintain that morals were the only proper subject of philosophy; for these inquiries were practicable and useful, but the discussions about nature were quite the contrary, neither being comprehensible, nor having any use, even if they were clearly understood.

For it would be no advantage to us, not even if soaring higher in the air than Perseus, 'O'er ocean's wave, and o'er the Pleiades,' we could with our very eyes

survey the whole world, and the nature of all 'beings,' of whatever kind that is. For we certainly shall not be on that account wiser, or more just or brave or temperate, nay, not even strong, or beautiful, or rich, without which advantages happiness is impossible. Wherefore Socrates was right in saying that of existing things some are above us, and others nothing to us: for the secrets of nature are above us, and the conditions after death nothing to us, but the affairs of human life alone concern us. And thus, he said, he also dismissed the physical theories of Anaxagoras and Archelaus, and studied only 'Whate'er of good or ill our homes have known.' And he thought besides that their physical discussions were not merely difficult and even impossible, but also impious and opposed to the laws. For some maintained that gods do not exist at all, and others, that the Infinite, or Being, or the One, are gods, and anything rather than those who are generally acknowledged.

Their dissension again, he said, was very great: for some represented the All as infinite, and others as finite; and some maintained that all things are in motion, and others that nothing at all moves. Moreover the following words of Timon of Phlius in his Silli seem to me the best of all on these very subjects: 'Say then, who urged them to the fatal strife? Echo's attendant rout: who filled with wrath Against the silent, sent upon mankind A fell disease of talk, and many died.' Do you see how at last these noble sages scoff at each other? For instance, the same author, besides what I have quoted, describes their mutual jealousy and their battles and quarrels in the following style: 'There baneful Discord stalks with senseless shriek, Of murderous Strife the sister and ally, Who, blindly stumbling round, anon her head, With ponderous weight set firm, uplifts to hope.'

Since, however, we have now exhibited the dissension and fighting of these sages among themselves, and since the wholly superfluous, and unintelligible, and to us utterly unnecessary study and learning of all the other subjects in which the tribes of philosophers still take pride, have been refuted not by our demonstrations but by their own; nay more, since we have also plainly set forth the reason why we have rejected their doctrines and preferred the Hebrew oracles, let us at this point conclude our treatise on The Preparation for the Gospel; but the more complete treatise on The Demonstration of the Gospel it now remains for us to consider from a different basis of argument, which the question still needs for those who are to deal with its teaching. It remains, therefore, to make answer to those of the circumcision who find fault with us, as to why we, being foreigners and aliens, make use of their books, which, as they would say, do not belong to us at all; or why, if we gladly accept their oracles, we do not also render our life conformable to their law.

[Footnotes moved to end and numbered]

Introduction

LONDINI ET NOVI EBORACI [image omitted] APUD HENRICUM FROWDE
ΕΥΣΕΒΙΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΠΑΜΦΙΛΟΥ ΕΥΑΓΓΕΛΙΚΗΣ ΠΡΟΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΗΣ ΛΟΓΟΙ ΙΕ

EUSEBII PAMPHILI EVANGELICAE PRAEPARATIONIS
LIBRI XV AD CODICES MANUSCRIPTOS DENUO COLLATOS RECENSUIT ANGLICE NUNC PRIMUM REDDIDIT NOTIS ET INDICIBUS INSTRUXIT

E. H. GIFFORD, S.T.P.
OLIM ARCHIDIACONUS LONDINENSIS TOMUS III. PARS PRIOR OXONII E TYPOGRAPHEO ACADEMICO M. CM. III OXONII Excudebat Horatius Hart Typographus academicus

INTRODUCTION
1. THE AUTHOR. The prominent position occupied by Eusebius of Caesarea in the Arian controversy and the Council of Nicaea has given rise to so many important treatises on his life and character, that it would be quite superfluous to prefix a formal biography to the present edition of one among his many literary works. It will be sufficient to mention a few of the best sources of information accessible to the English reader. (1) The article in Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography on Eusebius of Caesarea by the late Bishop G. E. L. Cotton. (2) Testimonies of the Ancients, in favour of and against Eusebius, collected by Valesius (Henri de Valois), and appended to the Prolegomena on The Life and Writings of Eusebius in Dr. McGiffert's English edition of the Church History (Parker, Oxford, 1890). (3) The very interesting and learned Introduction to the Greek text of the Ecclesiastical History of Eusebius, edited for the Clarendon Press by the late Dr. W. Bright, Canon of Christ Church, and Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History, Oxford, 1872.

(4) Bishop Lightfoot's article, Eusebius of Caesarea, in Smith and Wace's Dictionary of Christian Biography (ii. 308-48), of which Dr. McGiffert says with perfect truth: 'Lightfoot's article is a magnificent monument of patristic scholarship, and contains the best and most exhaustive treatment of the life and writings of Eusebius that has been written.' In each of these works the student will find abundant

references to earlier sources of information. There is, however, one interesting and important question concerning Eusebius, for a satisfactory explanation of which I have sought in vain even in these copious and excellent biographies. What was the true relation of Eusebius to Pamphilus? In other words, What is the exact meaning of the title Εὐσέβιος ὁ Παμφίλου? The inquiry is interesting because it is in connexion with Pamphilus that we first hear of Eusebius; and it is not unnecessary, because the older traditional explanations are very various, while in our own more critical days we find the title sometimes rendered as 'Eusebius Pamphilus,' and even as 'Eusebius the beloved of all,' a strange designation for one who was so well hated by his more orthodox brethren.

It will be convenient to begin with the summary account of the traditional notices given by Fabricius in his great work Bibliographia Graeca, Tom. vi. p. 30: 'Eusebius Pamphili, not the martyr's son, nor his sister's son (consobrinus), nor his slave, but a friend so peculiarly intimate that he took his name from him.' On the supposed relationship it is sufficient to quote Bishop Lightfoot's judicious remark: 'Nicephorus Callistus (H. E. vi. 37) makes him a nephew (ο τουτου αδελφιδους) of the martyr. Yet it is somewhat strange that he himself should never allude to this connexion, if it were so close. On the contrary, he speaks of his becoming acquainted with Pamphilus in such a manner as to suggest that there was no existing relationship which brought them together.' In a note on the passage already quoted Fabricius defends the rendering 'friend of Pamphilus' by supposed examples of a similar usage. 'Thus C. Avianus Philoxenus acquired the name Avianus from his friend Flaccus Avianus, as Cicero writes, Epist. ad Familiares, xiii. 35: "The name Avianus he received because there was no man with whom he was more intimate than with Flaccus Avianus, who, as I think you know, was my own most intimate friend."'

Of this example it is enough to say that the Latin usage is no authority for the Greek. In the same note Fabricius adds: 'Etiam Iudas Iacobi et Petrus Damiani dictus uterque a fratre.' On Luke vi. 16 Ιουδαν Ιακωβου Meyer remarks that it is usually rendered '"Judas the brother of James," and therefore the son of Alphaeus; but without any foundation in exegesis. . . . Hence here and in Acts i. 13, we must read "Judas son of James," of which James nothing further is known': and on Acts i. 13 Meyer again remarks that 'The relationship is arbitrarily defined as "brother of (the younger) James." It is: son of (an otherwise unknown) James.' This interpretation is now almost universally accepted. Thus Huther on Jude 1 writes: 'It is arbitrary to supply to Ιακωβου αδελφος instead of the usual supplement υιος,' and Reuss, Introduction to Jude: 'Cette derniere formule doit signifier necessairement "fils de Jacques," et non frere de Jacques.' Compare Viger, De Idiotismis Graecis, p. 12 'ὁ vel involvit substantivum ὑιος aut παῖς, filius, vel pro illo sumitur.' On which Hermann remarks Annot. ad Vig. De Idiot, p. 701 'Σωκρατης ο Σωφρονισκου significat aut hunc fuisse Sophronisci unicum, aut illum esse cui pater fuerit Sophro-

niscus, quo ab aliis Socratibus distinguatur. Σωκρατης Σωφρονισκου dicitur qui Sophroniscum, non alium, habet patrem.'

Even, however, if we could admit the rendering 'brother of James,' this extension of the genitive of kindred would not justify its further extension to the relation of 'friend': and the same objection applies to 'Petrus brother of Damianus,' as to whom see Fabric. Tom. viii. p. 88; Tom. xiii. p. 814. St. Jerome, writing about sixty years after the death of Eusebius, speaks of him as the 'friend, eulogist, and companion' of Pamphilus: Apolog. adv. Rufin. i. 9 'Ipse Eusebius amator et praeco et contubernalis Pamphili tres libros scripsit elegantissimos vitam Pamphili continentes.' Again in the Preface to his translation of the work of Eusebius On the names of places in Holy Scripture Jerome mentions that 'he took his surname from the blessed martyr Pamphilus'; while in the Preface to his Commentary on Isaiah and elsewhere he calls him simply 'Eusebius Pamphili.' If it seems strange that Jerome, who lived in the next generation to Eusebius, has failed to give a correct paraphrase of his adopted name, we must remember that Latin, not Greek, was Jerome's native language, and that in the Preface to his translation of the Chronicon of Eusebius he speaks in the strongest terms of the difficulty of rendering 'the peculiar and, so to speak, the native idiom of the language.'

On this point the Greek writers of Church History are better witnesses than Jerome. Socrates in the first words of his Ecclesiastical History (circ. 430 A. D.) calls him simply Ευσεβιος ο Παμφιλου, without any comment on the surname, which ought therefore to be taken in its usual and well-known sense. Sozomen, a contemporary of Socrates, in his Hist. Eccles. i. 1. 9 writes Ευσεβιος ο επικλην Παμφιλου, where επικλην may imply a patronymic, and may be illustrated by Xenophon, Oeconom. vii. 3 ονομαζοντες με Ισχομαχον πατροθεν προσκαλουνται. In a much later age Photius, Epist. 73, begins a bitter invective against the reputed heretic with the words Ευσεβιος ο του Παμφιλου ειτε δουλος ειτε συνηθης. Upon this the editor Baletta makes the usual remark that 'Eusebius was the disciple and friend of the martyr Pamphilus, from whom he took his surname': but it is evident that Photius himself either was or pretended to be ignorant of the actual meaning of the title; and his insolent insinuation, ειτε δουλος, is of course rightly rejected, as we have seen, by Fabricius. Bishop Lightfoot in the article already referred to writes with just indignation: 'It was either a blundering literalism or an ignoble sarcasm, which led Photius (Ep. 73 Baletta) to suggest the explanation that he was the slave of Pamphilus. Any man might have been proud to wear the slave's badge of such a devotion.'

We come at last to the positive testimony of one who at least knew the proper sense of the title ο Παμφιλου. The oldest MS. of the Praeparatio Evangelica (Paris, n. 451) has a Scholion on the passage i. 3 (Vig. 7 c 3) which refers to the works of earlier Christian writers. 'Such,' says the Scholiast, 'as were holy Justin, Athenago-

ras, Tatian, Clement the author of the Miscellanies, Origen, and moreover Pamphilus himself the father of our present author Eusebius, Παμφιλος ο του παροντος Ευσεβιου πατηρ.' Dr. Harnack in his description of this MS. in Texte u. Untersuch. i. 1. 34 remarks on this Scholion: 'It is worthy of notice that Pamphilus is described as the father of Eusebius (Ευσεβιος ο Παμφιλου). So obscure already was the Scholiast's historical knowledge.' In a foot-note to this passage Dr. Harnack asks 'why Pamphilus is mentioned here at all. Did the author perhaps think of Lucian, or allow himself to be misled by the title of the Apology for Origen?' Again on p. 177 Dr. Harnack says: 'This Scholion is of later origin. . . . Add to this that the learned Arethas cannot have supposed Pamphilus to be the father of Eusebius.'

As to Dr. Harnack's first objection, there is nothing to surprise us in the Scholiast's mention of Pamphilus as one of the 'recent authors' of whom Eusebius might have been thinking. His literary work was of a different character, less popular, and less generally known than the writings of the Apologists previously mentioned, and for these reasons, as it seems, the Scholiast in adding his name to theirs introduces it by the words καὶ αυτος ετι Παμφιλος. Dr. Harnack's passing remark that 'the Scholion is of later origin' is not accepted by his very learned co-editor Oscar v. Gebhardt, who made a most careful examination of the Codex, and assigned this particular Scholion to the hand of Arethas himself (Texte u. Unters. i. 3. 183, n. 70). Thus, instead of an ignorant Scholiast of a later age, we have the learned Archbishop Arethas asserting that the title is to be understood in its proper sense, 'Eusebius son of Pamphilus,' and this we shall find to be consistent with all that we know of the relations between Pamphilus and Eusebius.

Pamphilus, we know, was many years older than Eusebius, was the director as well as the partner of his studies, and is always mentioned by him in terms not only of admiration and affection but of the most profound respect. Thus he calls him 'the great glory of the diocese of Caesarea, most admirable of the men of our time,' of all my companions by me most fondly regretted, a man most glorious of the martyrs of our time for every virtue,' 'the name to me thrice dear,' 'a man who through his whole life shone pre-eminent in every virtue'; and when we add to such language the still more remarkable expressions quoted by Bishop Lightfoot from Cureton's edition of the Syriac Martyrs of Palestine, that 'heavenly martyr of God,' 'my lord Pamphilus,' 'for it is not meet that I should mention the name of that holy and blessed Pamphilus without styling him "my lord"'----with such testimony of filial reverence we can hardly doubt that when Eusebius adopted the patronymic ο Παμφιλου, he meant it in its full and proper significance, that henceforth he would call no man 'father' save this best and dearest friend of his early manhood. 'How else,' as Bishop Lightfoot says,' could he express the strength of his devotion to this friend, who was more than a friend, than by adopting his name. He would henceforward be known as "Eusebius of Pamphilus."' Let us only complete the title,

'Eusebius son of Pamphilus,' and so do justice to the old Scholiast, that is, to the learned archbishop himself.

A further explanation of the patronymic may probably be found in the prevalent custom of adoption. We know that Pamphilus 'had gathered about him a collection of books which seems to have been unrivalled in Christian circles' (Lightfoot, ibid.), and of which Eusebius became the possessor and made a catalogue (Eus. Hist. Eccl. vi. 32). It is therefore most probable that Pamphilus had made Eusebius his heir, and 'the only way in which a childless individual could acquire an heir was by adopting him' (Prof. W. M. Ramsay, Expositor, Sept. 1898, p. 204). Cf. Hermann, Political Antiquities of Greece, § 120 'The appointment of an heir, even by will, could take place only by adoption.' This statement that the heir was necessarily an adopted son is confirmed, among other passages, by Plato, Laws 924 A, and by Isaeus 66. 31 ουτε αν εισεποιουν εις τουτον τον κληρον υιον Αριστ̀αρχω, 'they would not have represented that a son had been adopted by Aristarchus into this inheritance.' If Eusebius was thus made the heir of Pamphilus, his legal and usual designation would henceforth be 'Ευσεβιος ο Παμφιλου.' And in any case, whether he was actually adopted, or took the patronymic as a symbol of respect and affection, the only true rendering is, I believe, 'Eusebius son of Pamphilus.'

2. THE DATE. The work itself contains no direct statement of the date at which it was written, and it is difficult to determine this very closely from the allusions to contemporary events, especially to the persecutions of the Christians and the subsequent prosperity of their religion. The persecution commenced by Diocletian (February 24, A. D. 303), and continued by Galerius, ceased by his edict A. D. 311. Speaking of this persecution Eusebius says (Eccl. Hist. viii. 16) that having begun to decrease after the eighth year 'through the grace of God it ceased altogether in the tenth year.' After the defeat of Maxentius (A. D. 312) Constantine and Licinius gave freedom to the Christians, which was confirmed by the Edict of Milan late in the same year (Eus. Eccl. Hist. x. 5). With these historical statements we have to compare the allusions to the condition of the Christians in the two portions of the great apologetic work of the same author.

We may notice first certain passages which seem to have been written just before, or immediately after, the final cessation of the persecution. Praep. Ev. 584 a, b 'Even up to the present time the noble witnesses (martyrs) of our Saviour throughout the whole inhabited world, while practising "not to seem but to be" just and devout, have suffered all things that Plato enumerated.' Here the words εις δευρο πεπονθασιν imply that the persecution if not still raging had very recently ceased. Another passage which seems to have been written before the persecution had come to an end is found in the Demonstration of the Gospel, iii. 5. 78. Commenting on our Saviour's prophecy (Matt. xxiv. 9; Luke xxi. 12) that his disciples should be brought before rulers and kings for His name's sake, he adds 'and shall suffer

all kinds of punishment for no fault or other good reason, but all this solely for His name's sake: and we may marvel at the prediction when we see this working up to the present time: for the confession of the name of Jesus is wont to inflame the wrath of the rulers, so that though no fault has been committed by one who confesses Christ, they punish him cruelly for His name's sake.'

Here again the present tenses εις δευρο θεωρουντας ενεργουμενον seem to imply that persecution was still raging. A strong contrast to the language of these earlier passages is found in the Demonstration, v. 3. 11 'Who therefore on seeing the Churches of our Saviour flourishing (ανθουσας) in the midst of the cities, and in villages and country places throughout the whole inhabited world, and the peoples being ruled (κυριευομενους) by Him. . . .' Again in the Praep. Ev. 9 d 7 Eusebius speaking of the Christian religion says: 'after these many years of persecution it shines forth far more brightly, and daily becomes more conspicuous, and grows and multiplies more and more.' From such a description it is evident that a great change had occurred in the policy of the Roman Emperors towards the Christian religion, and we may fairly conclude that the earlier passages were written shortly before or shortly after the cessation of the persecution, and the later after some years of peace and prosperity.

Considering that the Preparation and the Demonstration are the two connected portions of one great work which must have been a long time in execution, we cannot be surprised at finding indications of different dates occurring in different parts of the two treatises. And though unable to fix a precise date either for the commencement or for the completion of the whole work, we can hardly be wrong in saying that it was begun about the year 312 A.D., but not finished till a few years afterwards. On this latter point we have an interesting note of time in Praep. Ev. 135 c 4 'many of the most highly inspired even of their chief hierophants, and theologians, and prophets, who were celebrated for this kind of theosophy, not only in former times but also recently in our own day, under cruel tortures (διὰ βασανων αικιας) before the Roman courts declared that the whole delusion was produced by human frauds.' The passage evidently refers to the punishment of the false prophets and hierophants described by Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. ix. 11 'Licinius on arriving at the city of Antioch made a search for impostors, and tortured (βασανοις ηκιζετο) the prophets and priests of the newly erected statue, asking them "for what reason they practised their deception." And when under the stress of torture they were no longer able to conceal the matter, they declared that the whole mystery was a fraud contrived by the art of Theotecnus. He therefore meted out just judgement to all of them, and first put Theotecnus himself to death, and then his confederates in the imposture, after innumerable tortures (μετα πλειστας οσας αικιας).'

These executions took place immediately after the death of Maximinus in A. D. 313, and were followed by a further decree of toleration for the Christians. We cannot be wrong therefore in saying that the words 'recently in our time' (ενεγχος καθ ημας) were written neither before nor much after A. D. 314. 3. THE OCCASION. The time thus indicated in the work itself was especially opportune for such a defence of Christianity as Eusebius was undertaking. Persecution had ceased for the present, and there was no immediate need of such appeals to the justice or mercy of Pagan Emperors as had formed a chief subject of the first Christian Apologists. But the remembrance of the sufferings endured especially by the martyrs of Palestine, and witnessed if not actually shared by Eusebius himself, was still fresh; nor could there be any assurance that persecution would not be renewed under emperors less favourable to Christianity or less prudent than Constantine.

The wavering attitude of the emperor himself at this period is well described by Gibbon, c. xx 'The devotion of Constantine was more peculiarly directed to the genius of the Sun, the Apollo of Greek and Roman mythology; and he was pleased to be represented with the symbols of the God of Light and Poetry.' . . . 'As long as Constantine exercised a limited sovereignty over the provinces of Gaul, his Christian subjects were protected by the authority, and perhaps by the laws, of a prince who wisely left to the gods the care of vindicating their honour. If we may credit the assertion of Constantine himself, he had been an indignant spectator of the savage cruelties which were inflicted by the hands of Roman soldiers on those citizens whose religion was their only crime.' If the prudent policy of the emperor was dictated by a sense of the growing power of Christianity in the State, nothing could help so much to strengthen this feeling and turn it into a permanent conviction as a full exhibition of the contrast between the effete superstitions and gross immorality of Paganism and the pure and vigorous spirit of the new religion.

The conflict was not ended, but it had assumed a new character: persecution had failed, but other weapons not less formidable remained. The old charges of atheism, apostasy, and hostility to the State though often refuted were constantly renewed. Learning and philosophy lent their aid both in attacking the supposed credulity of the Christians, and in endeavouring to infuse new life into the ancient Polytheism. Porphyry, the most learned and able philosopher of his age and the bitterest opponent of Christianity, was but lately dead, and had left behind him a work in fifteen books Against the Christians. As far as we can judge from the fragments that remain this was the most comprehensive and powerful attack that had yet been made upon the new faith. Eusebius was keenly alive both to the ability of the author, and to the dangerous character of his criticism: and there was need as well as opportunity for a new and comprehensive defence of the truth so vehemently attacked.

4. THE METHOD. In explaining the plan of his treatise Eusebius promises (7 a 1) that his purpose shall be worked out in a way of his own, differing from the methods of the many Christian authors who had preceded him. This promise is further explained (17 a 1) as meaning that his arguments will not depend on his own statements, but will be given in the very words of the most learned and best known advocates of the Pagan religions, that so the evidence alleged may not be suspected of being invented by himself. The cogency of this mode of argument truthfully and fairly conducted is unquestionable, but it had not in this case such entire novelty as Eusebius seems to claim for it. We shall find as we proceed that many of his arguments are the same as those of the earlier Apologists, Aristides, Justin Martyr, Tatian, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen; that he constantly borrows long passages from their writings, including the same quotations from Greek authors, reproduced word for word with due acknowledgement. Those earlier authors had in fact adopted the very same method which Eusebius announced as distinctive of his own work. The quotations thus borrowed are however few in comparison with the great multitude gathered by Eusebius himself from all parts of the Greek literature of a thousand years, from works both known and unknown of poets, historians, and philosophers.

The peculiar value of the Praeparatio resulting from this wealth of quotation is universally acknowledged. 'This book is almost as important to us in the study of ancient Philosophy as the Chronicon is with reference to History, since in it are present specimens of the writings of almost every philosopher of any note whose works are not now extant' (G. E. L. Cotton, Dict. Gk. and R. Biogr., 'Eusebius,' 116b). 'The Preparation exhibits the same wide range of acquaintance with the classical writers of Greece which the History exhibits in the domain of Christian literature. The list of writers quoted or referred to is astonishing for its length (see Fabric. Bibl. Graec. vii. 346). Some of these are known to us, even by name, only through Eusebius, and of several others he has preserved large portions which are not otherwise extant. . . . It was chiefly the impression produced by this mass of learning which led Scaliger to describe it as "divini commentarii," and Cave to call it "opus profecto nobilissimum" (H. L. i. p. 178)' (Lightfoot, Smith and "Wace's Dict. Chr. Biogr. ii. 331).

5. THE STYLE. It follows from the nature of the method thus described that the value of the treatise does not depend on the literary style of Eusebius. His part in the work is that of an editor or compiler rather than of an original author. His own contributions are small, except in a few places such as Book VI, chapter 6, on the subject of Fate and Free Will, and the earlier chapters of Book VII, in which he describes the religious ideas and mode of life of the original Hebrews. For the most part he is content to give short notices of the numerous authors whom he quotes, and such brief comments as serve either to connect the passages selected or to explain their meaning and force. It is thus a matter of less importance that

his own style is not attractive: the sentences are often of inordinate length, and the constructions awkward and confused. On the other hand the diction is simple, appropriate, and free from all affectation of eloquence or rhetorical artifice. Bishop Lightfoot's judgement is, as usual, very accurate when he speaks of the want of 'rhetorical vigour and expression,' but adds that 'the forcible and true conceptions which it exhibits from time to time, more especially bearing on the theme which may be briefly designated "God in history," arrest our attention now, and must have impressed his contemporaries still more strongly; while in learning and comprehensiveness it is without a rival.'

The same great critic passes a less favourable judgement on the arrangement of the contents: 'The divisions,' he says, 'are not kept distinct; the topics start up unexpectedly and out of season.' On this point I may be allowed to plead on behalf of Eusebius that if he deserves the censure, it is not from want of very careful endeavours to avoid it. His best defence is to be found in his very frequent explanations of the purpose and arrangement of his work. 6. THE CONTENTS. In his first sentence Eusebius shows us that the proper title of his proposed work as a whole is The Demonstration of the Gospel (Αποδειξις Ευαγγελικη), of which the first part (Προπαρασκευη της Ευαγγελικης Αποδειξεως, or more briefly Ευαγγελικη Προπαρασκευη) is intended to explain beforehand the objections which are likely to be urged against the Christians and their religion by both Greeks and Jews.

These objections refer to three main points:---- (i) The abandonment of the ancestral religion of the Greeks (5 a 2). (ii) The acceptance of the foreign doctrines of the Barbarians, i. e. Jews (5 b). (iii) The inconsistency of rejecting the Jewish sacrifices, rites, and general manner of life, while appropriating their sacred Scriptures and promised blessings (5 c). The third point, however, is not included in the Preparation for the reason stated in the closing sentence (856 a 6), but is left for consideration in the Demonstration. The fifteen books containing the discussion of the first two points are divided into five groups of three each, and this distribution is clearly indicated at the beginning of each group in Books I, IV, VII, X, XIII, while in the first chapter of Book XV we have a clear summary of the whole preceding argument, showing how the several divisions have been treated each in three books.

The first three books discuss the threefold system of Pagan Theology, Mythical, Allegorical, and Political (788 b 3-d 3). The next three, IV-VI, give an account of the chief oracles, of the worship of daemons, and of the various opinions of Greek philosophers on the doctrines of Fate and Free Will. Books VII-IX give reasons for preferring the religion of the Hebrews founded chiefly on the testimony of various authors to the excellency of their Scriptures and the truth of their history. In Books X-XII Eusebius argues that the Greeks had borrowed from the older theology and philosophy of the Hebrews, dwelling especially on the supposed dependence of

Plato upon Moses. In the last three books the comparison of Plato with Moses is continued, and the mutual contradictions of other Greek philosophers, especially the Peripatetics and Stoics, are exposed and criticized. A like orderly arrangement is observed in the smaller divisions of each group.

Book I. After stating the general purpose and plan of his intended work (chapters 1-5), Eusebius takes a brief survey of the earliest notions of the origin of the world, of mankind, and of the gods from the writings of Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch, Xenophon, Plato, and Porphyry (chapters 6-9, 17 b-30 d), showing that a simpler worship of sun, moon, and stars had preceded the endless theogonies and bloody sacrifices of the manifold forms of superstition among the heathen nations. The remainder of the book (31 a-42 d) is occupied by Philo's translation of Sanchuniathon's account of the Phoenician theology. In Book II the religions of Egypt and of Greece are described in the words of Diodorus and of Clement of Alexandria; after which Eusebius himself states his reasons for rejecting both the gross legends of the older mythology and the physical explanations by which later philosophers endeavoured to throw a decent veil of allegorical interpretation over the shameless obscenities of their ancestral religion, and ends the book by a description of the comparatively purer religion of Rome from Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

In Book III the physical explanations of the Greeks and the allegorical theology of the Egyptians are further described in the language of Plutarch, Diodorus, and Porphyry, with brief criticisms by Eusebius himself (chapters 1-8). Then after quoting the Orphic Hymn, in which Zeus is described as the All, both body and soul of the universe, with Porphyry's comments upon it, Eusebius proceeds 'to examine quietly and at leisure what after all the verses declare Zeus to be' (102 a). On this passage Gesner founded a charge of forgery against our author, whom he supposed to have introduced the verses in order to show that the Orphic poem taught the existence of the One true God, and even Cudworth strangely fell into the same error (Intellectual System, iv. 17). Fortunately Eusebius, while refuting Porphyry, has given us his own interpretation of the verses, showing at considerable length (102a-108a) that they represent the world as a great animal to which the name of Zeus is applied, his mind being nothing else than the ether. Compare Valckenaer, Diatribe de Aristobulo, xxvi. After quoting Porphyry again on the physical theologies of Greece and Egypt (108b-117d), Eusebius himself exposes their contradictions and absurdities in the five remaining chapters of the book (118 a-127 c).

In the second group of three books (IV-VI) he passes on from the mythical and physical systems of Greek theology to the political forms of religion upheld and enforced by the laws of the several states. Books IV and V are mainly occupied with discussions on the oracles and their pretended prophecies and healings, which are attributed both by Eusebius and by the witnesses whom he quotes to the activity of

evil daemons. The evidence on these subjects is for the most part taken from Porphyry's work On the Philosophy to be derived from Oracles, fragments of which are preserved by Eusebius, and his extant and well-known work On Abstinence from Animal Food. The last nine chapters are devoted to the subject of human sacrifices, the chief witnesses being Porphyry, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Diodorus Siculus. In Book V the nature and operation of daemons, the incantations by which they may be controlled, and their regard for the images in which they are supposed to be present, are described in extracts from Plutarch On the Cessation of Oracles, from Porphyry's works already mentioned, and from his Epistle to Anebo. The latter half of the book is occupied by a most interesting and witty satire upon the oracles from the work of Oenomaus entitled The Detection of Impostors.

Book VI is devoted to the subject of Fate and Free Will in connexion with astrology, the evidence being supplied by Porphyry, Oenomaus, Diogenianus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Bardesanes the Syrian, and Origen. In the sixth chapter we have a good specimen of the clear argumentative style of Eusebius himself: with much force and earnestness he defends 'the freedom of the Will against the fatalism of pagan religion,' and especially of the Stoic philosophy.' By the independence with which he maintains the cause of Liberty, Morality, and Duty it is evident that no such teaching as that of Pelagius had as yet disturbed men's minds, or called forth the decisions of the Church on the doctrines of grace' (Dictionnaire des Sciences philosophiques, ii. 340). The next group consisting of Books VII-IX deals with the religion of the Hebrews. Of Book VII the first half (298 d-322 d) is the work of Eusebius himself, describing the lives and religion of the Patriarchs, and the doctrines of Moses and the Prophets on Divine Providence, on God as the First Cause of the Universe, and on the Word as the Second Cause. In the latter half of the book the same subjects are illustrated from Jewish and Christian authors, Philo, Dionysius of Alexandria, Origen, and Methodius.

Beck VIII consists of the history of the Septuagint as described by Aristeas, of quotations concerning the Exodus and the Law from Philo, Josephus, and Eleazar the High Priest, on the Biblical anthropomorphisms from Aristobulus, and two accounts of the Essenes from Philo, followed by his views of Creation, and of Providence. Book IX contains the testimony of heathen writers who have made mention of the Jews, a third account of the Essenes by Porphyry, quotations by Josephus from Hecataeus of Abdera, Clearchus the Peripatetic, Choerilus the poet, Abydenus, author of the Assyrian History, the Sibyl, and others on the Deluge and Tower of Babel. The remaining twenty-six chapters of the book are chiefly occupied by several important extracts from the work of Alexander Polyhistor, Concerning the Jews, which include long passages from the Iambic poems of Theo-dotus and Ezekiel on events in Jewish history, the spurious letters of Solomon to Vaphres king of Egypt, and Suron (Hiram) of Tyre; with descriptions of Jerusalem and other matters by various authors.

In the next group, Books X-XII, Eusebius gives examples from Clement, Porphyry, and Diodorus of the plagiarism of Greek authors both from each other and, as they argue, from the much older Scriptures of the Hebrews. The testimony to their antiquity is drawn from the Chronography of Africanus, and from Tatian, Clement, and Josephus. In Book XI Eusebius proposes to show the agreement of Plato, as the representative of Greek Philosophy, with the Hebrew Scriptures. Adopting the threefold division of Ethics, Dialectic, and Physics, he notices the moral teaching of the sacred writers, their literary methods, accurate reasoning, and correct use of significant names, their knowledge of the natural world, and their contemplation of the 'true being' of things unseen (chapters 1-9). He then quotes the comments of Numenius, and his saying, What else is Plato than Moses speaking Attic Greek?, and Plutarch's treatise on the Eἰ at Delphi (10, 11).

Other points of comparison are the ineffable nature of God, His unity, the Second Cause as contemplated by Philo, Plotinus, Numenius, and Amelius, the Third Divine Power of the Ps.-Platonic Epinomis (chapters 12-30). The nature of the Good and of the Ideas, as stated by Plato in the Republic and Timaeus, is illustrated by quotations from Numenius, Philo, and Clement of Alexandria (21-25). The existence of evil powers, the immortality of the soul and the Divine image, as taught in the Alcibiades and Phaedo, and illustrated from Porphyry's answer to Boethus On the Soul, the creation of the world and of the heavenly bodies, the goodness of God's works, their changes and dissolution, the resurrection of the dead, and the final judgement, are all brought into the comparison, and illustrated from the Timaeus, Republic, Politicus, and Phaedo, and from a fragment of Plutarch On the Soul. In Book XII the comparison of Plato with the Hebrew Scriptures is continued on the simple instruction of children, the need of faith, the qualifications of rulers as described in the Laws, the Gorgias, and the Republic (chapters 1-9); the picture of the just man and his fate in the Republic; Paradise and the garden of Zeus, and the origin of mankind male and female, in the Symposium; the Deluge, the right foundation of law, religious training, the use of poetry, music, and wine, and the control of the passions, all illustrated from the Laws (chapters 10-28).

Other subjects brought into the comparison are the contrast of true philosophy and spurious wisdom (Theaetetus), the education of women (Republic), and passages of the Laws and Republic corresponding to the Hebrew Proverbs and laws of Moses on 'the memory of the just,' riches and poverty, and the honour due to parents, on slaves, landmarks, and thieves (chapters 29-42). Other coincidences are found in the use of certain examples and figures of speech, in the division of a nation into twelve tribes, in the situation of the chief city, and in Plato's thoughts on faults in education (Republic), on atheism, on God, and Divine providence (Laws). In Book XIII Eusebius quotes with approval Plato's opinions on the absurdities of Greek mythology in the Timaeus, Republic, and Eutliyphron (chapters 1-5), on stedfast adherence to truth even unto death in the Crito and the Apology of Socrates (chap-

ters 6-11), adding the testimonies of Aristobulus and Clement to the agreement of Plato and other Greek philosophers with the Hebrew Scriptures (chapters 12, 13).

The remainder of the book treats of matters in which Plato's teaching is condemned concerning the belief of the common people (Timaeus and Republic), a multitude of inferior gods and daemons, the nature of the soul (Timaeus) criticized by the Platonist Severus, the worship of the heavenly bodies (Laws and Timaeus), the treatment of women (Laws and Republic), unnatural vice, and the laws of murder. In Book XIV the consistent truth of Hebrew doctrines adopted by Christians is contrasted with the contradictions and conflicts of Greek philosophers, showing how Plato criticized his predecessors in the Theaetetus and Sophista, and was himself criticized by his followers in the successive Academies, who in their turn are subjected to the keen satire of Numenius (chapters 1-9). The subject is continued in quotations from Porphyry, Xeno-phon, Plato, Plutarch, and especially from Aristocles On Philosophy against the schools of Parmenides who rejected the evidence of the senses, of Aristippus, Metrodorus, and Protagoras who believed them alone, and of the Pyr-rhonists who believed nothing at all. The doctrines of Epicurus are refuted from the writings of Aristocles, Plato, and Dionysius of Alexandria (chapters 21-47).

In Book XV the moral character of Aristotle is defended against the slanders of Epicurus and others by Aristocles; but where he differed from Plato and the Hebrews in regard to virtue and happiness, the ideas of God and His providence, the creation of the world, the fifth corporeal essence, the nature of the heavenly bodies, and the immortality of the soul, his doctrines are severely criticized by Atticus the Platonist (chapters 2-9). His description of the soul as an enteleceia is further criticized by Plotinus, Porphyry, and Atticus (10-13); the Stoic philosophy is discussed by Aristocles, Areius Didymus, Porphyry, Longinus, and Plotinus (14-22), and the remainder of the book is occupied with a long extract from Plutarch, De placitis Philosophorum, on the various physical theories of the world, followed by the judgement of Socrates on such questions from the Memorabilia of Xenophon. After this survey of the contents of the Preparation as described chiefly by Eusebius himself, I think we are in fairness bound to acquit him of the charge of confusion in the divisions of the work and the arrangement of its topics. His occasional repetitions are for the most part confined to quotations, and especially to certain well-known and striking passages of Plato which are used more than once in different branches of the subject, and with different applications.

7. QUOTATIONS. The literary value of the Preparation for the Gospel will be most fully appreciated by considering a separate list of the chief fragments of ancient authors for the preservation of which we are indebted to Eusebius in that work. (α) Fragments of Poetry. 1. An interesting epigram by Callimachus on the simplicity of the primitive statues (99 b): this is contained in a fragment of Plutarch, De Daedalis

Plataeensibus. 2. A fragment of Euripides, Melanippe Captiva, on the characters of bad and good women (466 d). 3. Large extracts in iambic verse from the Exodus, a tragedy by the Jewish dramatist Ezekiel (438 c 10-446 d 2), on which see Schürer, Jewish People, ii. 3. 224. 4. Fragments of an epic poem On Jerusalem by a Jew named Philo, 421 c, d, 430 c, 453 a. Cf. Schürer, ibid. 222. 5. Eight extracts from the epic poem of Theodotus On the Jews, describing Sichem, and narrating the story of the sons of Emmor (426 b-429 a). Cf. Schürer, ibid. 224.

6. Many of the oracles quoted by Oenomaus in The Detection of Impostors (209 c-234 a). 7. All the oracles contained in the work of Porphyry On the Philosophy to be derived from Oracles (123 d-124 b, 145 a-146 b, 168 b, 175 c). These oracles with their contexts are carefully edited by Wolff in his work Porph. De Philos. ex Oraculis haurienda, of which they form the chief substance. 8. Pindar, Fr. Incert. 2 (105), Paean. 10 (33), both in 687 b. 9. The remarkable epigram on the Tetragrammaton and the Name of seven vowels (520 a). 10. Part of the Orphic Hymn to Zeus, of which vv. 19-42 (except two or three) are found first in the fragment of Porphyry Peri Agalmatwn preserved by Eusebius P. E. 100 c 5-101 c 1. (β) Historical Fragments. 1. In history we have first the long extract from the translation by Philo Byblius of Sanchuniathon's Phoenician History contained in a fragment of Porphyry's work Against the Christians preserved by Eusebius (31 a-42 b). If we could fully trust Porphyry's testimony to the truthfulness of Philo, and to the genuineness and antiquity of the work of Sanchuniathon, the historical value of the extract could hardly be over-estimated: and we cannot wonder that the question of its authenticity has been a most fruitful source of criticism and controversy from the time of Scaliger and Grotius to our own days. 'Few problems, in fact, in the circle of Semitic studies and of ancient history in general are of more importance than this.' So writes M. Renan. Memoire sur l'Origine et le Caractere veritable de l'Histoire phenicienne qui porte le nom de Sanchoniathon, p. 6.

2. Diodorus Siculus. In 59 c 2-61 a we have an interesting fragment of the sixth book of the Bibliotheca, confirming his account of the sources of Greek theology from the Ιερα αναγραφη, or Sacred Record of Euemerus, and adding the wonderful narrative of Euemerus concerning his voyage to the fabulous island of Panchaea in the Indian Ocean. 3. The large fragments of Philo Judaeus first known from Eusebius will be found in 322 d 11 on the Word or Second God, in 336 b Concerning Providence, in 355 c-361 b on the Exodus and the Law from a work otherwise unknown, entitled Hypothetica, and in 379 a-400 a a very long and important passage from the Apology for the Jews. These fragments will be found placed together at the end of the sixth volume of Richter's edition of the Greek text of Philo. 4. Among the most important of the historical fragments preserved for us by Eusebius are the long extracts from the work of Alexander Polyhistor Concerning the Jews, which occupy the larger part of Book IX, and have been very carefully edited in a special monograph by Dr. J. Freudenthal. The value of these extracts is much increased by

quotations from lost works of authors otherwise unknown, Eupolemus, Artapanus, Molon, a certain Philo, and Demetrius, who all wrote on the history of the Jews. On the importance of the fragments see Schürer, ibid. ii. 3. 197.

5. The extract from the Chronicon of Julius Africanus (487 d-491 b) was edited from Eusebius by Dr. Routh in Rell. Sacr. ii. 269-78, who enlarged the text from Georgius Syncellus and added copious notes (423-37). 6. From the lost work of Abydenus On Assyrian History we have most interesting notices of the Flood of Sisithrus, i. e. Noah (414 d), of the Tower of Babel (416 b), of Nebuchadnezzar's madness and of his fortification of Babylon (456 d). (γ) Philosophical Fragments. It is in the region of Greek Philosophy that the wealth of quotation is most remarkable. 1. Among the Neo-Platonists we find Atticus, whose commentary on the Timaeus is sharply criticized by Proclus, but of whose own writings there remain only the important fragments preserved by Eusebius; the first of which describes the three-fold division of Philosophy into Ethics, Physics, and Logic, and eulogizes Plato as 'a man from nature's mysteries new-inspired,' and 'in very truth sent down from the gods, in order that Philosophy might be seen in its full proportions,' (509 b-510 a). Also in the long and important extracts contained in Book XV, chapters 4-9, 12, 13, Atticus appears as a passionate defender of Plato against Aristotle.

2. From the Epitome of Areius Didymus we have a short extract on the Platonic Ideas (545 b), and several passages on the Stoic doctrines in Book XV, chapters 15, 20. 3. Numenius the Neo-Pythagorean is known almost exclusively from the long and numerous extracts preserved by Eusebius. From the contemplation of true 'Being' with Plato (525 c-527 a) he passes on to the nature of 'the First and Second God' (537 a), and to 'the only Good' transcending all essence, which can be contemplated only apart from sense 'in a certain, immense, ineffable, and absolutely Divine solitude' (543 d). In 650 d we find him defending Plato for 'preserving both life and truth' by withdrawing from Athens; and in 727 b-739 he describes The revolt of the Academics against Plato, under the leaders of the three, or more, Academies. 4. The fragments of Aristocles the Peripatetic contain an interesting criticism of Socrates and Plato, and of the divergent Socratic Schools (510 b-511 c), a defence of the veracity of the senses against the Eleatics Xenophanes and Parmenides (756 b-757 d), a long refutation of the Sceptics Pyrrho and Timon (758 c-763 d), strong and able censures of the Sophists, Cyrenaics, and Epicureans (764 c-768 d), and lastly a defence of the moral character of Aristotle against the slanderous attacks of Epicurus, Timaeus of Tauromenium, Alexinus the Eristic, Eubulides, Democharis, Cephisodorus, and Lycon (791 a-793 c).

5. Of the three known fragments of Euemerus, the most important is contained in a fragment of the sixth book of Diodorus Siculus, itself preserved by Eusebius (Diod. Sic. iv. 179, Dindorf). 6. On the falsehood of oracles we have first a valuable fragment of Diogenianus directed against the fatalism of Chrysippus (136 d 3); then

the vigorous and amusing invective of Oenomaus occupying no less than eighteen chapters of Book V (209 b-234 c); and the long series of extracts from the work of Porphyry On the Philosophy to be derived from Oracles, mentioned above (p. xxvi). 7. Of other works of Porphyry Eusebius has preserved many fragments of the Epistle to Anebo (92 a, 197 c, 740 d), on which see Parthey's edition of Iamblichus De Mysteriis; a large part of the treatise De Statuis (97 d 2 note); several fragments of a work On the Soul, against Boethus; three long extracts from the Philological Lecture; fragments of the famous treatise Against the Christians (31 a, 179 d, 485 b).

8. A fragment attributed to Plotinus on the Entelecheia of Aristotle, which is inserted by Creuzer after Ennead. iv. 2. 9. From Plutarch's treatise on the Daedala, or primitive wooden statues at Plataeae, and the worship connected with them Eusebius has preserved two very interesting fragments (83 c, 99 b); and though the long extracts from the Stromateis (22 b-25 b) and the De placitis Philosophorum (836 a-852 c) are not the work of Plutarch, but a compilation by some unknown writer from the Epitome of Aetius, this very ancient error in the title does not detract from their value. We are equally indebted for their preservation to Eusebius, to whose accuracy and fidelity Diels (Proleg. 5-10) pays an emphatic and even enthusiastic testimony. 8. CONCLUSION. The work which has been my chief occupation and my delight for several years is now drawing to a close. I have to renew my thanks to friends already mentioned in the Preface to vol. i; to Dr. Sanday, whose counsel and encouragement first led me to add to the English translation a revised text; to Dr. Redpath, by whose many useful suggestions and careful correction of the proof-sheets I have been aided throughout; to Dr. John Mayor, the Professor of Latin in the University of Cambridge, and Dr. Joseph Mayor; to the Rev. W. R. Inge, one of the rare students of Plotinus; to Dr. H. H. Turner, F.R.S., Savilian Professor of Astronomy; and last not least to the Delegates, Secretary, and other Officers of the Clarendon Press, to whose unfailing kindness and invaluable help I am most deeply indebted.

Of the inadequacy of my own work I am painfully conscious. To do full justice to so large a compilation from all branches of ancient literature the editor himself should be historian, poet, philosopher, archaeologist, astronomer, ethnologist; and I certainly am none of these. For all errors and defects which remain un-corrected I can only trust to receive the indulgence for which old age not often pleads in vain.

CORRECTIONS

PART I 153 c 3 'how far they proceed who need'] read 'how far in need.' 168 c 3 'Then fragrant incense and dark blood of grapes'] read 'Dark blood of grapes pour'd on the blazing pyre.' 302 d 1 'mariners' stars'] read 'star-fish.' 210 d 7 'He killed with his spear Carnus son of Phylander an Aetolian knight'] read 'Hippotes son of Phylander kill'd with his spear Carnus the Aetolian.' 224 d 3 'No spot on

earth . . .' Omit this line. 294 c 3 'not only'] read 'I do not mean.' 404 b 11 'upon God'] read 'upon them as gods.' 448 d 5 'as soon as they cease to be wanted'] read 'as being no longer wanted.' PART II 634 c 9 ' had become indestructible'] read when once created were indestructible.' 642 b 1 'and by those who are growing elderly and'] read 'and as they grow older.'

734 b 4 ' such as they were '] read 'whether few or many.' 734 c 2 ' house '] read ' room.' 737 b 1 ' to the leadership'] read ' Hegesinus.' Cf. note. 756 d 7 ' the existing thing'] read ' being.' 778 a 8 ' simultaneous circular revolution'] read ' synodical revolution.' 782 c 9 'show evidence'] read ' find evidence.' 823 b 9 'it is '] read ' they are.' 826 c 1 'universals'] read ' wholes.' 830 d 7 'wrist'] read ' palm.' 836 b 4 'the sun out of] read ' the Sun, or out of.' 850 a 5 ' pillar supporting the surfaces'] read ' pillar: but of the surfaces....' See note. [Footnotes have been placed at the end]

Source. English translation: an older public-domain translation as collected in the Writings-Database (HistoricalChristianFaith), mostly from the Ante-Nicene, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers and similar nineteenth-century editions. SermonIndex has only divided it into chapters and short sections; the wording is the translator's own. Square brackets, Greek or Latin words and footnote-free text are as the source file prints them, and a transcription error may remain. No Greek or Latin text is shown beside it yet, and no modern English version has been made.