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  WRITINGS OF WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM
  by William Cunningham
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A collection of theological writings, sermons, and essays by William Cunningham,
compiled for study and devotional reading.

  Chapters: 2

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  TABLE OF CONTENTS
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    1. S. Infant Baptism
    2. S. The Principles of the Reformation not the cause of Sects and Heresies

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  CHAPTER 1: S. INFANT BAPTISM
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Infant Baptism by William Cunningham The Reformers, and the great body of
Protestant divines, in putting forth the definition of the sacraments in
general, or of a sacrament as such, intended to embody the substance of what
they believe Scripture to teach, or to indicate, as equally applicable to both
sacraments; and in laying down what they believe concerning the general objects
and the ordinary effects of the sacraments, they commonly assume, that the
persons partaking in them are rightly qualified for receiving and improving
them,-- and further, and more specially, that the persons baptized are adults.
It is necessary to keep these considerations in view in interpreting the general
description given of sacraments and of baptism, in our Confession of Faith and
the other Reformed confessions; and with these assumptions, and to this extent,
there is no difficulty in the way of our maintaining the general principle,
which can be established by most satisfactory evidence, -- namely, that the
fundamental spiritual blessings, on the possession of which the salvation of men
universally depends,-- justification and regeneration by faith,-- are not
conveyed through the instrumentality of the sacraments, but that, on the
contrary, they must already exist before even baptism can be lawfully or safely
received. The general tenor of Scripture language upon the subject of baptism
applies primarily and directly to the baptism of adults, and proceeds upon the
assumption, that the profession implied in the reception of baptism by adults,--
the profession, that is, that they had already been led to believe in Christ,
and to receive Him as their Savior and their Master,-- was sincere, or
corresponded with the real state of their minds and hearts. It is necessary,
therefore, to form our primary and fundamental conceptions of the objects and
effects of baptism in itself, as a distinct subject, and in its bearing upon the
general doctrine of the sacraments, from the baptism of adults and not of
infants. The baptisms which are ordinarily described or referred to in the New
Testament, were the baptisms of men who had lived as Jews and heathens, and who,
having been led to believe in Christ,-- or, at least, to profess faith in Him,--
expressed and sealed this faith, or the profession of it, by complying with
Christ’s requirement, that they should be baptized. This is the proper, primary,
full idea of baptism; and to this the general tenor of Scripture language upon
the subject, and the general description of the objects and ends of baptism, as
given in our Confession of Faith, and in the other confessions of the Reformed
churches, are manifestly adapted.

As, in the condition in which we are placed in providence, we but seldom witness
the baptism of adults, and commonly see only the baptism of infants,-- and as
there are undoubtedly some difficulties in the way of applying fully to the
baptism of infants the definition usually given of a sacrament, and the general
account commonly set forth of the objects and ends of baptism,-- we are very apt
to be led to form insensibly very erroneous and defective views of the nature
and effects of baptism, as an ordinance instituted by Christ in His church, or
rather, to rest contented with scarcely any distinct or definite conception upon
the subject. Men usually have much more clear and distinct apprehensions of the
import, design, and effects of the Lord’s Supper than of Baptism; and yet the
general definition commonly given of a sacrament applies equally to both, being
just intended to embody the substance of what Scripture indicates as equally
applicable to the one ordinance as to the other. If we were in the habit of
witnessing adult baptism, and if we formed our primary and full conceptions of
the import and effects of the ordinance from the baptism of adults, the one
sacrament would be as easily under- stood, and as definitely apprehended, as the
other; and we would have no difficulty in seeing how the general definition
given of the sacraments in our Confession of Faith and Catechisms applied
equally to both. But as this general definition of sacraments, and the
corresponding general description given of the objects and effects of baptism,
do not apply fully and without some modification to the form in which we usually
see baptism administered, men commonly, instead of considering distinctly what
are the necessary modifications of it, and what are the grounds on which these
modifications rest, leave the whole subject in a very obscure and confused
condition in their minds.

These statements may, at first view, appear to be large concessions to the
anti-pado-baptists, or those who oppose the lawfulness of the baptism of
infants, and to affect the solidity of the grounds on which the practice of
pado-baptism, which has ever prevailed almost universally in the church of
Christ, is based. But I am persuaded that a more careful consideration of the
subject will show that these views, besides being clearly sanctioned by
Scripture, and absolutely necessary for the consistent and intelligible
interpretation of our own standards, are, in their legitimate application,
fitted to deprive the arguments of the anti-pado-baptists of whatever
plausibility they possess. It cannot be reasonably denied that they have much
that is plausible to allege in opposition to infant baptism; but I am persuaded
that the plausibility of their arguments will always appear greatest to men who
have not been accustomed to distinguish between the primary and complete idea of
this ordinance, as exhibited in the baptism of adults, and the distinct and
peculiar place which is held by the special subject of infant baptism, and the
precise grounds on which it rests. Pado-baptists, from the causes to which I
have referred, are apt to rest contented with very obscure and defective notions
of the import and objects of baptism, and to confound adult and infant baptism
as if the same principles must fully and universally apply to both. And in this
state of things, when those views of the sacraments in general, and of baptism
in particular, which I have briefly explained, are pressed upon their attention,
and seen and acknowledged to be well founded, they are not unlikely to imagine
that these principles equally rule the case of infant baptism; and they are thus
prepared to see, in the arguments of the anti-pado-baptists, a much larger
amount of force and solidity than they really possess. Hence the importance of
being familiar with what should be admitted or conceded, as clearly sanctioned
by Scripture, with respect to baptism in general, in its primary, complete
idea,-- estimating exactly what this implies, and how far it goes; and then,
moreover, being well acquainted with the special subject of infant baptism as a
distinct topic,-- with the peculiar considerations applicable to it, and the
precise grounds on which its lawful- ness and obligation can be established.

It is not my purpose to enter upon a full discussion of infant baptism, or an
exposition of the grounds on which the views of psedo-baptists can, as I
believe, be successfully established and vindicated. I shall merely make a few
observations on what it is that pado-baptists really maintain,-- on the distinct
and peculiar place which the doctrine of infant baptism truly occupies,-- and on
the relation in which it stands to the general subject of baptism and the
sacraments; believing that correct apprehensions upon these points are well
fitted to illustrate the grounds on which infant baptism rests in all their
strength, and the insufficiency of the reasons by which the opposite view has
been supported.

Let me then, in the first place, remark that intelligent pado-baptists hold all
those views of the sacraments and of baptism which I have endeavored to explain,
and are persuaded that they can hold them in perfect consistency with
maintaining that the infants of believing parents ought to be baptized. There is
nothing in these views peculiar to the anti-pado-baptists; and there is, we are
persuaded, no real advantage which they can derive from them in support of their
opinions. These views are clearly sanctioned by our Confession of Faith; while,
at the same time, it contains also the following proposition as a part of what
the word of God teaches upon the subject of baptism: "Not only those that do
actually profess faith in and obedience unto Christ, but also the infants of one
or both believing parents are to be baptized." Now, let it be observed that this
position is all that is essential to the doctrine of the pado-baptists, as such.
We are called upon to maintain nothing more upon the subject than this plain and
simple proposition, which merely asserts the lawfulness and propriety of
baptizing the infants of believing parents. Let it be noticed also, that the
statement is introduced merely as an adjunct or appendage to the general
doctrine of baptism; not as directly and immediately comprehended under it, any
more than under the general definition given of a sacrament, but as a special
addition to it, resting upon its own distinct and peculiar grounds. This is the
true place which infant baptism occupies; this is the view that ought to be
taken of it; and I am persuaded that it is when contemplated and investigated in
this aspect, that there comes out most distinctly and palpably the sufficiency
of the arguments in favor of it, and the sufficiency of the objections against
it. On this, as on many other subjects, the friends of truth have often injured
their cause, by entering too fully and minutely into explanations of their
doctrines, for the purpose of commending them to men’s acceptance, and solving
the difficulties by which they seemed to be beset. They have thus involved them-
selves in great difficulties, by trying to defend their own minute and
unwarranted explanations, as if they were an essential part of the Scripture
doctrine. It is easy enough to prove from Scripture that the Father is God, that
the Son is God, and that the Holy Ghost is God, and that they are not three
Gods, but one God; but many of the more detailed explanations of the doctrine of
the Trinity which have been given by its friends, have been untenable and
indefensible, and have only laid it open unnecessarily to the attacks of its
enemies. In like manner, we think it no difficult matter to produce from
Scripture sufficient and satisfactory evidence of the position, that the infants
of believing parents are to be baptized; but minute and detailed expositions of
the reasons and the effects of infant baptism are unwarranted by Scripture; they
impose an unnecessary burden upon the friends of truth, and tend only to give an
advantage to its opponents. The condition and fate of infants, and the
principles by which they are determined, have always been subjects on which men,
not un- naturally, have been prone to speculate, but on which Scripture has
given us little explicit information beyond this, that salvation through Christ
is just as accessible to them as to adults. One form in which this tendency to
speculate unwarrantably about infants has been exhibited, is that of inventing
theories about the objects and effects of infant baptism. These theories are
often made to rest as a burden upon the scriptural proof of the lawful- ness and
propriety of the mere practice itself; and thus have the appearance of
communicating to that proof, which is amply sufficient for its own proper
object, their own essential weakness and invalidity.

It is manifest that, from the nature of the ease, the principles that determine
and indicate the objects and effects of baptism in adults and infants, cannot be
altogether the same; and the great difficulty of the whole subject lies in
settling, as far as we can, what modifications our conceptions of baptism should
undergo in the case of infants, as distinguished from that of adults; and, at
the same time, to show that, even with these modifications, the essential and
fundamental ideas involved in the general doctrine ordinarily professed
concerning baptism are still preserved. The investigation even of this point is,
perhaps, going beyond the line of what is strictly necessary for the
establishment of the position, that the infants of believing parents are to be
baptized. But some notice of it can scarcely be avoided in the discussion of the
question. The scriptural evidence, in support of the position that the infants
of believing parents are to be baptized, consists chief in the proof which the
word of God affords, to the following effect: -- that, in the whole history of
our race, God’s covenanted dealings with His people, with respect to spiritual
blessings, have had regard to their children as well as to themselves; so that
the children as well as the parents have been admitted to the spiritual
blessings of God’s covenants, and to the outward signs and seals. of these
covenants; -- that there is no evidence that this general principle, so full of
mercy and grace, and so well fitted to nourish faith and hope, was to be
departed from, or laid aside, under the Christian dispensation; but, on the
contrary, a great deal to con- firm the conviction that it was to continue to be
acted on; -- that the children of believers are capable of receiving, and often
do in fact receive, the blessings of the covenant, justification and
regeneration; and are therefore -- unless there be some very ex- press
prohibition, either by general principle or specific statement -- admissible and
entitled to the outward sign and seal of these blessings; -- that there is a
federal holiness, as distinguished from a personal holiness, attaching, under
the Christian as well as the Jewish economy, to the children of believing
parents, which affords a sufficient ground for their admission, by an outward
ordinance, into the fellowship of the church; -- and that the com- mission which
our Savior gave to His apostles, and the history we have of the way in which
they exercised this commission, decidedly favor the conclusion, that they
admitted the children of believers along with their parents, and because of
their relation to their parents, into the communion of the church by baptism.
This line of argument, though in some measure inferential, is, we are persuaded,
amply sufficient in cumulo to establish the conclusion, that the children of
believing parents are to be baptized, unless either the leading positions of
which it consists can be satisfactorily proved to have no sanction from
Scripture, or some general position can be established which proves the
incompatibility of infant baptism, either with the character of the Christian
dispensation in general, or with the qualities and properties of the ordinance
of baptism in particular. I do not mean to enter upon the consideration of the
specific scriptural evidence in support of the different positions that
constitute the proof of the lawfulness and propriety of baptizing the children
of believing parents, or of the attempts which have been made to disprove them
singly, and in detail. I can only advert to the general allegation, that infant
baptism is inconsistent with some of the qualities or properties of the
ordinance of baptism, as it is set before us in Scripture.

It is manifestly nothing to the purpose to say, in support of this general
allegation, that baptism in the case of infants cannot be, in all respects, the
same as baptism in the case of adults; or, that we cannot give so full and
specific an account of the objects and effects of infant as of adult baptism.
These positions are certainly both true; but they manifestly concern merely
incidental points, not affecting the root of the matter, and afford no ground
for any such conclusion as the unlawfulness of infant baptism. In the case of
the baptism of adults, we can speak clearly and decidedly as to the general
objects, and the ordinary effects, of the administration of the ordinance. The
adult receiving baptism is either duly qualified and suitably prepared for it,
or he is not. If he is not duly qualified, his baptism is a hypocritical
profession of a state of mind and heart that does not exist; and, of course, it
can do him no good, but must be a sin, and, as such, must expose him to the
divine displeasure. If he is duly qualified and suitably prepared, then his
baptism, though it does not convey to him justification and regeneration, which
he must have before received through faith, impresses upon his mind, through
God’s blessing, their true nature and grounds, and strengthens his faith to
realize more fully his own actual condition, as an unworthy recipient of
unspeakable mercies, and his obligations to live to God’s praise and glory. We
are unable to put any such clear and explicit alternative in the case of the
baptism of infants, or give any very definite account of the way and manner in
which it bears upon or affects them individually. Men have often striven hard in
their speculations to lay down something precise and definite, in the way of
general principle or standard, as to the bearing and effect of baptism in
relation to the great blessings of justification and regeneration in the case of
infants individually. But the Scripture really affords no adequate materials for
doing this; for we have no sufficient warrant for asserting, even in regard to
infants, to whom it is God’s purpose to give at some time justification and
regeneration, that He uniformly or ordinarily gives it to them before or at
their baptism. The discomfort of this state of uncertainty, the difficulty of
laying down any definite doctrine upon this subject, has often led men to adopt
one or other of two opposite extremes, which have the appearance of greater
simplicity and definiteness,-- that is, either to deny the lawfulness of infant
baptism altogether, or to embrace the doctrine of baptismal justification and
regeneration, and to represent all baptized infants, or at least all the
baptized infants of believing parents, as receiving these great blessings in and
with the external ordinances, or as certainly and infallibly to receive them at
some future time. But this is manifestly unreasonable. "True fortitude of
understanding," according to the admirable and well- known saying of Paley,
"consists in not suffering what we do know, to be disturbed by what we do not
know." And assuredly, if there be sufficient scriptural grounds for thinking
that the infants of believing parents are to be baptized, it can be no adequate
ground for rejecting, or even doubting, the truth of this doctrine, that we have
no sufficient materials for laying down any precise or definite proposition of a
general kind as to the effect of baptism in the case of infants individually.
But the leading allegation of the anti-pado-baptists on this department of the
subject is, that it is inconsistent with the nature of baptism, as set before us
in Scripture, that it should be administered to any, except upon the ground of a
previous possession of faith by the person receiving it. If this proposition
could be established, it would, of course, preclude the baptism of infants who
have not faith, and who could not profess it if they had it. We are persuaded
that this proposition cannot be established, though we admit that a good deal
which is plausible can be adduced from Scripture in support of it. It is
admitted that all persons who are in a condition to possess and to profess
faith, must possess and profess it before they can lawfully or safely receive
the ordinance of baptism. This can be easily established from Scripture. It is
admitted, also, that the ordinary tenor of Scripture language concerning baptism
has respect, primarily and principally, to persons in this condition,-- that is,
to adults,-- and that thus a profession of faith is ordinarily associated with
the Scripture notices of the administration of baptism; so that, as has been
explained, we are to regard baptism upon a profession of faith, as exhibiting
the proper type and full development of the ordinance. Had we no other
information bearing upon the subject in Scripture than what has now been
referred to, this might be fairly enough regarded as precluding the baptism of
infants; but in the absence of anything which, directly or by implication,
teaches that this previous profession of faith is of the essence of the
ordinance, and universally necessary to its legitimate administration and
reception, an inference of this sort is not sufficient to neutralize the direct
and positive evidence we have in Scripture in favor of the baptism of infants.
The only thing which seems to be really of the essence of the ordinance in this
respect is, that the parties receiving it are capable of possessing, and have a
federal interest in, the promise of the spiritual blessings which it was
intended to signify and to seal. Now, the blessings which baptism was intended
to signify and seal are justification and regeneration,-- that is, the washing
away of guilt, and the washing away of depravity. These, and these alone, are
the spiritual blessings which the washing with water in the name of the Father,
and the Son, and the Holy Ghost, directly signifies and represents. Faith does
not stand in the same relation to baptism as these blessings do, and for, this
obvious and conclusive reason, that it is not directly and expressly signified
or represented in the external ordinance itself, as they are.

Faith is, indeed, ordinarily, and in the case of all who are capable of it, the
medium or instrument through which these in- dispensable blessings are conveyed;
and there is certainly much better scriptural evidence in support of the
necessity of faith in order to being saved, than in support of the necessity of
a profession of faith in order to being baptized. But yet it is quite certain,
that faith is not universally necessary in order to a right to these blessings,
or to the actual possession of them. It is universally admitted that infants,
though incapable of faith, are capable of salvation, and are actually saved; and
they cannot be saved unless they be justified and regenerated. And since it is
thus certain that infants actually receive the very blessings which baptism
signifies and represents, without the presence of the faith which is necessary
to the possession of these blessings in adults, while yet the Scripture has much
more explicitly connected faith and salvation than it has ever connected faith
and baptism,-- there can be no serious difficulty in the idea of their
admissibility to the outward sign and seal of these blessings, without a
previous profession of faith.

If it be said that something more than a mere capacity of receiving the
blessings which baptism signifies and represents, is necessary to warrant the
administration of it, since the ordinance is, in its general nature and
character, distinguishing, and it is not all infants that are admitted to it --
it is not difficult to show, that not only does the admission of this general
idea, as pertaining to the essence of the doctrine of baptism, not preclude the
baptism of infants, but that we have in their case what is fairly analogous to
the antecedently existing ground, which is the warrant or foundation of the
administration of it to adults. In the case of adults, this antecedent ground or
warrant is their own faith professed; and in the case of the infants of
believing parents, it is their interest in the covenant which, upon scriptural
principles, they possess simply as the children of believing parents,-- the
federal holiness which can be proved to attach to them, in virtue of God’s
arrangements and promises, simply upon the ground of their having been born of
parents who are themselves comprehended in the covenant. If this general
principle can be shown to be sanctioned by Scripture,-- and we have no doubt
that it can be conclusively established,-- then it affords an antecedent ground
or warrant for the admission of the children of believing parents to the
ordinance of baptism analogous to that which exists in believing adults,-- a
ground or warrant the relevancy and validity of which cannot be affected by
anything except a direct and conclusive proof of the absolute and universal
necessity of a profession of faith, as the only sufficient ground or warrant, in
every instance, of the administration of baptism; and no such proof has been, or
can be, produced.

Calvin, in discussing this point, fully admits the necessity of some antecedent
ground or warrant attaching to infants, as the foundation of admitting them to
baptism; but he contends that this is to be found in the scriptural principle of
the interest which the infants of believing parents have, as such, in virtue of
God’s arrangements and promises, in the covenant and its blessings. My chief
object in these observations has been to illustrate the importance of
considering and investigating the subject of infant baptism as a distinct topic,
resting upon its own proper and peculiar grounds,-- of estimating aright its
true relation to the sacraments in general, and to baptism as a whole,-- and of
appreciating justly the real nature and amount of the modifications which it is
necessary to introduce into the mode of stating and defending the general
doctrine as to the objects and effects of baptism, in the case of infants as
distinguished from adults; and I have made them, because I am persuaded that it
is when the subject is viewed in this aspect, that the strength of the arguments
for, and the weakness of the arguments against, infant baptism, come out most
palpably, and that by following this process of investigation we shall be best
preserved from any temptation to corrupt and lower the general doctrines of the
sacraments, -- while at the came time we shall be most fully enabled to show
that infant baptism, with the difficulties which undoubtedly attach to it, and
with the obscurity in which some points connected with it are involved, is
really analogous in its essential features to the baptism of adults, and implies
nothing that is really inconsistent with the view taught as in Scripture with
respect to sacraments and ordinances in general, or with respect to baptism in
particular.


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  CHAPTER 2: S. THE PRINCIPLES OF THE REFORMATION NOT THE CAUSE OF SECTS AND HERESIES
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The Principles of the Reformation not the cause of Sects and Heresies Rev.
William Cunningham, D.D.

Principle and Professor of Divinity and Church History, New College, Edinburgh

There is no more common and favourite allegation of the Papists than that the
history of the Reformed Churches in general has fully established the unsound
and dangerous character of the principles on which the Reformation was based,
and especially of the two great Protestant principles of the right of private
judgment, and of the sufficiency, perfection, and exclusive authority of the
written Word as the rule of faith, the only available external source from which
men’s convictions of truth and duty ought to be derived; and there is no doubt,
that in skimming over the history of the Reformed Churches, they can easily
enough collect materials which enable them to present a picture that seems at
first sight to afford some countenance to the allegation. The topic on which
chiefly they delight to dwell, when discussing this subject, is of course the
number and variety of the different sects that have sprung up among Protestants,
the differences and disputes that have arisen among men who all profess to be
exercising the same right of private judgment, and to be following the same
standard—the written Word. They are fond of stringing together the names of all
the different sects that have sprung up among the Reformed Churches, the most
obscure and insignificant as well as the most numerous and influential (often
swelling the number by misrepresentation and by fabricating sects from the names
of particular individuals, who may have held some peculiar opinions, but who had
few or no followers in their singularities), and then representing the
prevalence of all these sects as the natural and legitimate result and
consequence of the Protestant principles above referred to. This has a plausible
appearance to superficial thinkers, and it is not to be wondered at, that it
should have a considerable influence on the minds of those who have been trained
in the Church of Rome, in prejudicing them against Protestantism, and in
preventing anything like a fair and impartial examination of its claims.

It is, however, no difficult matter to perceive and expose the futility of all
this, when it is seriously and deliberately propounded as an argument. The case
stands thus. The Papists allege that the two great Protestant principles, of the
right of private judgment and of the exclusive authority of the written Word,
are unsound and dangerous; and the chief proof which they adduce of this
position, that on which they most delight to dwell, and that which alone
possesses any plausibility, is, that the history of the Reformed Churches shows,
that the maintenance and application of these principles lead to injurious
consequences, as is evidenced by the multitude of sects which hold opposite
opinions upon many points—a state of things of course involving the prevalence
of a large amount of error or opposition to God’s revealed truth. In dealing
with this allegation, it is proper in the first place to direct attention to the
real nature and import of the main position, and to the standard by which its
truth or falsehood ought to be determined. The main position is, that the
Protestant principles of the right of private judgment and of the exclusive
authority of the written Word are false; and the evidence adduced in support of
this assertion is that the practical tendency and results of them are injurious.
Now we object to proceeding so hastily to a consideration of alleged practical
tendencies and results, and founding so much upon these, without first examining
whether the truth or falsehood of the principles themselves may not be
ascertained more directly and immediately, by an investigation of evidence
directly and properly applicable to this point. Men are very inadequate to judge
fully and certainly of the tendencies of things, and very apt to fall into
mistakes in estimating the relations of cause and effect in complicated
questions; and therefore it is the right and safe course, when we are called
upon to determine upon the truth or soundness of a principle, to examine, first,
the evidence, if there be any, that bears directly upon the question of its
truth and soundness, before we venture to involve ourselves in the uncertainties
of an examination of all its tendencies and results. The truth and soundness of
the principle itself is the main point, and this, when once ascertained, settles
the whole question. A false and unsound principle has, of course, an injurious
tendency, and will certainly produce injurious results; and its falsehood or
unsoundness may often be confirmed and rendered more palpable by a practical
exhibition of these. A true and sound principle, on the other hand, can never
have any injurious tendency, or be in itself the proper cause or source, though
it may be made the occasion, of injurious results; and the injurious results
ascribed to it either stand in no relation to it whatever, or else are to be
regarded as exhibiting only the abuse or perversion of the principle, and not
its natural and legitimate application. If the direct investigation or the truth
of falsehood of the principle propounded, on its own proper merits and evidence,
be attended with much difficulty, and the fair result, after all, seem to be
involved in some uncertainty, then our examination of its alleged tendency and
consequences may be more reasonably allowed to have some weight in affecting the
conclusion; though in general, and in all ordinary cases, the right and safe
course is to begin with examining and making up our minds, if possible, on the
direct and appropriate evidence, and then applying the ascertained truth or
falsehood of the principle itself for enabling us to thread our way through the
often complicated mass of alleged tendencies or results, and especially to
distinguish accurately between what are natural and legitimate consequences, and
what are merely abuses or perversions. These observations are of universal
application. They are, I think, of some practical importance in controversial
discussion; and they admit of being very obviously applied to the subject before
us.

Let it be considered, in the first place, whether or not the Protestant
principles, of the right of private judgment and the exclusive authority of the
written Word, as the rule of faith, are in themselves true and sound, and if
their truth and soundness can be clearly established, then let it be maintained
upon this basis, as of itself sufficient, that the evils which may have arisen
in connection with the application of them, are not to be traced to these
principles as their proper sources or causes, but are to be regarded as
perversions or misapplications of them, as exhibiting only the abuse of the
principles, and not their natural and legitimate application. Now, there need be
no hesitation in asserting that the Protestant principles of the right of
private judgment and the exclusive authority of the written Word, can be
incontrovertibly established, on their own proper evidence, as true and sound,
and that nothing can be adduced against them that has any measure even of
plausibility, except their alleged tendency and consequences. I do not mean to
enter upon anything like a discussion of those topics, but it may be proper to
state briefly their true nature and grounds, as this will be sufficient to show
something of the conclusive character of the evidence on which their truth and
soundness rest, and at the same time, to illustrate the futility of assigning to
these principles any proper tendency to produce, or any causal efficacy in
producing, the evil consequences which Papists commonly ascribe to them. The
Protestant principle of the right of private judgment does certainly not imply,
as Papists commonly represent it, that men have a right to form any opinions
they please, or that they are at liberty to gratify their own caprice and mere
inclination in adopting their religious profession. There is nothing whatever in
the Protestant principle upon this point, which is in the least inconsistent
with the maintenance of these great truths, that men are responsible to God for
all the opinions they form on religious subjects, that they bear guilt by the
adoption of erroneous opinions, that therefore they are bound to conduct all
their inquiries into divine things under a deep sense of their being
responsible, not only for the application of the right means to reach that
truth, but for actually reaching a right result, and that they are bound to
employ all suitable means to attain a clear and certain knowledge of the truth,
with perfect impartiality, with unwearied diligence, and unshrinking
perseverance. All these positions are true in themselves, and of great practical
importance. They are perfectly consistent with the Protestant principle of the
right of private judgment, and they have been maintained by all true
Protestants, and indeed, by all but infidel or semi-infidel rationalists. It is
chiefly by insinuating that the Protestant principle of private judgment
involves or produces a denial of these great truths, that Papists contrive to
excite a prejudice against it, as if it were something very much akin to, or
rather identical with, the infidel notion, that men are not responsible for
their opinions, but may adopt any opinions upon religious subjects they please,
without guilt and without danger. Now, not only does the Protestant principle
afford no countenance to the infidel one, but, on the contrary, there is no
ground on which men’s responsibility for the soundness of their opinions can be
firmly based, or so clearly brought out, as in connection with the Protestant
principle of the right of private judgment. This Protestant principle may be
viewed either negatively or positively. Viewed negatively, it is just a denial
of the right of any man, or body of men, to dictate to me or to any other man,
what we are to believe or to practice in religious matters, so as to impose upon
us an obligation to believe and to practice as they have prescribed, and just
because they have so prescribed. And surely this denial is abundantly warranted,
for it is manifest that such a right to dictate or prescribe can be rationally
based only upon the infallibility of the party claiming it, or at least on his
ability to answer for us, and to bear us scatheless, at the tribunal of Him to
whom we are responsible; and the claims which Papists put forth to such an
infallibility and power, on behalf of councils, Popes, and other ecclesiastical
authorities, rest upon no foundation whatever, and are scarcely worthy of a
serious answer. There is no man or body of men upon earth who can put forth a
claim to a right to dictate or prescribe to others, which has any real
plausibility to rest upon. All such claims, therefore, may be openly and
unhesitatingly denied; and to deny all such claims is just virtually to assert,
that each man must ultimately judge for himself upon his own responsibility—in
the diligent and careful use, indeed, of all the available means of forming a
right judgment, but certainly without receiving the doctrine of any man or body
of men as of itself conclusive in determining what he ought to believe or to do.
Now, this negation of all right to dictate or prescribe to others with
conclusive authority, is just in substance the Protestant principle of the right
of private judgment; and it is not absolutely necessary that any one, in
maintaining that principle, should do more in argument than establish this
negation. The principle, however, may be warrantably and safely regarded in a
somewhat more positive aspect. If no man or body of men has the right to
prescribe to me what I shall believe in religious matters, so that I can
righteously and innocently follow his dictation, then the consequence is
unavoidable, that I must form my opinion for myself—that I have a right to do
so—and am under an obligation to do so—that it is my duty and my privilege to be
“fully persuaded in my own mind,” and to receive nothing as true unless and
until I am myself satisfied, through some competent and legitimate medium of
probation or standard of reference, that it is true. Now, this is all that is
involved in the Protestant principle of the right of private judgment; as thus
explained, it is clearly and incontrovertibly true; and it stands perfectly
clear of all connection, real or apparent, with those infidel or semi-infidel
principles with which Papists labour to confound it. It is indeed, only when
this right, and the corresponding duty—a right, which viewed in relation to the
unfounded claims and pretensions of other men, and a duty, when viewed in
relation to men’s allegiance to God and the promotion of their own best
interests—are duly recognised and acted upon, that men can have any adequate
sense of their responsibility for the formation of right opinions, or will be
likely to use due care and diligence in the use of the right means for the
attaining of truth; and nothing is more certain, and more fully established by
experience, than the tendency of Popery to eradicate from men’s breasts a sense
of personal responsibility, and to lead them to devolve this responsibility upon
others, who have never produced any evidence of their ability to discharge it.
The general substance of these observations applies equally to the other great
Protestant principle to which I have referred—viz., the exclusive authority of
the written Word, as the only standard of faith. The truth and soundness of this
principle can also be clearly and conclusively established—so clearly and
conclusively, indeed, that no apparent injurious tendency, and no alleged
injurious consequences, should in the least shake our convictions on this point.
It, too, as well as the former, may be regarded both in a negative and in a
positive aspect. Viewed negatively, it is just a denial that there is any other
source than the written Word, from which the mind and will of God on matters of
religion can be fully and certainly learned. In this aspect, its truth is to be
established by examining and disposing of the claims of other pretenders to
anything like co-ordinate authority in determining our faith—such as antiquity,
tradition, the consent of the Fathers, the authority of the Church, or the
decrees of Popes and Councils. This examination is not attended with any great
difficulty. The claims of all these pretenders can be disposed of, and disposed
of triumphantly, and the practical result is that we are fully warranted in
maintaining as a principle conclusively established, that there is no other
external source but the written Word, from which we can learn with accuracy and
certainty the mind and will of God. The principle, in the more positive form, is
just the assertion of what Protestants have been accustomed to call the
sufficiency of the written Word in point of fullness and clearness, and its
perfection or completeness as a rule of faith. This may be regarded as a fair
deduction from the principle in its negative form, for if the Bible be the
written Word of God, and there be no other external source from which we can
accurately and certainly learn the mind and will of God, then it follows that
the written Word must have been intended to be the only rule and standard of our
faith, and must have been fitted by its author of the accomplishment of this
object; and these are positions moreover which we can prove to be asserted by
the Bible with regard to itself. The Protestant principle of the exclusive
authority of the written Word no more implies, as Papists commonly assert, that
men may put any interpretation they please upon the statements of Scripture,
than the principle of the right of private judgment implies, that they may adopt
generally any opinions they please. All deference to mere inclination or caprice
is excluded. The true and real meaning of the statements of Scripture as they
stand there is to be ascertained. All means naturally fitted as means to
contribute to the attainment of this end, are to be employed under a deep sense
of responsibility, with perfect impartiality and with unwearied diligence, and
God by the promise of His Spirit has made provision that men, in the due use of
these means, shall attain to a correct knowledge of his revealed will, and shall
not fall into error, except through their own faults; and it is only when these
views are recognised and acted upon, that men can be expected to be duly
solicitous about the adoption of all the means, though the use of which they may
attain a correct knowledge of the meaning of Scripture, and be animated in their
investigation of it by a due sense of their responsibility. The Protestant
principles, then, of the right of private judgment, and of the exclusive
authority of the written Word, as the only source from which the mind and will
of God can be accurately and certainly learned, are clearly and conclusively
established—so clearly and conclusively established upon their own direct and
appropriate evidence, that we are fully warranted in refusing to enter into an
investigation of their alleged tendency and results, for the purpose of
ascertaining from this source whether they are true and sound or not. If the
Papists could produce direct evidence of their falsehood and unsoundness that
was possessed of plausibility, so as to leave the controversy upon this point
doubtful, they might have some fair ground for challenging us to a discussion
upon their alleged tendency and consequences. But when the direct evidence of
their truth is so satisfactory, and when all that has been adduced on the other
side is so weak and frivolous, we are entitled to take our stand upon their
proved truth and soundness, and to maintain as a position necessarily involved
in this, that any injurious consequences which have been ascribed to their
operations, are not their natural and legitimate results, but arise from the
perversion or misapplication of them. But though we are fully entitled, upon the
grounds which have been explained, to dispose in this way of the common Popish
allegation as to the conclusion deducible from the history of the Reformed
Churches, and though it is important that we should ever remember, that in all
discussions of this sort, with whomsoever conducted, the primary question is,
are the principles themselves true and sound, or are they not?—yet we do not
need to shrink from a direct investigation of the tendency and results of the
principles under consideration, and we can at least easily show, that nothing
can be proved to have resulted from them, which in right reason should lead us
to entertain any doubt either of their being true and sound, or of their being
safe and salutary; or, in other words, the evils which have been ascribed to
their operation, cannot be shown to be their natural and legitimate
consequences, but rather can be shown to be traceable to other principles which
may have been held by some Protestants along with them, but with which they have
no natural or necessary connection. If men calling themselves, or called by
others, Protestants, probably upon no other or better ground than merely that
they were not Papists, have openly professed, or have acted as if they believed,
that it was of little or no importance what opinions they held upon religious
subjects, provided they were sincere; or if they have allowed their opinions to
be formed merely by the outward circumstances in which they were placed, or the
influences to which they were subjected, without being at the pains to ascertain
what was the right standard, and to follow it steadily and faithfully; or if
they have sought fame and distinction by indulging in paradoxes, or by
propounding what they expected to excite the surprise, and perhaps to shock the
feelings of others; or if they have in any measure regulated their professed
opinions by a regard to personal and selfish objects, or by mere whim and
caprice—assuredly in these cases the Protestant principle of the right and duty
of private judgment was not responsible for the errors into which they fell.
They were not applying this principle in a right and legitimate way, but were
abusing or perverting it under the sway of sinful principles and motives, which
they cherished and indulged in place of mortifying and subduing. These sinful
motives, these corrupt influences, were the true and real sources of the evils
and the errors, and not the true and sound principle which these views led them
to misapply and pervert. In like manner it is very easy to point out, in
surveying the history of the Church, mistakes, errors, and sins in the mode in
which the Scriptures have been read and applied; and these ought to be regarded
as the true sources or causes of the errors into which men have fallen in the
interpretation of the Bible, and not the true and sound general principle, that
the written Word is the only authentic standard of faith and practice.
Independently of those directly sinful motives and influences to which we
adverted under the former head, as perverting men in the exercise of the right
or the discharge of the duty of private judgment, and which have also operated
largely in the perversion of the interpretation of Scripture, it has been very
common for men, while professing to be searching into the meaning of the Word of
God, to bring their own preconceived notions and fancies to the Scriptures, and
to labour to procure for them some countenance from that quarter, instead of
really drawing their opinions from Scripture by an impartial and conscientious
investigation of the meaning and import of its statements. It has been no
uncommon thing for men to engage in the work of interpreting Scripture in a
light and frivolous or in a merely controversial, spirit, without any adequate
sense of their obligation to investigate carefully its true meaning, and it
submit implicitly to its authority. Many have entered upon this work while they
had erroneous and defective notions of the principles by which it ought to be
conducted, and while they are very scantily furnished with those resources and
appliances, which are manifestly useful, if not indispensable, as means to aid
and assist in the interpretation of such a book as the Bible is. Many have
professed to interpret the Bible without any sense of the necessity of the
promised agency of the Spirit to guide them into all truth, a principle true in
itself, and always maintained by the Reformers and by all their genuine
followers, as a necessary part of their whole doctrine in regard to the rule of
faith; and being involved in ignorance or error upon this important point, they
have failed to plead the promise of the Spirit, to realise their dependence upon
his agency, and to seek his guidance; and on this account, or from this cause,
they have fallen into great and dangerous error.

These things are the true causes, the legitimate and satisfactory explanations,
of a large portion of the errors which have been broached by men who professed
to be acting upon the Protestant principle of using the Bible as the only
standard of faith. They are not involved in that principle, or fairly and
naturally deducible from it. They are not exhibitions of its legitimate
application; on the contrary, they are abuses and perversions for which the
principle itself is in no way responsible. They are to be traced not to the
natural and legitimate operation of the principle, but to a failure to follow it
out fully and fairly, or to the operation of errors and perverting influences
which have no natural or necessary connection with it, but which being de facto
combined with it in the same persons, have been the real causes of the evils
which are unwarrantably ascribed to it.

Even, when we cannot distinctly and specifically trace the errors into which men
have fallen in the interpretation of the Bible, to these or to any other abuses
or misapplications of the Protestant principle—to these or to any similar errors
or perverting influences which have de facto accompanied its application, we are
still entitled to maintain the general position, that this principle, rightly
used and applied, is not the proper cause or source of error in the
interpretation of Scripture, inasmuch as we might contend, that in an strict and
proper sense the principle is then only rightly used and applied when the true
and real meaning of the Scripture is correctly brought out. The principle,
viewed in its tendency and practical bearing, and laying out of view its
established truth and soundness, cannot be shown to involve or to bring into
operation any source or cause of error, or to exert any influence directly or
indirectly in producing it. It simply asserts, that the truth of God is
accurately and certainly set forth in the statements of Scripture and nowhere
else, and on this ground directs men to go to the Bible, and to labour in the
use of all appropriate means to ascertain its meaning, assuring them at the same
time, that by the right use of the right means they will attain this end, and
will not fail of it except through their own fault. There the principle stops,
its influence and application go no further.

These two great questions, what is the only authentic source of the knowledge of
divine things; and 2nd, what are the true and correct views of divine things
derived from this source are perfectly distinct from each other, and should
never be intermingled or confounded together. Men may be agreed in regard to the
first, who differ widely in regard to the second. Each of these questions should
be answered and disposed of upon its own proper grounds. If a man, who agrees
with me upon the first question, differs from me upon the second, that is surely
no reason why I should renounce the principle of the exclusive authority of
Scripture as the only rule of faith—a principle which we hold in common, but
only a reason why I should attempt to convince him, in the use of all legitimate
and appropriate means, that he has made a wrong use, or application of the
principle, and that from some cause or other he has mistaken the true meaning
and import of Scripture statements. It is true that I have no right to dictate
or prescribe authoritatively to him what he is to receive as the true and real
meaning of Scripture, any more than he has to dictate or prescribe to me; but
the want of any such right to dictate is in no way inconsistent with the
doctrines, that the Bible is the only standard of faith, that all its statements
are true, that these statements have a certain definite meaning, and that that
meaning may be ascertained. It may be true, that I cannot lay my hand upon the
motives or influences which have led him astray in the interpretation of
Scripture, but such motives or influences may have been in operation, though the
Searcher of hearts may have reserved the judgment of them to his own tribunal.
Experience, indeed, proves that it is no easy matter to convince men, that the
views which they may have formed of the meaning of Scripture are erroneous, and
may suggest the apprehension, that controversies and errors upon religious
subjects are not likely to be soon brought to an end, without some special
enlightening and sanctifying influence from on high; but this only proves, that
it was not the plan of God’s wisdom so to fashion and form His Word, or so to
regulate in other respects the communication of his gifts and benefits, as to
secure that all men who have the Bible in their hands, and who profess to be
searching into its meaning, should be preserved from all error, and guided into
all truth, while it affords no presumption, that he has established any other
means, or made any more effectual provision for securing this end, and while it
is important to observe that the provisions for effecting this, which the Church
of Rome ascribes to the all-wise God, besides being wholly unsanctioned by Him,
have in point of fact just as much failed in accomplishing it as the Bible,
regarded and treated in the way in which Protestant principle represents it. The
great Protestant principles, then, of the right and duty of private judgment,
and of the exclusive authority of the written Word, are undoubtedly true and
sound in themselves, liable to no objection that is possessed of plausibility;
and therefore they cannot be the direct and proper causes of schisms and
heresies. Much error, indeed, has been taught by many who professed to hold and
to act upon these principles; but it is easy to show that they are not
responsible for the errors which have been ascribed to them, and that the errors
are really traceable to the abuse or perversion of them. These considerations
should convince us of the utter futility of the common Popish allegation,
professedly founded upon a survey of the history of the Reformed Church, viz.,
that these principles are the true causes or sources of the errors and heresies
which have sprung up and still exist; and while they should warn us of the
numerous and varied sources of error to which we are exposed in the
investigation of divine things, and in the interpretation of the sacred
Scriptures, and constrain us to be most diligent and faithful in the use of all
the means by which these dangers may be averted, and the whole truth of God may
be secure and held fast, they should just lead us to cleave more closely to the
written Word, to take it as the only light unto our feet, to study it under a
deeper sense of our responsibility for ascertaining its true meaning, and
especially to abound more in prayer, that God would give us His Spirit to
preserve us from all error, and to guide us into all truth. But while it is easy
enough to show, as a mere matter of logic or dialectics, that the Popish
argument which we have been considering is destitute of all real weight, and
that the only fair result of an impartial examination of the whole subject, must
be to confirm us in our conviction of the certain truth of the great principles
of the Reformation, and to impress us at the same time with a deeper sense of
our responsibility for applying them rightly, so as to bring out a true and
accurate result, yet it should not be forgotten, that practically, and in point
of fact, the schisms and heresies which have sprung up among Protestants have
done a great deal to injure the cause of the Reformation, and to strengthen the
hold of the Church of Rome on the minds of her votaries. The Romanists are well
aware of the practical influence of this consideration, and take care to turn it
to good account. One of the most eminent Popish controversialists of the present
day—M. Malou, formerly Professor of Theology in Louvain, and now Bishop of
Bruges—goes so far as to say, that the reason why the ecclesiastical authorities
think it safe to allow the Romanists a much greater indulgence in regard to
reading the sacred Scriptures, in Great Britain and the United States than in
Popish countries, is, because the contentions and divisions among Protestants
more than neutralise any mischief which the reading of the Scriptures might
produce, and prove a powerful and permanent preservative against error. (La
Lecture de la Sainte Bible on langue Vulgaire, par J. B. Malou, Louvain, 1846.
Tom. i. p. 69; tom. ii. p. 277.) There may be some bluster and insincerity in
this allegation. But the fact that such an allegation was openly made, is well
fitted to impress, and to fix our attention upon one great source of Protestant
weakness and Popish strength. It is well fitted, not only to remind us of the
responsibility connected with the formation of all our opinions upon religious
subjects, but also to constrain us to have it for a great object of desire, and
prayer, and effort—first, that all who profess to take God’s Word as their rule
and standard should, as far as possible, be of one mind and of one heart; and
second, where this cannot in the meantime be accomplished, that the unity of
mind and heart—the oneness both in judgment and in affection, which really does
exist among all true Protestants, and especially upon the most essential topics
bearing upon the answer to the question, “What must I do to be saved?” should be
openly and consistently proclaimed, should be publicly and palpably exhibited,
and should, so far as may be practicable, be embodied in united and strenuous
efforts in opposing the great adversary, and in advancing the cause and the
kingdom of their one common Lord and Master.


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Source: https://sermonindex.net/books/writings-of-william-cunningham/
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