Bondage of the Will

Sections 126 through 134 of The Bondage of the Will, by Martin Luther, translated by Henry Cole. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Discussion, second part, concluded. Section 126. The diatribe after this, having said that many such testimonies as Luther collects may be collected out of the Book of Proverbs, but which, by a convenient interpretation, may stand both for and against free will, adduces at last that Achillean and invincible weapon of Luther, Without me ye can do nothing, and so forth. John 15, 5. I, too, must laud that notable champion disputant for free will, who teaches us to modify the testimonies of Scripture just as it serves our turn by convenient interpretations, in order to make them appear to stand truly in confirmation of free will, that is, that they might be made to prove not what they ought, but what we please, and who merely pretends a fear of one Achillean scripture, that the silly reader, seeing this one overthrown, might hold all the rest in utter contempt. But I will just look on and see, by what force the full-mouthed and heroic diatribe will conquer my Achilles, which hitherto has never wounded a common soldier, nor even a Thersites, but has never miserably dispatched itself with its own weapons. Catching hold of this one word, nothing, it stabs it with many words and many examples, and by means of a convenient interpretation brings it to this, that nothing may signify that which is in degree and imperfect, that is, it means to say, in other words, that the sophists have hitherto explained this passage thus, without me you can do nothing, that is, perfectly. This gloss, which has been long worn out and obsolete, the diatribe, by its own power of rhetoric, renders new, and so presses it forward as though it had first invented it, and it had never been heard before, thus making it appear to be a sort of miracle. In the meantime, however, it is quite self-secure, thinking nothing about the text itself, nor what precedes or follows it, whence alone the knowledge of the passage is to be obtained. But to say no more about its having attempted to prove by so many words and examples, that the term nothing may in this passage be understood as meaning that which is in a certain degree, or imperfect, as though we were disputing whether or not it may be, whereas what was to be proved is whether or not it ought to be so understood, the whole of this grand interpretation affects nothing if it affects anything but this, the rendering of this passage of John uncertain and obscure. And no wonder, for all that the diatribe aims at is to make the scriptures of God in every place obscure, to the intent that it might not be compelled to use them, and the authorities of the ancients certain to the intent that it might abuse them, a wonderful kind of religion truly, making the words of God to be useless and the words of man useful. Section 127. But it is most excellent to observe how well this gloss nothing may be understood to signify that which is in degree consists with itself. Yet the diatribe says that in this sense of the passage, it is most true that we can do nothing without Christ, because he is speaking of evangelical fruits which cannot be produced but by those who remain in the vine which is Christ. Here the diatribe itself confesses that fruit cannot be produced but by those who remain in the vine, and it does the same in that convenient interpretation by which it proves that nothing is the same as in degree and imperfect. But perhaps its own adverb cannot, ought also to be conveniently interpreted, so as to signify that evangelical fruits can be produced without Christ in degree and imperfectly, so that we may preach that the ungodly who are without Christ can, while Satan reigns in them and wars against Christ, produce some of the fruits of life. That is, that the enemies of Christ may do something for the glory of Christ. But away with these things. Here, however, I should like to be taught how are we to resist heretics who, using this rule throughout the scriptures, may contend that nothing and not are to be understood as signifying that which is imperfect. Thus, without him nothing can be done, that is, a little. The fool hath said in his heart there is not a God, that is, there is an imperfect God. He hath made us and not we ourselves, that is, we did a little towards making ourselves. And who can number all the passages in the scripture where nothing and not are found? Shall we then here say that a convenient interpretation is to be attended to, and is this clearing up difficulties to open such a door of liberty to corrupt minds and deceiving spirits? Such a license of interpretation is, I grant, convenient to you who care nothing whatsoever about the certainty of the scripture. But as for me, who labor to establish consciences, this is an inconvenience than which nothing can be more inconvenient, nothing more injurious, nothing more pestilential. Hear me, therefore, thou great conqueress of the Lutheran Achilles. Unless you shall prove that nothing, not only may be, but ought to be understood as signifying a little, you have done nothing by all this profusion of words or examples but fight against fire with dry straw. What have I to do with your may be, which only demands of you to prove your ought to be? And if you do not prove that, I stand by the natural and grammatical signification of the term, laughing both at your armies and at your triumphs. Where is now that probable opinion which determined that free will can will nothing good? But perhaps the convenient interpretation comes in here, to say that nothing good signifies something good, a kind of grammar and logic never before heard of, that nothing is the same as something, which with logicians is an impossibility because they are contradictions. Where now then remains that article of our faith, that Satan is the prince of the world, and, according to the testimonies of Christ and Paul, rules in the wills and minds of those men who are his captives and servants? Shall that roaring lion, that implacable and ever restless enemy of the grace of God and the salvation of man, suffer it to be that man, his slave and a part of his kingdom, should attempt good by any motion in any degree, whereby he might escape from his tyranny, and that he should not rather spur and urge him on to will and to do the contrary to grace with all his powers, especially when the just and those who are led by the Spirit of God and who will and do good can hardly resist him, so great is his rage against them? You who make it out that the human will is a something placed in a free medium and left to itself, certainly make it out at the same time that there is an endeavor which can exert itself either way, because you make both God and the devil to be at a distance, spectators only, as it were, of this mutable and free will, though you do not believe that they are impellers and agitators of that bondage will, the most hostily opposed to each other. Admitting therefore this part of your faith only, my sentiment stands firmly established, and free will lies prostrate, as I have shown already. For it must either be, that the kingdom of Satan in man is nothing at all, and thus Christ will be made to lie, or, if his kingdom be such as Christ describes, free will must be nothing but a beast of burden, the captive of Satan, which cannot be liberated unless the devil be first cast out by the finger of God. From what has been advanced, I presume, friend diatribe, thou fully understandest what that is, and what it amounts to, where thy author, detesting the obstinate way of assertion in Luther, is accustomed to say, Luther indeed pushes his cause with plenty of scriptures, but they may all by one word be brought to nothing. Who does not know that all scriptures may by one word be brought to nothing? I knew this full well before I ever heard the name of Erasmus. But the question is, whether it be sufficient to bring a scripture by one word to nothing. The point in dispute is, whether it be rightly brought to nothing, and whether it ought to be brought to nothing. Let a man consider these points, and he will then see whether or not it be easy to bring scriptures to nothing, and whether or not the obstinacy of Luther be detestable. He will then see that not one word only is ineffective, but all the gates of hell cannot bring them to nothing. Section 128. What therefore the diatribe cannot do in its affirmative, it will do in the negative. And though I am not called upon to prove the negative, yet I will do it here, and will make it by the force of argument undeniably appear that nothing in this passage not only may be but ought to be understood as meaning not a certain small degree, but that which the term naturally signifies. And this I will do in addition to that invincible argument by which I am already victorious, namely, that all terms are to be preserved in their natural signification and use unless the contrary shall be proved, which the diatribe neither has done nor can do. First of all, then, I will make that evidently manifest which is plainly proved by scriptures neither ambiguous nor obscure, that Satan is by far the most powerful and crafty prince of this world, as I said before, under the reigning power of whom the human will be no longer free nor in its own power, but the servant of sin and of Satan can will nothing but that which its prince wills, and he will not permit it to will anything good. Though even if Satan did not reign over it, sin itself, of which man is the slave, would sufficiently harden it to prevent it from willing good. Moreover, the following part of the context itself evidently proves the same, which the diatribe proudly sneers at, although I have commented upon it pericopiously in my assertions. For Christ proceeds thus, John 15, 6, Whoso abideth not in me is cast forth as a branch and is withered, and men gather them and cast them into the fire, and they are burned. This, I say, the diatribe, in a most excellent rhetorical way, passed by, hoping that the intent of this evasion would not be comprehended by the shallow-brained Lutherans. But here you see that Christ, who is the interpreter of his own similitude of the vine and the branch, plainly declares what he would have understood by the term nothing, that man who is without Christ is cast forth and is withered. And what can the being cast forth and withered signify, but the being delivered up to the devil, and becoming continually worse and worse? And surely becoming worse and worse is not doing or attempting anything good. The withering branch is more and more prepared for the fire the more it withers. And had not Christ himself thus amplified and applied this similitude, no one would have dared so to amplify and apply it. It stands manifest, therefore, that nothing ought in this place to be understood in its proper signification, according to the nature of the term. Section 129. Let us now consider the examples also by which it proves that nothing signifies in some places a certain small degree, in order that we may make it evident that the diatribe is nothing, and affects nothing in this part of it, in which, though it should do much, yet it would affect nothing. Such a nothing is the diatribe in all things and in every way. It says, Generally, he is said to do nothing who does not achieve that at which he aims, and yet, for the most part, he who attempts it makes some certain degree of progress in the attempt. I answer, I never heard this general usage of the term. You have invented it by your own license. The words are to be considered according to the subject matter, as they say, and according to the intention of the speaker. No one calls that nothing, which he does in attempting, nor does he then speak of the attempt, but of the effect. It is to this the person refers when he says he does nothing or he affects nothing, that is, achieves and accomplishes nothing. But, supposing your example to stand good, which, however, it does not, it makes more for me than for yourself, for this is what I maintain, and would invincibly establish, that free will does many things, which nevertheless are nothing before God. What does it profit, therefore, to attempt, if it affect nothing at which it aims? So that, let the diatribe turn which way it will, it only runs against and confutes itself, which generally happens to those who undertake to support a bad cause. With the same unhappy effect does it adduce that example out of Paul, neither is he that planteth anything, neither he that watereth, but God who giveth the increase, 1 Corinthians 3.7. That, says the diatribe, which is of the least moment and useless of itself, he calls nothing. Who? Do you pretend to say that the ministry of the Word is of itself useless, and of the least moment, when Paul everywhere, and especially in 2 Corinthians 3.6-9, highly exalts it, and calls it the ministration of life and of glory? Here, again, you neither consider the subject matter nor the intention of the speaker. As to the gift of the increase, the planter and the waterer are certainly nothing, but as to the planting and sowing they are not nothing, seeing that to teach and to exhort are the greatest work of the Spirit in the Church of God. This is the intended meaning of Paul, and this his words convey with satisfactory plainness. But be it so that this ridiculous example stands good, again it stands in favour of me, for what I maintain is this, that free will is nothing, that is, is useless of itself as you expound it before God, and it is concerning its being nothing as to what it can do of itself that we are now speaking. For as to what it essentially is in itself, we know that an impious will must be a something, and cannot be a mere nothing. There is also that of 1 Corinthians 13.2, If I have not charity I am nothing. Why the diatribe adduces this as an example I cannot see, unless it seeks only numbers and forces, or thinks that we have no arms at all by which we can effectually wound it. For he who is without charity is truly and properly nothing before God. The same also we say of free will. Wherefore this example also stands for us against the diatribe. Or can it be that the diatribe does not yet know the argument ground upon which I am contending? I am not speaking about the essence of nature, but the essence of grace as they term it. I know that free will can by nature do something, it can eat, drink, beget, rule, and so forth. Nor need the diatribe laugh at me as having prating frenzy enough to imply, when I press home so closely the term nothing, that free will cannot even sin without Christ, whereas Luther nevertheless says that free will can do nothing but sin. But so it pleases the wise diatribe to play the fool in a matter so serious. For I say that man without the grace of God remains nevertheless under the general omnipotence of the acting God, who moves and carries along all things of necessity in the course of his infallible motion. But that the man's being thus carried along is nothing, that is, avails nothing in the sight of God, nor is considered anything else but sin. Thus in grace he that is without love is nothing. Why then does the diatribe, when it confesses itself that we are here speaking of evangelical fruits, as that which cannot be produced without Christ, turn aside immediately from the subject point, harp upon another string, and cavil about nothing but natural works and human fruits? Except it be to evince that he who is devoid of the truth is never consistent with himself. So also that of John 3.27, a man can receive nothing except it were given him from above. John is here speaking of man who is now a something, and denies that this man can receive anything, that is, the spirit with his gifts. For it is in reference to that he is speaking, not in reference to nature. For he did not want the diatribe as an instructor to teach him that man has already eyes, nose, ears, mouth, hands, mind, will, reason, and all things that belong to man. Unless the diatribe believes that the Baptist, when he made mention of man, was thinking of the chaos of Plato, the vacuum of Lucipus, or the infinity of Aristotle, or some other nothing which by a gift from heaven should at least be made a something, is this producing examples out of the scripture, thus to trifle designedly in a matter so important? And to what purpose is all that profusion of words where it teaches us that fire, the escape from evil, the endeavor after good, and other things are from heaven, as though there were any one who did not know or who denied those things? We are now talking about grace, and, as the diatribe itself said, concerning Christ and evangelical fruits, whereas it is itself making out its time in fabling about nature, thus dragging out the cause and covering the witless reader with a cloud. In the meantime, it does not produce one single example as it professed to do wherein nothing is to be understood as signifying some small degree. Nay, it openly exposes itself as neither understanding nor caring what Christ or grace is, nor how it is that grace is one thing and nature another, when even the sophists of the meanest rank know and have continually taught this difference in their schools in the most common way. Nor does it all the while see that every one of its examples make for me and against itself, for the word of the Baptist goes to establish this, that man can receive nothing unless it be given him from above, and that therefore free will is nothing at all. Thus it is, then, that my Achilles is conquered, the diatribe puts weapons into his hand by which it is itself dispatched, naked and weaponless, and thus it is also that the scriptures by which that obstinate asserter Luther urges his cause are by one word brought to nothing. Section 131. After this it enumerates a multitude of similitudes by which it affects nothing but the drawing aside the witless reader to irrelevant things, according to its custom, and at the same time leaves the subject point entirely out of the question. Thus God indeed preserves the ship, but the mariner conducts it into harbour, wherefore the mariner does not do nothing. This similitude makes a difference of work, that is, it attributed that of preserving to God and that of conducting to the mariner, and thus if it prove anything it proves this, that the whole work of preserving is of God, and the whole work of conducting of the mariner, and yet it is a beautiful and apt similitude. Thus again the husbandman gathers in the increase, but it was God that gave it. Here again it attributes different operations to God and to man, unless it mean to make the husbandman the creator also who gave the increase. But even supposing the same works be attributed to God and to man, what do these similitudes prove? Nothing more than that the creature co-operates with the operating God. But are we now disputing about co-operation, and not rather concerning the power and operation of free will as of itself? Whither, therefore, has the renowned rhetorician betaken himself? He set out with a professed design to dispute concerning a palm, whereas all his discourses have been about a gourd. A noble vase was designed by the potter. Why then is a pitcher produced at last? I also know very well that Paul co-operates with God in teaching the Corinthians while he preaches without and God teaches within, and that where their works are different, and that in like manner he co-operates with God while he speaks by the Spirit of God, and that where the work is the same. For what I assert and contend for is this, that God, where he operates without the grace of his Spirit, works all in all, even in the ungodly, while he alone moves, acts on, and carries along by the motion of his omnipotence all those things which he alone has created, which motion those things can neither avoid nor change, but of necessity follow and obey, each one according to the measure of power given of God. Thus all things, even the ungodly, co-operate with God. On the other hand, when he acts by the Spirit of his grace on those whom he has justified, that is, in his own kingdom, he moves and carries them along in the same manner, and they, as they are the new creatures, follow and co-operate with him, or rather, as Paul saith, are led by him, Romans 8, 14, and 30. But the present is not the place for discussing these points. We are not now considering what we can do in co-operation with God, but what we can do of ourselves, that is, whether created as we are out of nothing, we can do or attempt anything of ourselves under the general motion of God's omnipotence, whereby to prepare ourselves unto the new creation of the Spirit. This is the point to which Erasmus ought to have answered, and not to have turned aside to something else. What I have to say upon this point is this. As man, before he is created man, does nothing and endeavours nothing toward his being made a creature, and as, after he is made and created, he does nothing and endeavours nothing toward his preservation, or towards his continuing in his creature existence. But each takes place alone by the will of the omnipotent power and goodness of God, creating us and preserving us without ourselves. But as God nevertheless does not work in us without us, seeing we are for that purpose created and preserved, that he might work in us, and that we might co-operate with him, whether it be out of his kingdom under his general omnipotence, or in his kingdom under the peculiar power of his Spirit. So man, before he is regenerated into the new creation of the kingdom of the Spirit, does nothing and endeavours nothing toward his new creation into that kingdom, and after he is recreated, does nothing and endeavours nothing toward his perseverance in that kingdom. But the Spirit alone affects both in us, regenerating us and preserving us when regenerated without ourselves. As James saith, of his own will beget he us by the word of his power, that we should be a kind of firstfruits of his creatures. James 1.18, where he speaks of the renewed creation. Nevertheless he does not work in us without us, seeing that he has for this purpose created and preserved us, that he might operate in us, and that we might co-operate with him. Thus by us he preaches, shows mercy to the poor, and comforts the afflicted. But what is hereby attributed to free will? Nay, what is there left of it but nothing at all? And in truth it is nothing at all. Section 132. Read therefore the diatribe in this part through five or six times, and you will find that by similitudes of this kind, and by some of the most beautiful passages and parables selected from the Gospel and from Paul, it does nothing else but show us that innumerable passages, as it observes, are to be found in the Scriptures which speak of the co-operation and assistance of God, from which, if I should draw this conclusion, man can do nothing without the assisting grace of God, therefore no works of man are good, it would on the contrary conclude, as it has done by a rhetorical inversion, nay, there is nothing that man cannot do by the assisting grace of God, therefore all the works of man can be good. For as many passages as there are in the Holy Scriptures which make mention of assistance, so many are there which confirm free will, and they are innumerable. Therefore, if we go by the number of testimonies, the victory is mine. Do you think the diatribe could be sober, or in its right senses, when it wrote this? For I cannot attribute it to malice or iniquity, unless it be that it designed to effectually wear me out by perpetually wearying me, while thus ever like itself it is continually turning aside to something contrary to its professed design. But if it is pleased thus to play the fool in a matter so important, then I will be pleased to expose its voluntary fooleries publicly. In the first place, I do not dispute, nor am I ignorant, that all the works of man may be good, if they be done by the assisting grace of God, and, moreover, that there is nothing which a man might not do by the assisting grace of God. But I cannot feel enough surprise at your negligence, who, having set out with the professed design to write upon the power of free will, go on writing about the power of grace, and, moreover, dare to assert publicly, as if all men were posts or stones, that free will is established by those passages of Scripture which exalt the grace of God. And not only dare to do that, but even to sound forth encomiums on yourself as a victor most gloriously triumphant. From this very word and act of yours I truly perceive what free will is, and what the effect of it is. It makes men mad. For what, I ask, can it be in you that talks at this rate but free will? But just listen to your own conclusions. The Scripture commends the grace of God, therefore it proves free will. It exalts the assistance of the grace of God, therefore it establishes free will. By what kind of logic did you learn such conclusions as these? On the contrary, why not conclude thus? Grace is preached, therefore free will has no existence. The assistance of grace is exalted, therefore free will is abolished. For to what extent is grace given? Is it for this that free will as being of sufficient power itself might proudly display and sport grace on fair days as a superfluous ornament? Wherefore I will invert your order of reasoning, and though no rhetorician will establish a conclusion more firm than yours. As many places as there are in the Holy Scriptures which make mention of assistance, so many are there which abolish free will, and they are innumerable. Therefore if we are to go by the number of testimonies, the victory is mine. For grace is therefore needed, and the assistance of grace is therefore given, because free will can of itself do nothing, as Erasmus himself has asserted according to that probable opinion, that free will cannot will anything good. Therefore when grace is commended, and the assurance of grace declared, the impotency of free will is declared at the same time. This is a sound inference, a firm conclusion, against which not even the gates of hell will ever prevail. Section 133. Here I bring to a conclusion the defense of my scriptures which the diatribe attempted to refute, lest my book should be swelled to too great a bulk, and if there be anything yet remaining that is worthy of notice, it shall be taken into the following part, wherein I make my assertions. For as to what Erasmus says in his conclusion, that if my sentiments stand good, the numberless precepts, the numberless threatenings, the numberless promises are all in vain, and no place is left for merit or demerit, for rewards or punishments, that moreover it is difficult to defend the mercy, nay even the justice of God, if God damn sinners of necessity, and that many other difficulties follow, which have so troubled some of the greatest men, as even to utterly overthrow them. To all these things I have fully replied already, nor will I receive or bear with that moderate medium which Erasmus would, with a good intention I believe, recommend to me, that we should grant some certain little to free will, in order that the contradictions of the scripture and the difficulties before mentioned might be the more easily remedied. For by this moderate medium the matter is not bettered, nor is any advantage gained whatever, because unless you ascribe the whole and all things to free will, as the Pelagians do, the contradictions in the scriptures are not altered, merit and reward are taken entirely away, the mercy and justice of God are abolished, and all the difficulties which we try to avoid by allowing this certain little ineffective power to free will, remains just as they were before, as I have already fully shown. Therefore we must come to the plain extreme, deny free will altogether, and ascribe all unto God. Thus there will be in the scriptures no contradictions, and if there be any difficulties they will be borne with, where they cannot be remedied. Section 134. This one thing, however, my friend Erasmus, I entreat of you. Do not consider that I conduct this cause more according to my temper than according to my principles. I will not suffer it to be insinuated that I am hypocrite enough to write one thing and believe another. I have not, as you say of me, been carried so far by the heat of defensive argument as to deny here free will altogether for the first time, having conceded something to it before. Confident I am that you can find no such concession anywhere in my works. There are questions and discussions of mine extent in which I have continued to assert down to this hour that there is no such thing as free will, that it is a thing formed out of an empty term, which are the words I have there used. And I then thus believed and thus wrote as overpowered by the force of truth when called and compelled to the discussion. And as to my always conducting discussions with ardor, I acknowledge my fault, if it be my fault. Nay, I greatly glory in this testimony which the world bears of me in the cause of God. And may God himself confirm the same testimony in the last day. Then, who more happy than Luther to be honored with the universal testimony of his age that he did not maintain the cause of truth lazily nor deceitfully, but with a real, if not too great, ardor. Then shall I be blessedly clear from that word of Jeremiah, Cursed be he that doeth the work of the Lord deceitfully. Jeremiah 48.10. But if I seem to be somewhat more severe than usual upon your diatribe, pardon me. I do it not from a malignant heart, but from concern, because I know that by the weight of your name you greatly endanger this cause of Christ, though by your learning, as to real effect, you can do nothing at all. And who can always so temper his pen as never to grow warm? For even you, who from a show of moderation grow almost cold in this book of yours, not unfrequently hurl a fiery and gall-dipped dart. So much so that if the reader were not very liberal in kind, he could not but consider you virulent. But, however, this is nothing to the subject point. We must mutually pardon each other in these things, for we are but men, and there is nothing in us that is not touched with human infirmity. End of section 134