Bondage of the Will

Sections 76 through 90 of The Bondage of the Will by Martin Luther, translated by Henry Cole. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Discussion, second part. Section 76. The diatribe having thus first cited numberless passages of Scripture, as it were, a most formidable army of support of free will, in order that it might inspire courage into the confessors and martyrs, the men saints and women saints on the side of free will, and strike terror into all the fearful and trembling deniers of, and transgressors against free will, imagines to itself a poor, contemptible handful only standing up to oppose free will. And therefore it brings forward no more than two Scriptures, which seem to be more prominent than the rest, to stand up on their side, intent only upon slaughter, and that to be executed without much trouble. The one of these passages is from Exodus 9.13, the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh. The other is from Malachi 1.2-3, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated. Paul has explained at large both these passages in the Romans 9.11-17, but according to the judgment of the diatribe, what a detestable and useless discussion has he made of it. So that, did not the Holy Spirit know a little something of rhetoric, there would be some danger, lest being broken at the outset by such an artfully managed show of contempt, he should despair of his cause, and open the yield to free will before the sound of the trumpet for the battle. But, however, I, as a recruit taken into the rear of those two passages, will display the forces on our side. Although, where the state of the battle is such that one can put to flight ten thousand, there is no need of forces. If therefore one passage shall defeat free will, its numberless forces will profit at nothing. Section 77. In this part of the discussion, then, the diatribe has found out a new way of eluding the most clear passages. That is, it will have that there is in the most simple and clear passages a trope. And, as before, when speaking in defense of free will, it eluded all the imperative and conditional sentences of the law by means of conclusions, tact, and similitudes added to them. So, now, where it designs to speak against us, it twists all the words of the divine promise and declaration just which way it pleases, by means of a trope which it has invented, thus being everywhere an incomprehensible proteus. Nay, it demands with a haughty brow that this permission should be granted it, saying that we ourselves, when pressed closely, are accustomed to get off by means of invented tropes, as in these instances, On which thou wilt stretch forth thine hand. Exodus 8.5 That is, grace shall extend thine hand on which it will. Make you a new heart. Ezekiel 18.31 That is, grace shall make you a new heart, and the like. It seems, therefore, an indignity offered, that Luther should be allowed to give forth an interpretation so forced and twisted, and that it should not be far more allowable to follow the interpretations of the most approved doctors. You see, then, that here the contention is not for the text itself, no, nor for conclusions and similitudes, but for tropes and interpretations. When, then, shall we ever have any plain and pure text, without tropes and conclusions, either for or against free will? Has the Scriptures no such texts anywhere? And shall the cause of free will remain forever in doubt, like a reed shaken with the wind, as being that which can be supported by no certain text, but which stands upon conclusions and tropes only introduced by men mutually disagreeing with each other? But let our sentiment rather be this, that neither conclusion nor trope is to be admitted into the Scriptures, unless the evident strife of the particulars, or the absurdity of any particular as militating against an article of faith, require it. But that the simple, pure, and natural meaning of the words is to be adhered to, which is according to the rules of grammar, and to that common use of speech which God has given unto men, for if every one be allowed, according to his own lust, to invent conclusions and tropes in the Scriptures, what will the whole Scripture together be, but a reed shaken with the wind, or a kind of vertumness? Then, in truth, nothing could, to a certainty, be determined on or proved concerning any one article of the faith, which you might not subject to cavillation by means of some trope. But every trope ought to be avoided as the most deadly poison, which is not absolutely required by the Scriptures itself. See what happened to that trope-inventor Origen, in expounding the Scriptures? What just occasion did he give the columniator Porphyry, to say those who favor Origen can be no great friends of Hieronymus? What happened to the Arians by means of the trope, according to which they made Christ God nominally? What happened in our own times to those new prophets concerning the words of Christ, This is my body? One invented a trope in the word This, another in the word Is, another in the word Body. I have therefore observed this, that all heresies and errors in the Scriptures have not arisen from the simplicity of the words, as is the general report throughout the world, but from men not attending to the simplicity of the words, and hatching tropes and conclusions out of their own brain. For example, On whichsoever thou wilt stretch forth thine hand, I, as far as I can remember, never put upon these words so violent an interpretation as to say Grace shall extend thine hand on whichsoever it will. Make yourselves a new heart, that is, Grace shall make you a new heart, and the like, although the diatribe produces me thus, in a public work, from being so carried away with and eluded by its own tropes and conclusions that it knows not what it says about anything. But I said this, that by the words Stretch forth thine hand, simply taken as they are, without tropes or conclusions, nothing else is signified than what is required of us in the stretching forth of our hand, and what we ought to do, according to the nature of an imperative expression with grammarians, and in the common use of speech. But the diatribe, not attending to this simplicity of the word, but with violent seducing conclusions and tropes, interprets the words thus, Stretch forth thine hand, that is, thou art able by thine own power to stretch forth thine hand. Make you a new heart, that is, you are able to make a new heart. Believe in Christ, that is, you are able to believe in Christ. So that with it, what is spoken imperatively and what is spoken indicatively is the same thing, or else it is prepared to aver that the Scripture is ridiculous and to no purpose. And these interpretations which no grammarian will bear must not be called in theologians violent or invented, but the productions of the most approved doctors received by so many ages. But it is easy for the diatribe to admit and follow tropes in this part of the discussion, seeing that it cares not at all whether what is said be certain or uncertain. Nay, it aims at making all things uncertain, for its design is that the doctrines concerning free will should be left alone rather than searched into. Therefore it is enough for it to be enabled in any way to avoid those passages by which it finds itself closely pressed. But as for me, who am maintaining a serious cause and who am inquiring what is to the greatest certainty the truth, for the establishing of consciences, I must act very differently. For me, I say, it is not enough that you say there may be a trope here, but I must inquire whether there ought to be or can be a trope there. For if you cannot prove that there must of necessity be a trope in that passage, you will affect nothing at all. There stands there this word of God, I will harden the heart of Pharaoh, Exodus 4.21, Romans 9, 17-18. If you say that it can be understood or ought to be understood thus, I will permit it to be hardened. I hear you say indeed that it may be so understood. And I hear this trope used by everyone. I destroyed you because I did not correct you immediately when you began to do wrong. But here there is no place for that interpretation. We are not here inquiring whether that trope be in use. We are not inquiring whether anyone can use it in that passage of Paul. But this is the point of inquiry, whether or not it be sure and safe to use this passage plainly as it stands, and whether Paul would have it so used. We are not inquiring into the use of an indifferent reader of this passage, but into the use of the author, Paul himself. What will you do with a conscience inquiring thus? Behold God, as the author, saith, I will harden the heart of Pharaoh. The meaning of the word harden is plain and well known. But a man who reads this passage tells me that in this place, to harden, signifies to give an occasion of becoming hardened, because the sinner is not immediately corrected. But by what authority does he this? With what design, by what necessity, is the natural signification of this passage thus twisted? And suppose the reader and interpreter should be in error. How shall it be proved that such a turn ought to be given to this passage? It is dangerous, nay impious, thus to twist the word of God without necessity and without authority. Would you then comfort a poor soul thus laboring in this way? Origen thought so and so. Cease to search into such things, because they are curious and superfluous. But he would answer you, This admonition should have been given to Moses or Paul before they wrote, and so also to God himself. For it is they who vex us with these curious and superfluous scriptures. Section 78 This miserable scapegoat of tropes, therefore, profits the diatribe nothing. But this proteus of ours must here be held fast and compelled to satisfy us fully concerning the trope in this passage, and that by scriptures the most clear or by miracles the most evident. For as to its mere opinion, even though supported by the labored industry of all ages, we give no credit to that whatever. But we urge on and press it home that there can be here no trope whatever, but that the word of God is to be understood according to the plain meaning of the words. For it is not given unto us, as the diatribe persuades itself, to turn the words of God backwards and forwards according to our own lust. If that were the case, what is there in the whole scripture that might not be resolved into the philosophy of Anaxagoras, that anything might be made from anything? And thus I will say, God created the heavens and the earth, that is, he stationed them, but did not make them out of nothing. Or he created the heavens and the earth, that is, the angels and the devils. Or the just and the wicked. Who, I ask, if this were the case, might not become a theologian at the first opening of a book? Let this therefore be a fixed and settled point, that since the diatribe cannot prove that there is a trope in these, our passages which it utterly destroys, it is compelled to cede to us that the words are to be understood according to their plain meaning, even though it should prove that the same trope is contained in all the other passages of scripture and used in common by everyone. And by the gaining of this one point, all our arguments are at the same time defended, which the diatribe designed to refute. And thus its refutation is found to affect nothing, to do nothing, to be nothing. Whenever therefore this passage of Moses, I will harden the heart of Pharaoh, is interpreted thus, my long-suffering by which I bear with the sinner leads indeed others unto repentance, but it shall render Pharaoh more hardened in iniquity. It is a pretty interpretation, but it is not proved that it ought to be so interpreted. But I am not content with what is said, I must have the proof. And that also of Paul, he hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will harden he hardeneth, Romans 9.18, is plausibly interpreted thus, that is, God hardens when he does not immediately punish the sinner, and he has mercy when he immediately invites to repentance by afflictions. But how is this interpretation proved? And also that of Isaiah 63.17, Why hast thou made us to err from thy ways, and harden our heart from thy fear? Be it so that Jerome interprets it thus from Origen, He is said to make to err who does not immediately recall from error. But who shall certify us that Jerome and Origen interpret rightly? It is therefore a settled determination with me not to argue upon the authority of any teacher whatever, but upon that of the Scripture alone. What Origen's and Jerome's does the diatribe then, forgetting its own determination, set before us? Especially when, among all the ecclesiastical writers, there are scarcely any who have handled the Holy Scriptures less to the purpose, and more absurdly, than Origen and Jerome. In a word, this liberty of interpretation, by a new and unheard-of kind of grammar, goes to confound all things, so that when God saith, I will harden the heart of Pharaoh, you are to change the persons, and understand it thus, Pharaoh hardens himself by my long-suffering. God hardeneth our hearts, that is, we harden ourselves by God's deferring the punishment. Thou, O Lord, hast made us to err, that is, we have made ourselves to err by thy not punishing us. So also, God's having mercy no longer signifies his giving grace, or showing mercy, or forgiving sin, or justifying, or delivering from evil, but, on the contrary, signifies bringing on evil and punishing. In fact, by these tropes matters will come to this. You may say that God had mercy upon the children of Israel when he sent them into Assyria, and to Babylon, because he there punished the sinners, and there invited them by afflictions to repentance. And that, on the other hand, when he delivered them and brought them back, he had not then mercy upon them, but hardened them. That is, by his long suffering and mercy he gave them an occasion of becoming hardened. And also, God's sending the Savior Christ into the world will not be said to be the mercy, but the hardening of God, because by this mercy he gave men an occasion of hardening themselves. On the other hand, his destroying Jerusalem and scattering the Jews even unto this day is his having mercy on them, because he punishes the sinners and invites them to repentance. Moreover, his carrying the saints away into heaven on the day of judgment will not be in mercy, but in hardening, because by his long suffering he will give them an occasion of abusing it, but his thrusting the wicked down to hell will be his mercy, because he punishes the sinners. Who, I pray you, ever heard of such examples of the mercy and wrath of God as these? And be it so, that good men are made better both by the long suffering and by the severity of God, yet, when we are speaking of the good and the bad promiscuously, these tropes, by an utter perversion of the common manner of speaking, will make out of the mercy of God his wrath and his wrath out of his mercy, seeing that they call it the wrath of God when he does good and his mercy when he afflicts. Moreover, if God be said then to harden when he does good and endures with long suffering, and then to have mercy when he afflicts and punishes, why is he more particularly said to harden Pharaoh than to harden the children of Israel, or then the whole world? Did he not do good to the children of Israel? Does he not do good to the whole world? Does he not bear with the wicked? Does he not reign upon the evil and upon the good? Why is he rather said to have mercy upon the children of Israel than upon Pharaoh? Did he not afflict the children of Israel in Egypt and in the desert? And be it so, that some abuse and some rightly use the goodness and the wrath of God, yet, according to your definition, to harden is the same as to indulge the wicked by long suffering and goodness, and to have mercy is not to indulge, but to visit and punish. Therefore, with reference to God, he by his continual goodness does nothing but harden, and by his perpetual punishment does nothing but show mercy. Section 79 But this is the most excellent statement of all, that God is said to harden when he indulges sinners by long suffering, but to have mercy upon them when he visits and afflicts, and thus by severity invites to repentance. What, I ask, did God leave undone in afflicting, punishing, and calling Pharaoh to repentance? Are there not in his dealings with him ten plagues recorded? If, therefore, your definitions stand good, that showing mercy is punishing and calling the sinner immediately, God certainly had mercy upon Pharaoh. Why, then, does not God say, I will have mercy upon Pharaoh, whereas he saith, I will harden the heart of Pharaoh? For in the very act of having mercy upon him, that is, as you say, afflicting and punishing him, he saith, I will harden him, that is, as you say, I will bear with him and do him good. What can be heard of more enormous? Where are now your tropes? Where are your origins? Where are your Jerome's? Where are all your most approved doctors whom one poor creature Luther daringly contradicts? But at this rate, the flesh must unawares impel the man to talk who trifles with the words of God and believes not their solemn importance. The text of Moses itself, therefore, incontrovertibly proves that here these tropes are mere inventions and things of naught, and that by those words I will harden the heart of Pharaoh, something else is signified far different from and of greater importance than doing good or affliction and punishment. Because we cannot deny that both were tried upon Pharaoh with the greatest care and concern. For what wrath and punishment could be more instant than his being stricken by so many wonders and so many plagues that, as Moses himself testifies, the like had never been? Nay, even Pharaoh himself, repenting, was moved by them more than once. But he was not effectually moved, nor did he persevere. And what longsuffering or goodness of God could be greater than his taking away the plagues so easily, hardening his sins so often, so often bringing back the good, and so often taking away the evil? Yet neither is of any avail. He still saith, I will harden the heart of Pharaoh. Ye see, therefore, that even if your hardening and mercy, that is, your glosses and tropes, be granted to the greatest extent, as supported by use and by example, and as seen in the case of Pharaoh, there is yet a hardening that still remains. And that the hardening of which Moses speaks must of necessity be one, and that of which you dream another. Section 80 But since I have to fight with fiction framers and ghosts, let me turn to ghost-raising also. Let me suppose, which is an impossibility, that the trope of which the diatribe dreams avails in this passage. In order that I may see which way the diatribe will elude the being compelled to declare that all things take place according to the will of God alone and from necessity in us, and how it will clear God from being himself the author and cause of our becoming hardened. For if it be true that God is then said to harden when he bears with longsuffering and does not immediately punish, these two positions still stand firm. First, that man nevertheless of necessity serves sin. For when it is granted that free will cannot will anything good, which kind of free will the diatribe undertook to prove, then by the goodness of a longsuffering God it becomes nothing better, but of necessity worse. Wherefore, it still remains that all that we do is done from necessity. And next, that God appears to be just as cruel in this bearing with us by his longsuffering as he does by being preached, as willing to harden by that will inscrutable. For when he sees that free will cannot will good, but becomes worse by his enduring with longsuffering, by this very longsuffering he appears to be most cruel, and to delight in our miseries, seeing that he could remedy them if he willed, and might not thus endure with longsuffering if he willed, nay, that he could not thus endure unless he willed. For who can compel him against his will? That will, therefore, without which nothing is done, being admitted, and it being admitted also that free will cannot will anything good, all is advanced in vain that is advanced, either in excusation of God or in accusation of free will. For the language of free will is ever this, I cannot, and God will not. What can I do? If he have mercy upon me by affliction, I shall be nothing benefited, but must of necessity become worse unless he give me his spirit. But this he gives me not, though he might give it me if he willed. It is certain, therefore, that he wills not to give. Section 81 Nor do the similitudes adduced make anything to the purpose where it is said by the diatribe, As under the same sun mud is hardened and wax melted, as by the same shower the cultivated earth brings forth fruit and the uncultivated earth thorns, so by the same longsuffering of God some are hardened and some converted. For we are not now dividing free will into two different natures and making the one like mud, the other like wax, the one like cultivation, the one like cultivated earth, the other like uncultivated earth. But we are speaking concerning that one free will equally impotent in all men, which, as it cannot will good, is nothing but mud, nothing but uncultivated earth. Nor does Paul say that God, as the potter, makes one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor out of different kinds of clay, but he saith out of the same lump and so forth. Romans 9.21 Therefore, as mud always becomes harder, and uncultivated earth always becomes more thorny, even so free will always becomes worse, both under the hardening sun of longsuffering and under the softening shower of rain. If, therefore, free will be of one and the same nature and impotency in all men, no reason can be given why it should attain unto grace in one and not in another. If nothing else free will must be preached to all but the goodness of a longsuffering and the punishment of a mercy-showing God. For it is a granted position that free will in all is alike defined to be that which cannot will good. And indeed, if it were not so, God could not elect anyone, nor would there be any place left for election, but for free will only as choosing or refusing the longsuffering and anger of God. And if God be thus robbed of His power and wisdom to elect, what will there be remaining but that idle fortune, under the name of which all things take place at random? Nay, we shall at length come to this, that men may be saved and damned without God's knowing anything at all about it, as not having determined by certain election who should be saved and who should be damned, but having set before all men in general His hardening goodness and longsuffering and His mercy-showing correction and punishment, and left them to choose for themselves whether they would be saved or damned, while He, in the meantime, should be gone, as Homer says, to an Ethiopian feast. It is just such a God as this that Aristotle paints out to us, that is, who sleeps Himself and leaves everyone to use or abuse His longsuffering and punishment just as He will. Nor can reason of Herself form any other judgment than the diatribe here does. For as She Herself snores over and looks with contempt upon divine things, She thinks, concerning God, that He sleeps and snores over them too, not exercising His wisdom, will, and presence in choosing, separating, and inspiring, but leaving the troublesome and irksome business of accepting or refusing His longsuffering and His anger entirely to men. This is what we come to when we attempt by human reason to limit and make excuses for God, not revering the secrets of His Majesty, but curiously prying into them, being lost in the glory of them, instead of making one excuse for God, we pour forth a thousand blasphemies. And forgetting ourselves, we pray like madmen, both against God and against ourselves, when we are all the while supposing that we are with a great deal of wisdom, speaking both for God and for ourselves. Here then you see what that trope and gloss of the diatribe will make of God, and moreover how excellently consistent the diatribe is with itself, which before, by its one definition, made free will one and the same in all men, and now, in the course of its argumentation, forgetting its own definition, makes one free will to be cultivated and the other uncultivated, according to the difference of works, of manners, and of men, thus making two different free wills, the one that which cannot do good, the other that which can do good, and that by its own powers before grace, whereas its former definition declared that it could not by those its own powers will anything good whatever. Hence, therefore, comes to pass that while we do not ascribe unto the will of God only the will and power of hardening, showing mercy, and doing all things, we ascribe unto free will itself the power of doing all things without grace, which, nevertheless, we declared to be unable to do any good whatever without grace. The similitudes, therefore, of the sun and of the shower make nothing at all to the purpose. The Christian would use those similitudes more rightly if he were to make the sun and the shower to represent the gospel, as Psalm 19 does, and as does also Hebrews 6, 7, and were to make the cultivated earth to represent the elect, and the uncultivated the reprobate. For the former are by the word edified and made better, while the latter are offended and made worse. Or, if this distinction be not made, then, as to free will itself, that is, in all men, uncultivated earth and the kingdom of Satan. But let us now inquire into the reason why this trope was invented in this passage. It appears absurd, says the diatribe, that God, who is not only just but also good, should be said to have hardened the heart of a man in order that by his iniquity he might show forth his own power. The same also occurred to Origen, who confesses that the occasion of becoming hardened was given of God, but throws all the fault upon Pharaoh. He has, moreover, made a remark upon that which the Lord saith, For this very purpose have I raised thee up. He does not say, he observes, For this very purpose have I made thee. Otherwise, Pharaoh could not have been wicked if God had made him such in one as he was. For God beheld all his works and they were very good. Thus the diatribe. It appears, then, that one of the principal causes why the words of Moses and of Paul are not received is their absurdity. But against what article of faith does that absurdity militate, or who is offended at it? It is human reason that is offended, who, being blind, deaf, impious, and sacrilegious in all the words and works of God, is, in the case of this passage, introduced as a judge of the words and works of God. According to the same argument of absurdity, you will deny all the articles of faith, because it is of all things the most absurd and, as Paul saith, foolishness to the Gentiles and a stumbling block to the Jews that God should be a man, the son of a virgin, crucified, and sitting at the right hand of his father. It is, I say, absurd to believe such things. Therefore, let us invent some tropes with the Arians and say that Christ is not truly God. Let us invent some tropes with the Maniches and say that he is not truly man, but a phantom introduced by means of a virgin, or a reflection conveyed by glass which fell and was crucified. And in this way we shall handle the Scriptures to excellent purpose indeed. After all, then, the tropes amount to nothing, nor is the absurdity avoided, for it still remains absurd, according to the judgment of reason, that God, who is just and good, should exact of free will impossibilities, and that when free will cannot will good and of necessity serve sin, that sin should yet be laid to its charge, and that, moreover, when he does not give the Spirit, he should nevertheless act so severely and unmercifully as to harden or permit to become hardened. These things reason will still say are not becoming of God good and merciful. Thus they, too, far exceed her capacity, nor can she so bring herself into subjection as to believe and judge that the God who does such things is good. But, setting aside faith, she wants to feel out and see and comprehend how he can be good and not cruel. But she will comprehend that when this shall be said of God, he hardens no one, he damns no one, but he has mercy upon all, he saves all, and he has so utterly destroyed hell that no future punishment need be dreaded. It is thus that reason blusters and contends in attempting to clear God and to defend him as just and good. But faith and the Spirit judge otherwise, who believe that God would be good even though he should destroy all men. And to what profit is it to weary ourselves with all these reasonings in order that we might throw the fault of hardening upon free will? Let all the free will in the world do all it can with all its powers, and yet it never will give one proof, either that it can avoid being hardened where God gives not his Spirit, or merit mercy where it is left to its own powers. And what does it signify whether it be hardened or deserve being hardened if the hardening be of necessity as long as it remains in that impotency in which, according to the testimony of the diatribe, it cannot will good? Since, therefore, the absurdity is not taken out of the way by these tropes, or if it be taken out of the way, greater absurdities still are introduced into the world in their stead, and all things are ascribed unto free will. Away with such useless and seducing tropes, and let us cleave close to the pure and simple word of God. As to the other point, that those things which God has made are very good, and that God did not say, For this purpose have I made thee, but, For this purpose have I raised thee up. I observe, first of all, that this, Genesis 1, concerning the works of God being very good, was said before the fall of man, but it is recorded directly after in Genesis 3 how man became evil when God departed from him and left him to himself. And from this one man, thus corrupt, all the wicked were born. And Pharaoh also, as Paul saith, We were all, by nature, the children of wrath, even as others, Ephesians 2, 8. Therefore God made Pharaoh wicked, that is, from a wicked and corrupt seed, as he saith in the Proverbs of Solomon, 16.4. God hath made all things for himself, yea, even the wicked for the day of evil, that is, not by creating evil in them, but by forming them out of a corrupt seed and ruling over them. This, therefore, is not a just conclusion. God made man wicked, therefore he is not wicked. For how can he not be wicked from a wicked seed? As Psalm 51, 5 saith, Behold, I was conceived in sin, and Job, 14, 4. Who can make that clean which is conceived from unclean seed? For although God did not make sin, yet he ceases not to form and multiply that nature, which from the spirit being withdrawn is defiled by sin. And as it is when a carpenter makes statues of corrupt wood, so such as the nature is, such are the men made when God creates and forms them out of that nature. Again, if you understand the words they were very good, as referring to the works of God after the fall, you will be pleased to observe that this was said not with reference to us, but with reference to God. For it is not said, Man saw all the things that God had made, and behold, they were very good. Many things seem very good unto God and are very good, which seem unto us very evil, and are considered to be very evil. Thus, afflictions, evils, errors, hell, nay, all the very best works of God are in the sight of the world very evil, and even damnable. What is better than Christ and the gospel, but what is more execrated by the world? And therefore, how those things are good in the sight of God, which are evil in our sight, is known only unto God and unto those who see with the eyes of God, that is, who have the spirit. But there is no need of argumentation so close as this. The preceding answer is sufficient. Section 84 But here, perhaps, it will be asked, How can God be said to work evil in us in the same way as he is said to harden us, to give us up to our own desires, to cause us to err, and so forth? We ought, to be content with the word of God and simply to believe what that sayeth, seeing that the works of God are utterly unspeakable. But, however, in compliance with reason, that is, human foolery, I will just act the fool and the stupid fellow for once, and try, by a little babbling, if I can produce any effect upon her. First, then, both reason and the diatribe grant that God works all in all, and that without him nothing is either done or effective because he is omnipotent and because, all things come under his omnipotence as Paul sayeth to the Ephesians. Now, then, Satan and man being fallen and left of God cannot will good, that is, those things which please God or which God wills, but are ever turned to the way of their own desires so that they cannot but seek their own. This, therefore, their will and nature so turned from God cannot be a nothing, nor are Satan and the wicked man a nothing, nor are the nature and the will which they have a nothing, although it be a nature corrupt and averse. That remnant of nature, therefore, in Satan and the wicked man of which we speak, as being the creature and work of God is not less subject to the divine omnipotence and action than all the rest of the creatures and works of God. Since, therefore, God moves and does all in all, he necessarily moves and does all in Satan and the wicked man. But he so does all in them as they themselves are and as he finds them, that is, as they are themselves averse and evil. Being carried along by that motion of the divine omnipotence, they cannot but do what is averse and evil. Just as it is with a man driving a lame horse on one foot or lame on two feet, he drives him just so as the horse himself is, that is, the horse moves badly. But what can the man do? He is driving along this kind of horse together with sound horses. He, indeed, goes badly and the rest well. But it cannot be otherwise unless the horse be made sound. Here, then, you see, that when God works in and by evil men, the evils themselves are in wrought. But yet, God cannot do evil, although he thus works the evils by evil men. Because, being good himself, he cannot do evil. But he uses evil instruments which cannot escape the sway and motion of his omnipotence. The fault, is in the instruments which God allows not to remain actionless, seeing that the evils are done as God himself moves, just in the same manner as a carpenter would cut badly with a saw-edged or broken-edged axe. Hence it is that the wicked man cannot but always err and sin, because being carried along by the motion of the divine omnipotence, he is not permitted to remain motionless, but must will, desire, and act according to his nature. All this is fixed certainty if we believe that God is omnipotent. It is, moreover, as certain that the wicked man is the creature of God, though, being averse and left to himself without the spirit of God, he cannot will or do good. For the omnipotence of God makes it that the wicked man cannot evade the motion and action of God, but, being of necessity subject to it, he yields, though his corruption and aversion to God makes him that he cannot be carried along and moved unto good. God cannot suspend his omnipotence on account of his aversion, nor can the wicked man change his aversion. Wherefore, it is, that he must continue of necessity to sin and err until he be amended by the spirit of God. Meanwhile, in all these things, Satan goes on to reign in peace and keeps his palace undisturbed under this motion of the divine omnipotence. But now follows the act itself of hardening, which is thus, the wicked man, as we have said, like his prince Satan, is turned totally the way of selfishness and his own. He seeks not God, nor cares for the things of God. He seeks his own riches, his own glory, his own doings, his own wisdom, his own power, and, in a word, his own kingdom, and wills only to enjoy them in peace. And if any one oppose him or wish to diminish any of these things with the same aversion to God under which he seeks these, with the same he is moved, enraged, and roused to indignation against his adversary, and he is as much unable to overcome this rage as he is to overcome his desire of self-seeking, and he can no more avoid this seeking than he can avoid his own existence, and this he cannot do as being the creature of God, though a corrupt one. The same is that fury of the world against the gospel of God, for by the gospel comes that stronger than he, who overcomes the quiet possessor of the palace, and condemns those desires of glory, of riches, of wisdom, of self-righteousness, and of all things in which he trusts. This very irritation of the wicked, when God speaks and acts contrary to what they willed, is their hardening and their galling weight, for as they are in this state of aversion from the very corruption of nature, so they become more and more averse, and worse and worse as this aversion is opposed or turned out of its way. And thus, when God threatened to take away from the wicked Pharaoh his power, he irritated and aggravated him, and hardened his heart the more, the more he came to him with his word by Moses, making known his intention to take away his kingdom and to deliver his own people from his power, because he did not give him his spirit within, but permitted his wicked corruption under the dominion of Satan to grow angry, to swell with pride, to burn with rage, and to go on still in a certain secure contempt. Section 86 Let no one think, therefore, that God, where he is said to harden or to work evil in us, for to harden is to do evil, so does the evil as though he created evil in us anew, in the same way as a malignant liquor seller, being himself bad, would pour poison into or mix it up in a vessel that was not bad, where the vessel itself did nothing but receive or passively accomplish the purpose of the malignity of the poison mixer. For when people hear it said by us that God works in us both good and evil, and that we from mere necessity passively submit to the working of God, they seem to imagine that a man who is good or not evil in himself is passive while God works evil in him, not rightly considering that God is far from being inactive in all his creatures and never suffers any one of them to keep holiday. But whoever wishes to understand these things let him think thus, that God works evil in us, that is, by us, not from the fault of God but from the fault of evil in us, that is, as we are evil by nature, God, who is truly good, carrying us along by his own action according to the nature of his own omnipotence cannot do otherwise than do evil by us as instruments, though he himself be good, though by his wisdom he overrules that evil well to his own glory and to our salvation. Thus God, finding the will of Satan evil, not creating it so, but leaving it while Satan sinningly commits the evil, carries it along by his working and moves it which way he will, though that will ceases not to be evil by this motion of God. In this same way also David spoke concerning Shimei. Let him curse, for God hath bidden him to curse David. 2 Samuel 16.10 How could God bid to curse, an action so evil and virulent? There was nowhere an external force. Thus God with the greatest certainty knew, and with the greatest certainty declared, that Pharaoh would be hardened. Because he with the greatest certainty knew, that the will of Pharaoh could neither resist the motion of his omnipotence, nor put away its own enmity, nor receive its adversary Moses. And that, as that evil will still remained, he must of necessity become worse, more hardened, and more proud, while by his course in impetus, trusting to his own powers, he ran against that which he would not receive, and which he despised. Here, therefore, you see, it is confirmed, even by this very scripture, that free will can do nothing but evil, while God, who is not deceived from ignorance nor lies from iniquity, so surely promises the hardening of Pharaoh. Because he was certain that an evil will could will nothing but evil, and that, as the good which it hated was presented to it, it could not but wax worse and worse. Section 88 It now, then, remains, that perhaps some one may ask, Why, then, does not God cease from that motion of his omnipotence by which the will of the wicked and the wicked motion of his by which by which the wicked and the of the the wicked of most learned men of so many ages? And no wonder, for even the sun itself would not shine, if it should be assailed by such arts as these. But, to say nothing about that which I have already proved from the scriptures, that Pharaoh cannot rightly be said to be hardened, because, being born with and by the long-suffering of God, he was not immediately punished, seeing that he was punished by so many plagues. If hardening be bearing with divine long-suffering and not immediately punishing, what need was there that God should so many times promise that he would harden the heart of Pharaoh when the signs should be wrought, who now, before those signs were wrought and before that hardening, was such that being inflated with his success, prosperity, and wealth, and being born with by the divine long-suffering and not punished, inflicted so many evils on the children of Israel? You see, therefore, that this trope of yours makes not at all to the purpose in this passage, seeing that it applies generally unto all as sinning because they are born with by the divine long-suffering, and thus we shall be compelled to say that all are hardened, seeing that there is no one who does not sin, and that no one sins but he who is born with by the divine long-suffering. Wherefore, this hardening of Pharaoh is another hardening, independent of that general hardening as produced by the long-suffering of the divine goodness. Section 90 The more immediate the more immediate more immediate the the more immediate the more immediate the more immediate the the more the more immediate the more And again, For this purpose have I raised thee up, that I might show in thee my power, that my name might be declared throughout all the earth. Exodus 9.16, Romans 9.17 Here you see that Pharaoh was for this purpose hardened, that he might resist God and put off the redemption, in order that there might be an occasion given for the working of signs, and for the display of the power of God, that he might be declared and believed on throughout all the earth. And what is this but showing that all these things were said and done to confirm faith, and to comfort the weak, that they might afterwards freely believe in God as true, faithful, powerful, and merciful? Just as though he had spoken to them in the kindest manner as to little children, and had said, Be not terrified at the hardness of Pharaoh, for I will work that very hardness myself, and I who deliver you have it in my own hand. I will only use it, that I may thereby work many signs and declare my majesty for the furtherance of your faith. And this is the reason why Moses generally, after each plague, repeats, And the heart of Pharaoh was hardened, so that he would not let the people go, as the Lord had spoken. Exodus 7, 13, 22, 8, 15, 32, 9, 12, and so forth. What is the intent of this, as the Lord had spoken, but that the Lord might appear true who had foretold that he should be hardened? Now, if there had been any vertability or liberty of will in Pharaoh, which could turn either way, God could not with such certainty have foretold his hardening. But as he promised, who could neither be deceived nor lie, it of certainty and of necessity came to pass that he was hardened. Which could not have taken place had not the hardening been totally apart from the power of man, and in the power of God alone, in the same manner as I said before, namely, from God being certain that he should not omit the general operation of his omnipotence in Pharaoh, or on Pharaoh's account, nay, that he could not omit it. Moreover, God was equally certain that the will of Pharaoh being naturally evil and averse could not consent to the word and work of God, which was contrary to it, and that therefore, while the impetus of willing was preserved in Pharaoh by the omnipotence of God, and while the hated word and work was continually set before his eyes without, nothing else could take place in Pharaoh but offense and the hardening of his heart. For if God had then omitted the action of his omnipotence in Pharaoh when he set before him the word of Moses which he hated, and the will of Pharaoh might be supposed to have acted alone by its own power, then, perhaps, there might have been room for a discussion which way it had power to turn. But now, since it was led on and carried away by its own willing, no violence was done to its will, because it was not forced against its will, but was carried along by the natural operation of God to will naturally just as it was by nature, that is, evil, and therefore it could not but run against the word, and thus become hardened. Hence we see that this passage makes most forcibly against free will, and in this way God who promised could not lie, and if he could not lie then Pharaoh could not but be hardened.