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  WRITINGS OF JACOBUS ARMINIUS
  by Jacobus Arminius
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A collection of theological writings, sermons, and essays by Jacobus Arminius,
compiled for study and devotional reading.

  Chapters: 10

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  TABLE OF CONTENTS
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    1. S. Assurance of Salvation
    2. S. Divinity of the Son of God
    3. S. Free-Will of Man
    4. S. Grace of God
    5. S. Justification of Man Before God
    6. S. Nine Questions
    7. S. Perfection of Believers in This Life
    8. S. Perseverance of the Saints
    9. S. Providence Of God
   10. S. Revision of the Dutch Confession & Heidelberg

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  CHAPTER 1: S. ASSURANCE OF SALVATION
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The Assurance of Salvation By Jacobus Arminius With regard to the certainty [or
assurance] of salvation, my opinion is, that it is possible for him who believes
in Jesus Christ to be certain and persuaded, and, if his heart condemn him not,
he is now in reality assured, that he is a son of God, and stands in the grace
of Jesus Christ. Such a certainty is wrought in the mind, as well by the action
of the Holy Spirit inwardly actuating the believer and by the fruits of faith,
as from his own conscience, and the testimony of God’s Spirit witnessing
together with his conscience. I also believe, that it is possible for such a
person, with an assured confidence in the grace of God and his mercy in Christ,
to depart out of this life, and to appear before the throne of grace, without
any anxious fear or terrific dread: and yet this person should constantly pray,
"O lord, enter not into judgment with thy servant!"

But, since "God is greater than our hearts, and knoweth all things," and since a
man judges not his own self--yea, though a man know nothing by himself, yet is
he not thereby justified, but he who judgeth him is the Lord, (1 John 3:19; 1
Corinthians 4:3) I dare not [on this account] place this assurance [or
certainty] on an equality with that by which we know there is a God, and that
Christ is the saviour of the world. Yet it will be proper to make the extent of
the boundaries of this assurance, a subject of inquiry in our convention.


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  CHAPTER 2: S. DIVINITY OF THE SON OF GOD
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The Divinity of the Son of God By Jacobus Arminius With regard to the Divinity
of the Son of God and the word autoqeov both of which have been discussed in our
University in the regular form of scholastic disputations, I cannot sufficiently
wonder what the motive can be, which has created a wish in some persons to
render me suspected to other men, or to make me an object of suspicion to
themselves. This is still more wonderful, since this suspicion has not the least
ground of probability on which to rest, and is at such an immense distance from
all reason and truth, that, whatever reports have been spread abroad respecting
this affair to the prejudice of my character, they can be called nothing better
than "notorious calumnies." At a disputation held one afternoon in the
University, when the thesis that had been proposed for disputation was the
Divinity of the Son of God, one of the students happened to object, "that the
Son of God was autotheos, and that he therefore had his essence from himself and
not from the Father." In reply to this I observed, "that the word autotheos was
capable of two different acceptations, since it might signify either "one who is
truly God," or "one who is God of himself;" and that it was with great propriety
and correctness attributed to the Son of God according to the former
signification, but not according to the latter." The student, in prosecution of
his argument, violently contended, that the word was justly applicable to the
Son of God, principally according to the second of these significations: and
that the essence of the Father could not be said to be communicated to the Son
and to the Holy Spirit, in any other than in an improper sense; but that it was
in perfect correctness and strict propriety common alike to the Father, the Son,
and the Holy Ghost." He added "that he asserted this with the greater confidence
because he had the younger Trelcatius of pious memory, [but who was then
living,] as an authority in his favour on this point; for that learned Professor
had written to the same purport in his Common Places." To these observations I
answered, "that this opinion was at variance with the word of God, and with the
whole of the ancient Church, both Greek and Latin, which had always taught, that
the Son had His Deity from the Father by eternal generation." To these remarks I
subjoined, "that from such an opinion as this, necessarily followed the two
mutually conflicting errors, Tri-theism and Sabellianism; that is, (1.) It would
ensue as a necessary consequence, from these premises, that there are three
Gods, who have together and collaterally the Divine essence, independently of
this circumstance--that one of them (being only personally distinguished from
the rest) has that essence from another of the persons. Yet the proceeding of
the origin of one person from another, (that is, of the Son from the Father,) is
the only foundation that has ever been used for defending the Unity of the
Divine Essence in the Trinity of Persons. (2.) It would likewise follow as
another consequence, that the Son would himself be the Father, because he would
differ from the Father in nothing but in regard to name, which was the opinion
of Sabellius. For, since it is peculiar to the Father to derive his Deity from
himself, or (to speak more correctly,) to derive it from no one, if, in the
sense of being "God of himself," the Son be called autotheos, it follows that he
is the Father." Some account of this disputation was dispersed abroad in all
directions, and it reached Amsterdam. A minister of that city, who now rests in
the Lord, having interrogated me respecting the real state of this affair, I
related the whole of it to him plainly, as I have now done: and I requested him
to make Trelcatius of blessed memory acquainted with it as it had actually
occurred, and to advise him in a friendly manner to amend his opinion, and to
correct those inappropriate words in his Common Places: this request the
minister from Amsterdam engaged to fulfill in his own way. In all this
proceeding I am far from being liable to any blame; for I have defended the
truth and the sentiments of the Catholic and Orthodox Church. Trelcatius
undoubtedly was the person most open to animadversion; for he adopted a mode of
speaking which detracted somewhat from the truth of the matter. But such has
always been either my own infelicity or the zeal of certain individuals that, as
soon as any disagreement arises, all the blame is instantly cast upon me, as if
it was impossible for me to display as much veracity [or orthodoxy] as any other
person. Yet on this subject I have Gomarus himself consenting with me; for, soon
after Trelcatius had published his common places, a disputation on the Trinity
having been proposed in the University, Gomarus did in three several parts of
his theses express himself in such terms as were diametrically opposed to those
of Trelcatius. The very obvious difference in opinion between those two
Professors I pointed out to the Amsterdam minister, who acknowledged its
existence. Yet, notwithstanding all these things, no one endeavoured to
vindicate me from this calumny; while great exertion was employed to frame
excuses for Trelcatius, by means of a qualified interpretation of his words,
though it was utterly impossible to reconcile their palliative explanations with
the plain signification of his unperverted expressions. Such are the effects
which the partiality of favour and the fervour of zeal can produce! The milder
and qualified interpretation put upon the words of Trelcatius, was the
following: "the Son of God may be styled autotheos, or may be said to have his
Deity from himself, in reference to his being God, although he has his Deity
from the Father, in reference to his being the Son." For the sake of a larger
explanation, it is said, "God, or the Divine Essence, may be considered both
absolutely and relatively. When regarded absolutely, the Son has his Divine
essence from himself; but, when viewed relatively, he derives it from the
Father." But these are new modes of speaking and novel opinions, and such as can
by no means consist together. For the Son, both in regard to his being the Son,
and to his being God, derives his Deity from the Father. When he is called God,
it is then only not expressed that he is from the Father; which derivation is
particularly noted when the word Son is employed. Indeed, the essence of God can
in no manner come under our consideration, except it be said, "that the Divine
Essence is communicated to the Son by the Father." Nor can it possibly in any
different respect whatever be said, that this essence is both "communicated to
him" and "not communicated;" because these expressions are contradictory, and
can in no diverse respect be reconciled to each other. If the Son have the
Divine Essence from himself in reference to its being absolutely considered, it
cannot be communicated to him. If it be communicated to him in reference to its
being relatively considered, he cannot have it from himself in reference to its
being absolutely considered.

I shall probably be asked, "do you not acknowledge, that, to be the Son of God,
and to be God, are two things entirely distinct from each other?" I reply,
undoubtedly I subscribe to such distinction. But when those who make it proceed
still further, and say, "since to be the Son of God signifies that he derives
his essence from the Father, to be God in like manner signifies nothing less
than that he has his essence from himself or from no one;" I deny this
assertion, and declare, at the same time, that it is a great and manifest error,
not only in sacred theology, but likewise in natural philosophy. For, these two
things, to be the Son and to be God, are at perfect agreement with each other;
but to derive his essence from the Father, and, at the same time, to derive it
from no one, are evidently contradictor, and mutually destructive the one of the
other.

But, to make this fallacy still more apparent, it must be observed, how equal in
force and import are certain double ternary and parallel propositions, when
standing in the following juxta-position:

God is from eternity, possessing the Divine Essence from eternity. The Father is
from no one, having the Divine Essence from no one. The Son is from the Father,
having the Divine Essence from the Father. The word "God" therefore signifies,
that He has the true Divine Essence; but the word "Son" signifies, that he has
the Divine Essence from the Father. On this account, he is correctly denominated
both God and the Son of God. But since he cannot be styled the Father, he cannot
possibly be said to have the Divine Essence from himself or from no one. Yet
much labour is devoted to the purpose of excusing these expressions, by saying,
"that when the son of God in reference to his being God is said to have his
essence from that form of speech signifies nothing more, than that the Divine
essence is not derived from any one." But if this be thought to be the most
proper mode of action which should be adopted, there will be no depraved or
erroneous sentiment which can be uttered that may not thus find a ready excuse.
For though God and the divine Essence do not differ substantially, yet whatever
may be predicated of the Divine Essence can by no means be equally predicated of
God; because they are distinguished from each other in our mode of framing
conceptions, according to which mode all forms of speech ought to be examined,
since they are employed only with a design that through them we should receive
correct impressions. This is very obvious from the following examples, in which
we speak with perfect correctness when we say, "Deum mortuum esse," and "the
Essence of God is communicated;" but very incorrectly when we say, "God is
communicated." That man who understands the difference existing between concrete
and abstract, about which there were such frequent disputes between us and the
Lutherans will easily perceive what a number of absurdities will ensue, if
explanations of this description be once tolerated in the Church of God.
Therefore, in no way whatever can this phrase, "the Son of God is autotheos,"
["God of himself," or "in his own right,"] be excused as a correct one, or as
having been happily expressed. Nor can that be called a proper form of speech
which says, "the Essence of God is common to three persons;" but it is improper,
since the Divine Essence is declared to be communicated by one of them to
another. The observations which I now make, I wish to be particularly regarded,
because it may appear from them how much we are capable of tolerating in a man
whom we do not suspect of heresy; and, on the contrary, with what avidity we
seize upon any trivial circumstance by which we may inculpate another man whom
we hold under the ban of suspicion. Of such partiality, this incident affords
two manifest examples.


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  CHAPTER 3: S. FREE-WILL OF MAN
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The Free-Will of Man By Jacobus Arminius This is my opinion concerning the
free-will of man: In his primitive condition as he came out of the hands of his
creator, man was endowed with such a portion of knowledge, holiness and power,
as enabled him to understand, esteem, consider, will, and to perform the true
good, according to the commandment delivered to him. Yet none of these acts
could he do, except through the assistance of Divine Grace. But in his lapsed
and sinful state, man is not capable, of and by himself, either to think, to
will, or to do that which is really good; but it is necessary for him to be
regenerated and renewed in his intellect, affections or will, and in all his
powers, by God in Christ through the Holy Spirit, that he may be qualified
rightly to understand, esteem, consider, will, and perform whatever is truly
good. When he is made a partaker of this regeneration or renovation, I consider
that, since he is delivered from sin, he is capable of thinking, willing and
doing that which is good, but yet not without the continued aids of Divine
Grace.


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  CHAPTER 4: S. GRACE OF GOD
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The Grace of God By Jacobus Arminius In reference to Divine Grace, I believe, 1.
It is a gratuitous affection by which God is kindly affected towards a miserable
sinner, and according to which he, in the first place, gives his Son, "that
whosoever believers in him might have eternal life," and, afterwards, he
justifies him in Christ Jesus and for his sake, and adopts him into the right of
sons, unto salvation. 2. It is an infusion (both into the human understanding
and into the will and affections,) of all those gifts of the Holy Spirit which
appertain to the regeneration and renewing of man--such as faith, hope, charity,
&c.; for, without these gracious gifts, man is not sufficient to think, will, or
do any thing that is good. 3. It is that perpetual assistance and continued aid
of the Holy Spirit, according to which He acts upon and excites to good the man
who has been already renewed, by infusing into him salutary cogitations, and by
inspiring him with good desires, that he may thus actually will whatever is
good; and according to which God may then will and work together with man, that
man may perform whatever he wills. In this manner, I ascribe to grace the
commencement, the continuance and the consummation of all good, and to such an
extent do I carry its influence, that a man, though already regenerate, can
neither conceive, will, nor do any good at all, nor resist any evil temptation,
without this preventing and exciting, this following and co-operating grace.
From this statement it will clearly appear, that I by no means do injustice to
grace, by attributing, as it is reported of me, too much to man’s free-will. For
the whole controversy reduces itself to the solution of this question, "is the
grace of God a certain irresistible force?" That is, the controversy does not
relate to those actions or operations which may be ascribed to grace, (for I
acknowledge and inculcate as many of these actions or operations as any man ever
did,) but it relates solely to the mode of operation, whether it be irresistible
or not. With respect to which, I believe, according to the scriptures, that many
persons resist the Holy Spirit and reject the grace that is offered.


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  CHAPTER 5: S. JUSTIFICATION OF MAN BEFORE GOD
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The Justification of Man Before God By Jacobus Arminius

I am not conscious to myself, of having taught or entertained any other
sentiments concerning the justification of man before God, than those which are
held unanimously by the Reformed and Protestant Churches, and which are in
complete agreement with their expressed opinions.

There was lately a short controversy in relation to this subject, between John
Piscator, Professor of Divinity in the University of Herborn in Nassau, and the
French Churches. It consisted in the determination of these two questions: (1.)
"is the obedience or righteousness of Christ, which is imputed to believers and
in which consists their righteousness before God, is this only the passive
obedience of Christ?" which was Piscator’s opinion. Or (2.) "is it not, in
addition to this, that active righteousness of Christ which he exhibited to the
law of God in the whole course of his life, and that holiness in which he was
conceived?" Which was the opinion of the French Churches. But I never durst
mingle myself with the dispute, or undertake to decide it; for I thought it
possible for the Professors of the same religion to hold different opinions on
this point from others of their brethren, without any breach of Christian peace
or the unity of faith. Similar peaceful thoughts appear to have been indulged by
both the adverse parties in this dispute; for they exercised a friendly
toleration towards each other, and did not make that a reason for mutually
renouncing their fraternal concord. But concerning such an amicable plan of
adjusting differences, certain individuals in our own country are of a different
judgment. A question has been raised from these words of the Apostle Paul:
"Faith is imputed for righteousness." (Romans 4:22) The inquiry was, (1.)
Whether those expressions ought to be properly understood, "so that faith
itself, as an act performed according to the command of the gospel, is imputed
before God for or unto righteousness--and that of grace; since it is not the
righteousness of the law." (2.) Whether they ought to be figuratively and
improperly understood, "that the righteousness of Christ, being apprehended by
faith, is imputed to us for righteousness." Or (3.) Whether it is to be
understood "that the righteousness, for which, or unto which, faith is imputed,
is the instrumental operation of faith;" which is asserted by some persons. In
the theses on justification, which were disputed under me when I was moderator,
I have adopted the former of these opinions not in a rigid manner, but simply,
as I have likewise done in another passage which I wrote in a particular letter.
It is on this ground that I am accounted to hold and to teach unsound opinions
concerning the justification of man before God. But how unfounded such a
supposition is, will be very evident at a proper season, and in a mutual
conference. For the present, I will only briefly say, "I believe that sinners
are accounted righteous solely by the obedience of Christ; and that the
righteousness of Christ is the only meritorious cause on account of which God
pardons the sins of believers and reckons them as righteous as if they had
perfectly fulfilled the law. But since God imputes the righteousness of Christ
to none except believers, I conclude that, in this sense, it may be well and
properly said, to a man who believes, faith is imputed for righteousness through
grace, because God hath set forth his Son, Jesus Christ, to be a propitiation, a
throne of grace, [or mercy seat] through faith in his blood." Whatever
interpretation may be put upon these expressions, none of our Divines blames
Calvin or considers him to be heterodox on this point; yet my opinion is not so
widely different from his as to prevent me from employing the signature of my
own hand in subscribing to those things which he has delivered on this subject,
in the third book of his Institutes; this I am prepared to do at any time, and
to give them my full approval. Most noble and potent Lords, these are the
principal articles, respecting which I have judged it necessary to declare my
opinion before this august meeting, in obedience to your commands.


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  CHAPTER 6: S. NINE QUESTIONS
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Nine Questions By Jacobus Arminius

Exhibited, by the Deputies of the Synod, to Their Lordships the Curators of the
University of Leyden, for the Purpose of Obtaining an Answer to each of them
from the Professors of Divinity; and the Replies which James Arminius Gave to
them, in November, 1605. With Other Nine Opposite Questions THE NINE
QUESTIONS...AND NINE OPPOSITE QUESTIONS I. Which is first, Election, or Faith
Truly Foreseen, so that God elected his people according to faith foreseen?

I. Is the decree "for bestowing Faith on any one," previous to that by which is
appointed "the Necessity of Faith to salvation?"

ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION The equivocation in the word "Election," makes it
impossible to answer this question in any other manner, than by distinction. If
therefore "Election" denotes "the decree which is according to election
concerning the justification and salvation of believers." I say Election is
prior to Faith, as being that by which Faith is appointed as the means of
obtaining salvation. But if it signifies "the decree by which God determines to
bestow salvation on some one," then Faith foreseen is prior to Election. For as
believers alone are saved, so only believers are predestinated to salvation. But
the Scriptures know no Election, by which God precisely and absolutely has
determined to save anyone without having first considered him as a believer. For
such an Election would be at variance with the decree by which he hath
determined to save none but believers.

QUESTION AND..... QUESTION REVERSED

II. If it be said, "that God, by his eternal decree, has determined and governs
all things and every thing, even the depraved wills of men, to appointed good
ends," does it follow from this, that God is the author of sin?

II. Is "to determine or direct all things and every thing, even the depraved
wills of men, to appointed good ends," the same thing as "to determine that man
be made corrupt, by which a way may be opened for executing God’s absolute
decree concerning damning some men through wrath, and saving others through
mercy?"

ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION

Sin is the transgression of the law; therefore, God will be the author of sin,
if He cause any man to transgress the law. This is done by denying or taking
away what is necessary for fulfilling the law, or by impelling men to sin. But
if this "determination" be that of a will which is already depraved, since it
does not signify the denying or the removing of grace nor a corrupt impelling to
sin, it follows, that the consequence of this cannot be that God is the author
of sin. But if this "determination" denote the decree of God by which He
resolved that the will should become depraved, and that man should commit sin,
then it follows from this that God is the author of sin.

QUESTION AND.....QUESTION REVERSED

III. Does original sin, of itself, render man obnoxious to eternal death, even
without the addition of any actual sin? Or is the guilt of original sin taken
away from all and every one by the benefits of Christ the Mediator?

III. If some men are condemned solely on account of the sin committed by Adam,
and others on account of their rejection of the Gospel, are there not two
peremptory decrees concerning the damnation of men, and two judgments, one
Legal, the other Evangelical?

ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION

Those things which in this question are placed in opposition to each other,
easily agree together. For original sin can render man obnoxious to eternal
death, and its guilt can be taken away from all men by Christ. Indeed, in order
that guilt may be removed, it is necessary that men be previously rendered
guilty. But to reply to each part separately: It is perversely said, that
"original sin renders a man obnoxious to death," since that sin is the
punishment of Adam’s actual sin, which punishment is preceded by guilt, that is,
an obligation to the punishment denounced by the law. With regard to the second
member of the question, it is very easily answered by the distinction of the
soliciting, obtaining, and the application of the benefits of Christ. For as a
participation of Christ’s benefits consists in faith alone, it follows that, if
among these benefits "deliverance from this guilt" be one, believers only are
delivered from it, since they are those upon whom the wrath of God does not
abide.

QUESTION AND.....QUESTION REVERSED

IV. Are the works of the unregenerate, which proceed from the powers of nature,
so pleasing to God, as to induce Him on account of them to confer supernatural
and saving grace on those who perform them?

IV. Are a serious consciousness of sin, and an initial fear so pleasing to God,
that by them He is induced to forgive sins, and to create a filial fear?

ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION

Christ says, "To him that hath shall be given, and from him that hath not shall
be taken away even that which he hath." Not, indeed, because such is the
worthiness and the excellence of the use of any blessing conferred by God,
either according to nature or to grace, that God should be moved by its merits
to confer greater benefits; but, because such are the benignity and liberality
of God, that, though these works are unworthy, yet He rewards them with a larger
blessing. Therefore, as the word "pleasing" admits of two meanings, we can reply
to the question proposed in two ways - - either affirmatively, if that word be
viewed as signifying "to please," "to find favour in his eyes," and "to obtain
complacency for itself;" or negatively if "placeo" be received for that which it
also signifies, "to please by its own excellence." Yet it might be said, that
good works are rewarded, in a moral view, not so much through the powers of
nature, as by some operation in them of the Holy Spirit.

QUESTION AND.....QUESTION REVERSED

V. Can God now, in his own right, require faith from fallen man in Christ, which
he cannot have of himself? But does God bestow on all and every one, to whom the
Gospel is preached, sufficient grace by which they may believe, if they will?

V. Can God require that man to believe in Jesus Christ, for whom He has
determined by an absolute decree that Christ should not die, and to whom by the
same decree He has determined to refuse the grace necessary for believing?

ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION The parts of this question are not opposed to each
other; on the contrary, they are at the most perfect agreement. So that the
latter clause may be considered the rendering of a reason, why God may require
from fallen man faith in Christ, which he cannot have of himself. For God may
require this, since he has determined to bestow on man sufficient grace by which
he may believe. Perhaps, therefore, the question may be thus corrected: "Can
God, now, in his own right, demand from fallen man faith in Christ, which he
cannot have of himself, though God neither bestows on him, nor is ready to
bestow, sufficient grace by which he may believe?" This question will be
answered by a direct negative. God cannot by any right demand from fallen man
faith in Christ, which he cannot have of himself, except God has either
bestowed, or is ready to bestow, sufficient grace by which he may believe if he
will. Nor do I perceive what is false in that reply, or to what heresy it has
affinity. It has no alliance with the Pelagian heresy: for Pelagius maintained,
that with the exception of the preaching of the Gospel, no internal grace is
required to produce faith in the minds of men. But what is of more consequence,
this reply is not opposed to St. Augustine’s doctrine of Predestination; "yet
this doctrine of his, we do not account it necessary to establish," as Innocent,
the Roman Pontiff, has observed.

QUESTION AND.....QUESTION REVERSED

VI. Is justifying faith the effect and the mere gift of God alone, who calls,
illuminates, and reforms the will? and is it peculiar to the elect alone from
all eternity?

VI. Can that be called a mere gift which, though offered by the pure liberality
of Him who makes the offer, is still capable of being rejected by him to whom it
is offered? But does a voluntary acceptance render it unworthy of the name of a
gift? It may likewise be asked, "Is faith bestowed on these who are to be saved?
Or is salvation bestowed on those who have faith?" Or can both these questions
be answered affirmatively in a different respect? If they can, how is it then
that there is not in those decrees a circle, in which nothing is first and
nothing last?

ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION A double question requires a double answer. (1.) To the
first I reply, Faith is the effect of God illuminating the mind and sealing the
heart, and it is his mere gift. (2.) To the second I answer, by making a
distinction in the word Election. If it be understood as signifying Election to
salvation; since this, according to the scriptures, is the election of
believers, it cannot be said, "Faith is bestowed on the elect, or on those who
are to be saved," but that "believers are elected and saved." But if it be
received for the decree by which God determines variously to administer the
means necessary to salvation; in this sense I say that Faith is the gift of God,
which is conferred on those only whom He hath chosen to this, that they may hear
the word of God, and be made partakers of the Holy Spirit.

QUESTION AND.....QUESTION REVERSED

VII. May every one who is a true believer be assured in this life of his
individual salvation; and is it his duty to have this assurance?

VII. Does justifying faith precede, in the order of nature, remission of sins,
or does it not? And can any man be bound to any other faith than that which
justifies?

ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION

Since God promises eternal life to all who believe in Christ, it is impossible
for him who believes, and who knows that he believes, to doubt of his own
salvation, unless he doubts of this willingness of God [to perform his promise.]
But God does not require him to be better assured of his individual salvation as
a duty which must be performed to himself or to Christ; but it is a consequence
of that promise, by which God engages to bestow eternal life on him who
believes.

QUESTION AND.....QUESTION REVERSED VIII. May true believers and elect persons
entirely lose faith for a season?

VIII. May any man who has faith and retains it, arrive at such a moment, as, if
he were then to die, he would be damned?

ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION

Since Election to salvation comprehends within its limits not only Faith, but
likewise perseverance in Faith; and since St. Augustine says, "God has chosen to
salvation those who he sees will afterwards believe by the aid of his preventing
or preceding grace, and who will persevere by the aid of his subsequent or
following grace; "believers and the elect are not correctly taken for the same
persons. Omitting, therefore, all notice of the word "Election," I reply,
believers are sometimes so circumstanced, as not to produce, for a season, any
effect of true faith, not even the actual apprehension of grace and the promises
of God, nor confidence or trust in God and Christ; yet this is the very thing
which is necessary to obtain salvation. But the apostle says, concerning faith,
in reference to its being a quality and a capability of believing, "some, having
cast away a good conscience concerning faith, have made shipwreck."

QUESTION AND.....QUESTION REVERSED IX. Can believers under the grace of the New
Covenant, perfectly observe the law of God in this life?

IX. May God, or may He not, require of those who are partakers of the New
Covenant, that the flesh do not lust against the Spirit, as a duty corresponding
with the grace of that covenant?

Twenty-Five Public Disputations: Dedication The performance of the law is to be
estimated according to the mind of Him who requires it to be observed. The
answer will be two-fold, since He either wills it to be rigidly observed in the
highest degree of perfection, or only according to epieikeian clemency; that is,
if he require this according to clemency, and if the strength or powers which he
confers be proportionate to the demand. (1.) Man cannot perfectly perform such a
law of God, if it be considered as to be performed according to rigor. (2.) But
if he require it according to clemency, and if the powers conferred be
proportionate, (which must be acknowledged, since He requires it according to
the evangelical covenant,) the answer is, it can be perfectly observed. But the
question about capability is not of such great importance, "provided a man
confesses that it is possible to be done by the grace of Christ," as St.
Augustine justly observes.

REMARKS ON THE PRECEDING QUESTIONS, AND ON THOSE OPPOSED TO THEM In reply to
some queries which Uytenbogard had addressed to Arminius, concerning these nine
questions and their opposites, the latter gave his friend the following
explanation, in a letter dated the 31st of January, 160vi,

"I. In answer to the First Question, this is the order of the decrees. (1.) It
is my will to save believers. (2.) On this man I will bestow faith and preserve
him in it. (3.) I will save this man. For thus does the first of these decrees
prescribe, which must necessarily be placed foremost; because, without this,
faith is not necessary to salvation, and therefore no necessity exists to
administer the means for faith. But to this is directly opposed the opinion
which asserts, that faith is bestowed on him on whom God had previously willed
to bestow salvation. For, in this case, it would be his will to save one who did
not believe. All that has been said about the difference of the decree and its
execution, is futile; as if, in fact, God willed salvation to any one prior to
faith, and yet not to bestow salvation on any others than believers. For, beside
the consistent agreement of these, [the decree and its execution,] it is certain
that God cannot will to bestow that which, on account of his previous decree, He
cannot bestow. As therefore faith is, in a general manner, placed before
salvation by the first decree; so it must, specially and particularly, be placed
before the salvation of this and that man, even in the special decree which has
the subsequent execution.

"III. To the Third Question I shall in preference oppose the following: Has God
determined peremptorily to act with some men according to the strict rigor of
the law, as He did with the fallen angels, and to act with others according to
the grace of the Gospel? If they deny this, I have what I wish. But if they
affirm it, such a sentiment must be overwhelmed with absurdities; because in
such a case God would have acted towards many men with greater severity, than
towards the fallen angels, who, as being creatures purely spiritual, each sinned
of himself, through his own wickedness without persuasion from any one.

"IV. They will not be able to deny my Fourth opposite Question. For remission is
promised to those who confess their sins; and the fear is called initial in
reference to the filial fear which follows. If they acknowledge it, but say, Yet
God is not induced by them;’ I will then command them to erase the same word out
of their interrogatory, and in a better form to enunciate their own opinion.

"V. They will not consider it their duty entirely to deny my Fifth opposing
Question. If they affirm it, they will declare a falsehood, and will incur the
ill opinion of all prudent persons, even of those who are weak. Let them
therefore search out what they may place as an intermediate postulate between
theirs and mine, and I will then show that it co-incides either with their
postulate or with mine.

"VI. I have placed two questions in opposition to the Sixth, because their
question is also a double one. On the First of them you require no observation.
About the Second I have said, for the sake of explanation, that it is a circle,
in which nothing is first and nothing last,’ but in every part of it a beginning
and an end are found--which cannot, without absurdity, have place in the decrees
of God. I ask, has God determined to bestow salvation on those who believe, or
to bestow faith on those who are to be saved? If both of these be asserted, I
ask, which of them is the first, and which the last? They will reply, neither;
and it is then a circle. If they affirm the latter, that God has determined to
bestow faith on those who are to be saved; I will prove, that He has determined
to bestow salvation on those who believe, and shall then have formed a circle,
notwithstanding their unwillingness. If they adduce the different respect, I
will endeavour to confute it; which cannot be a work of much difficulty in so
very plain a matter.

"VII. In the Seventh opposite Question, I had regard to the expression, is it
his duty? for about its possibility there is no contention. But justifying faith
is not that by which I believe that my sins are remitted; for thus the same
thing will be the object and the effect of justifying faith. By this [justifying
faith] I obtain remission of sins, therefore it precedes the other object; [the
remission of sins;] and no one can believe that his sins are remitted, unless he
knows that he believes by a justifying faith. For this reason, also, no one can
believe that his future sins will likewise be remitted, unless he knows that he
will believe to the end. For sins are forgiven to him who believes, and only
after they have been committed; wherefore the promise of forgiveness, which is
that of the New Testament, must be considered as depending on a condition
stipulated by God, that is FAITH, without which there is no covenant.

"VIII. With respect to the Eighth Question, let a distinction be made between
Faith as it is a quality or habit, and between the same as it is an art. Actual
believing justifies, or the act of believing is imputed for righteousness.
Because God requires actual faith; for our capability to perform which, He
infuses that which is habitual. Therefore, as actual faith does not consist with
moral sin, he who falls into mortal sin may be damned. But it is possible for a
believer to fall into mortal sin, of which David is seen as an instance
Therefore, he may fall at such a moment as, if he were then to die, he would be
damned. If our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence toward God.’
Therefore, if it does condemn us, we have no confidence, we cannot have any;
because God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things.’ What is said
about the impossibility of this event, because, God has determined not to take
such persons out of the world at that moment, conduces nothing in favour of
their hypothesis. For this is opposed to final destruction, not to temporary,
and to their total destruction for a season, which is the subject of their
Eighth Question.

"IX. If it be replied to my Ninth opposing Question, that, in the covenant of
grace, God requires a duty which is impossible to man; they will be forced to
confess, that, in addition to this covenant, another is necessary, according to
which God pardons a duty not performed according to that covenant of grace; as
it was necessary that there should be another covenant, by which God might
pardon a duty not performed according to the legal covenant. And thus shall we
proceed on ad infinitum. At length we must arrive at the point from which we can
say, God save sinners, of his infinite mercy, which is limited by no conditions
prescribed by his equity. This seems to be an expression which will be entirely
conformable to the whole doctrine of those who urge absolute predestination,
For, since wrath and mercy are opposed to each other, as wrath is infinite, may
not mercy too, be infinite? According to their doctrine, whatever they oppose to
the contrary, wrath makes men sinners, that it may have those whom it can
punish. But they expressly say, mercy makes men believers by an omnipotent
force, and preserves them from the possibility of falling, that it may have
those whom it can save. But, as Nicasius Van der Schuer says, if God could make
a sinner, that He might have one whom He could punish; He could also punish
without sin; therefore He could likewise mercifully save without faith. And as
Wrath willed to have a just title for damnation, through the intervention of
sin, so it became Mercy to save, without the intervention of any duty, that it
might be manifest that the whole is of mercy without the semblance of justice. I
say, without the semblance of justice; because it begets faith by an
irresistible force, and by an irresistible force it causes man to continue in
faith to the end, and thus necessarily to be saved, according to the decree, he
that believes and perseveres, shall be saved This being laid down, all equity is
excluded, as well from the decree of predestination to salvation, as from that
of predestination to death. These objections, I am conscientiously of opinion,
may, without calumny, be made to their sentiments; and I am prepared to maintain
this very thing against any patron whatsoever of those sentiments. For they do
not extricate themselves when they say, that man spontaneously sins, and
believes by a spontaneous motion. For that which is spontaneous, and that which
is natural, are not in opposition. And that which is spontaneous coincides with
that which is absolutely necessary; as, a stone is moved downwards; a beast
eats, and propagates its species; man loves that which is good for himself. But
all excuses terminate in this spontaneous matter." The passage immediately
subsequent to this, is the one which I have quoted in pages 179, 180 of the
First Volume of these Works, respecting the two sick persons who were desirous
of obtaining an assurance of the Divine Favour, and respecting the very
important distinction to be observed between a faith which is merely historical,
and that by which a sinner is justified, a distinction, the neglect of which
has, in every age of the Church, been a prolific source of error among the
professors of our common Christianity.


========================================================================
  CHAPTER 7: S. PERFECTION OF BELIEVERS IN THIS LIFE
========================================================================

Perfection of Believers in This Life By Jacobus Arminius

Beside those doctrines on which I have treated, there is now much discussion
among us respecting the perfection of believers, or regenerated persons, in this
life; and it is reported, that I entertain sentiments on this subject, which are
very improper, and nearly allied to those of the Pelagians, viz: "that it is
possible for the regenerate in this life perfectly to keep God’s precepts." To
this I reply, though these might have been my sentiments yet I ought not on this
account to be considered a Pelagian, either partly or entirely, provided I had
only added that "they could do this by the grace of Christ, and by no means
without it." But while I never asserted, that a believer could perfectly keep
the precepts of Christ in this life, I never denied it, but always left it as a
matter which has still to be decided. For I have contented myself with those
sentiments which St. Augustine has expressed on this subject, whose words have
frequently quoted in the University, and have usually subjoined, that I had no
addition to make to them.

Augustine says, "four questions may claim our attention on this topic. The first
is, was there ever yet a man without sin, one who from the beginning of life to
its termination never committed sin? The second, has there ever been, is there
now, or can there possibly be, an individual who does not sin, that is, who has
attained to such a state of perfection in this life as not to commit sin, but
perfectly to fulfill the law of God? The third, is it possible for a man in this
life to exist without sin? The fourth, if it be possible for a man to be without
sin, why has such an individual never yet been found?" St. Augustine says, that
such a person as is described in the first question never yet lived, or will
hereafter be brought into existence, with the exception of Jesus Christ. He does
not think, that any man has attained to such perfection in this life as is
portrayed in the second question. With regard to the third, he thinks it
possible for a man to be without sin, by means of the grace of Christ and
free-will. In answer to the fourth, man does not do what it is possible for him
by the grace of Christ to perform, either because that which is good escapes his
observation, or because in it he places no part of his delight." From this
quotation it is apparent, that St. Augustine, one of the most strenuous
adversaries of the Pelagian doctrine, retained this sentiment, that "it is
possible for a man to live in this world without sin."

Beside this, the same Christian father says, "let Pelagius confess, that it is
possible for man to be without sin, in no other way than by the grace of Christ,
and we will be at peace with each other." The opinion of Pelagius appeared to
St. Augustine to be this--"that man could fulfill the law of God by his own
proffer strength and ability; but with still "greater facility by means of the
grace of Christ." I have already most abundantly stated the great distance at
which I stand from such a sentiment; in addition to which I now declare, that I
account this sentiment of Pelagius to be heretical, and diametrically opposed to
these words of Christ, "Without me ye can do nothing:" (John 15:5.) It is
likewise very destructive, and inflicts a most grievous wound on the glory of
Christ.

I cannot see that anything is contained in all I have hitherto produced
respecting my sentiments, on account of which any person ought to be "afraid of
appearing in the presence of God," and from which it might be feared that any
mischievous consequences can possibly arise. Yet because every day brings me
fresh information about reports concerning me, "that I carry in my breast
destructive sentiments and heresies," I cannot possibly conceive to what points
those charges can relate, except perhaps they draw some such pretext from my
opinion concerning the Divinity of the Son of God, and the justification of man
before God. Indeed, I have lately learnt, that there has been much public
conversation, and many rumors have been circulated, respecting my opinion on
both these points of doctrine, particularly since the last conference [between
Gomarus and myself] before the Counselors of the Supreme Court. This is one
reason why I think, that I shall not be acting unadvisedly if I disclose to your
mightinesses the real state of the whole matter.


========================================================================
  CHAPTER 8: S. PERSEVERANCE OF THE SAINTS
========================================================================

The Perseverance of the Saints By Jacobus Arminius My sentiments respecting the
perseverance of the saints are, that those persons who have been grafted into
Christ by true faith, and have thus been made partakers of his life-giving
Spirit, possess sufficient powers [or strength] to fight against Satan, sin, the
world and their own flesh, and to gain the victory over these enemies--yet not
without the assistance of the grace of the same Holy Spirit. Jesus Christ also
by his Spirit assists them in all their temptations, and affords them the ready
aid of his hand; and, provided they stand prepared for the battle, implore his
help, and be not wanting to themselves, Christ preserves them from falling. So
that it is not possible for them, by any of the cunning craftiness or power of
Satan, to be either seduced or dragged out of the hands of Christ. But I think
it is useful and will be quite necessary in our first convention, [or Synod] to
institute a diligent inquiry from the Scriptures, whether it is not possible for
some individuals through negligence to desert the commencement of their
existence in Christ, to cleave again to the present evil world, to decline from
the sound doctrine which was once delivered to them, to lose a good conscience,
and to cause Divine grace to be ineffectual.

Though I here openly and ingenuously affirm, I never taught that a true believer
can, either totally or finally fall away from the faith, and perish; yet I will
not conceal, that there are passages of scripture which seem to me to wear this
aspect; and those answers to them which I have been permitted to see, are not of
such a kind as to approve themselves on all points to my understanding. On the
other hand, certain passages are produced for the contrary doctrine [of
unconditional perseverance] which are worthy of much consideration.


========================================================================
  CHAPTER 9: S. PROVIDENCE OF GOD
========================================================================

The Providence Of God By Jacobus Arminius

I consider Divine Providence to be "that solicitous, continued, and universally
present inspection and oversight of God, according to which he exercises a
general care over the whole world, but evinces a particular concern for all his
[intelligent] creatures without any exception, with the design of preserving and
governing them in their own essence, qualities, actions, and passions, in a
manner that is at once worthy of himself and suitable to them, to the praise of
his name and the salvation of believers. In this definition of Divine
Providence, I by no means deprive it of any particle of those properties which
agree with it or belong to it; but I declare that it preserves, regulates,
governs and directs all things and that nothing in the world happens
fortuitously or by chance. Beside this, I place in subjection to Divine
Providence both the free-will and even the actions of a rational creature, so
that nothing can be done without the will of God, not even any of those things
which are done in opposition to it; only we must observe a distinction between
good actions and evil ones, by saying, that "God both wills and performs good
acts," but that "He only freely permits those which are evil." Still farther
than this, I very readily grant, that even all actions whatever, concerning
evil, that can possibly be devised or invented, may be attributed to Divine
Providence Employing solely one caution, "not to conclude from this concession
that God is the cause of sin." This I have testified with sufficient clearness,
in a certain disputation concerning the Righteousness and Efficacy of Divine
Providence concerning things that are evil, which was discussed at Leyden on two
different occasions, as a divinity-act, at which I presided. In that
disputation, I endeavoured to ascribe to God whatever actions concerning sin I
could possibly conclude from the scriptures to belong to him; and I proceeded to
such a length in my attempt, that some persons thought proper on that account to
charge me with having made God the author of sin. The same serious allegation
has likewise been often produced against me, from the pulpit, in the city of
Amsterdam, on account of those very theses; but with what show of justice such a
charge was made, may be evident to any one, from the contents of my written
answer to those Thirty-one Articles formerly mentioned, which have been falsely
imputed to me, and of which this was one.


========================================================================
  CHAPTER 10: S. REVISION OF THE DUTCH CONFESSION & HEIDELBERG
========================================================================

The Revision of the Dutch Confession & Heidelberg Catechism By Jacobus Arminius

But, besides these things, I had some annotations to make on the Confession of
the Dutch Churches and on the Heidelberg Catechism; but they will be discussed
most appropriately in our Synod, which at the first opportunity we hope to
obtain through your consent, or rather by means of your summons. This is the
sole request which I prefer to your mightinesses, that I may be permitted to
offer a few brief remarks on a certain clause, subject to which their high
mightinesses, the States General, gave their consent to the convening of a
National Synod in this province, (Holland,) and the substance of which was, that
in such Synod the Confession and Catechism of the Dutch Churches should be
subjected to examination. This clause has given great umbrage to many persons,
not only because they account it unnecessary, but likewise unjust, to subject
the Confession and Catechism to examination. They also suppose, that I and a
certain individual of great reputation, are the persons who prevailed with the
States General to have such a clause inserted. But it is by no means true that
the revision of the Confession and Catechism is unnecessary and unjust, or that
we were the instigators of their high mightinesses in this affair. With regard
to the last of these two suppositions, so far were we from having any concern
with the origin of that clause, that, eleven or twelve years ago, at the
pressing importunity of the Churches that prayed for a National Synod, the
States of South Holland and West Friezland at last judged it proper to consent
to it by their decree, on no other condition than that in such Synod the
Confession of the Dutch Churches should be subjected to examination. Yet we, at
that time, neither endeavoured by our advice, nor by our influence, to promote
any such measure. But if we had with all our might made the attempt, we should
have been doing nothing but what was compatible with our official duties;
because it is obviously agreeable to reason as well as to equity, and quite
necessary in the present posture of affairs, that such a measure should be
adopted.

First. That it may openly appear to all the world that we render to the word of
God alone such due and suitable honour, as to determine it to be beyond (or
rather above) all disputes, too great to be the subject of any exception, and
worthy of all acceptation.

Secondly. Because these pamphlets are writings that proceed from men, and may,
on that account, contain within them some portion of error, it is, therefore,
proper to institute a lawful inquiry, that is, in a National Synod, whether or
not there be any thing in those productions which requires amendment.

1. The first inquiry may be, whether these human writings are accordant, in
every part, with the word of God, with regard to the words themselves, the
construction of the sentences and the correct meaning.

2. Whether they contain whatever is necessary to be believed unto salvation, so
that salvation is, according to this rule, not denied to those things to which
it appertains.

3. Whether it [the rule of these formularies] does not contain far too many
particulars, and embrace several that are not necessary to be believed unto
salvation, so that salvation is consequently attributed to those things to which
it does not belong.

4. Whether certain words and forms of speech are not employed in them, which are
capable of being understood in different ways and furnishing occasion for
disputes. Thus, for example, in the Fourteenth article of the Confession, we
read the following words, "nothing is done without God’s ordination," [or
appointment]: if by the word "ordination" is signified, "that God appoints
things of any kind to be done," this mode of enunciation is erroneous, and it
follows as a a consequence from it, that God is the author of sin. But if it
signify, that "whatever it be that is done, God ordains it to a good end," the
terms in which it is conceived are in that case correct.

5. Whether things utterly repugnant to each other may not be discovered in them.
For instance, a certain individual who is highly honoured in the Church,
addressed a letter to John Piscator, Professor of Divinity in the University of
Herborn in Nassau, and in it he exhorted him to confine himself within the
opinion of the Heidelberg Catechism on the doctrine of Justification. For this
purpose he cited three passage, which he considered to be at variance with
Piscator’s sentiments. But the learned Professor replied, that he confined
himself completely within the doctrinal boundaries of the Catechism; and then
quoted out of that formulary ten or eleven passages as proofs of his sentiments.
But I solemnly declare, I do not perceive by what method these several passages
can possibly be reconciled with each other.

6. Whether every thing in these writings is digested in that due order in which
the Scripture requires them to be placed.

7. Whether all things are disposed in a manner the most suitable and convenient
for preserving peace and unity with the rest of the reformed Churches.

Thirdly. The third reason is, because a National Synod is held for the purpose
of discovering whether all things in the Church are in a proper state or right
condition. One of the chief duties which appertains to such an assembly, is, the
examination of doctrine, whether it be that which is admitted by unanimous
consent, or that for which particular Divines contend.

Fourthly. The fourth reason is, because an examination of this description will
obtain for these writings a greater degree of authority, when after a mature and
rigid examination they shall be found to agree with the word of God, or shall be
made conformable to it in a still greater measure. Such an examination will also
excite within the minds of men a greater value for Christian ministers, when
they perceive that these sacred functionaries hold in the highest estimation
that truth which is revealed in Scripture, and that their attachment to it is so
great as to induce them to spare no labour in order to render their own doctrine
more and more conformable to that revealed truth.

Fifthly. The fifth reason why at this, if at any period, it is necessary to
adopt the suggestion which we have mentioned, is, (1.) Because there are several
individuals in the ministry who have certain views and considerations respecting
some points contained in these writings, which they reserve in secret and reveal
to no one, because they hope that such points will become subjects of discussion
in a National Synod. Because such a convention has been promised, some of them
have suffered themselves to be persuaded not to give the least publicity to any
of the views or considerations which they have formed on these subjects.

(2.) Besides, this will be the design of a National Synod-- That their high
mightinesses the States General may be pleased to establish and arm with public
authority certain ecclesiastical sanctions, according to which every one may be
bound to conduct himself in the Church of God. That this favour may be obtained
from their high mightinesses and that they may execute such a measure with a
good conscience, it is necessary that they be convinced in their own
understandings, that the doctrine contained in the formulary of union is
agreeable to the word of God. This is a reason which ought to induce us
spontaneously to propose an examination of our Confession before their high
mightinesses, and to offer either to shew that it is in accordance with the word
of God, or to render it conformable to that Divine standard.

Sixthly. The sixth reason is drawn from the example of those who are associated
together under the Augustan Confession, and from the conduct of the Swiss and
the French Churches, that have within two or three years enriched their
Confessions with one entirely new article. And the Dutch Confession has itself
been subjected to examination since it was first published: some things having
been taken away from it and others added, while some of the rest have undergone
various alterations.

Numerous other reasons might be produced, but I omit them; because I consider
those already mentioned to be quite sufficient for proving, that the clause
concerning examination and revision, as it is termed, was with the greatest
justice and propriety inserted in the instrument of consent of which we have
made previous mention.

I am not ignorant, that other reasons are adduced, in opposition to these; and
one in particular, which is made a principal subject of public conversation, and
is accounted of all others the most solid. To it, therefore I consider it
necessary to offer a brief reply. It is thus stated: "by such an examination as
this, the doctrine of the Church will be called in question; which is neither an
act of propriety nor of duty.

"I. Because this doctrine has obtained the approbation and suffrages of many
respectable and learned men; and has been strenuously defended against all those
who have offered it any opposition.

"II. Because it has been sealed with the blood of many thousand martyrs.

"III. Because from such an examination will arise, within the Church, confusion,
scandal, offenses, and the destruction of consciences; and, out of the Church,
ridicule, calumnies and accusations." To all these I answer:

1. It would be much better, not to employ such odious forms of speech, as to
call in question, and others of that class, when the conversation is only
respecting some human composition, which is liable to have error intermixed with
its contents. For with what right can any writing be said to be called in
question or in doubt, which was never of itself unquestionable, or ought to be
considered as indubitable?

2. The approbation of Divines, the defense of a composition against its
adversaries, and the sealing of it with the blood of martyrs, do not render any
doctrine authentic or place it beyond the limits of doubt: because it is
possible both for Divines and martyrs to err--a circumstance which can admit of
no denial in this argument.

3. A distinction ought to be made between the different matters contained in the
Confession. For while some of them make a near approach to the foundation of
salvation and are fundamental articles of the Christian religion, others of them
are built up as a superstructure on the foundation, and of themselves are not
absolutely necessary to salvation. The doctrines of this former class are
approved by the unanimous consent of all the Reformed, and are effectually
defended against all gainsaying adversaries. But those of the latter class
become subjects of controversy between different parties: and some of these are
attacked by enemies not without some semblance of truth and justice. The blood
of martyrs has sealed those of the former class but by no means those of the
latter. In reference to this affair, it ought to be diligently observed, what
was proposed by the martyrs of our days, and on what account they shed their
blood. If this be done, it will be found, that no man among them was even
interrogated on that subject which I consider it equitable to make a prominent
part in the deliberations of a Synod, and, therefore, that no martyr ever sealed
it with his blood. I will produce an example: when a question was raised about
the meaning of the seventh chapter of the epistle to the Romans, one individual
said, "that the passage was quoted in the margin of the Confession exactly in
the same sense as he had embraced it, and that the martyrs had with their own
blood sealed this Confession." But, in reply to this, it was stated, "that if
the strictest search be instituted throughout the entire large history of the
martyrs, as it is published by the French, it will be discovered, that no martyr
has at any period been examined on that passage, or has shed his blood on that
account." To sum up the whole: the blood of the martyrs tends to confirm this
truth, that they have made profession of their faith "in simplicity and
sincerity of conscience." But it is by no means conclusive, that the Confession
which they produced is free from every degree of reprehension or superior to all
exception; unless they had been led by Christ into all truth and therefore
rendered incapable of erring.

4. If the Church be properly instructed in that difference which really does and
always ought to exist between the word of God and all human writings, and if the
Church be also rightly informed concerning that liberty which she and all
Christians possess, and which they will always enjoy, to measure all human
compositions by the standard rule of God’s word, she will neither distress
herself on that account, nor will she be offended on perceiving all human
writings brought to be proved at the touch-stone of God’s word. On the contrary,
she will rather feel far more abundant delight, when she sees, that God has
bestowed on her in this country such pastors and teachers, as try at the chief
touch-stone their own doctrine, in a manner at once suitable, proper, just, and
worthy of perpetual observance; and that they do this, to be able exactly and by
every possible means to express their agreement with the word of God, and their
consent to it even in the most minute particulars.

5. But it is no less proper, that the doctrine once received in the Church
should be subjected to examination, however great the fear may be "lest
disturbances should ensue, and lest evil disposed persons should make such
revision an object of ridicule, calumny or accusation," or should even turn it
to their own great advantage, [by representing the matter so as to induce a
persuasion,] "that those who propose this examination are not sufficiently
confirmed in their own religion ;" when, on the contrary, this is one of God’s
commands, "search and try the spirits whether they be of God." (1 John 4:1.) If
cogitations of that description had operated as hindrances on the minds of
Luther, Zuinglius, and others, they would never have pried into the doctrine of
the Papists, or have subjected it to a scrutinizing examination. Nor would those
who adhere to the Augustan Confession have considered it proper to submit that
formulary again to a new and complete revision, and to alter it in some
particulars. This deed of theirs is an object of our praise and approval. And we
conclude, that, when Luther towards the close of his life was advised by Philip
Melancthon to bring the eucharistic controversy on the sacrament of the Lord’s
Supper to some better state of concord, (as it is related in the writings of our
own countrymen,) he acted very improperly in rejecting that counsel, and in
casting it back as a reproach on Philip, for this reason, as they state his
declaration, "lest by such an attempt to effect an amicable conclusion, the
whole doctrine should be called in question." Besides, if reasons of this kind
ought to be admitted, the Papists with the best right and the greatest propriety
formerly endeavoured to prevent the doctrine, which had for many preceding
centuries been received in the Church, from being called in question or
subjected again to examination. But it has been suggested, in opposition to
these reasons, "that if the doctrine of the Churches be submitted to an entirely
new revision as often as a National Synod shall be held, the Church would never
have any thing to which it might adhere or on which it might fully depend, and
it will be possible to declare with great justice, concerning Churches thus
circumstanced, that, they have an anniversary faith: are tossed to and fro, and
carried about with every wind of doctrine. (Ephesians 4:14.)

1. My first answer to these remarks, is, the Church always has Moses and the
Prophets, the Evangelists and the Apostles, that is, the Scriptures of the Old
and of the New Testament; and these Scriptures fully and clearly comprehend
whatever is necessary to salvation. Upon them the Church will lay the foundation
of her faith, and will rest upon them as on an immovable basis, principally
because, how highly soever we may esteem Confessions and Catechisms every
decision on matters of faith and religion must obtain its final resolution in
the Scriptures.

2. Some points in the Confession are certain and do not admit of a doubt: these
will never be called in question by any one, except by heretics. Yet there are
other parts of its contents which are of such a kind, as may with the most
obvious utility become frequent subjects of conference and discussion between
men of learning who fear God, for the purpose of reconciling them with those
indubitable articles as nearly as is practicable.

3. Let it be attempted to make the Confession contain as few articles as
possible; and let it propose them in a very brief form, conceived entirely in
the expressions of Scripture. Let all the more ample explanations, proofs,
digressions, redundancies, amplifications and exclamations, be omitted; and let
nothing be delivered in it, except those truths which are necessary to
salvation. The consequences of this brevity will be, that the Confession will be
less liable to be filled with errors, not so obnoxious to obloquy, and less
subject to examination. Let the practice of the ancient Church be produced as an
example, that comprehended, in as brief a form of words as was practicable,
those articles which she judged necessary to be believed.

Some individuals form a distinction between the Confession and the Catechism
with respect to revision; and, since the Confession is the peculiar property of
the Dutch Churches, and is on that account found in the hands of comparatively
few people, they conclude, "that it is possible without any difficulty to revise
it in a Synod and subject it to examination., But since the Catechism belongs
not only to us, but likewise and principally to the Churches of the Palatinate,
and is therefore to be found in the hands of all men, the same persons consider
the examination of it "to be connected with great peril." But to this I reply,
if we be desirous of constituting the Heidelberg Catechism a formulary of
concord among the teachers of the Churches, and if they be obliged to subscribe
it, it is still necessary to subject it to examination. For no Churches whatever
ought to hold such a high station in our esteem, as to induce us to receive any
writing of their composition without, at the same time, reserving to ourselves
the liberty of submitting it to a nice scrutiny. And I account this to be the
principal cause, why the Churches of different provinces, although at perfect
agreement with each other on the fundamental points of Christian doctrine, have
each composed for themselves their own Confessions. But if the Heidelberg
Catechism be not allowed, to become a formulary of this kind, and if a suitable
liberty be conceded in the explanation of it, it will not then be necessary
either to revise it or subject it to examination; provided, I repeat, that the
obligatory burden of subscription be removed, and a moderate liberty be conceded
in its explanation. This is all that I had to propose to your mightinesses, as
to my most noble, potent, wise and prudent masters. While I own myself bound to
render an account of all my actions, to the members of this most noble and
potent assembly, (next after God,) I at the same time present to them my humble
and grateful acknowledgments, because they have not disdained to grant me a
courteous and patient audience. I embrace this opportunity solemnly to declare,
that I am sincerely prepared to institute an amicable and fraternal conference
with my reverend brethren, (at whatever time or place and on whatever occasion
this honourable assembly may judge proper to appoint,) on all the topics which I
have now mentioned, and on any other concerning which it will be possible for a
controversy to exist, or at some future period to arise. I also make this
additional promise, that I will in every conference conduct myself with
equanimity, moderation and docility, and will shew myself not less actuated by
the desire of being taught, than by that of communicating to others some portion
of instruction. And, since in the discussion of every topic on which it will be
possible to institute a conference, two points will become objects of attention.
First. "Whether that be true which is the subject of the controversy," and,
secondly, "Whether it be necessary to be believed unto salvation," and since
both these points ought to be discussed and proved out of the Scriptures, I here
tender my sacred affirmation, and solemnly bind myself hereafter to observe it,
that, however cogently I may have proved by the most solid [human] arguments any
article to be agreeable to the word of God, I will not obtrude it for an article
of belief on those of my brethren who may entertain a different opinion
respecting it, unless I have plainly proved it from the word of God and have
with equal clearness established its truth, and the necessity unto salvation
that every Christian should entertain the same belief.

If my brethren will be prepared to act in this manner, as far as I know the
complexion of my own opinions, there will not easily arise among us any schism
or controversy. But, that I may on my part remove every cause of fear that can
possibly invade this most noble assembly, occupied and engaged as its honourable
members now are with important concerns on which in a great measure depends the
safety of our native country and of the Reformed Churches, I subjoin this
remark, "that to hinder my toleration of any matters in my brethren, they must
be very numerous and very important. For I am not of the congregation of those
who wish to have dominion over the faith of another man, but am only a minister
to believers, with the design of promoting in them an increase of knowledge,
truth, piety, peace and joy in Jesus Christ our Lord." But if my brethren cannot
perceive how they can possibly tolerate me, or allow me a place among them, in
reference to myself I indulge in no hope that a schism will on this account be
formed. May God avert any such catastrophe, since far too many schisms have
already arisen and spread themselves abroad among Christians. It ought rather to
be the earnest endeavour of every one, to diminish their number and destroy
their influence. Yet, even under such circumstances, [when I shall be rejected
from the communion of my brethren,] in patience will I possess my soul; and
though in that case I shall resign my office, yet I will continue to live for
the benefit of our common Christianity as long as it may please God to lengthen
out my days and prolong my existence. Never forgetting this sentiment, Sat
EcclesE, sat PatriE daturm, Enough has been done to satisfy the Church of Christ
and my country!


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Source: https://sermonindex.net/books/writings-of-jacobus-arminius/
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